[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 70 (Friday, April 11, 2014)][Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 20315-20743]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-29579]
Vol. 79
Friday,
No. 70
April 11, 2014
Part II
Department of Labor
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Occupational Safety and Health Administration
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29 CFR Parts 1910 and 1926
Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution; Electrical
Protective Equipment; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 79 , No. 70 / Friday, April 11, 2014 / Rules
and Regulations
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
29 CFR Parts 1910 and 1926
[Docket No. OSHA-S215-2006-0063]
RIN 1218-AB67
Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution;
Electrical Protective Equipment
AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: OSHA last issued rules for the construction of transmission
and distribution installations in 1972. Those provisions are now out of
date and inconsistent with the more recently promulgated general
industry standard covering the operation and maintenance of electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution lines and equipment.
OSHA is revising the construction standard to make it more consistent
with the general industry standard and is making some revisions to both
the construction and general industry requirements. The final rules for
general industry and construction include new or revised provisions on
host employers and contractors, training, job briefings, fall
protection, insulation and working position of employees working on or
near live parts, minimum approach distances, protection from electric
arcs, deenergizing transmission and distribution lines and equipment,
protective grounding, operating mechanical equipment near overhead
power lines, and working in manholes and vaults. The revised standards
will ensure that employers, when appropriate, must meet consistent
requirements for work performed under the construction and general
industry standards.
The final rule also revises the general industry and construction
standards for electrical protective equipment. The existing
construction standard for the design of electrical protective
equipment, which applies only to electric power transmission and
distribution work, adopts several national consensus standards by
reference. The new standard for electrical protective equipment, which
matches the corresponding general industry standard, applies to all
construction work and replaces the incorporation of out-of-date
consensus standards with a set of performance-oriented requirements
that is consistent with the latest revisions of the relevant consensus
standards. The final construction rule also includes new requirements
for the safe use and care of electrical protective equipment to
complement the equipment design provisions. Both the general industry
and construction standards for electrical protective equipment will
include new requirements for equipment made of materials other than
rubber.
OSHA is also revising the general industry standard for foot
protection. This standard applies to employers performing work on
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
installations, as well as employers in other industries. The final rule
removes the requirement for employees to wear protective footwear as
protection against electric shock.
DATES: The final rule becomes effective on July 10, 2014. (Certain
provisions have compliance deadlines after this date as explained later
in this preamble.)
ADDRESSES: In accordance with 28 U.S.C. 2112(a), the Agency designates
the Associate Solicitor of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health,
Office of the Solicitor of Labor, Room S4004, U.S. Department of Labor,
200 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210, to receive petitions
for review of the final rule.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
General information and press inquiries: Mr. Frank Meilinger,
Office of Communications, Room N3647, OSHA, U.S. Department of Labor,
200 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210; telephone (202) 693-
1999.
Technical information: Mr. David Wallis, Directorate of Standards
and Guidance, Room N3718, OSHA, U.S. Department of Labor, 200
Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210; telephone (202) 693-1950
or fax (202) 693-1678.
For additional copies of this Federal Register document, contact
OSHA, Office of Publications, U.S. Department of Labor, Room N3101, 200
Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210; telephone (202) 693-
1888. Electronic copies of this Federal Register document are available
at http://www.regulations.gov. Electronic copies of this Federal
Register document, as well as news releases and other relevant
documents, are available at OSHA's Web page at http://www.osha.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
A. Introduction
B. Need for Regulation
C. Affected Establishments
D. Benefits, Net Benefits, and Cost Effectiveness
E. Cost Effectiveness
F. Compliance Costs
G. Economic Impacts
H. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
II. Background
A. Acronyms and Abbreviations
B. Need for the Rule
C. Accident Data
D. Significant Risk and Reduction in Risk
III. Development of the Final Rule
A. History of the OSHA Standards
B. Relevant Consensus Standards
C. Advisory Committee on Construction Safety and Health
IV. Legal Authority
V. Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule
A. Section 1926.97, Electrical Protective Equipment
B. Subpart V, Electric Power Transmission and Distribution
C. Part 1910, Revisions
D. Part 1926, Removal of Incorporations by Reference
E. Part 1926, Subpart CC Revisions
VI. Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
A. Introduction
B. Need for the Rule
C. Examination of Alternative Regulatory Approaches
D. Profile of Affected Industries
E. Benefits, Net Benefits, and Cost Effectiveness
F. Technological Feasibility
G. Costs of Compliance
H. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
I. References
VII. Federalism
VIII. Unfunded Mandates
IX. Consultation and Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments
X. Office of Management and Budget Review Under the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995
A. Information Collection Request for the Proposed Rule
B. Information Collection Requirements in the Final Rule
XI. State-Plan Requirements
XII. Dates
A. The New Requirements for Transferring Information Between
Host Employers and Contract Employers (Sec. Sec. 1926.950(c) and
1910.269(a)(3))
B. Revised Provisions on the Use of Fall Protection Systems
(Sec. Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii) and (b)(3)(iv) and
1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C), and (g)(2)(iv)(D))
C. Revised Requirements for Minimum Approach Distances
(Sec. Sec. 1926.960(c)(1) and 1910.269(l)(3))
D. New Requirements for Protecting Employees From the Hazards
Associated with Electric Arcs (Sec. Sec. 1926.960(g) and
1910.269(l)(8))
XIII. Authority and Signature
Executive Summary
A. Introduction
OSHA last issued rules for the construction of transmission and
distribution installations in 1972. Those provisions are now out of
date and inconsistent with the more recently promulgated general
industry standard covering the operation and maintenance of electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution lines and equipment.
OSHA is revising the construction standard to make it more consistent
with the general industry standard and is making some revisions to both
the construction and general industry requirements. The final rules for
general industry and construction include new or revised provisions on
host employers and contractors, training, job briefings, fall
protection, insulation and working position of employees working on or
near live parts, minimum approach distances, protection from electric
arcs, deenergizing transmission and distribution lines and equipment,
protective grounding, operating mechanical equipment near overhead
power lines, and working in manholes and vaults. The revised standards
will ensure that employers, when appropriate, must meet consistent
requirements for work performed under the construction and general
industry standards.
The new provisions on host employers and contractors include
requirements for host employers and contract employers to exchange
information on hazards and on the conditions, characteristics, design,
and operation of the host employer's installation. These new provisions
also include a requirement for host employers and contract employers to
coordinate their work rules and procedures to protect all employees.
The revised provisions on training add requirements for the degree of
training to be determined by the risk to the employee for the hazard
involved and for training line-clearance tree trimmers and remove the
existing requirement for the employer to certify training. The revised
requirements for job briefings include a new requirement for the
employer to provide information about existing characteristics and
conditions to the employee in charge. The revised fall protection
provisions include new requirements for the use of fall restraint
systems or personal fall arrest systems in aerial lifts and for the use
of fall protection equipment by qualified employees climbing or
changing location on poles, towers, or similar structures. The revised
provisions on insulation and working position of employees working on
or near live parts include new requirements relating to where an
employee who is not using electrical protective equipment may work. The
revised provisions on minimum approach distances include a new
requirement for the employer to determine maximum anticipated per-unit
transient overvoltages through an engineering analysis or, as an
alternative, assume certain maximum anticipated per-unit transient
overvoltages. These provisions also replace requirements for specified
minimum approach distances with requirements for the employer to
establish minimum approach distances using specified formulas. The new
provisions for protection from electric arcs include new requirements
for the employer to: Assess the workplace to identify employees exposed
to hazards from flames or from electric arcs, make reasonable estimates
of the incident heat energy to which the employee would be exposed,
ensure that the outer layer of clothing worn by employees is flame
resistant under certain conditions, and generally ensure that employees
exposed to hazards from electric arcs wear protective clothing and
other protective equipment with an arc rating greater than or equal to
the estimated heat energy. The revised provisions on deenergizing
transmission and distribution lines and equipment clarify the
application of those provisions to multiple crews and to deenergizing
network protectors. The revised requirements for protective grounding
now permit employers to install and remove protective grounds on lines
and equipment operating at 600 volts or less without using a live-line
tool under certain conditions. The revised provisions for operating
mechanical equipment near overhead power lines clarify that the
exemption from the requirement to maintain minimum approach distances
applies only to the insulated portions of aerial lifts. The revised
provisions on working in manholes and vaults clarify that all of the
provisions for working in manholes also apply to working in vaults and
include a new requirement for protecting employees from electrical
faults when work could cause a fault in a cable.
The final rule also revises the general industry and construction
standards for electrical protective equipment. The existing
construction standard for the design of electrical protective
equipment, which applies only to electric power transmission and
distribution work, adopts several national consensus standards by
reference. The new standard for electrical protective equipment applies
to all construction work and replaces the incorporation of out-of-date
consensus standards with a set of performance-oriented requirements
that is consistent with the latest revisions of the relevant consensus
standards. The final construction rule also includes new requirements
for the safe use and care of electrical protective equipment to
complement the equipment design provisions. Both the general industry
and construction standards for electrical protective equipment will
include new requirements for equipment made of materials other than
rubber.
OSHA is also revising the general industry standard for foot
protection. This standard applies to employers performing work on
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
installations, as well as employers in other industries. The final rule
removes the requirement for employees to wear protective footwear as
protection against electric shock.
B. Need for Regulation
Employees doing work covered by the final rule are exposed to a
variety of significant hazards that can and do cause serious injury and
death. As explained fully in Section II.B, Need for the Rule, later in
this preamble, after carefully weighing the various potential
advantages and disadvantages of using a regulatory approach to reduce
risk, OSHA concludes that in this case mandatory standards represent
the best choice for reducing the risks to employees. In addition,
rulemaking is necessary in this case to replace older existing
standards with updated, clear, and consistent safety standards.
Inconsistencies between the construction and general industry standards
can create difficulties for employers attempting to develop appropriate
work practices for their employees. For example, an employer replacing
a switch on a transmission and distribution system is performing
construction work if it is upgrading the cutout, but general industry
work if it is simply replacing the cutout with the same model. Under
the existing standards, different requirements apply depending upon
whether the work is construction or general industry work. Under the
final rule, the requirements are the same.
C. Affected Establishments
The final rule affects establishments in a variety of different
industries involving electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution. The rule primarily affects firms that construct, operate,
maintain, or repair electric power generation, transmission, or
distribution installations. These firms
include electric utilities, as well as contractors hired by utilities
and primarily classified in the construction industry. In addition,
potentially affected firms are found in a variety of manufacturing and
other industries that own or operate their own electric power
generation, transmission, or distribution installations as a secondary
part of their business operations. The rule also affects establishments
performing line-clearance tree-trimming operations.
D. Benefits, Net Benefits, and Cost Effectiveness
OSHA expects the final rule to result in an increased degree of
safety for the affected employees, thereby reducing the numbers of
accidents, fatalities, and injuries associated with the relevant tasks
and reducing the severity of certain injuries, such as burns or
injuries that employees could sustain as a result of an arrested fall,
that may still occur during the performance of some of the affected
work procedures.
An estimated 74 fatalities and 444 serious injuries occur annually
among employees involved in the electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work addressed by the provisions of this
rulemaking. Based on a review and analysis of the incident reports
associated with the reported injuries and fatalities, OSHA expects full
compliance with the final rule to prevent 79.6 percent of the relevant
injuries and fatalities, compared with 52.9 percent prevented with full
compliance with the existing standards. Thus, OSHA estimates that the
final rule will prevent approximately 19.75 additional fatalities and
118.5 additional serious injuries annually. Applying an average
monetary value of $62,000 per prevented injury and a value of $8.7
million per prevented fatality results in estimated monetized benefits
of $179.2 million annually.
OSHA estimated the net monetized benefits of the final rule to be
about $129.7 million annually when costs are annualized at 7 percent
($179.2 million in benefits minus $49.5 million in costs), and $132.0
million when costs are annualized at 3 percent ($179.2 million in
benefits minus $47.1 million in costs). Note that these net benefits
exclude any unquantified benefits associated with revising existing
standards to provide updated, clear, and consistent regulatory
requirements for electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work. OSHA believes that the updated standards are easier
to understand and to apply. Accordingly, the Agency expects the final
rule to improve safety by facilitating compliance.
Table 1 summarizes the costs, benefits, net benefits, and cost
effectiveness of the final rule.
Table 1--Net Benefits and Cost Effectiveness *
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7 percent 3 percent
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Annualized Costs:
Calculating Incident Energy $2.2 million...... $1.8 million.
and Arc-Hazard Assessment
(Arc-Hazard Assessment).
Provision of Arc-Flash $17.3 million..... $15.7 million.
Protective Equipment.
Fall Protection............. $0.6 million...... $0.4 million.
Host-Contractor $17.8 million..... $17.8 million.
Communications.
Expanded Job Briefings...... $6.7 million...... $6.7 million.
Additional Training......... $3.0 million...... $2.7 million.
Other costs for employees $0.2 million...... $0.2 million.
not already covered by Sec.
1910.269.
MAD Costs................... $1.8 million...... $1.8 million.
Total Annual Costs...... $49.5 million..... $47.1 million.
Annual Benefits:
Number of Injuries Prevented 118.5............. 118.5.
Number of Fatalities 19.75............. 19.75.
Prevented.
Monetized Benefits (Assuming $179.2 million.... $179.2 million.
$62,000 per injury and $8.7
million per fatality
prevented.
OSHA standards that are Unquantified...... Unquantified.
updated and consistent.
Total Annual Benefits... 118.5 injuries and 118.5 injuries and
19.75 fatalities 19.75 fatalities
prevented. prevented.
Net Benefits (Benefits minus $129.7 million.... $132.0 million.
Costs):.
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* Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
Source: Office of Regulatory Analysis, OSHA. Details provided in text.
E. Cost Effectiveness
OSHA estimates that compliance with the final rule will result in
the prevention of an one fatality and six injuries per $2.4 million in
costs (using a 7-percent annualization rate) and one fatality and six
injuries per $2.2 million in costs (using a 3-percent annualization
rate).
F. Compliance Costs
The estimated costs of compliance with this rule represent the
additional costs necessary for employers to achieve full compliance.
They do not include costs for employers that are already in compliance
with the new requirements imposed by the final rule; nor do they
include costs employers must incur to achieve full compliance with
existing applicable requirements.
OSHA based the Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis and Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (PRIA) for the proposed rule, in part,
on a report prepared by CONSAD Corp. (Exhibit 0080) under contract to
OSHA. Eastern Research Group, Inc., (ERG) under contract to OSHA,
assisted in preparing the analysis of the final rule presented here.
With ERG's assistance, OSHA updated data on establishments, employment,
wages, and revenues, and updated the analyses in the final rule with
these new cost inputs. OSHA also calculated costs for provisions of the
final rule not accounted for in the PRIA. These costs are for the use
of upgraded fall protection equipment resulting from revised fall
protection requirements, the provision of arc-rated head and face
protection for some employees, the training of employees in the use of
new fall protection equipment, the calculation of minimum approach
distances, and, in some cases, the use of portable protective gaps
(PPGs) to comply with the new minimum approach-distance requirements.
The FEA also modifies the PRIA's approach
to estimating costs for arc-hazard assessments.
OSHA estimated the total annualized cost of compliance with the
present rulemaking to be between about $47.1 million (when costs are
annualized at 3 percent) and $49.5 million (when costs are annualized
at 7 percent). The final rule's requirements for employers to provide
arc-flash protective equipment account for the largest component of the
total compliance costs, at approximately $15.7 million to $17.2 million
(when costs are annualized at 3 and 7 percent, respectively). Other
nonnegligible compliance costs associated with the final rule include
costs related to host-contractor communications ($17.8 million), job
briefings ($6.7 million), training ($2.7 million to $3.0 million),
minimum approach distances ($1.8 million to $1.8 million), fall
protection ($0.4 million to $0.6 million), compliance with existing
Sec. 1910.269 for employees not already covered by that standard ($0.2
million), and arc-hazard assessments ($1.8 million to $2.2 million).
G. Economic Impacts
To assess the economic impacts associated with compliance with the
final rule, OSHA developed quantitative estimates of the potential
economic impact of the requirements in this rule on entities in each
affected industry. OSHA compared the estimated costs of compliance with
industry revenues and profits to provide an assessment of potential
economic impacts.
The costs of compliance for the final rule are not large in
relation to the corresponding annual financial flows associated with
the regulated activities. The estimated costs of compliance (when
annualized at 7 percent) represent about 0.007 percent of revenues and
0.06 percent of profits, on average, across all entities; compliance
costs do not represent more than 0.1 percent of revenues or more than
about 2 percent of profits in any affected industry.
The economic impact of the present rulemaking is most likely to
consist of a small increase in prices for electricity, of about 0.007
percent on average. It is unlikely that a price increase on the
magnitude of 0.007 percent will significantly alter the services
demanded by the public or any other affected customers or
intermediaries. If employers can substantially recoup the compliance
costs of the present rulemaking with such a minimal increase in prices,
there may be little effect on profits.
In general, for most establishments, it is likely that employers
can pass some or all of the compliance costs along in the form of
increased prices. In the event that unusual circumstances may inhibit
even a price increase of 0.1 percent (the highest estimated cost as a
percent of revenue in any of the affected industries), profits in any
of the affected industries would be reduced by a maximum of about 2
percent.
OSHA concludes that compliance with the requirements of the final
rule is economically feasible in every affected industry sector.
In addition, based on an analysis of the costs and economic impacts
associated with this rulemaking, OSHA concludes that the effects of the
final rule on international trade, employment, wages, and economic
growth for the United States are negligible.
H. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
The Regulatory Flexibility Act, as amended in 1996 by the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, requires the preparation
of a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis for certain rules
promulgated by agencies (5 U.S.C. 601-612). Under the provisions of the
law, each such analysis must contain: (1) A succinct statement of the
need for, and objectives of, the rule; (2) A summary of the significant
issues raised by the public comments in response to the initial
regulatory flexibility analysis, a summary of the assessment of the
agency of such issues, and a statement of any changes made in the final
rule as a result of such comments; (3) a description and an estimate of
the number of small entities to which the rule will apply or an
explanation of why no such estimate is available; (4) a description of
the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and other compliance
requirements of the rule, including an estimate of the classes of small
entities that will be subject to the requirement, and the type of
professional skills necessary for preparation of the report or record;
and (5) a description of the steps the agency took to minimize the
significant economic impact on small entities consistent with the
stated objectives of applicable statutes, including a statement of the
factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the alternative
adopted in the final rule, and why the agency rejected each one of the
other significant alternatives to the rule considered by the agency
which affect the impact on small entities.
OSHA analyzed the potential impact of the final rule on small and
very small entities, as described further under the heading "Final
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis," in Section VI, Final Economic
Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in this preamble.
OSHA concludes that the compliance costs are equivalent to
approximately 0.086 percent of profits for affected small entities
generally, and less than approximately 2.9 percent of profits for small
entities in any particular industry, and approximately 0.39 percent of
profits for affected very small entities generally, and less than
approximately 5.61 percent of profits for very small entities in any
particular industry.
II. Background
A. Acronyms and Abbreviations
The following acronyms have been used throughout this document:
ACCSH Advisory Committee on Construction Safety and Health
AED automated external defibrillator
AGC Associated General Contractors of America
ALJ administrative law judge
ANSI American National Standards Institute
APPA American Public Power Association
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
BLS Bureau of Labor Statistics
BPA Bonneville Power Administration
CFOI Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries
CPL 02-01-038 the compliance directive for existing Sec. 1910.269,
CPL 02-01-038, "Enforcement of the Electric Power Generation,
Transmission, and Distribution Standard" (June 18, 2003, originally
CPL 2-1.38D)
CPR cardiopulmonary resuscitation
CRIEPI Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry
EEI Edison Electric Institute
EIA Energy Information Administration
E.O. Executive Order
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
ERG Eastern Research Group, Inc.
ESCI Electrical Safety Consultants International
Ex. Exhibit \1\
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FEA Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
FR flame-resistant \2\
FRA flame-resistant apparel
FRECC Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation
FRFA Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
FTE full-time equivalent [employee]
IBEW International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
IMIS OSHA's Integrated Management Information System
IRFA Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
IRS Internal Revenue Service
ISEA International Safety Equipment Association
MAD minimum approach distance
MAID minimum air-insulation distance
MCC motor control center
MTID minimum tool-insulation distance
NA not applicable
NAHB National Association of Home Builders
NAICS North American Industry Classification System
NAM National Association of Manufacturers
NECA National Electrical Contractors Association
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
NESC National Electrical Safety Code
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NRECA National Rural Electric Cooperative Association
OIRA Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OSH Act (or the Act) Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OSHRC Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
PPE personal protective equipment
PPG portable protective gap
PRIA Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis and Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis
PSM process safety management
p.u. per unit
RIN regulatory information number
SBA Small Business Administration
SBAR Panel (or Panel) Small Business Advocacy Review Panel
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\1\ Exhibits are posted on http://www.regulations.gov and are
accessible at OSHA's Docket Office, Docket No. OSHA-S215-2006-0063,
U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Room N2625,
Washington, DC 20210; telephone (202) 693-2350. (OSHA's TTY number
is (877) 889-5627.) OSHA Docket Office hours of operation are 8:15
a.m. to 4:45 p.m., E.T.
Throughout this notice exhibit numbers are referred to in the
form Ex. XXXX, where XXXX is the last four digits of the full
document number on http://www.regulations.gov. For example, document
number OSHA-S215-2006-0063-0001 is referred to as Ex. 0001. Exhibit
numbers referred to as "269-Ex." are from the record for the 1994
final rule on Sec. Sec. 1910.137 and 1910.269 and are contained in
Docket Number OSHA-S015-2006-0645.
\2\ In citations, such as 70 FR 34822, "FR" means "Federal
Register."
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SBREFA Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
SER small entity representative
SIC Standard Industrial Classification
T maximum transient overvoltage, which is defined as the ratio of
the 2-percent statistical switching overvoltage expected at the
worksite to the nominal peak line-to-ground voltage of the system
TCIA Tree Care Industry Association
the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking the rulemaking in which existing
Sec. Sec. 1910.137 and Sec. 1910.269 were developed and published
on January 31, 1994
Tr. Transcript page number or numbers from the March 6-14, 2006,
public hearing on the proposed rule \3\
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\3\ Exhibit numbers 0509 through 0515.
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Tr2. Transcript page number or numbers from the October 28, 2009,
public hearing on the limited reopening of the proposed rule \4\
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\4\ Exhibit number 0571.
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TVA Tennessee Valley Authority
ULCC Utility Line Clearance Coalition
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
UWUA Utility Workers Union of America
WCRI Worker Compensation Research Institute
Record citations. References in parentheses are to exhibits or
transcripts in the rulemaking record. Documents from the Subpart V
rulemaking record are accessible at the Docket Office under Docket
OSHA-S215-2006-0063 (originally Docket S-215). (The 2006 transcripts,
abbreviated as "Tr.," are listed in this docket as "exhibits" 0509
through 0515. The 2009 transcript, abbreviated as "Tr2.," is listed
as "exhibit" 0571.) Because the subpart V proposal was based in large
part on existing Sec. 1910.269, OSHA has also relied on the record
developed during the earlier rulemaking for that general industry
standard (the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking). EEI "incorporate[d]
into [the subpart V] record the entire record in . . . the record
underlying existing Section 1910.269" (Ex. 0227). References in this
preamble that are prefixed by "269" are to exhibits and transcripts
in the rulemaking record from OSHA's 1994 rulemaking on Sec. 1910.137
and Sec. 1910.269 (59 FR 4320-4476, Jan. 31, 1994). These documents
are accessible at the Docket Office under Docket OSHA-S015-2006-0645
(originally Docket S-015).\5\
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\5\ Documents in the records, with the exception of copyrighted
material such as ASTM standards, are also generally available
electronically at http://www.regulations.gov. The subpart V and 1994 Sec.
1910.269 dockets are available at:
http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;dct=FR+PR+N+O+SR+PS;rpp=250;po=0;D=OSHA-S215-2006-0063
and http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;dct=FR+PR+N+O+SR+PS;rpp=250;po=0;D=OSHA-S015-2006-0645,
respectively.
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Some exhibits (see, for example, Exs. 0002, 0003, 0004, and 0400)
contain records of accidents that are relevant to work covered by the
final rule. In several instances in this preamble, OSHA has included
hyperlinks to accident descriptions from those exhibits. Those
hyperlinks link to one or more accident records in OSHA's IMIS system.
The hyperlinked pages contain the most recent version of those records,
which might have been edited since being placed in the record for this
rulemaking. Consequently, the accident descriptions could differ
slightly from the description included in the rulemaking record.
However, the accident record numbers in the hyperlinked page match the
accident record numbers in the relevant exhibit.
B. Need for the Rule
Employees performing work involving electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution are exposed to a variety of hazards,
including fall, electric shock, and burn hazards, that can and do cause
serious injury and death. These workers are often exposed to energized
parts of the power system, and the voltages involved are generally much
higher than voltages encountered in other types of work. OSHA estimates
that, on average, 74 fatalities and 444 serious injuries occur annually
among these workers. (See Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in the preamble, for a detailed
discussion of the methodology used to develop these estimates.)
Although some of these incidents may have been prevented with
better compliance with existing safety standards, OSHA concludes that
many, in fact almost half of, fatal and nonfatal injuries among
employees covered by the final rule would continue to occur even if
employers were in full compliance with existing standards. Discounting
incidents that would potentially have been prevented with compliance
with existing standards, an estimated additional 19.75 fatalities and
118.5 serious injuries will be prevented each year through full
compliance with the final rule. (See Section VI, Final Economic
Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in the preamble,
for a detailed discussion of the methodology used to develop these
estimates.)
This rulemaking will have the additional benefit of providing
updated, clear, and consistent safety standards for electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution work. OSHA currently has
different standards covering construction and general industry work on
electric power transmission and distribution systems. In most
instances, the work practices used by employees are the same whether
they are performing construction or general industry work. Which
standard applies to a particular job depends upon whether the employer
is altering the system (construction work) or maintaining the system
(general industry work). For example, an employer replacing a cutout
(disconnect switch) on a transmission and distribution system is
performing construction work if it is upgrading the cutout, but general
industry work if it is simply replacing the cutout with the same model.
Since the work practices used by the employees would most
likely be identical, the applicable OSHA standards should be as similar
as possible. Inconsistencies between the construction and general
industry standards can create difficulties for employers attempting to
develop appropriate work practices for their employees. Currently, it
is conceivable that, for work involving two or more cutouts, different
and conflicting OSHA standards (that is, one for construction work, the
other for general industry work) might apply. For this reason,
employers and employees have told OSHA that it should make the two
standards more consistent with each other. This final rule does so.
(This issue is addressed in greater detail in the summary and
explanation for Sec. 1926.950, in Section V, Summary and Explanation
of the Final Rule, later in this preamble.)
Moreover, the final rule adds important updates to, and clarifies,
existing standards. The existing standards for the construction of
electric power transmission and distribution lines and equipment and
for electrical protective equipment are contained in subpart V of
OSHA's construction standards (29 CFR 1926.950 through 1926.960).
Subpart V was promulgated on November 23, 1972, around 40 years ago (37
FR 24880, Nov. 23, 1972). Some of the technology involved in electric
power transmission and distribution work has changed since then, and
the current standards do not reflect those changes. For example,
methods for determining minimum approach distances have become more
exact since 1972, and the minimum approach distances in existing Sec.
1926.950(c)(1) are not based on the latest methodology. The minimum
approach distances in the final rule are more protective and more
technologically sound than the distances specified in the existing
standard. Even the newer general industry standards on the operation
and maintenance of electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution installations (29 CFR 1910.269) and electrical protective
equipment (29 CFR 1910.137) are not entirely consistent with the latest
advances in technology.
Finally, the final rule clarifies certain confusing parts of the
regulations. See, for example, Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. OSHRC, 567
F.2d 735, 738 (7th Cir. 1977) ("[r]evision of the regulations by any
competent draftsman would greatly improve their clarity").
C. Accident Data
OSHA has looked to several sources for information on accidents in
the electric utility industry in preparing this final rule. Besides
OSHA's own accident investigation files (recorded in the Agency's
Integrated Management Information System (IMIS)), statistics on
injuries are compiled by the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) and by the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW). Additionally,
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) publishes accident data, including
incidence rates for total cases, lost-workday cases, and lost workdays,
and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
publishes accident data as part of its Fatality Assessment and Control
Evaluation Program.
To develop estimates of the potential benefits associated with the
standards during the proposal stage, CONSAD Corp., under contract to
OSHA, researched and reviewed potential sources of useful data. CONSAD,
in consultation with the Agency, determined that the most reliable data
sources for this purpose were OSHA's IMIS data and the Census of Fatal
Occupational Injuries developed by BLS. A majority of the accidents
reviewed by CONSAD involved electrocutions or shocks. In addition, a
significant percentage of victims (5.5 percent) suffered from burns to
their arms, abdomen, or legs from electric arc blasts and flashes, and
another sizeable group of victims (3.2 percent) died or sustained
injuries after falling out of vehicle-mounted aerial lifts.\6\
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\6\ " Analytical Support and Data Gathering for a Preliminary
Economic Analysis for Proposed Standards for Work on Electric Power
Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Lines and Equipment (29
CFR 1910.269 and 29 CFR 1926--Subpart V)," 2005, CONSAD Research
Corp. (Ex. 0080).
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D. Significant Risk and Reduction in Risk
Section 3(8) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH
Act or the Act) defines an "occupational safety and health standard"
as "a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of
one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes,
reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful
employment and places of employment." 29 U.S.C. 652(8). This
definition has been interpreted to require OSHA to make a threshold
showing of "significant risk" before it can promulgate a safety or
health standard. See, for example, Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Institute (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality
opinion); see also, for example, UAW v. OSHA (Lockout/Tagout II), 37
F.3d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Agency's obligation to show significant
risk is not, however, a "mathematical straitjacket." Benzene, 448
U.S. at 655. In fact, the Agency has discretion to "determine, in the
first instance, what it considers to be a `significant' risk[,]" and
it "is not required to support its finding that a significant risk
exists with anything approaching scientific certainty." Id. at 655-56;
see also, for example, Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson
(Ethylene Oxide), 796 F.2d 1479, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Although OSHA makes significant risk findings for both health and
safety standards, see Lockout/Tagout II, 37 F.3d 665, the methodology
used to evaluate risk in safety rulemakings is more straightforward.
Unlike the risks related to health hazards, which "may not be evident
until a worker has been exposed for long periods of time to particular
substances," the risks associated with safety hazards such as burns
and falls, "are generally immediate and obvious." Benzene, 448 U.S.
at 649, n.54. See also 59 FR 28594, 28599 (June 2, 1994) (proposed rule
for longshoring and marine terminals, explaining that health hazards
"are frequently undetectable because they are subtle or develop slowly
or after long latency periods," whereas safety hazards "cause
immediately noticeable physical harm"). As OSHA explained in its
lockout-tagout rulemaking:
For health standards, such as benzene, risk estimates are
commonly based upon mathematical models (e.g., dose response curves)
and the benefits are quantified by estimating the number of future
fatalities that would be prevented under various exposure
reductions. [In contrast, f]or safety standards risk is based upon
the assumption that past accident patterns are representative of
future ones. OSHA estimates benefits [for safety standards] by
determining the percentage of accidents that will be prevented by
compliance with the standard. . . . [58 FR 16612, 16623, Mar. 30,
1993]
OSHA's Final Economic and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis presents
the Agency's assessment of the risks and benefits of this final rule.
(See Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis, later in the preamble.) In these analyses, as previously
mentioned, OSHA estimates that there are 74 fatalities and 444 serious
injuries among employees covered by this final rule each year. The
Agency has determined that almost half of those injuries and fatalities
would have occurred even if employers were in full compliance with
existing standards. (See Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in the preamble, in
which OSHA estimates that 53 percent of injuries and fatalities could
have been prevented through full compliance with existing standards.)
The accident data reviewed during this rulemaking, as explained in
detail in the economic and regulatory analyses, reveals that the
injuries and fatalities suffered by workers in power generation,
transmission, and distribution result from electric shocks, burns from
electric arcs, and falls, as well as other types of harmful incidents,
including ones in which employees are struck by, struck against, or
caught between, objects. Based on the large number of injuries and
fatalities occurring in this industry each year, and the fact that
existing standards are inadequate to prevent almost half of those
incidents, OSHA has determined that employees working on electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution installations are currently
exposed to a significant risk of injury or death.\7\
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\7\ In industries in which worker exposure is less frequent than
in other industries, the number of injuries or fatalities associated
with the hazards covered by the final rule will most likely be less
than that of industries that have a higher rate of exposure. But
even for industries with low, negligible, or even no reported
injuries or fatalities, the workers exposed to the hazards covered
by the final rule face a "significant risk of material harm." As
such, there is a significant risk to any worker of any industry
exposed to the hazards covered by the final rule. See, for example,
Lockout/Tagout II, 37 F.3d at 670 ("even in industries with low or
negligible overall accident rates, the workers who engage in the
operations covered by the standard face a `significant risk of
material harm"'); Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v.
Brock, 862 F.2d 63, 67-68 (3d Cir. 1988) (where the Court ordered
OSHA to expand its rule to cover additional industries, there was no
need to make separate significant risk findings for those industries
because "the significant risk requirement must of necessity be
satisfied by a general finding concerning all potentially covered
industries").
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency estimates that the changes implemented in this final
rule will prevent 19.75 fatalities and 118.5 serious injuries each
year. (See Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis, later in the preamble.) OSHA, therefore,
concludes that this final standard substantially reduces the
significant risk that currently exists at power generation,
transmission, and distribution worksites. As noted in Section VI, Final
Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in the
preamble, the various new provisions and amendments being adopted
target the hazards the Agency has identified as contributors to the
significant risk associated with electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work. Therefore, each element of this
final rule is reasonably necessary and appropriate to achieve the
anticipated reduction in overall risk.
No rulemaking participants meaningfully disputed OSHA's conclusion
that the aforementioned estimates establish a significant risk for
power generation, transmission, and distribution work. EEI, however,
argued that OSHA has an obligation to make an independent significant
risk showing for each of the hazards addressed by this rulemaking (See,
for example, Exs. 0227, 0501; see also Ex. 0237 (comments of the
American Forest & Paper Association).) OSHA does not agree that it is
required to make multiple, hazard-specific significant risk findings.
As OSHA has explained in prior rulemakings, "[v]ertical standards
[such as Sec. 1910.269 and subpart V of part 1926] apply specifically
to a given industry" or type of work (59 FR 28596 (proposed rule for
longshoring and marine terminals)). They generally address multiple
hazards faced by employees performing the covered work. See, for
example, 66 FR 5196 (Jan. 18, 2001) (steel erection standards address,
among other hazards, risks from working under loads, dangers associated
with landing and placing decking, and falls to lower levels); 62 FR
40142 (July 25, 1997) (standards covering longshoring and marine
terminals address multiple hazards, including hazards associated with
manual cargo handling and exposure to hazardous atmospheres); 52 FR
49592 (Dec. 31, 1987) (standard covering grain-handling facilities
includes provisions related to fire and explosion hazards, as well as
other safety hazards, such as the danger associated with entering bins,
silos, and tanks). OSHA believes that vertical "standards can
encourage voluntary compliance because they are directed to the
particular problems of [an] industry" (59 FR 28596). The adoption of
vertical standards is recognized as a legitimate exercise of OSHA's
standard-setting authority under the OSH Act. See Forging Indus. Ass'n
v. Secretary of Labor (Noise), 773 F.2d 1436, 1455 (4th Cir. 1985)
("[T]he Agency has determined that a particular industry should be
made the subject of a vertical standard. . . . That decision was not
arbitrary or capricious . . . . Nor does the use of a comprehensive
vertical standard amount to a prohibited special treatment").
Although the Agency can identify the general types of hazards
addressed by its vertical standards, and has done so in this
rulemaking, there is no legal requirement for hazard-by-hazard
significant risk findings in vertical standards. First, the DC Circuit
Court of Appeals has already rejected the argument "that Benzene
requires that the agency find that each and every aspect of its
standard eliminates a significant risk faced by employees." Ethylene
Oxide, 796 F.2d at 1502, n. 16. Once OSHA makes a general finding of
significant risk, the question becomes whether the requirements of the
standard are reasonably related to the standard's purpose. See, for
example, Noise, 773 F.2d at 1447. Second, when the Supreme Court first
construed the OSH Act as imposing a significant risk requirement, it
spoke in terms of the Agency making findings about unsafe workplaces,
not individual hazards. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 642 ("before promulgating
any standard, the Secretary must make a finding that the workplaces in
question are not safe [and] a workplace can hardly be considered
`unsafe' unless it threatens the workers with a significant risk of
harm"). See also, for example, id. (framing the "significant risk"
requirement as obligating OSHA "to make a threshold finding that a
place of employment is unsafe--in the sense that significant risks are
present and can be eliminated or lessened by a change in practices");
Texas Indep. Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 400 (5th Cir.
1980) ("[t]he Supreme Court recently ruled that the Act requires OSHA
to provide substantial evidence that a significant risk of harm arises
from a workplace or employment"). Third, courts have held that the OSH
Act does not require the disaggregation of significant risk analyses
along other lines. See, for example, Lockout/Tagout II, 37 F.3d at 670
(upholding OSHA's decision not to conduct individual significant risk
analyses for various affected industries); American Dental Ass'n v.
Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 827 (7th Cir. 1993) (OSHA is not required to
evaluate risk "workplace by workplace"); Associated Builders and
Contractors, 862 F.2d at 68 ("the significant risk requirement must of
necessity be satisfied by a general finding concerning all potentially
covered industries").
Requiring OSHA to make multiple, hazard-specific significant risk
findings would place an unwarranted burden on OSHA rulemaking because
of difficulties in specifically defining each of the hazards addressed
by a vertical standard.\8\ Hazards can be defined
broadly, for example, falling from an elevation, or more narrowly, for
example, falling from an elevated aerial lift while performing tree-
trimming work. The outcome of the significant risk analysis called for
by EEI would be largely (and somewhat arbitrarily) dependent on where
along this vast spectrum OSHA defined the relevant dangers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Indeed, disputes over how to define hazards are commonplace
in enforcement cases under the general duty clause of the OSH Act.
See, for example, Secretary of Labor v. Arcadian Corp., 20 BNA OSHC
2001 (OSHRC, Sept. 30, 2004); Secretary of Labor v. Inland Steel
Co., 12 BNA OSHC 1968 (OSHRC, July 30, 1986); Secretary of Labor v.
Pelron Corp., 12 BNA OSHC 1833 (OSHRC, June 2, 1986).
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OSHA reviewed the authority EEI relied on in support of the
purported requirement for hazard-specific risk findings, but does not
find it persuasive. First, EEI argued that the Supreme Court, in its
Benzene decision, held that the Agency had to make separate significant
risk findings for the air-contaminant and dermal-contact provisions of
that standard (Ex. 0227). A close reading of the decision in that case
reveals no such holding. Instead, the dermal-contact provisions in that
case were remanded on the same basis that the air-contaminant
provisions were rejected--namely that the provisions were not supported
by any significant risk findings. See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 661-62.
While the Court did suggest that OSHA needed to find that a prohibition
on dermal contact was reasonably necessary and appropriate to address a
significant risk, that is, that preventing dermal contact would reduce
the overall risk associated with workplace exposure to benzene, it did
not address whether a single significant risk finding could ultimately
support both the dermal-contact and air-contaminant provisions in the
standard. Id.
Second, EEI relied on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in AFL-CIO v.
OSHA (PELs), 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992), which vacated and remanded
OSHA's Air Contaminants Standard (Ex. 0227). That rule set permissible
exposure limits for more than 400 toxic substances. Although in that
case the court said that OSHA needed to explain its assessment of risk
for each regulated substance, that rulemaking is readily distinguished
from this final rule. In PELs, the various regulated substances were
"unrelated" and had "little [in] common." 965 F.2d at 972. Here, in
contrast, the various hazards addressed by this final rule are closely
related. They all arise at power generation, transmission, and
distribution worksites and jointly contribute to the large number of
injuries and fatalities suffered by covered workers. OSHA does not
believe that the PELs decision limits its discretion to adopt
provisions it deems reasonably necessary and appropriate to abate the
existing electrocution, burn, fall, and other hazards that, together,
result in covered employees being exposed to an overall workplace risk
that is significant.
Finally, EEI's reliance on the Agency's ergonomics rulemaking is
misplaced. EEI pointed out that OSHA's risk assessment in its
ergonomics rulemaking considered only accidents that resulted from
hazards covered by that standard (Ex. 0227). But this interpretation
offers no support for EEI's position, as the risk assessment in this
rulemaking similarly considered only injuries and fatalities that
occurred during the performance of work covered by this final rule (Ex.
0080). (See also Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis, later in the preamble.)
Although OSHA does not agree that hazard-specific significant risk
findings are necessary, the Agency believes that the record supports
such findings for the critical hazards addressed in this rulemaking--
namely electrocutions and electric shocks, burns from arc flashes, and
falls. The Agency has found that a significant number of injuries and
fatalities occur every year as a result of employee exposure to each of
these hazards. (See Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis, later in the preamble.) Moreover, as EEI points
out, "most of the hazards" addressed in this rulemaking "are already
covered by the existing standards that OSHA [is] now . . . modify[ing]
and supplement[ing]" (Ex. 0227). Furthermore, some of the hazards
addressed by this rulemaking are already the subject of generally
applicable hazard-specific horizontal standards. See, for example, 29
CFR part 1926, subpart K (electrical hazards) and subpart M (fall
hazards). All of these existing standards were supported by findings of
significant risk, and OSHA simply concludes that the additional
provisions of this final rule are reasonably necessary and appropriate
to reduce a substantial portion of the remaining significant risk at
power generation, transmission, and distribution worksites.
III. Development of the Final Rule
A. History of the OSHA Standards
OSHA first adopted standards for the construction of power
transmission and distribution lines and equipment in 1972 (subpart V of
29 CFR part 1926). OSHA defines the term "construction work" in 29
CFR 1910.12(b) as "work for construction, alteration, and/or repair,
including painting and decorating." The term "construction" is
broadly defined in Sec. 1910.12(d) and existing Sec. 1926.950(a)(1)
to include the original installation of, as well as the alteration,
conversion, and improvement of electric power transmission and
distribution lines and equipment.
The general industry standard at 29 CFR 1910.269 applies to the
operation and maintenance of electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution installations. OSHA adopted Sec. 1910.269 on January
31, 1994. That standard is a companion standard to subpart V of the
construction standards and addresses work to which subpart V did not
apply. When promulgated, Sec. 1910.269 was also based on the latest
technology and national consensus standards.
OSHA revised its Electrical Protective Equipment Standard in Sec.
1910.137 at the same time Sec. 1910.269 was promulgated. The revision
of Sec. 1910.137 eliminated the incorporation by reference of national
consensus standards for rubber insulating equipment and replaced it
with performance-oriented rules for the design, manufacture, and safe
care and use of electrical protective equipment.
OSHA published a proposed rule (the subpart V proposal) on June 15,
2005 (70 FR 34822). That document proposed revising the construction
standard for electric power transmission and distribution work (29 CFR
part 1926, subpart V) and the general industry standards for electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution work (29 CFR
1910.269). That document also proposed a new construction standard for
electrical protective equipment (29 CFR 1926.97) and revisions to the
general industry standards for foot protection (29 CFR 1910.136) and
electrical protective equipment (29 CFR 1910.137). Public comments were
originally due by October 13, 2005, but in response to requests from
interested parties, including EEI, OSHA extended the comment period 90
days to January 11, 2006 (70 FR 59290, Oct. 12, 2005). OSHA held an
informal public hearing beginning on March 6, 2006, and ending on March
14, 2006. After the hearing, interested parties had until May 15, 2006,
to submit additional information and until July 14, 2006, to file
posthearing briefs (Tr. 1415).
On October 22, 2008, OSHA reopened the record for 30 days to gather
information from the public on specific questions related to minimum
approach distances (73 FR 62942). EEI requested a public hearing and an
additional 60 days to submit comments on the issues raised in the
reopening notice (Ex. 0530). On September 14, 2009, OSHA
opened the record for an additional 30 days to receive more comments on
minimum approach distances and announced a public hearing to be held on
October 28, 2009, addressing the limited issues raised in the two
reopening notices (74 FR 46958). After the hearing, interested parties
had until December 14, 2009, to submit additional information and until
February 10, 2010, to file posthearing briefs (Tr2. 199).
The record for this rulemaking consists of all prehearing comments,
the transcripts of the two public hearings, all exhibits submitted
prior to and during the two hearings, and posthearing submissions and
briefs. Administrative Law Judge Stephen Purcell issued an order
closing the record and certified the record to the Assistant Secretary
of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health. The Agency carefully
considered the entire record in preparing this final standard.
B. Relevant Consensus Standards
The National Electrical Safety Code (American National Standards
Institute (ANSI) Standard ANSI/IEEE C2, also known as the NESC)
contains provisions specifically addressing electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work. ANSI/IEEE C2 does not, however,
address the full range of hazards covered by this final rule. It is
primarily directed to the prevention of electric shock, although it
does contain a few requirements for the prevention of falls and burns
from electric arcs.
The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) has adopted
standards related to electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work. ASTM Committee F18 on Electrical Protective
Equipment for Workers has developed standards on rubber insulating
equipment, climbing equipment, protective grounding equipment,
fiberglass rod and tube used in live-line tools, and clothing for
workers exposed to electric arcs.
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has adopted a
standard on electrical safety for employees, NFPA 70E, Standard for
Electrical Safety in the Workplace. Although it does not apply to
electric power generation, transmission, or distribution installations,
the NFPA standard contains provisions addressing work near such
installations performed by unqualified employees, that is, employees
who have not been trained to work on or with electric power generation,
transmission, or distribution installations. It also contains methods
for estimating heat energy levels from electric arcs and describes ways
to protect employees from arc-flash hazards.
The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) writes
standards for electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
installations and for work on those installations. Many of these
standards have been adopted by ANSI. Among these IEEE standards are:
IEEE Std 516, IEEE Guide for Maintenance Methods on Energized Power-
Lines, and IEEE Std 1048, IEEE Guide for Protective Grounding of Power
Lines.
OSHA recognizes the important role consensus standards can play in
ensuring worker safety. A comprehensive list of consensus standards
relating to electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
work can be found in existing Appendix E to Sec. 1910.269. OSHA
proposed to add the same list as Appendix E to subpart V. OSHA
considered the latest editions of all the standards listed in Appendix
E in the development of this final rule. Any substantial deviations
from these consensus standards are explained in Section V, Summary and
Explanation of the Final Rule, later in this preamble.
C. Advisory Committee on Construction Safety and Health
Under 29 CFR parts 1911 and 1912, OSHA must consult with the
Advisory Committee on Construction Safety and Health (ACCSH or the
Committee), established pursuant to Section 107 of the Contract Work
Hours and Safety Standards Act (40 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.), in setting
standards for construction work. Specifically, Sec. 1911.10(a)
requires the Assistant Secretary to provide ACCSH with a draft proposed
rule (along with pertinent factual information) and give the Committee
an opportunity to submit recommendations. See also Sec. 1912.3(a)
("[W]henever occupational safety or health standards for construction
activities are proposed, the Assistant Secretary [for Occupational
Safety and Health] shall consult the Advisory Committee.").
OSHA has a long history of consulting with ACCSH on this
rulemaking. On May 25, 1995, OSHA took a draft of the proposed
construction standards to ACCSH, providing the Committee with a draft
of the proposal and with a statement on the need to update the
standards. The Committee formed a workgroup to review the materials,
and the workgroup provided comments to OSHA. The Agency gave a status
report on the proposal to the Committee on August 8, 1995, and an
updated draft of the proposal to ACCSH on December 10, 1999. On
February 13, 2003, OSHA gave ACCSH another status report and summarized
the major revisions it had made to the proposal. On May 22, 2003, OSHA
provided the Committee with the same copy of the draft proposal that
had been provided to the small entity representatives who were
participating in the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement and Fairness
Act (SBREFA) proceedings, which were being conducted at that time. OSHA
also explained the major issues being raised by the small entity
representatives on the draft proposal.
On May 18, 2004, ACCSH gave the Agency formal recommendations on
the proposal. OSHA sought ACCSH's recommendations on the proposal
generally, as well as on issues specifically related to host employer-
contractor communications and flame-resistant clothing. ACCSH voted
unanimously that: (1) The construction standards for electric power
transmission and distribution work should be the same as the general
industry standards for the same type of work; (2) it was necessary to
require some safety-related communications between host employers and
contractors; and (3) employees need to be protected from hazards posed
by electric arcs through the use of flame-retardant clothing. ACCSH
recommended, by unanimous vote, that OSHA issue its proposal,
consistent with these specific recommendations.\9\
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\9\ ACCSH transcript for May 18, 2004, pages 224-239. This
document can be viewed in the OSHA Docket Office or online at http://www.osha.gov.
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EEI suggested that OSHA had to seek additional input from ACCSH if
it decided to rely on the recent work of the IEEE technical committee
responsible for revising IEEE Std 516, which has not been presented to
ACCSH, in developing the final rule's minimum approach-distance
provisions (Tr2. 18-19). EEI is not correct. In making its assertion,
EEI relies on Nat'l Constructors Ass'n. v. Marshall (Nat'l
Constructors), 581 F.2d 960 (D.C. Cir. 1978). EEI's reliance on this
case is misplaced. Although the court stated that the OSH Act and
OSHA's procedural regulations (29 U.S.C. 655(b)(1); 29 CFR 1911.10(a))
place "a `stricter' requirement on when, and how often, the agency
must utilize the advisory committee procedure than does the
[Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] with respect to public comment
during informal rulemaking," id. at 970, that statement in the
decision is nonprecedential dicta. The court did not "decide how much
stricter the requirement is" because, the court
concluded, the rule at issue did not meet "even the APA's . . .
standard." Id. at 971 n.27. As such, the case stands, at most, for the
proposition that OSHA must return to ACCSH where the final rule at
issue does not meet the APA's "logical outgrowth" test.
OSHA's consultation with ACCSH in this rulemaking was consistent
with the Nat'l Constructors decision. The Nat'l Constructors court
stated that OSHA had to engage in further consultation with ACCSH
regarding its ground-fault circuit protection standard where the final
rule recognized "assured equipment grounding conductor programs" as a
method of compliance, but ACCSH had never had the opportunity to
comment on that particular form of employee protection. The DC Circuit
concluded that the compliance program in question was neither presented
to ACCSH, nor "gr[e]w logically out of anything that was presented to,
or heard from, the Committee." Id. at 970--971. In this Subpart V
rulemaking, in contrast, the basic requirement to adhere to minimum
approach distances was presented to ACCSH. (See, for example, ACCSH
Docket ACCSH 1995-2.) The Agency is simply refining the method used to
establish the minimum approach distances \10\ in light of technical
progress that has been made since the proposal was reviewed by ACCSH.
(For a complete discussion of the minimum approach-distance
requirements and OSHA's rationale for adopting them, see the summary
and explanation for final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1), in Section V, Summary
and Explanation of the Final Rule, later in this preamble.)
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\10\ The basic equation for computing minimum approach distances
in the final rule is the same as the one used in existing Sec.
1910.269 and in the draft proposal submitted to ACCSH.
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In any event, ACCSH had an opportunity to comment on whether OSHA
should rely on the work of the IEEE committee generally. ACCSH knew
that OSHA might base the minimum approach distances for subpart V on
existing Sec. 1910.269. (See, for example, Exhibit 12 in Docket ACCSH
1995-2 and Exhibit 101-X in Docket ACCSH 1995-3.) In fact, ACCSH
ultimately concluded in its recommendation that the construction
standards for electric power transmission and distribution work should
be the same as the general industry standards for the same type of
work. As existing Sec. 1910.269's minimum approach-distance
requirements were derived from IEEE Std 516 (59 FR 4320, 4382-4384
(Jan. 31, 1994)), ACCSH was on notice that the work of the IEEE 516
committee might be used by the Agency in formulating the minimum
approach-distance requirements for this final rule.
That ACCSH did not specifically pass on the question of whether
OSHA should derive its minimum approach-distance requirements from work
done in the formulation of an IEEE standard that was not yet issued at
the time of the ACCSH consultation is of no consequence. The OSH Act
and OSHA's procedural regulation (29 U.S.C. 655(b)(1); 29 CFR
1911.10(a)) "make clear that the Assistant Secretary need only supply
whatever information he has available to him at the time he submits his
proposal to the Committee." Nat'l Constructors, 581 F.2d at 968. As
the Nat'l Constructors Court recognized, "by designing the Advisory
Committee option as a procedural step that must precede public notice,
comment, and the informal hearing, [Congress] assumed that the
Committee would not be provided with all information that the Labor
Department eventually developed on the subject." Id. at 968 n.16.
Thus, OSHA's action in the final rule is consistent with Nat'l
Constructors.
IV. Legal Authority
The purpose of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq., is "to assure
so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources." 29
U.S.C. 651(b). To achieve this goal, Congress authorized the Secretary
of Labor to promulgate and enforce occupational safety and health
standards. 29 U.S.C. 654, 655(b), 658.
A safety or health standard "requires conditions, or the adoption
or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or
processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment and places of employment." 29 U.S.C. 652(8). A
safety standard is reasonably necessary or appropriate within the
meaning of 29 U.S.C. 652(8) if:
It substantially reduces a significant risk of material
harm in the workplace;
It is technologically and economically feasible;
It uses the most cost-effective protective measures;
It is consistent with, or is a justified departure from,
prior Agency action;
It is supported by substantial evidence; and
It is better able to effectuate the purposes of the OSH
Act than any relevant national consensus standard.
