[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 213 (Thursday, November 3, 2011)][Rules and Regulations][Pages 68084-68097]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-28274]
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
29 CFR Part 1980
[Docket Number: OSHA-2011-0126]
RIN 1218-AC53
Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints Under
Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as Amended
AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Labor.
ACTION: Interim Final Rule; request for comments.
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SUMMARY: The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is
amending the regulations governing employee protection ("retaliation"
or "whistleblower") claims under section 806 of the Corporate and
Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley" or "Act"), which was amended by
sections 922 and 929A of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010, enacted on July 21, 2010. Public Law 111-203.
These revisions to the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower regulations clarify
and improve the procedures for handling Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower
complaints and implement statutory changes enacted into law as part of
the 2010 statutory amendments. These changes to the Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower regulations also make the procedures for handling
retaliation complaints under Sarbanes-Oxley more consistent with OSHA's
procedures for handling complaints under the employee protection
provisions of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, 29 CFR
part 1978; the National Transit Systems Security Act and the Federal
Railroad Safety Act, 29 CFR part 1982; the Consumer Product Safety
Improvement Act of 2008, 29 CFR part 1983; and the Employee Protection
Provisions of Six Environmental Statutes and Section 211 of the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, 29 CFR part 24.
DATES: This interim final rule is effective on November 3, 2011.
Comments and additional materials must be submitted (post-marked, sent
or received) by January 3, 2012.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments and attachments electronically at
http://www.regulations.gov, which is the Federal eRulemaking Portal.
Follow the instructions online for making electronic submissions.
Fax: If your submissions, including attachments, do not exceed 10
pages, you may fax them to the OSHA Docket Office at (202) 693-1648.
Mail, hand delivery, express mail, messenger or courier service:
You must submit your comments and attachments to the OSHA Docket
Office, Docket No. OSHA-2011-0126, U.S. Department of Labor, Room N-
2625, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210. Deliveries
(hand, express mail, messenger and courier service) are accepted during
the Department of Labor's and Docket Office's normal business hours,
8:15 a.m.-4:45 p.m., e.t.
Instructions: All submissions must include the Agency name and the
OSHA docket number for this rulemaking (Docket No. OSHA-2011-0126).
Submissions, including any personal information you provide, are placed
in the public docket without change and may be made available online at
http://www.regulations.gov. Therefore, OSHA cautions you about
submitting personal information such as social security numbers and
birth dates.
Docket: To read or download submissions or other material in the
docket, go to http://www.regulations.gov or the OSHA Docket Office at the address
above. All documents in the docket are listed in the http://www.regulations.gov
index, however, some information (e.g., copyrighted material) is not
publicly available to read or download through the Web site. All submissions,
including copyrighted material, are available for inspection and copying
at the OSHA Docket Office.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sandra Dillon, Acting Director, Office
of the Whistleblower Protection Program, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Room N-3610, 200 Constitution
Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210; telephone (202) 693-2199. This is not
a toll-free number. This Federal Register publication is available in
alternative formats. The alternative formats are large print,
electronic file on computer disk (Word Perfect, ASCII, Mates with
Duxbury Braille System) and audiotape.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010, Public Law 111-203, (Dodd-Frank) amended the Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower provision, 18 U.S.C. 1514A. The regulatory revisions
described herein reflect these statutory amendments and also seek to
clarify and improve OSHA's procedures for handling Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower claims. To the extent possible within the bounds of
applicable statutory language, these revised regulations are designed
to be consistent with the procedures applied to claims under other
whistleblower statutes administered by OSHA, including the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA), 29 CFR part 1978; the
National Transit Systems Security Act (NTSSA) and the Federal Railroad
Safety Act (FRSA), 29 CFR part 1982; the Consumer Product Safety
Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA), 29 CFR part 1983; and the Employee
Protection Provisions of Six Environmental Statutes and Section 211 of
the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, 29 CFR part 24.
Responsibility for receiving and investigating complaints under
Sarbanes-Oxley has been delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Labor
for Occupational Safety and Health (Secretary of Labor's Order No. 4-
2010 (Sept. 2, 2010), 75 FR 55355 (Sept. 10, 2010)). Hearings on
determinations by the Assistant Secretary are conducted by the Office of
Administrative Law Judges, and appeals from decisions by administrative
law judges (ALJs) are decided by the Administrative Review Board (ARB)
(Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-2010 (Jan. 15, 2010), 75 FR 3924
(Jan. 25, 2010)).
II. Summary of Statutory Changes to the Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower
Provision
Dodd-Frank, enacted on July 21, 2010, amended the Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower provision to make several substantive changes. First,
section 922(b) of Dodd-Frank added protection for employees from
retaliation by nationally recognized statistical rating organizations
(as defined in section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. 78c)) or their officers, employees, contractors, subcontractors,
and agents.\1\ Second, section 922(c) of Dodd-Frank extended the
statutory filing period for retaliation complaints under Sarbanes-Oxley
from 90 to 180 days after the date on which the violation occurs or
after the date on which the employee became aware of the violation.
Section 922(c) of Dodd-Frank also provided parties with a right to a
jury trial in district court actions brought under Sarbanes-Oxley's
"kickout" provision, 18 U.S.C. 1514A(b)(1)(B), which provides that,
if the Secretary has not issued a final decision within 180 days of the
filing of the complaint and there is no showing that there has been
delay due to the bad faith of the complainant, the complainant may
bring an action at law or equity for de novo review in the appropriate
district court of the United States, which will have jurisdiction over
such action without regard to the amount in controversy. Third, section
922(c) amended Sarbanes-Oxley to state that the rights and remedies
provided for in 18 U.S.C. 1514A may not be waived by any agreement,
policy form, or condition of employment, including by a predispute
arbitration agreement, and to provide that no predispute arbitration
agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement requires
arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.
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\1\ Section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines
nationally recognized statistical rating organization as a credit
rating agency that--
(1) issues credit ratings certified by qualified institutional
buyers, in accordance with 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(a)(1)(B)(ix), with
respect to--
(i) financial institutions, brokers, or dealers;
(ii) insurance companies;
(iii) corporate issuers;
(iv) issuers of asset-backed securities (as that term is defined
in section 1101(c) of part 229 of title 17, Code of Federal
Regulations, as in effect on September 29, 2006);
(v) issuers of government securities, municipal securities, or
securities issued by a foreign government; or
(vi) a combination of one or more categories of obligors
described in any of clauses (i) through (v); and
(2) is registered under 15 U.S.C. 78o-7.
15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(62).
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In addition, section 929A of Dodd-Frank clarified that companies
covered by the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provision include any
company with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l), or that is required to
file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. 78o(d)) including any subsidiary or affiliate whose
financial information is included in the consolidated financial
statements of such company. As explained in Johnson v. Siemens
Technologies, Inc., ARB No. 08-032, 2011 WL 1247202, at *11 (Mar. 31,
2011), section 929A merely clarified that subsidiaries and affiliates
are covered under the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provision. Section
929A applies to all cases currently pending before the Secretary.
Dodd-Frank left the remaining requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower provision unchanged. Sarbanes-Oxley continues to provide
that proceedings under the Act will be governed by the rules and
procedures and burdens of proof of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation
Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century ("AIR21"), 49 U.S.C.
42121(b). Sarbanes-Oxley continues to authorize an award to a
prevailing employee of make-whole relief, including reinstatement with
the same seniority status that the employee would have had but for the
retaliation, back pay with interest, and compensation for any special
damages sustained, including litigation costs, expert witness fees and
reasonable attorney's fees. See 18 U.S.C. 1514A(c)(2).
III. Summary and Discussion of Regulatory Provisions
The regulatory provisions in this part are being revised to reflect
the 2010 Dodd-Frank statutory amendments, to improve the procedures for
handling Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases, and to make the Sarbanes-
Oxley whistleblower regulations more consistent with the regulations
that OSHA has promulgated for the administration of other whistleblower
programs to the extent possible within the bounds of the applicable
statutory language.
These regulatory revisions make several non-substantive changes in
terminology. First, cases under the whistleblower provision of
Sarbanes-Oxley will now be referred to as actions alleging
"retaliation" rather than "discrimination." This change is not
intended to have substantive effect. It simply reflects the fact that
claims brought under the whistleblower provisions are prototypical
retaliation claims. A retaliation claim is a specific type of
discrimination claim that focuses on the actions taken as a result of
an employee's protected activity rather than as a result of an
employee's characteristics (e.g., race, gender, or religion).
Second, these rules previously referred to persons named in
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower complaints as "named persons," but in
the revised regulations they will be referred to as "respondents."
Third, rather than referring to an employer's "unfavorable personnel
action," these revisions use the term "adverse action." Again, these
changes are not intended to have any substantive impact on the handling
of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases. The revisions simply reflect a
preference for more conventional terminology. These updated terms are
already used in OSHA's procedural rules for handling whistleblower
complaints under several other statutes, including STAA, 29 CFR part
1978; NTSSA and FRSA, 29 CFR part 1982; CPSIA, 29 CFR part 1983; and
the Employee Protection Provisions of Six Environmental Statutes and
Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, 29
CFR part 24. The minor changes here create consistency with these other
programs and reduce possible confusion.
Subpart A--Complaints, Investigations, Findings and Preliminary Orders
Section 1980.100 Purpose and Scope
This section describes the purpose of the regulations implementing
Sarbanes-Oxley and provides an overview of the procedures covered by
these regulations. This section has been revised to reflect the 2010
statutory amendments to Sarbanes-Oxley.