Lockout/Tagout II, 37 F.3d at 668. In addition, safety standards must
be highly protective. See, for example, id. at 669.
A standard is technologically feasible if the protective measures
it requires already exist, can be brought into existence with available
technology, or can be created with technology that can reasonably be
expected to be developed. See, for example, American Iron and Steel
Inst. v. OSHA (Lead II), 939 F.2d 975, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per
curiam). A standard is economically feasible when industry can absorb
or pass on the costs of compliance without threatening industry's long-
term profitability or competitive structure. See, for example, American
Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 530 n. 55 (1981); Lead
II, 939 F.2d at 980. A standard is cost effective if the protective
measures it requires are the least costly of the available alternatives
that achieve the same level of protection. See, for example, Lockout/
Tagout II, 37 F.3d at 668.
Section 6(b)(7) of the OSH Act authorizes OSHA to include among a
standard's requirements labeling, monitoring, medical testing, and
other information-gathering and information-transmittal provisions. 29
U.S.C. 655(b)(7). Finally, the OSH Act requires that when promulgating
a rule that differs substantially from a national consensus standard,
OSHA must explain why the promulgated rule is a better method for
effectuating the purposes of the Act. 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(8). Deviations
from relevant consensus standards are explained elsewhere in this
preamble.
V. Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule
OSHA is adopting a new construction standard on electrical
protective equipment, 29 CFR 1926.97, and is revising the standard on
the construction of electric power transmission and distribution lines
and equipment, 29 CFR part 1926, subpart V. The Agency is also revising
the general industry counterparts to these two construction standards,
29 CFR 1910.137 and 1910.269, respectively. Finally, OSHA is revising
its general industry standard on foot protection, 29 CFR 1910.136, to
require employers to ensure that each affected employee uses protective
footwear when the use of protective footwear will protect the affected
employee from an electrical hazard, such as a static-discharge or
electric-shock hazard, that remains after the employer takes other
necessary protective measures.
This section discusses the important elements of the final rule,
explains the individual requirements, and explains
any differences between the final rule and existing standards. This
section also discusses issues that were raised at the two public
hearings, significant comments received as part of the rulemaking
record, and substantive changes from the language of the proposed rule.
Unless otherwise noted, paragraph references in the summary and
explanation of the final rule fall under the section given in the
heading for the discussion. For example, except as otherwise noted,
paragraph references in V.A, Section 1926.97, Electrical Protective
Equipment, are to paragraphs in final Sec. 1926.97. Except as noted,
the Agency has carried proposed provisions into the final rule without
substantive change.
The final rule contains several differences from the proposal and
existing Sec. Sec. 1910.137 and 1910.269 that are purely editorial and
nonsubstantive. For example, the Agency amended the language of some
provisions to shift from passive to active voice, thereby making the
standard easier to read. OSHA does not discuss explicitly in the
preamble all of these differences. The purpose of these differences,
unless otherwise noted, is to clarify the final standard.
A. Section 1926.97, Electrical Protective Equipment
Workers exposed to electrical hazards face a risk of death or
serious injury from electric shock. According to BLS, there were 192
and 170 fatalities involving contact with electric current in 2008 and
2009, respectively (http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cftb0240.pdf* and
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cftb0249.pdf)*. About half of these
fatalities (89 in both years) occurred in construction (id.).\11\
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\11\ Similar data are available at http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoi1.htm#2009
for each year back to 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The use of properly designed, manufactured, and cared-for
electrical protective equipment helps protect employees from this risk.
Therefore, OSHA is issuing final Sec. 1926.97, Electrical protective
equipment, which addresses the design, manufacture, and proper care of
electrical protective equipment. In addition, OSHA is revising existing
Sec. 1910.137, which also contains provisions addressing the design,
manufacture, and proper care of electrical protective equipment. For
reasons described at length in this section of the preamble, OSHA
concludes that the final rule will be a more effective means of
protecting employees from the risk of electric shock than existing OSHA
standards.
The existing requirements for electrical protective equipment in
construction work are in Sec. 1926.951(a)(1), which only applies to
the construction of electric power transmission and distribution lines
and equipment. However, employers throughout the construction industry
use electrical protective equipment, and OSHA believes that provisions
for electrical protective equipment, as specified by final Sec.
1926.97, should apply, not only to electric power transmission and
distribution work, but to all construction work. Therefore, OSHA is
issuing new Sec. 1926.97, Electrical protective equipment, which
applies to all construction work.
Existing Sec. 1926.951(a)(1) incorporates by reference the
following six American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Item ANSI Standard
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rubber insulating gloves.............. J6.6-1971
Rubber matting for use around electric J6.7-1935 (R1971)
apparatus.
Rubber insulating blankets............ J6.4-1971
Rubber insulating hoods............... J6.2-1950 (R1971)
Rubber insulating line hose........... J6.1-1950 (R1971)
Rubber insulating sleeves............. J6.5-1971
------------------------------------------------------------------------
These standards contain detailed specifications for manufacturing,
testing, and designing electrical protective equipment. However, these
standards have undergone several revisions since the 1971 publication
date of existing subpart V and are now seriously out of date. Following
is a complete list of the corresponding current national consensus
standards:
ASTM D120-09, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves.
ASTM D178-01 (Reapproved 2010), Standard Specification for Rubber
Insulating Matting.
ASTM D1048-12, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Blankets.
ASTM D1049-98 (Reapproved 2010), Standard Specification for Rubber
Insulating Covers.
ASTM D1050-05 (Reapproved 2011), Standard Specification for Rubber
Insulating Line Hose.
ASTM D1051-08, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Sleeves.
Additionally, there are now standards on the in-service care of
insulating line hose and covers (ASTM F478-09), insulating blankets
(ASTM F479-06 (2011)), and insulating gloves and sleeves (ASTM F496-
08), which OSHA did not incorporate or reference in existing Sec.
1926.951(a)(1).\12\
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\12\ The relevant ASTM standards are in the record as Exs. 0048,
0049, 0050, 0051, 0066, 0067, 0068, 0069, 0070. In several cases,
the version of the consensus standard in the record is older than
the version listed in the preamble. However, OSHA based final
Sec. Sec. 1926.97 and 1910.137 only on the ASTM documents and other
data in the record. The preamble lists editions of the consensus
standards not in the record because OSHA evaluated them for
consistency with the final rule. OSHA determined that these later
ASTM standards conform to the requirements of final Sec. Sec.
1926.97 and 1910.137. See the discussion of the notes following
paragraphs (a)(3)(ii)(B) and (c)(2)(ix) for the significance of this
determination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA derived proposed new Sec. 1926.97 from these national
consensus standards, but drafted it in performance terms. OSHA is
carrying this approach forward into the final rule. The final rule
relies on provisions from the consensus standards that are performance
based and necessary for employee safety, but the final rule does not
contain many of the detailed specifications from those standards. Thus,
the final rule will provide greater flexibility for compliance.
BGE commented that OSHA's performance-based approach leaves the
standards "vague" and creates "opportunities for unsafe practices"
(Ex. 0126).
OSHA disagrees with this comment for the following reasons.
The Agency recognizes the importance of the consensus standards in
defining basic requirements for the safe design and manufacture of
electrical protective equipment for employees. To this end, OSHA will
allow employers to comply with the final rule by following specific
provisions in the consensus standards. OSHA believes that the option of
following these specific provisions addresses the commenter's concern
about vagueness.
However, OSHA determined that it would be inappropriate to adopt
the consensus standards in toto in this rulemaking. First, each of the
currently referenced standards has undergone several revisions since
OSHA adopted the standards in existing Sec. 1926.951(a)(1). Because of
the continual process by which the consensus standards development
organizations periodically revise their consensus standards, any
specific editions that OSHA might adopt likely would be outdated within
a few years. Additionally, since OSHA's rulemaking process is lengthy,
it would not be practical for OSHA to revise its standards as often as
necessary to keep pace with the changes in the consensus
standards. Final Sec. 1926.97 is flexible enough to accommodate
changes in technology, obviating the need for constant revision.
Wherever possible, OSHA wrote the final rule in performance terms to
allow alternative methods of compliance that provide comparable safety
to employees.
Another difficulty with incorporating the consensus standards by
reference is that they contain details that go beyond the scope of the
OSHA standard and are not directly related to employee safety. In final
Sec. 1926.97, OSHA relied only on consensus standard provisions that
are relevant to employee safety in the workplace. Furthermore, to make
the requirements easier for employers and employees to use and
understand, OSHA adopted language in the final rule that is simpler
than that in the consensus standards. Because all relevant requirements
are in the text of the regulations, employers will not need to refer to
the consensus standards to determine their obligations under final
Sec. 1926.97. Although OSHA is no longer incorporating the consensus
standards by reference, notes throughout the rule clarify that OSHA
will deem compliance with the consensus standards listed in the notes
to be compliance with the performance requirements of final Sec.
1926.97.
OSHA notes that it recently decided not to adopt a proposed
performance-based approach when it revised the design requirements
contained in several personal protective equipment standards (74 FR
46350, Sept. 9, 2009). In issuing that final rule, OSHA reasoned that
"widespread opposition" to, and misunderstanding of, the proposal
indicated "possible misapplication . . . if adopted" (74 FR 46352).
This rationale does not apply to this rulemaking. First, there was
no widespread opposition to the proposed performance-based approach in
this rulemaking. A number of commenters did request that OSHA deem
employers that are in compliance with all future revisions of the
listed consensus standards as being in compliance with the final rule
(see, for example, Exs. 0156, 0180, 0183, 0202, 0206, 0229, 0231,
0239). The Agency believes that the performance-based approach it
adopts in final Sec. 1926.97 will provide these commenters with the
flexibility they requested by permitting employers to follow future
versions of consensus standards so long as those future versions meet
the final rule's performance-based criteria. Second, OSHA adopted a
performance-based approach when it previously revised existing Sec.
1910.137 in 1994 (59 FR 4323-4325). Several participants in the 1994
rulemaking supported a performance-based approach (59 FR 4324). Third,
OSHA believes that harmonizing Sec. 1926.97 and Sec. 1910.137 will
reduce misapplication by the regulated community and, thereby, reduce
the risk of electric shock. Promulgating inconsistent standards would
increase misapplication by the regulated community and, consequently,
increase the risk of electric shock. Finally, OSHA has had no
difficulty enforcing Sec. 1910.137 since issuing it in 1994.
Regarding the commenters' requests that OSHA deem employers that
are in compliance with all future revisions of the listed consensus
standards as being in compliance with the final rule, OSHA has no basis
on which to find that future revisions of the consensus standards will
provide suitable guidance for compliance with the performance criteria
of the final rule. Revised consensus standards may or may not meet the
final rule's performance criteria. If a revised consensus standard does
not satisfy this final rule's performance criteria, however, the Agency
may consider compliance with that consensus standard to be a de minimis
condition if the consensus standard clearly provides protection equal
to, or greater than, the protection provided by Sec. 1926.97.\13\
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\13\ De minimis conditions are conditions in which an employer
implemented a measure different from one specified in a standard,
but that has no direct or immediate relationship to safety or
health. The Agency does not issue citations or penalties for de
minimis conditions, nor is the employer required to bring the
workplace into compliance, that is, there are no abatement
requirements. Pursuant to OSHA's de minimis policy, which is set
forth in OSHA Instruction CPL 02-00-148 ("Field Operations
Manual"), a de minimis condition exists when an employer complies
with a consensus standard rather than with the standard in effect at
the time of the inspection and the employer's action clearly
provides equivalent or more effective employee protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An employer seeking to rely on an updated consensus standard may
evaluate for itself whether the consensus standard meets the
performance criteria contained in final Sec. 1926.97. An employer that
is unsure about whether a revised consensus standard meets the OSHA
standard's performance criteria may seek guidance from OSHA. If a
revised consensus standard does not appear to meet the OSHA standard's
performance criteria, but the employer nonetheless wants to follow the
revised consensus standard, the employer should seek guidance from OSHA
as to whether the Agency would consider an employer's following the
revised consensus standard to be a de minimis condition.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Note that this approach applies to the use of any consensus
standard referenced in the final rule. Moreover, the same principles
described with respect to subsequent versions of the consensus
standards also apply to earlier versions of the consensus standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some rulemaking participants asked OSHA to provide the applicable
consensus standards to employers at no cost. (See, for example, Exs.
0156, 0161, 0183, 0202, 0206, 0229, 0231, 0233; Tr. 1287-1288.) For
instance, Mr. Terry Williams with the Electric Cooperatives of South
Carolina stated: "If OSHA is to rely on procedures that it does not
describe in full, . . . the agency should provide a cost-free way for
employers to review these procedures to make sure they are following
them" (Ex. 0202). Mr. Don Adkins with Davis H. Elliot Construction Co.
stated that the "cost of securing and reviewing these voluntary
standards place[s] a financial burden on small employers" (Ex. 0156).
OSHA is rejecting these requests. The Agency stated the rule in
performance-based terms, which allows employers flexibility in
complying with the rules. The Agency understands that employers may
want additional guidance in terms of precise procedures or detailed
specifications to follow. Final Sec. 1926.97 references relevant
consensus standards to provide such additional guidance, but those
standards are not mandatory.
In any event, even when OSHA incorporates consensus standards by
reference, the Agency does not provide those consensus standards to
employers at no cost. Many consensus standards are copyrighted
documents; and, in those cases, the copyright holder has certain legal
rights regarding the public distribution of those documents. Note that
some consensus standards development organizations, for example, NFPA,
do provide free, view-only access to their standards
(http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=279&itemID=18123&URL=Codes%20&%20Standards/Code%20development%20process/Online%20access).
\15\ OSHA also will
continue to explore other ways of informing the regulated community
about applicable compliance obligations specified by the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ For instance, NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in
the Workplace, one of the documents listed in Appendix G to Subpart
V, described later in this section of the preamble, is available at
http://www.nfpa.org/aboutthecodes/AboutTheCodes.asp?DocNum=70E&cookie_test=1.
Select either the 2009
or 2012 edition from the drop-down box labeled "Edition to
display" and click the link labeled "View [selected] edition
online." Note that registration with NFPA is required to view the
standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, employers can often rely on the assurances of third
parties that equipment or test methods meet the listed consensus
standards. First, OSHA expects that employers will typically get the
assurance of manufacturers that electrical protective equipment is
capable of withstanding the appropriate electrical proof tests required
by final paragraphs (a) and (b). In this regard, an employer can simply
look for equipment labeled as meeting the listed consensus standards.
Manufacturers attest, through such a label, typically required by the
relevant consensus standard, that their equipment passed the requisite
tests.
Second, it is OSHA's understanding that many employers,
particularly small employers, do not test their own equipment to
determine whether employees can use the equipment, as required by final
paragraph (c). Instead, these employers send the equipment to an
electrical laboratory for testing (see, for example, the testimony of
Mr. Frank Brockman of Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation
about the use of testing laboratories, Tr. 1301-1302). It is OSHA's
understanding that, as a matter of practice, such laboratories follow
the test methods in the applicable consensus standards for testing a
wide range of products (see, for example, Ex. 0211).\16\ To determine
whether employees can use the equipment in accordance with final
paragraph (c), employers can rely on the assurance of these testing
laboratories that they followed the listed consensus standards, as well
as the requirements of OSHA's standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ When a question arises as to the validity of a test method
a laboratory is using, OSHA will investigate the validity of the
method.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA expects that, when consensus standards development
organizations revise their consensus standards, manufacturers' labels
will certify that the equipment meets the latest consensus standards,
and that testing laboratories will use the test methods in the latest
consensus standards, rather than the consensus standards listed in the
notes. OSHA is sympathetic to concerns that employers, especially small
businesses, do not have the resources to purchase and check whether
revised consensus standards meet the final rule's performance criteria.
As discussed previously, an employer that does not have the resources
to purchase and review an updated consensus standard (indeed, any
employer) may request guidance from OSHA on whether compliance with an
updated consensus standard would conform to this final rule or bring
the employer within OSHA's de minimis policy.
In the final rule, OSHA reworded the headings for paragraphs (a),
(b), and (c) to more accurately reflect the content of the respective
paragraphs. Paragraph (a). Paragraph (a) of Sec. 1926.97 addresses the
design and manufacture of the following types of rubber insulating
equipment: Blankets, matting, covers, line hose, gloves, and
sleeves.\17\ (Paragraph (b) of Sec. 1926.97 contains general
requirements for other types of insulating equipment (see the
discussion of this paragraph later in this section of the preamble).)
Paragraphs (a) and (c) of proposed Sec. 1926.97 were based on existing
Sec. 1910.137(a) and (b); however, the proposal added Class 00
equipment to the classes addressed by the existing provisions to
reflect the coverage of this new class of equipment in the consensus
standards (Exs. 0048, 0051). This class of electrical protective
equipment is used with voltages of 500 volts or less. OSHA received no
comments on the proposed addition of Class 00 electrical protective
equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ The language in proposed paragraph (a) has been editorially
revised in the final rule to make it clearer that the paragraph
applies to rubber insulating equipment only.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (a)(1)(i), which is being adopted without change from the
proposal, requires blankets, gloves, and sleeves to be manufactured
without seams. This method of making the protective equipment minimizes
the chance that the material will split. Because they are used when
workers handle energized lines, gloves and sleeves are the only defense
an employee has against electric shock. Additionally, the stresses
placed on blankets, gloves, and sleeves by the flexing of the rubber
during normal use could cause a seam to separate from tensile or shear
stress.
The prohibition on seams does not apply to the other three types of
electrical protective equipment covered by paragraph (a) (covers, line
hose, and matting). These types of equipment generally provide a more
indirect form of protection because they insulate the live parts from
accidental, rather than intended, contact. Moreover, they are not
usually subject to similar amounts or types of flexing and, thus, are
not subject to the same stress.\18\
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\18\ Flexing can cause different types of stress on rubber,
including tensile, compression, and shear stress. Rubber insulating
line hose and covers are subject to the greatest amount of flexing
while employees are installing them on an energized part. However,
employees install this equipment either with live-line tools or
while wearing rubber insulating gloves and sleeves. Thus, when seam
separation is likely, the employee is protected by other means.
Rubber insulating matting is generally laid on the floor and is
not subject to the type of flexing that is likely to cause
separation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (a)(1)(ii), which is being adopted with one modification
from the proposal, requires electrical protective equipment to be
marked to indicate its class and type. The class marking indicates the
voltage with which the equipment can be used; \19\ the type marking
indicates whether the equipment is ozone resistant. These markings
enable employees to know the uses and voltages for which the equipment
is suited. This provision also permits equipment to contain other
relevant markings, for example, the manufacturer's name, the size of
the equipment, or a notation that the equipment is manufactured in
accordance with the relevant consensus standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ The maximum use voltages for individual classes of
equipment are provided in Table E-4, discussed under the summary and
explanation for paragraph (c)(2)(i), infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed paragraphs (a)(1)(ii)(G) and (a)(1)(ii)(H) would have
required rubber insulating equipment "other than matting" to be
marked as Type I or Type II to indicate whether or not it was ozone-
resistant. Mr. James Thomas, President of ASTM International, submitted
comments recommending that the quoted language be deleted from these
paragraphs because the "type classification denotes the manufacturing
material being either Nonresistant to Ozone (Type I) or Resistant to
Ozone (Type II) and applies to all [rubber insulating equipment],
including [m]atting" (Ex. 0148).
OSHA agrees that the ASTM standards require matting to be marked
with the type to indicate whether or not it is ozone-resistant, and the
Agency has adopted the commenter's recommendation in the final rule.
Mr. Leo Muckerheide of Safety Consulting Services recommended that
OSHA require marking the maximum use voltage on electrical protective
equipment, stating:
Many electrical workers work with multiple voltages and are
infrequent users of electrical protective equipment. Therefore,
expecting them to remember which class to use with which voltage is
a potentially hazardous problem. This problem can be easily
eliminated by having the maximum use voltage marked on the
electrical protective equipment. [Ex. 0180]
OSHA rejects this recommendation. First, workers using electrical
protective equipment receive training that ensures that they know which
class of equipment to use on which voltage. The
record demonstrates that most of the workers covered by Sec. 1910.269
and subpart V are highly trained (see, for example, Tr. 1228) and use
electrical protective equipment to work on energized lines on a
regular, often daily, basis (see, for example, Tr. 394, 889, 1218-
1219). Furthermore, several OSHA standards require training for
employees working on or near exposed energized parts, when electrical
protective equipment would also be required. For instance, final
Sec. Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(ii)(D) and 1926.950(b)(2)(iv) require
training in the use of electrical protective equipment for qualified
employees performing electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work. Paragraph (c)(2) of Sec. 1910.333 contains a
similar requirement for workers performing other types of general
industry electrical work. Paragraph (b)(2) of Sec. 1926.21 contains
training requirements for workers performing construction work.
Although this requirement is more general than the training requirement
in this final standard, Sec. 1926.21 requires training in OSHA
standards applicable to the employee's work environment.
Second, electrical protective equipment meeting the applicable
consensus standards is manufactured with the Class ratings included,
but generally without labels for maximum use voltages. (See, for
example, Exs. 0048, 0049, 0050, 0066, 0067, 0068.) Requiring electrical
protective equipment to be marked with its maximum use voltage would
likely force employers to mark the equipment themselves. OSHA believes
that the permanent class-rating marking placed on electrical protective
equipment by the manufacturer provides adequate information and is less
likely to wear off over the useful life of the equipment than any
marking put in place by an employer. Thus, the Agency concludes that a
requirement for marking the maximum use voltage on electrical
protective equipment is unnecessary.
Mr. Frank Owen Brockman, representing Farmers Rural Electric
Cooperative Corporation, recommended that OSHA also require that the
markings include the company testing the equipment, the test date, and
owners of the equipment (Ex. 0173). He did not explain how including
this additional information in the markings would better protect
employees. Moreover, although requiring the employer to note the date
equipment is tested does enhance worker protection, final paragraph
(c)(2)(xii) of Sec. 1926.97 addresses this matter by requiring the
employer to certify that equipment has successfully passed the periodic
testing required by the final rule and by requiring this certification
to identify the equipment that passed the test and the date it was
tested. OSHA agrees with Mr. Brockman that keeping workers aware of the
date of last testing would enhance worker protection. Therefore, OSHA
revised the language in final paragraph (c)(2)(xii) to also require
that the certification required by the rule be made available to
employees or their authorized representatives.
It should be noted that, although not required, the markings
suggested by Mr. Muckerheide and Mr. Brockman are permitted under
paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(I).
Paragraph (a)(1)(iii) requires all markings to be nonconductive and
to be applied so as not to impair the insulating properties of the
equipment. OSHA did not receive any comments on this provision in the
proposal and has carried it forward without change into the final rule.
This requirement ensures that no marking interferes with the protection
to be provided by the equipment.
Paragraph (a)(1)(iv), which is being adopted without change from
the proposal, requires markings on gloves to be confined to the cuff
area.\20\ As OSHA explained in the preamble to the proposed rule,
markings in other areas could possibly wear off (70 FR 34828).
Moreover, having the markings in one place will allow the employee to
determine the class and type of glove quickly. Finally, as discussed
later in this section of the preamble, final paragraph (c)(2)(vii)
requires that rubber gloves normally be worn under protector gloves.
Because a protector glove is almost always shorter than the
corresponding rubber glove with which it is worn, and because the cuff
of the protector glove can easily be pulled back without removal, it is
easy to see markings on the cuff portion of the rubber glove beneath.
Any marking provided on the rubber glove in an area outside of the cuff
could not be seen with the protector glove in place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ The cuff area is the area near the reinforced edge of the
glove.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (a)(2) of final Sec. 1926.97 contains electrical
requirements for rubber insulating blankets, matting, line hose,
gloves, and sleeves. As previously discussed, this provision uses
performance language, and does not contain a lengthy discussion of
specific test procedures.
Paragraph (a)(2)(i), which is being carried forward from the
proposed rule, requires electrical protective equipment to be capable
of withstanding the ac proof-test voltages in Table E-1 or the dc
proof-test voltages in Table E-2 of the standard.\21\ The proof-test
voltages listed in these tables have been derived from the current ASTM
standards, which also contain detailed test procedures that can be used
to determine whether electrical protective equipment is capable of
withstanding these voltages. As previously discussed, these details
were not included in the proposed rule, and this approach is being
carried forward in the final rule. Paragraph (a)(2)(i)(A) replaces
those details with a performance-oriented requirement that any proof
test can be used as long as it reliably indicates that the equipment
can withstand the proof-test voltage involved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Existing Sec. 1910.137 contains Table I-2 through Table I-
6, and the proposal did not redesignate those tables. The final rule
revises all of Sec. 1910.137 so as to redesignate the tables,
starting with Table I-1. Consequently, existing Table I-2
corresponds to Table I-1 in the final rule, existing Table I-3
corresponds to Table I-2 in the final rule, existing Table I-4
corresponds to Table I-3 in the final rule, existing Table I-5
corresponds to Table I-4 in the final rule, and existing Table I-6
corresponds to Table I-5 in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Muckerheide with Safety Consulting Services stated that the
standard for rubber insulating gloves, ASTM D120, lists a 280-
millimeter glove instead of the 267-millimeter glove listed in Table E-
1 in the proposed rule (Ex. 0180). He recommended making OSHA's
standard consistent with the ASTM standard or explaining the difference
in the standard.
OSHA is revising Table E-1 from the proposal in response to this
comment.
OSHA based proposed Table E-1 on Table I-2 in existing Sec.
1910.137, which, in turn, was based on the 1987 edition of ASTM D120.
Section 10.3.1 of ASTM D120-1987 lists four standard lengths for Class
0 rubber insulating gloves: 279, 356, 406, and 457 millimeters. Table 2
in that edition, however, listed 267 millimeters as the shortest length
glove even though the shortest standard length was 279 millimeters.
Unlike the 1987 edition of the consensus standard, the latest
edition, ASTM D120-2009, rounds up the standard metric sizes. Thus, the
relevant consensus standards for rubber insulating gloves list four
standard sizes of 280, 360, 410, and 460 millimeters for Classes 00, 0,
1, 2, 3, and 4 gloves. The table in the 2009 edition of the consensus
standard corresponding to Table 2 in the 1987 edition lists a 280-
millimeter glove as the shortest one.
Based on this information, OSHA concludes that the appropriate
length for the shortest glove is 280 millimeters. In addition, the
Agency does not consider the difference between the 280-millimeter
length recommended by Mr.
Muckerheide and the 267-millimeter proposed length to be substantial.
The 1987 and 2009 editions of the consensus standard each permit a
glove to vary from the standard length by as much as 13 millimeters.
Thus, a 280-millimeter glove can be as short as 267 millimeters.
However, to ensure consistency with the latest consensus standard, OSHA
is adopting, in Table E-1, both the 280-millimeter glove length in
place of the proposed 267-millimeter length and the rounded-up metric
sizes, as listed in the latest edition of the consensus standard.
Paragraph (a)(2)(i)(B), which is being adopted as proposed,
requires the proof-test voltage to be applied continuously for 1 minute
for insulating matting and 3 minutes for other insulating equipment.
These times are derived from on the proof-test times given in the ASTM
design standards and are appropriate for testing the design
capabilities of electrical protective equipment.
Paragraph (a)(2)(i)(C), which is being adopted as proposed,
requires rubber insulating gloves to be capable of withstanding the ac
proof-test voltage indicated in Table E-1 of the standard after a 16-
hour water soak. If rubber insulating gloves absorb water, a reduction
in insulating properties will result. Electrical work is sometimes
performed in the rain, and an employee's perspiration is often present
while the gloves are in use, so water absorption is a critical
property. The soak test is needed to ensure that rubber insulating
gloves can withstand the voltage involved under these conditions.
It should be noted that the soak test is a separate test from the
initial proof test. Gloves must be capable of passing both tests.
Paragraph (a)(2)(ii), which is being adopted as proposed, prohibits
the 60-hertz ac proof-test current from exceeding the values specified
in Table E-1 at any time during the test period. The currents listed in
the table have been taken from ASTM D120-09. This provision in the
final rule is important because, when an ac proof test is used on
gloves, the resulting proof-test current gives an indication of the
validity of the gloves' make-up, the dielectric constant of the type of
material used, its thickness, and the total area under test.
Under paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(A), which is being adopted without
change from the proposal, the maximum current for ac voltages at
frequencies other than 60 hertz is computed from the direct ratio of
the frequencies. This provision ensures that maximum current is
equivalent for varying frequencies.
Paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B), which is being adopted as proposed,
specifies that gloves to be tested be filled with and immersed in water
to the depth given in Table E-3 and that water be added to or removed
from the glove as necessary to ensure that the water level is the same
inside and outside the glove. Table E-3 is derived from ASTM D120 and
is valid for the proof-test currents listed in Table E-1. During the ac
proof test, a gloves is filled with, and immersed in, water, and the
water inside and outside the glove forms the electrodes. The ac proof-
test current is dependent on the length of the portion of the glove
that is out of the water. Because the proof-test current is a function
of immersion depth, it is important to specify the depth in the
rule.\22\
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\22\ Atmospheric conditions might invalidate the test results at
the clearances specified in Table E-3. For instance, under certain
atmospheric conditions, the air between the water inside and outside
the glove, which forms the two electrodes, might flash over, and
thereby invalidate the test results and damage the glove. As another
example, some atmospheric conditions can lead to excessive corona
and the formation of ozone that ventilation cannot sufficiently
dissipate. To account for these atmospheric conditions, final Table
E-3 contains a note that provides that, if atmospheric conditions
make these clearances impractical, the clearances may be increased
by a maximum of 25 mm. (1 in.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(C) requires that, after the 16-hour water soak
specified in paragraph (a)(2)(i)(C), the 60-hertz proof-test current
not exceed the values given in Table E-1 by more than 2 milliamperes.
The allowable proof-test current must be increased for proof tests on
gloves after a 16-hour water soak because the gloves absorb a small
amount of water, which results in slightly increased current during the
test. The final rule was derived from ASTM D120, which allows an
increase in the proof-test current of 2 milliamperes. If the proof-test
current increases more than 2 milliamperes, it indicates that the
gloves absorbed too much water. OSHA has revised this provision in the
final rule to indicate more clearly that it is a requirement rather
than an exception.
Paragraph (a)(2)(iii), which is being adopted without change from
the proposed rule, prohibits electrical protective equipment that has
been subjected to a minimum breakdown voltage test from being used to
protect employees from electrical hazards. The relatively high voltages
used in testing electrical protective equipment for minimum breakdown
voltage can damage the insulating material under test (even if the
equipment passes). The intent of this rule is to prohibit the use of
equipment that has been tested for minimum breakdown voltage under
conditions equivalent to those in the ASTM standards, because minimum
breakdown tests are destructive. Such tests are performed only on
equipment samples that are to be discarded.
Paragraph (a)(2)(iv), which is being adopted as proposed, requires
ozone-resistant material (Type II) to be capable of withstanding an
ozone test that can reliably indicate that the material will resist
ozone exposure in actual use. Standardized ozone tests are given in the
ASTM specifications listed in the note following paragraph
(a)(3)(ii)(B), and compliance with these specifications will be deemed
compliance with this OSHA requirement. Around high-voltage lines and
equipment, a luminous discharge, called electric corona, can occur due
to ionization of the surrounding air caused by a voltage gradient that
exceeds a certain critical value. The blue corona discharge is
accompanied by a hissing noise and by ozone, which can cause damage to
certain types of rubber insulating materials. Therefore, when there is
a chance that ozone may be produced at a work location, electrical
protective equipment made of ozone-resistant material is frequently
used. The final rule ensures that ozone-resistant material will, in
fact, be resistant to the deteriorating effects of the gas. The final
rule also provides that visible signs of ozone deterioration, such as
checking, cracking, breaks, and pitting, are evidence of failure to
meet the requirements for ozone-resistant material.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ ASTM F819-10, Standard Terminology Relating to Electrical
Protective Equipment for Workers, which is listed in the note
following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B), defines "ozone cutting and
checking" as: "Cracks produced by ozone in a material under
mechanical stress."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (a)(3) addresses the workmanship and finish of electrical
protective equipment. Because physical irregularities can interfere
with the insulating properties of the equipment and thus reduce the
protection it affords, paragraph (a)(3)(i) prohibits the presence of
physical irregularities that can adversely affect the insulating
properties of the equipment and that can be detected by the tests or
inspections required under other provisions in Sec. 1926.97. In the
final rule, OSHA has revised the language for this provision to clarify
that "harmful physical irregularities" (the term used in the
proposal) means "physical irregularities that can adversely affect the
insulating properties of the equipment."
OSHA recognizes that some minor irregularities are nearly
unavoidable in the manufacture of rubber goods, and
these imperfections may be present in the insulating materials without
significantly affecting the insulation. Paragraph (a)(3)(ii), which is
being adopted without change from the proposal, describes the types of
imperfections that are permitted. Even with these imperfections,
electrical protective equipment must be capable of passing the
electrical tests specified in paragraph (a)(2).
Since paragraph (a) of final Sec. 1926.97 is written in
performance-oriented language, OSHA has included a note at the end of
the paragraph stating that rubber insulating equipment meeting the
requirements of the listed ASTM standards will be deemed in compliance
with the performance requirements of final Sec. 1926.97(a). This list
of ASTM standards references the latest revisions of those documents.
The Agency has reviewed the referenced ASTM standards and has found
them to provide suitable guidance for compliance with the performance
criteria of Sec. 1926.97(a).\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ See the extended discussion, earlier in this section of the
preamble, on how to address future revisions of the listed consensus
standards, as well as earlier versions of the listed consensus
standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (b). Paragraph (b) of final Sec. 1926.97 addresses
electrical protective equipment other than the rubber insulating
equipment addressed in paragraph (a). Equipment falling under this
paragraph includes plastic guard equipment, insulating barriers, and
other protective equipment intended to provide electrical protection to
employees.
Mr. Steven Theis, representing MYR Group, requested that OSHA
clarify that equipment complying with the ASTM and IEEE consensus
standards mentioned in the proposal would constitute compliance with
the final rule (Ex. 0162). In the proposal, OSHA pointed to ASTM F712.
OSHA has reviewed ASTM F712-06 (2011) and has found that it provides
suitable guidance for plastic guard equipment that employers can use to
comply with final Sec. 1926.97(b). To clarify the standard, OSHA has
added a new note to paragraph (b) to indicate that OSHA will consider
plastic guard equipment to conform to the performance requirements of
paragraph (b) if it meets, and is used in accordance with, ASTM F712-06
(2011).
In the proposal, the Agency also pointed to IEEE Std 516, Guide for
Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines, as support for the
electrical criteria in proposed paragraph (b). The Agency has not
referenced this consensus standard in the final rule. The IEEE standard
does not contain specifications or test methods for electrical
protective equipment. Instead, that consensus standard contains work
methods for live-line work, including criteria for evaluating
insulating tools and equipment. The Agency notes that the criteria for
evaluating insulating tools and equipment specified in the IEEE
standard are equivalent to the design criteria for electrical
protective equipment contained in paragraph (b) in the final rule.
Paragraph (b)(1), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposed rule, requires electrical protective equipment to be
capable of withstanding any voltage that might be imposed on it. The
voltage that the equipment must withstand includes transient
overvoltages, as well as the nominal voltage that is present on an
energized part of an electric circuit. Equipment withstands a voltage
if it maintains its integrity without flashover or arc through.
Equipment conforming to a national consensus standard for that type
of equipment will generally be considered as complying with this rule
if that standard contains proof testing requirements for the voltage
involved. In the proposal, OSHA considered accepting electrical
protective equipment that was capable of passing a test equivalent to
that described in ASTM F712 or IEEE Std 516 for types of equipment not
addressed by any consensus standard. OSHA invited comments on whether
these standards contain suitable test methods and whether equipment
passing those tests should be acceptable under the OSHA standard.
Rulemaking participants generally agreed that the consensus
standards provide suitable guidance for the equipment they addressed.
(See, for example, Exs. 0162, 0230.) For instance, IBEW stated:
The test methods referenced in these standards are suitable for
the types of equipment they are designed for . . . [This] equipment
[has] proven to be acceptable for use in this industry. [Ex. 0230]
Mr. Steven Theis of MYR Group agreed that the "specified standards
contain suitable test methods" (Ex. 0162).
As noted previously, OSHA has reviewed ASTM F712-06 (2011) and
found that it provides suitable guidance for compliance with final
paragraph (b). The Agency has included a note in the final rule to
indicate that plastic guard equipment is deemed to conform to the
performance requirements of paragraph (b) if the equipment conforms to
that consensus standard.
ASTM maintained that none of the ASTM standards listed in the
proposed standard contain an impulse test method for transient
overvoltages (Ex. 0148). The organization recommended that the final
rule reflect the current referenced consensus standards.
ASTM misconstrues paragraph (b)(1) of the final rule. Paragraph
(b)(1) of the final rule does not require impulse testing as ASTM
alleges. Rather, it is a performance requirement that equipment be
capable of withstanding both the steady-state voltages and transient
(or impulse) overvoltages, to which it will be subjected. Both types of
voltages can appear across the equipment during use. (See the summary
and explanation for final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1), later in this section
of the preamble, for a discussion of maximum transient overvoltages
that can appear on electric power lines and equipment.)
The typical test method contained in the ASTM standards for
determining minimum breakdown voltage (or withstand voltage) requires
testing at substantially higher voltages than those on which the
equipment will be used. (See, for example, Exs. 0048, 0053, 0071.) In
addition, minimum breakdown voltage testing is performed using a
steadily rising ac voltage, in contrast to impulse testing, in which
the overvoltage is applied for a very short period (id.). As noted in
IEEE Std 516-2009, the existing standards for insulating tools and
equipment do not address whether equipment passing the ac withstand
voltage tests in those standards will also withstand transient voltage
stresses (Ex. 0532). However, the IEEE standard suggests the use of a
1.3 ratio to convert ac withstand voltages to impulse, or transient,
voltages (id.). While the IEEE standard notes that research in this
area is ongoing, OSHA concludes that, in the absence of better
information, employers may rely on this ratio and multiply the ac
minimum breakdown voltage for protective equipment by this value to
determine if that equipment can withstand the expected transient
overvoltages on energized circuits. For example, insulating equipment
with a minimum breakdown, or withstand, voltage of 20,000 volts is
capable of withstanding a maximum transient overvoltage of 26,000
volts. This equipment would be acceptable for use to protect employees
from phase-to-ground exposures on a circuit operating at 15-kilovolt,
phase-
to-phase, with a 3.0 per unit maximum transient overvoltage.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ The maximum impulse voltage for this equipment is 20
kilovolts times 1.3, or 26 kilovolts. The maximum phase-to-ground
use voltage for the equipment is 26 kilovolts divided by the maximum
transient overvoltage in kilovolts, or 8.7 kilovolts. The phase-to-
phase circuit voltage for this exposure is 8.7 kilovolts times
[radic]3, or 15 kilovolts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Alabama Rural Electric Association of Cooperatives, requested
that OSHA provide a definition of "transient overvoltage" and a
suggested method of calculation (Ex. 0224).
IEEE Std 516-2009 contains the following suitable guidance
(although, as stated earlier, the standard does not contain
specifications or test methods for electrical protective equipment).
First, the IEEE standard contains the industry-recognized definition of
"transient overvoltage," which reads as follows:
Voltage that exceeds the maximum operating line-to-ground
voltage. This voltage may be the result of a transient or switching
surge. [Ex. 0532 \26\]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ This is the definition of "overvoltage," for which
"transient overvoltage" is a synonym.
Second, the IEEE consensus standard contains methods of determining
the maximum transient overvoltage on an electric power generation,
transmission, or distribution system and, as noted earlier, discusses
comparing the ability of insulation equipment to withstand a transient
overvoltage based on its ability to withstand voltages under more
typical testing conditions (Ex. 0532). OSHA has not duplicated this
information in Sec. 1926.97. It is copyrighted information that is
publicly available. However, OSHA concludes that the IEEE standard
provides suitable guidance that can assist employers in complying with
paragraph (b)(1) and has added a reference to that consensus standard
in the note following that paragraph in the final rule.
The proposed rule invited comments on the need to set specific
electrical performance values in the standard and on whether the
electrical test criteria in ASTM F968 \27\ (which were summarized in
Table IV-1 and Table IV-2 of the preamble to the proposal (70 FR
34830)) could be applied to all types of electrical protective
equipment covered by proposed paragraph (b). IBEW commented that the
test values and use values in ASTM F968 are appropriate for
electrically insulating plastic guard equipment, but suggested that the
values are not suitable for other types of equipment because plastic
guard equipment is designed to perform differently than other types of
electrical protective equipment (Ex. 0230). Based on the IBEW comment,
OSHA has not included in the final rule the values from Table IV-1 and
Table IV-2. Moreover, since the final rule is written in performance
terms, inclusion of values like those included in these tables is
unnecessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ The proposal noted that there were two ASTM standards
addressing plastic guard equipment, F712, which contained test
methods, and F968, which contained specifications (70 FR 34829-
34830, June 15, 2005). ASTM has since combined those two standards
into a single one, F712-06 (2011), which contains both test methods
and specifications for plastic guard equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final paragraph (b)(2) addresses the properties of insulating
equipment that limit the amount of current to which an employee is
exposed. Paragraph (b)(2)(i), which is being adopted without change
from the proposal, requires electrical protective equipment used as the
primary insulation of employees from energized parts to be capable of
passing a test for current (that is, a proof test) when subjected to
the highest nominal voltage on which the equipment is to be used.
Paragraph (b)(2)(ii), which is also being adopted as proposed, provides
that during the test, the equipment current may not exceed 1
microampere per kilovolt of phase-to-phase applied voltage. This
requirement will prevent dangerous electric shock to employees by
prohibiting use of both poor insulating materials and good insulating
materials that are contaminated with conductive substances (for
example, fiberglass-reinforced plastic coated with a conductive
finish). The limit for current has been derived from IEEE Std 516, and
OSHA believes such a limit is reasonable and appropriate.
In the preamble to the proposed rule, the Agency invited comments
on whether another value would better protect employees. IBEW commented
on this issue as follows:
The IEEE Standard 516 limit of 1 microampere per kilovolt of
phase-to-phase applied voltage is appropriate for testing equipment
used for primary insulation of employees from energized parts. This
limit has apparently worked to keep inferior protective equipment
of[f] the market. [Ex. 0230]
One commenter was concerned that the proposed current limit might
not protect employees in the event that a fault occurred (Ex. 0126).
OSHA believes that this concern is unfounded. During a fault, the
voltage on a circuit typically falls, and the equipment current would
fall with it. Although it is possible that transient overvoltages may
occur, either during a fault on an adjacent phase or during switching
operations, such overvoltages are extremely short in duration, and the
possible resulting increase in equipment current should not prove life-
threatening to employees.
ASTM stated that the only one of its standards that includes a 1-
microampere per kilovolt requirement is ASTM F712 on plastic guard
equipment (Ex. 0148). The organization recommended that OSHA limit this
provision to this type of equipment.
OSHA is not adopting ASTM's recommendation. The Agency notes that
ASTM F712 is not the only ASTM standard that limits equipment current
to values less than 1 microampere per kilovolt of test voltage. ASTM
F711, Standard Specification for Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic (FRP)
Rod and Tube Used in Live Line Tools, limits maximum current during the
dielectric testing prescribed in that standard to values substantially
less than 1 microampere per kilovolt of test voltage (Ex. 0053).\28\
Further, as noted previously, this limit has been derived from IEEE Std
516. Thus, OSHA concludes that the 1-microampere limit is reasonable
and appropriate.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Table 2 in ASTM F711-02 sets maximum leakage current for
different types of rod and tube used in live-line tools (Ex. 0053).
The highest value in this table is 14 microamperes. A note to the
table provides that, for special applications, the maximum
acceptable leakage current is twice the value listed in the table,
so that 28 microamperes is the highest acceptable leakage current.
The voltage applied during this test is 50 kilovolts. Thus, the
maximum current is less than 1 microampere per kilovolt.
\29\ It should be noted that the equipment current requirement
contained in paragraph (b)(2) does not apply to rubber insulating
equipment, which is covered by paragraph (a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1 to paragraph (b)(2), which is being adopted without
substantive change from the proposal, emphasizes that this paragraph
applies to equipment that provides primary insulation from energized
parts, which is consistent with the plain language of paragraph
(b)(2)(i). The note also clarifies that paragraph (b)(2) does not apply
to equipment used for secondary insulation or equipment used for brush
contact only. OSHA considers primary insulation to be the insulation
that is placed directly between an employee and an energized part or,
for live-line barehand work, between an employee and ground. Insulation
that supplements the primary insulation, for example, a second form of
insulation placed between the employee and ground (in addition to the
primary insulation), is secondary insulation.
Note 2 to paragraph (b)(2), which is being adopted without change
from the proposal, provides that when equipment is tested with ac
voltage, the current measured during the test consists of three
components: (1) Capacitive
current caused by the dielectric properties of the equipment being
tested, (2) conduction current through the equipment, and (3) leakage
current passing along the surface of the equipment. The conduction
current is negligible for materials typically used in insulating
equipment, and the leakage current should be small for clean, dry
insulating equipment. The capacitive component usually predominates
when insulating equipment is tested in good condition.
OSHA expects that the tests required under final paragraphs (b)(1)
and (b)(2) will normally be performed by the manufacturer during the
design process and periodically during the manufacturing process. The
Agency recognizes, however, that some employers might want to use
equipment that is made of insulating materials but that was not
intended by the manufacturer to be used as insulation. For example, a
barrier made of rigid plastic may be intended for use as a general
purpose barrier. An employer could test the barrier under paragraphs
(b)(1) and (b)(2), and, if the equipment passes the tests, it would be
acceptable for use as insulating electrical protective equipment.
Paragraph (c). Although existing construction standards do not
contain provisions for the care and use of insulating equipment, OSHA
believes provisions of this type can contribute greatly to employee
safety. Electrical protective equipment is, in large part, manufactured
in accordance with the latest ASTM standards. This would probably be
the case even in the absence of OSHA regulation. However, improper use
and care of this equipment can easily reduce, or even eliminate, the
protection afforded by this equipment. Therefore, OSHA proposed to add
new requirements for the in-service care and use of electrical
protective equipment to the design standards already contained in
existing Sec. 1926.951(a)(1). These new provisions are being adopted
in the final rule and will help ensure that these safety products
retain their insulating properties.
Paragraph (c)(1), which is being adopted without change from the
proposal, requires electrical protective equipment to be maintained in
a safe and reliable condition. This general, performance-oriented
requirement, which applies to all equipment addressed by final Sec.
1926.97, helps ensure that employees are fully protected from electric
shock.
Detailed criteria for the use and care of specific types of
electrical protective equipment are contained in the following ASTM
standards:
ASTM F478-09, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of
Insulating Line Hose and Covers.
ASTM F479-06 (2011), Standard Specification for In-Service Care of
Insulating Blankets.
ASTM F496-08, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of
Insulating Gloves and Sleeves.
The requirements in final paragraph (c)(2) are derived from these
standards.
Paragraph (c)(2) applies only to rubber insulating blankets,
covers, line hose, gloves, and sleeves. No consensus standards address
the care and use of other types of electrical protective equipment.
Whereas the material design specifications for rubber insulating
matting is addressed in Sec. 1926.97(a), the in-service care of this
matting is not covered by any ASTM standard or by existing Sec.
1910.137(b)(2). This type of equipment is generally permanently
installed to provide supplementary protection against electric shock.
Employees stand on the matting, and they are insulated from the floor,
which is one of the grounds present in the work area. This provides a
degree of protection from phase-to-ground electric shock. Because this
type of equipment is normally left in place after it is installed, and
because it is not relied on for primary protection from electric shock
(the primary protection is provided by other insulating equipment or by
insulating tools), it does not need to be tested on a periodic basis
and need not be subject to the same careful inspection before use that
other insulating equipment must receive. It should be noted, however,
that rubber insulating matting is still required to be maintained in a
safe, reliable condition under paragraph (c)(1).
In final paragraph (c)(2)(i) and Table E-4, which are being adopted
without substantive change from the proposal, OSHA is incorporating the
margins of safety recognized in the ASTM standards by restricting the
use of insulating equipment to voltages lower than the proof-test
voltages given in Table E-1 and Table E-2. The rubber insulating
equipment addressed in Sec. 1926.97(a) is to be used at lower voltages
than the voltages the equipment is designed to withstand. For instance,
although Class 4 equipment is currently designed to be capable of
withstanding voltages of up to 40 kilovolts, the maximum use voltage
for such equipment is 36 kilovolts (see also, for example, ASTM F496 on
the care and use of rubber insulating gloves and sleeves). The use of
insulating equipment at voltages less than the actual breakdown voltage
provides a margin of safety for the employee.
The maximum use voltage for class 3 equipment in Table E-4 in the
final rule is being corrected to 26,500. OSHA proposed that the maximum
use voltage for this class of equipment be 26,000. OSHA intended this
cell in the proposed table to read 26,500, as it is in Table I-5 in
existing Sec. 1910.137 and in the applicable consensus standards, but
an inadvertent error in printing resulted in the wrong number being
entered in the table.
In the proposed rule, Note 1 to Table E-4 explained how the maximum
use voltage of electrical protective equipment varies depending on
whether multiphase exposure exists. In the general case, electrical
protective equipment must be rated for the full phase-to-phase voltage
of the lines or equipment on which work is being performed. This
requirement ensures that employees are protected against the most
severe possible exposure, that is, contact between one phase conductor
and another. However, if the employee is only exposed to phase-to-
ground voltage, then the electrical protective equipment selected can
be based on this lower voltage level (nominally, the phase-to-phase
voltage divided by [radic]3). For example, a three-phase, solidly
grounded, Y-connected overhead distribution system could be run as
three phase conductors with a neutral or as three single-phase circuits
with one phase conductor and a neutral each. If only one phase
conductor is present on a pole, there is no multiphase exposure. If all
three phase conductors are present, the multiphase exposure can be
removed by insulating two of the phases or by isolating two of the
phases.\30\ After the insulation is in place or while the employee is
isolated from the other two phase conductors, there is no multiphase
exposure, and electrical protective equipment rated for the phase-to-
ground voltage could be used.\31\
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\30\ Depending on the configuration of the system, an employee
could be isolated from two of the phases on the pole by approaching
one of the outside phase conductors and working on it from a
position where there is no possibility of coming too close to the
other two phase conductors. Isolation of the employee may be
impossible for some line configurations.
\31\ It should be noted that, until the multiphase exposure has
actually been removed, the phase-to-phase voltage remains the
maximum use voltage. Thus, the maximum use voltage of any insulation
used to "remove phase-to-phase exposure" must be greater than or
equal to the phase-to-phase voltage on the system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the proposal, the Agency requested information about whether
employees can be insulated or isolated from multiphase exposure to
ensure safe use of electrical protective equipment. The
comments generally supported the note to proposed Table E-4 and
previously codified in Table I-5 in existing Sec. 1910.137. (See, for
example, Exs. 0155, 0175, 0177, 0227.) Mr. Charles Kelly of EEI
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
explained:
[T]he typical practice in the industry is for employees to cover
the first phase from a position where the other phases cannot be
reached. This practice isolates employees from multiphase exposure.
Thus, the use of phase-to-ground voltage-rated equipment is safe.
Many utilities use a class of equipment which is rated for the
phase to ground voltage and rely on isolation and, to a lesser
extent, cover-up equipment, to remove the potential for a multiphase
exposure. Multiphase exposure is always avoided regardless of
whether protective equipment (gloves or gloves and sleeves) is rated
for the phase to phase voltage. Outside of rubber blankets, cover-up
equipment is considered secondary protection against brush contact.
Isolation from phases different than the one being worked on has
always and will continue to be the primary form of defense against a
phase to phase contact. The administrative control of cover on the
way in and uncover on the way out ensures the cover-up equipment is
placed from a position which isolates the worker. A worker will
always cover the first phase from a position where he cannot reach
the other phases. . . .
The terminology for maximum use voltage in ASTM F-819 has always
recognized this work practice: Thus, the ability to use phase to
ground voltage rated equipment is considered by the industry to be
both prudent and safe. [Ex. 0227; emphasis included in original]
Mr. Thomas Taylor of Consumers Energy agreed that these practices
isolate employees from multiphase exposure so that using equipment
based on the phase-to-ground voltage is safe (Ex. 0177). Ms. Salud
Layton of the Virginia, Maryland & Delaware Association of Electric
Cooperatives similarly believed that using isolating work practices can
minimize employee exposure. She stated that, while "isolation or
insulation of the employee from differing potentials in the work zone
is limited to the ability of the insulating equipment to cover exposed
parts," work practices can greatly minimize employee exposure (Ex.
0175).
IBEW did not specifically object to the language in the note to
proposed Table E-4, but cautioned:
To ensure a worker is isolated from contact to an energized
circuit, the isolating device has to physically prohibit the worker
from making contact, and the device has to maintain the electrical
integrity of the energized circuit. Although the isolating device
does not need to be permanent, the device should have the physical
strength to ensure isolation in the case of a slip or fall, and
other types of unintentional movements. [Ex. 0230]
The union also maintained that "the insulating value of the equipment
would have to be . . . rated at the phase-to-phase voltage of the
circuit being worked" (id.).
Another commenter, however, objected to the preamble statements
that permitted using phase-to-ground rated insulation, stating:
"Industry practice has always been to use protective equipment rated
for the phase-to-phase rms voltage" (Ex. 0184).
After considering the rulemaking record on this issue, OSHA
concludes that the note to proposed Table E-4 is necessary and
appropriate and has carried it forward into the final rule without
substantive change. The comments broadly supported the proposed note.
In addition, the note is identical to Note 1 to Table I-5 of existing
Sec. 1910.137. As observed by the commenters, when multiphase exposure
has been removed, by either isolating or insulating the employee, the
worker is adequately protected against electric shock from the
remaining phase-to-ground exposure by using phase-to-ground rated
electrical protective equipment. The extent to which the note was
supported contradicts the comment that industry practice is to use
phase-to-phase rated electrical protective equipment. To address IBEW's
concerns, OSHA emphasizes that any insulation used to remove multiphase
exposure must adequately protect workers carrying out their tasks from
factors that could negate the insulation's purpose. These factors
include, among other things, worker movements such as reaching for
tools, adjusting clothing or personal protective equipment, and slips
and falls. Finally, OSHA agrees with IBEW that insulation used to
protect employees from phase-to-phase exposure must be rated for the
phase-to-phase exposure. After all, until this protective equipment is
installed, there is phase-to-phase exposure.
Paragraph (c)(2)(ii), which is being adopted substantially as
proposed, requires insulating equipment to be visually inspected before
use each day and immediately after any incident that can reasonably be
suspected of causing damage. In this way, obvious defects can be
detected before an accident occurs. Possible damage-causing incidents
include exposure to corona and direct physical damage. Additionally,
rubber gloves must be subjected to an air test, along with the visual
inspection. In the field, this test usually consists of rolling the
cuff towards the palm so that air is entrapped within the glove. In a
testing facility, a mechanical inflater is typically used. In either
case, punctures and cuts can easily be detected. The note following
paragraph (c)(2)(ii) indicates that ASTM F1236-96 (2012), Standard
Guide for Visual Inspection of Electrical Protective Rubber Products,
contains information on how to inspect rubber insulating equipment and
descriptions and photographs of potential irregularities in the
equipment.
Electrical protective equipment could become damaged during use and
lose some of its insulating value. Final paragraph (c)(2)(iii), which
is being adopted without substantive change from the proposal, lists
types of damage that cause the insulating value of rubber insulating
equipment to drop, for example, a hole, tear, puncture, or cut, or an
embedded foreign object. The equipment may not be used if any of the
defects listed here or in paragraph (c)(2)(iii), or any other defect
that damages its insulating properties, is present.
Defects other than those listed in paragraph (c)(2)(iii) might
develop during use of the equipment and could also affect the
insulating or mechanical properties of the equipment. If such defects
are found, paragraph (c)(2)(iv), which is being adopted without change
from the proposal, requires the equipment to be removed from service
and tested in accordance with other requirements in paragraph (c)(2).
The results of the tests will determine if it is safe to return the
items to service.
Foreign substances on the surface of rubber insulating equipment
can degrade the material and lead to damage to the insulation.
Paragraph (c)(2)(v), which is being adopted as proposed, requires the
equipment to be cleaned as needed to remove any foreign substances.
Over time, certain environmental conditions can also cause
deterioration of rubber insulating equipment. Final paragraph
(c)(2)(vi), which is being adopted without substantive change from the
proposal, requires insulating equipment to be stored so that it is
protected from damaging conditions and substances, such as light,
temperature extremes, excessive humidity, and ozone. This requirement
helps the equipment retain its insulating properties as it ages. OSHA
has replaced the proposed term "injurious substances and conditions"
with "damaging substances and conditions" to make it clear that the
equipment must be protected from substances and conditions that might
damage it rather
than substances and conditions that could injure workers.
In connection with this requirement, the Agency does not believe
that it is safe to store equipment on trucks for extended periods
between use if such storage would expose the equipment to extremes of
temperature or humidity. It may be necessary, under some circumstances,
to store equipment indoors during prolonged periods when employees are
not using the equipment. Workers are dependent upon electrical
protective equipment for their safety, and all reasonable means of
protecting it from unnecessary damage must be employed.
Rubber insulating gloves are particularly sensitive to physical
damage during use. Through handling conductors and other electrical
equipment, an employee can damage the gloves and lose the protection
they provide. For example, a sharp point on the end of a conductor
could puncture the rubber. To protect against damage, protector gloves
(made of leather) are worn over the rubber gloves. Paragraph
(c)(2)(vii) recognizes the extra protection afforded by leather gloves
and requires their use over rubber gloves, except under limited
conditions.
Proposed paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(A) provided that protector gloves
are not required with Class 0 or Class 00 gloves under limited-use
conditions, that is, when unusually high finger dexterity is needed for
small equipment and parts manipulation. This exception is necessary to
allow work to be performed on small energized parts. The Agency is
adopting the proposed provision with one revision. Under paragraph
(c)(2)(i) and Table E-4, which are being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, the maximum voltage on which Class 0 and
Class 00 gloves can be used is 1,000 volts and 500 volts, respectively.
Mr. James A Thomas, President of ASTM International, pointed out that
Section 8.7.4 of ASTM F496 restricts the use of Class 00 rubber
insulating gloves to voltages of 250 volts, ac, or less when they are
used without protectors (Ex. 0148). Moreover, the consensus standard
also includes a maximum dc voltage for Class 00 gloves used without
protectors. Section 8.7.4 of ASTM F496-02a, Standard Specification for
In-Service Care of Insulating Gloves and Sleeves, states:
Protector gloves may be omitted for Class 0 gloves, under
limited use conditions, where small equipment and parts manipulation
require unusually good finger dexterity. Under the same conditions,
Class 00 gloves may be used without protectors, but only at voltages
up to and including 250 V a-c or 375 V d-c. Other classes of gloves
may be used without protector gloves for similar conditions only
where the possibility of physical damage to the gloves is unlikely
and provided the voltage class of the glove used is one class above
the voltage exposure. Rubber insulating gloves that have been used
without protectors shall not be used with protectors until given an
inspection and electrical retest. [Ex. 0051]
Based on Section 8.7.4 of ASTM F496-02a, the Agency concludes that
using Class 00 gloves without protectors on voltages above 250 volts,
ac, or 375 volts, dc, is considered to be unsafe by the experts on the
consensus standards committee.\32\ In the final rule, OSHA has
therefore included a new paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(B) addressing the use of
Class 00 gloves and incorporating these two voltage restrictions on the
use of Class 00 gloves without protectors. Consequently, OSHA
renumbered proposed paragraphs (c)(2)(vii)(B) and (c)(2)(vii)(C) as
paragraphs (c)(2)(vii)(C) and (c)(2)(vii)(D), respectively, and is
adopting them without substantive change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ ASTM F496-08 contains an identical requirement in Section
8.7.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted earlier, if protector gloves are not worn, there is a
danger a sharp object could puncture the rubber. The resulting hole
could endanger employees handling live parts because of the possibility
that current could arc through the hole to the employee's hand or that
leakage could develop and expose the employee to electric shock. At 250
volts, ac, or less, or 375 volts, dc, or less, for Class 00 gloves, and
at 1,000 volts or less for Class 0 gloves, the danger of current
passing through a hole is low, and an employee is protected against
electric shock as long as the live part itself does not puncture the
rubber and contact the employee's hand (59 FR 4328). Although the type
of small parts, such as small nuts and washers, encountered in work
covered by the exception are not likely to do this, the danger still
exists (id.). OSHA, therefore, is adopting, without substantive change
from the proposal, a note to final paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(A) that
provides that persons inspecting rubber insulating gloves used under
these conditions need to take extra care in visually examining them and
that employees using the gloves under these conditions need to take
extra care to avoid handling sharp objects.
Under paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(C), classes of rubber insulating gloves
other than Class 0 and Class 00 may be used without protector gloves
only if: (1) The employer can demonstrate that the possibility for
physical damage to the glove is small, and (2) gloves at least one
class higher than required for the voltage are used. For example, if a
Class 2 glove is used at 7,500 volts or less (the maximum use voltage
for Class 1 equipment pursuant to Table E-4) and the employer can
demonstrate that the possibility of damage is low, then protector
gloves need not be used. The final rule ensures that, under the
conditions imposed by the exception, damage is unlikely, and the rule
further reduces the risk to the employee by requiring thicker
insulation as a measure of extra physical protection that will better
resist puncture during use.\33\ In addition, the consensus standard
permits these classes of rubber insulating gloves to be used without
protectors under the same conditions (Ex. 0051). This exception does
not apply when the possibility of damage is significant, such as when
an employee is using a knife to trim insulation from a conductor or
when an employee has to handle moving parts, such as conductors being
pulled into place.
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\33\ The thickness of the rubber increases with increasing class
of rubber insulating glove (for example, from Class 0 to Class 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Brockman with Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation
recommended, without explanation, that there should be no exception
permitting the use of rubber insulating gloves above Class 0 without
protectors (Ex. 0173).
The Agency rejects this recommendation. OSHA has explained that it
is safe to use Class 1 and higher rubber insulating gloves without
protectors under the conditions imposed by final paragraph
(c)(2)(vii)(C). OSHA notes, however, that electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work covered by Sec. 1910.269 and
subpart V will nearly always pose a substantial probability of physical
damage to rubber insulating gloves worn without protectors. Thus, the
exception contained in paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(C) will rarely apply when
rubber insulating gloves are used for that type of work. However,
electrical protective equipment covered by Sec. 1926.97 is used
outside of electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
work, and there may be rare cases in these other types of work, for
example, in product manufacturing or testing laboratories, in which the
possibility of damage is slight.
To ensure that no loss of insulation has occurred, paragraph
(c)(2)(vii)(D) prohibits any rubber insulating gloves used without
protector gloves from being reused until the rubber gloves have been
tested in accordance with paragraphs (c)(2)(viii) and (c)(2)(ix),
which address required test voltages and the adequacy of the test
method, respectively. It should be noted that this testing is required
regardless of whether the glove is Class 0 or 00, as permitted in
paragraphs (c)(2)(vii)(A) and (c)(2)(vii)(B), or is Class 1 or higher,
as permitted in paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(C).
The National Electrical Contractors Association (NECA) and several
NECA chapters objected to the requirement to test rubber insulating
gloves after use without protectors. (See, for example, Exs. 0127,
0171, 0172, 0188.) They argued that there was no safety benefit and
that the increased frequency of testing would be a burden on employers.
For example, NECA stated:
The preamble doesn't include any information on electrical
injuries resulting from the failure of insulated gloves used without
leather protectors. Thus, requiring insulating gloves to be retested
after each use without a protector is a burden upon the employer
without offering any additional safety to employees. When using
gloves in Classes 1-4, protectors often must be removed for reasons
of manual dexterity, but the parts being worked on are fairly large
which minimizes the likelihood for damage. Current techniques of
inspecting and air-testing insulating gloves are sufficient to
identify damaged gloves. [Ex. 0171]
Another commenter, Mr. Tom Chappell of the Southern Company, argued
that an accelerated testing schedule (every 90 days instead of every 6
months) should be an acceptable alternative to testing each time a
rubber insulating glove is used without a protector (Ex. 0212).
OSHA disagrees with these objections. First, the consensus standard
also contains this requirement, which indicates that the consensus of
expert opinion considers that the requirement provides necessary
additional safety to employees (Ex. 0051). Second, a visual inspection
and air test may not detect minor damage that a voltage test will. Even
Mr. Chappell believes that additional testing is required to supplement
the visual inspection. Third, testing on an accelerated schedule would
allow such damage to go undetected until the next test, which could be
as long as 89 days under Mr. Chappell's recommended testing regimen.
Fourth, OSHA believes that the requirement to test rubber insulating
gloves used without protectors will strongly discourage any unnecessary
use of the gloves without protectors because of the expense of the test
and because testing gloves shortens their useful life. Finally, any
additional burden on employers is insubstantial, as employers are
already required to do much of the testing specified by the final rule.
In addition, existing Sec. 1910.137(b)(2)(vii)(B) already requires
gloves used without protectors to be tested before being used at a
higher voltage.\34\ Therefore, OSHA has carried forward proposed
paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(C) into the final rule without change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Existing Sec. 1910.137(b)(2)(vii)(B) only requires gloves
to be tested before being used on a higher voltage. The final rule
adopts the proposed revision to this requirement so that rubber
insulating gloves used without protectors must be tested before
reuse after any use without protector gloves. For the purposes of
Sec. Sec. 1926.97(c)(2)(vii)(D) and 1910.137(c)(2)(vii)(D),
"reuse" means any use after the limited use permitted without
protector gloves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (c)(2)(viii), which is being adopted as proposed,
requires insulating equipment to be tested periodically at the test
voltages and testing intervals specified in Table E-4 and Table E-5,
respectively. These tests will verify that electrical protective
equipment retains its insulating properties over time. Table E-4 lists
the retest voltages that are required for the various classes of
protective equipment, and Table E-5 presents the testing intervals for
the different types of equipment. These test voltages and intervals
were derived from the relevant ASTM standards.
Mr. Thomas Frank of Ameren Company objected to the inclusion of
rubber insulating line hose in proposed Table E-4 and Table E-5 (Ex.
0209). He argued that the applicable consensus standard does not
designate a test method for this equipment.
OSHA disagrees with this objection. Contrary to Mr. Frank's
assertion, ASTM D1050, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Line Hose, does contain test methods for rubber insulating line hose
(Ex. 0068).\35\ Table E-5, which specifies test intervals for rubber
insulating equipment, only requires testing of line hose either when
the insulating value is suspect \36\ or after repair. In these cases,
testing is the only way of ensuring that the insulating properties of
the equipment are at an acceptable level (id.). After all, paragraph
(a)(2)(i) requires rubber insulating equipment to be capable of passing
electrical tests. When the insulating value of the equipment is
suspect, or when the equipment has been altered, as it will have been
during any repair, there is simply no way other than testing to
determine whether the equipment retains the required insulating value.
Therefore, OSHA has carried proposed Table E-4 and Table E-5 into the
final rule without substantive change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Both the 1990 edition of ASTM D1050 referenced in the note
to existing Sec. 1910.137(b)(2)(ix) and the 2005 edition referenced
in the note to final Sec. 1926.97(c)(2)(ix) contain test methods
for rubber insulating line hose.
\36\ The insulating value of rubber insulating equipment is
suspect when the inspection required by final paragraph (c)(2)(ii)
leads to questions about the quality of the insulation or uncovers
any damage to the insulating equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (c)(2)(ix), which is being adopted without change from
the proposal, establishes a performance-oriented requirement that the
method used for the tests required by paragraphs (c)(2)(viii) and
(c)(2)(xi) (the periodic and postrepair tests, respectively) give a
reliable indication of whether the electrical protective equipment can
withstand the voltages involved. As this is a performance-oriented
standard, OSHA does not spell out detailed procedures for the required
tests, which will obviously vary depending on the type of equipment
being tested.
Following paragraph (c)(2)(ix) is a note stating that the
electrical test methods in various listed ASTM standards on rubber
insulating equipment will be deemed to meet the performance
requirement. As mentioned earlier, this note does not mean that OSHA is
adopting the listed ASTM standards by reference. In enforcing Sec.
1926.97(c)(2)(ix), the Agency will accept any test method that meets
the performance criteria of the OSHA standard.
Once equipment has undergone in-service inspections and tests, it
is important to ensure that any failed equipment is not returned to
service. Final paragraph (c)(2)(x), which is being adopted without
change from the proposal, prohibits the use of electrical protective
equipment that failed the required inspections and tests. Paragraph
(c)(2)(x) does, however, list the following acceptable means of
eliminating defects and rendering the equipment fit for use again.
The final standard permits defective portions of rubber line hose
and blankets to be removed in some cases. The result would be a smaller
blanket or a shorter length of line hose. Under the standard, Class 1,
2, 3, and 4 rubber insulating blankets may only be salvaged by severing
the defective portions of the blanket if the resulting undamaged area
is at least 560 millimeters by 560 millimeters (22 inches by 22
inches). For these classes, smaller sizes cannot be reliably tested
using standard test methods. Although the standard does not restrict
the size of Class 0 blankets, OSHA believes that practical
considerations in testing and using Class 0 blankets will force
employers to similarly limit the size of these blankets when they have
been repaired by cutting out a damaged portion.
Obviously, gloves and sleeves cannot be repaired by removing a
defective portion; however, the final standard permits patching rubber
insulating gloves and sleeves if the defects are minor. Blankets may
also be patched under certain circumstances. Moreover, rubber
insulating gloves and sleeves with minor surface blemishes may be
repaired with a compatible liquid compound. In all cases (that is,
whether a patch is applied or a liquid compound is employed), the
repaired area must have electrical and physical properties equal to
those of the material being repaired.
Repairs performed in accordance with the standard are unlikely to
fail because the rule requires the use of compatible patches or
compatible liquid compounds and requires the repaired area to have
electrical and physical properties equal to those of the surrounding
material. However, to minimize the possibility that glove repairs will
fail, repairs to rubber insulating gloves outside the gauntlet area
(that is, the area between the wrist and the reinforced edge of the
opening) are not allowed. OSHA stresses that the final rule does not
permit repairs in the working area of the glove, where the constant
flexing of the rubber during the course of work could loosen an ill-
formed patch. A failure of a patch or liquid compound in this area of
the glove would likely lead to injury very quickly. On the other hand,
the gauntlet area of rubber insulating gloves is not usually in direct
contact with energized parts. If a patch fails in this area, a worker
is much less likely to be injured.
Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation recommended, without
explanation, that OSHA not permit patching of rubber insulating gloves
and sleeves (Ex. 0173). OSHA rejects this recommendation. OSHA has
explained that it is safe only to patch insulating gloves and sleeves
under the conditions imposed by final paragraph (c)(2)(x)(D).
Once the insulating equipment has been repaired, it must be
retested to ensure that any patches are effective and that there are no
other defects present. Such retests are required under paragraph
(c)(2)(xi), which is being adopted without change from the proposal.
Employers, employees, and OSHA compliance staff must have a method
of determining whether the tests required under this section have been
performed. Paragraph (c)(2)(xii) requires this determination to be
accomplished by means of certification by the employer that equipment
has been tested in accordance with the standard. The certification is
required to identify the equipment that passed the test and the date it
was tested. Typical means of meeting this requirement include logs and
stamping test dates on the equipment. A note following paragraph
(c)(2)(xii) explains that these means of certification are acceptable.
As explained under the summary and explanation for paragraph (a)(1)(ii)
earlier in this section of the preamble, the final rule, unlike the
proposal, includes an explicit requirement that employers make this
certification available upon request to employees and their authorized
representatives. OSHA has also clarified the requirement to indicate
that the certification records must be made available upon request to
the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health.
B. Subpart V, Electric Power Transmission and Distribution
OSHA is revising subpart V of its construction standards. This
subpart contains requirements designed to prevent deaths and other
injuries to employees performing construction work on electric power
transmission and distribution installations. OSHA based the revision of
subpart V primarily on the general industry standard at Sec. 1910.269,
Electric power generation, transmission, and distribution, which the
Agency promulgated in January 1994. The final standard revises the
title of subpart V from "Power Transmission and Distribution" to
"Electric Power Transmission and Distribution" to make it clear that
the subpart addresses "electric" power transmission and distribution
(and not mechanical power transmission) and to match the title of Sec.
1910.269 more closely.
1. Section 1926.950, General
Section 1926.950 defines the scope of final subpart V and includes,
among other provisions, general requirements for training and the
determination of existing workplace conditions. Paragraph (a)(1)(i) of
final Sec. 1926.950 is adopted without change from proposed Sec.
1926.950(a)(1) and sets the scope of revised subpart V. This paragraph
has been taken largely from existing Sec. 1926.950(a) and (a)(1).
Subpart V applies to the construction of electric power transmission
and distribution installations. In accordance with existing Sec.
1926.950(a)(1) and Sec. 1910.12(d), paragraph (a)(1)(i) of final Sec.
1926.950 provides that "construction" includes the erection of new
electric transmission and distribution lines and equipment, and the
alteration, conversion, and improvement of existing electric
transmission and distribution lines and equipment.
As noted in Section II, Background, earlier in this preamble,
rulemaking participants generally supported OSHA's goal of providing
consistency between Sec. 1910.269 and subpart V. However, many
commenters urged the Agency to combine Sec. 1910.269 and subpart V
into a single standard applicable to all electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work. (See, for example, Exs. 0099,
0125, 0127, 0146, 0149, 0151, 0152, 0153, 0156, 0159, 0161, 0164, 0172,
0175, 0179, 0180, 0183, 0186, 0188, 0202, 0206, 0225, 0226, 0229, 0231,
0233, 0239, 0241, 0401; Tr. 291-294, 542-543, 1235-1236, 1282-1283,
1322, 1332.) These rulemaking participants argued that several benefits
would result from combining Sec. 1910.269 and subpart V into a single
standard, including:
Lessening confusion--a single standard would eliminate
questions about whether work is construction or maintenance and ensure
uniform interpretations for all generation, transmission, and
distribution work (see, for example, Exs. 0146, 0151, 0152, 0156, 0175,
0183, 0202, 0233);
Facilitating compliance and reducing costs--under a single
standard, employers would be able to train workers in a single set of
rules rather than one set for construction and another set for
maintenance (Tr. 293-294); and
Eliminating the need to maintain and update two standards
over time (see, for example, Exs. 0127, 0149, 0152, 0179).
OSHA is rejecting these recommendations to combine Sec. 1910.269
and subpart V into a single standard. First, OSHA does not believe that
employers will have to maintain separate sets of rules for construction
and maintenance. Because the final rule largely adopts identical
requirements for construction and maintenance, OSHA expects that
employers will be able to fashion a single set of rules, consistent
with both Sec. 1910.269 and subpart V, that apply regardless of the
type of work being performed. In the final standard, OSHA is adopting
different rules in a few cases, based on fundamental differences
between the other construction standards in part 1926 and the general
industry standards in part 1910. For example, Sec. 1910.269 and
subpart V reference the general industry and construction standards on
medical services and first aid in Sec. Sec. 1910.151 and 1926.50,
respectively. These general industry and construction standards set
slightly different requirements for
medical services and first aid. Similarly, Sec. 1910.269 and subpart V
separately reference the general industry and construction standards on
ladders. The differences between the construction and general industry
standards that may apply to electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution work go well beyond the few examples described here.
It is beyond the reach of this rulemaking to unify all of the different
general industry and construction standards that apply to electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution work. Consequently,
any employer that performs both general industry and construction work
will need to ensure compliance with applicable provisions in both part
1910 and part 1926. Even if OSHA were to adopt one electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution standard, employers would
still be faced with differences between other requirements in the
general industry and construction standards.
Second, commenters' concerns over differences in language and
interpretation are largely unfounded. As noted in the preamble to the
proposal, one of the primary goals of this rulemaking is to make the
requirements for construction and maintenance consistent with one
another. The Agency will take steps to ensure that interpretations of
identical requirements in the two standards are the same. Toward this
end, the Agency is including a note to final Sec. 1926.950(a)(1)(i) to
indicate that an employer that complies with Sec. 1910.269 generally
will be considered in compliance with the requirements in subpart V.
There is a minor exception for provisions in subpart V that incorporate
by reference requirements from other subparts of part 1926. For those
provisions of subpart V, the employer must comply with the referenced
construction standards; compliance with general industry standards
referenced in comparable provisions of Sec. 1910.269 will not be
sufficient. The new note to Sec. 1926.950(a)(1) should allay the
concerns of commenters about potentially inconsistent interpretations
of identical requirements in Sec. 1910.269 and subpart V. The note
should also assure employers that they can adopt uniform work practices
for the construction, operation, and maintenance of electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution installations with regard to
these requirements.
Ameren Corporation was concerned that OSHA would "make significant
and costly changes to the current 1910.269 standard without adequately
providing the opportunity for utilities to study and comment on the
impact to these changes" (Ex. 0209). The company requested that the
Agency provide the utility industry with an opportunity to comment on
any changes to existing Sec. 1910.269 that were not identified in the
proposal.
OSHA does not believe additional notice and opportunity for comment
is necessary for any of the revisions to Sec. 1910.269 being made in
this final rule. In the preamble to the proposed rule, the Agency
stated:
OSHA expects that final Subpart V will differ from proposed
Subpart V because of changes adopted based on the rulemaking record.
When the final rule is published, the Agency intends to make
corresponding changes to Sec. 1910.269 to keep the two rules the
same, except to the extent that substantial differences between
construction work and general industry work warrant different
standards. [70 FR 34892]
The Agency met this objective in this final rule. OSHA concludes that
any revisions to existing Sec. 1910.269 adopted in the final rule are
based on the record considered as a whole and are a logical outgrowth
of the rulemaking record.
Mr. Anthony Ahern with Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives recommended
that OSHA combine Sec. Sec. 1910.137 and 1926.97, or simply reference
Sec. 1910.137, instead of creating a new section on electrical
protective equipment in the construction standards (Ex. 0186).
OSHA rejects this request. New Sec. 1926.97 applies to all of
construction, not just electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work. Final Sec. 1926.97 imposes no additional burden on
employers beyond what would apply under Sec. 1910.137. Duplicating the
Sec. 1910.137 requirements in part 1926 meets the needs of
construction employers and employees for ready access to the protective
equipment standards that are applicable to their work.
Ms. Salud Layton of the Virginia, Maryland & Delaware Association
of Electric Cooperatives objected to the word "improvement" in
proposed Sec. 1926.950(a)(1) (Ex. 0175). Ms. Layton also expressed
concern about a part of the preamble to the proposed rule in which OSHA
used the term "repair" to describe construction activities (id.). She
commented:
As defined in the regulation, "construction" includes
"erection of new transmission and distribution lines and equipment,
and the alteration, conversion, and improvement of existing electric
transmission and distribution lines and equipment.["] While
"alteration" and "conversion" can be construed as construction
activities, the term "improvement" is too broad. Many maintenance
activities are considered improvements. Additionally, the preamble
uses the term "repair" in describing construction activities.
Repairs are typically considered maintenance activities in our
industry, further complicating this issue. [id.]
OSHA considered Ms. Layton's comments, but decided to adhere to its
longstanding practice of treating "improvements" and "repairs" as
construction. The term "improvement" has been a part of the
definition of construction work under Subpart V for decades.
Furthermore, as noted earlier, this definition is codified in 29 CFR
1910.12(d). In addition, removing the term would have no practical
effect on the definition, as all improvements are "alterations," a
term to which she did not object. OSHA has consistently treated
"repairs" as construction work as well. See Sec. 1910.12(b)
("Construction work means work for construction, alteration, and/or
repair. . . ."). OSHA recognizes that there may not always be a clear
distinction between construction repair and general industry
maintenance and has provided clarification in numerous letters of
interpretation, including the Agency's Memorandum for Regional
Administrators dated August 11, 1994.\37\ That memorandum explains
construction work as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ This document is available at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21569.
[C]onstruction work is not limited to new construction. It
includes the repair of existing facilities. The replacement of
structures and their components is also considered construction
work.
* * * * *
There is no specified definition for "maintenance", nor a
clear distinction between terms such as "maintenance", "repair",
or "refurbishment." "Maintenance activities" can be defined as
making or keeping a structure, fixture or foundation (substrates) in
proper condition in a routine, scheduled, or anticipated fashion.
This definition implies "keeping equipment working in its existing
state, i.e., preventing its failure or decline." However, this
definition, (taken from the directive on confined spaces) is not
dispositive; and, consequently, determinations of whether a
contractor is engaged in maintenance operations rather than
construction activities must be made on a case-by-case basis, taking
into account all information available at a particular site.
[Emphasis included in original.]
(See also, for example, letter to Raymond Knobbs (Nov. 18, 2003) and
letter to Randall Tindell (Feb. 1, 1999).\38\) In addition, the
Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) has addressed this issue.
(See, for example, Gulf States Utilities Co., 12 BNA OSHC 1544 (No. 82-
867, Nov. 20, 1985).) In any event, one of OSHA's primary objectives in
this rulemaking is to make Sec. 1910.269 and subpart V more consistent
with each other. Therefore, going forward, the distinction between
construction and maintenance will be of much less significance to
employers covered by these standards. Even Ms. Layton recognized that
her concern about the definition of construction was only relevant
"[i]f the regulations are not the same" (Ex. 0175). The proposed
definition of "construction" in Sec. 1926.950(a)(1) is, therefore,
being carried forward into the final rule without change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ The Knobbs and Tindell letters are available at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24789
and
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=22687
,respectively.
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Mr. Kenneth Stoller of the American Insurance Association inquired
about the applicability of the revised standards to insurance industry
employees, stating:
AIA is concerned that the new contractor obligations
contemplated by the proposal with respect to training, reporting,
record-keeping and personal protective equipment may unintentionally
apply to insurance industry employees, whose only obligation is to
inspect--but not work on--some of the electrical equipment in
question. While our members are neither electrical utilities nor
electrical construction companies, some of their commissioned
inspectors are required to visit and inspect equipment that is both
energized and open. In addition, some state laws identify certain
equipment (such as pressure vessels) located within close proximity
to energized and open electrical apparatus that must be inspected
periodically.
Subjecting insurers to these new requirements would require
individual companies to spend tens of thousands of dollars per year
for additional training and equipment, notwithstanding the fact that
the proposal's preamble indicates that these obligations should only
apply to entities performing maintenance and repairs, not simply
inspections. Accordingly, we recommend that the proposal be amended
to explicitly exempt insurance industry employees from any
obligations it places on contractors. [Ex. 0198]
OSHA considered this comment, but will not be exempting insurance
industry employees from the final rule. Existing Sec. 1910.269 already
covers inspections of electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution installations performed by insurance company workers as
work "directly associated with" these installations. In this regard,
existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(i)(D) states that "[Sec. 1910.269
applies to:] (D) Work on or directly associated with [electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution and other covered]
installations. . . ." OSHA, therefore, interprets existing Sec.
1910.269(a)(1)(i)(D) as applying to inspections conducted by insurance
company employees because the purpose of these inspections is to assure
the safety of these installations and employees working on or near
them. Insurance inspections are similar to inspections conducted by
electric utilities and their contractors. The preamble to the 1994
final rule adopting Sec. 1910.269 specifically listed "inspection"
as an activity covered by that standard (59 FR 4333). Section 1910.269
applies to this type of work without regard to the industry of the
employer that has employees performing the inspections.\39\ Thus,
existing Sec. 1910.269 covers this work as it pertains to general
industry and will continue to cover this work after the final rule
becomes effective. However, insurance inspections may fall under
subpart V, instead of Sec. 1910.269, to the extent the inspections are
construction work. Whether an insurance inspection constitutes
construction depends on the characteristics of the work performed.
(See, for example, CH2M Hill, Inc. v. Herman, 192 F.3d 711 (7th Cir.
1999).)
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\39\ See the letter of interpretation dated June 9, 1999, to Mr.
G. William Doody, which is available at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=22749.
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OSHA does not believe that the final rule will impose substantial
additional costs on the insurance industry. Existing Sec. 1910.269
currently covers the vast majority of insurance inspections on electric
power installations. Of the new provisions this final rule is adding to
Sec. 1910.269, the ones that impose the greatest costs on all
employers are unlikely to impose significant economic burdens on
inspections conducted by insurance industry workers. First, the minimum
approach distance and arc-flash-protection requirements usually will
not apply to the insurance industry because insurance industry
inspectors will almost never be qualified employees (see final
Sec. Sec. 1910.269(l) and 1926.960).\40\
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\40\ According to final Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B), Sec.
1910.269 does not apply to electrical safety-related work practices
covered by Subpart S. Subpart S applies to work performed by
unqualified persons on, near, or with electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution installations (see Sec.
1910.331(b)).
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Second, the host-contractor provisions in Sec. Sec. 1910.269(a)(3)
and 1926.950(c) should not impose significant costs on the insurance
industry. As explained in Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in this preamble, OSHA estimated
the costs of the host-contractor provisions on a per-project basis;
that is, employers will incur costs once for each project. OSHA
believes that its estimate of the number of projects fully accounts for
projects that involve inspections, including insurance inspections, of
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
installations, though OSHA allocated the costs to contract employers
generally. OSHA anticipates that the number of insurance inspections
will be a small fraction of the number of overall projects. If 1 in
every 1,000 projects involves an insurance inspection, then the total
costs related to employers' complying with the host-contractor
provisions for insurance inspections would be less than $20,000 per
year, half of which host employers would bear. The Agency deems such
costs an inconsequential portion of the overall costs of the final rule
and not significant for the insurance industry.
Third, OSHA does not believe that insurance inspections will
typically involve employees working from aerial lifts or on poles,
towers, or similar structures covered by the personal protective
equipment requirements in final Sec. Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C) and
1926.954(b)(3)(iii). Mr. Stoller's lone example of work potentially
affected by the final rule, the inspection of pressure vessels, is not
generally covered by those provisions, which primarily affect work
involving overhead transmission and distribution lines. OSHA is unaware
of any other insurance inspection work that would involve employees
working from aerial lifts or on poles, towers, or similar structures.
Even if such inspections are taking place, they should be rare, and the
Agency deems costs associated with such inspections an inconsequential
portion of the overall costs of the final rule, and inconsequential as
well for the insurance industry.
Paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of final Sec. 1926.950 provides that subpart
V does not apply to electrical safety-related work practices for
unqualified employees. Electrical safety-related work-practice
requirements for these employees are contained in other subparts of
part 1926, including subparts K, N, and CC. For example, Sec.
1926.416(a)(1) in subpart K prohibits employers from permitting an
employee to work in such proximity to any part of an electric power
circuit that the employee could contact the electric power circuit in
the course of work, unless the employee is protected against
electric shock by deenergizing the circuit and grounding it or by
guarding it effectively by insulation or other means. Deenergizing
circuits and insulating them from employees protects unqualified
employees from electric shock. By contrast, subpart V, in final Sec.
1926.960(b)(1)(i), permits only qualified employees to work on or with
exposed energized lines or parts of equipment. Final Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)(iii) requires the employer to ensure that no employee
approaches or takes any conductive object closer to exposed energized
parts than the minimum approach distances, established by the employer
under final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(i), unless the employee is insulated
from the energized part (for example, with rubber insulating gloves and
sleeves), or the energized part is insulated from the employee and from
any other conductive object at a different potential, or the employee
is performing live-line barehand work in accordance with Sec.
1926.964(c).
Subpart CC generally requires employers to ensure that employees
maintain minimum clearances when operating cranes or derricks near
overhead power lines. Paragraph (a)(6) of Sec. 1926.600 also generally
requires minimum clearances when mechanical equipment is operated near
overhead power lines. In part because subpart V establishes
requirements for qualified employees operating mechanical equipment,
Sec. 1926.959(d)(1) of this final rule generally requires mechanical
equipment, including cranes and derricks, to maintain minimum approach
distances that are significantly less than the minimum clearance
distances in either Sec. 1926.600(a)(6) or subpart CC.
OSHA did not expressly propose to exempt electrical safety-related
work practices used by unqualified employees from subpart V; however,
the preamble to the proposal made it clear that subpart V's
requirements did not apply to electrical safety-related work practices
used by unqualified employees. (See, for example, 70 FR 34857.)
Specifically, the Agency stated: "The general approach taken in the
proposed revision of Subpart V is to provide safety-related work
practices for qualified employees to follow when they are performing
electric power transmission and distribution work. Safe work practices
for unqualified employees are not addressed in proposed Subpart V . .
." (70 FR 34857). Information in the record shows that the
requirements in subpart V are not sufficiently protective for
unqualified employees. (See, for example, Exs. 0077, 0134.) For
example, NFPA 70E contains electrical safety-related work practice
requirements to protect unqualified employees from electrical hazards
posed by electric power transmission and distribution installations
(Ex. 0134).\41\ The consensus standard requires unqualified employees
to maintain minimum approach distances that are substantially greater
than the minimum approach distances in Subpart V.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ See NFPA 70E-2004, Section 110.1, which sets the scope for
Article 110, General Requirements for Electrical Safety-Related Work
Practices (Ex. 0134).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA designed subpart V to mirror the requirements in Sec.
1910.269. Existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(i)(A), which is being adopted
in the final rule without substantive change, provides that Sec.
1910.269 applies to "[p]ower generation, transmission, and
distribution installations, including related equipment for the purpose
of communication or metering, which are accessible only to qualified
employees." Existing (and final) Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B)
explicitly excludes "electrical safety-related work practices . . .
covered by subpart S of this part" from coverage. According to Sec.
1910.331(b), subpart S covers electrical safety-related work practices
for unqualified employees working on, near, or with installations for
the generation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy. Thus,
Sec. 1910.269 does not apply to electrical safety-related work
practices for unqualified employees.
In conclusion, OSHA notes that the electrical safety-related work
practices required by Subpart V do not provide sufficient protection
for unqualified employees. Therefore, Subpart V does not and should not
cover such work practices. The final rule, in Sec. 1926.950(a)(1)(ii),
expressly clarifies that Subpart V does not cover electrical safety-
related work practices for unqualified employees.
Paragraph (a)(2) of final Sec. 1926.950, which is being adopted
without change from the proposal, explains that subpart V applies in
addition to all other applicable standards contained in part 1926. This
paragraph also provides that employers doing work covered by subpart V
are not exempt from complying with other applicable provisions in part
1926 by the operation of Sec. 1910.5(c). Paragraph (a)(2) also
clarifies that specific references in subpart V to other sections of
part 1926 are provided for emphasis only. In accordance with this
provision, all construction industry standards continue to apply to
work covered by subpart V unless there is an applicable exception in
subpart V or elsewhere in part 1926. For example, Sec. 1926.959(a)(2)
requires the critical safety components of mechanical elevating and
rotating equipment to be visually inspected before each shift. This
provision does not supersede Sec. 1926.1412(d), which details specific
requirements for the visual inspection of cranes each shift by a
competent person. In a change that OSHA considers nonsubstantive, Sec.
1910.269(a)(1)(iii) is being amended to include language equivalent to
that in Sec. 1926.950(a)(2).
Subpart V has never applied to work on electric power generation
installations. Proposed Sec. 1926.950(a)(3) provided that Sec.
1910.269 would cover all work, including construction, involving
electric power generation installations. In the preamble to the
proposal, the Agency explained that the construction of an electric
power generation station normally poses only general construction
hazards, that is, hazards not addressed by subpart V (70 FR 34833).
OSHA recognized, however, the following two exceptions to this
conclusion: (1) during the final phase of construction of a generating
station, when electrical and other acceptance testing of the
installation is being performed, and (2) during "reconstruction,"
when portions of the generating station not undergoing construction are
still in operation (id.). In both of these scenarios, construction work
at a generation station exposes workers to hazards akin to those posed
by the operation and maintenance of a generation plant. Because the
Agency believed that these two operations were more like general
industry work than construction, it deemed it appropriate for employers
to follow Sec. 1910.269 in those situations (id.). Rather than repeat
the relevant portions of Sec. 1910.269 in subpart V, OSHA proposed
that Sec. 1910.269 apply to all work involving electric power
generation installations.
The Agency requested comments on whether Sec. 1910.269 should
apply to all work involving electric power generation installations, as
proposed, or whether instead the relevant requirements from Sec.
1910.269 should be contained in final subpart V for purposes of
construction work involving electric power generation installations.
OSHA received numerous responses to this request. (See, for example,
Exs. 0125, 0127, 0130, 0149, 0151, 0155, 0159, 0162, 0163, 0172, 0177,
0179, 0186, 0188, 0201, 0208, 0209, 0212, 0213, 0227, 0230.) Commenters
largely supported OSHA's proposed approach and the language making
Sec. 1910.269 applicable to all work involving electric power
generation installations. For
example, Mason County Public Utility District 3 commented: "We believe
the proposed language referencing 1910.269 for all work involving
electric power generation installations should be adopted" (Ex. 0125).
Siemens Power Generation responded similarly, explaining, "Subpart V
should not apply to the electric power generation installations
[because m]aintenance in these installations is covered adequately by
1910.269 and construction is covered adequately by general construction
requirements" (Ex. 0163). In addition, Mr. Tom Chappell of Southern
Company agreed with OSHA that "[a]pplying 1910.269 during the `final
phase of construction' or `reconstruction work' would be preferable to
recreating the same requirements in Subpart V" (Ex. 0212).
On the other hand, NIOSH suggested that it "would be less
burdensome" for employers if the relevant requirements for
construction at generation installations were incorporated in subpart V
(Ex. 0130). In addition, MYR Group was concerned that OSHA's proposed
approach could lead to confusion, explaining:
[A]pplying part 1910 electrical standards [to construction work
involving generation installations] would cause confusion as to
whether other applicable general industry or construction standards
would govern the remaining aspects of such work. Thus, OSHA's
proposal--based on an alleged simplification--does itself create
confusion. [Ex. 0162]
OSHA considered these comments, but does not believe that applying
Sec. 1910.269 to construction involving generation installations is
likely to result in any heavy burdens or confusion. OSHA's construction
standards (29 CFR part 1926) apply to general construction activities
performed at generation installation sites. As previously explained,
Sec. 1910.269 generally will not apply to the original construction of
a generating station until the final phase of construction, when many
of the provisions in Sec. 1910.269 become applicable. For example, in
the early construction phases, the generation installation would
contain no energized circuits, so the provisions for working near
energized parts in Sec. 1910.269(l) would not apply. Similarly, in the
construction of a coal-fired generating station, the requirements in
Sec. 1910.269(v)(11) on coal handing would have no application until
coal is present. To the extent an employer is performing late-stage
construction or reconstruction of a generation installation and Sec.
1910.269 applies, the provisions of Sec. 1910.269 supplement, but do
not replace, any relevant general construction requirements. (See
Sec. Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(iii) and 1926.950(a)(2).) For example, the
training requirements in Sec. 1910.269(a)(2) apply in addition to any
applicable training requirements in part 1926.\42\
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\42\ Paragraph (e) of Sec. 1910.269 contains requirements for
work in enclosed spaces. OSHA recently proposed a standard covering
confined spaces in construction, which will cover many of the same
hazards. OSHA will consider how to apply these new confined space
provisions to the construction of power generation installations in
the development and promulgation of that final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With this additional clarification and the support of most of the
commenters who provided feedback on this issue, the Agency is adopting
proposed Sec. 1926.950(a)(3) as it relates to the construction of
electric power generation installations.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ Current Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(A) provides that Sec.
1910.269 does not apply to construction work. In the final rule,
OSHA is revising this paragraph to indicate that Sec. 1910.269 does
not apply to construction work, as defined in Sec. 1910.12, except
for line-clearance tree-trimming operations and work involving
electric power generation installations as specified in Sec.
1926.950(a)(3). This change makes the application of Sec. 1910.269
consistent with the coverage of work involving electric power
generation installations in subpart V.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another coverage issue raised in the proposal relates to line-
clearance tree trimming, which is currently addressed in Sec.
1910.269.\44\ (See existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(i)(E).) As OSHA
explained in the preamble to the proposal, line-clearance tree trimming
is not normally performed as part of the construction of electric power
transmission or distribution installations (70 FR 34833). One exception
occurs when trees are trimmed along an existing overhead power line to
provide clearance for a new transmission or distribution line that is
under construction (id.). While this type of work by line-clearance
tree trimmers is properly classified as construction work, it shares
many similarities with the work done by line-clearance tree trimmers
that is properly classified as general industry work.\45\ For this
reason, as well as for ease of compliance and enforcement, proposed
Sec. 1926.950(a)(3) provided that Sec. 1910.269 would apply to all
line-clearance tree-trimming operations, even those that might be
considered construction. OSHA requested comments on whether Sec.
1910.269 should apply to all work involving line-clearance tree
trimming, as proposed, or whether the relevant requirements from Sec.
1910.269 should be contained in subpart V.
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\44\ Line-clearance tree trimming is also addressed in Sec.
1910.268 when the lines involved are telecommunications lines. (See
29 CFR 1910.268(q).)
\45\ Throughout the preamble discussion of this final rule, OSHA
generally refers to line-clearance tree trimmers who are not
qualified employees under Sec. 1910.269 or subpart V as "line-
clearance tree trimmers," and to qualified employees who also meet
the definition of "line-clearance tree trimmers" as "qualified
employees."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency received a handful of comments on this issue. (See, for
example, Exs. 0175, 0186, 0201, 0213, 0230.) These comments generally
supported OSHA's proposed approach. For example, Mr. Anthony Ahern of
Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives agreed that OSHA need not duplicate
the line-clearance tree-trimming requirements from Sec. 1910.269 in
subpart V (Ex. 0186). Also, Mr. James Gartland of Duke Energy commented
that the requirements for line-clearance tree-trimming operations
should be covered exclusively under Sec. 1910.269, explaining that
line-clearance tree-trimming operations are the same whether one
considers the work to be general industry or construction (Ex. 0201).
IBEW asked OSHA to clarify whether Sec. 1910.269 would apply even
to tree-trimming operations that could be considered "construction,"
for example clearing around existing energized facilities for a new
right of way (Ex. 0230). OSHA is applying Sec. 1910.269 in those
circumstances. Given that clarification, IBEW agreed that the Sec.
1910.269 requirements for line-clearance tree-trimming operations do
not need to be repeated in subpart V (Ex. 0230). In light of the
commenters' support, OSHA is adopting Sec. 1926.950(a)(3) as proposed
with respect to line-clearance tree trimming.\46\
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\46\ Current Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(A) provides that Sec.
1910.269 does not apply to construction work. In the final rule,
OSHA is revising this paragraph to indicate that Sec. 1910.269 does
not apply to construction work, as defined in Sec. 1910.12, except
for line-clearance tree-trimming operations and work involving
electric power generation installations as specified in Sec.
1926.950(a)(3). This change makes the application of Sec. 1910.269
consistent with the coverage of line-clearance tree-trimming
operations in subpart V.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the tree trimming industry did not object to covering all
line-clearance tree trimming in Sec. 1910.269, representatives of the
industry urged the Agency to expand the scope of covered line-clearance
tree-trimming activities by broadening the definition of that term.
(See, for example, Exs. 0174, 0200, 0502, 0503; Tr. 620-628, 765-769.)
The proposed definition of "line-clearance tree trimming" in Sec.
1926.968, which was based on existing Sec. 1910.269(x), read as
follows:
The pruning, trimming, repairing, maintaining, removing, or
clearing of trees or the cutting of brush that is within 3.05 m (10
feet) of electric supply lines and equipment.
The Utility Line Clearance Coalition (ULCC) commented that the
definition of line-clearance tree trimming should not be limited to
trees within 3.05 meters (10 feet) of an electric supply line. ULCC
requested that OSHA expand the definition of "line-clearance tree
trimming" to include all vegetation management work done by line-
clearance tree trimmers and trainees for the construction or
maintenance of electric supply lines or for electric utilities (Ex.
0502). The Tree Care Industry Association (TCIA) proposed the same
change to the definition of "line-clearance tree trimming" (Ex.
0503). Both tree trimming trade associations recommended that the
definition of "line-clearance tree trimming" be revised to read as
follows:
The pruning, trimming, repairing, maintaining, removing,
treating or clearing of trees or the cutting of brush (vegetation
management) that is within 10 feet (305 cm) of electric supply lines
and equipment, or vegetation management work performed by line
clearance tree trimmer/trainees for the construction or maintenance
of electric supply lines and/or for electric utilities. [Exs. 0502,
0503]
The industry provided three main arguments in support of its
recommendation to expand the scope of tree-trimming work covered by
Sec. 1910.269. For the reasons described later, OSHA is not persuaded
by the industry's arguments and will not be expanding the definition of
"line-clearance tree trimming" to include all vegetation management
work for the construction or maintenance of electric supply lines or
for electric utilities. However, OSHA is making some changes to the
definition of "line-clearance tree trimming" that will broaden, in a
limited manner, the scope of tree-trimming operations covered by Sec.
1910.269. These changes are discussed later in this section of the
preamble.
The tree trimming industry's first argument in support of its
recommended definition is that the "10-foot rule" (as they described
it) contradicts other portions of Sec. 1910.269. Joe Tommasi of the
Davey Tree Expert Company, testifying on behalf of ULCC, noted:
[T]he minimum separation distances tables in the standard
requires [sic] a line clearance arborist to maintain more than ten
feet from some lines depending on the voltage exposures, but at the
same time, the definition says that such work is not subject to
[the] line clearance tree trimming standard because the standard
[applies] only to trees that are within the ten feet of overhead
conductors. [Tr. 622]
Mr. Tommasi also suggested that some requirements, such as those for
spraying herbicides and stump cutting, may apply to work that takes
place more than 3.05 meters away from power lines (Tr. 622-623).
OSHA does not find this argument persuasive. This first of the tree
trimmers' arguments reflects a basic misunderstanding of the way the
proposed standard worked. Under the proposed rule, tree-trimming work
was covered by Sec. 1910.269 only to the extent it was done on trees
or brush within 3.05 meters of electric supply lines and equipment. If
it was done on trees or brush more than 3.05 meters away from lines and
equipment, none of the provisions in proposed Sec. 1910.269 applied.
The proposed "10-foot rule" did not create any internal conflicts in
Sec. 1910.269. For work done outside of the 3.05-meter boundary, the
proposed provisions the industry was concerned about, that is, minimum
approach distances and requirements for spraying herbicides and stump
cutting, did not apply.
The tree trimmers' second justification for expanding the
definition of line-clearance tree trimming in Sec. 1910.269 is that
the "10-foot rule" undermines safety by causing different safety
requirements to apply to line-clearance tree trimmers depending on
their distance from the line. Mr. Tommasi testified that "experience
teaches that a single set of safety rules applicable to the line tree
arborist achieves the highest rate of compliance and thus the highest
safety" (Tr. 625). Mr. Tommasi maintained that Federal and State OSHA
compliance officials have enforced other standards, such as OSHA's
logging standard (29 CFR 1910.266), during arborist operations more
than 3.05 meters from power lines (id.). Further, ULCC commented that
"the foundation of worker safety in line clearance tree trimming is
adherence to a single predictable set of safety standards in which
employees can be trained and repeatedly drilled" (Ex. 0174).
OSHA appreciates the industry's desire for a single set of safety-
related work practices, but changing the definition of "line-clearance
tree trimming" in Sec. 1910.269 would not necessarily achieve the
industry's goal. As stated previously, even work covered by Sec.
1910.269 and subpart V must comply with all other applicable general
industry and construction standards. In any event, the Agency does not
believe that it is necessary to employee safety to address in Sec.
1910.269 every hazard faced by line-clearance tree trimmers. Employers
in every industry, including line-clearance tree trimming firms, must
identify all OSHA standards applicable to their work, along with their
general duty clause obligations, and then set, communicate, and enforce
a set of work rules that meets all of the applicable requirements. For
example, if a line-clearance tree trimming contractor performs work
that falls under the logging or site-clearing standards (Sec. Sec.
1910.266 and 1926.604, respectively), the contractor will have to
ensure that its work rules meet those standards, in addition to Sec.
1910.269.\47\
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\47\ ULCC suggested that the references in Sec. 1910.269(r)(5)
to specific requirements in the logging standard "shows OSHA's
intent to not apply [the] logging standard to line clearance unless
so-designated" (Ex. 0174). This is an erroneous interpretation that
overlooks existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(iii), which explains that
"[s]pecific references in this section to other sections of part
1910 are provided for emphasis only." Other relevant provisions in
part 1910 continue to apply, including other provisions in the
logging standard, if the work being performed falls within the scope
of those standards and within the scope of Sec. 1910.269 at the
same time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The provisions on brush chippers, sprayers and related equipment,
stump cutters, gasoline-engine power saws, backpack units for use in
pruning and clearing, rope, and fall protection (Sec. 1910.269(r)(2),
(r)(3), (r)(4), (r)(5), (r)(6), (r)(7), and (r)(8), respectively) in
existing Sec. 1910.269 were taken, in part, from the EEI-IBEW draft on
which Sec. 1910.269 was based. Those provisions were "checked against
the equivalent ANSI standard, ANSI Z133.1-1982[, American National
Standard for Tree Care Operations--Pruning, Trimming, Repairing,
Maintaining, and Removing Trees, and Cutting Brush--Safety
Requirements] ([269-]Ex. 2-29), to be sure that OSHA's regulations
would better effectuate safety than the national consensus standard"
(59 FR 4322). However, OSHA did not incorporate a comprehensive tree-
trimming standard in Sec. 1910.269. Thus, many important safety
provisions included in applicable consensus standards and in other OSHA
standards were not included in Sec. 1910.269, and that section does
not address some important safety hazards faced by workers performing
tree care operations. For example, Sec. 1910.269 does not contain any
specific requirements to protect workers felling trees. Those
requirements are in OSHA's logging standard. Furthermore, even with
respect to the nonelectrical hazards that are regulated in the Sec.
1910.269 tree-trimming provisions, the OSHA standards do not cover
those hazards as comprehensively as the current version,
or even the 1982 version, of ANSI Z133.1.\48\ For example, the new and
old consensus standards include additional requirements for brush
chippers and provisions on hand tools such as axes, pruners, and saws
that are not contained in Sec. 1910.269. For these reasons, adopting
the industry's recommendation to have Sec. 1910.269 be the exclusive
source of requirements for tree-trimming work would not improve
employee safety. Instead, it would jeopardize the workers performing
those operations. For example, an employer may perform a logging
operation near an overhead power line under contract with an electric
utility to remove trees along the right of way for the power line.