Section 1980.101 Definitions
This section includes general definitions applicable to Sarbanes-
Oxley's whistleblower provision. The definition of the term "Act" has
been revised to incorporate the 2010 Dodd-Frank statutory amendments
within that definition. Also, consistent with the recently promulgated
interim final rules under STAA, 29 CFR part 1978; NTSSA and FRSA, 29
CFR part 1982; and CPSIA, 29 CFR part 1983, a new definition of
"business days" is being added at paragraph 1980.101(c) of these rules
to clarify that the term means days other than Saturdays, Sundays and
Federal holidays.
The 2010 statutory amendments to Sarbanes-Oxley define "nationally
recognized statistical rating organization" by reference to the
definition in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified at 15
U.S.C. 78c(a)(62), and that definition has been included here.
Similarly, the definition of "company" has been revised to reflect
that "company" under the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provision
includes any subsidiary or affiliate whose financial information is
included in the consolidated financial statements of a company. Thus
under these regulations "company" means any company with a class of
securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l) or any company required to file reports under
section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d))
including any subsidiary or affiliate whose financial information is
included in the consolidated financial statements of such company.
These regulatory revisions also replace the term "company
representative" with the term "covered person," which is defined in
subparagraph 1980.101(f) as "any company, including any subsidiary or
affiliate whose financial information is included in the consolidated
financial statements of such company, or any nationally recognized
statistical rating organization, or any officer, employee, contractor,
subcontractor, or agent of such company or nationally recognized
statistical rating organization." In addition, as noted above, these
rules have replaced the definition of "named person" with a
definition for "respondent" at paragraph 1980.101(k), and define the
term "respondent" as "the person named in the complaint who is
alleged to have violated the Act." The term "employee" in
1980.101(g) has also been revised consistent with these changes, and
the term "person" in 1980.101(j) has been revised to explicitly
include "companies" in the definition of "person." The order of the
terms in this section has been changed as necessary to permit the
inclusion and substitution of the terms described above. These changes
in terminology were needed to reflect the addition of nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations and their officers,
employees, contractors, subcontractors, and agents to the list of
potential respondents in whistleblower cases under Sarbanes-Oxley.
These changes in terminology also continue to reflect that Sarbanes-
Oxley's statutory provisions identify individuals, as well as the
employer, as potentially liable for retaliation. OSHA continues to
anticipate, however, that in most cases the covered person and the
respondent likely will be the complainant's employer. The definitions
in this section also continue to reflect OSHA's longstanding position
that the statute protects both employees of publicly traded companies
and employees of contractors, subcontractors, and agents of publicly
traded companies. See Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination
Complaints under Section 806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud
Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Final Rule, 69 FR 52104, 52106 (Aug. 24, 2004); Brief for the
Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellees,
Lawson v. FMR, LLC, No. 10-2240 (1st Cir. 2011).
Section 1980.102 Obligations and Prohibited Acts
This section describes the activities that are protected under
Sarbanes-Oxley and the conduct that is prohibited in response to any
protected activities. The term "covered person" has been substituted
for "company or company representative" throughout this section, and
other minor changes have been made to make this section consistent with
OSHA's procedural rules implementing other whistleblower provisions. It
should be noted that it is the Department's longstanding position that
complaints to an individual member of Congress under this section are
protected. The individual member need not be conducting an
investigation or on a Committee conducting an investigation. The
critical focus is on whether the employee reported conduct that he or
she reasonably believed constituted a violation of one of the
enumerated laws or regulations.
Section 1980.103 Filing of Retaliation Complaints
This section explains the requirement for filing a retaliation
complaint under Sarbanes-Oxley. The terminology used in this section
has been revised to reflect the updated terminology described above.
The 2010 statutory amendments changed the statute of limitations for
complaints under the Act from 90 to 180 days. Now, to be timely, a
complaint must be filed within 180 days of when the alleged violation
occurs, or after the date on which the employee became aware of the
violation. This section of the regulations has been updated to reflect
that statutory change. Under Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S.
250, 258 (1980), the time of the alleged violation is considered to be
when the retaliatory decision has been both made and communicated to
the complainant.
Additionally, section 1980.103(b) has been amended to change the
requirement that whistleblower complaints to OSHA under Sarbanes-Oxley
"must be in writing and should include a full statement of the acts
and omissions, with pertinent dates, which are believed to constitute
the violations." Consistent with OSHA's procedural rules under other
whistleblower statutes, complaints filed under Sarbanes-Oxley need not
be in any particular form. They may be either oral or in writing. When
a complaint is made orally, OSHA will reduce the complaint to writing.
If a complainant is not able to file the complaint in English, the
complaint may be filed in any language. With the consent of the
employee, complaints may be filed by any person on the employee's
behalf.
These changes are consistent with decisions of the ARB, which have
permitted oral complaints under the environmental statutes. See, e.g.,
Roberts v. Rivas Environmental Consultants, Inc., 1996-CER-1, 1997 WL
578330, at *3 n.6 (ARB Sept. 17, 1997) (complainant's oral statement to
an OSHA investigator, and the subsequent preparation of an internal
memorandum by that investigator summarizing the oral complaint,
satisfies the "in writing" requirement of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9610(b),
and the Department's accompanying regulations in 29 CFR part 24);
Dartey v. Zack Co. of Chicago, No. 1982-ERA-2, 1983 WL 189787, at *3
n.1 (Sec'y of Labor Apr. 25, 1983) (adopting administrative law judge's
findings that complainant's filing of a complaint to the wrong DOL
office did not render the filing invalid and that the agency's
memorandum of the complaint satisfied the "in writing" requirement of
the Energy Reorganization Act ("ERA") and the Department's
accompanying regulations in 29 CFR part 24). Moreover, these changes
are consistent with OSHA's longstanding practice of accepting oral
complaints filed under Section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. 660(c); Section 211 of the Asbestos
Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. 2651; Section 7 of the
International Safe Container Act of 1977, 46 U.S.C. 80507; and STAA, 49
U.S.C. 31105. This change also accords with the Supreme Court's
decision in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., in which
the Court held that the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, which prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise
discriminating against an employee because such employee has "filed any
complaint," protects employees' oral complaints of violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. 563 U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 1325 (2011).
OSHA believes that the changes in this section complement the ARB's
decision in Sylvester v. Parexel International, LLC. Noting that OSHA
does not require complaints under Sarbanes-Oxley to be in any form and
that under 29 CFR 1980.104(b) OSHA has a duty, if appropriate, to
interview the complainant to supplement the complaint, the ARB held
that the Federal court pleading standards established in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
----, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) do not apply to Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower complaints filed with OSHA. Sylvester v. Parexel Int'l,
Inc., ARB Case No. 07-123, 2011 WL 2165854, at *9-10 (ARB May 26,
2011).
Section 1980.104 Investigation
This section describes the procedures that apply to the
investigation of Sarbanes-Oxley complaints. The terminology used in
this section has been updated and the content of each paragraph has
been reorganized to be consistent with OSHA's investigation procedures
under other whistleblower statutes, to the extent such parallel
procedures are consistent with the Act.
Paragraph (a) of this section outlines the procedures for notifying
the parties and the Securities and Exchange Commission of the complaint
and notifying respondents of their rights under these regulations.
Paragraph (a) also provides that the respondent will receive a copy of
the complaint, redacted if necessary in accordance with the Privacy Act
of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and other applicable confidentiality laws.
Former paragraphs (b) through (d) described the statutory burdens of
proof applicable to Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower complaints. The
discussion of these burdens has been consolidated without substantive
change in a single paragraph 1980.104(e), consistent with the approach
taken in OSHA's procedural rules under other whistleblower statutes.
Paragraph (b) now describes the procedures for the respondent to submit
its response to the complaint, which were formerly contained in
1980.104(c). Paragraph (c) now addresses disclosure to the complainant
of respondent's submissions to the agency that are responsive to the
complaint. The revised paragraph (c) newly specifies that throughout
the investigation the agency will provide to the complainant (or the
complainant's legal counsel if the complainant is represented by
counsel) a copy of all of respondent's submissions to the agency that
are responsive to the complainant's whistleblower complaint, and the
complainant will have an opportunity to respond to those submissions.
Before providing such materials to the complainant, the agency will
redact them in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a,
and other applicable confidentiality laws. The agency expects that
sharing information with complainants in accordance with this new
provision will enhance OSHA's ability to conduct full and fair
investigations and permit the Assistant Secretary to more thoroughly
assess defenses raised by respondents. Paragraph (d) of this section
discusses confidentiality of information provided during
investigations. Paragraph (f), formerly 1980.104(e), describes the
procedures the Assistant Secretary will follow prior to the issuance of
findings and a preliminary order when the Assistant Secretary has
reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred. This
paragraph has been amended to provide that the complainant will be sent
a copy of the materials that OSHA must send to the respondent before
OSHA issues a preliminary order of reinstatement should the agency have
reasonable cause to believe that such an order is appropriate. Before
providing such materials to the complainant, the agency will redact
them, if necessary, in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5
U.S.C. 552a, and other applicable confidentiality laws.
As noted above, former paragraphs (b) through (d), which describe
the statutory burdens of proof applicable to Sarbanes-Oxley complaints,
have been consolidated in paragraph (e). The Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower provision mandates that an action under the Act is
governed by the burdens of proof set forth in AIR21, 49 U.S.C.