Applying the tree care industry's recommendation and logic to this work
would place that work exclusively under Sec. 1910.269, eliminating the
protection provided by the logging standard's tree-felling provisions.
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\48\ As stated earlier, in its review of the EEI-IBEW draft,
OSHA checked provisions of that draft against equivalent provisions
in ANSI Z133.1-1982. However, because Sec. 1910.269 is a standard
for electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work
and not a comprehensive standard on tree trimming, the Agency did
not examine provisions in the ANSI standard that had no counterpart
in the EEI-IBEW draft.
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The Agency has published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking
to gather information to use in developing a comprehensive standard on
tree care operations (73 FR 54118-54123, Sept. 18, 2008). In that
rulemaking, OSHA will consider whether, and to what extent, any new
standard on tree care operations should cover line-clearance tree
trimming.
The tree trimmers' third justification for expanding the definition
of line-clearance tree trimming in Sec. 1910.269 is that the
electrical hazards regulated by Sec. 1910.269 exist at distances
greater than 3.05 meters from the line. ULCC argued that there are many
circumstances that expose line-clearance tree trimmers to electrical
hazards at distances beyond 3.05 meters from the line, such as when a
tree or section of a tree can fall into the line even though the tree
itself is farther than 3.05 meters away (Ex. 0174). To illustrate this
point, Mr. Tommasi provided an example of a 15.2-meter tall oak tree
located 4.6 meters from an overhead power line (Tr. 623).
OSHA has considered this argument, but has concluded that the 3.05-
meter rule is generally reasonable and consistent with provisions in 29
CFR part 1910, subpart S, OSHA's general industry electrical standards.
An examination of the different requirements that apply to the
electrical hazards posed by tree-trimming operations will illuminate
the need to set a locus within which Sec. 1910.269 should apply.
The line-clearance tree-trimming provisions in existing Sec.
1910.269 contain several requirements to protect line-clearance tree
trimmers from electrical hazards. First, to be considered line-
clearance tree trimmers under Sec. 1910.269, employees must, through
training or experience, be familiar with the special techniques and
hazards involved in line-clearance tree trimming.\49\ (See existing
Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(i)(E)(2) and the definition of "line-clearance
tree trimmer" in existing Sec. 1910.269(x).) Second, there must be at
least two line-clearance tree trimmers present under any of the
following conditions: (1) If a line-clearance tree trimmer is to
approach any conductor or electric apparatus energized at more than 750
volts more closely than 3.05 meters, (2) if branches or limbs being
removed are closer than the applicable minimum approach distances to
lines energized at more than 750 volts, or (3) if roping is necessary
to remove branches or limbs from such conductors or apparatus. (See
existing Sec. 1910.269(r)(1)(ii).) Third, when the voltage on the
lines is 50 volts or more and two or more employees are present,
generally at least two employees must be trained in first aid,
including cardiopulmonary resuscitation.\50\ (See existing Sec.
1910.269(b)(1).) Fourth, employees must maintain minimum approach
distances appropriate for qualified employees. (See existing Sec.
1910.269(r)(1)(iii) and (r)(1)(v).) Fifth, employees must use
insulating equipment to remove branches that are contacting exposed,
energized conductors or equipment or that are within the applicable
minimum approach distances of energized conductors or equipment. (See
existing Sec. 1910.269(r)(1)(iv).) Sixth, line-clearance tree-trimming
work may not be performed when adverse weather conditions make the work
hazardous in spite of the work practices required by Sec. 1910.269.
(See existing Sec. 1910.269(r)(1)(vi).) Seventh, mechanical equipment
must maintain appropriate minimum approach distances, and certain
measures must be taken to protect employees on the ground from hazards
that might arise from equipment contact with energized lines. (See
existing Sec. 1910.269(p)(4).)
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\49\ Throughout this preamble, OSHA differentiates between line-
clearance tree trimmers (as defined in Sec. 1910.269) and other
workers involved in tree-trimming operations. OSHA refers to
employees doing tree-related work who are not line-clearance tree
trimmers under Sec. 1910.269 as "regular tree trimmers" (that is,
all other tree trimmers) or "tree workers who are not line-
clearance tree trimmers" (that is, all other tree trimmers and
ground workers). See also the summary and explanation for Sec.
1926.950(b)(2), later in this section of the preamble.
\50\ See the summary and explanation for final Sec.
1926.951(b)(1), later in this section of the preamble, for a
discussion of the requirements for first-aid training for field
work, such as line-clearance tree-trimming operations.
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Requirements for tree trimmers who are not performing line-
clearance tree trimming (as defined in final Sec. 1910.269(x)), that
is, "regular tree trimmers," are contained in Subpart S of the
general industry standards in part 1910. It is important to note that,
for the purposes of Subpart S, tree trimmers fall into two categories:
(1) Regular tree trimmers, whom OSHA treats as unqualified persons, and
(2) line-clearance tree trimmers (as defined in Sec. 1910.269), whom
OSHA considers qualified persons under subpart S. Line-clearance tree
trimmers under Sec. 1910.269 are exempt from the electrical safety-
related work practice requirements in subpart S and must comply with
the Sec. 1910.269 requirements described previously.\51\ (See Sec.
1910.331(c)(1).) In contrast, regular tree trimmers are subject to the
subpart S requirements, but are not covered by Sec. 1910.269.\52\
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\51\ Note 2 to the definition of "line-clearance tree trimmer"
in existing Sec. 1910.269(x) explains that line-clearance tree
trimmers are considered qualified employees for purposes of the
electrical safety-related work practices in Subpart S (Sec. Sec.
1910.331 through 1910.335). Paragraph (c)(1) of Sec. 1910.331
provides that Sec. Sec. 1910.331 through 1910.335 do not apply to
work performed by qualified persons, including line-clearance tree
trimmers under Sec. 1910.269, on or directly associated with
generation, transmission, and distribution installations. In
addition, Note 3 to Sec. 1910.331(c)(1) clarifies that the agency
considers line-clearance tree trimming to be work directly
associated with such installations.
\52\ Currently, an employee must meet the definition of "line-
clearance tree trimmer" in existing Sec. 1910.269(x) and have
training meeting Sec. 1910.332(b)(3) to be considered a line-
clearance tree trimmer who is a qualified employee for the purposes
of subpart S. (See Note 1 to Sec. 1910.332(b)(3), which states that
a person must have the training required by that paragraph to be
considered a qualified person.) As explained in the summary and
explanation for Sec. Sec. 1926.950(b)(2) and 1910.269(a)(2)(iii),
later in this section of the preamble, OSHA added to Sec. 1910.269
appropriate training requirements for line-clearance tree trimmers.
Consequently, under this final rule, an employee must meet the
definition of "line-clearance tree trimmer" and have training
meeting Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(iii) to be considered a line-clearance
tree trimmer who is a qualified employee for the purposes of subpart
S. Under both the existing standards and the final rule, any given
tree trimmer is either a line-clearance tree trimmer, who is
considered a qualified employee under subpart S, or a regular tree
trimmer, who is considered an unqualified employee under subpart S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subpart S sets some basic requirements for regular tree trimmers.
(Other requirements also apply, but are not germane to this
discussion.) First, regular tree trimmers must be appropriately trained
(see Sec. 1910.332(b)(1) and (b)(2)), although the training required
for regular tree trimmers is not as extensive as that required for
line-clearance tree trimmers. Second, regular tree trimmers must
generally maintain a minimum separation of 3.05 meters from overhead
power lines (see Sec. 1910.333(c)(3)(i) and (c)(3)(iii)). Finally,
regular tree trimmers working on the ground may not contact vehicles or
mechanical equipment capable of having parts of its structure elevated
near energized overhead lines, except under certain conditions (see
Sec. 1910.333(c)(3)(iii)(B)).
As a general matter, OSHA believes that workers performing line-
clearance tree-trimming operations under existing Sec. 1910.269 are
afforded more protection than workers performing regular tree-trimming
operations under Subpart S. Under existing Sec. 1910.269, line-
clearance tree-trimming operations generally require the presence of at
least two line-clearance tree trimmers trained in first aid, including
cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Subpart S does not have a comparable
requirement. Existing Sec. 1910.269 forbids line-clearance tree-
trimming operations from being performed when adverse weather
conditions make work unsafe. Subpart S does not address weather
conditions. Furthermore, in comparison with subpart S, existing Sec.
1910.269 contains additional requirements to protect workers in case
mechanical equipment contacts a power line. OSHA believes that these
important protections in existing Sec. 1910.269 must be required only
when tree-trimming operations expose employees to the most serious
electrical hazards, not any time electrical hazards are present, as
posited by ULCC.
OSHA believes that the seriousness of electrical hazards posed by
tree trimming depends on how close the tree is to the power line. The
closer the tree is to the power line, the more difficulty the worker
has in maintaining minimum approach distances. For example, roping may
be necessary to maintain the required minimum approach distances. (This
practice is addressed in existing Sec. 1910.269(r)(1)(ii)(C).)
Furthermore, when the tree is close to the power line, a worker
trimming trees from an aerial lift has to be more concerned with the
distances between the power line and the tree, the aerial lift, and
himself or herself. The farther the tree is from the power line, the
more room an employee has in which to maneuver the aerial lift.
Therefore, the Agency has only to decide how close the tree needs
to be to a power line before the protections required by Sec. 1910.269
are necessary. The Agency concludes that those protections should start
when the tree is 3.05 meters from a power line. Under Subpart S,
unqualified employees are not permitted within that distance, but they
are permitted to work in compliance with subpart S outside of that
distance (plus 100 millimeters (4 inches) of additional distance for
every 10 kilovolts over 50 kilovolts). (See Sec. 1910.333(c)(3)(i).)
OSHA believes that it would be inconsistent to expand the definition of
"line-clearance tree trimming" to the point that line-clearance tree
trimmers working on trees or brush more than 3.05 meters from the lines
would be entitled to the enhanced protections of Sec. 1910.269, while
employees doing other types of work closer to the lines (between 3.05
meters from the line and where the line-clearance tree trimmers are
working) would be governed by the more limited protections afforded by
subpart S. The Agency generally believes that any electrical hazards
that are present when a tree is more than 3.05 meters from power lines
are addressed adequately by subpart S.
Nevertheless, changes to the existing definition of "line-
clearance tree trimming" in Sec. 1910.269 (which is identical to the
definition proposed for subpart V) are necessary to ensure consistency
with the 3.05-meter rule that applies to unqualified employees under
Sec. 1910.331(c)(3)(i). As noted previously, under Sec.
1910.333(c)(3)(i)(A)(1), 3.05 meters is the minimum distance an
unqualified employee must maintain from overhead power lines. If the
voltage is higher than 50 kilovolts, the required distance under Sec.
1910.333(c)(3)(i)(A)(2) increases by 100 millimeters for every 10
kilovolts of voltage above 50 kilovolts. OSHA believes that this
increase in distance reasonably captures the relationship between the
severity of the electrical hazard and voltage. Therefore, OSHA decided
that, although it is not expanding the definition of "line-clearance
tree trimming" to the extent recommended by the tree trimming
industry, it will add this extra distance to the definition of "line-
clearance tree trimming" to accord with Sec. 1910.333(c)(3)(i)(A).
The revised definition appears in Sec. Sec. 1910.269(x) and 1926.968.
Paragraph (b) of final Sec. 1926.950 addresses training for
employees. Subpart V currently contains no general provisions related
to training employees in the safety practices necessary to perform
electric power transmission and distribution work. It is widely
recognized that the types of work covered by this standard require
special knowledge and skills. Additionally, final subpart V contains
many safety-related work practice requirements that are necessary for
the protection of employees. To gain the requisite knowledge and skills
to use these work practices, employees must be adequately trained.
Therefore, in the proposed revision of subpart V, OSHA included
training requirements mirroring those already in Sec. 1910.269, with a
few changes and additions (discussed later). OSHA notes that editorial
changes are being made throughout paragraph (b) to clarify that
employers must ensure that "each" employee covered by a specific
training provision receives the training required by that
provision.\53\
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\53\ Several provisions in the proposed rule and existing Sec.
1910.269 require employers to provide personal protective equipment
(PPE) and training for "employees" or for "all employees." The
final rule amends these provisions to require PPE and training for
"each employee." These editorial, nonsubstantive changes emphasize
that the standards' training and PPE requirements impose a
compliance duty to each and every employee covered by the standards
and that noncompliance may expose the employer to liability on a
per-employee basis. This action is in accord both with OSHA's
longstanding position and OSHA standards addressing employers'
duties. (See Sec. Sec. 1910.9 and 1926.20(f); see also 73 FR 75568
(Dec. 12, 2008)). It should be noted that, if any provision in the
final rule continues to require training or PPE for "employees" or
for "all employees," rather than for "each employee," as
described above, this was an unintentional omission on OSHA's part
and should not be interpreted as amending OSHA's longstanding
position, or the general standards, addressing employers' duties to
provide training and PPE to each employee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (b)(1) contains training requirements applying to all
employees performing work covered by subpart V. Siemens Power
Generation and ORC Worldwide suggested deleting the heading "All
employees" from proposed paragraph (b)(1). They expressed concern that
the provision could be construed to require training for clerical
employees or other workers doing tasks not covered by subpart V (Exs.
0163, 0208, 0235). Siemens commented:
By adding the word "ALL" the Agency is implying that training
must be conducted for any and all employees regardless of their
scope of task. It implies for example, that even for clerical
employees that have no risk, there must be some documented training
conducted to comply with this requirement. [Ex. 0163]
OSHA appreciates these concerns, but has elected to retain the
title in paragraph (b)(1) as proposed. The Agency thinks that it is
important to distinguish the training requirements in
paragraph (b)(1), which is broadly applicable to workers doing work
covered by subpart V, from the requirements in paragraph (b)(2), which
is applicable only to "qualified employees." OSHA clarified in the
proposal, and is reiterating here, that paragraph (b)(1) does not
impose training requirements on employees who are not performing work
covered by subpart V. The text of paragraph (b)(1) is self-limiting--
employers need only ensure that each employee receives safety training
that "pertain[s] to his or her job assignments" and that is "related
to his or her work."
As clerical workers do not perform the types of hazardous work
covered by subpart V, this provision does not require employers to
train such employees in live-line barehand or other work techniques
addressed by this final rule. Employees performing clerical work or
other work not covered by subpart V would not need to receive the same
electrical safety training required for workers involved in the
construction of transmission and distribution lines and equipment.
However, employers must train clerical workers performing work covered
by subpart V in the hazards to which they might be exposed.
Proposed paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (b)(1)(ii) were borrowed in large
part from provisions in existing Sec. 1910.269. Paragraph (b)(1)(i)
requires each employee to be trained in, and be familiar with, the
safety-related work practices, safety procedures, and other safety
requirements in subpart V that pertain to his or her job assignments.
OSHA considers this training necessary to ensure that employees use the
safety-related work practices outlined in subpart V. It should be noted
that this provision requires employers to train employees not only in
the content of the applicable requirements of the final rule but in how
to comply with those requirements. OSHA received no comments on
proposed paragraph (b)(1)(i) and is carrying it forward into the final
rule without substantive change.
Proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii) additionally provided that employees
had to be trained in, and be familiar with, any other safety practices
related to their work and necessary for their safety, including
applicable emergency procedures, such as pole-top and manhole rescue.
Proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii) required that safety training be provided
in areas that are not directly addressed by subpart V, but that are
related to the employee's job. This training fills in the gaps left
when the final rule does not specify requirements for every hazard the
employee may encounter in performing electric power generation,
transmission, or distribution work. OSHA explained in the preamble to
the proposal that if more than one set of work practices could be used
to accomplish a task safely, the employee would only need to be trained
in the work methods to be used (70 FR 34833). For example, an insulator
on a power line could be replaced by an employee using live-line tools
or rubber insulating equipment or by an employee working without
electrical protective equipment after deenergizing and grounding the
line. The employee would only need to be trained in the method actually
used to replace that insulator.
The Agency received numerous comments suggesting that the training
requirement proposed in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) was too broad (Exs. 0156,
0160, 0168, 0170, 0202, 0206, 0207, 0229, 0233, 0237). Mr. Don Adkins
of Davis H. Elliot Company, an electrical contractor, commented, for
example, that this proposed provision was "impermissibly broad" and
offered "no guidance as to what safety practices are `related' to the
work of those covered by the standard" (Ex. 0156). Mr. Robert Matuga
of the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) believed that
paragraph (b)(1)(ii) was "overly broad," potentially "creating an
obligation for employers to provide training to workers . . . on almost
every hazard that could conceivably be encountered on a construction
jobsite" (Ex. 0168). He also argued that proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii)
is duplicative of Sec. 1926.21(b)(2), which requires "[t]he employer
[to] instruct each employee in the recognition and avoidance of unsafe
conditions and the regulations applicable to his work environment to
control or eliminate any hazards or other exposure to illness or
injury" (id.). Also, the U.S. Small Business Administration's (SBA)
Office of Advocacy commented:
The scope of this mandatory employee training is not limited to
work practices required by the proposed electrical standards, but
extends to any other safety practices that are related to their work
and necessary for their safety. The SBREFA panel was concerned that
this language was overly broad and could be viewed as covering
other, non-specified hazards on the worksite, such as ergonomic
injuries from overhead work.
* * * * *
The proposed training language remains vague and OSHA should
clarify what training is necessary to comply with the standard (as
well as what alternative training is acceptable for compliance) [Ex.
0207]
Despite these comments, OSHA continues to believe that the
requirement in proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii) is essential to the safety
and welfare of employees and is adopting it without significant change
in this final rule. Mr. Brian Erga of Electrical Safety Consultants
International (ESCI) supported the proposed training requirements and
attributed an increase in employee proficiency, and safer work
environments, to the adoption of these provisions in existing Sec.
1910.269. He explained:
It has been shown time and time again that high quality training
and retraining not only provides a safer work site, but returns
dividends in financial contributions and long term productivity to
the employer. The proposed [1926.]950(b) and associated verbiage in
the preamble, if followed, will, in our opinion, move the industry
to a safer work site. The current training requirements in 1910.269
and [the] proposed training requirements are not unduly burdensome,
and will provide a more educated and experienced work force. [Ex.
0155]
Further, Mr. Donald Hartley with IBEW testified at the 2006 public
hearing that "ensur[ing] that . . . employees are trained in the
safety-related work practices, procedures, and requirements that
pertain to their . . . assignments . . . is necessary to ensure that
employees are equipped to deal with potential hazards associated with
this dangerous work" (Tr. 876). He did not suggest that this training
be limited only to the safety practices and other safety requirements
in subpart V. Several rulemaking participants recognized that subpart V
does not specifically address all hazards faced by employees performing
covered work and suggested that training is an important factor in
employee safety. For example, Mr. Lee Marchessault testified about the
importance of training in substation rescue procedures, stating, "You
should do rescue training from substation structures" (Tr. 572). Also,
Energy United EMC commented that "proper training is necessary" to
prevent employees in insulated aerial lifts from touching conductors
(Ex. 0219). The record also indicates that employers train employees to
protect them from heat-stress hazards (see, for example, Tr. 1129-
1130), to ensure proper maintenance of protective clothing (see, for
example, Tr. 471), and to supplement the line-clearance tree-trimming
requirements in existing Sec. 1910.269 (see, for example, Tr. 683).
Existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(i) already contains a requirement
identical to the one proposed in Sec. 1926.950(b)(1)(ii), and OSHA has
successful enforcement experience with this provision. First, except
for two questions addressing who needs to be trained in emergency and
rescue procedures, the Agency has
not received any letters requesting interpretation or clarification of
this provision, leading the Agency to believe that the requirement is
not as ambiguous as the commenters claim. Second, OSHA has issued only
a few citations under existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(i) (for example, in
2008, OSHA issued only 2 citations of Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(i) in 362
inspections of electric utilities), which supports OSHA's conclusion
that employees performing work under existing Sec. 1910.269 are
generally being trained as required. Third, even EEI admits that "EEI
members have generally found the training requirements of paragraph
1910.269(a)(2) to be workable for their employees" (Ex. 0227). Thus,
it appears that electric utilities have not had difficulty complying
with the identical requirement in existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(i).
On the other hand, the Agency agrees with these commenters that
Sec. 1926.950(b)(1)(ii) of the final rule sets a broad, general
requirement to train employees. This is not an uncommon approach for an
OSHA standard to take. OSHA's personal protective equipment (PPE)
standards in Sec. Sec. 1910.132(a) and 1926.95(a) require the employer
to provide and ensure the use of protective equipment wherever it is
necessary by reason of hazards of processes or environment, chemical
hazards, radiological hazards, or mechanical irritants encountered in a
manner capable of causing injury or impairment in the function of any
part of the body through absorption, inhalation or physical contact. An
employer is deemed to be in violation of the PPE standards when it
fails to provide PPE despite having actual or constructive knowledge of
a hazard in its facility for which protective equipment is necessary.
(See, for example, Cape & Vineyard Div. of the New Bedford Gas & Edison
Light Co. v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148, 1152 (1st Cir.1975).) The general
construction training requirement contained in Sec. 1926.21(b)(2) is
similarly broad, requiring employers to instruct each employee in the
recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations
applicable to his or her work environment to control or eliminate any
hazards or other exposure to illness or injury. That standard has been
interpreted to require employers to provide employees with "the
instructions that a reasonably prudent employer would have given in the
same circumstances." (El Paso Crane & Rigging Co., Inc., 16 BNA OSHC
1419 (No. 90-1106, Sept. 30, 1993); see also Pressure Concrete Constr.
Co., 15 BNA OSHC 2011 (No. 90-2668, Dec. 7, 1992) ("Because section
1926.21(b)(2) does not specify exactly what instruction the employees
must be given, the Commission and the courts have held that an employer
must instruct its employees in the recognition and avoidance of those
hazards of which a reasonably prudent employer would have been
aware.").) The applicability of Sec. 1926.21(b)(2) turns on an
employer's actual or constructive knowledge of hazards, just as under
the general PPE requirements. (See, for example, W.G. Fairfield Co. v.
OSHRC, 285 F. 3d 499 (6th Cir. 2002).)
OSHA is applying final paragraph (b)(1)(ii) in the same manner.
Therefore, if an employer has actual knowledge of a hazard (for
example, through safety warnings from equipment manufacturers or
through injury experience), or if the employer has constructive
knowledge of a hazard (for example, when industry practice recognizes
particular hazards), then each employee exposed to the hazard must be
trained. For the training to comply with this provision, it must be
sufficient to enable the employee to recognize the hazard and take
reasonable measures to avoid or adequately control it.
In addition, OSHA agrees with Mr. Matuga that, except to the extent
that it only covers Subpart V work, paragraph (b)(1)(ii) requires the
same training as Sec. 1926.21(b)(2). Consequently, employers who meet
Sec. 1926.21(b)(2) also meet final Sec. 1926.950(b)(1)(ii). Even
though the final rule duplicates the general construction training
provision, the Agency is adopting paragraph (b)(1)(ii) to maintain
consistency with existing Sec. 1910.269.
Mr. Lee Marchessault with Workplace Safety Solutions recommended
that paragraph (b)(1)(ii) refer to rescues at heights generally, rather
than just pole-top rescue, in the parenthetical listing examples of
potentially applicable emergency procedures (Tr. 572). He noted that
rescue procedures are performed from wind turbines, towers, and
substation structures, as well as utility poles (id.).
OSHA has decided not to adopt this recommendation because no change
is necessary. The types of emergency procedures listed in paragraph
(b)(1)(ii) in the final rule are examples only. Pole-top rescue is
listed because it is a widely recognized and used emergency procedure.
The Agency notes, however, that training in these other types of
emergency procedures is required if it is necessary for employee safety
during the work in question.
OSHA proposed to add a new provision to both subpart V and Sec.
1910.269 clarifying that the degree of training required is based on
the risk to the employee for the task involved. OSHA explained that,
under this proposed paragraph, the training provided to an employee
would need to be commensurate with the risk he or she faces (70 FR
34834). The two provisions, proposed Sec. Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(i)(C)
and 1926.950(b)(1)(iii), were based on Sec. 1910.332(c), although
Sec. 1910.332(c) does not contain the "for the task involved"
language. The purpose of these new training paragraphs was to ensure
that an appropriate level of training is provided to employees.
Employees who face little risk in their job tasks need less training
than those whose jobs expose them to more danger. OSHA believed that
this provision would ensure that employers direct their training
resources where they will provide the greatest benefit, while still
making sure that all employees receive adequate training to protect
them against the hazards they face in their jobs (id.). OSHA noted in
the preamble to the proposal that training already provided in
compliance with existing Sec. 1910.269 would be considered sufficient
for compliance with these paragraphs (id.). The provisions would not
require employers to make changes to existing training programs that
comply with Sec. 1910.269; rather, they would provide employers with
options to tailor their training programs and resources to employees
with particularly high-risk jobs (id.).
OSHA received several comments regarding paragraph (b)(1)(iii) of
proposed Sec. 1926.950. (See, for example, Exs. 0128, 0162, 0163,
0169, 0177, 0201, 0209, 0210, 0212, 0221, 0225, 0227, 0235; Tr. 873-
874, 1316-1319, 1332-1333.)\54\ Some commenters maintained that this
provision was unnecessary or too vague. For example, Mr. Pat McAlister
of Henry County REMC requested additional guidance to "clarify
generally when and how risks link with training and [how to assign] the
appropriate level of training to offset those risks" (Ex. 0210). EEI
commented that this proposed training provision was unnecessary,
explaining:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ The remaining discussion of these provisions refers to the
proposed construction requirement. However, the comments and OSHA's
resolution of those comments applies equally to the corresponding
general industry provision as is generally the case throughout this
preamble.
We question the soundness of changing the [current] requirements
[in Sec. 1910.269] because if compliance with existing Section
1910.269 training requirements is sufficient, there is no reason to
add another regulatory
requirement, and the proposed provisions demonstrably have no
purpose. The stated explanation is that the standard is intended to
"provide employers with options," but employers have those options
without the added regulation. No additional provisions are necessary
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to preserve existing options. [Ex. 0227]
EEI went on to suggest that the added requirement would create
confusion, commenting:
EEI's concern is that the new language will likely create
confusion among many employers who do not have access to or
regularly consult the preambles to OSHA standards. All but the most
sophisticated readers likely will assume that the revised standard
imposes a requirement to modify existing training programs.
Moreover, the proposal is unclear: The meaning of the term "degree
of training" is difficult to discern in that it is not evident how
OSHA would classify and evaluate a "degree" of training. [Id.]
Many of the comments received on proposed paragraph (b)(1)(iii)
expressed concern only about the language tying training to "the task
involved." For example, Mr. Mark Spence with Dow Industries generally
supported the proposed provision, but stated that the similar
requirement in Sec. 1910.332(c), which does not contain the "for the
task involved" language, "has been in effect since 1990 without
causing significant problems for employers" (Ex. 0128). Mr. Spence had
concerns about the additional language in proposed paragraph
(b)(1)(iii), explaining:
[T]he proposal refers to training "for the task involved".
Training programs typically are broad, rather than task-specific.
[T]he present wording could be interpreted to indicate an
unmanageable requirement to train affected employees on the details
of each individual task. OSHA should consider re-wording this
provision or clarifying that it means that, where necessary,
additional training may be required for a particular task . . .
[Id.]
Mr. Tom Chappell of Southern Company similarly noted that "[d]ue
to the large number of different tasks that an employee may need to
perform, it would be difficult to evaluate each task and identify the
level of training that would be required" (Ex. 0212). Consumers Energy
commented that, in its experience, "employees can safely complete
hundreds of specific tasks" without the need for training in each task
individually (Ex. 0177). Mr. Donald Hartley of IBEW testified that the
requirement "to tie the degree of training to the risk to the employee
for the task involved . . . is both an unworkable and inappropriate
standard" (Tr. 873-874). Mr. William Mattiford with Henkels & McCoy
testified:
[I]t's not very clear as to what by definition, the degree of
training shall be determined by the risk to the employee for the
task involved. And that's where we see it's very confusing.
And if it's literally taken that way, then it's each individual
task. So it's not just setting a pole, but it's digging a hole, to
set the pole, to prefab the pole. Each one of those things could be,
I guess, understood as being training for each one of those tasks.
And I feel as though, many of us feel as though that by the
design of the training programs today that have redundancy and
overlapping in them, you do cover all of those.
But to actually spell out perhaps a lesson plan for each one of
those tasks I think would be just too difficult to do, if not
impossible. [Tr. 1339]
Mr. Wilson Yancey with Quanta Services agreed with these comments:
I agree with Bill's comments, too. I think most of that is being
covered today. If we have to go down and copy it and put lesson
plans for everything, we will never get it accomplished and it will
be too costly to the contractor. [Tr. 1340]
OSHA continues to believe that it is important that the level of
training provided to employees be commensurate with the risk they
encounter. Focusing training where the risk is greatest maximizes the
benefits to be achieved. In addition, providing no more training than
is necessary for hazards that pose less risk can conserve valuable, and
often limited, safety and health resources. OSHA successfully used this
general approach in Sec. 1910.332(c), allowing employers flexibility
in providing training to employees, yet ensuring that employees most at
risk receive the most training. This approach is recognized by the
Agency's publication "Training Requirements in OSHA Standards and
Training Guidelines." \55\
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\55\ This document can be obtained by contacting OSHA's Office
of Publications as directed in the ADDRESSES section of this
preamble or from OSHA's Web page:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/publications/publication.html.
See, in particular, Section III of
the voluntary guidelines, "Matching Training to Employees," on pp.
6-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the other hand, the Agency understands the rulemaking
participants' concerns. Most commenters objected to providing a level
of training determined by "the task involved." Although employees are
trained to perform the various tasks involved in their jobs, as noted
by Mr. Mattiford (Tr. 1339), examining each task to determine the
relative risk may seem daunting and unworkable as claimed by Mr.
Hartley (Tr. 873-874). Employers should, however, be capable of
determining the relative risk of the various hazards encountered by
their employees. To clarify this requirement, OSHA replaced the phrase
"for the task involved" from the proposal with the phrase "for the
hazard involved" in paragraph (b)(1)(iii) of the final rule.
To determine the relative risk encountered by employees, employers
are encouraged to follow the guidelines in OSHA's publication
"Training Requirements in OSHA Standards and Training Guidelines,"
Voluntary Training Guidelines, Section III. In any event, employers may
allocate training resources in accordance with their own determination
of relative risk, provided that each affected employee receives the
minimum training required under subpart V.
Paragraph (b)(2) contains additional requirements for training
qualified employees. Because qualified employees may work extremely
close to electric power lines and equipment and, therefore, encounter a
high risk of electrocution, it is important that they be specially
trained. Towards this end, the standard requires that these employees
be trained in: distinguishing exposed live parts from other parts of
electric equipment; determining nominal voltages of exposed live parts;
applicable minimum approach distances and how to maintain them; the
techniques, protective equipment, insulating and shielding materials,
and tools for working on or near exposed live parts; and the knowledge
necessary to recognize electrical hazards and the techniques to control
or avoid these hazards. The language in paragraph (b)(2) generally
mirrors language in existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(ii). However,
paragraph (b)(2)(v), which requires training in how to recognize and
control or avoid electrical hazards, has no counterpart in existing
Sec. 1910.269. In addition, OSHA has added language to paragraph
(b)(2)(iii) of the final rule explicitly requiring employers to train
qualified employees in the skills and techniques necessary to maintain
minimum approach distances. See the summary and explanation of final
Sec. 1926.960(c)(1), later in this section of the preamble, for an
explanation of this change.
NIOSH commented that qualified and unqualified employees are
exposed to the same electrical hazards and should receive the same
training (Ex. 0130). NIOSH suggested that "[a]ll workers potentially
exposed to electrocution hazards should be trained in hazard awareness
and the identification and control of these hazards, as qualified
employees are trained" (id.). NIOSH specifically noted that line-
clearance tree trimmers and ground workers face
electrical hazards comparable to those of qualified employees (id.).
OSHA does not believe that is appropriate to adopt requirements in
this final rule for the training of ground workers on tree crews or
other tree workers who are neither qualified employees under Sec.
1910.269 nor line-clearance tree trimmers. Subpart S, not Sec.
1910.269 or subpart V, applies to electrical safety-related work
practices of ground workers on tree crews and other tree workers who
are not line-clearance tree trimmers. (See Sec. 1910.331(b).) The
preamble to the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 final rule makes this clear as
follows:
Other tree workers do not have the training necessary for them
to be either "qualified employees" or "line-clearance tree
trimmers", as defined under Sec. 1910.269(x). These employees are
not covered under Sec. 1910.269 at all. The work practices these
employees must use are contained in Subpart S of Part 1910. Under
Subpart S, tree workers must maintain a 10-foot minimum approach
distance from overhead lines. (In fact, trimming any branch that is
within 10 feet of an overhead power line is prohibited by Subpart
S.) [59 FR 4410; footnotes omitted.]
Existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B) states that Sec. 1910.269 does
not cover "electrical safety-related work practices . . . covered by
subpart S." Consequently, addressing the training of ground workers on
tree crews or other tree workers who are neither qualified employees
nor line-clearance tree trimmers in Sec. 1910.269 or subpart V would
be inappropriate.
On the other hand, OSHA believes that the final rule should address
the training of line-clearance tree trimmers. However, not all of the
training requirements in final Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(ii), which are
applicable to qualified employees, are appropriate for line-clearance
tree trimmers. Qualified employees are trained to work on energized
parts. Specifically, the final rule requires qualified employees to be
trained in, among other topics, the proper use of the special
precautionary techniques, personal protective equipment, insulating and
shielding materials, and insulated tools for working on or near exposed
energized parts of electric equipment (Sec. 1926.950(b)(2)(iv)). This
training enables qualified employees to work directly on energized
parts of electric circuits, which line-clearance tree trimmers do not
do.
Line-clearance tree trimmers work close to, but not on, energized,
overhead power lines. (See, for example, Ex. 0502; Tr. 611.)
Consequently, the Agency believes that these employees have different
training needs than qualified employees covered by Sec. 1910.269.
Under existing Sec. 1910.269, OSHA has addressed the training for
line-clearance tree trimmers in the definition of "line-clearance tree
trimmer" and in the notes to that definition. The definition and notes
appear in existing Sec. 1910.269(x). Note 2 to that definition
explains that while line clearance tree trimmers are not considered
qualified employees for purposes of Sec. 1910.269, they are considered
to be qualified employees exempt from the electrical safety-related
work practice requirements in subpart S (Sec. Sec. 1910.331 through
1910.335). The note following Sec. 1910.332(b)(3) indicates that, for
the purposes of Sec. Sec. 1910.331 through 1910.335, a person must
have the training required by Sec. 1910.332(b)(3) for OSHA to consider
that person a qualified person. Therefore, to be considered a line-
clearance tree trimmer under Sec. 1910.269 and, thus, a qualified
person under subpart S, a tree trimmer needs the training specified by
Sec. 1910.332(b)(3). Any tree trimmer who has not had such training is
considered an unqualified person under subpart S, and the electrical
safety-related work practices in that standard apply instead of those
in Sec. 1910.269 as explained previously.
The training required by Sec. 1910.332(b)(3) is virtually
identical to the training required by final Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(ii)(A)
through (a)(2)(ii)(C) for qualified employees, except that Sec.
1910.332(b)(3)(iii) requires training in the clearance (that is,
minimum approach) distances specified in Sec. 1910.333(c), whereas
Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(ii)(C) requires training in the minimum approach
distances in Sec. 1910.269 and in the skills and techniques necessary
to maintain those distances. Considering NIOSH's recommendation, OSHA
believes that putting appropriate training requirements for line-
clearance tree trimmers directly in Sec. 1910.269 rather than applying
them indirectly through definitions and scope statements will make the
standards more transparent and make the obligation to train these
workers clearer. Consequently, the Agency is adopting a new Sec.
1910.269(a)(2)(iii) requiring line-clearance tree trimmers to be
trained in: (1) The skills and techniques necessary to distinguish
exposed live parts from other parts of electric equipment (final Sec.
1910.269(a)(2)(iii)(A)), (2) the skills and techniques necessary to
determine the nominal voltage of exposed live parts (final Sec.
1910.269(a)(2)(iii)(B)), and (3) the minimum approach distances in the
final rule corresponding to the voltages to which the line-clearance
tree trimmer will be exposed and the skills and techniques necessary to
maintain those distances (final Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(iii)(C)).\56\ The
first two training requirements, final Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(iii)(A) and
(a)(2)(iii)(B), are identical to Sec. 1910.332(b)(3)(i) and
(b)(3)(ii). The remaining requirement, final Sec.
1910.269(a)(2)(iii)(C), is comparable to Sec. 1910.332(b)(3)(iii),
except that line-clearance tree trimmers need to be trained in the
minimum approach distances required under Sec. 1910.269 rather than
those in subpart S and need to be trained in the skills and techniques
necessary to maintain those distances. OSHA concludes that the minimum
approach distances required under Sec. 1910.269 are the more
appropriate reference for final Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(iii)(C) because
line-clearance tree trimmers are required to comply with the minimum
approach distances in Sec. 1910.269.\57\ The Agency also concludes
that line-clearance tree trimmers need to be trained in the skills and
techniques necessary to maintain the required minimum approach
distances for the same reasons that qualified employees must be trained
in these subjects. (See the discussion of minimum approach distances
under the summary and explanation for final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1), later
in this section of the preamble.) OSHA believes that training in these
skills and techniques are even more important for line-clearance tree
trimmers, who, unlike qualified employees, generally work without
electrical protective equipment (see, for example, Ex. 0503).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Line-clearance tree trimming firms may need to train their
employees in the more protective of the minimum approach distances
in subpart S and Sec. 1910.269 to ensure compliance both during
work that is covered by subpart S and work that is covered by Sec.
1910.269.
\57\ Even though line-clearance tree trimmers are not generally
qualified employees under Sec. 1910.269, paragraph (r)(1)(iii) of
final Sec. 1910.269 requires them to maintain the minimum approach
distances specified in Table R-5, Table R-6, Table R-7, and Table R-
8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (b)(2)(v), which is being adopted without change from the
proposal, requires qualified employees to be trained in the recognition
of electrical hazards to which the employee may be exposed and the
skills and techniques necessary to control or avoid those hazards.
Commenting on proposed Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(ii)(E), which is the
general industry counterpart to proposed Sec. 1926.950(b)(2)(v), Mr.
Kevin Taylor of Lyondell Chemical Company requested clarification of
the training required for workers who operate, but do not maintain,
480-volt circuit breakers (Ex. 0218). Workers operating these circuit
breakers need not be
qualified employees unless the devices are in areas restricted to
qualified employees (final Sec. Sec. 1910.269(u)(4) and (v)(4) and
1926.966(e)) or otherwise expose the employees to contact with live
parts (final Sec. 1910.269(l)(1) and 1926.960(b)(1)). Thus, assuming
that these workers are not qualified employees, they would need to be
trained only as required by final Sec. Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(i) and
1926.950(b)(1). The scope of this training is described earlier in this
section of the preamble under the discussion of final Sec.
1926.950(b)(1).
OSHA proposed to supplement the training requirements in paragraphs
(b)(1) and (b)(2) with requirements for supervision and additional
training in paragraphs (b)(3) and (b)(4). These requirements were taken
directly from existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(iii) and (a)(2)(iv). The
Agency explained in the proposal that initial instruction in safe
techniques is not sufficient to ensure that employees will use safe
work practices all of the time (70 FR 34834). Continual reinforcement
of this initial training must be provided to ensure that the worker
uses the procedures he or she has been taught. This reinforcement can
take the form of supervision, safety meetings, prejob briefings or
conferences, and retraining.
Paragraph (b)(3), which is being adopted without change from the
proposal, requires the employer to determine, through regular
supervision (that is, supervision that takes place on a periodic basis
throughout the year) and inspections conducted at least annually, that
each employees is complying with the safety-related work practices
required by subpart V. Paragraph (b)(4), also being adopted without
change from the proposal, requires additional training (or retraining)
whenever:
Regular supervision or an annual inspection required by
paragraph (b)(3) indicates that the employee is not following the
safety-related work practices required by subpart V,
New technology, new types of equipment, or changes in
procedures necessitate the use of safety-related work practices that
are different from practices that the employee would normally use, or
The employee must use safety-related work practices that
are not normally used during his or her regular job duties.
A note to paragraph (b)(4)(iii) explains that retraining must be
provided before an employee performs a task that is done less
frequently than once a year. Instruction provided in prejob briefings
is acceptable if it is detailed enough to fully inform the employee of
the procedures involved in the job and to ensure that he or she can
accomplish them in a safe manner.
Mr. Leo Muckerheide of Safety Consulting Services commented that
the requirements for retraining in proposed paragraph (b)(4) were
reactive rather than proactive (Ex. 0180). He recommended that the
standard require 4 to 8 hours of retraining every 2 to 3 years, arguing
that workers follow proper safety practices immediately after training,
but drift away from those practices as time goes on.
OSHA does not agree that the retraining requirements in paragraph
(b) are exclusively reactive. Employees performing work covered by the
final rule typically employ the safety-related work practices required
by the standard on a daily or other regular basis. The Agency believes
that workers generally will continue to follow these practices over
time and has no evidence that a lack of regularly scheduled retraining
contributes to a failure to follow safe work practices that are used
frequently. OSHA does recognize, however, that retraining is important
for work practices that are employed infrequently. Thus, paragraphs
(b)(4)(ii) and (b)(4)(iii) require employees to receive additional
training if they need to use new or different safety-related work
practices or safety-related work practices that are not part of their
regular job duties. For example, under paragraph (b)(4)(iii), an
employee who is expected to administer CPR in the event of an emergency
needs retraining if he or she has not used those emergency practices
over the course of the previous year. Retraining would also be required
for an employee who needs to climb a pole if it has been more than a
year since he or she has used pole-climbing practices.\58\ OSHA does
not believe that any changes to paragraph (b)(4) are necessary and is
adopting that paragraph without change from the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ OSHA interprets the phrase "must employ" in paragraph
(b)(4)(iii) to include both practices the employer specifically
assigns to the employee and practices the employer expects the
employee to be prepared to use, such as emergency response
procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under paragraph (b)(5), training required by paragraph (b) can be
provided in a classroom or on-the-job, or in both places. This
paragraph is taken directly from existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(v). The
Agency has found these types of instruction, which provide workers an
opportunity to ask questions and have the employer respond to them, to
be most effective. (See, for example, OSHA's publication "Training
Requirements in OSHA Standards and Training Guidelines.") OSHA
received no comments on this provision, and it is being adopted as
proposed.
Paragraph (b)(6) provides that training given in accordance with
Sec. 1926.950(b) has to result in employee proficiency in required
work practices and introduce procedures necessary for subpart V
compliance. OSHA did not receive any comments on this paragraph, which
is borrowed from existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(vi), and is adopting it
without change from the proposal. Unless a training program establishes
an employee's proficiency in safe work practices and that employee then
demonstrates his or her ability to perform the necessary work
practices, there will be no assurance that the employee will work
safely. An employee who has attended a single training class on a
complex procedure, for example lockout and tagging procedures used in
an electric generating plant, will not generally be deemed proficient
in that procedure. Paragraph (b)(6), and the demonstration of
proficiency requirement contained in paragraph (b)(7) (discussed
later), will ensure that employers do not try to comply with Sec.
1926.950(b) by simply distributing training manuals to employees. These
provisions require employers to take steps to assure that employees
comprehend what they have been taught and that they are capable of
performing the work practices mandated by the standard. OSHA believes
that this maximizes the benefits of the training required under the
final rule.
Existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(vii) requires employers to certify
that each employee has received required training. The certification
has to be made when the employee demonstrates proficiency in the
relevant work practices and maintained for the duration of the
employee's employment. OSHA proposed to eliminate this certification
requirement and to replace it with paragraphs in both Sec. 1910.269
(paragraph (a)(2)(vii)) and subpart V (Sec. 1926.950(b)(7)) that
simply require the employer to determine that each employee has
demonstrated proficiency in the necessary work practices. In proposing
this change, the Agency aimed to reduce unnecessary paperwork burdens
on employers (70 FR 34835). In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA
explained that, in the absence of training certifications, compliance
with training requirements could be determined through employee
interviews (id.). A note following this proposed paragraph explained
that, although not required, employee
training records could continue to be used by employers to track when
employees demonstrate proficiency. OSHA specifically requested comments
on whether the existing certification requirement is necessary and
whether the proposed standard, without a certification requirement, was
adequately protective.
OSHA received a lot of feedback on this issue. Many rulemaking
participants supported OSHA's proposal. (See, for example, Exs. 0125,
0127, 0159, 0169, 0171, 0175, 0177, 0179, 0186, 0212, 0222, 0227.) For
instance, Mr. Brian Skeahan of Public Utility District No. 1 of Cowlitz
County commented that the change from the certification requirement to
the requirement to demonstrate proficiency was an "acceptable
modification," pointing out that recording on-the-job training can be
burdensome (Ex. 0159). Mr. Wilson Yancey of Quanta Services provided
similar comments, expressing "support [for] OSHA's proposal to require
only that the employer ensure that the employee is able to demonstrate
proficiency" (Ex. 0169). He commented that the "certification
requirement is an unnecessary recordkeeping burden that would be
difficult to administer in practice because of the way that crews are
spread out and would not advance employee safety and health in any
material way" (id.). Mr. Brooke Stauffer of the National Electrical
Contractors Association also supported the proposal: "NECA supports
the proposed changes from certification of training to demonstration of
proficiency. We do not support a requirement to keep records of
employee training, due to high turnover in the line construction
industry. Such record-keeping also isn't feasible to document on-the-
job training . . . ." (Ex. 0171). EEI commented that "in the
experience of EEI members, the existing training certification
requirement in paragraph 1910.269(a)(2)(vii) has proven to be of no
value, and is unnecessary and should be eliminated" (Ex. 0227). Also,
Southern Company told OSHA:
Since on-the-job training is recognized as a method for training
employees, it would be difficult or impossible to maintain records
for this type of training. We agree that records of training that
are normally maintained (classroom instruction or hands-on training
exercises) should be recognized as a method for determining if an
employee has been trained. However, it is the employee's ability to
demonstrate their proficiency which should be the measure of the
employee's ability to work safely. [Ex. 0212]
Other commenters objected to the proposed move away from the
certification requirement, stressing the importance of recordkeeping.
(See, for example, Exs. 0200, 0213, 0230, 0505.) For instance, Mr.
Tommy Lucas of TVA commented:
To ensure that employees have been trained and demonstrated
proficiency, the training should be documented. Documented training
is necessary for managers and supervisors to know whether or not the
employee is proficient in the skills required for tasks being
assigned. Having training records available to managers and
supervisors will better protect employees. [Ex. 0213]
IBEW similarly supported a recordkeeping requirement for training,
commenting as follows:
The standard should require employers to record employee
training. The question that needs [to be] asked is how, if training
records are not kept, can an employer comply with requirements for
initial and ongoing training? Most training that is offered in this
industry is structured using somewhat universal subjects and
methods. Those employers that are engaged in this type of training
are most likely recording initial training and any other additional
training that they may offer. Recording of employee training will
not impose any unnecessary or costly requirement on employers that
they are not currently doing. [Ex. 0230]
Mr. Donald Hartley with IBEW further explained the union's position
in his testimony during the 2006 public hearing:
OSHA should require employers to certify that employees are
proficient in the tasks that they are assigned to perform and to
maintain records documenting their demonstrated proficiency. There
is simply no way to ensure that employers are actually certifying
employees if documentation is not required. Moreover, the records
can be used over time to determine whether employees have satisfied
the training requirements in the past and whether retraining or
recertification is necessary. [Tr. 874]
Mr. Steven Semler, counsel for ULCC, asked that OSHA retain the
existing training certification requirement because it "works well . .
. and has enhanced safety . . . by requiring the checkoff of
certification of employees in writing" (Tr. 743). Mr. Scott Packard of
Wright Tree Service testified on behalf of TCIA that the certification
requirement "has clearly raised the level of safety in the line
clearance tree trimming industry overall" (Tr. 751). The TCIA further
commented:
The current and existing "shall certify" language has raised
the level of safety in the line clearance tree trimming industry as
well as in non-line clearance firms with exposure to the electrical
hazard and hence the need to train and to certify. This requirement
is particularly important among smaller employers with less
sophisticated safety programs.
Requiring "certification" of employees having received the
required safety training has imposed internally within line
clearance contractors' and others' training procedures creation of
failsafe mechanisms to unambiguously assure the employee has
received the required safety training. The newly-proposed method is
a more subjective--hence looser--requirement. [Ex. 0200; footnote
omitted; emphasis included in original.]
Mr. Peter Gerstenberger, also testifying on behalf of TCIA, suggested
that "it's the connotation of the word `certify' that just accords the
whole process more importance" (Tr. 811-812).
OSHA has carefully considered the feedback it received on this
issue and has decided to adopt the requirement as proposed, without a
certification requirement. OSHA believes this gives employers maximum
flexibility, while still ensuring that employees have demonstrated
required proficiencies. The Agency concludes that it is particularly
important to provide flexibility for employers using less formal (that
is, on-the-job) methods to train workers because, as noted by Messrs.
Stauffer and Yancey, it could be challenging for these employers to
record training that occurs sporadically and in circumstances that are
not conducive to the preparation of written certifications. In
addition, as noted in the preamble to the proposal, the Agency does not
need training certifications for enforcement purposes under final Sec.
1910.269 and subpart V because compliance with the training
requirements can be determined through interviews with management and
workers (70 FR 34835). Therefore, the Agency believes that the plain
language of the final rule will be at least as effective in protecting
workers as a requirement to certify these records; in this regard, the
plain language of the final rule still requires employers to determine
that each employee demonstrates necessary proficiencies.
OSHA also points out that Note 1 to paragraph (b)(7) specifically
clarifies that the rule does not prohibit the keeping of training
records. In light of the comments received, OSHA expects that some
employers will voluntarily elect to prepare and maintain training
records for their own purposes in tracking who has received training
and demonstrated the requisite level of proficiency.
OSHA proposed a second note to paragraph (b)(7) of Sec. 1926.950
that described how an employer may treat training that an employee has
received previously (for example, through previous employment). OSHA
explained in the preamble to the proposal that employers relying on
training provided by others would need
to take steps to verify that the employee had been trained and to
ensure that the previous training was adequate for the work practices
the employee would be performing (70 FR 34835). The proposed note read:
Employers may rely on an employee's previous training as long as
the employer: (1) Confirms that the employee has the job experience
appropriate to the work to be performed, (2) through an examination
or interview, makes an initial determination that the employee is
proficient in the relevant safety-related work practices before he
or she performs any work covered by this subpart, and (3) supervises
the employee closely until that employee has demonstrated
proficiency in all the work practices he or she will employ.
Several rulemaking participants noted that some employees receive
training from third parties, such as unions, and supported OSHA's
effort to recognize the potential portability of training. (See, for
example, Exs. 0162, 0169, 0234.) For example, MYR Group stated: "MYR
Group . . . supports allowing reliance on prior training through
demonstration of proficiency--in the circumstance of prior training not
conducted by the employer a proficiency demonstration is a reasonable
means of avoiding duplicative training" (Ex. 0162).
The line-clearance tree trimming industry, however, claimed that
the new note would make it too difficult for an employer to rely on
training that its employees received elsewhere. The tree trimmers
argued that closely supervising all newly hired employees would be
unworkable. (See, for example, Exs. 0174, 0200; Tr. 753-754.) For
instance, Mr. Steven Semler representing ULCC argued that the note
would unnecessarily require the close scrutiny of experienced and
already-trained employees and suggested that the high rate of turnover
in the line-clearance tree trimming industry made close supervision of
all new hires administratively impractical (Ex. 0174). ULCC preferred
existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(vii), which contained the training
certification requirement, because, in its view, the existing standard
permitted an employer to "verify the [previous employer's]
certification records and observe the demonstrated proficiency of the
newly hired employee staff" (id.). According to ULCC, "the current
standard desirably enable[d] continuity of operations with trained
personnel whose proficiency is determined by verification of training
and observance of work" (id.). TCIA echoed these arguments and stated
that the proposed new note "adds a new hardship to the employer
without any offset whatsoever in safety" (Ex. 0200).
OSHA did not impose any new burdens on employers through proposed
Note 2 to paragraph (b)(7). The proposed note simply explained one way
for an employer to comply with the proficiency-demonstration
requirement in final paragraph (b)(7). Tree care industry witnesses
described the process they use to determine the proficiency of newly
hired experienced employees, and OSHA believes that process is similar
to the steps for determining proficiency that were described in
proposed Note 2 (Tr. 715-717, 805-806). For example, one tree-care
industry witness described his company's process for hiring an
experienced employee as follows:
[T]here would be face-to-face interviews. There will be
verification of prior certifications and/or training. There will be
observations done and there will be field evaluations [to verify]
that . . . the certification that they claim to possess they do.
[Tr. 805-806]
Although the tree care industry appears to use the process that
OSHA envisioned in drafting the proposed note, OSHA reworded the note
in the final rule to more closely match the process described by the
tree care industry. The note in the final rule explains that for an
employee with previous training, an employer may determine that that
employee has demonstrated the required proficiency using the following
process: (1) Confirm that the employee has the training required by
final Sec. 1926.950(b), (2) use an examination or interview to make an
initial determination that the employee understands the relevant
safety-related work practices before he or she performs any work
covered by subpart V, and (3) supervise the employee closely until that
employee has demonstrated the required proficiency.