42121(b). The statute requires that a complainant make an initial prima
facie showing that protected activity was "a contributing factor" in
the adverse action alleged in the complaint, i.e., that the protected
activity, alone or in combination with other factors, affected in some
way the outcome of the employer's decision. The complainant will be
considered to have met the required burden if the complaint on its
face, supplemented as appropriate through interviews of the
complainant, alleges the existence of facts and either direct or
circumstantial evidence to meet the required showing. Complainant's
burden may be satisfied, for example, if he or she shows that the
adverse action took place shortly after protected activity, giving rise
to the inference that it was a contributing factor in the adverse
action.
If the complainant does not make the prima facie showing, the
investigation must be discontinued and the complaint dismissed. See
Trimmer v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 174 F.3d 1098, 1101 (10th Cir. 1999)
(noting that the burden-shifting framework of the ERA, which is the
same as that under Sarbanes-Oxley, serves a "gatekeeping function"
that "stem[s] frivolous complaints"). Even in cases where the
complainant successfully makes a prima facie showing, the investigation
must be discontinued if the employer "demonstrates, by clear and
convincing evidence," that it would have taken the same adverse action
in the absence of the protected activity. 49 U.S.C. 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii).
Thus, OSHA must dismiss a complaint under Sarbanes-Oxley and not
investigate (or cease investigating) if either: (1) The complainant
fails to meet the prima facie showing that protected activity was a
contributing factor in the adverse action; or (2) the employer rebuts
that showing by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken
the same adverse action absent the protected activity.
Assuming that an investigation proceeds beyond the gatekeeping
phase, the statutory burdens of proof require an employee to prove that
the alleged protected activity was a "contributing factor" to the
alleged adverse action. If the employee proves that the alleged
protected activity was a contributing factor to the adverse action, the
employer, to escape liability, must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that it would have taken the same action in the absence of
the protected activity. A contributing factor is "any factor which,
alone or in connection with other factors, tends to affect in any way
the outcome of the decision." Marano v. Dep't of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137,
1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C.
1221(e)(1)). In proving that protected activity was a contributing
factor in the adverse action, "a complainant need not necessarily
prove that the respondent's articulated reason was a pretext in order
to prevail," because a complainant alternatively can prevail by
showing that the respondent's "reason, while true, is only one of the
reasons for its conduct," and that another reason was the
complainant's protected activity. See Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs.
Holdings, Inc., ARB No. 04-149, 2006 WL 3246904, at *13 (ARB May 31,
2006) (citing Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th
Cir. 2004)) (discussing contributing factor test under the Sarbanes-
Oxley whistleblower provision), aff'd sub nom. Klopfenstein v. Admin.
Review Bd., U.S. Dep't of Labor, 402 F. App'x 936, 2010 WL 4746668 (5th
Cir. 2010).
Sarbanes-Oxley's burdens of proof do not address the evidentiary
standard that applies to a complainant's proof that protected activity
was a contributing factor in an adverse action. Sarbanes-Oxley simply
provides that the Secretary may find a violation only "if the
complainant demonstrates" that protected activity was a contributing
factor in the alleged adverse action. See 49 U.S.C.
42121(b)(2)(B)(iii). It is the Secretary's position that the
complainant must prove by a "preponderance of the evidence" that his
or her protected activity contributed to the adverse action; otherwise
the burden never shifts to the employer to establish its defense by
"clear and convincing evidence." See, e.g., Allen v. Admin. Review
Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 475 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008) ("The term 'demonstrate'
[under 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii)] means to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence."). Once the complainant establishes that the protected
activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action, the employer
can escape liability only by proving by clear and convincing evidence
that it would have reached the same decision even in the absence of the
prohibited rationale. The "clear and convincing evidence" standard is
a higher burden of proof than a "preponderance of the evidence"
standard.
Section 1980.105 Issuance of Findings and Preliminary Orders
As provided in the previous procedures for handling retaliation
complaints under Sarbanes-Oxley, this section provides that, on the
basis of information obtained in the investigation, the Assistant
Secretary will issue, within 60 days of the filing of a complaint,
written findings regarding whether or not there is reasonable cause to
believe that the complaint has merit. If the findings are that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the complaint has merit, in accordance
with the statute, 18 U.S.C. 1514A(c), the Assistant Secretary will
order "all relief necessary to make the employee whole," including
preliminary reinstatement; back pay with interest; and compensation for
any special damages sustained as a result of the retaliation, including
litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney's fees.
In ordering interest on back pay under Sarbanes-Oxley, the
Secretary has determined that, instead of computing the interest due by
compounding quarterly the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") interest
rate for the underpayment of taxes, which under 26 U.S.C. 6621 is
generally the Federal short-term rate plus three percentage points, the
Secretary will instead compound such interest daily. This is a change
from the way interest has been calculated. See Doyle v. Hydro Nuclear
Services, ARB Nos. 99-041, 99-042, and 99-012, 2000 WL 694384, at *15-
16 (ARB May 17, 2000). The Secretary believes that daily compounding of
interest better achieves the make-whole purpose of a back pay award.
Daily compounding of interest has become the norm in private lending
and recently was found to be the most appropriate method of calculating
interest on back pay by the National Labor Relations Board. See Jackson
Hospital Corp. v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy,
Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, 356 NLRB No. 8,
2010 WL 4318371, at *3-4 (Oct. 22, 2010). Additionally, interest on tax
underpayments under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 6621, is
compounded daily pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 6622(a).
As in the previous procedures for handling retaliation complaints
under Sarbanes-Oxley, the findings and, where appropriate, preliminary
order, advise the parties of their right to file objections to the
findings of the Assistant Secretary and to request a hearing. The
findings and, where appropriate, preliminary order, also advise the
respondent of the right to request attorney's fees not exceeding $1,000
regardless of whether the respondent has filed objections, if the
respondent alleges that the complaint was frivolous or brought in bad
faith. If no objections are filed within 30 days of receipt of the
findings, the findings and any preliminary order of the Assistant
Secretary become the final decision and order of the Secretary. If
objections are timely filed, any order of preliminary reinstatement
will take effect, but the remaining provisions of the order will not
take effect until administrative proceedings are completed.
Finally, the statement that reinstatement would not be appropriate
where the respondent establishes that the complainant is a security
risk has been removed from 1980.105(a)(1). OSHA believes that the
determination of whether reinstatement is inappropriate in a given case
is best made on the basis of the facts of each case and the relevant
case law, and thus it is not necessary in these procedural rules to
define the circumstances in which reinstatement is not a proper remedy.
This amendment also makes these procedural regulations consistent with
the recent interim final rules under STAA, NTSSA, FRSA, and CPSIA,
which do not contain this statement.
In appropriate circumstances, in lieu of preliminary reinstatement,
OSHA may order that the complainant receive the same pay and benefits
that he received prior to his termination, but not actually return to
work. Such "economic reinstatement" is akin to an order of front pay
and is frequently employed in cases arising under Section 105(c) of the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. See, e.g., Sec'y of Labor
on behalf of York v. BR&D Enters., Inc., 23 FMSHRC 697, 2001 WL
1806020, at *1 (June 26, 2001). Front pay has been recognized as a
possible remedy in cases under Sarbanes-Oxley and other whistleblower
statutes enforced by OSHA in circumstances where reinstatement would
not be appropriate. Hagman v. Washington Mutual Bank, Inc., 2005-SOX-
73, 2006 WL 6105301, *32 (Dec. 19, 2006) (noting that while
reinstatement is the "preferred and presumptive remedy" under
Sarbanes-Oxley, "[f]ront pay may be awarded as a substitute when
reinstatement is inappropriate due to: (1) An employee's medical
condition that is causally related to her employer's retaliatory action
* * *; (2) manifest hostility between the parties * * *; (3) the fact
that claimant's former position no longer exists * * *; or (4) the fact
that employer is no longer in business at the time of the decision");
see, e.g., Hobby v. Georgia Power Co., ARB No. 98-166, ALJ No. 1990-
ERA-30 (ARB Feb. 9, 2001), aff'd sub nom. Hobby v. U.S. Dept. of Labor,
No. 01-10916 (11th Cir. Sept. 30, 2002) (unpublished) (noting
circumstances where front pay may be available in lieu of reinstatement
but ordering reinstatement); Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 2008-SOX-
49, 2010 WL 2054426, at *55-56 (Jan. 15, 2010) (same). Congress
intended that employees be preliminarily reinstated to their positions
if OSHA finds reasonable cause to believe that they were discharged in
violation of Sarbanes-Oxley. When a violation is found, the norm is for
OSHA to order immediate preliminary reinstatement. An employer does not
have a statutory right to choose economic reinstatement. Rather,
economic reinstatement is designed to accommodate situations in which
evidence establishes to OSHA's satisfaction that reinstatement is
inadvisable for some reason, notwithstanding the employer's retaliatory
discharge of the employee. In such situations, actual reinstatement
might be delayed until after the administrative adjudication is completed
as long as the employee continues to receive his or her pay and benefits
and is not otherwise disadvantaged by a delay in reinstatement. There is
no statutory basis for allowing the employer to recover the costs of
economically reinstating an employee should the employer ultimately prevail
in the whistleblower adjudication.