The revised note makes it clearer than the proposed note that the
process described in the note is not mandatory. Any process that
ensures that the employee is not treated as having completed training
until the employer confirms that he or she has had the training
required by paragraph (b), and has demonstrated proficiency as required
by paragraph (b)(7), is acceptable. The revised language also replaces
the phrase "in all the work practices he or she will employ" with
"as required by this paragraph" at the end of the note to make it
clear that the process is designed to ensure that the employee
demonstrates proficiency to the employer as required by the final rule.
Since subpart V covers some transient workers, and training is
often provided by previous employers or third parties (for example,
unions), some commenters suggested that employers could benefit from
the development of a system for storing and accessing training
information for all covered workers (Exs. 0196, 0227). EEI noted the
potential value of such a system, but did not think it should be an
OSHA requirement (Ex. 0227). Also, Mr. Lee Marchessault with Workplace
Safety Solutions recommended that OSHA consider recognizing a universal
training booklet, called a training passport in some countries, that
workers would carry to prove to employers that they have been trained
and have demonstrated their abilities (Ex. 0196; Tr. 573-574).
OSHA understands the third-party process by which many line workers
are trained. The Agency has adopted Note 2 to paragraph (b)(7) in the
final rule partly in recognition that this type of training takes
place. The final rule is designed to allow employers to rely on
previous training conducted by unions, previous employers, or other
third parties. In fact, it would be permissible for employer groups,
unions, or other third parties to design and implement a system such as
the training passport recommended by Mr. Marchessault, provided that
employers using the system complied with relevant OSHA training
requirements. OSHA stresses that it is the employer's, not the
employee's, obligation to determine that the employee demonstrates
proficiency before he or she is deemed to have completed the required
training.
OSHA proposed to add provisions to both subpart V and Sec.
1910.269 concerning communication between host employers (utilities)
and the contractors they hire to work on their systems.\59\ As OSHA
explained in the preamble to the proposal, the work covered by Subpart
V is frequently done by an employer working under contract to an
electric utility (70 FR 34835). Traditionally, employers with electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution systems have had a
workforce sufficient for the day-to-day maintenance of their systems.
These employers usually hire contractors when the work to be performed
goes beyond routine maintenance. Thus, contractors typically construct
new transmission and distribution lines,
perform extensive renovations of transmission and distribution lines
(such as replacing a large number of utility poles or upgrading a line
to a higher voltage), do line-clearance tree trimming, overhaul
generation plants, and repair extensive storm damage. Mr. Donald
Hartley of IBEW testified at the 2006 public hearing in this rulemaking
that "utilities are increasingly contracting out work, both because
contractors bring expertise that the utilities do not themselves
possess and as a cost-saving measure to reduce their overall payroll
and overhead" (Tr. 875).
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\59\ In this discussion, OSHA uses the term "electric utility"
and "host employer" synonymously. In some cases, however, the host
employer may not be an electric utility. See the discussion of the
definition of "host employer" later in this section of the
preamble.
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In proposing the host-contractor provisions, OSHA explained that,
in many (if not all) instances, sharing of information between the
electric utility employer and the contractor is necessary to adequately
protect the contractor's employees from hazards associated with work on
the utility's facilities (70 FR 34838-34839). For example, if the host
employers and contract employers do not coordinate their procedures for
deenergizing lines and equipment, then contractor employees could
mistakenly believe that a line is deenergized when it is not. This
mistake could have potentially fatal results for contractor employees.
In a similar fashion, as OSHA also explained in the preamble to the
proposal, the safety of electric utility employees is affected by the
contract employer's work (id.). For example, a contractor's work could
cause an overhead energized line to fall on a deenergized line on which
an electric utility employee is working, creating hazards for the
electric utility employee. Although electric utility employees do not
typically work with contract employees, sometimes they do work
together. For example, it is common practice for contract employees and
electric utility employees to work side by side during emergency-
restoration operations, such as after a big storm (Ex. 0505; Tr. 392,
1379-1380). Additionally, contractors in electric power generation
plants will be working near utility employees who work in the plant
(Tr. 985). The record also indicates that utility and contract
employees work side by side in other situations, including during
outages on transmission lines (Ex. 0505; Tr. 1380) and while working in
the same substation (Ex. 0505; Tr. 313-314, 559).
Because in this host-contractor relationship the work of (or
information possessed by) one affects the safety of the other's
employees, OSHA believed that it was necessary for host employers and
contractors to cooperate and communicate with each other to provide
adequate protection for all employees maintaining or constructing
electric power generation, transmission, or distribution facilities.
Thus, OSHA proposed requirements in Sec. 1926.950 (as well as in Sec.
1910.269) to ensure the necessary exchange of information between host
employers and contract employers. The requirements in the proposal were
loosely based on similar provisions in the Agency's standard for
process safety management (PSM), Sec. 1910.119(h).
IBEW agreed that there was a need for host-contractor requirements
in these standards, explaining that it "fully supports the basic
principles underlying OSHA's proposals regarding the reciprocal
obligations of the host employers and contract employers to provide one
another with information necessary to safeguard their workforces" (Tr.
878).
Mr. Donald Hartley of IBEW testified about the importance of host
employers and contract employers exchanging "critically important"
information (Tr. 877-878). He elaborated that for contractor employees
to be "equipped to deal with potential hazards associated with this
dangerous work, [they require] access to information that may be in the
sole possession of the host employer" (Tr. 876). He continued:
[W]hile some contract employers report that utilities routinely
provide this information with every job they contract out, as we
have heard, others have found that utilities refuse to disclose that
information about operating conditions even when the contract
employers specifically request it.
Just as the host employer possesses information critically
important to the safety of contract employees, the contract
employees may in the course of their work discover conditions about
which the host is unaware, also recently testified to. This is
particularly true when contract employees are working out in the
field on equipment that the host employer may not regularly inspect.
[Tr. 877-878]
OSHA received a number of comments suggesting that it should not
include host-contractor provisions in the final rule. The Agency has
considered these comments and concluded that, although some changes to
the proposed regulatory text are necessary (as described later in this
section of the preamble), the information-sharing requirements in Sec.
1926.950(c) of this final rule are reasonably necessary and
appropriate.
Some commenters took the position that the extent to which host
employers and contract employers exchange information with each other
is an issue best left to private contracts between the parties. (See,
for example, Exs. 0149, 0151, 0159, 0172, 0179, 0188.) For example, the
Lewis County Public Utility District commented:
We feel that any arrangement between a contractor and host
employer is best handled by contractual language between the two
parties without OSHA involvement. This includes how the host
employer and contractor communicate and exchange information. [Ex.
0149].
Evidence in the record makes clear, however, that relying on
private contracts has proven to be an ineffective method of ensuring
the adequate exchange of information between hosts and contractors. A
number of participants at the 2006 public hearing explained that there
are times when contractors are unable to get the information they need
from utilities to permit the contractors' employees to work safely. For
example, Mr. Donald Hartley of IBEW testified that "complying with
[OSHA standards] requires access to information that may be in the sole
possession of the host employer" (Tr. 876). As noted earlier, he also
stated that some "utilities refuse to disclose . . . information about
operating conditions even when the contract employers specifically
request it" (Tr. 877). An ESCI representative agreed, testifying: "I
work with a number of utility contractors that tell me that [t]here are
a number of things that they are not provided that they need" (Tr.
1240). Also, MYR noted that "although . . . the transfer of
information between utilities and contractors has improved tremendously
over the last several years, issues still exist in the industry today"
(Tr. 1333). In light of this evidence, OSHA concludes that relying on
the parties' private contracts to serve this function is unlikely to
ensure that host employers and contract employers receive all of the
information they need to protect their workers.
Some commenters suggested that OSHA does not have statutory
authority to adopt host-contractor provisions. (See, for example, Exs.
0168, 0177, 0209, 0227, 0501.) For instance, EEI commented:
The fundamental point is that the OSH Act simply does not confer
authority upon OSHA to require one employer to be responsible for
the safety or health of another employer's employees. Any final rule
that seeks to impose duties on host employers and contractors vis-
[agrave]-vis each other will be legally vulnerable. [Ex. 0227]
OSHA has clear authority to include the host-contractor provisions
in the final rule. First, the plain language of the OSH Act and its
underlying purpose support OSHA's authority to place requirements on
employers that are necessary to protect the employees of
others.\60\ Second, congressional action subsequent to passage of the
OSH Act recognizes this authority. Third, OSHA has consistently
interpreted its statutory authority as permitting it to impose
obligations on employers that extend beyond their own employees, as
evidenced by the numerous standards, including several construction
standards, that OSHA has promulgated with multiemployer provisions.
Finally, OSHA's authority to place obligations on employers that reach
beyond their own employees has been upheld by numerous courts of
appeals and the OSHRC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ As explained later in this section of the preamble, the
overall sharing of information that will occur in accordance with
the final host-contractor provisions will help protect the employees
of both host employers and contract employers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The purpose of the OSH Act is to assure so far as possible safe and
healthful working conditions for every working man and woman in the
nation (29 U.S.C. 651(b)). To achieve this goal, Congress authorized
the Secretary of Labor to establish mandatory occupational safety and
health standards. The Act broadly defines an OSHA standard as a rule
that "requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more
practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably
necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and
places of employment" (29 U.S.C. 652(8)). (See Building & Constr.
Trades Dep't., AFL-CIO v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1988).)
OSHA standards must prescribe measures that are appropriate to protect
"places of employment;" nothing in the statutory language suggests
that OSHA may do so only by regulating an employer's interactions with
its own employees. On the contrary, the OSH Act's broad language gives
OSHA almost "unlimited discretion" to devise means to reach the
statutory goal. (See United Steelworkers v. Marshall (Steelworkers),
647 F.2d 1189, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1980).)
Similarly, Section 5(a)(2) of the OSH Act provides that each
employer "shall comply with occupational safety and health standards
promulgated under" the OSH Act (29 U.S.C. 654(a)(2)).\61\ Nothing in
this language suggests that compliance is required only when necessary
to protect the employer's own employees or that the employer is
entitled to endanger other employer's employees at the worksite.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ This language is in marked contrast to the language of
Section 5(a)(1) of the OSH Act (known as the "general duty
clause"), which requires each employer to "furnish to each of his
employees employment and a place of employment which are free from
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm to his employees" (29 U.S.C. 654(a)(1)). (See
Brennan v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d 1032, 1037-38 (2d Cir. 1975).)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 6(b)(7) of the OSH Act specifically permits the Secretary
to "prescribe the use of labels or other appropriate forms of warning
as are necessary to insure that employees are apprised of all hazards
to which they are exposed . . . and proper conditions and precautions
of safe use or exposure" (29 U.S.C. 655(b)(7)). (Notably, the Agency's
authority to require warnings is not limited to information that would
warn the employer's own employees of hazards.) Finally, Section 8(g)(2)
of the OSH Act generally affords the Secretary authority to "prescribe
such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out . . .
responsibilities under" the OSH Act (29 U.S.C. 657(g)(2)).
In short, the statute focuses on workplace conditions to effectuate
the OSH Act's congressional mandate and not on a particular employment
relationship. The OSH Act's underlying purpose is broad--to assure safe
and healthful working conditions for working men and women--and
Congress made clear that it expected the Act to protect all employees.
(See H. Rep. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pp.14-16 (July 9,
1970).) Numerous references in the legislative history of the OSH Act
discuss requiring employers to provide a safe and healthful "place of
employment." (See for example, S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., p. 10 (Oct. 6, 1970).) The OSH Act tasks OSHA with promulgating
rules that will create safe places of employment, notwithstanding the
many varied employment relationships that might exist at a worksite.
Subsequent congressional action has also recognized OSHA's
authority to impose responsibilities on employers to protect employees
who are not their own. For example, Congress directed OSHA to develop a
chemical process safety standard (the PSM Standard) requiring employers
to "ensure contractors and contract employees are provided appropriate
information and training" and to "train and educate employees and
contractors in emergency response" (Pub. L. 101-549, Title III, Sec.
304, Nov. 15, 1990, 104 Stat. 2576 (reprinted at 29 U.S.C. 655 Note)).
This is a clear ratification of the Agency's authority to require
employers to protect the employees of others. Congress also approved of
the Agency's authority when it relied on the provisions of OSHA's
Hazard Communication Standard in promulgating the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. 11001-11050. The
Hazard Communication Standard requires, in part, that manufacturers and
importers of hazardous chemicals provide information for the benefit of
downstream employees.\62\ (See 29 CFR 1910.1200; see also Martin v.
American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 140, 141 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that the
Hazard Communication Standard requires "that a manufacturer of
hazardous chemicals inform not only its own employees of the dangers
posed by the chemicals, but downstream employers and employees as
well").) Congress incorporated provisions of the Hazard Communication
Standard in EPCRA as a basis for triggering obligations on owners or
operators of facilities producing hazardous chemicals to provide local
governments with information needed for emergency response. Had
Congress not approved of the multiemployer provisions in the Hazard
Communication Standard, it would not have approved of it as a basis for
obligations in EPCRA.
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\62\ As a rationale for those provisions, OSHA explained that
chemical manufacturers and importers are in the best position to
develop, disseminate, and obtain information about their products.
(See 48 FR 53280, 53322, Nov. 25, 1983.)
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Furthermore, OSHA has consistently interpreted the OSH Act as
authorizing it to impose multiemployer obligations in its standards. In
addition to the Hazard Communication Standard and the PSM Standard
already noted, OSHA included multiemployer provisions in its standard
for powered platforms, which requires that a building owner inform
employers that the building installation has been inspected and is safe
to use. (See 29 CFR 1910.66(c)(3).) OSHA also has imposed multiemployer
obligations in construction standards. For example, OSHA exercised its
OSH Act authority to promulgate provisions in the Asbestos Standard for
the construction industry that require building owners to communicate
the presence of asbestos or presumed asbestos-containing materials to
certain employers with employees who may be exposed to such materials.
(See 29 CFR 1926.1101(k).) In OSHA's Steel-Erection Standard, the
Agency imposed duties on controlling contractors to ensure that site
conditions are safe for steel erection. (See 29 CFR 1926.752(c).) More
recently, OSHA promulgated rules requiring controlling entities and
utilities to take steps to protect other employers' employees during
crane operations. (See 29 CFR 1926.1402(c), 1926.1402(e), 1926.1407(e),
1926.1408(c), and 1926.1424(b).)
Finally, OSHA's authority to impose these provisions is confirmed
by the
decisions of numerous courts of appeals and the Review Commission. For
example, the Third Circuit upheld the information-sharing requirements
in the Asbestos Standard for the construction industry, noting: "We
are not convinced that the Secretary is powerless to regulate in this
[way], especially given the findings she has made regarding the
importance of building owners in the discovery and communication of
asbestos hazards." Secretary of Labor v. Trinity Indus., Inc.
(Trinity), 504 F.3d 397, 402 (3d Cir. 2007). (See also Universal
Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 182 F.3d 726, 728 (10th Cir. 1999) (following
decisions from Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
holding that an employer's duties and OSHA standards may extend beyond
an employer's own employees).)
EEI asserted that Sec. 1910.12(a) precludes host-contractor
requirements in subpart V, commenting:
Section 1910.12(a), standing alone, precludes OSHA from
requiring an employer covered by the final Part 1926 rule to take
any responsibility for the safety of another employer's employees,
certainly insofar as the final standard purports to regulate
"construction." [Ex. 0227].
OSHA disagrees with EEI. Paragraph (a) of Sec. 1910.12 provides:
The standards prescribed in part 1926 of this chapter are
adopted as occupational safety and health standards under section 6
of the Act and shall apply, according to the provisions thereof, to
every employment and place of employment of every employee engaged
in construction work. Each employer shall protect the employment and
places of employment of each of his employees engaged in
construction work by complying with the appropriate standards
prescribed in this paragraph.
Paragraph (a) of Sec. 1910.12 has no bearing on the host-
contractor requirements in the final rule because the Agency clearly
intends to assign specific responsibilities to host employers and
contract employers, and the final regulatory text plainly reflects that
intent. (See Trinity, 504 F.3d at 402 (rejecting argument premised on
Sec. 1910.12(a) where "the regulation at issue . . . specifically
applie[d] to building owners").) Moreover, the Eighth Circuit and the
Review Commission have squarely rejected EEI's argument. In Solis v.
Summit Contractors, Inc. (Summit Contractors), the Eighth Circuit
concluded that Sec. 1910.12(a) is "unambiguous" in that it does not
preclude OSHA from citing an employer when only employees of other
employers are exposed to the hazard in question (558 F.3d 815, 825 (8th
Cir. 2009)). The Review Commission similarly held that Sec. 1910.12(a)
does not prevent OSHA from citing a controlling employer that does not
have exposed employees (Summit Contractors, Inc., 23 BNA OSHC 1196 (No.
05-0839, Aug. 19, 2010)). Both the Eighth Circuit and the Review
Commission emphasized the language in Sec. 1910.12(a) establishing a
duty on the part of employers to protect "places of employment" as
well as employees. (See, for example, Summit Contractors, 558 F.3d at
824.) The first sentence in Sec. 1910.12(a) makes the construction
standards applicable to every employment and to every "place of
employment" of every construction employee, and the second sentence,
by providing that each employer must protect "places of employment,"
does not negate the broad reach of the first sentence.
Moreover, the history of Sec. 1910.12(a) reveals that the purpose
of this provision is to extend, not limit, the Agency's authority.
Indeed, Sec. 1910.12(a) is located in a subpart entitled "Adoption
and Extension of Established Federal Standards," which was established
to extend OSHA's authority through adoption of the Construction Safety
Act's standards. (See 29 CFR 1910.11(a) ("The provisions of this
subpart . . . adopt[,] and extend the applicability of, established
Federal standards . . . with respect to every employer, employee, and
employment covered by the Act.").) Thus, neither the language nor the
context of Sec. 1910.12(a) suggest a conflict with the information-
sharing requirements in this final rule.
Some commenters asserted that the proposed host-contractor
provisions inappropriately expanded or conflicted with OSHA's existing
Multi-Employer Citation Policy (CPL 02-00-124 (Dec. 10, 1999)). (See,
for example, Exs. 0162, 0167, 0170, 0207, 0237.)
These comments reflect a misunderstanding of both the proposal and
the multiemployer citation policy. The host-contractor provisions do
not rely on, or modify, the Agency's multiemployer enforcement policy.
(See Trinity, 504 F.3d at 402 (distinguishing an enforcement action
under the multiemployer provisions of the Asbestos Standard for
construction from cases in which the Agency invoked the multiemployer
citation policy).) Rather, the multiemployer citation policy and the
host-contractor provisions represent separate exercises of OSHA's
statutory authority to protect places of employment. The host-
contractor provisions and the multiemployer enforcement policy operate
in different, yet entirely consistent, ways to permit the Agency to
fulfill its statutory mission.
OSHA's multiemployer citation policy simply recognizes the existing
responsibilities of different employers at multiemployer worksites
under the Act and OSHA standards. For example, employers have a duty
not to create hazardous conditions that violate OSHA standards,
regardless whether it is their own employees or another employer's that
they endanger. (Employers who do so are referred to as "creating
employers.") And employers have a duty to protect their own employees
from violative conditions, even if created by another employer. Such
"exposing employers" must take reasonable steps to correct the
hazards or otherwise protect their workers. Similarly, "controlling
employers," that is, employers with general supervisory authority over
safety and health at a worksite, by virtue of that authority, have
certain responsibilities to prevent and detect violations affecting
employees at the workplace.
When OSHA promulgates new safety and health standards, it does so
against this background principle that employers share responsibility
for working conditions, and thus for OSHA compliance, at multiemployer
worksites. Therefore, when the Agency issues a new safety or health
standard, it is with the intention that creating, exposing, and
controlling employers at multiemployer worksites will exercise their
respective responsibilities to ensure that affected employees are
protected as required by the standard.
In some situations, however, the general background principles
reflected in the multiemployer policy will not be sufficient to ensure
the safety of workplaces; in those instances, OSHA may find it
necessary to impose additional or more specific obligations on
particular employers to protect workers. The host-contractor provisions
in this final rule, as well as similar information-sharing provisions
in the Hazard Communication Standard, the PSM Standard, and the
Asbestos Standard for construction, are examples of the Agency
regulating in this manner. In this rulemaking, OSHA determined that the
final host-contractor provisions are necessary, in addition to the
general background responsibilities employers have, to ensure the
safety of affected employees. Not all utilities (or host employers)
will have sufficient authority over, or relationships with, contractor
worksites to qualify as controlling employers under the multiemployer
citation policy. In addition, the final rule prescribes with
specificity the information-sharing responsibilities of hosts and
contractors. The specific information-sharing
requirements in the host-contractor provisions are necessary to ensure
that critical information sharing and coordination take place at all
workplaces where employees perform work covered by the final rule.
Some commenters argued that the host-contractor provisions could
create employer-employee relationships between host employers and
contractor employees. (See, for example, Exs. 0173, 0178.) For
instance, the Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation commented:
It is up to the contractor and the employees of that firm to
perform this work, under their supervision and direction, using
their work practices and safety rules. Should we as hosts begin to
direct their work, provide supervision of that work, oversee their
safety practices, the IRS would then say they are our employees and
are entitled to benefits. [Ex. 0173]
Also, some commenters suggested, more generally, that the host-
contractor provisions could expand the potential legal liability of the
respective employers. (See, for example, Exs. 0168, 0187, 0220, 0226.)
A few commenters argued that in these ways the proposed host-contractor
provisions went so far as to violate the OSH Act. For example, the
National Association of Home Builders commented:
[W]e also believe that OSHA's multi-employer language in the
proposed rule in Subpart V impermissibly expands the common law
liability of host/general contractors in violation [of Section
4(b)(4)] of the OSH Act. [Ex. 0168].
OSHA concludes that, under any of the potentially applicable legal
tests for an employment relationship, the final host-contractor
provisions are unlikely to result in one employer exercising the type
or degree of control over the employees of another employer that would
create an employer-employee relationship when one otherwise would not
have existed. (See, for example, Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co v. Darden,
503 U.S. 318 (1992) (common-law test for determining who is an
"employee"); Antenor v. D&S Farms, 88 F.3d 925 (11th Cir. 1996)
(factors relevant to determining whether two employers are "joint
employers" of an individual employee for purposes of the Fair Labor
Standards Act); Weber v. C.I.R., 60 F.3d 1104 (4th Cir. 1995) (test
for determining whether there is an employment relationship for income
tax purposes).)
OSHA also disagrees with the commenters' claim about Section
4(b)(4) of the OSH Act. That provision states:
Nothing in [the OSH] Act shall be construed to . . . in any
manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or
diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory
rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any
law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees
arising out of, or in the course of, employment. [29 U.S.C.
653(b)(4)]
This provision serves two purposes: First, it establishes that the OSH
Act does not create a private right of action. (See, for example, Crane
v. Conoco, Inc., 41 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1994).) Second, it makes clear
that the duties and liabilities imposed under the OSH Act do not
displace the duties and liabilities that exist under State tort and
workers' compensation schemes. (See, for example, Frohlick Crane Serv.,
Inc. v. OSHRC, 521 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1975).)
OSHA acknowledges that State courts are free to permit the use of
OSHA regulations, including these final host-contractor provisions, as
evidence of a standard of care in a negligence action. (See, for
example, Knight v. Burns, Kirkley & Williams Constr. Co., 331 So.2d 651
(Ala. 1976).) However, it does not follow that regulations used in that
fashion are invalid under Section 4(b)(4) on the ground that they
expand employers' common-law liabilities, a result that would limit the
Secretary's rulemaking authority to issuing regulations that codify
duties already owed by employers at common law. Such a result would be
inconsistent with Congressional intent in promulgating the OSH Act, and
no court has ever invalidated an OSHA regulation on the ground that it
violates Section 4(b)(4). Indeed, courts have squarely rejected the
argument that Section 4(b)(4) precludes multiemployer enforcement
practices. For example, in Summit, the Eighth Circuit concluded that
OSHA's multiemployer citation policy did not violate Section 4(b)(4),
explaining that even though it could "increas[e] an employer's
liability at common law[,]" the policy "neither creates a private
cause of action nor preempts state law" (558 F.3d at 829). (See also
Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1234-36.)
OSHA decided to adopt the proposed host-contractor provisions, with
some substantial modifications (described later in this section of the
preamble), in the final rule. Before addressing each specific
provision, however, OSHA must first address the scope of these
requirements.
The proposal defined a "host employer" as "[a]n employer who
operates and maintains an electric power transmission or distribution
installation covered by subpart V of this Part and who hires a contract
employer to perform work on that installation." This definition
included electric utilities and other employers that operate and
maintain electric power transmission or distribution installations.
However, it did not include employers that own, but do not operate and
maintain, such installations. The Agency believed that entities that do
not operate or maintain these installations would generally not have
the expertise necessary to work safely on transmission or distribution
lines and equipment and would have little hazard-related knowledge to
pass on to contractors. In addition, the employees of such entities
would have little if any exposure to hazards created by a contract
employer. The Agency invited comments on whether excluding such
employers from the host-contractor provisions would unduly jeopardize
employee safety and whether any of the host-contractor provisions could
reasonably be applied to such employers.
Some commenters, such as Energy United EMC (Ex. 0219), supported
the proposed exclusion of owners that do not operate or maintain
installations. Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives commented: "If an
employer only owns but does not actually operate its own lines or
equipment then that employer would certainly not be able to pass on any
useful information to a contractor" (Ex. 0186).
IBEW took the position that "[e]xcluding such employers from any
host-contract employer provisions, in general, should not jeopardize
employee safety," but questioned whether those entities may make
"decisions on how the system will be operated, such as switching
procedures and load transfer, that . . . could have a direct impact on
worker safety" (Ex. 0230). The union went on to suggest that
"[w]hatever entity has the responsibility and/or decision making power
as to how the system is operated should be included in the proposed
provisions" (id.).
Others commented that the host-contractor provisions should apply
to all system owners. Ms. Susan O'Connor of Siemens Power Generation
commented, for example, that excluding owners that do not perform
operations or maintenance could jeopardize employee safety "in
situations where host employers might use this provision as a loophole
to avoid regulation" (Ex. 0163). Ms. O'Connor suggested that a utility
could "eliminate [its] qualified maintenance department and outsource
. . . maintenance to avoid dealing with this regulation" (id.). MYR
Group also "believe[d] that the protections afforded to contractors
through the host employer obligations should apply
regardless of whether the host actually operates the installation"
(Ex. 0162). MYR thought that "[s]erious and inequitable problems could
arise from failure to apply the proposed rule requirements on host
employers that own but do not operate their electric utility
installations" (id.).
OSHA considered the record and concludes that the host employer
should be the employer that is in the best position to have information
on the design, operation, and condition of an electric power
generation, transmission, or distribution system. Based on this
principle, OSHA decided that an employer that controls how the system
is operated, such as switching procedures and load transfer, should not
be excluded from the host-contractor provisions. Depending on the type
of work practices used, such operational control could have a direct
impact on worker safety. For example, an employer that controls the
operation of an electric power generation, transmission, or
distribution system could institute new switching procedures without
informing contractors or coordinating the new procedures with
contractors (Ex. 0230). In addition, because an employer, to fall
within the proposed definition of "host employer," needed to operate
and maintain the installation and hire the contractor, it would have
been possible under the proposal to have scenarios in which there was
no host employer, such as if one employer owned the installation (and
hired the contractor) and a different employer operated or maintained
the installation. This result could have undermined the information-
sharing requirements altogether.
The Agency is revising the definition of "host employer" to
include employers that operate installations or control procedures for
operation of installations without regard to whether the employer owns
the installation. In addition, OSHA is deleting the reference to
"maintenance" in the final definition of "host employer" because
the Agency believes that an employer that only maintains an electric
power generation, transmission, or distribution system is unlikely to
have knowledge of the design, operation, and condition of the
installation; employers that perform such maintenance may be
contractors hired by an electric utility. (See, for example, Tr. 403,
1200-1201.) Maintenance contractors will need information from the
employer that operates or controls the operation of the installation,
as would any other contractor. The final rule states that an employer
that operates, or that controls the operating procedures for, an
electric power generation, transmission, or distribution installation
on which a contract employer is performing work covered by subpart V is
a host employer. A note to the definition of "host employer" provides
that OSHA will treat the electric utility or the owner of the
installation as the host employer if it operates or controls operating
procedures for the installation. If the electric utility or
installation owner neither operates nor controls operating procedures
for the installation, OSHA will treat the employer that the utility or
owner has contracted with to operate or control the operating
procedures for the installation as the host employer. In no case will
there be more than one host employer. (See the definition of "host
employer" in final Sec. 1926.968.)
The revised definition incorporates IBEW's recommendation that the
Agency focus on the entity that has control over the system. OSHA
believes any such entity is likely to have critical safety-related
information about the system. In addition, the revised language renders
Ms. O'Connor's comment moot; the revised language ensures that an
entity that is in a position to have information that affects the
safety of contractor employees will be identified as a host employer
under the final rule.\63\ Note that OSHA has added electric power
generation installations to the installations covered by the definition
of "host employer" in subpart V for consistency with the definition
of this term in Sec. 1910.269.
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\63\ The definition of host employer in the final rule also
removes any confusion over whether a holding company that owns a
utility company's outstanding stock, which is a common practice, or
the electric utility itself "owns" the installation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the definition in the final rule removes the criterion
that the host employer be the entity that hires the contractor. The
record indicates that various entities hire contractors to work on
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
installations. For example, utility owners hire contractors to perform
maintenance (Ex. 0186; Tr. 403). In addition, some contractors
subcontract some of their work (Tr. 315-316, 1380-1381). Subcontractors
will be treated as "contract employers" under the final rule even
though the host does not hire them directly.\64\ The standard's
information-exchange requirements hinge on the need to exchange
information between the entity that operates or controls operating
procedures for the system and entities that are performing maintenance
or construction work on the system. The type of contractual
relationship that exists between the host employer and contract
employers does not change the need for this information exchange. OSHA
realizes that the final rule will require some employers to exchange
information with entities with which they have no direct contractual
relationship. These employers can either exchange information directly
with each other or can arrange to handle their information exchange
through contacts with entities that do have contractual relationships
with the other employer. For example, an electric utility transmitting
information to an employer under contract to perform work on the
installation could instruct (or contract for) that contractor to share
the same information with any subcontractors hired to perform work
under the contract. Ultimately, however, it is the host employer's
responsibility to ensure that whatever procedures it uses are adequate
to get the required information to all "contract employers" working
on the installation. Paragraph (c)(3) of final Sec. 1926.950
(discussed later in this section of the preamble) requires host
employers and contract employers to coordinate their work rules and
procedures; part of this coordination involves establishing appropriate
procedures for exchanging information in accordance with the host-
contractor provisions.
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\64\ As explained later in this section of the preamble,
"contract employer" is defined as: "An employer, other than a
host employer, that performs work covered by subpart V of this part
under contract."
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The other issue involving coverage under the host-contractor
provisions pertains to line-clearance tree trimming. OSHA proposed to
exclude from the host-contractor requirements work done by line-
clearance tree trimmers who are not qualified employees. As discussed
earlier in this section of the preamble, line-clearance tree-trimming
work is covered by Sec. 1910.269. Paragraph (a)(1)(i)(E)(2) of
existing Sec. 1910.269 lists the paragraphs of that section that apply
to work performed by line-clearance tree trimmers who are not qualified
employees, and OSHA did not propose to add the host-contractor
provisions to that list.
By not proposing to modify existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(i)(E)(2),
OSHA would not have applied the host-contractor provisions to line-
clearance tree-trimming operations performed by unqualified employees.
However, as long as qualified employees are using electrical protective
equipment, these employees would be permitted to come much closer to
energized parts than unqualified employees. The Agency believed that
qualified employees
performing line-clearance tree-trimming work in proximity to energized
lines and equipment face hazards similar to contract power line workers
and should receive similar protection.\65\
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\65\ For a full discussion of why Sec. 1910.269 applies
different requirements to line-clearance tree-trimming operations
depending on whether they are performed by qualified or unqualified
employees, see the preamble to the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 final rule
(59 FR 4336).
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OSHA requested comments on whether its proposed approach for
dealing with line-clearance tree-trimming work under the host-
contractor provisions unduly jeopardized employee safety and whether
any of the host-contactor provisions could reasonably be applied to
tree-trimming work performed by line-clearance tree trimmers who are
unqualified employees. Many commenters supported OSHA's proposal. (See,
for example, Exs. 0126, 0174, 0177, 0200, 0201, 0213, 0219, 0227.) For
instance, EEI agreed "that line clearance tree-trimming contractors
should be excluded from the requirement," explaining: "Host utilities
are usually not familiar with the hazards associated with trimming
trees and routinely rely on the expertise of the line clearance tree-
trimming contractors to perform that work in a manner which ensures the
safety of their employees" (Ex. 0227). These comments were echoed by
ULCC, which "commended" OSHA's proposal to exclude work done by line-
clearance tree trimmers who "do not work on or touch electric supply
lines" from the host-contractor provisions (Ex. 0174). ULCC urged the
Agency to maintain this exclusion in the final rule, commenting:
[T]he wisdom of the exclusion is manifest: for, the rationale of
the proposed "host-contractor" provisions . . . is to apply the
utilities' expertise to utility contractors performing utilities'
typical work--in effect, to force down utilities' safety expertise
onto their electric-work contractors in order to raise the safety
experience rate of those contractors to the better safety rate of
the utilities who employ them. Such policy-driver for applying
"host-contractor" to utility contractors performing electric
utility (i.e. lineman) "qualified" work, simply is inapplicable to
line clearance work: for, the utilities hire line clearance
contractors because line clearance contractors are arborists who are
specialists in vegetation management--precisely skills which the
utilities contract out because they typically do not have that
expertise in tree growth, tree trimming techniques, tree rigging,
tree removal, vegetation management, etc. In short, utilities simply
do not have the institutional expertise of line clearance tree
knowledge to develop and direct line clearance safety practices of
line clearance contractors via "host-contractor" provisions. . . .
So, the "force-down" premise of "host-contractor" simply does
not apply to line clearance. [Id.; emphasis included in original.]
Duke Energy commented that "[t]here should be no expectation that
host employers provide information on tree-trimming hazards to line-
clearance tree trimming contractors," suggesting that "[a]pplying the
host-contract employer provisions [in the context of line-clearance
tree trimming] will be very difficult" (Ex. 0201).
Some commenters, however, advised against the proposed exclusion
and argued that all line-clearance tree trimmers should be covered by
the host-contractor provisions. (See, for example, Exs. 0162, 0186,
0230, 0234.) IBEW, for instance, commented:
Line-clearance tree-trimming work could, in some instances, be
affected by the host employer[']s operation of the system. Lockout/
Tagout procedures during service restoration are one example where
contractor employee safety could be jeopardized if line-clearance
tree-trimming contractors are excluded from all provisions of the
proposed host-contract employer provisions. At a minimum,
information regarding circuit conditions, changes in conditions, and
lockout/tagout applications should be communicated by the host
employer to the contractor employer. [Ex. 0230]
The Ohio Rural Electrical Cooperatives agreed, also suggesting that
all line-clearance tree trimmers be covered by the host-contractor
requirements. That organization explained that tree trimmers "might
not need as much information as a line contractor but they still need
to know for sure which lines are energized, which are on single-shot
protection, etc." (Ex. 0186). Mr. Wilson Yancey of Quanta Services
noted that "[w]hether an employee is qualified or not, hazards will
exist that are unique to the host employer" (Ex. 0234). He believed
that the proposal to leave some line-clearance tree trimmers out of the
host-contractor requirements was "not well-founded and might unduly
jeopardize employee safety" (id.).
The Agency recognizes that line-clearance tree trimmers do not face
exactly the same hazards as line workers. However, the record indicates
that host employers have information that line-clearance tree trimmers
need so that they can perform their work safely (Ex. 0505; Tr. 642-643,
686-688, 775). For example, Mr. Mark Foster of Lucas Tree Experts
testified that line workers will generally inform tree crews that a
line is about to be reenergized (Tr. 642-643). In addition, ULCC's
posthearing brief indicated that "line clearance tree trimmers
necessarily must rely upon information from utility representatives
that the line has been deenergized, isolated and grounded when those
procedures are appropriate" and that the "safety of line clearance
tree trimmers would be enhanced by . . . utilities being required, by
OSHA standard, to give [certain] information to line clearance tree
trimmers" (Ex. 0502).
Not only do line-clearance tree trimmers need information from
utilities, but line-clearance tree trimming contractors often have
important safety information for utilities, for example, information
they discover in the course of work about hazardous conditions that
could affect utility employees. Such conditions can include downed
power lines, transformer problems, and insulator and pole issues (Tr.
665, 689-690, 787-788).
Upon considering the record, it has become apparent to OSHA that:
(1) There is a need for information exchange between host employers and
tree-trimming contractors and (2) the host-contractor provisions should
apply to all line-clearance tree trimming. Therefore, the Agency added
Sec. 1910.269(a)(3) to the list of paragraphs denoted in final Sec.
1910.269(a)(1)(i)(E)(2) to cover line-clearance tree-trimming
operations performed by line-clearance tree trimmers who are not
qualified employees.
As noted earlier, some commenters maintained that utilities hire
contractors for their expertise and knowledge about particular hazards
and rely on those contractors to use that expertise to protect their
(that is, the contractors') own employees. (See, for example, Exs.
0127, 0172, 0173, 0177, 0200, 0207, 0227.) For instance, Mr. Frank
Brockman with Farmers Rural Electric Cooperatives Corporation stated,
"We, as host employers, hire contractors to do specific jobs, often
that we do not have the knowledge, expertise, equipment or manpower to
accomplish." He maintained that "[c]ontractors are responsible for
their employees' safety" (Ex. 0173). SBA commented that "the host is
usually not present at these worksites and often does not possess
expertise in the type of work being performed" and noted that "many
of the SERs questioned whether the host-contractor provisions are
appropriate for the electric power industry at all" (Ex. 0207).
Some comments specifically addressed the issue of whether line-
clearance tree trimming firms should be covered by the host-contractor
provisions. For example, Consumers Energy stated, "Host utilities are
usually not familiar with the hazards associated with trimming trees
and routinely rely
on the expertise of the line clearance tree-trimming contractors to
perform that work in a manner which ensures the safety of their
employees" (Ex. 0177). In addition, TCIA stated:
OSHA makes the correct assertion that the utility must have a
shared expertise with the contractor in order to specify its safety
standards for the contractor to follow. In stark contrast, utilities
typically contract line clearance tree trimming because of their
lack of expertise in that subject. [Ex. 0200; emphasis included in
original]
OSHA recognizes that contractors may have specific expertise that
host employers do not have. However, the Agency does not believe that
this is a valid reason not to require the type of information exchange
required by the final rule. As noted earlier, electric utilities have
information about their systems that the contractors do not have. The
Agency also believes that contractors, especially those hired for
expertise in a particular area, have information about hazardous
conditions related to their work that host employers do not have (for
example, the dangers posed to the host employer's employees from
chippers and falling tree limbs). In addition, when one employer's
activities may endanger another employer's employees, the Agency
believes that it is essential for the two employers to coordinate their
activities to ensure that all employees are adequately protected. For
example, as noted later in this section of the preamble, it is
important for an electrical contractor to coordinate procedures for
deenergizing and grounding lines and equipment with the host employer.
Similarly, it is important for line-clearance tree trimming firms to
coordinate their work with host employers and to inform host employers
of hazardous conditions posed by the tree-trimming work to ensure that
the host employers' employees are not exposed to tree-trimming hazards
about which those employees have received no training.
OSHA proposed to define "contract employer" as "[a]n employer
who performs work covered by subpart V of this part for a host
employer." OSHA did not receive any significant comment on this
definition. However, OSHA is revising the definition to include any
"work covered by subpart V of this part under contract" rather than
just work "for a host contractor." This revision correlates the
definition of "contract employer" with the revised definition of
"host employer," which no longer provides that an employer must
"hire" another employer to be a host employer. This revision makes it
clear that an employer performing subpart V work under contract is
covered as a "contract employer" by the host-contractor provisions in
final paragraph (c) regardless of whether the entity for which the work
is being performed is the "host employer" or another "contract
employer." Contract employers under the final rule may include
painting contractors, line-construction contractors, electrical
contractors, and any other contractors working on the construction of
electric power transmission and distribution lines. (For final Sec.
1910.269, contract employers will also include contractors working on
covered electric power generation installations, such as boiler-
maintenance contractors, conveyor-servicing contractors, and electrical
contractors.) The definition of "contract employer" does not include
contractors that might be present at a jobsite where some work
performed is covered by subpart V, but that are not performing covered
work.
Paragraph (c) of final Sec. 1926.950 contains requirements for the
transfer of information between host employers and contract employers.
In the proposal, OSHA entitled this paragraph "Contractors." After
considering the comments received, the Agency concludes that the
proposed title does not reflect the true scope of the paragraph's
provisions. The title at final Sec. 1926.950(c) is being changed to
"Information transfer" to more appropriately describe the
requirements contained in the paragraph.\66\ In addition, the final
rule does not include proposed Sec. 1926.950(c)(1)(ii), which would
have required host employers to report observed contract-employer-
related violations of this section to the contract employer.
Consequently, OSHA renumbered proposed paragraph (c)(1)(i) (and
subordinate paragraphs (c)(1)(i)(A) and (c)(1)(i)(B)) as final
paragraph (c)(1) (and subordinate paragraphs (c)(1)(i) through
(c)(1)(iv)).
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\66\ The title of this provision is "Information transfer."
However, throughout the rulemaking, the Agency and the regulated
community referred to the provision as the "host-contractor
provision," as the provision contains information-transfer
requirements for host employers and contract employers. OSHA,
therefore, uses the terms "information-transfer provision" and
"host-contractor provision" interchangeably when referring to this
provision.
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Proposed paragraph (c)(1)(i) required host employers to provide
certain information to contract employers. Paragraph (c)(1)(i)(A), as
proposed, required host employers to provide contractors with
information about "[k]nown hazards that are covered by this section,
that are related to the contract employer's work, and that might not be
recognized by the contract employer or its employees." The purpose of
this provision was to ensure that contractors could take measures to
protect their employees from hazards posed by hosts' workplaces.
Although this proposed provision would not require hosts to inform
contract employers of hazards that contract employees are expected to
recognize, such as hazards posed by an overhead power line, the
proposal provided that hosts inform contract employers of hazards known
to the hosts that might not be recognized by the contractors. For
example, if a host employer knew that a particular manhole on its
system was subject to periodic contamination from a nearby fuel tank,
the host was to share this information with the contractor.
OSHA received considerable feedback on this proposed requirement.
(See, for example, Exs. 0146, 0159, 0160, 0167, 0175, 0178, 0186, 0201,
0227, 0234, 0480, 0505; Tr. 1333-1334.) Some commenters agreed with the
proposal to require host employers to inform contractors of known
hazards. (See, for example, Exs. 0167, 0169, 0234; Tr. 1333-1334.) For
example, the Iowa Association of Electric Cooperatives commented that
its members supported proposed paragraph (c)(1)(i)(A), explaining that
"[i]t is . . . common practice for Iowa's cooperatives to inform their
contract employers of hazards that are related to the contract
employer's work that might not be recognized by the contract employer
or its employees" (Ex. 0167).
However, most of the comments on this provision objected to the
proposed language. The most common complaint was that the proposed
language was too broad or vague. (See, for example, Exs. 0146, 0175,
0178, 0201, 0227.) For instance, EEI commented:
This proposal is impermissibly vague because it fails to provide
adequate notice of what would constitute compliance. See, e.g., Ga.
Pac. Corp., v. OSHRC, 25 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 1994). For example,
what are hazards "that are covered by this section?" Considering
that the proposed standards incorporate the requirements of many
standards other than those addressed in the proposal, would host
employers be required to inform contractors of known hazards
addressed by all potentially applicable standards? Even if the term
is confined to the standards under consideration here, this is a
vastly overbroad requirement.
Next, what is the test for determining the hazards that are
"related" to the contractor's work? Further, on what objective
basis is a host employer to determine which hazards might not be
recognized by the contract employer or its employees? Does this mean
that the host must be sufficiently familiar with the training of a
specialty contractors' employees to allow an intelligent assessment
of what hazards those employees "might" or "might not"
recognize? What will be the penalty for mis-evaluating these
possibilities, if made in good faith?
Indeed, what are "hazards" for purposes of this rule? Are they
limited to conditions and practices that pose a significant risk of
injury to employees, and would the likelihood of occurrence and
degree of gravity make a difference? Similarly, what are "known"
hazards? Are they hazards that the host employer actually knows of,
or are they hazards that a host employer should have known through
the exercise of reasonable diligence? Does actual knowledge for this
purpose mean knowledge of any hazard that can be discerned by
searching a company's records--a daunting test for an electric
utility that may have decades of records related to work on
transmission and distribution facilities that cover literally
thousands of square miles--or is a more realistic test to be
applied? If so, what is it? [Ex. 0227]
Mr. James Shill with ElectriCities similarly commented that the
proposed provision would `require ElectriCities' members to take into
account every section of the OSHA standards, as well as others
incorporated by reference, and make a `guess' as to all of the
potential hazards a contractor may be unable or unwilling to
`recognize' (Ex. 0178). Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, Maryland &
Delaware Association of Electric Cooperatives argued that "[t]he
phrase `might not be recognized by the contract employer or its
employees' is too broad" and suggested that the proposed paragraph be
revised to "specifically state the items that must be provided by the
host employer to the contract employer" (Ex. 0175).
Some commenters proposed new language for this provision. (See, for
example, Exs. 0201, 0227, 0505.) For instance, EEI suggested:
[T]he final rules should be limited to requiring that a host
employer notify a contractor of a hazard where: (1) The host
employer has actual knowledge: (a) That the hazard is present, and
(b) that the contractors' employees are likely to encounter the
hazard in performing the work for which the contractor is engaged;
(2) given its known expertise, the contractor cannot reasonably be
expected to recognize the hazard; and (3) for this purpose, the
"hazard" is a condition or practice that poses a significant risk
of death or serious physical harm to the contractor's employees. The
standard should also make clear that the host employer is not
obligated to evaluate each job assigned to a contractor to determine
whether such hazards are presented. [Ex. 0227]
IBEW, although generally supporting this and the other proposed
host-contractor requirements, also suggested changes to paragraph
(c)(1)(i)(A). The union proposed:
The host employer shall inform the contract employer of . . .
existing or reasonably anticipated hazards covered by this
subsection (i) of which the host employer is aware, (ii) that are
related to the contract employer's work, and (iii) that are
sufficiently unique to the host employer's operations or premises
that the contract employer or its employees would not, through the
exercise of reasonable care, be expected to recognize. [Ex. 0505]
Mr. Donald Hartley with IBEW explained:
It is important . . . to require the host employer to disclose
hazardous conditions that it knows actually exist and that it
reasonably anticipates may exist. The point here is to include
hazards that may exist intermittently: for example, switching surges
or environmental conditions or only under certain circumstances
that, when they occur, affect the workplace safety.
Second, the focus of the information disclosure should be on
information that is sufficiently unique to the host's workplace or
operations that the contract employer cannot be expected to know
without the input from the host employer. A contractor may be unable
to identify hazards not only because it lacks the technical
expertise, but for the very basic reason that it is unfamiliar with
the unique features of the host's operation or workplace
environment. Again, environmental conditions or specific operating
procedures are examples of this.
Finally, we believe that host employers should be required to
disclose any hazards that threaten contractor employees with any
illness or injury, not just death or the most serious of physical
harm. [Tr. 879-880]
OSHA considered the comments on proposed paragraph (c)(1)(i)(A) and
continues to believe that the final rule should include a requirement
for host employers to convey certain information to contractors that
will bear on the contractor's ability to ensure the safety of its
employees. Much of the opposition to this provision was to the specific
language in the proposal, not to the general principle that utilities
have safety-related information that should be shared with contractors.
OSHA is sensitive to the concerns of commenters who noted that the
proposed language was overbroad or unclear. Therefore, OSHA revised the
final rule to more clearly define the information host employers must
provide to contractors. The Agency is linking the information-transfer
requirements, in part, to the requirement in final Sec. 1926.950(d)
for determining existing conditions. (Paragraph (d), discussed later in
this section of the preamble, is essentially the same as existing Sec.
1910.269(a)(3).) In the final rule, Sec. 1926.950(d) requires a
determination of the existing characteristics and conditions of
electric lines and equipment related to the safety of the work. The
examples of "existing conditions" that were listed in proposed
paragraph (d) have been separately numbered in final paragraph (d). The
first five items of information listed in final paragraph (d) are
"characteristics" of the electric power installation. The remaining
three items of information listed in final paragraph (d) are
"conditions" at those installations. Therefore, paragraphs (c)(1)(i)
and (c)(1)(ii) of the host-contractor provisions in the final rule
refer to (and require the sharing of) information about the
characteristics and conditions specifically listed in final paragraph
(d) that are related to the safety of the work to be performed.
Contract employers may request from the host employer information
they need to protect their employees, in addition to the information
that host employers must provide under final paragraphs (c)(1)(i)
through (c)(1)(iii).\67\ Thus, final paragraph (c)(1)(iv) requires host
employers to provide contractors with information about the design or
operation of the host employer's installation that is known by the host
employer, that the contract employer requests, and that is related to
the protection of the contract employer's employees.
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\67\ Final paragraph (c)(1)(iii), discussed later in this
section of the preamble, requires host employers to provide
contractors with information about the design and operation of the
host employer's installation that the contract employer needs to
make the assessments required by subpart V.
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As already noted, OSHA decided to adopt language in paragraphs
(c)(1)(i) and (c)(1)(ii) in the final rule that more clearly specifies
the information that host employers must provide to contractors and
does so by using language that is familiar to employers complying with
existing Sec. 1910.269.\68\ Paragraph (d), discussed later in this
section of the preamble, lists specific characteristics and conditions
of electric lines and equipment that must be determined before work on
or near electric lines or equipment is started when these
characteristics and conditions are related to the safety of the work to
be performed. These characteristics and conditions include the nominal
voltages of lines and
equipment, maximum switching transient voltages, the presence and
condition of protective grounds and equipment grounding conductors, and
the condition of poles. Host employers are the parties that possess
much of this information, and it would be difficult in many cases (and
impossible in others) for contract employers to determine these
conditions and comply with paragraph (d) without getting the necessary
information from the host employer.
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\68\ It should be noted that, in revising the language of this
provision in the final rule, OSHA did not conclude that the proposed
language was overbroad or too vague. Similar language is used in
other OSHA standards, including the standard for process safety
management of highly hazardous chemicals (see Sec.
1910.119(h)(2)(ii)). The Agency believes that employers subject to
that rule are successfully complying with it. However, OSHA is
revising the language of this provision in Subpart V because it
resolves rulemaking participants' concerns about the proposed
provision in a manner that adequately protects employees and is more
consistent with existing requirements for electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work in Sec. 1910.269.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, an electrical contractor might be able to make a
reasonable estimate of the nominal voltage on a line through
examination of the equipment. However, having the host employer provide
that information to the contractor eliminates guesswork and the hazards
associated with inaccurate estimates.
Similarly, contractors will usually be unable to determine the
maximum switching transient overvoltages on a power line without
information from the host employer. The maximum per-unit transient
overvoltage determines the minimum approach distance for workers to
maintain from exposed, energized parts (see the discussion of this
issue under the summary and explanation of final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)
later in this section of the preamble). Without this information from
the host, a contractor might not adhere to the proper minimum approach
distance and, as a result, a power line worker might come too close to
the power line and be at risk of serious injury from electric shock and
burns.
Paragraph (c)(1)(i) of the final rule provides that, before work
begins, the host employer must inform the contractor of the
characteristics of the host employer's installation that are related to
the safety of the work to be performed and are listed in paragraphs
(d)(1) through (d)(5). These characteristics are: the nominal voltages
of lines and equipment, the maximum switching-transient voltages, the
presence of hazardous induced voltages, the presence of protective
grounds and equipment grounding conductors, and the locations of
circuits and equipment, including electric supply and communication
lines and fire-protective signaling circuits.\69\ OSHA presumes that
host employers have this information because they typically need it for
the design and operation of an electric power generation, transmission,
or distribution system. A note to final paragraph (c)(1)(i) explains
that in an unusual case in which the host employer does not have this
information in existing records, it must obtain the information for
purposes of complying with paragraph (c)(1)(i).
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\69\ In final Sec. 1926.950(d)(5), OSHA changed the proposed
term "power . . . lines" to "electric supply . . . lines." The
two terms are synonymous, and the final rule defines "electric
supply lines" in Sec. 1926.968. Note that lines that employees
encounter are either electric supply lines, communication lines, or
control lines, such as those on fire-protective signaling circuits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of the final rule requires that, before work
begins, the host employer inform the contract employer of the
conditions of the host employer's installation that are related to the
safety of the work to be performed, that are listed in final paragraphs
(d)(6) through (d)(8), and that are known to the host employer. These
conditions are: the condition of protective grounds and equipment
grounding conductors, the condition of poles, and environmental
conditions relating to safety. Final paragraph (c)(1)(ii) only requires
host employers to provide known information to contractors. Host
employers gain information on the condition of their electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution systems through normal
preventive-maintenance inspections; and, if host employers find
conditions listed in final paragraphs (d)(6) through (d)(8) and related
to the safety of work to be performed by a contractor during such
inspections, the host employer must pass that information to the
contract employer under final paragraph (c)(1)(ii). For example, if a
utility conducts a wood-pole inspection program and finds several poles
that are structurally unsound and that need replacement, this
information must be imparted to a contractor whose work involves the
affected poles. However, this paragraph only requires the host employer
to provide information that the host can obtain from existing records
through the exercise of reasonable diligence; this provision does not
require host employers to conduct inspections to identify these
conditions. To make this clear in the final rule, OSHA included a note
following paragraph (c)(1)(ii) clarifying that, for the purposes of
that paragraph, the host employer does not have to inspect of worksite
conditions or otherwise get information that it cannot obtain through a
reasonably diligent search of its existing records.
OSHA believes that the revised language in paragraphs (c)(1)(i) and
(c)(1)(ii) of the final rule addresses the concerns expressed by
commenters, such as ElectriCities and EEI, about the clarity and scope
of proposed paragraph (c)(1)(i)(A). The provision no longer requires
host employers to determine whether a hazard exists or whether
contractors might be expected to recognize particular hazards.
Under final paragraph (c)(1)(iv), before work begins, a host
employer must provide additional information about the design or
operation of the installation, but only if that information (1) is
known by the host employer, (2) is requested by the contract employer,
and (3) is related to the protection of the contract employer's
employees. A note to final paragraph (c)(1)(iv) clarifies that, for
purposes of complying with that paragraph, the host employer is not
required to make inspections or otherwise get information that it
cannot obtain through a reasonably diligent search of its existing
records.
IBEW commented that, "[i]n addition to the information about
`existing conditions' needed to perform the hazard analysis, there may
be other information unique to the host's operations or premises that
the contractor employer needs to ensure the safety of its employees"
(Ex. 0505). The union identified "schedules of other crews that may be
working on the same circuits or equipment, anticipated operational
changes, and the potential impact of unique localized climatic,
environmental or geological conditions" as examples of such
information (id.). Details about the scheduling of outages is another
example of information a contractor might need to obtain from the host
employer before employees start work.
OSHA is not explicitly requiring host employers to provide this
other type of information to contractors. The Agency believes that,
although information such as the scheduling of crews may prove useful
in some situations, it is not always essential to ensure the safety of
employees. When a contractor needs this information to protect its
employees, the contractor may request this type of information under
final paragraph (c)(1)(iv). In addition, OSHA believes that host
employers and contract employers will exchange this type of information
in their efforts to comply with other provisions in final paragraph
(c). For example, when host and contractor crews will be working
together or on the same circuit, OSHA intends for both employers to
exchange crew-scheduling information when necessary to comply with
final paragraph (c)(3) (discussed later in this section of the
preamble), which requires the contract employer and the host employer
to coordinate their work rules and procedures to ensure that employees
are protected as required by subpart V.
As a general matter, OSHA does not believe that the information
host
employers must share with contract employers under final paragraph
(c)(1)(iv) is likely to contain proprietary information or trade
secrets. OSHA recognizes, however, that an unusual case could arise
presenting issues related to trade secrets. In any such case, OSHA
expects that the host employer will find a way to provide the necessary
information to the contract employer without divulging trade secrets or
will share the information with the contract employer pursuant to an
appropriate confidentiality agreement.
Southern Company expressed concern that contractors and their
employees might rely on the information provided by the utility in lieu
of doing a thorough job briefing as required by final Sec. 1926.952
(Ex. 0212). Final Sec. 1926.950(c)(1)(i), which requires host
employers to provide information to contractors, does not replace the
contract employer's basic responsibility to conduct the job briefing
required by final Sec. 1926.952. The briefing will impart information,
including relevant information a contractor obtains from a host
employer, to the employees doing the work. The requirements in final
Sec. Sec. 1926.950(c)(1) and (d) and 1926.952 work in combination to
ensure that the employees performing the work are provided with
sufficient information to perform that work safely.
Proposed paragraph (c)(1)(i)(B) required host employers to provide
contract employers with information about the installation that the
contract employer would need to make the assessments required elsewhere
in Subpart V. EEI inquired as to who (the host or contract employer)
would be responsible for deciding what assessments the contractor must
make and whether the host would have to survey contractor work areas to
identify hazards that need assessment (Ex. 0227).
The language in final paragraph (c)(1)(iii) states explicitly that,
before work begins, the host employer must provide information that the
contract employer needs to perform the assessments. In addition, the
language from the proposal has been modified in the final rule to limit
the information the host employer must provide to "[i]nformation about
the design and operation of the host employer's installation." Table 2
shows the assessments that are implicitly or explicitly required by
final subpart V and lists information that the Agency anticipates
contractors will need to perform the required assessments.
Table 2--Assessments Required by Subpart V
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type of information
to be provided under
Provision Assessment required Sec.
1926.950(c)(1)(iii)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 1926.953(a).......... Whether an enclosed Whether an enclosed
space must be space contains
entered as a permit- hazards, other than
required confined electrical and
space. atmospheric
hazards, that could
endanger the life
of an entrant or
could interfere
with escape from
the space.
Sec. 1926.953(m).......... Whether forced air The size of the
ventilation has enclosed space.
been maintained
long enough that a
safe atmosphere
exists.
Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(i).... What is the What the operating
appropriate minimum conditions are for
approach distance the value of the
for the work to be maximum transient
performed. overvoltage
provided to the
contract
employer.\1\
Sec. 1926.960(g)(1)....... Whether employees Information on
are exposed to electric equipment,
hazards from flames such as safety
or electric arcs. information
provided by
manufacturers, that
relates to the
required hazard
assessment.
Sec. 1926.960(g)(2)....... What is the The electrical
estimated incident parameters needed
energy from an to calculate
electric arc. incident energy,
such as maximum
fault current, bus
spacings, and
clearing times.
Sec. 1926.960(k).......... Whether devices are Load current for,
designed to open or and the opening and
close circuits closing ratings of,
under load devices used to
conditions. open and close
circuits under
load.
Sec. Sec. 1926.961 and What are the known All known sources of
1926.967(h). sources of electric electric energy,
energy (including including known
known sources of sources of
backfeed) supplying backfeed.
electric circuits.
Sec. 1926.962(d)(1)(i).... Whether protective The maximum fault
grounds have current and
adequate current- clearing time for
carrying capacity. the circuit.
Sec. 1926.962(g).......... Whether there is a Potential rise on
possibility of remote grounds
hazardous transfer under fault
of potential should conditions.
a fault occur.
Sec. 1926.964(a)(2)....... Whether overhead The design strength
structures such as of the pole or
poles and towers structure.
are capable of
sustaining stresses
imposed by the work.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Includes information on conditions that must be in place for the
maximum transient overvoltage to be valid, such as whether circuit
reclosing devices are disabled.
In specific cases, contractors may need information that is
somewhat different from that described in Table 2. OSHA expects that
contractors will inform host employers if they need additional
information, and that information must be provided to the extent the
host employer is required to provide it by final paragraph (c)(1)(iii).
In addition, the Agency does not expect host employers to provide
contractors with information in the table if the contractor informs the
host that the information is not needed.
EEI questioned whether the proposed provision was limited to
information actually known by the host employer (Ex. 0227). OSHA
expects that the host employer will usually have, in existing records,
information about the design and operation of its installation that the
contract employer will need to make required assessments. OSHA presumes
that host employers know their electric power generation, transmission,
or distribution installations and know their systems' nominal system
and operating voltages, available fault currents, relay protection
schemes, anticipated relay clearing times, and switching schedules. As
IBEW noted, this is information "that the host employer should have
for basic operational purposes and that is
generally solely in the host's possession" (Ex. 0505). In addition,
electric utilities will also need to have this information to perform
their own required assessments when their employees are performing work
on the utilities' installations. However, the record also indicates
that, in some unusual circumstances, electric utilities do not have
basic information about their system readily available. (See Mr. Brian
Erga's testimony regarding a nuclear power plant that did not know its
available fault current, Tr. 1241-1242.) In such cases, the final rule
requires the host employer to ascertain the information and provide it
to its contractor so that the contractor can conduct the required
assessments. A note to final paragraph (c)(1)(iii) clarifies that, in
any situation in which the host does not have such information in
existing records, it must obtain the information and provide it to the
contract employer to comply with paragraph (c)(1)(iii).\70\
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\70\ The preamble to the proposal indicated that proposed
paragraph (c)(1)(i) would not require host employers to provide
"unknown information" to contractors (70 FR 34840). It should be
noted, however, that OSHA presumes that host employers "know" the
information that must be shared under final paragraphs (c)(1)(i) and
(c)(1)(iii) because it relates to the design and operation of the
installation, which are aspects of an electric power generation,
transmission, or distribution system that are under the exclusive
purview of the host employer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Steven Theis of MYR Group recommended that the final rule
require hosts and contractors to perform joint hazard analyses (Tr.
1334).
The final rule neither requires nor prohibits such joint
assessments. Even if employers do not conduct a joint hazard analysis,
the information exchange required by final paragraph (c)(1) of the
final rule will be part of a two-way conversation between host
employers and contract employers. As discussed later in this section of
the preamble, final paragraph (c)(3) requires hosts and contractors to
coordinate their work rules and procedures to ensure that employees are
protected as required by subpart V. To comply with the final rule, the
contractor, as part of this effort, must communicate with the host
about the information the contractor needs about the host's
installation.
OSHA notes that final paragraph (c)(1) does not require the host
employer to report any information to the contract employer in writing;
the Agency will deem it sufficient for the host employer to provide the
necessary information, through any appropriate mechanism (for example,
a phone call or an email), to an authorized agent of the contractor.
Proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii) would have required the host employer
to report observed contract-employer-related violations of subpart V to
contract employers. OSHA included this provision in the proposal
because the Agency believed that host employers occasionally observe
contractor employees performing work under the contract and that it was
important for the host employer to inform the contract employer of
observed violations so that the contractor could correct them and
prevent them from occurring in the future.
OSHA received many comments on this proposed requirement. (See, for
example, Exs. 0128, 0152, 0160, 0167, 0169, 0170, 0171, 0178, 0183,
0186, 0201, 0222, 0227, 0235, 0505; Tr. 880-882.) IBEW supported the
need for a reporting requirement, explaining:
[T]he point is that if in performing its usual functions the
host observes contract employees exposed to hazards, it must report
those observations to their contract employer. This requirement is
particularly important in the electrical industry where contract
employees are potentially exposed to extremely serious hazards.
If the host employer who knows the worksite's hazards and the
potential for harm sees a contract employee exposed to those
conditions the host knows to be hazardous, it is unconscionable for
the host to walk away. The host must report that information to the
contract employer so the contract employer can take the steps
necessary to eliminate the unsafe condition, and the contract
employer must report back what action it actually took . . . [Tr.
881].
Many commenters objected to the proposed reporting requirement,
however. (See, for example, Exs. 0128, 0152, 0167, 0170, 0178, 0183,
0186, 0222, 0227.) Some expressed concerns about putting host employers
in an enforcement role and requiring them to make determinations about
whether an OSHA violation exists. (See, for example, Exs. 0128, 0152,
0170, 0178, 0183, 0222, 0227.) For instance, EEI commented:
The proposal would require a host employer to report observed
contract-employer-related violations of the standard to the contract
employer.
* * * * *
Typically, utility employees and managers are not trained "in
the requirements of" OSHA standards." [sic] Rather . . . they are
trained in the requirements of their own employer's safety rules. .
. . There simply are no requirements that any employee know what
OSHA standards require--only that behavior and work practices be in
compliance with standards. Employees are entitled, however, to
assume that if they comply with their employer's safety rules, they
will comply with OSHA standards. . . . Indeed, among EEI members,
the requirements of safety rules often exceed the minimum
requirements of OSHA standards.
Clearly, the proposed requirement would create confusion.
Utility representatives may believe they are seeing OSHA violations,
but in fact may observe that contractors are not performing as the
utility's internal safety rules require. [T]he proposal would
effectively place utility personnel in the role of surrogate
Compliance Officers. They are not trained or qualified to perform
such a function. [Ex. 0227; emphasis included in original]
Mr. Alan Blackmon with the Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative
suggested that, "[b]y requiring the [host] employer to report on the
violation of a federal rule, the proposal in a sense deputizes the
employer as an OSHA inspector, a role for which employers have no
training and no experience" (Ex. 0183). Mr. Chris Tampio of the
National Association of Manufacturers argued that, by requiring hosts
to report observed violations, OSHA "would inappropriately force a
host employer to make a legal determination as to whether the
contractor has committed a violation of the OSH Act" (Ex. 0222).
EEI was also concerned that host employers would be cited for
failing to report violations that were present, but not recognized by,
the host's employees, commenting:
The proposal provides no guidance as to the kinds of observation
that would trigger a notification requirement. For example,
[utilities commonly] engage inspectors . . . to observe contractors'
performance. In other situations, this is performed by a utility's
own foremen or supervisors. Such inspections often are aimed at
assuring that the work is performed accurately and in timely
fashion, and observation of safety performance, while important, may
not be the main or only focus. If a utility inspector is found to
have had the opportunity to observe a contractor's violative
behavior but did not understand or appreciate what he saw and failed
to report it, would the host be cited? [Ex. 0227]
Similarly, Duke Energy commented: "Host employers may have a variety
of employees observing contract operations for reasons unrelated to
safety. They may be observing contract operations for quality,
schedule, productivity, or cost purposes. A host employee may `observe'
a condition, but not recognize it as a violation of this OSHA
regulation" (Ex. 0201).
Some commenters presumed that the proposal required host employers
to either actively monitor contractors or take measures to ensure that
reported hazards were abated. (See, for example, Exs. 0187, 0225, 0235,
0238, 0504.) For instance, Mr. James Strange with American Public Power
Association (APPA) commented that municipal
utilities "do not have the personnel to shadow contractors on each
utility job site to assure that they are working according to OSHA
rules" (Ex. 0238). In addition, several commenters argued that the
proposal would create an adversarial relationship between hosts and
contractors. (See, for example, Exs. 0169, 0171, 0183.) Mr. Wilson
Yancey expressed this argument as follows:
[T]he proposed requirements might create an unduly adversarial
relationship between the parties. For instance, the host employer
seeking to fulfill its perceived duties under the regulations would
thrust the host employer into the role of an investigator and rule-
enforcer, rather than a business partner seeking to achieve a common
goal of employee safety. [Ex. 0169]
After considering the comments received on this issue, OSHA decided
not to include proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii) in the final rule. First,
the host employer, as defined in the final rule, may not be in position
to recognize, or even observe, hazardous conditions created by contract
employers. OSHA based the proposed rule on the premise that the host
employer would hire the contract employer and would perform some
maintenance on the system. As noted earlier, in the final rule, the
Agency adopted a definition of "host employer" that is designed to
capture the employer in the best position to provide information about
the electric power generation, transmission, or distribution
installation on which the contract employer is working. The definition
of "host employer" in the final rule does not require the host
employer to maintain the installation or to be the entity that hired
the contractor. A host employer that does not perform maintenance work
on the system would be unlikely to recognize hazardous conditions
created by contractors. In addition, a host employer that does not hire
the contract employer usually would not find itself in a position to
observe the contractor's employees working.\71\
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\71\ For example, a generation plant owner could contract with a
company to operate, but not maintain, the plant. If the plant owner
neither operates nor controls operating procedures for the
installation, the company it contracts with to operate the plant is
the host employer under the final rule. The plant owner could hire a
different company to perform maintenance in the substation in the
generation plant. Because the host employer in this scenario does
not perform maintenance, it is likely that the host employer will
not have any employees qualified to enter the substation, and, thus,
will not observe the maintenance contractor's employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, in some circumstances, the host employer will also be a
controlling employer under OSHA's multiemployer citation policy. A
controlling employer has an underlying duty to exercise reasonable care
to prevent and detect violations endangering contractor employees at
the worksite. (See CPL 02-00-124; see also OSHA's discussion of the
multiemployer citation policy earlier in this section of the preamble.)
This is a broader obligation than the one OSHA proposed for host
employers in proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii); therefore, the proposed
requirement is not necessary with respect to hosts that are controlling
employers. (Whether a host employer is a controlling employer depends
on whether it has general supervisory authority over the worksite,
including the power to correct, or require others to correct, safety
and health violations.\72\) Indeed, the Agency is concerned that
including the proposed reporting requirement in the final rule would
lead host employers to believe they could fulfill their obligations as
controlling employers just by complying with the more limited
requirement in the standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ Such control can be established by contract or by the
exercise of control in practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although OSHA is not including proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii) in the
final rule, the Agency expects that, in many situations, liability and
practical considerations will drive host employers that are not
controlling employers to notify the contractor if they observe
hazardous conditions involving the contractor's employees. Unsafe
conditions created by contractors can pose hazards to employees of the
host employer and to the public and can create additional obligations
for host employers to protect their employees (for example, through
OSHA standards and the general duty clause) and the public (for
example, through liability concerns) from those hazards. For instance,
a host employer that observes a contractor bypassing safety rules when
installing a new line will likely have concerns about the quality of
the contractor's work and about the effect of the contractor's unsafe
practices on the installation and on public safety. These concerns will
form a strong incentive for the host employer to report the hazardous
conditions to the contractor.
Although the Agency concluded, based on the current rulemaking
record, that the reporting requirement in proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii)
is neither necessary nor appropriate for this final rule, the Agency
will continue to monitor this issue and evaluate whether regulatory
requirements like the one in proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii) are
necessary to ensure the safety of employees under subpart V or other
OSHA standards.
Proposed paragraph (c)(2)(iii)(C) would have required the contract
employer to advise the host employer of measures taken to correct, and
prevent from recurring, violations reported by the host employer under
proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii). In light of the Agency's decision not to
adopt proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii), proposed paragraph (c)(2)(iii)(C)
is no longer meaningful and is not incorporated in the final rule.
In addition to proposing the requirement for hosts to report
observed contract-employer-related violations, OSHA requested comments
on the related, but distinct, issue of whether it should require host
employers to take appropriate measures to enforce contractual safety
requirements or review the contracts of contractors who fail to correct
violations.\73\
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\73\ Contracts between electric utilities and their contractors
often contain provisions requiring contractors to meet OSHA
standards and other provisions addressing noncompliance with the
terms of the contract. (See, for example, Ex. 0175.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IBEW was the only commenter that supported such requirements,
explaining:
The host employer should regularly review the safety performance
of a contractor while operating on its site. The host employer
should take necessary action to ensure contractual obligations are
being met. The rule should require the host employer to initiate
further action if the review finds non compliance. [Ex. 0230]
Rulemaking participants agreed that host employers regularly adopt
contracts that specify safety standards to which contractors must
adhere and that include provisions for enforcing those requirements.
(See, for example, Exs. 0163, 0175, 0213, 0405; Tr. 1386-1387.) Also,
some commenters recognized a general need for hosts to evaluate the
safety performance of contractors. (See, for example, Exs. 0167, 0175,
0184, 0213, 0219.) However, none of these rulemaking participants
supported the adoption of OSHA requirements related to the enforcement,
review, or awarding of contracts.
For example, Ms. Susan O'Connor with Siemens Power Generation
explained:
While host employers often [require and enforce compliance with
OSHA standards], in practice it would be burdensome [on] the host
employer to require them, at the risk of OSHA sanctions, to enforce
contract provisions as a regulatory matter. Indeed, establishing
this as a regulatory standard could operate as a disincentive for
host employers to establish sound health and safety contractual
terms with contractors,
particularly terms which go beyond regulatory requirements. . . . In
addition, OSHA regulations are promulgated and undergo public
review; Host Employer requirements do not go through such a
regulatory review process and therefore must not be held on par with
OSHA regulations. Host employers have a right to establish site
safety requirements that are more stringent than the law requires;
however, they should have the right to deal with contractors who do
not comply individually and in their own manner. But they must
currently do this against the backdrop of specific OSHA standards,
and the OSHA Multi-employer Workplace policy. Siemens sees no reason
to change this.
* * * * *
OSHA should not prescribe how contractors are selected or
prescribe how contractors must be evaluated for purposes of
contracting work or terminating work. It is up to the discretion of
the party contracting for the services to make those determinations.
Host employers should have the discretion to choose, to dismiss, or
continue utilizing contractors. Given the already comprehensive and
pervasive nature of health and safety regulation through OSHA and
the states, as well as considerations of tort law, the effects of
the marketplace will weed out contractors that are repeatedly
substandard from a safety standpoint, as well as those that are
chronically poor perform[ers] from a quality, delivery, or other
standpoint. Contractors should be answerable to the host employe[r]
for business matters, and the agency for regulatory matters. These
lines should not be blurred by attempting to make the host employer
responsible for both. As a practical matter, it would be impossible
for OSHA . . . to come up with minimum requirements for every
contract activity, to establish an "acceptable" versus
"unacceptable" contractor. [Ex. 0163]
Duke Energy commented:
The only safety performance that OSHA has authority to regulate
is compliance with OSHA rules. Worker Compensation Insurance
Carriers and others review safety performance. There is no need for
OSHA to impose additional requirements. Each host employer is faced
with a unique set of available contractors, each with its own safety
record. Some may excel in one area and perform poorly in another.
Some host employers may have such a limited pool of available
contractors that requiring some pre-determined level of contractor
safety performance would eliminate all contractors. Other goals,
such as employing minority firms may cause hosts to work with poor
performers to improve their performance, rather than eliminating the
minority contractor with the poor record. OSHA should not interfere
in decisions such as these. [Ex. 0201]
In light of the comments received, OSHA decided not to adopt
provisions requiring host employers to enforce contractual safety
requirements, to review the contracts of contractors who fail to
correct violations or hazards, or to evaluate the safety performance of
contractors. As discussed previously, the host employer might not be
the entity that hired the contract employer, in which case the host
employer would not be in position to enforce contract requirements or
be involved in awarding contracts to the contract employer. In
addition, as Ms. O'Connor pointed out, and as noted earlier in this
section of the preamble, host employers that have supervisory authority
over a contractor's worksite are subject to a background statutory
obligation, as set forth in OSHA's multiemployer citation policy, to
exercise reasonable care to detect and prevent violations affecting
contractor employees. Moreover, for the reasons stated previously, OSHA
believes that, even in the absence of a specific requirement in subpart
V, host employers that are not controlling employers have strong
incentives to take measures to ensure safe contractor performance. In
addition, the Agency believes that contractors with poor safety
performance are likely to have similarly poor records with respect to
the quality of their work, making it less likely that host employers
will hire them. Therefore, the final rule does not contain provisions
related to the enforcement, review, or awarding of contracts.
Paragraph (c)(2) of final Sec. 1926.950 addresses the
responsibilities of the contract employer. Final paragraph (c)(2)(i)
requires the contract employer to ensure that each of its employees is
instructed in any hazardous conditions relevant to the employee's work
of which the contractor is aware as a result of information
communicated to the contractor by the host employer as required by
final paragraph (c)(1). This paragraph ensures that information on
hazards the employees might face is conveyed to those employees. The
information provided by the host employer under paragraph (c)(1) is
essential to the safety of employees performing the work, especially
because it may include information related to hazardous conditions that
the contract employees might not identify or recognize.
Proposed paragraph (c)(2)(i) was worded differently from the final
rule; the proposed paragraph required contractors to instruct their
employees in hazards communicated by the host employer. OSHA received
no comments on this proposed provision. However, changes were made to
this paragraph in the final rule to mirror the changes made to
paragraph (c)(1) (described earlier). In the final rule, the Agency did
not include the note to proposed paragraph (c)(2)(i) because OSHA
believes that the note was confusing. The proposed note suggested that
the instruction required under paragraph (c)(2)(i) was not part of the
training required under Sec. 1926.950(b). The contractors' employees
will already be trained in many of the hazards that are related to the
information the contractor receives from the host, and the final rule
does not require employers to duplicate this training. Contractors will
need to supplement an employee's training only when that employee will
be exposed to a hazard or will follow safety-related work practices
with respect to which he or she has not already been trained.
Paragraph (c)(2)(ii), as proposed, required the contract employer
to ensure that its employees followed the work practices required by
subpart V, as well as safety-related work rules imposed by the host
employer. In proposing this provision, OSHA explained that a host
employer's safety-related work rules are almost certain to impact the
safety and health of the contractor's employees (70 FR 34840). For
example, electric utilities typically require contractors to follow the
utilities' procedures for deenergizing electric circuits. If the
contract employer's employees do not follow these procedures, a circuit
the contractor's employees are working on might not be properly
deenergized, endangering the contractor's employees, or a circuit the
contractor was not working on might become reenergized, endangering any
host employer's employees that might be working on that circuit.
OSHA invited comments on whether requiring a contractor to follow a
host employer's safety-related work rules could make work more
hazardous. A few commenters supported proposed paragraph (c)(2)(ii).
(See, for example, Exs. 0164, 0213.) For instance, Mr. Tommy Lucas of
TVA commented:
The proposed requirement is supported. Regardless whether this
requirement is carried forward, we will require contractors to
follow certain host-employer safety rules contractually, such as the
lockout/tagout (LOTO) procedure. Failure to follow the LOTO
procedure could result in host or contractor employees being
seriously injured. [Ex. 0213]
In contrast, the vast majority of rulemaking participants opposed
the proposed provision. (See, for example, Exs. 0156, 0161, 0162, 0168,
0183, 0201, 0202, 0212, 0220, 0222, 0227, 0233, 0237, 0501; Tr. 1323,
1333.) These commenters gave several reasons for objecting to this
proposed requirement:
It could result in the implementation of inadequately safe
work rules, such as when the contractor has more protective work rules
than the
host (see, for example, Ex. 0161) or when the host's work rules may be
based on its own employees' working conditions that are less hazardous
than the working conditions to which contractor employees will be
exposed (see, for example, Ex. 0233).
It could cause contract employees to be confused about
proper work methods if rules change from contract to contract (see, for
example, Ex. 0227).
It would result in contractual requirements becoming
enforceable OSHA standards in a way that constitutes an illegal
delegation of OSHA's rulemaking authority, thereby circumventing proper
rulemaking procedures (see, for example, Ex. 0237).
It would place OSHA in the position of having to interpret
and enforce third-party contracts (see, for example, Ex. 0233).
It could increase disaster-response time (Ex. 0233).
It would increase costs and administrative burdens on
contract employers (see, for example, Ex. 0162).
It could result in contractors having to follow host
employer work rules that are not directly linked to employee safety,
for example, in a situation in which the host's rules approve only one
vendor for safety equipment when equivalent, equally protective,
equipment is available from other vendors (Ex. 0162).
For instance, Mr. Steven Theis with MYR Group commented:
MYR Group believes that requiring a contractor to follow a
host's safety rules would create hazards. Contractors are required
by the standard to have appropriate work rules and policies for
compliance. Requiring them to follow another employer's policies--
which they are unfamiliar with and untrained on--would either result
in accidents or add undue and unnecessary time for retraining and
familiarization with the policies when the contractor has its own
policy . . . Indeed, MYR Group has experienced situations where host
employers impose work rules that do not significantly affect
employee safety and may even create an unsafe situation. [H]ost work
rules can specify chain of command requirements that do not align
with contractor management structure or responsibility and thus
following host requirements could result in loss or miscommunication
of safety information or safe work directives. Accordingly, MYR
Group respectfully submits that the requirement to follow host
employer work rules should be deleted. [Ex. 0162]
Mr. Terry Williams with the Electric Cooperatives of South Carolina
agreed and provided an example of how following a host employer's
safety rules could jeopardize worker safety:
The proposal ignores the fact that contractors have developed
their own rules that are appropriate for the work they do. They
train on these rules and operate according to them all the time.
Requiring contractors . . . to work to the rules of others could
easily result in the contractor working less safely.
Consider the following actual situation: an electric utility
that is primarily a 12kV system, with some 34.5kV. The utility uses
its own crews for the 12kV work, and uses a qualified contractor for
the 34.5kV work, as the need arises. The utility's safety rules
specify use of Class 2 gloves, sleeves and cover up for all work, as
that is all their line crews need. For the 34.5 kV work, the
contractor should use Class 4 equipment, yet OSHA's proposal could
justify use of Class 2, with unsafe results.
OSHA should retract this proposal and allow host employers to
require contractors to work to appropriate safety rules. [Ex. 0202]
EEI made similar comments in its posthearing brief:
[T]he standard would require contractors to utilize different
safe procedures depending upon the owner involved. For example, an
electric line contractor could be required to observe a "ground-to-
ground" rubber glove requirement while working for one electric
utility, but not while working for another utility nearby (Tr. 110-
11). The confusion and consequent increased risk to employees from
such requirements is obvious, not to mention the cost of training
for employees and supervisors alike. [Ex. 0501]
As to the legal arguments, Susan Howe with the Society of the
Plastics Industry suggested that "OSHA's incorporation" of the host
employer's rules "into the OSHA standards which are the subject of
this rulemaking would violate the rulemaking provisions of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Administrative Procedures Act,
and the Federal Register Act" (Ex. 0170). The National Association of
Manufacturers similarly stated, with reference to this provision:
"OSHA has never had the authority to incorporate the provisions of
millions of private contracts into OSHA standards, nor to delegate its
rulemaking authority to private entities" (Ex. 0222). EEI also
commented that the proposed requirement "effectively would place each
host employer in the position of promulgating safety and health
standards for contractors' employees, and therefore would constitute an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power" (Ex. 0227).
OSHA does not believe that the proposed provision would cause the
practical problems identified by rulemaking participants. There is
evidence in the record that, as IBEW stated, "contractors . . .
routinely adapt their work rules and safety practices to accommodate
the demands of particular jobs and the requirements of specific hosts"
(Ex. 0505). The union explained this statement as follows:
There are circumstances related to contractors performing work
on utility properties that would require the contractors to work
under the host employer's safety related work rules to ensure both
the contractor employees and the host employer employees are
provided a safe work environment. In fact, many collective
bargaining agreements require this. [Ex. 0230]
Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI noted that some utilities have such unique
systems that contractors have no choice but to follow the host's rules
(Tr. 1271-1272). Several witnesses stated that contractors routinely
follow a host employer's lockout-tagout requirements (Tr. 314, 984,
1299-1301). There is evidence that some host employers require
contractors to follow NFPA 70E (Ex. 0460), to follow the host's fall
protection requirement for working from aerial lifts (Tr. 391), and to
use particular types of flame-resistant clothing (Tr. 1346). In
addition, the proposal did not require contractors to follow all of the
host employer's safety rules, only rules the host imposes on
contractors, which the contractors are required to follow anyway. The
Agency also does not believe that proposed paragraph (c)(2)(ii) would
result in undue confusion from work rules that vary from one employer
to another. The record indicates that contractors are already required
to institute different work rules because of contractual or other
requirements imposed by host employers, such as following the host
employers' lockout-tagout procedures (Tr. 314), using particular live-
line work methods (Tr. 320), and using particular forms of fall
protection (Tr. 643-644).
On the other hand, the record establishes that hosts sometimes
impose rules that do not meet OSHA requirements (Tr. 1366 \74\) or that
may be less safe than the contractor's rules (Tr. 1365-1366 \75\).
These are outcomes that OSHA did not envision in proposing paragraph
(c)(2)(ii). Considering these potential risks, and the commenters'
overwhelming opposition to this proposed provision, the Agency decided
not to include proposed paragraph (c)(2)(ii) in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ Some host employers "don't believe in equipotential work
zone," which is required by existing Sec. 1910.269(n)(3), or want
trucks barricaded, instead of having them grounded, as required by
existing Sec. 1910.269(p)(4)(iii)(C).
\75\ One host employer requires contractor employees to wear
rubber insulating gloves while working with live-line tools on
transmission lines, which may cause the gloves to fail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA concludes, however, that some coordination of work rules
between
hosts and contractors is necessary, particularly with respect to
deenergizing lines and equipment (Ex. 0505) and grounding procedures
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(Tr. 1271-1272). According to IBEW:
[What is important] is not that one party's rules take
precedence over the others. Instead, what is important is that the
parties operating on an electrical system coordinate procedures to
ensure that all of the employees can perform safely. There are two
sets of circumstances in which this kind of coordination is an
issue: Where employees actually work together and when the manner in
which one group of employees performs has an impact on the safety of
another group of employees. [Ex. 0505]
Other rulemaking participants similarly supported a requirement for
coordination between host employers and contract employers to assure
the protection of host employees and contract employees. (See, for
example, Exs. 0128, 0235, 0237.) Therefore, the Agency is adopting a
new paragraph in the final rule, Sec. 1926.950(c)(3), entitled "Joint
host- and contract-employer responsibilities," which reads as follows:
The contract employer and the host employer shall coordinate
their work rules and procedures so that each employee of the
contract employer and the host employer is protected as required by
this subpart.
This new provision provides host employers and contract employers more
flexibility than the proposal to select appropriate work rules and
procedures for each task or project, while ensuring that workers are
not at risk of harm due to a lack of coordination between employers.
Under the new provision, each employer has independent
responsibility for complying with the final rule. In addition, the
Agency stresses that a contract employer must comply with the final
rule even though a host employer may try to impose work rules that
would cause the contract employer to violate OSHA's rules. Accordingly,
a contract employer is not relieved of its duty to comply with the
final rule by following a work rule imposed by the host employer. For
example, a contract employer must comply with final Sec. 1926.962(c),
which prescribes rules for equipotential grounding, even if the host
employer has its own noncompliant grounding procedures. Paragraph
(c)(3) of final Sec. 1926.950 requires host employers and contract
employers to confer in an effort to select work rules and procedures
that comply with final Sec. 1926.962(c).
Final paragraphs (c)(2)(ii) and (c)(2)(iii) (proposed as part of
paragraph (c)(2)(iii)) require the contract employer to advise the host
employer of unique hazardous conditions posed by the contract
employer's work \76\ and any unanticipated hazardous conditions found,
while the contractor's employees were working, that the host employer
did not mention. Final paragraphs (c)(2)(ii) and (c)(2)(iii) enable the
host employer to take necessary measures to protect its employees from
hazards of which the host employer would not be aware. These
requirements will protect the host employer's employees: when they are
working near the contractor's employees (for example, during storm
situations (Tr. 315, 392, 1379-1380); during outages on transmission
lines (Tr. 1380) and in plants (Tr. 985); while working in the same
substation (Tr. 313-314, 559); and when the host employer's employees
work on the same equipment after the contract employer departs (such
as, when contractors are working on equipment in the field that the
host employer does not regularly inspect) (Tr. 877-878)). The Utility
Workers Union supported these proposed requirements, commenting:
"Requiring the sharing of information of hazards found or created by
the contractor is . . . insurance that all employees, host and
contractor, are in a safer working environment" (Ex. 0197). OSHA notes
that proposed paragraph (c)(2)(iii)(B) (now paragraph (c)(2)(iii))
required contractors to report any unanticipated "hazards" not
mentioned by the host; however, in the final rule, the phrase
"hazardous conditions" replaces the word "hazards" throughout
paragraph (c). In addition, the Agency anticipates that contract
employers will inform host employers of any information provided by the
host that is at odds with actual conditions at the worksite, consistent
with paragraph (c)(3), which specifies that host employers and contract
employers coordinate their work rules and procedures so that each
employee is protected as required by subpart V.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ For the purposes of final paragraph (c)(2)(ii), "unique
hazardous conditions presented by the contract employer's work"
means hazardous conditions that the work poses to which employees at
the worksite are not already exposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some commenters believed that proposed paragraph (c)(2)(iii) (now
paragraphs (c)(2)(ii) and (c)(2)(iii)) needed clarification. For
example, the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC) commented
that proposed paragraph (c)(2)(iii) was vague and did not provide
guidance on the timeframes or format of required information transfers
(Ex. 0160).
OSHA does not agree that final paragraphs (c)(2)(ii) or (c)(2)(iii)
are vague or unclear. These provisions simply require that contractors
provide information to host employers, which reciprocates the
requirements under final paragraph (c)(1) that host employers provide
contractors with information. The Agency deliberately omitted, in the
proposed and final rules, any requirement for a formal or written
report; the final rule simply requires contractors to advise the host
employer, which allows contract employers maximum flexibility in
complying with the final requirements. The Agency will deem it
sufficient for the contract employer to provide the necessary
information, through any appropriate mechanism (for example, a phone
call or an email), to an authorized agent of the host employer.
The purpose of final paragraph (c)(2)(ii) is to enable host
employers to protect their own employees from hazardous conditions
presented by the contractor's work. Thus, the information addressed by
paragraph (c)(2)(ii) needs to be provided to the host employer soon
enough so that the host employer can take any necessary action before
its employees are exposed to a hazardous condition. To address AGC's
concern that the proposed paragraph did not provide guidance on the
timeframe of the required information transfer, OSHA added language to
paragraph (c)(2)(ii) in the final rule to indicate that this
information must be provided "[b]efore work begins."
The final rule also includes, in paragraph (c)(2)(iii), a 2-working
day timeframe in which the contractor must advise the host employer of
information described in that paragraph. OSHA believes that this
timeframe will give the contract employer sufficient time to provide
the required information. The final rule does not specifically require
hosts to take any direct action in response to information provided by
contractors, although the Agency anticipates that host employers will
use this information to protect their employees and comply with the OSH
Act.
Frequently, the conditions present at a jobsite can expose workers
to unexpected hazards. For example, the grounding system available at
an outdoor site may be damaged by weather or vehicular traffic, or
communications cables in the vicinity could reduce the approach
distance to an unacceptable level. To protect employees from such
adverse situations, conditions affecting safety that are present in the
work area should be known so that appropriate action can be taken.
Paragraph (d) of Sec. 1926.950 addresses this problem by requiring
safety-related characteristics and conditions existing in the work area
to
be determined before employees start working in the area. The language
for proposed paragraph (d) was based on language in current Sec.
1926.950(b)(1) and was the same as existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(3). A
similar requirement can be found in ANSI/IEEE C2-2002, Rule 420D.\77\
As noted earlier, OSHA revised the language in the final rule to
clarify that the paragraph addresses installation characteristics, as
well as work-area conditions, and to separately number the examples
listed in the provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ The 2012 NESC contains an equivalent requirement in Rule
420D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA received only a few of comments on proposed paragraph (d). EEI
objected to this provision, commenting:
EEI recognizes that the regulatory text of proposed paragraph
1926.950(d) is the same as in existing 1910.269(a)(3). Also, the
preamble accompanying the current proposal is essentially the same
as in the final 1910.269. There are certain aspects of the current
proposal, however, that are troublesome. . . .
* * * * *
It is susceptible of being applied in a manner that effectively
requires an employer to examine every imaginable condition on a
jobsite, lest it be held accountable if some obscure, unexpected
condition later is involved in causing an accident.
* * * * *
[I]f the standard is not applied reasonably, the result could be
a significant burden for line crews, as time is taken not to miss a
single detail, however obscure, lest the crew be second-guessed for
having missed observing some condition if something later goes
wrong. In the final rule, OSHA needs to address this issue. Rather
than state that there is an unqualified obligation to "determine"
existing conditions relating to the safety of the work, the
obligation should be modified to require a "reasonable effort to
determine" the reasonably anticipated hazards. [Ex. 0227]
EEI noted, as an example of "some obscure, unexpected condition . . .
involved in causing an accident," an energized static line that caused
the electrocution of an apprentice line worker (id.):
In that case, the contractor was performing maintenance work on
a high-voltage transmission tower. The host utility was shown to
have been aware that what appeared to be a grounded static line atop
one side of the tower was in fact energized at 4,000 volts. The
utility did not inform the contractor of this information, however,
and the contractor's foremen on the ground and on the tower did not
notice that there was an insulator separating the line and tower,
thus indicating that the line could be energized. [Id.]
EEI stated that the contractor was cited, under existing Sec.
1910.269(a)(3), "for failing to ascertain existing conditions, i.e.,
the energized condition of the static line, before beginning work"
(id.).
OSHA considered this comment and decided not to adopt EEI's
recommended change to proposed Sec. 1926.950(d). First, OSHA does not
believe that obscure and unexpected conditions often lead to accidents,
as EEI seems to argue. EEI's example, in which an apprentice power line
worker was electrocuted by an energized static line, is a case in point
(id.). An employer exercising reasonable diligence can be expected to
determine that a static line is energized. In the case described by
EEI, the electric utility that owned the line was aware that the line
was energized, and the line itself was installed on insulators (id.).
Thus, the energized condition of the static wire was neither obscure
nor unexpected.
Second, EEI appears confused about the purpose of this provision.
Paragraph (d) of final Sec. 1926.950 requires employers to determine,
before work is started on or near electric lines or equipment, existing
installation characteristics and work-area conditions related to the
safety of the work to be performed. The requirement also includes
examples of such characteristics and conditions.
Characteristics of the installation, such as the nominal voltage on
lines, maximum switching transient overvoltages, and the presence of
grounds and equipment grounding conductors, are parameters of the
system. This is information the employer already has, either through
direct knowledge or by the transfer of information from the host
employer to the contract employer.\78\ Thus, this aspect of final
paragraph (d) does not place any burden, much less an unreasonable one,
on line crews.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ The employer may not have knowledge of the exact locations
of customer-owned backup generators; however, the location of
possible sources of backfeed from such customer-owned equipment can
readily be determined by looking for connections to customers'
wiring in circuit diagrams or during an inspection at the worksite.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conditions of the installation, including the condition of
protective grounds and equipment grounding conductors, the condition of
poles, and environmental conditions relating to safety, are worksite
conditions. In some cases, the employer already will have information
on the condition of the installation, such as information on the
condition of poles from pole-inspection programs or on the condition of
electric equipment from equipment manufacturers. In the usual case,
however, the conditions addressed by paragraph (d) of the final rule
will be determined by employees through an inspection at the worksite.
This inspection need not be overly detailed, but it does need to be
thorough rather than cursory. The standard does not require crews to
determine "every imaginable condition," as EEI suggests. Rather, the
inspection must be designed to uncover the conditions specifically
noted in this paragraph as well as any other conditions of electric
lines and equipment that are related to the safety of the work to be
performed and that can be discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence by employees with the training required by Sec. 1926.950(b)
of the final rule.
Employers are required by Sec. 1926.952(a)(1) of the final rule to
provide information on such worksite-specific conditions and the
characteristics of the installation to the employee-in-charge. With
this information, the employer then will determine the current
conditions of the installation through an examination by employees at
the worksite. Employer-supplied information, as well as information
gathered at the worksite, must be used in the job briefing required by
Sec. 1926.952 of the final rule. (See the discussion of Sec. 1926.952
later in this section of the preamble.) The characteristics and
conditions found as a result of compliance with final Sec. 1926.950(d)
could affect the application of various Subpart V requirements. For
example, the voltage on equipment will determine the minimum approach
distances required under final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1). Similarly, the
presence or absence of an equipment grounding conductor will affect the
work practices required under final Sec. 1926.960(j). If conditions
are found to which no specific subpart V provision applies, then the
employee would need to be trained, as required by final Sec.
1926.950(b)(1)(ii), to use appropriate safe work practices.
Employers need not take measurements on a routine basis to make the
determinations required by final Sec. 1926.950(d). For example,
knowledge of the maximum transient voltage level is necessary to
perform many routine transmission and distribution line jobs safely.
However, no measurement of this maximum level is necessary to make the
requisite determination. Employers can make the determination by
conducting an analysis of the electric circuit, or they can assume the
default maximum transient overvoltages discussed under the summary and
explanation of final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1), later in this section of
the preamble. Similarly, employers can make determinations about the
presence of hazardous induced voltages, as well as the presence and
condition of grounds, without taking measurements.
It may be necessary for employers to make measurements when there
is doubt about the condition of a ground or the level of induced or
transient voltage if the employer is relying on one of these conditions
to meet other requirements in the standard. For example, an engineering
analysis of a particular installation might demonstrate that the
voltage induced on a deenergized line is considerable, but should not
be dangerous. However, a measurement of the voltage may be required if
the employer is using this analysis as a basis for claiming that the
provisions of final Sec. 1926.964(b)(4) on hazardous induced voltage
do not apply. In another example, further investigation is required
when an equipment ground is found to be of questionable reliability,
unless the equipment is treated as energized under final Sec.
1926.960(j).
EEI was concerned about this discussion of engineering analysis in
the preamble to the proposed rule (70 FR 34841), commenting:
This [discussion] is unrealistic: engineering analyses are not
made in the field in transmission and distribution work. [Ex. 0227]
OSHA agrees with EEI that engineering analyses are not made in the
field. Under this provision of the final rule, employers would conduct
any engineering analyses required by this provision off site and supply
the requisite information to the employees performing the work.
Section 1926.951, Medical services and first aid
Section 1926.951 sets requirements for medical services and first
aid. Paragraph (a) of Sec. 1926.951 emphasizes that the requirements
of Sec. 1926.50 apply. (See Sec. 1926.950(a)(2).) Existing Sec.
1926.50 includes provisions for available medical personnel, first-aid
training and supplies, and facilities for drenching or flushing of the
eyes and body in the event of exposure to corrosive materials.
Mr. Daniel Shipp with the International Safety Equipment
Association (ISEA) recommended that the reference in Sec. 1926.50,
Appendix A, to ANSI Z308.1-1978, Minimum Requirements for Industrial
Unit-Type First-aid Kits, be updated to the 2003 edition (Ex. 0211).
OSHA did not propose any changes to Sec. 1926.50, nor was that section
a subject of this rulemaking. Thus, the Agency is not adopting Mr.
Shipp's suggestion. It should be noted, however, that Appendix A to
Sec. 1926.50 is not mandatory. The Agency encourages employers to
examine the recommendations in the latest edition of the consensus
standard, which is ANSI/ISEA Z308.1-2009, when reviewing the guidance
in Appendix A to Sec. 1926.50.
Mr. Stephen Sandherr with AGC was concerned that the requirements
proposed in Sec. 1926.951 conflicted with the requirements in Sec.
1926.50 and maintained that such a conflict would hinder a contractor's
ability to implement safety (Ex. 0160).
OSHA reexamined the requirements in proposed Sec. 1926.951 and
found that the requirements for first-aid supplies in proposed
paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) in that section conflicted with similar
requirements in Sec. 1926.50. Proposed paragraph (b)(2) would have
required weatherproof containers if the supplies could be exposed to
the weather, whereas existing Sec. 1926.50(d)(2) requires that the
contents of first-aid kits be placed in weatherproof containers, with
individual sealed packages for each type of item. Further, proposed
paragraph (b)(3) would have required that first-aid kits be inspected
frequently enough to ensure that expended items are replaced, but not
less than once per year. By contrast, existing Sec. 1926.50(d)(2)
requires that first-aid kits "be checked by the employer before being
sent out on each job and at least weekly on each job to ensure that the
expended items are replaced."
As noted earlier, final Sec. 1926.951(a), which requires that
employers comply with existing Sec. 1926.50, was adopted without
change from the proposal. The Agency is not including proposed
paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) in the final rule because these provisions
were less restrictive than the requirements of Sec. 1926.50. Including
them in the final rule would compromise OSHA's efforts to enforce Sec.
1926.50 on jobsites covered by Subpart V. OSHA notes that the remaining
provisions in Sec. 1926.951 apply in addition to those in Sec.
1926.50.
Final Sec. 1926.951(b) supplements Sec. 1926.50 by requiring
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) to help resuscitate electric shock
victims.\79\ OSHA concludes that the requirements for CPR training in
the final rule are supported by the record. This training is required
by existing Sec. 1910.269(b)(1), and work under subpart V poses the
same electric-shock hazards and requires the same protection against
those hazards. As discussed in the summary and explanation for Sec.
1926.953(h), the final rule defines "first-aid training" to include
CPR training. Therefore, in final Sec. 1926.951(b), OSHA replaced the
proposed phrase "persons trained in first aid including
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)" with "persons with first-aid
training." The Agency stresses that CPR training is required by this
and other provisions in the final rule for first-aid training.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ In discussing these remaining provisions in this preamble,
OSHA generally uses the term "CPR training" to describe the first-
aid training required by the provisions. OSHA does not mean to imply
by this language that the final provisions do not require first-aid
training other than CPR. In fact, as explained later in the
preamble, the final rule defines "first-aid training" as training
in the initial care, including CPR, performed by a person who is not
a medical practitioner, of a sick or injured person until definitive
medical treatment can be administered. OSHA is emphasizing "CPR
training" in its preamble discussion because that type of first aid
is particularly beneficial to workers who are injured by an electric
shock.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electric shock is a serious and ever-present hazard to electric
power transmission and distribution workers because of the work they
perform on or with energized lines and equipment. CPR is necessary to
revive an employee rendered unconscious by an electric shock. As OSHA
concluded in the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking, CPR must be started
within 4 minutes to be effective in reviving an employee whose heart
has gone into fibrillation (59 FR 4344-4347; see also 269-Ex. 3-21).
To protect employees performing work on, or associated with,
exposed lines or equipment energized at 50 volts or more, OSHA proposed
to require that employees with training in first aid including CPR be
available to render assistance in an emergency.
OSHA chose 50 volts as a widely recognized threshold for hazardous
electric shock.\80\ In this regard, several OSHA and national consensus
standards recognize this 50-volt threshold. For example, OSHA's general
industry and construction electrical standards require guarding live
parts energized at 50 volts or more (Sec. Sec. 1910.303(g)(2)(i) and
1926.403(i)(2)(i)); the general industry electrical standard also
requires that electric circuits be deenergized generally starting at 50
volts (Sec. 1910.333(a)(1)). Similarly, NFPA's Standard for Electrical
Safety in the Workplace (NFPA 70E-2004) and the National Electrical
Safety Code (ANSI/IEEE C2-2002) impose electrical safety requirements
starting at 50 volts (Exs. 0134, 0077, respectively). (See, for
example, Section 400.16 of NFPA 70E-
2004, which requires guarding of live parts of electric equipment
operating at more than 50 volts, and Rule 441A2 of ANSI/IEEE C2-
2002,\81\ which prohibits employees from contacting live parts
energized at 51 to 300 volts unless certain precautions are taken.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ Although it is theoretically possible to sustain a life-
threatening shock below this voltage, it is considered extremely
unlikely. (See, for example, Ex. 0428.)
\81\ The 2012 NESC contains a similar requirement in Rule 441A2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many electric shock victims suffer ventricular fibrillation (59 FR
4344-4347; 269-Ex. 3-21). Ventricular fibrillation is an abnormal,
chaotic heart rhythm that prevents the heart from pumping blood and, if
unchecked, leads to death (id.). Someone must defibrillate a victim of
ventricular fibrillation quickly to allow a normal heart rhythm to
resume (id.). The sooner defibrillation is started, the better the
victim's chances of survival (id.). If defibrillation is provided
within the first 5 minutes of the onset of ventricular fibrillation,
the odds are about 50 percent that the victim will recover (id.).
However, with each passing minute, the chance of successful
resuscitation is reduced by 7 to 10 percent (id.). After 10 minutes,
there is very little chance of successful rescue (id.). Paragraph (b)
of the final rule requires CPR training to ensure that electric shock
victims survive long enough for defibrillation to be efficacious. The
employer may rely on emergency responders to provide defibrillation.
In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested public comment on
whether the standard should require the employer to provide automated
external defibrillators (AEDs) and, if so, where they should be
required. AEDs are widely available devices that enable CPR-trained
individuals to perform defibrillation.
Many rulemaking participants recommended that OSHA not adopt a
requirement for AEDs. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0162, 0167, 0169,
0171, 0173, 0174, 0177, 0200, 0225, 0227; Tr. 635-636, 762-763.) Some
commenters argued that there were no injuries for which AEDs would
prove beneficial. (See, for example, Exs. 0174, 0200; Tr. 635-636, 762-
763.) In this regard, Mr. Steven Semler, commenting on behalf of ULCC,
stated:
[W]hen tragic electric contact accidents do, albeit rarely,
occur with respect to line clearance tree trimmers, they tend to
involve catastrophic accidental direct contract with high voltage
electric supply lines which inherently pass massive amounts of
electricity through the victim which irreversibly damages cardiac
conductivity altogether--as to which AED's cannot, nor even purport
to, rectify . . . . It is, of course, a misnomer that AED's can
restart a heart which is stopped from electrical contact or any
other reason. The stoppage is known as "asystole" for which an AED
is programmed to not shock the patient because AED's cannot start a
stopped heart--for instance, one whose stoppage is due to
destruction of the heart's electrical path, or due to irreversible
brain damage, respiratory muscle paralysis, tissue burn, or due to
electrical contact which serves to destroy the ability to breathe.
Rather, AED's use is limited solely to cases of cardiac
fibrillation--cases of the heart beating in quivering fashion so as
to cease effective pumping capacity (and also to rarer situations of
ventricular tachycardia where the heart beats very fast). But, as a
trauma specialist physician has observed, ventricular fibrillation
is a rare occurrence in high voltage electrical contacts, as to
which rescue breathing and CPR (currently required) are remedial
pending arrival of medical help. [Footnote: Richard F. Edlict, MD,
"Burns, Electrical, www.emedicine.com/plastic/topic491.htm (7/12/
05) . . .]
Given that the unfortunate nature of line clearance tree
trimmers cardiac events due to electric contact tend to be
catastrophic because of accidental non compliance with the OSHA
minimum distance separation from electric supply lines separation
requirement, the cardiac events which unfortunately have happened to
line clearance tree trimmers have tended to catastrophic, tending to
involve cardiac and brain damage of such severity that AED's are not
designed to, and cannot, perform a useful purpose. [Ex. 0174;
emphasis included in original]
Furthermore, TCIA presented polling data to show that their members
have not experienced any occupational incidents for which AED use would
have been appropriate to treat the victim (Exs. 0200, 0419).