Subpart B--Litigation
Section 1980.106 Objections to the Findings and the Preliminary Order
and Request for a Hearing
As under the prior procedures for whistleblower complaints under
Sarbanes-Oxley, to be effective, objections to the findings of the
Assistant Secretary must be in writing and must be filed with the Chief
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC
20001, within 30 days of receipt of the findings. The date of the
postmark, facsimile transmittal, or email communication is considered
the date of the filing; if the objection is filed in person, by hand-
delivery or other means, the objection is filed upon receipt. The
filing of objections also is considered a request for a hearing before
an ALJ. Although the parties are directed to serve a copy of their
objections on the other parties of record, as well as the OSHA official
who issued the findings and order, the Assistant Secretary, and the
Associate Solicitor, Division of Fair Labor Standards, U.S. Department
of Labor, the failure to serve copies of the objections on the other
parties of record does not affect the ALJ's jurisdiction to hear and
decide the merits of the case. See Shirani v. Calvert Cliffs Nuclear
Power Plant, Inc., ARB No. 04-101, 2005 WL 2865915, at *7 (ARB Oct. 31,
2005). Paragraph (b) has been revised to note that a respondent's
motion to stay OSHA's preliminary order of reinstatement will be
granted only based on exceptional circumstances. This revision
clarifies that a stay is only available in "exceptional
circumstances," because the Secretary believes that a stay of the
Assistant Secretary's preliminary order of reinstatement under
Sarbanes-Oxley would be appropriate only where the respondent can
establish the necessary criteria for equitable injunctive relief, i.e.,
irreparable injury, likelihood of success on the merits, and a
balancing of possible harms to the parties and the public favors a
stay.
Section 1980.107 Hearings
As under the prior procedures for whistleblower complaints under
Sarbanes-Oxley, this section adopts the rules of practice and procedure
for administrative hearings before the Office of Administrative Law
Judges at 29 CFR part 18 subpart A. It specifically allows hearings to
be consolidated if both the complainant and respondent object to the
findings and/or order of the Assistant Secretary. This section
continues to provide that the hearing is to commence expeditiously,
except upon a showing of good cause or unless otherwise agreed to by
the parties. Hearings will be conducted de novo, on the record.
Administrative law judges continue to have broad discretion to limit
discovery where necessary to expedite the hearing. As under the prior
procedures, formal rules of evidence will not apply, but rules or
principles designed to assure production of the most probative evidence
will be applied. The administrative law judge may exclude evidence that
is immaterial, irrelevant, or unduly repetitious. Minor revisions have
been made throughout this section to update the terminology used.
Section 1980.108 Role of Federal Agencies
As noted in this section, 1980.108(a)(1) previously, the Assistant
Secretary, at his or her discretion, may participate as a party or
amicus curiae at any time in the administrative proceedings under
Sarbanes-Oxley. For example, the Assistant Secretary may exercise his
or her discretion to prosecute the case in the administrative
proceeding before an ALJ; petition for review of a decision of an ALJ,
including a decision based on a settlement agreement between the
complainant and the respondent, regardless of whether the Assistant
Secretary participated before the ALJ; or participate as amicus curiae
before the ALJ or in the ARB proceeding. Although OSHA anticipates that
ordinarily the Assistant Secretary will not participate, the Assistant
Secretary may choose to do so in appropriate cases, such as cases
involving important or novel legal issues, large numbers of employees,
alleged violations that appear egregious, or where the interests of
justice might require participation by the Assistant Secretary.
Consistent with OSHA's procedural rules under other whistleblower
statutes, paragraph (a)(2) has been amended to require the parties to
send all documents to each other, in addition to the Assistant
Secretary.
Paragraph (b) has been revised to state that "The Securities and
Exchange Commission, if interested in a proceeding, may participate as
amicus curiae at any time in the proceeding, at the Commission's
discretion." This revision makes this provision consistent with the
analogous provisions in the Secretary's procedural rules under other
whistleblower statutes. However, the revision is not intended to
materially change the circumstances in which the Securities and
Exchange Commission may participate in proceedings under Sarbanes-
Oxley. The Securities and Exchange Commission may participate as amicus
curiae at any time in the proceedings.
Section 1980.109 Decision and Orders of the Administrative Law Judge
Revisions have been made to this section to make it consistent with
OSHA's procedural rules for handling complaints under other
whistleblower statutes. This section sets forth the requirements for
the content of the decision and order of the ALJ, and includes the
standard for finding a violation under Sarbanes-Oxley. Former paragraph
(a) has been divided into three paragraphs--(a), (b) and (c). Paragraph
(a) now states that a determination that a violation has occurred may
be made only if the complainant has demonstrated by a preponderance of
the evidence that protected activity was a contributing factor in the
adverse action alleged in the complaint. Paragraph (b) now explains
that if the complainant has satisfied this burden, relief may not be
ordered if the respondent demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence
that it would have taken the same adverse action in the absence of any
protected activity. A full discussion of the burdens of proof used by
the Department of Labor to resolve whistleblower cases under this part
is presented above in the discussion of section 1980.104. Paragraph (c)
now provides that the Assistant Secretary's determination to dismiss
the complaint without an investigation or without a complete
investigation pursuant to section 1980.104 is not subject to review.
Thus, paragraph (c) of section 1980.109 clarifies that the Assistant
Secretary's determinations on whether to proceed with an investigation
under Sarbanes-Oxley and whether to make particular investigative
findings are discretionary decisions not subject to review by the ALJ.
The ALJ hears cases de novo and, therefore, as a general matter, may not
remand cases to the Assistant Secretary to conduct an investigation or
make further factual findings. Paragraph (c) now also clarifies that the
ALJ can dispose of a matter without a hearing if the facts and circumstances
warrant. The provisions formerly contained in paragraph (b) have been moved
to new paragraphs (d)(1) and (2). Paragraph (d)(1) additionally provides
that interest on back pay will be calculated using the interest rate
applicable to underpayment of taxes under 26 U.S.C. 6621 and will be
compounded daily. The provisions formerly contained in paragraph (c) have
been moved to new paragraph (e), which also requires that the ALJ's
decision be served on the Assistant Secretary and the Associate Solicitor
of the Division of Fair Labor Standards.
Section 1980.110 Decision of the Administrative Review Board
As in section 1980.110(a) previously, upon the issuance of the
ALJ's decision, the parties have 10 business days within which to
petition the ARB for review of that decision. Subsection (b) has been
revised to clarify that if no timely petition for review is filed with
the ARB, the decision of the ALJ becomes the final decision of the
Secretary and is not subject to judicial review. The date of the
postmark, facsimile transmittal, or email communication is considered
the date of filing of the petition; if the petition is filed in person,
by hand delivery or other means, the petition is considered filed upon
receipt.
The appeal provisions in this part provide that an appeal to the
ARB is not a matter of right but is accepted at the discretion of the
ARB. The parties should identify in their petitions for review the
legal conclusions or orders to which they object, or the objections may
be deemed waived. The ARB has 30 days to decide whether to grant the
petition for review. If the ARB does not grant the petition, the
decision of the ALJ becomes the final decision of the Secretary. If a
timely petition for review is filed with the ARB, any relief ordered by
the ALJ, except for that portion ordering reinstatement, is inoperative
while the matter is pending before the ARB. When the ARB accepts a
petition for review, the ALJ's factual determinations will be reviewed
under the substantial evidence standard.
This section also provides that based on exceptional circumstances,
the ARB may grant a motion to stay an ALJ's preliminary order of
reinstatement under Sarbanes-Oxley, which otherwise would be effective,
while review is conducted by the ARB. Subsection (b) has been amended
to clarify that a stay is only available in "exceptional
circumstances," because the Secretary believes that a stay of an ALJ's
preliminary order of reinstatement under Sarbanes-Oxley would be
appropriate only where the respondent can establish the necessary
criteria for equitable injunctive relief, i.e., irreparable injury,
likelihood of success on the merits, and a balancing of possible harms
to the parties and the public favors a stay.
Finally, paragraph (d) has been revised to provide that interest on
back pay ordered under this section will be calculated using the
interest rate applicable to underpayment of taxes under 26 U.S.C. 6621
and will be compounded daily.
Subpart C--Miscellaneous Provisions
Section 1980.111 Withdrawal of Complaints, Objections, and Findings;
Settlement
This section provides for the procedures and time periods for
withdrawal of complaints, the withdrawal of findings and/or preliminary
orders by the Assistant Secretary, and the withdrawal of objections to
findings and/or orders. It also provides for approval of settlements at
the investigative and adjudicative stages of the case.
Paragraph (a) has been revised to allow the complainant to notify
the Assistant Secretary of his withdrawal orally or in writing. Minor
revisions also have been made to this section to make it consistent
with the procedural rules under other whistleblower statutes. These
minor revisions do not reflect substantive changes in the requirements
for withdrawals of complaints, objections or petitions for review, or
substantive changes in the requirements for submission and Departmental
approval of settlement agreements. Rather, these amendments simply
incorporate the procedures that the Department has been using under
Sarbanes-Oxley. Paragraph (a) now notes that complainant may not
withdraw a complaint after filing objections to an ALJ's order.
Paragraph (d)(1) now notes that the Assistant Secretary's approval of a
settlement reached by the respondent and the complainant demonstrates
his or her consent and achieves the consent of all three parties.
Section 1980.112 Judicial Review
This section describes the statutory provisions for judicial review
of decisions of the Secretary and requires, in cases where judicial
review is sought that the ARB submit the record of proceedings to the
appropriate court pursuant to the rules of such court. The section has
been renumbered for clarity and consistency with OSHA's other
whistleblower protection regulations. Paragraph (c) has been revised to
clarify that "rules of the court" refers to the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and local rules of the relevant Federal court of
appeals.
Section 1980.113 Judicial Enforcement
This section describes the Secretary's power under Sarbanes-Oxley
to obtain judicial enforcement of orders and the terms of a settlement
agreement. It has been amended for consistency with OSHA's other
whistleblower programs and clarifies that Federal district courts have
authority to grant all appropriate relief in an action to enforce a
preliminary order of reinstatement or a final order of the Secretary,
including a final order approving a settlement agreement.