On the other hand, several rulemaking participants pointed out that
AEDs have saved lives (Exs. 0213, 0230). TVA, which has deployed AEDs
in both fixed work locations, such as generation plants, and in field
service-centers, reported two successful uses of AEDs in a 17-month
period (Ex. 0213). IBEW commented that "AED units have proven to be
effective in the utility industry. More than one `save' has occurred"
(Ex. 0230). Testifying on behalf of IBEW, Mr. James Tomaseski stated,
"[B]ased on what the experts tell you about the need to have AEDs in
certain environments, [electric utility work] is [at the] top of the
list. We have an aging workforce. The possibilities of sudden cardiac
arrest to occur to people in this industry is very high" (Tr. 964).
The Agency concludes that employees performing work covered by
subpart V and Sec. 1910.269 are exposed to electric shocks for which
defibrillation is needed as part of the emergency medical response to
such injuries. The Agency bases this conclusion on the evidence in both
this record, as well as the record supporting its decision in the 1994
Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking to require first-aid training, including CPR
training, for work covered by that standard. OSHA found in its 1994
Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking that line-clearance tree trimmers were
exposed to electric-shock hazards for which CPR would be efficacious
(59 FR 4344-4347), and the National Arborist Association (TCIA's
predecessor) pointed out that low-voltage electric shock can result
from indirect contact with higher voltage sources (269-Ex. 58, 59 FR
4345). OSHA's inspection data amply demonstrate that indirect contacts,
such as contacting a power line through a tree branch, do occur in work
covered by Sec. 1910.269 and Subpart V (Ex. 0400). Half of the ten
line-clearance tree-trimmer electrocutions described in these data
resulted from indirect contacts. The experience of TVA and IBEW
reinforces the Agency's conclusion that employees performing work
covered by Subpart V and Sec. 1910.269 are exposed to electric shocks
for which defibrillation is needed as part of the emergency medical
response.
Many rulemaking participants argued that work covered by Subpart V
would subject AEDs to environmental and other conditions for which the
devices are not, or may not be, designed, including:
Extreme heat (see, for example, Exs. 0169, 0171, 0173,
0177, 0227),
Extreme cold (see, for example, Exs. 0169, 0171, 0173,
0177, 0227),
Vibration or jarring (see, for example, Exs. 0169, 0173,
0175),
Dust (see, for example, Exs. 0169, 0171, 0173, 0175), and
Humidity and moisture (see, for example, Exs. 0169, 0171,
0173).
For instance, Mr. Wilson Yancey with Quanta Services commented that the
conditions to which AEDs would be exposed could "quickly degrade the
performance of the equipment and require frequent inspection and
maintenance" (Ex. 0169). Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, Maryland
& Delaware Association of Electric Cooperatives commented, "Most field
experience with AED's has been at either fixed sites or carried by
ambulances in padded bins/cases inside of heated and cooled ambulance
bodies. This is not what the AED's would be exposed to on a utility
vehicle" (Ex. 0175). Mr. Thomas Taylor with Consumers Energy noted
that manufacturers' instructions tightly control AEDs' storage
requirements, explaining:
[L]ine truck storage conditions would prohibit the AED from
functioning properly and therefore provide no tangible safety
benefit to employees. In this regard, the manufacturer instructions
for preventing electrode damage states: "Store electrodes in a
cool, dry location (15 to 35 degree Celsius or 59 to 95 degrees
Fahrenheit". The instruction also states: ["]It is important that
when the AED is stored with the battery installed, temperature
exposure should not fall below 0 degrees Celsius (32 degrees
Fahrenheit) or exceed 50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit).
If the AED is stored outside this temperature range, the auto tests
may erroneously detect a problem and the AED may not operate
properly.["] [Ex. 0177]
OSHA decided not to include a requirement for AEDs in the final
rule because the Agency believes that there is insufficient evidence in
the record that AEDs exposed to the environmental extremes typical of
work covered by Subpart V and Sec. 1910.269 would function properly
when an incident occurs. There is no evidence in the record that AEDs
are adversely affected by dust, vibration, or humidity; however, it is
clear that line work in many areas of the country would subject AEDs to
temperatures above and below their designed operating range of 0 to 50
degrees Celsius. For example, Mr. Frank Owen Brockman with the Farmers
Rural Electric Cooperatives testified that temperatures in Kentucky can
get as cold as -34 degrees Celsius and as high as 44 degrees Celsius
(Tr. 1283). Although the record indicates that the highest of these
temperatures is within the operating range of AEDs, OSHA believes that
it is likely that the interior of trucks would be significantly hotter
than the 50-degree Celsius recommended maximum. Accordingly, there is
insufficient evidence in the record for the Agency to determine whether
AEDs will work properly in these temperature extremes during use, even
if they are stored in temperature-controlled environments as mentioned
by some rulemaking participants (see, for example, Ex. 0186; Tr. 965-
966).\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ Some rulemaking participants gave other reasons why OSHA
should not require AEDs, including: Costs of acquiring the devices
(see, for example, Exs. 0162, 0169, 0173, 0174, 0200, 0227), varying
State requirements related to AEDs, such as requirements that they
be prescribed by a physician (see, for example, Exs. 0125, 0149,
0227), conflicts with requirements of other Federal agencies, such
as the Food and Drug Administration (see, for example, Exs. 0177,
0227), and OSHA's failure to meet all its regulatory burdens, such
as burdens imposed by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act (Ex. 0170). Because OSHA decided not to require AEDs
for the reason given in this section of the preamble, it need not
consider these other issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As explained previously, the Agency stresses that defibrillation is
a necessary part of the response to electric shock incidents that occur
during work covered by the final rule. OSHA is not adopting a rule
requiring AEDs because the record is insufficient for the Agency to
conclude that these devices will be effective in the conditions under
which they would be used. OSHA encourages employers to purchase and
deploy AEDs in areas where they could be useful and efficacious. This
action likely will save lives and provide the Agency with useful
information on the use of AEDs under a wide range of conditions.
Proposed paragraph (b)(1) would have required CPR training for
field crews of two or more employees, in which case a minimum of two
trained persons would generally have been required (proposed paragraph
(b)(1)(i)), and for fixed worksites, in which case enough trained
persons to provide assistance within 4 minutes would generally have
been required (proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii)). Proposed paragraph
(b)(1)(i) provided that employers could train all employees in first
aid including CPR within 3 months of being hired as an alternative to
having two trained persons on every field crew. If the employer chose
this alternative for field work, then only one trained person would
have been required for each crew. In practice, crews with more than one
employee would normally have two or more CPR-trained employees on the
crew, since all employees who worked for an employer more than 3 months
would receive CPR training. However, employers who rely on seasonal
labor (for example, employees hired only in the summer months), or
those with heavy turnover, might have some two-person crews with only
one CPR-trained employee. Because the Agency was concerned that those
new employees might be most at risk of injury, OSHA requested comment
on whether allowing employers the option of training all their
employees in CPR if they are trained within 3 months of being hired is
sufficiently protective. The Agency also requested comment on how this
provision could be revised to minimize the burden on employers, while
providing adequate protection for employees.
Several commenters shared OSHA's concern with the 3-month delay in
CPR training. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0187, 0213, 0230) Mr. Rob
Land with the Association of Missouri Electric Cooperatives commented
that this option was too hazardous because of "the hazards that
linemen face and the distinct possibility that [emergency medical
services] may be delayed due to remoteness and distances involved"
(Ex. 0187). TVA opposed the option because the "3[ ]months when a two-
person crew would have only one CPR trained member . . . reduce[s] the
level of safety provided" (Ex. 0213). IBEW presented its reasons for
opposing the 3-month option, and its recommendation for revising the
rule, as follows:
Allowing employers the option of training all their employees in
CPR if they are trained within 3 months of being hired may not work
in all situations. Many utilities engaged in field work have
implemented the use of 2-person crews. It is not uncommon for the 2-
person crew to perform rubber gloving work on all distribution
voltage ranges. It is also not uncommon for a utility to assign a
new-hire (less than 3 months of service) as the second person on the
2-person crew. In these work scenarios, the second person would have
to be trained in CPR. Waiting 3 months to complete this training
would not [be] proper.
* * * * *
The only revision that is necessary is to make it clear that
under certain circumstances, new-hires may need to be trained in CPR
well before the 3 month window. Manning of crews, especially in the
construction industry, cannot always be accomplished using CPR
certification as a factor. All employees need to receive the
training and the 3 months gives enough flexibility when
appropriate[.] [Ex. 0230; emphasis included in original]
Other rulemaking participants supported the provision as proposed.
(See, for example, Exs. 0155, 0162, 0174, 0200; Tr. 633-635, 764-765.)
Some of them argued that the provision, which was taken from existing
Sec. 1910.269(b)(1)(i), has worked well. (See, for example, Exs. 0155,
0200; Tr. 764.) The tree care industry stated that the line-clearance
tree trimming industry did not use seasonal labor and argued that the
3-month delay in training new employees in CPR was justified on the
basis of high turnover in that industry (Exs. 0174, 0200; Tr. 633-635,
764-765). For example, testifying on behalf of ULCC, Mr. Mark Foster
stated:
[T]he current standard reflects a clearly considered balance
made by OSHA at the time of adoption of the current standard to
allow a three-month phase-in period for CPR compliance for new
hires. That policy judgment rests on the fact that there was then an
81 percent turnover rate among line clearance tree trimming
employees such that many would not last in employment beyond the
initial training period and that that would be very difficult to
field crews if new hires had first had to be sent for CPR training.
While the turnover ratio has improved somewhat, it is still
staggering[ly] high, [presenting] the same considerations that led
to the adoption of the phase-in period in the initial standard. [Tr.
633-634]
In its comment, ULCC indicated that the annual turnover rate in the
line-
clearance tree trimming industry is 53 to 75 percent (Ex. 0174).
OSHA decided to restrict the exception permitting a 3-month delay
in training employees in first aid, including CPR, to line-clearance
tree trimming. The Agency agrees that turnover in the line-clearance
tree trimming industry remains high, which was the underlying reason
for OSHA's original adoption of the 3-month delay in training for newly
hired employees in the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking (59 FR 4346-
4347). However, as noted by Mr. Land, the provision as proposed leaves
employees exposed to hazards when a new employee who has not yet been
trained in CPR is the second person in a two-worker crew (Ex. 0187).
IBEW also recognized the need to have both employees trained in CPR in
many circumstances (Ex. 0230). Finally, turnover rates for the electric
utility and power line contractor industries are not nearly as high as
that for the tree trimming industry. OSHA estimates that the turnover
rates among employees performing electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work ranges from 11 to 16 percent in the
construction industries and 3 percent in the generation and utility
industries (see Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis, later in the preamble). These turnover rates are
significantly lower than the turnover rate indicated by ULCC for the
line-clearance tree trimming industry.
Because this exception in the final rule applies only to line-
clearance tree trimming, which is addressed only in Sec. 1910.269, the
Agency is not adopting it in final Sec. 1926.951(b)(1).\83\ The
corresponding provision in Sec. 1910.269(b)(1)(i) retains the
exception providing for a 3-month delay in first-aid training,
including CPR, but only for line-clearance tree-trimming work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ Final Sec. 1926.951(b) uses the term "trained persons,"
rather than "trained employees," because the individuals with the
training do not necessarily need to be employees. For instance, the
"trained persons" required by the rule could be self-employed
individuals working with a crew of employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These changes will continue to permit employers in the line-
clearance tree trimming industry to delay training in first aid,
including CPR, to new employees for a reasonable time.
Finally, OSHA notes that it remains concerned that some employees
in the line-clearance tree trimming industry might encounter an
unnecessary delay in being treated in an emergency. The Agency does not
believe that it is reasonable to unnecessarily staff crews so that some
crews had only one CPR-trained worker, while other crews had three or
four. Although the Agency is not addressing this concern in the final
rule, OSHA expects employers to staff each tree trimming crew with as
many employees trained in first aid as possible, including CPR, to
assist in emergencies.
Mr. Steven Theis of MYR Group requested that OSHA provide a similar
3-month grace period for refresher training (Ex. 0162).\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ Although paragraph (b)(1) in the final rule does not
address refresher first-aid training, final Sec.
1926.950(b)(4)(iii) contains a general requirement that employees
receive additional training when they must employ safety-related
work practices (such as administering first aid) that are not
normally used during their regular work duties. A note following
Sec. 1926.950(b)(4)(iii) indicates that the Agency would consider
tasks performed less often than once per year to require retraining.
See the discussion of that requirement earlier in this section of
the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA rejects this request. As stated, OSHA is adopting the 3-month
delay in CPR training because of the high turnover in the tree trimming
industry. There is no evidence in the record that this rationale also
applies to refresher training. The Agency expects employers to plan for
their employees' training needs and to schedule training in accordance
with the standard.
Mr. Paul Hamer, a member of the NFPA 70E Technical Committee on
Electrical Safety in the Workplace, recommended that OSHA require
first-aid training, including CPR training, for all qualified employees
who work on electric circuits of 50 volts or more. He also recommended
deleting the 4-minute maximum response time for fixed work locations
(Ex. 0228). He argued that the sooner a victim receives CPR, the less
cell damage will occur. On the other hand, the American Forest & Paper
Association recommended that the 4-minute requirement should be deleted
because "no one could ensure ([that is], guarantee) survival of the
victim for any particular length of time or that defibrillation would
be successful" (Ex. 0237).
OSHA rejects these recommendations. OSHA considered requiring all
employees to receive first-aid training, including CPR training, when
the Agency developed existing Sec. 1910.269. In lieu of such a
requirement, OSHA decided that the best approach was to require a 4-
minute maximum response time for fixed work locations and to require at
least two trained persons for field work involving crews of two or more
employees (existing Sec. 1910.269(b)). OSHA supplemented these
provisions with a requirement that two employees be present for work
exposing an employee to contact with exposed live parts energized at
more than 600 volts (existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(1)).\85\ This approach
continues to be the best one, as it ensures that persons trained in
first aid, including CPR, will be available to employees most at risk
of electrocution. The Agency further notes that Mr. Hamer's approach
does not address employees working alone in fixed work locations. In
these cases, it would still take time for someone to discover the
injury, which also would delay first-aid treatment, including CPR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ The issue of whether the requirement for two employees
should apply to voltages of 600 volts or less is discussed under the
summary and explanation of final Sec. 1926.960(b)(3), later in this
section of the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two rulemaking participants commented that proposed paragraphs
(b)(1)(i) and (b)(1)(ii) were vague (Exs. 0175, 0180). They did not
understand the difference between "field work" and "fixed work
locations" (id.). For example, Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia,
Maryland & Delaware Association of Electric Cooperatives questioned
whether the requirements for fixed work locations applied to work at
unmanned substations (Ex. 0175). OSHA does not consider an unmanned
location to be a fixed work location, as there are normally no
employees present. In determining whether to apply paragraph (b)(1) or
(b)(2), the Agency would treat an unmanned substation no differently
than a manhole or utility pole in the field.
As explained previously in this section of the preamble, OSHA
decided not to include proposed paragraphs (b)(2) or (b)(3) in the
final rule. The corresponding provisions in existing Sec.
1910.269(b)(2) and (b)(3) are being retained, however. The Agency did
not propose to revise these existing requirements and received no
comments alleging inconsistencies between existing Sec. 1910.269(b)
and Sec. 1910.151, OSHA's general industry standard addressing medical
services and first aid.
Section 1926.952, Job Briefing
In Sec. 1926.952, OSHA is requiring that employers ensure that
employees conduct a job briefing before each job. This section, which
has no counterpart in existing subpart V, is based largely on existing
Sec. 1910.269(c).
Most of the work covered by this final rule requires planning to
ensure employee safety (as well as to protect equipment and the general
public). Typically, electric power transmission and distribution work
exposes employees to the hazards of exposed conductors energized at
thousands of volts. If the work is not thoroughly
planned ahead of time, the possibility of human error that could harm
employees increases greatly. To avoid problems, the task sequence is
prescribed before work is started. For example, before climbing a pole,
the employee must determine if the pole is capable of remaining in
place and if minimum approach distances are sufficient, and he or she
must determine what tools will be needed and what procedure should be
used for performing the job. Without job planning, the worker may not
know or recognize the minimum approach-distance requirements or may
have to reclimb the pole to retrieve a forgotten tool or perform an
overlooked task, thereby increasing employee exposure to the hazards of
falling and contact with energized lines.
Employers performing electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work use job briefings to plan the work and communicate
the job plan to employees. If the job is planned, but the plan is not
discussed with the workers, an employee may perform his or her duties
out of order or may not coordinate activities with the rest of the
crew, thereby endangering the entire crew. Therefore, OSHA is requiring
a job briefing before work is started.
Commenters agreed that job briefings are an important part of
electric power work. (See, for example, Exs. 0162, 0173, 0184, 0213,
0241; Tr. 1335.) For instance, Mr. John Masarick of the Independent
Electrical Contractors considered job briefings to be "one of the most
critical steps for safety on any task" (Ex. 0241). Also, Mr. Stephen
Frost of the Mid-Columbia Utilities Safety Alliance voiced his
organization's support for job briefings:
We strongly agree that the job briefing requirement should be
written into Sec. 1926.952. Good communications on the job is
paramount to safety, and too often workers either choose not to
communicate or don't have the skills to communicate their ideas. The
job briefing requirement makes it the personal responsibility of
every crew member to understand all aspects of the job. The time it
takes to do a thorough job briefing is usually 5 to 15 minutes. This
is time well-spent to eliminate the possibility of an accident due
to workers not knowing or controlling hazards in the work area. [Ex.
0184]
OSHA's experience in enforcing Sec. 1910.269(c), however, shows
that some employers are placing the entire burden of compliance with
the job briefing requirement on the employee in charge of the work.
Therefore, OSHA proposed to include a provision in Subpart V requiring
the employer to provide the employee in charge of a job with available
information necessary to perform the job safely. This requirement,
which is not in existing Sec. 1910.269(c), was in proposed Sec.
1926.952(a)(1). OSHA proposed to add the same requirement to Sec.
1910.269(c). A note following the proposed paragraph indicated that the
information provided by the employer was intended to supplement the
training requirements proposed in Sec. 1926.950(b) and was likely to
be more general than the job briefing provided by the employee in
charge. This note also clarified that information covering all jobs for
a day could be disseminated at the beginning of the day.
Many commenters recognized the need for the employer to provide
certain information to the employee in charge about conditions to which
an employee would be exposed. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0127, 0186,
0197, 0200, 0219, 0230.) For instance, Mr. Anthony Ahern with Ohio
Rural Electric Cooperatives commented:
The person in charge does need to be given more information than
is usually given him/her. They need to know things like the status
of the system where they will be working. What are the breaker
configurations/settings. Is reclosing enabled or disabled. What is
the available fault current at their work site. Are there any other
crews working in the area whose work could impact them. For the most
part most of this information is of a general type and a company
could probably develop a simple form that would be fairly easy to
fill out and attach to the usual work orders. This could also be
used to document that this information was given and could be used
to document the job briefing (tailgate) that the person in charge is
required to give the rest of the crew. [Ex. 0186]
Mr. James Junga, the Safety Director of Local 223 of the Utility
Workers Union of America (UWUA), also commented on the need for the
employer to supply information about the work:
Requiring the employer to provide adequate information to the
employee in charge of a crew is the best way of ensuring that all
available information is given to the crew leader. Then and only
then the crew leader will be able to brief the crew. Without this
requirement a crew leader will be left on his/her own to figure out
what the crew is to do. [Ex. 0197]
Some rulemaking participants described the types of information
that should be provided to employees. (See, for example, Exs. 0186,
0219; Tr. 402-403, 1373.) Commenters stated that employees in charge
need to be provided with the available fault current (Ex. 0186; Tr.
1373), circuit breaker settings, including whether reclosing is enabled
(Ex. 0186), whether there are other crews that could affect their work
(Ex. 0186), detailed maps and staking sheets (Ex. 0219), and relevant
information from outage reports by customers (Tr. 402-403).
Other rulemaking participants addressed when there was a need for
the employer to provide information about a job. Mr. Allan Oracion with
EnergyUnited EMC maintained: "When a job is not routine, special or
large-scale, the employer needs to share any special information with
the employee in charge. When the employee in charge is working at a
distant location, radio or telephone can be used to communicate
information" (Ex. 0219). Mr. Donald Hartley with IBEW stated that the
employer needs to provide information "when a contractor's crew
performs its first tasks on a host employer's worksite or when the job
assignment involves hazards or conditions the crew has not yet
encountered" (Tr. 887).
However, many commenters argued that the provision as proposed was
inappropriate. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0127, 0128, 0163, 0177,
0178, 0200, 0201 0226.) Many argued that the proposed provision was too
broad. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0127, 0200, 0226.) For instance,
Ms. Cynthia Mills of TCIA stated, "We are uncomfortable with the open-
ended and subjective nature of the [proposed language], even though we
believe it is intended to convey anything `known to the employer, but
unusual,' associated with the work assignment" (Ex. 0200).
Some commenters argued that it was the responsibility of the
employee in charge to survey the site and determine all hazards
associated with the work. (See, for example, Exs. 0163, 0177, 0178,
0201.) Consumers Energy's submission typified these comments:
The computer-generated job assignment will contain information
related to the location, circuit, and task to be accomplished but no
information related to unique hazards of the assignment. It is
critical that the employees on the job site survey the site and
identify all hazards upon arrival at the site. Removing that
responsibility from them would create a false sense of security and
a less than desirable knowledge of the hazards present. Safety
manuals and written procedures provide general information on
hazards that are typically expected in transmission and distribution
work. It is the responsibility of the employee in charge to survey
the site and identify all hazards upon arrival at the site. [Ex.
0177]
After carefully considering the evidence in the record, OSHA
concludes that job briefings are important for ensuring the safety of
employees performing work covered by the final rule and that the
employer needs to provide adequate information to employees in charge
so that a complete job briefing can be conducted. However, OSHA also
decided to address
the concerns of commenters that the proposed rule was overly broad or
open ended. To this end, OSHA decided to require the employer to
provide the employee in charge of the job with all available
information that relates to the determination of existing
characteristics and conditions required by Sec. 1926.950(d). Thus,
final Sec. 1926.952(a)(1) requires the employer, in assigning an
employee or a group of employees to perform a job, to provide the
employee in charge of the job with all available information that
relates to the determination of existing characteristics and conditions
required by Sec. 1926.950(d).
The Agency notes that final paragraph (a)(1) requires the employer
to provide the employee in charge with two types of available
information, as noted in Sec. 1926.950(d): (1) Available information
on the characteristics of electric lines and equipment, and (2)
available information on the conditions of the installation. The Agency
also notes that, because Sec. 1926.950(d) limits the determination of
characteristics and conditions only to characteristics and conditions
that relate to the safety of the work to be performed, this same
limitation extends to information that must be provided under final
Sec. 1926.952(a)(1). As such, information on the characteristics of
electric lines and equipment that must be provided under the final rule
(including, for instance, the nominal voltage of lines and equipment,
the maximum switching transient voltages, and the presence of hazardous
induced voltage) is critical to the selection of proper safety-related
work practices and protective equipment.\86\ For example, for an
employee to select the minimum approach distance required by final
Sec. 1926.960(c)(1), he or she needs to know, at a minimum, the
nominal voltage on the energized parts. Depending on the employer's
established minimum approach distances, the employee also may need to
know the maximum transient overvoltage at the worksite. Similarly, an
employee needs to know the employer's estimate of incident energy for
electric equipment so that he or she can select protective equipment
with an appropriate arc rating as required by final Sec.
1926.960(g)(5).
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\86\ In fact, these are the types of information that commenters
argued employers should provide. (See, for example, Exs. 0186, 0219;
Tr. 402-403, 1373.)
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Information on the conditions of the installation that must be
provided under the final rule (including, for instance, the condition
of protective grounds and equipment grounding conductors, the condition
of poles, and environmental conditions relative to safety) also is
critical because that information can facilitate the employees'
assessment of conditions at the worksite and enable the employees to
take appropriate protective measures. For example, an employer may know
of defects in a wood pole on which employees are to work because it has
a pole-inspection program or has received reports that the pole had
defects. Information on such defects can help employees ascertain
whether the pole is safe to climb as required by Sec. 1926.964(a)(2).
Likewise, information from an employee or a customer that electric
equipment is making arcing noises periodically can affect the
assessment of whether the employee is exposed to hazards from flames or
electric arcs as required by Sec. 1926.960(g)(1).
Thus, the type of information that the employer must provide under
the final rule ensures that employees in charge are provided with
information relevant to selecting appropriate work practices and
protective equipment as required by the final rule. Moreover, because
final Sec. 1926.952(a)(1) links the information that the employer must
provide the employee in charge to the determination required by Sec.
1926.950(d), final Sec. 1926.952(a)(1) is neither overly broad nor
open ended.
The final rule also is narrowly tailored because it limits the
information the employer must provide to information that is available
to the employer. Under the rule, the question of whether information is
available to the employer varies depending on the type of information
at issue. First, OSHA presumes that information related to the
characteristics of electric lines and equipment is available to the
employer. Second, OSHA will deem information on the condition of the
installation to be available to the employer only when the information
is known by the employer or can be obtained by the employer from
existing records through the exercise of reasonable diligence. OSHA
does not expect employers to make inspections of worksite conditions to
determine the conditions of the installation. The Agency believes that,
in most instances, employees will gather additional information about
worksite conditions after they reach the worksite. It is nevertheless
important that employers provide employees with available information
to aid the employees' assessment of worksite conditions and as a
secondary precaution in case employees at the site fail to observe a
particular condition related to their safety.
Paragraph (a)(1) of 1926.952 applies fully to contractors.
Contractors will obtain much or all of the information that they need
to comply with Sec. 1926.952(a)(1)--especially information about the
characteristics of electric lines and equipment--through the operation
of the host-contractor provision in Sec. 1926.950(c).
Several commenters maintained that, in proposing this provision,
OSHA did not account for the way work is currently assigned to
employees. (See, for example, Exs. 0128, 0163, 0177, 0178, 0201.) For
instance, Mr. James Shill of ElectriCities noted that small towns often
assign work through a town manager who has insufficient knowledge of
the electrical system to provide the required information (Ex. 0178).
Further, Mr. James Gartland of Duke Energy described how the process
commonly used to assign work to employees at many utilities was at odds
with the proposal:
Requiring a representative of the employer (a manager or
supervisor) to provide employees with information necessary to
perform a job safely for every job is inconsistent with the use of
technology in work management and scheduling. Today's utility
workers drive vehicles equipped with computers with wireless
communications. They receive job assignments throughout the day from
the computer. There frequently is no direct supervisor-employee
interface to discuss specific work assignments. The computer-
generated job assignment will contain information related to the
location, circuit, and task to be accomplished but no information
related to unique hazards of this assignment. . . .
It is also inconsistent with industry practices to expect a
supervisor/manager to conduct a pre-job briefing at the beginning of
the day as mentioned in the Note [to proposed Sec. 1926.952(a)(1)].
Many utilities have employees who report directly to work locations
where their supervisor/manager is not present. They are expected to
do a pre-job briefing and to assess hazards on their own. There is
no company manager/supervisor at the work location to do that
assessment. [Ex. 0201]
Some of these commenters also recommended that the Agency make it clear
(1) that the rule does not require a face-to-face exchange of
information and (2) that the exchange can be provided through work
orders or in conjunction with training, safety manuals, and written
procedures. (See, for example, Exs. 0177, 0201.)
OSHA appreciates these commenters' concerns and therefore changed
the heading for paragraph (a)(1) to read "Information provided by the
employer" to help clarify that a separate briefing or face-to-face
discussion
between the employer and the employee in charge is not required. The
Agency recognizes that assignments are made through a wide range of
mechanisms that do not always provide for face-to-face contact between
the employer and the employees performing the work. The rule does not
require such contact. The employer is free to use any mechanism that
provides the required information before the employees begin their
assignment. For example, information could be provided through radio
communication with the employee in charge, through a written work
order, or through a computer-generated assignment conveyed
electronically. Some of this information may be provided through
training, in a safety manual, or through written work procedures.
However, the Agency will deem such information as meeting paragraph
(a)(1) only if it effectively communicates the information about the
particular job in question to the employee in charge and if employers
respond to these employees' questions about this information as it
relates to the particular job in question.
Some commenters suggested that OSHA add certain explicit language
to the requirement. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0127, 0149, 0169,
0171.) For instance, several commenters recommended revising the rule
to read: "In assigning an employee or group of employees to perform a
job, the employer shall provide the employee in charge of the job with
any additional information known by the employee's supervisor that
could affect the safety of the job before the start of the work" (Exs.
0125, 0127, 0149). Other commenters recommended that OSHA clarify that
the employer need only provide the information once for work lasting
long periods of time (Exs. 0169, 0171).
OSHA rejects these recommended approaches. First, the key issue is
whether the information is available to the employer, not whether the
supervisor has knowledge of the required information. Second, the final
rule requires the employer to provide required information in
connection with each job. As stated, the information must be
communicated to the employee in charge in an effective manner. Whether
a prior communication constitutes an effective communication depends on
several factors, such as, but not limited to: The time between the
prior communication and the job at hand; the manner in which the prior
communication was made; the extent to which the prior job and the
present job are similar; and whether any additional or different
information needs to be provided with respect to the present job.
OSHA is not including in the final rule the note following proposed
paragraph (a)(1). This note was to clarify the meaning of the phrase
"available information necessary to perform the job safely." The
final rule does not contain that phrase, and OSHA concludes that the
note is no longer necessary.
Paragraph (a)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires the employee in charge of the job to
conduct a job briefing. This provision comes from existing Sec.
1910.269(c).
In the 2005 notice extending the comment period on the proposal,
OSHA requested comments on whether the standard should include a
requirement to document the job briefing. Comments addressing this
issue recommended that the Agency not include such a requirement in the
final rule because it would add to employers' paperwork burden without
a significant increase in safety. (See, for example, Exs. 0201, 0212.)
Considering the lack of record support for such a provision, OSHA is
not adopting a requirement to document job briefings in the final rule.
Paragraph (b), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires the briefing by the employee in charge to
cover: Hazards and work procedures involved, special precautions,
energy-source controls, and requirements for personal protective
equipment. This requirement also comes from existing Sec. 1910.269(c).
Under final paragraph (c)(1), the employee in charge must conduct
at least one briefing before the start of each shift. Only one briefing
in a shift is needed if all the jobs to be performed are repetitive or
similar. Additional briefings must be conducted pursuant to final
paragraph (c)(2) for work involving significant changes in routine that
might affect the safety of the employees. For example, if the first two
jobs of the day involve working on a deenergized line and the third job
involves working on energized lines with live-line tools, separate
briefings must be conducted for each type of job. It should be noted
that additional job briefings provided under paragraph (c)(2) are
separate from the job briefing provided at the start of the shift;
these briefings may not be combined. Paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2),
which duplicate existing Sec. 1910.269(c)(1), have been adopted
without substantive change from the proposal.
For routine work, under final paragraph (d)(1), the required
briefing need only consist of a concise discussion outlining the tasks
to be performed and how to perform them safely. However, if the work is
complicated or particularly hazardous or if the employees may not be
able to recognize and avoid the hazards involved, then a more thorough
discussion is required by paragraph (d)(2). OSHA included a note
following this paragraph to clarify that, regardless of how short the
discussion is, the briefing must still address all the topics listed in
paragraph (b).
OSHA received several comments on proposed paragraphs (d)(1) and
(d)(2). These commenters expressed concern that the proposed provisions
were vague and provided insufficient guidance on the conditions
requiring more detailed job briefings. (See, for example, Exs. 0162,
0175, 0213.) For instance, MYR Group maintained that the proposal did
not sufficiently distinguish between work that is "routine" and work
that is "complicated" (Ex. 0162; Tr. 1335), and TVA asked the Agency
to define "complicated or particularly hazardous" (Ex. 0213).
With final paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), which were taken from
existing Sec. 1910.269(c)(2), OSHA recognizes that employees are
familiar with the tasks and hazards involved in routine work. However,
it is important to take the time to carefully discuss unusual work
situations that may pose additional or different hazards to workers.
(See also the discussion of Sec. 1926.950(b)(4) earlier in this
section of the preamble.) The Agency believes that it is important for
the briefing to be as detailed as necessary for the hazards and work
practices involved. MYR Group noted that "the general requirement for
short discussions could . . . be applied differently depending on the
skill and qualification of the employees involved in the work rather
than the work itself" (Ex. 0162). This comment interprets the
requirement correctly, and the Agency believes that the language in
final Sec. 1926.952(d)(1) and (d)(2), which duplicates existing Sec.
1910.269(c)(2), appropriately conveys this meaning. Accordingly, a more
detailed discussion is required "[i]f the employee cannot be expected
to recognize and avoid the hazards involved in the job." In addition,
the Agency has received no formal interpretation requests related to
existing Sec. 1910.269(c)(2). Thus, OSHA concludes that the vast
majority of employers understand this provision, and the Agency is
adopting Sec. 1926.952(d) without change from the proposal.
OSHA recognizes the importance of job planning for all employees.
Although employees working alone cannot participate in formal job
briefings, the Agency believes that an employee who works alone needs
to plan his or her tasks as carefully and extensively as an employee
who works as part of a team. OSHA is aware of several fatalities
involving lone employees who could have benefited from better job
planning, or perhaps a briefing with the supervisor, before the job
started (Ex. 0400). In one such incident, a power line worker working
alone was repairing a broken guy. Standing on the ground, the employee
had the anchor in place and grabbed the dangling guy to attach it to
the anchor. The guy contacted a 7200-volt overhead power line that had
not been guarded or insulated. Had the employee properly planned the
job, he would have seen that the guy was close to the power line and
could have avoided the contact (id.).\87\ Therefore, paragraph (e),
which OSHA took from existing Sec. 1910.269(c)(3), provides that
employees working alone do not need to conduct job briefings, but the
employer must ensure that that the tasks are planned as if a briefing
were required. This provision is being adopted in the final rule
without change from the proposal.
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\87\ This accident can be viewed at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=909119.
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4. Section 1926.953, Enclosed Spaces
Section 1926.953 contains requirements for entry into, and work in,
enclosed spaces. An "enclosed space" is defined in final Sec.
1926.968 as a working space, such as a manhole, vault, tunnel, or
shaft, that has a limited means of egress or entry, that is designed
for periodic employee entry under normal operating conditions, and
that, under normal conditions, does not contain a hazardous atmosphere,
but may contain a hazardous atmosphere under abnormal conditions. The
hazards posed by enclosed spaces consist of (1) limited access and
egress, (2) possible lack of oxygen, (3) possible presence of flammable
gases, and (4) possible presence of limited amounts of toxic chemicals.
The potential atmospheric hazards are caused by an enclosed space's
lack of adequate ventilation and can normally be controlled through the
use of continuous forced-air ventilation alone. Practices to control
these hazards are widely recognized and are currently in use in
electric, telecommunications, and other underground utility industries.
Such practices include testing for the presence of flammable gases and
vapors, testing for oxygen deficiency, ventilation of the enclosed
space, controls on the use of open flames, and the use of an attendant
outside the space. These practices already are required by existing
Sec. 1910.269(e) for the maintenance of electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution installations, and OSHA took the
requirements adopted in final Sec. 1926.953 from existing Sec.
1910.269(e).
Paragraph (a) of final Sec. 1926.953, which is being adopted
without substantive change from the proposal, sets the scope of the
section's provisions. Accordingly, this section applies only to the
types of enclosed spaces that are routinely entered by employees
engaged in electric power transmission and distribution work and that
are unique to underground utility work. Work in these spaces is part of
the day-to-day activities performed by some of the employees protected
by this final rule. Enclosed spaces covered by this section include,
but are not limited to, manholes and vaults that provide employees
access to electric power transmission and distribution equipment.
There are several types of spaces that are not covered by final
Sec. 1926.953 (or the corresponding general industry provisions in
final Sec. 1910.269(e)). If maintenance work is being performed in
confined spaces, it may be covered by OSHA's general industry permit-
required confined space (permit-space) standard at Sec. 1910.146; this
standard applies to all of general industry, including industries
engaged in electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
work.
In Sec. 1910.146(b), the permit-space standard defines "confined
space" and "permit-required confined space." A confined space is a
space that: (1) Is large enough and so configured that an employee can
bodily enter and perform assigned work; and (2) Has limited or
restricted means for entry or exit (for example, tanks, vessels, silos,
storage bins, hoppers, vaults, and pits are spaces that may have
limited means of entry); and (3) Is not designed for continuous
employee occupancy. A permit-required confined space (permit space) is
a confined space that has one or more of the following characteristics:
(1) Contains or has a potential to contain a hazardous atmosphere; (2)
Contains a material that has the potential for engulfing an entrant;
(3) Has an internal configuration such that an entrant could be trapped
or asphyxiated by inwardly converging walls or by a floor which slopes
downward and tapers to a smaller cross-section; or (4) Contains any
other recognized serious safety or health hazard.
Section 1926.953 of the final rule applies to "enclosed spaces."
By definition, an enclosed space is a permit-required confined space
under Sec. 1926.146. An enclosed space meets the definition of a
confined space--it is large enough for an employee to enter; it has a
limited means of access or egress; and it is designed for periodic,
rather than continuous, employee occupancy under normal operating
conditions. An enclosed space also meets the definition of a permit
space--while it is not expected to contain a hazardous atmosphere, it
has the potential to contain one. OSHA also notes that the definition
of permit space in the general industry permit-space standard is
broader than the definition of enclosed space in Sec. 1926.968. For
instance, if a space contains a hazardous atmosphere under normal
conditions, that space is a permit space under Sec. 1910.146, but it
is not an enclosed space under final Sec. 1910.269 or Subpart V.
Paragraph (b)(6) of Sec. 1926.21 specifies training requirements
for employees who enter "confined or enclosed spaces" as defined in
Sec. 1926.21(b)(6)(ii).
When Sec. 1926.21(b)(6) applies, it requires employers to: (1)
Instruct their employees about confined-space hazards, the necessary
precautions to be taken, and protective and emergency equipment
required; and (2) comply with any specific regulations that apply to
work in dangerous or potentially dangerous areas. An enclosed space
under Sec. 1926.953 also is a confined or enclosed space under Sec.
1926.21(b)(6). However, the definition of confined or enclosed space in
Sec. 1926.21(b)(6) (like the definition of permit space in the general
industry permit-space standard) is broader than the definition of
enclosed space in Sec. 1926.968.\88\
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\88\ Under Sec. 1926.21(b)(6)(ii), a confined or enclosed space
is any space having a limited means of egress, which is subject to
the accumulation of toxic or flammable contaminants or has an oxygen
deficient atmosphere.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (b)(6) of Sec. 1926.21 applies to enclosed spaces
covered by final Sec. 1926.953 because employers covered under subpart
V are not exempt from complying with other applicable provisions in
Part 1926 (see Sec. 1926.950(a)(2)). Section 1926.953 is, therefore,
different from final Sec. 1910.269(e), which "applies to routine
entry into enclosed spaces in lieu of the permit-space entry
requirements contained in paragraphs (d) through (k) of Sec.
1910.146." OSHA concludes, however, that an employer that is compliant
with Sec. 1926.953 is considered as being in compliance with existing
Sec. 1926.21(b)(6) for entry into enclosed
spaces covered by final Sec. 1926.953. Therefore, for all practical
purposes, Sec. 1926.953 applies to routine entry into enclosed spaces
in lieu of the requirements contained in Sec. 1926.21(b)(6). OSHA is
not including the "in lieu of" language in final Sec. 1926.953
because OSHA recently proposed a new standard for confined-space entry
during construction work (72 FR 67352, Nov. 28, 2007). OSHA intends to
revise Sec. 1926.953 to include appropriate "in lieu of" language
when it promulgates the new standard.
Under final Sec. 1926.953(a), entry into an enclosed space to
perform construction work covered by Subpart V must meet the permit-
space entry requirements of paragraphs (d) through (k) of the general
industry permit-space standard at Sec. 1910.146 when the precautions
taken under Sec. Sec. 1926.953 and 1926.965 are insufficient to
eliminate hazards in the enclosed space that endanger the life of an
entrant or could interfere with escape from the space. This requirement
ensures that employees working in enclosed spaces will be afforded
protection in circumstances in which the Subpart V provisions are
insufficiently protective.\89\
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\89\ Section 1926.953 thus functions similarly to corresponding
provisions in Sec. 1910.146. An employer need not follow the
permit-entry requirements of Sec. 1910.146 for spaces where the
hazards have been completely eliminated, or for limited situations
in which OSHA permits the use of alternative procedures (Sec.
1910.146(c)(5) and (c)(7)). The spaces for which alternative
procedures may be used are similar to "enclosed spaces," as
defined in this final rule, and the alternative procedures
themselves are similar to the procedures contained in final Sec.
1926.953 (Sec. 1910.146(c)(5); 58 FR 4462, 4486-4489, Jan. 14,
1993).
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Some employers may prefer to comply with Sec. 1910.146 instead of
Sec. 1926.953 for entry into enclosed spaces covered by Subpart V.
Because the provisions of Sec. 1910.146 protect employees entering
enclosed spaces at least as effectively as Sec. 1926.953, OSHA will
accept compliance with Sec. 1910.146 as meeting the enclosed-space
entry requirements of Sec. 1926.953. OSHA included a note to this
effect immediately following final Sec. 1926.953(o). The Agency is
adopting the note as proposed.
MYR Group opposed applying the general industry standard for permit
spaces to construction work. The company argued that subpart V should
not incorporate "standard requirements that have already been rejected
for construction work" and recommended that the Agency develop
requirements specific "to electrical construction work or through the
proposed and pending separate confined space standard for
construction" (Ex. 0162).
OSHA disagrees with this comment. The Agency developed the
enclosed-space provisions in existing Sec. 1910.269 to protect
employees during routine entry into enclosed spaces. As discussed in
detail previously, OSHA concluded that the requirements for work on
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution installations
should generally be the same regardless of whether the work is covered
by final Sec. 1910.269 or subpart V. (See the summary and explanation
for final Sec. 1926.950(a)(1), earlier in this section of the
preamble.) For the purpose of routine entry into these spaces, OSHA
concludes that it is appropriate for employers to follow the same rules
with respect to both construction and general industry work.
OSHA also is applying the general industry permit-space standard to
work in enclosed spaces when the hazards remaining in the enclosed
space endanger the life of an entrant or could interfere with escape
from the space after an employer takes the precautions required by
Sec. Sec. 1926.953 and 1926.965. This action is necessary because, as
OSHA noted in the proposed construction standard for confined spaces,
"the existing construction standard for confined and enclosed spaces
at 29 CFR 1926.21(b)(6) does not adequately protect construction
employees in confined spaces from atmospheric, mechanical, and other
hazards" (72 FR 67354). OSHA notes, however, that the references to
the general industry standard in final Sec. 1926.953 are included as a
placeholder pending the promulgation of the confined spaces in
construction standard. OSHA intends to change these references to refer
to the construction standard when it promulgates that standard.
Paragraph (a) in final Sec. 1926.953 provides that Sec. 1926.953
does not apply to vented vaults under certain conditions. Permanent
ventilation in vented vaults prevents a hazardous atmosphere from
accumulating. However, the intake or exhaust of a vented vault could be
clogged, limiting the flow of air through the vaults. The employee in
such cases would be exposed to the same hazards presented by unvented
vaults. Additionally, mechanical ventilation for a vault so equipped
may fail to operate. To ensure that the employee is protected from the
hazards posed by lack of proper ventilation, the final rule exempts
vented vaults only if the employer determines that the ventilation is
operating to protect employees. This determination must ensure that
ventilation openings are clear and that any permanently installed
mechanical ventilating equipment is in proper working order.
Section 1926.953 also does not apply to spaces not designed for
periodic entry by employees during normal operating conditions, such as
spaces that require energy sources to be isolated or fluids to be
drained before an employee can safely enter. These types of spaces
include, but are not limited to, boilers, fuel tanks, coal bunkers, and
transformer and circuit breaker cases. As explained in the preamble to
the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 final rule, the measures required in existing
Sec. 1910.269(e) (and, by implication, final Sec. 1926.953) are not
adequate to protect employees from the various hazards posed by these
types of permit-entry confined spaces (59 FR 4364-4367).
MYR Group commented that subpart V's definition of "enclosed
space" was "overly narrow and unclear" because "there is no
specific basis for creation of such a broad definition solely for
electrical work" (Ex. 0162).
OSHA disagrees with this comment. The Agency derived the definition
from the definition of "enclosed space" in existing Sec.
1910.269(x). As explained in the preamble to the 1994 Sec. 1910.269
final rule, OSHA narrowly tailored the definition of "enclosed space"
to the protective measures required by existing Sec. 1910.269(e) (59
FR 4364-4367). A broader definition would involve permit spaces
presenting hazards against which final Sec. 1926.953 would not offer
protection. Therefore, OSHA is adopting the definition of "enclosed
space" as proposed. However, OSHA is not adopting the proposed note in
final Sec. 1926.968.\90\ The proposed note, which appears in existing
Sec. 1910.269(x), describes types of spaces that are enclosed, but
that do not meet the definition of "enclosed space," and explains
that such spaces meet the definition of permit spaces in Sec. 1910.146
and that entries into those spaces must conform to that standard.
Although the types of spaces described in the proposed note do not meet
the definition of "enclosed space" in either the general industry or
construction standard, Sec. 1910.146 does not apply to confined-space
entry during construction work. Consequently, the final rule does not
include the note to the definition of "enclosed space" in final Sec.
1926.968. OSHA intends to revise Sec. 1926.968 to include an
appropriate note to the definition of "enclosed
space" when it promulgates the new standard for confined-space entry
during construction work.
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\90\ OSHA is not removing the existing note to that definition
from final Sec. 1910.269(x).
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Paragraph (b), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, contains the general requirement that employers
ensure the use of safe work practices for entry into, and work in,
enclosed spaces and for rescue of employees from such spaces. These
safe work practices ensure that employees are protected against hazards
in the enclosed space and include, among others, the practices
specified in paragraphs (e) through (o).
Paragraph (c), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires each employee who enters enclosed spaces,
or who serves as an attendant, to be trained in the hazards associated
with enclosed-space entry and in enclosed-space entry and rescue
procedures. This training must ensure that employees are trained to
work safely in enclosed spaces and that they will be knowledgeable of
the rescue procedures in the event that an emergency arises within the
space.
Paragraph (d), which is being adopted without change from the
proposal, requires that the employer provide equipment that will assure
the prompt and safe rescue of employees from the enclosed space. This
requirement is necessary to ensure that employees who are injured in
enclosed spaces will be retrieved from the spaces. The equipment must
enable a rescuer to remove an injured employee from the enclosed space
quickly and without injury to the rescuer or further harm to the
injured employee. A harness, lifeline, and self-supporting winch can
normally be used for this purpose.
Mr. Leo Muckerheide with Safety Consulting Services recommended
that, because of the risk of arc hazards, OSHA should explicitly
require nonconductive and flame-resistance-rated rescue equipment that
meets ASTM F887, Standard Specifications for Personal Climbing
Equipment (Ex. 0180). He argued that the general industry confined
space standard does not protect against arc-flash and electric-shock
hazards and contrasted proposed paragraph (d) with provisions in
proposed Sec. 1926.960 that do require protection from these hazards
(id.).
OSHA rejects this recommendation. First, work in enclosed spaces
does not always pose arc-flash or electric-shock hazards. Sometimes,
employees enter spaces to take readings or perform inspections; during
these activities these hazards are unlikely to be present,\91\ or there
may be no energized electric equipment present.
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\91\ It is possible under certain circumstances that employees
taking readings or performing inspection activities could be exposed
to arc-flash hazards. See the discussion of arc-flash hazard
assessment under the summary and explanation for final Sec.
1926.960(g)(1), later in this section of the preamble.
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Second, addressing arc-flash and electric-shock hazards in Sec.
1926.953 would be unnecessarily duplicative, as these hazards are more
appropriately addressed in Sec. 1926.960, which applies to work on or
near exposed live parts. When work is performed within reaching
distance of exposed energized parts of equipment, final Sec.
1926.960(f) requires the employer to ensure that each employee removes,
or renders nonconductive, all exposed conductive articles, unless such
articles do not increase the hazards associated with contact with the
energized parts. This provision covers conductive articles on
harnesses. Paragraph (c)(1)(iii) of final Sec. 1926.960 requires the
employer to ensure that employees do not take conductive objects, such
as conductive lifelines, closer to energized parts than the employer's
established minimum approach distances, unless the live parts or
conductive objects are insulated.\92\ Because, in a rescue situation,
the attendant would not have control over how close the lifeline got to
exposed energized parts, any lifeline would have to be insulated, or
the live parts would have to be insulated, to protect the attendant and
the entrant against electric shock. Paragraph (g)(1) of final Sec.
1926.960 requires the employer to assess the workplace to determine if
each employee is exposed to hazards from flames or electric arcs. This
assessment can guide the selection of rescue equipment that can effect
safe rescue when employees are exposed to these hazards. If there is a
risk that an electric arc could occur in an enclosed space, then the
rescue equipment must be capable of withstanding that hazardous
condition.
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\92\ There is a third exception associated with live-line
barehand work, which is generally inapplicable in enclosed spaces.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some conditions within an enclosed space, such as high temperature
and high pressure, make it hazardous to remove a cover from the space.
For example, if high pressure is present within the space, the cover
could be blown off in the process of removing it. Paragraph (e), which
is being adopted without substantive change from the proposal, protects
against these hazards by requiring a determination of whether it is
safe to remove the cover. This determination must include checking for
the presence of any atmospheric pressure or temperature differences
(generally between the inside and outside of the enclosed space) and
evaluating whether there might be a hazardous atmosphere in the space.
Furthermore, any condition making it unsafe for employees to remove the
cover must be eliminated (that is, reduced to the extent that it is no
longer unsafe) before the cover is removed. A note following paragraph
(e) clarifies that this determination may consist of checking the
conditions that might foreseeably be inside the enclosed space. For
example, the cover could be checked to see if it is hot and, if it is
fastened in place, it could be loosened gradually to release any
residual pressure. The note also clarifies that, to evaluate whether
there might be a hazardous atmosphere in the space, an evaluation needs
to be made of whether conditions at the site could cause a hazardous
atmosphere to accumulate in the space.
Paragraph (f), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires that, when covers are removed, openings to
enclosed spaces be promptly guarded to protect employees from falling
into the space and to protect employees in the enclosed space from
being injured by objects entering the space. The guard could be a
railing, a temporary cover, or any other barrier that provides the
required protection.
Paragraph (g), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, prohibits employees from entering enclosed spaces
that contain a hazardous atmosphere unless the entry conforms to the
general industry permit-space standard at Sec. 1910.146. Accordingly,
if an entry is to be made while a hazardous atmosphere is present in
the enclosed space, the entry must conform to the general industry
permit-required confined spaces standard at Sec. 1910.146.\93\ Once
the hazardous atmosphere is removed (for example, by ventilating the
enclosed space), employees may enter the enclosed space following the
provisions in Sec. 1926.953.
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\93\ As stated previously, the references to the general
industry standard in final Sec. 1926.953 are included as a
placeholder pending the promulgation of the confined spaces in
construction standard. OSHA intends to change these references to
refer to the construction standard when it promulgates that
standard.
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The use of the term "entry" in this paragraph of Sec. 1926.953
is consistent with the use of that term in Sec. 1910.146, and OSHA
proposed to include the Sec. 1910.146 definition of "entry" in
Subpart V. Two commenters objected to the proposed definition of
"entry" on the basis that the definition would
prevent them from hanging a tag in the chimney of a manhole with a
fault (Exs. 0157, 0227). Consolidated Edison Company of New York
(ConEd) described their opposition to the proposed definition of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
"entry" as follows:
In order to comply with Sec. 1910.269(t)(7)(i), Con Edison
utilizes an identification system for structures that have cable and
joint abnormalities. This system requires the identifying crew to
hang a tag (in our nomenclature, a D-Fault tag) in the chimney of
the manhole. This red tag is a clear indication to any other
personnel who may attempt to enter the structure that the entry
should not be made. This tagging system is an integral part of our
compliance method and of protecting our employees. If OSHA adds the
definition as proposed, it will prevent us from breaking the plane
of the opening and hence prevent us from hanging the tag. This
process will reduce, not increase the safety of our employees and as
such will have the opposite effect from what OSHA is trying to
accomplish. [Ex. 0157]
EEI recommended instead that "that the Agency grant electric utilities
an [exemption from] the definition for [Sec. 1910.269](t)(7)
Protection against faults, to allow utilities to properly comply" (Ex.
0227).
OSHA rejects ConEd's recommendation. Paragraph (g) of final Sec.
1926.953 does not preclude employers from hanging tags in the chimney
of a manhole with a fault. To the contrary, the rule permits entry into
an enclosed space that contains a hazardous atmosphere if entry
conforms to the general industry permit-space standard. Moreover, if
there is no hazardous atmosphere in the space, employees may enter when
the entry conforms to Sec. 1926.953. OSHA concludes that the proposed
definition is, therefore, appropriate as it applies to final Sec.