While some courts have declined to enforce preliminary orders of
reinstatement under Sarbanes-Oxley, the Secretary's consistent position
has been that such orders are enforceable in Federal district court.
See Solis v. Tenn. Commerce Bancorp, Inc., No. 10-5602 (6th Cir. 2010)
(order granting stay of preliminary injunction); Bechtel v. Competitive
Technologies, Inc., 448 F.3d 469 (2d Cir. 2006); Welch v. Cardinal
Bankshares Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 552 (W.D. Va. 2006) (decision
vacated, appeal dismissed, No. 06-2295 (4th Cir. Feb. 20, 2008)).
By incorporating the procedures of AIR21, Sarbanes-Oxley authorizes
district courts to enforce orders, including preliminary orders of
reinstatement, issued by the Secretary under the Act. See 18 U.S.C.
1514A(b)(2)(A) (adopting the rules and procedures set forth in AIR21,
49 U.S.C. 42121(b)). The Secretary consistently has interpreted
Sarbanes-Oxley to permit her to obtain civil enforcement of preliminary
orders of reinstatement. See Brief for the Intervenor/Plaintiff-
Appellee Secretary of Labor, Solis v. Tenn. Commerce Bancorp, Inc., No.
10-5602 (6th Cir. 2010); Brief for the Intervenor/Plaintiff-Appellant
United States of America, Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., No. 06-
2295 (4th Cir. Feb. 20, 2008); Brief for the Intervenor/Plaintiff-
Appellee Secretary of Labor, Bechtel v. Competitive Technologies, Inc.,
448 F.3d 469 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 05-2402).
Under 49 U.S.C. 42121(b), which provides the procedures applicable
to investigations of whistleblower complaints under Sarbanes-Oxley, the
Secretary must investigate complaints under the Act and determine
whether there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation has
occurred. "[I]f the Secretary of Labor concludes that there is a
reasonable cause to believe that a violation * * * has occurred, the
Secretary shall accompany the Secretary's findings with a preliminary
order providing the relief prescribed by paragraph (3)(B)," which
includes reinstatement of the complainant to his or her former
position. 49 U.S.C. 42121(b)(2)(A) and (b)(3)(B)(ii). The respondent
may file objections to the Secretary's preliminary order and request a
hearing. However, the filing of such objections "shall not operate to
stay any reinstatement remedy contained in the preliminary order." 49
U.S.C. 42121(b)(2)(A).
Paragraph (5) of 49 U.S.C. 42121(b) provides for judicial
enforcement of the Secretary's orders, including preliminary orders of
reinstatement. That paragraph states "[w]henever any person has failed
to comply with an order issued under paragraph (3), the Secretary of
Labor may file a civil action in the United States district court for
the district in which the violation was found to occur to enforce such
order. In actions brought under this paragraph, the district courts
shall have jurisdiction to grant all appropriate relief including, but
not limited to, injunctive relief and compensatory damages." 49 U.S.C.
42121(b)(5). Preliminary orders that contain the relief of
reinstatement prescribed by paragraph (3)(B) are judicially enforceable
orders, issued under paragraph (3). Brief for the Intervenor/Plaintiff-
Appellee Secretary of Labor, Solis v. Tenn. Commerce Bancorp, Inc., No.
10-5602 at 23-25 (6th Cir. 2010).
This analysis is not altered by the fact that paragraph (3) bears
the heading "Final Order." See United States v. Buculei, 262 F.3d
322, 331 (4th Cir. 2001) (a statute's title cannot limit the plain
meaning of its text), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 962 (2002). Focusing on
the title to subsection (b)(3) instead of reading section 42121(b) as a
coherent whole negates the congressional directives that preliminary
reinstatement must be ordered upon a finding of reasonable cause and
that such orders not be stayed pending appeal.
Sections of a statute should not be read in isolation, but rather
in conjunction with the provisions of the entire Act, considering both
the object and policy of the Act. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 162 (4th Cir. 1998), aff'd, 529 U.S. 120
(2000). 49 U.S.C. 42121(b)(2)(A)'s clear statement that objections
shall not stay any preliminary order of reinstatement demonstrates
Congress's intent that the Secretary's preliminary orders of
reinstatement be immediately effective. Reading 49 U.S.C. 42121(b)(5)
to allow enforcement of such orders is the only way to effectuate this
intent.
The Secretary's interpretation is buttressed by the legislative
history of Sarbanes-Oxley and AIR21. Before Congress enacted Sarbanes-
Oxley, the Department of Labor had interpreted this AIR21 provision to
permit judicial enforcement of preliminary reinstatement orders.
Accordingly, Congress is presumed to have been aware of the
Department's interpretation of 49 U.S.C. 42121(b)(5) and to have
adopted that interpretation when it incorporated that provision by
reference. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978)
("[W]here * * * Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a
prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of
the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as
it affects the new statute"). The Secretary's interpretation is
further supported by the legislative history of AIR21, which makes
clear that Congress regarded preliminary reinstatement as crucial to
the protections provided in the statute. Brief for the Intervenor/
Plaintiff-Appellee Secretary of Labor, Solis v. Tenn. Commerce Bancorp,
Inc., No. 10-5602, at 41-44 (6th Cir. 2010) (reviewing legislative
history of AIR21). Interpreting 49 U.S.C. 42121(b)(5) to permit
judicial enforcement of the Secretary's preliminary orders of
reinstatement is necessary to carry out Congress' clearly expressed
intent that whistleblowers be immediately reinstated upon the
Secretary's finding of reasonable cause to believe that retaliation has
occurred.
Sarbanes-Oxley also permits the person on whose behalf the order
was issued under Sarbanes-Oxley to obtain judicial enforcement of
orders and the terms of a settlement agreement. 18 U.S.C.
1514A(b)(2)(A) incorporating 49 U.S.C. 42121(b)(6).
Section 1980.114 District Court Jurisdiction of Retaliation Complaints
This section sets forth Sarbanes-Oxley's provisions allowing a
complainant to bring an original de novo action in district court,
alleging the same allegations contained in the complaint filed with
OSHA, if there has been no final decision of the Secretary within 180
days of the filing of the complaint. This section has been amended to
reflect the 2010 statutory amendments which afford parties bringing
cases under 18 U.S.C. 1514A(b)(1)(B) the right to a trial by jury.
This section also has been amended to require complainants to
provide file-stamped copies of their complaint within seven days after
filing a complaint in district court to the Assistant Secretary, the
ALJ, or the ARB, depending on where the proceeding is pending. A copy
of the complaint also must be provided to the Regional Administrator,
the Assistant Secretary, Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
and the Associate Solicitor, Division of Fair Labor Standards, U.S.
Department of Labor. This provision is necessary to notify the agency
that the complainant has opted to file a complaint in district court.
This provision is not a substitute for the complainant's compliance
with the requirements for service of process of the district court
complaint contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
local rules of the district court where the complaint is filed.
It is the Secretary's position that complainants may not initiate
an action in Federal court after the Secretary issues a final decision,
even if the date of the final decision is more than 180 days after the
filing of the complaint. The purpose of the "kick-out" provision is
to aid the complainant in receiving a prompt decision. That goal is not
implicated in a situation where the complainant already has received a
final decision from the Secretary. In addition, permitting the
complainant to file a new case in district court in such circumstances
could conflict with the parties' rights to seek judicial review of the
Secretary's final decision in the court of appeals.
Section 1980.115 Special Circumstances; Waiver of Rules
This section provides that in circumstances not contemplated by
these rules or for good cause the ALJ or the ARB may, upon application
and notice to the parties, waive any rule as justice or the
administration of Sarbanes-Oxley requires.
No substantive changes have been made to this section.
IV. Paperwork Reduction Act
This rule contains a reporting provision (filing a retaliation
complaint, section 1980.103) which was previously reviewed and approved
for use by the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") and assigned
OMB control number 1218-0236 under the provisions of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-13).
V. Administrative Procedure Act
The notice and comment rulemaking procedures of Section 553 of the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") do not apply "to interpretative
rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization,
procedure, or practice." 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A). This is a rule of agency
procedure and practice within the meaning of that section. Therefore,
publication in the Federal Register of a notice of proposed rulemaking
and request for comments are not required for these regulations, which
provide the procedures for the handling of retaliation complaints.
Although this is a procedural rule not subject to the notice and
comment procedures of the APA, we are providing persons interested in
this interim final rule 60 days to submit comments. A final rule will
be published after the agency receives and reviews the public's
comments.
Furthermore, because this rule is procedural rather than
substantive, the normal requirement of 5 U.S.C. 553(d) that a rule be
effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register is
inapplicable. The Assistant Secretary also finds good cause to provide
an immediate effective date for this interim final rule. It is in the
public interest that the rule be effective immediately so that parties
may know what procedures are applicable to pending cases.
VI. Executive Order 12866; Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995; Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996; Executive Order
13132
The Department has concluded that this rule should be treated as a
"significant regulatory action" within the meaning of Section 3(f)(4)
of Executive Order 12866 because this rule adds new provisions and
updates the language of the former regulations to implement the
statutory changes made by Dodd-Frank. Executive Order 12866 requires a
full economic impact analysis only for "economically significant"
rules, which are defined in Section 3(f)(1) as rules that may have an
annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more (adjusted annually
for inflation), or adversely affect in a material way the economy,
productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or
safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities. Because
the rule is procedural in nature, it is expected to have a negligible
economic impact. Therefore, no economic impact analysis has been
prepared. For the same reason, the rule does not require a Section 202
statement under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531
et seq.). Furthermore, because this is a rule of agency procedure and
practice, it is not a "rule" within the meaning of the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (5 U.S.C. 804(3)(C)), and
does not require Congressional review. Finally, this rule does not have
"federalism implications." The rule does not have "substantial
direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government" and therefore
is not subject to Executive Order 13132 (Federalism).
VII. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
The Department has determined that the regulation will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
The regulation simply updates existing procedures and implements
changes necessitated by enactment of Dodd-Frank. Furthermore, no
certification to this effect is required and no regulatory flexibility
analysis is required because no proposed rule has been issued.
Document Preparation: This document was prepared under the
direction and control of the Assistant Secretary, Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor.
List of Subjects in 29 CFR Part 1980
Administrative practice and procedure, Corporate fraud, Employment,
Investigations, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Whistleblower.
Signed at Washington, DC, on October 26, 2011.
David Michaels,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.
Accordingly, for the reasons set out in the preamble, 29 CFR part
1980 is revised to read as follows:
PART 1980--PROCEDURES FOR THE HANDLING OF RETALIATION COMPLAINTS
UNDER SECTION 806 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, AS AMENDED
Subpart A--Complaints, Investigations, Findings and Preliminary Orders
Sec:
1980.100 Purpose and scope.
1980.101 Definitions.
1980.102 Obligations and prohibited acts.
1980.103 Filing of retaliation complaints.
1980.104 Investigation.
1980.105 Issuance of findings and preliminary orders.
Subpart B--Litigation
1980.106 Objections to the findings and the preliminary order and
request for a hearing.
1980.107 Hearings.
1980.108 Role of Federal agencies.
1980.109 Decision and orders of the administrative law judge.
1980.110 Decision and orders of the Administrative Review Board.
Subpart C--Miscellaneous Provisions
1980.111 Withdrawal of complaints, objections, and findings;
settlement.
1980.112 Judicial review.
1980.113 Judicial enforcement.
1980.114 District court jurisdiction of retaliation complaints.
1980.115 Special circumstances; waiver of rules.
Authority: 18 U.S.C. 1514A, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-203
(July 21, 2010); Secretary of Labor's Order No. 4-2010 (Sept. 2,
2010), 75 FR 55355 (Sept. 10, 2010); Secretary of Labor's Order No.
1-2010 (Jan. 15, 2010), 75 FR 3924 (Jan. 25, 2010).
Subpart A--Complaints, Investigations, Findings and Preliminary
Orders
Sec. 1980.100 Purpose and scope.
(a) This part implements procedures under section 806 of the
Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley or Act), enacted into
law July 30, 2002, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010, enacted into law July 21, 2010.
Sarbanes-Oxley provides for employee protection from retaliation by
companies, their subsidiaries and affiliates, officers, employees,
contractors, subcontractors, and agents because the employee has
engaged in protected activity pertaining to a violation or alleged
violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, or any rule or
regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision
of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders. Sarbanes-Oxley
also provides for employee protection from retaliation by nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations, their officers, employees,
contractors, subcontractors or agents because the employee has engaged
in protected activity.
(b) This part establishes procedures pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley for
the expeditious handling of retaliation complaints made by employees,
or by persons acting on their behalf. These rules, together with those
codified at 29 CFR part 18, set forth the procedures for submission of
complaints under Sarbanes-Oxley, investigations, issuance of findings
and preliminary orders, objections to findings and orders, litigation
before administrative law judges, post-hearing administrative review,
withdrawals, and settlements.
Sec. 1980.101 Definitions.
As used in this part:
(a) Act means section 806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud
Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. 107-204, July 30, 2002, codified at 18 U.S.C. 1514A, as
amended by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-203, July 21, 2010.
(b) Assistant Secretary means the Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health or the person or persons to whom he or
she delegates authority under the Act.
(c) Business days means days other than Saturdays, Sundays, and
Federal holidays.
(d) Company means any company with a class of securities registered
under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l)
or any company required to file reports under section 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)) including any
subsidiary or affiliate whose financial information is included in the
consolidated financial statements of such company.
(e) Complainant means the employee who filed a complaint under the
Act or on whose behalf a complaint was filed.
(f) Covered person means any company, including any subsidiary or
affiliate whose financial information is included in the consolidated
financial statements of such company, or any nationally recognized
statistical rating organization, or any officer, employee, contractor,
subcontractor, or agent of such company or nationally recognized
statistical rating organization.
(g) Employee means an individual presently or formerly working for
a covered person, an individual applying to work for a covered person,
or an individual whose employment could be affected by a covered
person.
(h) Nationally recognized statistical rating organization means a
credit rating agency under 15 U.S.C. 78c(61) that:
(1) Issues credit ratings certified by qualified institutional
buyers, in accordance with 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(a)(1)(B)(ix), with respect
to:
(i) Financial institutions, brokers, or dealers;
(ii) Insurance companies;
(iii) Corporate issuers;
(iv) Issuers of asset-backed securities (as that term is defined in
section 1101(c) of part 229 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations,
as in effect on September 29, 2006);
(v) Issuers of government securities, municipal securities, or
securities issued by a foreign government; or
(vi) A combination of one or more categories of obligors described
in any of paragraphs (h)(1)(i) through (v) of this section; and
(2) Is registered under 15 U.S.C. 78o-7.
(i) OSHA means the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of
the United States Department of Labor.
(j) Person means one or more individuals, partnerships,
associations, companies, corporations, business trusts, legal
representatives or any group of persons.
(k) Respondent means the person named in the complaint who is
alleged to have violated the Act.
(l) Secretary means the Secretary of Labor or persons to whom
authority under the Act has been delegated.
(m) Any future statutory amendments that affect the definition of a
term or terms listed in this section will apply in lieu of the
definition stated herein.
Sec. 1980.102 Obligations and prohibited acts.
(a) No covered person may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten,
harass or in any other manner retaliate against, including, but not
limited to, intimidating, threatening, restraining, coercing,
blacklisting or disciplining, any employee with respect to the
employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
because the employee, or any person acting pursuant to the employee's
request, has engaged in any of the activities specified in paragraphs
(b)(1) and (2) of this section.
(b) An employee is protected against retaliation (as described in
paragraph (a) of this section) by a covered person for any lawful act
done by the employee:
(1) To provide information, cause information to be provided, or
otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the
employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341,
1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud
against shareholders, when the information or assistance is provided to
or the investigation is conducted by--
(i) A Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency;
(ii) Any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress; or
(ii) A person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such
other person working for the employer who has the authority to
investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct); or
(2) To file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or
otherwise assist in a proceeding filed or about to be filed (with any
knowledge of the employer) relating to an alleged violation of 18
U.S.C. 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law
relating to fraud against shareholders.
Sec. 1980.103 Filing of retaliation complaints.
(a) Who may file. An employee who believes that he or she has been
retaliated against by a covered person in violation of the Act may
file, or have filed on the employee's behalf, a complaint alleging such
retaliation.
(b) Nature of filing. No particular form of complaint is required.
A complaint may be filed orally or in writing. Oral complaints will be
reduced to writing by OSHA. If the complainant is unable to file the
complaint in English, OSHA will accept the complaint in any language.
(c) Place of filing. The complaint should be filed with the OSHA
office responsible for enforcement activities in the geographical area
where the employee resides or was employed, but may be filed with any
OSHA officer or employee. Addresses and telephone numbers for these
officials are set forth in local directories and at the following
Internet address: http://www.osha.gov
(d) Time for filing. Within 180 days after an alleged violation of
the Act occurs or after the date on which the employee became aware of
the alleged violation of the Act, any employee who believes that he or
she has been retaliated against in violation of the Act may file, or
have filed on the employee's behalf, a complaint alleging such
retaliation. The date of the postmark, facsimile transmittal, email
communication, telephone call, hand-delivery, delivery to a third-party
commercial carrier, or in-person filing at an OSHA office will be
considered the date of filing. The time for filing a complaint may be
tolled for reasons warranted by applicable case law.
Sec. 1980.104 Investigation.
(a) Upon receipt of a complaint in the investigating office, the
Assistant Secretary will notify the respondent of the filing of the
complaint by providing a copy of the complaint, redacted, if necessary,
in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and other
applicable confidentiality laws, and will also notify the respondent
of its rights under paragraphs (b) and (f) of this section and
paragraph (e) of Sec. 1980.110. The Assistant Secretary will provide
a copy of the unredacted complaint to the complainant (or complainant's
legal counsel, if complainant is represented by counsel) and to the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
(b) Within 20 days of receipt of the notice of the filing of the
complaint provided under paragraph (a) of this section, the respondent
may submit to the Assistant Secretary a written statement and any
affidavits or documents substantiating its position. Within the same 20
days, the respondent may request a meeting with the Assistant Secretary
to present its position.
(c) Throughout the investigation, the agency will provide to the
complainant (or the complainant's legal counsel if complainant is
represented by counsel) a copy of all of respondent's submissions to
the agency that are responsive to the complainant's whistleblower
complaint. Before providing such materials to the complainant, the
agency will redact them, if necessary, in accordance with the Privacy
Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and other applicable confidentiality laws.
The agency will also provide the complainant with an opportunity to
respond to such submissions.
(d) Investigations will be conducted in a manner that protects the
confidentiality of any person who provides information on a
confidential basis, other than the complainant, in accordance with part
70 of this title.
(e)(1) A complaint will be dismissed unless the complainant has
made a prima facie showing that protected activity was a contributing
factor in the adverse action alleged in the complaint.
(2) The complaint, supplemented as appropriate by interviews of the
complainant, must allege the existence of facts and evidence to make a
prima facie showing as follows:
(i) The employee engaged in a protected activity;
(ii) The respondent knew or suspected that the employee engaged in
the protected activity;
(iii) The employee suffered an adverse action; and
(iv) The circumstances were sufficient to raise the inference that
the protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action.
(3) For purposes of determining whether to investigate, the
complainant will be considered to have met the required burden if the
complaint on its face, supplemented as appropriate through interviews
of the complainant, alleges the existence of facts and either direct or
circumstantial evidence to meet the required showing, i.e., to give
rise to an inference that the respondent knew or suspected that the
employee engaged in protected activity and that the protected activity
was a contributing factor in the adverse action. The burden may be
satisfied, for example, if the complaint shows that the adverse
personnel action took place shortly after the protected activity,
giving rise to the inference that it was a factor in the adverse
action. If the required showing has not been made, the complainant (or
the complainant's legal counsel, if complainant is represented by
counsel) will be so notified and the investigation will not commence.
(4) Notwithstanding a finding that a complainant has made a prima
facie showing, as required by this section, an investigation of the
complaint shall not be conducted or will be discontinued if the
respondent demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that it would
have taken the same adverse action in the absence of the complainant's
protected activity.
(5) If the respondent fails to make a timely response or fails to
satisfy the burden set forth in the prior paragraph, the Assistant
Secretary will proceed with the investigation. The investigation will
proceed whenever it is necessary or appropriate to confirm or verify
the information provided by the respondent.
(f) Prior to the issuance of findings and a preliminary order as
provided for in Sec. 1980.105, if the Assistant Secretary has
reasonable cause, on the basis of information gathered under the
procedures of this part, to believe that the respondent has violated
the Act and that preliminary reinstatement is warranted, the Assistant
Secretary will again contact the respondent (or the respondent's legal
counsel, if respondent is represented by counsel) to give notice of the
substance of the relevant evidence supporting the complainant's
allegations as developed during the course of the investigation. This
evidence includes any witness statements, which will be redacted to
protect the identity of confidential informants where statements were
given in confidence; if the statements cannot be redacted without
revealing the identity of confidential informants, summaries of their
contents will be provided. The complainant will also receive a copy of
the materials that must be provided to the respondent under this
paragraph. Before providing such materials to the complainant, the
agency will redact them, if necessary, in accordance with the Privacy
Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and other applicable confidentiality laws.
The respondent will be given the opportunity to submit a written
response, to meet with the investigators, to present statements from
witnesses in support of its position, and to present legal and factual
arguments. The respondent will present this evidence within 10 business
days of the Assistant Secretary's notification pursuant to this
paragraph, or as soon afterwards as the Assistant Secretary and the
respondent can agree, if the interests of justice so require.
Sec. 1980.105 Issuance of findings and preliminary orders.
(a) After considering all the relevant information collected during
the investigation, the Assistant Secretary shall issue, within 60 days
of filing of the complaint, written findings as to whether or not there
is reasonable cause to believe that the respondent has retaliated
against the complainant in violation of the Act.
(1) If the Assistant Secretary concludes that there is reasonable
cause to believe that a violation has occurred, he or she shall
accompany the findings with a preliminary order providing relief to the
complainant. The preliminary order will include all relief necessary to
make the employee whole, including reinstatement with the same
seniority status that the complainant would have had but for the
retaliation; back pay with interest; and compensation for any special
damages sustained as a result of the retaliation, including litigation
costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney's fees. Interest on
back pay will be calculated using the interest rate applicable to
underpayment of taxes under 26 U.S.C. 6621 and will be compounded
daily.
(2) If the Assistant Secretary concludes that a violation has not
occurred, the Assistant Secretary will notify the parties of that
finding.
(b) The findings, and where appropriate, the preliminary order will
be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, to all parties of
record (and each party's legal counsel if the party is represented by
counsel). The findings, and where appropriate, the preliminary order
will inform the parties of the right to object to the findings and/or
order and to request a hearing, and of the right of the respondent to
request an award of attorney's fees not exceeding $1,000 from the
administrative law judge (ALJ) regardless of whether the respondent has
filed objections, if the complaint was frivolous or brought in bad
faith. The findings, and where appropriate, the preliminary order,
also will give the address of the Chief Administrative Law Judge. At
the same time, the Assistant Secretary will file with the Chief Administrative
Law Judge, U.S. Department of Labor, a copy of the original complaint and
a copy of the findings and/or order.
(c) The findings and any preliminary order will be effective 30
days after receipt by the respondent (or the respondent's legal counsel
if the respondent is represented by counsel), or on the compliance date
set forth in the preliminary order, whichever is later, unless an
objection and/or a request for hearing has been timely filed as
provided at Sec. 1980.106. However, the portion of any preliminary
order requiring reinstatement will be effective immediately upon the
respondent's receipt of the findings and the preliminary order,
regardless of any objections to the findings and/or the order.
Subpart B--Litigation
Sec. 1980.106 Objections to the findings and the preliminary order
and request for a hearing.
(a) Any party who desires review, including judicial review, of the
findings and preliminary order, or a respondent alleging that the
complaint was frivolous or brought in bad faith who seeks an award of
attorney's fees under the Act, must file any objections and/or a
request for a hearing on the record within 30 days of receipt of the
findings and preliminary order pursuant to Sec. 1980.105(b). The
objections, request for a hearing, and/or request for attorney's fees
must be in writing and state whether the objections are to the
findings, the preliminary order, and/or whether there should be an
award of attorney's fees. The date of the postmark, facsimile
transmittal, or email communication is considered the date of filing;
if the objection is filed in person, by hand-delivery or other means,
the objection is filed upon receipt. Objections must be filed with the
Chief Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington,
DC 20001, and copies of the objections must be mailed at the same time
to the other parties of record, the OSHA official who issued the
findings and order, the Assistant Secretary, and the Associate
Solicitor, Division of Fair Labor Standards, U.S. Department of Labor.
(b) If a timely objection is filed, all provisions of the
preliminary order will be stayed, except for the portion requiring
preliminary reinstatement, which shall not be automatically stayed. The
portion of the preliminary order requiring reinstatement will be
effective immediately upon the respondent's receipt of the findings and
preliminary order, regardless of any objections to the order. The
respondent may file a motion with the Office of Administrative Law
Judges for a stay of the Assistant Secretary's preliminary order of
reinstatement, which shall be granted only based on exceptional
circumstances. If no timely objection is filed with respect to either
the findings or the preliminary order, the findings and/or preliminary
order shall become the final decision of the Secretary, not subject to
judicial review.
Sec. 1980.107 Hearings.
(a) Except as provided in this part, proceedings will be conducted
in accordance with the rules of practice and procedure for
administrative hearings before the Office of Administrative Law Judges,
codified at subpart A of Part 18 of this title.
(b) Upon receipt of an objection and request for hearing, the Chief
Administrative Law Judge will promptly assign the case to an ALJ who
will notify the parties, by certified mail, of the day, time, and place
of hearing. The hearing is to commence expeditiously, except upon a
showing of good cause or unless otherwise agreed to by the parties.
Hearings will be conducted de novo, on the record. Administrative law
judges have broad discretion to limit discovery in order to expedite
the hearing.
(c) If both the complainant and the respondent object to the
findings and/or order, the objections will be consolidated and a single
hearing will be conducted.
(d) Formal rules of evidence will not apply, but rules or
principles designed to assure production of the most probative evidence
will be applied. The administrative law judge may exclude evidence that
is immaterial, irrelevant, or unduly repetitious.
Sec. 1980.108 Role of Federal agencies.
(a)(1) The complainant and the respondent will be parties in every
proceeding. At the Assistant Secretary's discretion, the Assistant
Secretary may participate as a party or as amicus curiae at any time at
any stage of the proceedings. This right to participate includes, but
is not limited to, the right to petition for review of a decision of an
ALJ, including a decision approving or rejecting a settlement agreement
between the complainant and the respondent.
(2) Copies of documents in all cases, whether or not the Assistant
Secretary is participating in the proceeding, must be sent to the
Assistant Secretary, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and
to the Associate Solicitor, Division of Fair Labor Standards, U.S.
Department of Labor, as well as all other parties.
(b) The Securities and Exchange Commission, if interested in a
proceeding, may participate as amicus curiae at any time in the
proceeding, at the Commission's discretion. At the request of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, copies of all pleadings in a case
must be sent to the Commission, whether or not the Commission is
participating in the proceeding.
Sec. 1980.109 Decision and orders of the administrative law judge.
(a) The decision of the ALJ will contain appropriate findings,
conclusions, and an order pertaining to the remedies provided in
paragraph (d) of this section, as appropriate. A determination that a
violation has occurred may be made only if the complainant has
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that protected activity
was a contributing factor in the adverse action alleged in the
complaint.
(b) If the complainant has satisfied the burden set forth in the
prior paragraph, relief may not be ordered if the respondent
demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken
the same adverse action in the absence of any protected activity.
(c) Neither the Assistant Secretary's determination to dismiss a
complaint without completing an investigation pursuant to Sec.
1980.104(e) nor the Assistant Secretary's determination to proceed with
an investigation is subject to review by the ALJ, and a complaint may
not be remanded for the completion of an investigation or for
additional findings on the basis that a determination to dismiss was
made in error. Rather, if there otherwise is jurisdiction, the ALJ will
hear the case on the merits or dispose of the matter without a hearing
if the facts and circumstances warrant.
(d)(1) If the ALJ concludes that the respondent has violated the
law, the order will provide all relief necessary to make the employee
whole, including reinstatement with the same seniority status that the
complainant would have had but for the retaliation; back pay with
interest; and compensation for any special damages sustained as a
result of the retaliation, including litigation costs, expert witness
fees, and reasonable attorney's fees. Interest on back pay will be
calculated using the interest rate applicable to underpayment of taxes
under 26 U.S.C. 6621 and will be compounded daily.
(2) If the ALJ determines that the respondent has not violated the
law, an order will be issued denying the complaint. If, upon the
request of the respondent, the ALJ determines that a complaint was
frivolous or was brought in bad faith, the judge may award to the
respondent a reasonable attorney's fee, not exceeding $1,000.
(e) The decision will be served upon all parties to the proceeding,
the Assistant Secretary, and the Associate Solicitor, Division of Fair
Labor Standards, U.S. Department of Labor. Any ALJ's decision requiring
reinstatement or lifting an order of reinstatement by the Assistant
Secretary will be effective immediately upon receipt of the decision by
the respondent. All other portions of the ALJ's order will be effective
10 business days after the date of the decision unless a timely
petition for review has been filed with the Administrative Review
Board.
Sec. 1980.110 Decision and orders of the Administrative Review Board.
(a) Any party desiring to seek review, including judicial review,
of a decision of the ALJ, or a respondent alleging that the complaint
was frivolous or brought in bad faith who seeks an award of attorney's
fees, must file a written petition for review with the Administrative
Review Board, U.S. Department of Labor (ARB), which has been delegated
the authority to act for the Secretary and issue final decisions under
this part. The decision of the ALJ will become the final order of the
Secretary unless, pursuant to this section, a petition for review is
timely filed with the ARB, and the ARB accepts the petition for review.
The parties should identify in their petitions for review the legal
conclusions or orders to which they object, or the objections may be
deemed waived. A petition must be filed within 10 business days of the
date of the decision of the ALJ. The date of the postmark, facsimile
transmittal, or email communication will be considered to be the date
of filing; if the petition is filed in person, by hand-delivery or
other means, the petition is considered filed upon receipt. The
petition must be served on all parties and on the Chief Administrative
Law Judge at the time it is filed with the ARB. Copies of the petition
for review and all briefs must be served on the Assistant Secretary,
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and on the Associate
Solicitor, Division of Fair Labor Standards, U.S. Department of Labor.
(b) If a timely petition for review is filed pursuant to paragraph
(a) of this section, the decision of the ALJ will become the final
order of the Secretary unless the ARB, within 30 days of the filing of
the petition, issues an order notifying the parties that the case has
been accepted for review. If a case is accepted for review, the
decision of the ALJ will be inoperative unless and until the ARB issues
an order adopting the decision, except that a preliminary order of
reinstatement will be effective while review is conducted by the ARB,
unless the ARB grants a motion by the respondent to stay the order
based on exceptional circumstances. The ARB will specify the terms
under which any briefs are to be filed. The ARB will review the factual
determinations of the ALJ under the substantial evidence standard. If
no timely petition for review is filed, or the ARB denies review, the
decision of the ALJ will become the final order of the Secretary. If no
timely petition for review is filed, the resulting final order is not
subject to judicial review.
(c) The final decision of the ARB shall be issued within 120 days
of the conclusion of the hearing, which will be deemed to be 10
business days after the date of the decision of the ALJ unless a motion
for reconsideration has been filed with the ALJ in the interim. The
ARB's final decision will be served upon all parties and the Chief
Administrative Law Judge by mail. The final decision will also be
served on the Assistant Secretary, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, and on the Associate Solicitor, Division of Fair Labor
Standards, even if the Assistant Secretary is not a party.
(d) If the ARB concludes that the respondent has violated the law,
the final order will include all relief necessary to make the
complainant whole, including reinstatement with the same seniority
status that the complainant would have had but for the retaliation;
back pay with interest; and compensation for any special damages
sustained as a result of the retaliation, including litigation costs,
expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney's fees. Interest on back
pay will be calculated using the interest rate applicable to
underpayment of taxes under 26 U.S.C. 6621 and will be compounded
daily.
(e) If the ARB determines that the respondent has not violated the
law, an order will be issued denying the complaint. If, upon the
request of the respondent, the ARB determines that a complaint was
frivolous or was brought in bad faith, the ARB may award to the
respondent a reasonable attorney's fee, not exceeding $1,000.
Subpart C--Miscellaneous Provisions
Sec. 1980.111 Withdrawal of complaints, objections, and findings;
settlement.
(a) At any time prior to the filing of objections to the Assistant
Secretary's findings and/or preliminary order, a complainant may
withdraw his or her complaint by notifying the Assistant Secretary,
orally or in writing, of his or her withdrawal. The Assistant Secretary
then will confirm in writing the complainant's desire to withdraw and
determine whether to approve the withdrawal. The Assistant Secretary
will notify the parties (and each party's legal counsel if the party is
represented by counsel) of the approval of any withdrawal. If the
complaint is withdrawn because of settlement, the settlement must be
submitted for approval in accordance with paragraph (d) of this
section. A complainant may not withdraw his or her complaint after the
filing of objections to the Assistant Secretary's findings and/or
preliminary order.
(b) The Assistant Secretary may withdraw his or her findings and/or
preliminary order at any time before the expiration of the 30-day
objection period described in Sec. 1980.106, provided that no
objection has yet been filed, and substitute new findings and/or
preliminary order. The date of the receipt of the substituted findings
and/or order will begin a new 30-day objection period.
(c) At any time before the Assistant Secretary's findings and/or
order become final, a party may withdraw its objections to the
Assistant Secretary's findings and/or order by filing a written
withdrawal with the ALJ. If the case is on review with the ARB, a party
may withdraw its petition for review of an ALJ's decision at any time
before that decision becomes final by filing a written withdrawal with
the ARB. The ALJ or the ARB, as the case may be, will determine whether
to approve the withdrawal of the objections or the petition for review.
If the ALJ approves a request to withdraw objections to the Assistant
Secretary's findings or order, and there are no other pending
objections, the Assistant Secretary's findings and order will become
the final order of the Secretary. If the ARB approves a request to
withdraw a petition for review of an ALJ decision, and there are no
other pending petitions for review of that decision, the ALJ's decision
will become the final order of the Secretary. If objections or a
petition for review are withdrawn because of settlement, the settlement
must be submitted for approval in accordance with paragraph (d) of this
section.
(d)(1) Investigative settlements. At any time after the filing of a
complaint, and before the findings and/or order are objected to or
become a final order by operation of law, the case may be settled if
the Assistant Secretary, the complainant and the respondent agree to a
settlement. The Assistant Secretary's approval of a settlement reached
by the respondent and the complainant demonstrates his or her consent
and achieves the consent of all three parties.
(2) Adjudicatory settlements. At any time after the filing of
objections to the Assistant Secretary's findings and/or order, the case
may be settled if the participating parties agree to a settlement and
the settlement is approved by the ALJ if the case is before the judge,
or by the ARB if the ARB has accepted the case for review. A copy of
the settlement will be filed with the ALJ or the ARB, as the case may
be.
(e) Any settlement approved by the Assistant Secretary, the ALJ, or
the ARB, will constitute the final order of the Secretary and may be
enforced pursuant to Sec. 1980.113.
Sec. 1980.112 Judicial review.
(a) Within 60 days after the issuance of a final order under
Sec. Sec. 1980.109 and 1980.110, any person adversely affected or
aggrieved by the order may file a petition for review of the order in
the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the
violation allegedly occurred or the circuit in which the complainant
resided on the date of the violation.
(b) A final order of the ARB is not subject to judicial review in
any criminal or other civil proceeding.
(c) If a timely petition for review is filed, the record of a case,
including the record of proceedings before the ALJ, will be transmitted
by the ARB to the appropriate court pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and the local rules of such court.
Sec. 1980.113 Judicial enforcement.
Whenever any person has failed to comply with a preliminary order
of reinstatement, or a final order, including one approving a
settlement agreement, issued under the Act, the Secretary or a person
on whose behalf the order was issued may file a civil action seeking
enforcement of the order in the United States district court for the
district in which the violation was found to have occurred. In such
civil actions, the district court will have jurisdiction to grant all
appropriate relief, including, but not limited to, injunctive relief
and compensatory damages, including:
(a) Reinstatement with the same seniority status that the employee
would have had, but for the discharge or retaliation;
(b) The amount of back pay, with interest; and
(c) Compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of
the discharge or retaliation, including litigation costs, expert
witness fees, and reasonable attorney's fees.
Sec. 1980.114 District court jurisdiction of retaliation complaints.
(a) If the Secretary has not issued a final decision within 180
days of the filing of the complaint, and there is no showing that there
has been delay due to the bad faith of the complainant, the complainant
may bring an action at law or equity for de novo review in the
appropriate district court of the United States, which will have
jurisdiction over such an action without regard to the amount in
controversy. A party to an action brought under this paragraph shall be
entitled to trial by jury.
(b) Within seven days after filing a complaint in Federal court, a
complainant must file with the Assistant Secretary, the ALJ, or the
ARB, depending on where the proceeding is pending, a copy of the file-
stamped complaint. A copy of the complaint also must be served on the
Regional Administrator, the Assistant Secretary, Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, and on the Associate Solicitor, Division of
Fair Labor Standards, U.S. Department of Labor.
Sec. 1980.115 Special circumstances; waiver of rules.
In special circumstances not contemplated by the provisions of this
part, or for good cause shown, the ALJ or the ARB on review may, upon
application, after three days notice to all parties, waive any rule or
issue any orders that justice or the administration of the Act
requires.
[FR Doc. 2011-28274 Filed 11-2-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P