1926.953 and the corresponding requirements in final Sec. 1910.269(e).
OSHA also rejects EEI's recommendation, because it is unnecessary.
The definition of "entry," as proposed and adopted, applies only to
the use of that term in final Sec. Sec. 1910.269(e) and 1926.953. The
definition does not apply to final Sec. 1910.269(t)(7)(i) or Sec.
1926.965(h)(1). (See the summary and explanation for final Sec.
1926.965(h)(1) for the response to ConEd's and EEI's concerns that this
provision, and its counterpart in Sec. 1910.269(t)(7)(i), would
preclude an employer from hanging a tag in the chimney of a manhole or
vault to indicate the presence of a faulted cable.)
Paragraph (h), which has been adopted with clarifying revisions
from the proposal, requires an attendant with first-aid training,
including CPR, to be immediately available outside the enclosed space
to provide assistance when a hazard exists because of traffic patterns
in the area of the opening used for entry.\94\ This paragraph does not
prohibit the attendant from performing other duties outside the
enclosed space, as long as those duties do not distract the attendant
from monitoring employees who are in the enclosed space (entrants) and
ensuring that it is safe to enter and exit the space. This paragraph
has two purposes: To protect the entrant from hazards involving traffic
patterns while the entrant is entering or exiting the space and to
provide assistance in an emergency.
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\94\ Typically, workers direct traffic away from the work area
using traffic control devices, as required by Sec. 1926.967(g).
When the resultant traffic patterns (that is, the flow of traffic)
could bring vehicles close to the enclosed space entrance (for
example, when the work reduces the number of traffic lanes), the
employer must provide an attendant.
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Mr. Frank Brockman with Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative
Corporation noted that attendants should never be allowed to enter
manholes or confined spaces (Ex. 0173).
The final rule, like the proposal, requires the attendant to remain
immediately available outside the enclosed space during the entire
entry. If the attendant were permitted to enter the enclosed space
during entry, he or she might not be able to assist the entrant. For
example, if traffic-pattern hazards are present in the area of the
opening to the enclosed space and if the attendant enters the space,
then both the attendant and the workers he or she is protecting would
be vulnerable upon leaving the enclosed space because no one would be
present to minimize or control the traffic-pattern hazards. Therefore,
the final rule specifies that the attendant must remain outside the
enclosed space during the entire entry process. It should be noted that
the rescue equipment required by paragraph (d) will enable the entrant
to rescue the entrant from the space before administering any necessary
first aid.
Mr. Lee Marchessault of Workplace Safety Solutions recommended that
paragraph (h) require the attendant to be trained in CPR, in addition
to first-aid training (Ex. 0196; Tr. 575). He noted that the electrical
hazards in the space, as well as other hazards, might present a need
for CPR (Tr. 598).
OSHA is clarifying paragraph (h) in the final rule. The proposed
rule required training in first aid, including CPR, so that the
attendant could provide emergency assistance in case of injury. This is
the type of training required by Sec. 1926.951(b). However, the
reference to Sec. 1926.951(b)(1) in the proposal likely caused Mr.
Marchessault to misinterpret the requirement. Therefore, the Agency
included a definition of "first-aid training" in Sec. 1926.968 in
the final rule. That definition states that first-aid training is
training in the initial care, including cardiopulmonary resuscitation
(which includes chest compressions, rescue breathing, and, as
appropriate, other heart and lung resuscitation techniques), performed
by a person who is not a medical practitioner, of a sick or injured
person until definitive medical treatment can be administered. The
definition clarifies that, wherever first-aid training is required by
the final rule, CPR training must be included.\95\ OSHA also dropped
the proposed cross-reference to Sec. 1926.951(b)(1), as it is no
longer necessary.
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\95\ The definition also clarifies that CPR training includes
resuscitation techniques both for the heart and for the lungs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Anthony Ahern with the Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives
recommended that an attendant always be available for enclosed-space
operations, not just when traffic-pattern hazards exist (Ex. 0186).
OSHA is not adopting this recommendation. By definition, an
enclosed space contains a hazardous atmosphere only under abnormal
conditions. The Agency previously concluded that these spaces do not
present the type of atmospheric hazards that warrant the presence of an
attendant after the employer takes precautions such as those required
by Sec. 1926.953. (See, for example, 58 FR 4485-4488.) In addition, as
provided in final Sec. 1926.953(a), when a hazardous atmosphere is
present after the employer takes the precautions required by this
section, paragraphs (d) through (k) of OSHA's general industry permit-
space standard, Sec. 1910.146, which do require attendants, apply.
Therefore, the Agency concluded that, when paragraph (h) applies, the
only hazards (other than electrical) that necessitate the presence of
an attendant while work is being performed in an enclosed space are
traffic-pattern hazards in the area of the opening used for entering
and exiting the enclosed space. OSHA notes that even if no traffic-
pattern hazards are present, an attendant is required under Sec.
1926.965(d) of the final rule while work is being performed in a
manhole or vault containing energized electric equipment. A note to
this effect follows final Sec. 1926.953(h).
Mr. Leo Muckerheide with Safety Consulting Services commented that
the purpose of proposed paragraph (h) was confusing because the purpose
of the requirement as stated in the first
sentence--that is, protecting entrants from traffic-pattern hazards--
differs from the attendant's duties as noted in the second sentence--
monitoring employees within the space. He recommended that OSHA revise
the second sentence of that paragraph as follows:
That person is not precluded from performing other duties
outside the enclosed space if these duties do not distract the
attendant from monitoring the traffic patterns outside the enclosed
space. [Ex. 0180]
OSHA rejects Mr. Muckerheide's recommended language. Part of the
attendant's duty to monitor employees in the space is to warn entrants
preparing to exit an enclosed space about hazards involving traffic
patterns. If the attendant is watching traffic patterns instead of
monitoring the entrant, the entrant might not receive warnings about
that traffic before exiting the space. When the entrant is ready to
exit the space, the attendant can then monitor or direct traffic and
let the entrant know when it is safe to exit the space. On the other
hand, OSHA agrees with Mr. Muckerheide that the duties of the attendant
may not be clear from the language of the provision as proposed.
Therefore, OSHA revised the language in final paragraph (h) to make it
clear that ensuring that it is safe to enter and exit an enclosed space
is part of the attendant's duties.
Paragraph (i), which is being adopted without change from the
proposal, requires that test instruments used to monitor atmospheres in
enclosed spaces have a minimum accuracy of 10 percent and
be kept in calibration. This provision will ensure that test
measurements are accurate so that hazardous conditions will be detected
when they arise. The accuracy of instruments used for testing the
atmosphere of these spaces is important for employee safety, and
calibration is critical to test-instrument accuracy. As noted in the
preamble to the proposal and to the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 final rule,
OSHA considers 10 percent to be the minimum accuracy needed
to detect hazardous conditions reliably (70 FR 34849, 59 FR 4369).
Two commenters objected to the proposed requirements (Exs. 0128,
0227). EEI recommended that the standard only require "that test
instruments be kept in calibration using the recommendations set forth
by the specific manufacturer" and not address accuracy (Ex. 0227). Mr.
Mark Spence of Dow Chemical Company argued that OSHA did not
demonstrate that the provision was necessary or that calibration has
been a problem (Ex. 0128). He stated that the general industry permit-
space standard did not contain such a requirement, but only requires
that the atmospheres in spaces be monitored (id.).
OSHA rejects the recommendations from these two commenters. Mr.
Spence is incorrect. The permit-space standard requires test equipment
to be calibrated. As mentioned previously, Sec. 1910.146(c)(5)
contains requirements for alternative procedures for permit spaces that
are analogous to the enclosed-space requirements contained in Sec.
1926.953 of the final rule. Paragraph (c)(5)(ii)(C) of Sec. 1910.146
requires atmospheric testing using a calibrated test instrument.
Paragraph (d) of Sec. 1910.146, which contains requirements for
permit-required confined-space programs, specifies, at paragraph
(d)(4)(i), that employers maintain "[t]esting and monitoring equipment
needed to comply with paragraph (d)(5)." As OSHA concluded in the
preamble to the general industry permit-space final rule, if test
equipment "is properly selected, calibrated, and maintained . . ., the
testing and monitoring needs for entry and work in permit-required
confined spaces can be effectively met" (58 FR 4498). Thus, the use of
inaccurate or uncalibrated test instruments does not meet the permit-
space standard.
OSHA rejects EEI's recommendation that the standard not address
accuracy. The Agency concluded in the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking
that the requirement for test instruments to be accurate within 10 percent
was reasonably necessary for the protection of employees (59 FR 4369).
OSHA continues to believe that the accuracy of instruments used for
testing the atmosphere of these spaces is important, and EEI offered
no evidence to the contrary.
OSHA also rejects EEI's assertion that equipment calibrated to
manufacturers' specification is an adequate substitute for test
equipment accuracy. Calibration and accuracy are not synonymous. A
calibrated test instrument is one that has been compared to a standard
reference source for the substance (oxygen, or a toxic or flammable
gas) to be measured. Accuracy is a measure of the precision with which
the substance can be measured. An oxygen meter, for example, with an
accuracy of 20 percent could give a reading as much as 20
percent above or below the actual oxygen content even when it is
properly calibrated. It is evident that this calibrated instrument
would not meet the final rule's minimum accuracy requirement of 10 percent.
Several commenters recommended that OSHA include in the final rule
specific requirements on how to keep instruments calibrated. (See, for
example, Exs. 0196, 0211, 0227.) For instance, ISEA recommended that
OSHA refer employers and employees to the Agency's Safety and Health
Information Bulletin "Verification of Calibration for Direct-Reading
Portable Gas Monitors" (SHIB 05-04-2004) for information on this topic
(Ex. 0211).\96\ As noted earlier, EEI recommended that test instruments
be calibrated in accordance with manufacturers' instructions (Ex.
0227). Another commenter, Mr. Lee Marchessault with Workplace Safety
Solutions agreed that the standard should require calibration in
accordance with manufacturers' instructions because test instruments
"may go out of calibration 2 hours after being calibrated" (Ex.
0196).
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\96\ This document is available on the OSHA Web site at:
http://www.osha.gov/dts/shib/shib050404.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA is not adopting these recommendations. The Agency decided to
adopt a performance-based approach for this requirement to provide
compliance flexibility. OSHA considers a test instrument to be "kept
in calibration," as required by paragraph (i), when the employer
follows the manufacturers' calibration instructions or other reasonable
guidelines for the calibration of the instrument involved. The Agency
anticipates that most employers will follow manufacturers'
instructions. However, these instructions might not be available if the
manufacturer has gone out of business. In addition, there are other
sources of information on proper calibration methods. As mentioned
earlier, ISEA noted one appropriate source of information that can be
used instead, although the Agency decided against including a reference
to that publication in the final rule.
Mr. Kevin Taylor with the Lyondell Chemical Company asked for
clarification of the requirement that test instruments have a minimum
accuracy of 10 percent (Ex. 0218). He inquired whether that
level of accuracy was needed for each measured gas or whether the
accuracy measurement was based on total detection of gases.
OSHA clarifies that the accuracy required by the final rule
pertains to each gas being measured. Moreover, the accuracy of the
instrument must be determined based on the threshold quantities that
would make the atmosphere within the space hazardous (as per the
definition of "hazardous atmosphere" in Sec. 1926.968). For
example, a particular enclosed space could potentially contain
hazardous levels of methane, carbon dioxide, and carbon monoxide, as
well as insufficient levels of oxygen. The instrument or instruments
used to test the space in this example must be accurate to within
10 percent of: (1) A 0.5-percent concentration of methane
(which is 10 percent of its lower flammable limit),\97\ (2) the
permissible exposure limits (PELs) contained in Subpart D for both
carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide (9,000 and 55 mg/m\3\,
respectively), and (3) atmospheric concentrations of oxygen at 19.5
percent. It is important for the test instrument to be accurate near
the threshold because those are the critical values for determining
whether or not a space is hazardous.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\ The lower flammable limit for methane is 5 percent, and 10
percent of that value is 0.5 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted earlier, because of the lack of adequate ventilation,
enclosed spaces can accumulate hazardous concentrations of flammable
gases and vapors, or an oxygen deficient atmosphere could develop. It
is important to keep concentrations of oxygen and flammable gases and
vapors at safe levels; otherwise, an explosion could occur while
employees are in the space, or an oxygen deficiency could lead to
suffocation of an employee. Toward these ends, paragraphs (j) through
(o) of the final rule address the testing of the atmosphere in the
space and ventilation of the space. OSHA notes that the specific
testing requirements in paragraphs (j), (k), and (o) must be met
irrespective of the results of the employer's evaluation performed
under paragraph (e). The evaluation performed under paragraph (e)
serves only to ensure that it is safe to remove the cover and will not
determine whether an enclosed space contains a hazardous atmosphere.
The testing required by paragraphs (j), (k), and (o) will ensure, as
required by paragraph (g), that employees not enter an enclosed space
while it contains a hazardous atmosphere unless they follow the
requirements of the general industry permit-space standard.
Paragraph (j), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires that, before an employee enters an enclosed
space, the atmosphere in the space be tested for oxygen deficiency and
that the testing be done with a direct-reading meter or similar
instrument capable of collecting and immediately analyzing data samples
without the need for off-site evaluation. Continuous forced air-
ventilation is permitted as an alternative to testing. However,
procedures for such ventilation must ensure that employees are not
exposed to the hazards posed by oxygen deficiency.\98\ (See also
paragraph (m) for additional requirements relating to ventilation of
the space.)
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\98\ The definition of "hazardous atmosphere" determines what
concentrations of oxygen are considered hazardous. (See Sec.
1926.968.) Paragraph (g) of final Sec. 1926.953 prohibits entry
into an enclosed space while a hazardous atmosphere is present.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (k), which is being adopted without change from the
proposal, requires that, before employees enter an enclosed space, the
internal atmosphere of the space be tested for flammable gases and
vapors. If the results of the test indicate the presence of a hazardous
atmosphere, employees may not enter under the procedures specified by
Sec. 1926.953. (See Sec. 1926.953(g).) So that the results are
accurate and relevant to the atmosphere in the space at the time of
employee entry, testing must be performed with a direct-reading meter,
or similar instrument, capable of collecting and immediately analyzing
data samples without the need for off-site evaluation. The flammability
test required by this paragraph must be performed after oxygen testing
and ventilation required by paragraph (j) demonstrate that the enclosed
space has sufficient oxygen for an accurate flammability test.
If flammable gases or vapors are detected or if an oxygen
deficiency is found, paragraph (l), which is being adopted without
substantive change from the proposal, requires the employer to provide
forced-air ventilation to maintain safe levels of oxygen and to prevent
a hazardous concentration of flammable gases or vapors from
accumulating. As an alternative to ventilation, an employer may use a
continuous monitoring system that ensures that no hazardous atmosphere
develops and no increase in flammable gas or vapor concentrations above
safe levels occur if flammable gases or vapors are detected at safe
levels. The language in the final rule clarifies that the monitoring
must ensure that concentrations of flammable gases and vapors do not
increase above safe levels (as opposed to not increasing at all). The
definition of hazardous atmosphere contains guidelines for determining
whether the concentration of a substance is at a hazardous level. OSHA
is including a note to this effect after paragraph (l). An identical
note appears after paragraph (o). OSHA changed the title of this
paragraph in the final rule to "Ventilation, and monitoring for
flammable gases or vapors" to accurately reflect the contents of the
paragraph.
Paragraph (m), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, contains specific requirements for the ventilation
of enclosed spaces. When forced-air ventilation is used, it must begin
before entry is made and must be maintained long enough for the
employer to be able to demonstrate that a safe atmosphere exists before
employees are allowed to enter the space. To accomplish this, the
ventilation must be maintained long enough to purge the atmosphere
within the space of hazardous levels of flammable gases and vapors and
to supply an adequate concentration of oxygen.
OSHA decided not to specify a minimum number of air changes before
employee entry into the enclosed space is permitted. Instead, the
Agency places the burden on the employer to ensure that the atmosphere
is safe before such entry. The employer can discharge this duty either
by testing to determine the safety of the atmosphere in the space or by
a thorough evaluation of the air flow required to make the atmosphere
safe. In this way, the safety of employees working in enclosed spaces
will not be dependent on speculation by a supervisor or an
employee.\99\
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\99\ This discussion, which also appeared in the preamble to the
proposal, responds to one commenter's request for clarification of
how the employer could demonstrate that the atmosphere in the
enclosed space is safe (Ex. 0186).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (m) also requires the air provided by the ventilating
equipment to be directed at the immediate area within the enclosed
space where employees are at work. The forced-air ventilation must be
maintained the entire time the employees are present within the space.
These provisions ensure that a hazardous atmosphere does not reoccur
where employees are working.
NIOSH recommended that "the atmosphere in a confined space be
tested before entry and monitored continuously while workers are in the
confined space to determine if the atmosphere has changed due to the
work being performed" (Ex. 0130). NIOSH identified its publication
"Worker Deaths in Confined Spaces: A Summary of NIOSH Surveillance and
Investigative Findings," Publication No. 94-103, as evidence of the
need for continuous monitoring (id.).
As explained earlier in this section of the preamble, the final
rule requires the atmosphere in enclosed spaces to be tested before
entry. OSHA concludes, however, that continuous monitoring of enclosed
spaces is unnecessary. By
definition, enclosed spaces contain a hazardous atmosphere only under
abnormal conditions. Thus, enclosed spaces almost never contain the
types of conditions that will cause a hazardous atmosphere to reoccur
after employers implement the precautions required by Sec. 1926.953
(such as forced-air ventilation). If these precautions are not
sufficient to keep the atmosphere in the space safe, then the space
would not qualify for entry under Sec. 1926.953, and entry could only
proceed under the general industry permit-required confined space
standard, as specified by paragraph (a) of that section. Therefore,
OSHA has not adopted NIOSH's recommendation in the final rule.
Two commenters noted that proposed paragraph (m) might be
impossible to implement under certain conditions and recommended that
the final rule recognize these conditions (Exs. 0128, 0224). One of
these commenters, Dow Chemical Company, noted that it is not always
possible to test atmospheric conditions before entry into an enclosed
space (Ex. 0128). The other commenter, the Alabama Rural Electric
Association of Cooperatives, maintained that it was not always feasible
to use forced-air ventilation because of space constraints (Ex. 0224).
OSHA concludes that no changes to paragraph (m) are necessary. The
final rule, as with the proposal, recognizes that the enclosed-space
procedures might not adequately protect employees in some
circumstances. Paragraph (a) of the final rule requires that employers
follow the general industry permit-space standard at Sec. 1910.146
whenever the precautions required by final Sec. Sec. 1926.953 and
1926.965 are insufficient to adequately control the hazards posed by
the space. These conditions include any conditions that make complying
with those two sections in this final rule infeasible. Therefore, OSHA
is including paragraph (m) in the final rule as proposed.
To ensure that the air supplied by the ventilating equipment
provides a safe atmosphere, paragraph (n), which is being adopted
without substantive change from the proposal, requires the air supply
to be from a clean source and prohibits it from increasing the hazards
in the enclosed space. For example, the final rule prohibits
positioning the air intake for ventilating equipment near the exhaust
from a gasoline or diesel engine because doing so would contaminate the
atmosphere in the enclosed space.
The use of open flames in enclosed spaces is safe only when
flammable gases or vapors are not present in hazardous quantities. For
this reason, final paragraph (o), which is being adopted without change
from the proposal, requires additional testing for flammable gases and
vapors if open flames are to be used in enclosed spaces. The tests must
be performed immediately before the open-flame device is used and at
least once per hour while the device is in use. More frequent testing
is required if conditions indicate the need for it. Examples of such
conditions include the presence of volatile flammable liquids in the
enclosed space and a history of hazardous quantities of flammable
vapors or gases in such a space.
5. Section 1926.954, Personal protective equipment
Final Sec. 1926.954 contains requirements for personal protective
equipment (PPE). Paragraph (a), which is being adopted without change
from the proposal, clarifies that PPE used by employees during work
covered by Subpart V must meet Subpart E of Part 1926.
Mr. Daniel Shipp with ISEA recommended that OSHA update the
national consensus standards incorporated by reference in Subpart E
(Ex. 0211). He pointed out, for example, that Sec. 1926.100, which
covers head protection, incorporates two outdated ANSI standards,
namely ANSI Z89.1-1969, Safety Requirements for Industrial Head
Protection, and ANSI Z89.2-1971, Industrial Protective Helmets for
Electrical Workers (id.).
Updating the national consensus standards incorporated by reference
in Subpart E is beyond the scope of this rulemaking, so OSHA is not
adopting Mr. Shipp's recommendation in this final rule. However, on
June 22, 2012, OSHA published a direct final rule updating its head
protection standard in Subpart E (77 FR 37587-37600).\100\ On November
16, 2012, OSHA published a notice confirming the effective date of the
direct final rule (77 FR 68684; effective date--September 20, 2012).
That rulemaking action updates the national consensus standard for head
protection incorporated in Subpart E of the construction standards as
recommended by Mr. Shipp.
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\100\ OSHA also updated its consensus standards for general
industry and maritime on September 9, 2009 (74 FR 46350). The Agency
again updated the general industry and maritime standards with the
June 22, 2012, direct final rule because OSHA published the proposal
for the 2009 final rule before ANSI updated its head-protection
standard that year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The preamble to the proposal noted that OSHA had separately
proposed regulatory language for the general PPE standards to clarify
that employers are generally responsible for the cost of PPE (70 FR
34868-34869; 64 FR 15402, Mar. 31, 1999). OSHA published the final rule
on employer payment for PPE on November 15, 2007 (72 FR 64342). The
final rule on employer payment for PPE requires employers to pay for
the PPE used to comply with OSHA standards, with a few exceptions. The
exceptions include: (1) Everyday clothing, such as longsleeve shirts,
long pants, street shoes, and normal work boots; and (2) ordinary
clothing, skin creams, or other items, used solely for protection from
weather, such as winter coats, jackets, gloves, parkas, rubber boots,
hats, raincoats, ordinary sunglasses, and sunscreen. (See Sec. Sec.
1910.132(h) and 1926.95(d).)
Employers must pay for fall protection equipment and other PPE used
by employees in compliance with this final rule to the extent required
by Sec. 1926.95(d), the general construction rule regarding payment
for PPE, or Sec. 1910.132(h), the general rule regarding payment for
PPE in general industry. (See 72 FR 64369 (explaining that the general
PPE-payment provisions "apply to all OSHA standards requiring PPE");
see also the March 16, 2009, letter of interpretation to Mr. William
Mattiford \101\ (employers must pay for body belts, positioning straps,
and pole- and tree-climbing equipment in accordance with Sec.
1910.132(h)) and the May 1, 2008, letter to Mr. Gil Niedenthal \102\
(employers must pay for body belts and pole climbers in accordance with
Sec. 1910.132(h)).)
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\101\ The letter of interpretation to Mr. Mattiford is available
at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=27014.
\102\ The letter of interpretation to Mr. Niedenthal is
available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=27091.
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OSHA included a note to final Sec. 1926.954(a) to indicate that
Sec. 1926.95(d) sets employer payment obligations for the PPE required
by subpart V, including, but not limited to, the fall protection
equipment required by final Sec. 1926.954(b), the electrical
protective equipment required by final Sec. 1926.960(c), and the
flame-resistant and arc-rated clothing and other protective equipment
required by final Sec. 1926.960(g). (See the summary and explanation
for Sec. 1926.960(g), later in this section of the preamble, for a
discussion of the issue of employer payment for flame-resistant and
arc-rated clothing.)
Paragraph (b) of the final rule sets requirements for personal fall
protection systems. Subpart M of part 1926, which sets requirements for
fall protection for
construction, contains provisions covering two types of personal fall
protection systems: Personal fall arrest systems, addressed in Sec.
1926.502(d), and positioning device systems, addressed in Sec.
1926.502(e). Subpart M defines a "personal fall arrest system" as a
system used to arrest an employee in a fall from a working level. It
consists of an anchorage, connectors, and body harness and may include
a lanyard, deceleration device, lifeline, or suitable combinations of
these. (See Sec. 1926.500(b).) Personal fall arrest systems are
designed to safely arrest the fall of an employee working on a
horizontal or vertical surface.
Subpart M defines a "positioning device system" as a body belt or
body harness system rigged to allow an employee to be supported on an
elevated vertical surface, such as a wall, and work with both hands
free while leaning. (See Sec. 1926.500(b).)
Positioning device systems are designed to support an employee
working on a vertical surface so that the employee can work with both
hands without falling. Proposed Subpart V contained requirements for
"work positioning equipment," which is equivalent to "positioning
device system" as that term is defined in subpart M. (See the summary
and explanation for final Sec. 1926.954(b)(2), later in this section
of the preamble.)
A third form of personal fall protection system, which is not
specifically addressed in Subpart M, is a tethering, restraint, or
travel-restricting system. OSHA's steel erection standard in Subpart R
of Part 1926 contains requirements for "fall restraint systems,"
which it defines as a fall protection system that prevents the user
from falling any distance. The system consists of either a body belt or
body harness, along with an anchorage, connectors and other necessary
equipment. The other components typically include a lanyard, and may
also include a lifeline and other devices. (See Sec. 1926.751.\103\)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\ The term "fall restraint system" as defined in Sec.
1926.751 is a broad term that includes travel-restricting equipment,
tethering systems, and other systems that prevent an employee from
falling any distance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fall restraint, tethering, and travel-restricting equipment are all
designed to prevent employees from falling, in some cases by
restraining an employee's access to unprotected edges (restraint,
tethering, and travel-restricting equipment) and in other cases by
holding the employee in place to prevent falling (restraint equipment).
IBEW recommended that the fall protection provisions in proposed
paragraph (b), and in its general industry counterpart, proposed Sec.
1910.269(g)(2), contain a reference to IEEE Std 1307, Standard for Fall
Protection for Utility Work (Ex. 0230; Tr. 904-905, 983-984). The union
noted that this is the only consensus standard addressing specific fall
protection issues for the utility industry (Ex. 0230).
OSHA agrees that this consensus standard provides useful
information to help employers comply with some provisions of the final
rule and added the IEEE standard to the list of reference documents in
Appendix G to subpart V and Appendix G to Sec. 1910.269.\104\ The
Agency is not, however, referencing IEEE Std 1307 in Sec. 1926.954 of
the final rule. OSHA made substantial changes to the fall protection
requirements in the final rule, and the IEEE standard does not reflect
all of the final rule's requirements. For example, on and after April
1, 2015, final Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(C) generally does not permit
qualified employees to climb poles, towers, or similar structures
without fall protection. (See the summary and explanation for final
Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii), later in this section of the preamble.) In
contrast, section 6.2.1 of IEEE Std 1307-2004 permits qualified
climbers to climb poles, towers, and similar structures without fall
protection (Ex. 0427).\105\
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\104\ See the discussion of the appendices to the final rule,
later in this section of the preamble. As explained in the
appendices, the referenced national consensus standards, including
IEEE Std 1307, contain detailed specifications that employers may
follow in complying with the more performance-oriented requirements
of OSHA's final rule. However, compliance with IEEE Std 1307 is not
a substitute for compliance with Sec. 1926.954(b).
\105\ IEEE Std 1307-2004 is the most recent edition of that
consensus standard.
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Proposed paragraph (b)(1) provided that personal fall arrest
systems had to meet the requirements of Subpart M of Part 1926.
Existing Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(i) already contains a similar
requirement. A note following proposed paragraph (b)(1) indicated that
this provision would apply to all personal fall arrest systems used in
work covered by subpart V. OSHA is not including this note in the final
rule as it is unnecessary.
OSHA received a number of comments about proposed paragraph (b)(1).
(See, for example, Exs. 0128, 0180, 0211, 0219, 0227, 0230.) Some of
these comments generally supported the proposal, noting that there are
no situations in which work covered by Subpart V would necessitate
different requirements for fall arrest equipment than those already
found in Subpart M. (See, for example, Exs. 0219, 0227, 0230.) Mr. Mark
Spence with Dow Chemical Company supported the incorporation of subpart
M in both subpart V and Sec. 1910.269, but noted OSHA's plan to revise
the general industry fall protection standard. He recommended that
Sec. 1910.269 and subpart V eventually be revised to refer to the
updated general industry fall protection provisions:
The existing general industry standard [Sec. 1910.269] requires
personal fall arrest equipment to meet the requirements of the
construction industry fall protection standards, 29 CFR Part 1926,
Subpart M. Both Sec. 1910.269 and Subpart M were promulgated in
1994, whereas the general industry fall protection standards date
back to 1971 (and are based on earlier requirements). To take
advantage of the updated fall protection requirements in the
construction standards, OSHA chose to make them applicable to work
under this general industry standard. [Footnote omitted.]
* * * * *
Dow sees no current option for OSHA other than continuing to
refer to Subpart M, supplementing it as appropriate with new
provisions, as OSHA has done here. However, Dow urges OSHA to
proceed expeditiously with the issuance of . . . new general
industry fall protection . . . standards. Once . . . new [general
industry fall protection standards are] published as a final rule,
OSHA should revise both [Subpart V and Sec. 1910.269] to refer to
the new [provisions]. [Ex. 0126]
On May 24, 2010, OSHA proposed to revise the general industry
walking-working surfaces standards and the personal protective
equipment standards (75 FR 28862). The proposal included a new standard
for personal fall protection systems, Sec. 1910.140, which would
increase consistency between construction, maritime, and general
industry standards. When that rulemaking is finalized, OSHA will
consider whether the cross-references in subpart V and Sec. 1910.269
should be changed as recommended by Mr. Spence.
Two commenters noted that subpart M does not address arc-flash
resistance for fall arrest equipment and recommended that OSHA require
this equipment to pass arc-flash tests (Exs. 0180, 0211). Mr. Daniel
Shipp of ISEA supported arc-flash testing as follows:
We believe that workers in electric power transmission and
distribution have special requirements different from those in
general construction activities. These special requirements are
recognized as hazards associated with exposure to high-voltage
electric current. The hazard of exposure to energized electrical
sources often occurs at height[s] where personal fall arrest systems
are required. The hazard of electric arc flash has been addressed in
the ASTM F887-04 [Standard Specifications for Personal Climbing
Equipment] for full body harnesses used in fall arrest.
We support the inclusion of electric arc-flash resistance
requirements, referenced in ASTM F887-04, to be extended to
[include] fall arrest PPE, especially full body harnesses and shock
absorbing lanyards that are worn together as part of a complete fall
arrest system. These components would be exposed to potentially
damaging thermal shock in the event of an arc flash. The damage to
lanyards not designed to withstand a high-voltage arc flash can be
quite severe, reducing strength to levels below the factor of safety
necessary to assure arrest of a fall. Tests have been performed by
the Kinetrics high energy laboratory on high-tensile webbing, such
as that used in fall protection PPE products. Testing at exposure
levels of 40 cal/cm\2\, in accordance with the procedures in ASTM
F1958/F1958M-99 [Standard Test Method for Determining the
Ignitability of Non-flame-Resistance Materials for Clothing by
Electric Arc Exposure Method Using Mannequins], demonstrated
ignition and melting of the webbing sufficient to reduce webbing
strength by greater than 30 percent.
One common example of this hazard involves employees tied off in
bucket trucks working in close proximity to high-voltage power
lines. The fall arrest harness and lanyard are typically exposed
above the edge of the bucket where contact with electric arc flash
is possible. In the event of an incident, including a fall by
ejection out of the bucket, the strength of fall arrest components
could be severely compromised if they were exposed to a high-voltage
electric arc flash. [Ex. 0211]
Mr. Leo Muckerheide of Safety Consulting Services similarly recommended
that harnesses and lanyards used by employees working on or near
energized circuits meet ASTM F887-04, because that consensus standard
provides performance criteria for arc resistance (Ex. 0180).
OSHA recognizes that employees performing work covered by subpart V
and Sec. 1910.269 are sometimes exposed to hazards posed by electric
arcs. In fact, final Sec. Sec. 1910.269(l)(8) and 1926.960(g) are
designed to protect employees from electric arcs. In addition, the
Agency already recognized the need for work-positioning equipment to be
capable of passing a flammability test to ensure that the equipment
does not fail if an electric arc occurs. (See final Sec. Sec.
1910.269(g)(2)(iii)(G)(5) and 1926.954(b)(2)(vii)(E).) On the other
hand, in work covered by subpart V or Sec. 1910.269, personal fall
arrest equipment has broader application than work-positioning
equipment, with work-positioning equipment being used primarily on
support structures for overhead power lines. Several applications for
personal fall arrest equipment involve work that does not pose
electric-arc hazards, especially in electric power generation work
covered by Sec. 1910.269. For example, an employee working on a
cooling tower or atop a dam at an electric power generation plant would
not normally be exposed to these hazards. Consequently, OSHA decided
not to include a general requirement for all fall arrest equipment used
under the final rule to be capable of passing an electric-arc test.
However, OSHA agrees that electric arcs can damage personal fall
arrest equipment as readily as work-positioning equipment. The testing
to which the commenters referred, and which is the basis of the test
data found in the record, demonstrates that harnesses subjected to an
electric arc can fail a drop test (Ex. 0432). The Agency concludes from
these test data that personal fall arrest equipment worn by an employee
who is exposed to an electric arc could fail if it is not designed to
withstand the heat energy involved. OSHA also agrees with the
commenters that employees working on or near energized circuits are
exposed to electric arcs when the circuit parts are exposed (Ex. 0180).
Accordingly, OSHA adopted a requirement in the final rule that fall
arrest equipment used by employees exposed to hazards from flames or
electric arcs be capable of passing a drop test after exposure to an
electric arc \106\ with a heat energy of 405 cal/cm\2\.
This requirement matches the electric arc performance required of fall
arrest equipment by ASTM F887-04 (Ex. 0055). The provision appears in
final paragraph (b)(1)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\ The electric arc test required by this paragraph is a test
exposing the equipment to an electric arc with a specified incident
heat energy. ASTM F887-12\e1\ includes an electric-arc test method
that involves positioning the fall arrest equipment in front of two
vertically mounted electrodes. The electric arc forms between the
electrodes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (g)(1) of Sec. 1926.960 in the final rule requires
employers to identify employees exposed to the hazards of flames or
electric arcs. When these employees are using personal fall arrest
equipment, that equipment also would be exposed to flame or electric-
arc hazards, and the final rule requires this fall arrest equipment to
be capable of passing a drop test equivalent to the test specified in
paragraph (b)(2)(xii) (discussed later in this section of the preamble)
after exposure to an electric arc with a heat energy of 405
cal/cm\2\. Harnesses and shock-absorbing lanyards meeting ASTM F887-
12\e1\ \107\ will be deemed to comply with this provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\ The final rule is based on the edition of the consensus
standard that is in the record, ASTM F887-04, Standard
Specifications for Personal Climbing Equipment (Ex. 0055). OSHA
reviewed the most recent edition of this standard, ASTM F887-12\e1\,
and found that equipment meeting that standard will also comply with
final Sec. 1926.954(b)(1)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA received a substantial number of comments addressing fall
protection requirements for employees working in aerial lifts. Existing
fall protection requirements to protect employees in aerial lifts
performing work, including line-clearance tree-trimming work, covered
by Subpart V or Sec. 1910.269 are found in several standards. In
construction, the construction aerial lift standard (Sec. 1926.453)
and subpart M apply. For maintenance and operation work, the general
industry aerial lift standard (Sec. 1910.67) and existing Sec.
1910.269(g)(2) (incorporating subpart M of the construction standards)
apply. Currently, line-clearance tree-trimming work is typically
governed by the fall protection requirements in Sec. 1910.269 and,
depending on the type of work performed, falls under either the general
industry or construction aerial lift standard.
Paragraph (b)(2)(v) of Sec. 1926.453 in the construction standard
for aerial lifts requires an employee working from an aerial lift to
wear a body belt with a lanyard attached to the boom or basket.
However, the introductory text to Sec. 1926.502(d) in subpart M
provides that "body belts are not acceptable as part of a personal
fall arrest system." The hazards of using a body belt as part of a
fall arrest system are described in the preamble to the Subpart M final
rule (59 FR 40672, 40702-40703, Aug. 9, 1994) and later in this section
of the preamble. In short, since the fall-arrest forces are more
concentrated for a body belt compared to a body harness, the risk of
injury in a fall is much greater with a body belt. In addition, an
employee can fall out of a body belt in a fall. Lastly, an employee
faces an unacceptable risk of further injury while suspended in a body
belt awaiting rescue.
Given the potential discrepancy between the aerial lift standard's
requirement for body belts and the subpart M limitation on the use of
body belts in fall arrest systems, a note following Sec.
1926.453(b)(2)(v) explains that Sec. 1926.502(d) provides that body
belts are not acceptable as part of a personal fall arrest system. The
use of a body belt in a tethering system or in a restraint system is
acceptable and is regulated under Sec. 1926.502(e).
Like the aerial lift standard in construction, the general industry
aerial lift standard at Sec. 1910.67(c)(2)(v) requires an employee
working from an aerial lift to wear a body belt with a lanyard attached
to the boom or basket. Even though existing Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(i)
requires fall arrest equipment to meet subpart M of part 1926, which
prohibits the use of body belts in personal fall arrest systems, the
Agency previously decided that employers could use body belts and
lanyards configured as fall
arrest systems to protect employees doing work covered by Sec.
1910.269 in aerial lifts.
OSHA explained in the preamble to the proposal that this rulemaking
would prohibit the use of body belts in personal fall arrest systems
for all work covered by Sec. 1910.269 and subpart V, including work
done from aerial lifts (70 FR 34850). The tree trimming industry
criticized OSHA's proposed application of the Subpart M prohibition on
body belts in personal fall arrest systems on the basis that it left
line-clearance tree trimming employers with two (in the industry's
view, undesirable) options--providing either (1) a personal fall arrest
system with a body harness, or (2) a positioning system that, under
proposed Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iv) (or proposed Sec.
1910.269(g)(2)(iii)(D)), is rigged to prevent free falls of more than
0.6 meters (2 feet). (See, for example, Exs. 0174, 0200, 0502, 0503;
Tr. 611-619, 756-760.)
The tree trimming industry is mistaken about the compliance options
available to its employers. The 0.6-meter free-fall limit applies only
to work-positioning equipment, which may not be used in aerial lifts.
As noted previously, under Sec. 1926.500(b) of subpart M,
"positioning device system" is defined as "a body belt or body
harness system rigged to allow an employee to be supported on an
elevated vertical surface, such as a wall, and work with both hands
free while leaning." Positioning device systems are not permitted to
be used from a horizontal surface, such as the platform or bucket of an
aerial lift.\108\
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\108\ See, for example, the following OSHA letters of
interpretation:
May 11, 2001, to Mr. Jessie L. Simmons
(http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24360);
August 14, 2000, to Mr. Charles E. Hill
(http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24110);
and
April 20, 1998, to Mr. Jonathan Hemenway Glazier
(http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=22569).
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Although employees in aerial lifts cannot use work-positioning
equipment, they can use restraint systems. As noted previously, a
restraint system is a method of fall protection that prevents the
worker from falling, for example, by preventing the employee from
reaching an unprotected edge. Body belts are permissible in restraint
systems. If an employer has an employee use a fall restraint system, it
must ensure that the lanyard and anchor are arranged so that the
employee is not exposed to falling any distance.\109\ In addition, for
a restraint system to work, the anchorage must be strong enough to
prevent the worker from moving past the point where the system is fully
extended, including an appropriate safety factor. In a November 2,
1995, letter of interpretation to Mr. Dennis Gilmore, OSHA suggested
that, at a minimum, a fall restraint system have the capacity to
withstand at least 13.3 kilonewtons (3,000 pounds) or twice the maximum
expected force that is needed to restrain the employee from exposure to
the fall hazard.\110\ The Agency recommended that, in determining this
force, employers should consider site-specific factors such as the
force generated by an employee (including his or her tools, equipment
and materials) walking, slipping, tripping, leaning, or sliding along
the work surface.\111\ With respect to work in aerial lifts, to the
extent that the bucket or platform can become separated from the boom
as noted by several commenters (see, for example, Tr. 614-615, 700),
the restraint system would need to be anchored to the boom.
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\109\ See, for example, the August 14, 2000, letter of
interpretation to Mr. Charles E. Hill
(http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24110).
\110\ This letter of interpretation is available at
(http://osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=22006.
\111\ See also the following letters of interpretation:
November 8, 2002, to Mr. Jeff Baum
(http://osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24576);
and
November 2, 1995, to Mr. Mike Amen
(http://osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rule gave line-clearance tree trimming employers two
options for employees in aerial lifts: (1) Use a personal fall arrest
system with a harness; or (2) use a fall restraint system with a body
belt or a harness. With respect to the first option, the tree trimming
industry argued that personal fall arrest systems with body harnesses
pose two hazards unique to line-clearance tree trimmers: (1) An
electrocution hazard in the event of a fall into a power line and (2) a
hazard associated with a harness' being pulled into a chipper. (See,
for example, Exs. 0174, 0200, 0502, 0503; Tr. 616-617, 757-758.)
Testifying on behalf of ULCC, Mr. Andrew Salvadore explained these
arguments as follows:
It is to be noted that this full body harness as one of the
options is potentially problematic though for line clearance tree
trimmers. [D]ue to the unique way that line clearance tree trimmers
work, this is for two reasons.
Reason 1: Linemen work next to energized conductors at arm's
height. So if they fall from the aerial lift, they fall below the
wire suspended in the air. But because . . . line clearance tree
trimmers uniquely work from aerial lifts routinely positioned . . .
or traveling above the wires if they were to fall from the bucket,
they would likely fall onto the wire below when using the six-foot
lanyard and full body harness, facing certain death by
electrocution.
Reason 2: Some line clearance tree trimming companies have their
tree trimmers help feed brush into the truck's wood chippers. This
is a concern among many line clearance tree trimming safety
professionals in that the harness's appendage straps . . . can get
caught on the brush being fed into the chipper and drag the operator
into the chipper. Additionally the donning and doffing of a full
body harness may predispose the aerial lif[t] operator to take [an]
unacceptable risk of aiding a coworker chipping brush on the ground
or conversely removing the harness and not putting it back on when
returning [aloft] in the lift. [Tr. 616-617]
In their posthearing comments, ULCC and TCIA expanded on this
testimony. These organizations acknowledged that power line workers
also work above power lines, but maintained that there are still
significant differences that make it more dangerous to use personal
fall arrest equipment with harnesses for line-clearance tree trimming
work (Exs. 0502, 0503). First, ULCC and TCIA argued that, unlike line-
clearance tree trimmers, line workers take measures to protect
themselves from contact with power lines below the aerial lift bucket.
For example, TCIA commented:
Through questioning of IBEW Panelists Jim Tomaseski and Don
Hartley (Hearing Transcript, pages 1016-1019), we discovered that it
is the lineman's typical practice to insulate wires underneath the
person in an elevated work position in an aerial lift when there is
the possibility of the worker coming within (including falling
within) the minimum approach distance. Obviously, it effectively
frees the lineman from concern of their fall protection allowing
them to drop into the conductor(s). [I]nsulating the line is
infeasible or impractical for our crews since they do not possess
the tools or expertise to implement it. [Ex. 0503]
Second, ULCC asserted that line workers perform significantly less work
above power lines than line-clearance tree trimmers, explaining:
Linemen usually work at the height of the electric line; their
work from above the line is atypical--we estimate that less than 20%
of linemen work is from above the line. Thus, the amount of linemen
work [conducted] from above an electric line is di minimis [sic].
[Ex. 0502; emphasis included in original]
First, with respect to fall arrest equipment, OSHA does not
consider body harnesses to pose greater hazards to line-clearance tree
trimmers than
body belts. The hazard to a worker from being pulled into a chipper is
easily dismissed. OSHA acknowledges that there are serious hazards
associated with operating chippers, including the hazard that workers
could be caught by the chipper feed mechanism. NIOSH published an
article warning of hazards associated with the operation of chippers
(see NIOSH Publication No. 99-145, "Hazard ID 8--Injury Associated
with Working Near or Operating Wood Chippers;" Ex. 0481), and that
publication provides recommendations to protect workers against being
caught in the feed mechanism.\112\ These recommendations include: (1)
Having workers wear close-fitting clothing and gloves, (2) having
workers wear trousers without cuffs, and (3) ensuring that employees
tuck in their clothing. Consistent with these recommendations, OSHA
expects that any hazards associated with using a chipper while wearing
a harness can be avoided by requiring employees to remove their
harnesses before working with the chipper. The tree trimming industry
commented that employees might not want to take off their harnesses
before feeding brush into chippers. (See, for example, Ex. 0502; Tr.
616-617.) OSHA does not find that argument persuasive. Employers can
avoid this concern altogether by having these workers perform other
ground-based work, such as moving the cut tree branches near the
chipper, while ground workers, who are not wearing harnesses, feed the
branches into the chippers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\ This document is available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/99-145.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, OSHA does not consider the risk of falling into a power
line to be as serious as the tree care industry portrays. If an
employee falls from an aerial lift while using a personal fall arrest
system with a harness, contact with a power line, though possible, is
not certain. Sometimes the employee will not be working over the line.
In other situations, the line will be on one side of the aerial lift
bucket, but the employee will fall out on the other side where no
conductors are present. In addition, the line may be far enough away
that the employee does not reach it during the fall. In any event, the
hazards associated with an employee falling into a power line can be
reduced--or even removed altogether--by using a shorter lanyard as
suggested by some rulemaking participants. (See, for example, Ex. 0505;
Tr. 694-695.) In this regard, IBEW noted: "If . . . the normal lanyard
length [for a fall arrest system] of 5 to 6 feet is too long, the
lanyard can be shortened to 3 or 4 feet, thereby eliminating the
anticipated problems" (Ex. 0505). Noting that the attachment point on
a harness will be farther from the anchorage on the boom than is the
attachment point on a body belt, ULCC claimed that a 0.9-meter (3-foot)
lanyard was unworkable with a body harness (Ex. 0502). OSHA is not
suggesting that a 0.9-meter lanyard with a body harness is feasible,
only that a lanyard shorter than 1.8 meters (6 feet) could be used to
reduce the risk of contact with a power line. A retractable lanyard
could be used to keep the length of the lanyard as short as possible,
thereby reducing the risk even further.
Finally, the tree trimming associations' attempt to portray the
hazards of falling into power lines as unique to their industry is
flawed. The evidence is clear from the comments of employees who
perform line work that power line workers also work above power lines
and can fall into them. (See, for example, Ex. 0505; Tr. 971.) In
addition, ULCC's attempt to distinguish line-clearance tree trimming
work from power line work on the grounds that power line workers
insulate the conductors above which they are working is unpersuasive.
Like line-clearance tree trimmers, power line workers often work above
energized power lines that have not been insulated. The final rule does
not require insulation on conductors for a power line worker
maintaining the minimum approach distance. In addition, insulating the
lines is not always possible. According to Sec. 1926.97(c)(2)(i) and
Table E-4 of the final rule, the highest maximum use voltage for rubber
insulating equipment, such as rubber insulating line hose or blankets,
is 36 kilovolts. The maximum use voltage for plastic guard equipment is
72.5 kilovolts (Ex. 0073). Insulation is not available above those
voltages.
TCIA argued that insulating power lines is not feasible or
practical for line-clearance tree trimming crews (Ex. 0503). OSHA is
not persuaded by this argument. To the extent that it is the practice
of line workers to insulate conductors beneath them, OSHA concludes
that this practice also represents a feasible means of protecting line-
clearance tree trimmers from the hazard of falling into the line. The
comment that line-clearance tree trimmers are not currently being
trained in this practice is not relevant to whether it is feasible. If
necessary, a line-clearance tree trimming employer could have the
electric utility install the insulation or train line-clearance tree
trimmers so that they are qualified to install insulation. In any
event, the final rule does not require insulation for line-clearance
tree trimmers; the final rule at Sec. 1910.269(r)(1)(iii) simply
requires them to maintain the minimum approach distance from power
lines. The use of insulation would simply be one way for line-clearance
tree trimming employers to address their concern about employees
falling into power lines while using personal fall arrest systems.
The tree trimming industry did not submit any comments directly
addressing the use of restraint systems, which is the second compliance
option available to line-clearance tree trimming employers. Instead, as
a result of the industry's misunderstanding regarding the applicability
of the 0.6-meter (2-foot) free-fall distance for work-positioning
systems (described earlier), it simply argued that it would be
impossible or unsafe for employees working from an aerial lift to use a
0.6-meter lanyard with a body belt for their work. (See, for example,
Exs. 0174, 0200, 0419, 0502, 0503; Tr. 613-615, 756.)
Mr. Andrew Salvadore, representing ULCC, testified as follows:
[W]e can't do line clearance tree trimming with a lanyard of two
foot [sic] or less. There are three reasons for this.
Reason No. 1: Line clearance tree trimmers need to be able to
reach from the four corners of an aerial lift bucket to do their
work because [of the need] to maintain a minimum approach distance
from energized wires different from linemen who can work right next
to the wires. We can't get to the four corners of the bucket with a
two-foot or shorter lanyard, typically anchored . . . outside of the
bucket on the boom. This prevents us from reaching outside of the
bucket with our tools or extending from the bucket. . . .
Reason 2: The two-foot limitation is also unworkable because we
usually work from [an] aerial lift positioned above energized
conductors, reaching down to the tree branches below adjacent to
conductors using insulated pole tools. This is different from
linemen who typically position their lift buckets right next to the
wire at arm's length. We lack the range of movement within the
bucket necessary to reach over the bucket and down to the worksite
because we would be restrained to the side of the bucket closest to
the anchor. Relocation of an anchor is not [an] easy fix because the
anchor is required to withstand a 5,000 pounds of force and
typically can't be installed on the bucket . . . because [of] the
lack of [a] strong enough anchoring point and because if the bucket
breaks off in a catastrophic incident the worker goes down with the
anchor attached to the bucket [rather than] being suspended by the
lanyard attached to the boom.
The Third Reason: Our people may be potentially yanked out of
the bucket into precisely the fall that is sought to be avoided by
the proposal because line clearance tree trimmers routinely rotate
and articulate their lift buckets in ways that would exceed the
distance of a short lanyard. . . . [This
exposes] the worker to being yanked out of the bucket by the short
lanyard when the range of articulation of the bucket exceeds the
short length of the lanyard. [Tr. 613-615]
To address these problems, the tree care industry recommended that OSHA
permit the use of a 0.9-meter (3-foot) shock-absorbing lanyard with a
body belt. (See, for example, Exs. 0174, 0200, 0502, 0503; Tr. 615--
616, 759--760.) The industry proposed a 408-kilogram (900-pound)
limitation on fall arrest forces, presumably to remove hazards
associated with concentrated fall arrest forces in falls into body
belts (id.).
As noted earlier, the tree care industry misinterpreted its
compliance options under the proposed rule. For work from an aerial
lift, there are only two options: (1) Fall arrest equipment and (2) a
fall restraint system. Restraint systems do not permit any free fall.
An acceptable restraint system for an aerial lift would prevent an
employee from falling out of the lift and from being catapulted from
the lift (for example, if the vehicle supporting the aerial lift was
struck by a vehicle or if a large tree section struck the boom). Body
belts are permitted as part of a restraint system; however, a system
rigged to allow an employee to free fall even 0.6 meters (2 feet) would
not be acceptable as a restraint system. The system proposed by the
tree care industry, namely a body belt connected to a 0.9-meter (3-
foot) lanyard attached to an anchorage on the boom of an aerial lift,
would not prevent the employee from falling out of or being catapulted
from an aerial lift. Therefore, it would not be acceptable as a
restraint system.
Moreover, with a body belt instead of a harness, the system
proposed by the tree care industry would not be an acceptable fall
arrest system. Even if it provides sufficient protection to employees
against concentrated fall arrest forces, it does not address the other
two significant hazards associated with falling into body belts, that
is, falling out of the body belt and sustaining further injury during
suspension.\113\
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\113\ Paragraph (d)(16) of Sec. 1926.502 requires a personal
fall arrest system to be rigged so that the employee cannot free
fall more than 6 feet (1.8 meters) nor contact any lower level. The
Agency notes that the lanyard may need to be shorter than the
maximum free-fall distance. This is the case for aerial lift work.
The anchorage point on the boom of an aerial lift may be below the
attachment point on the body belt or harness. As a result, the
employee could free fall a distance equal to twice the length of the
lanyard if he or she is ejected or catapulted from the aerial lift,
as can happen when a vehicle strikes the aerial lift truck or a
falling object, such as a tree branch, strikes the boom. This is not
an unlikely event as several accidents in the record demonstrate
(Ex. 0003; these three accidents can be viewed at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=14507743&id=953869&id=14333157).
Thus, the tree industry's recommended lanyard length could result in a
free fall of 1.8 meters (6 feet).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The tree care industry asserted that OSHA has not demonstrated that
using body belts in personal fall arrest systems in aerial lifts poses
hazards to line-clearance tree trimmers. (See, for example, Exs. 0174,
0200, 0502, 0503; Tr. 613, 758-759.) TCIA made this point as follows:
The only fall protection issue arising in aerial lifts is
failure to use any form of fall protection--an unsafe and non-
compliant behavior that the industry must strive to eliminate.
Similarly, if operators in the past have worn body belts
incorrectly, causing the equipment to not deliver the level of
protection it should have, then there is a behavioral issue to
address in training.
It is our industry's experience that workers are not being
injured by virtue of using body belts . . . and that non-compliance
with PPE use requirements is directly proportional to how hard or
uncomfortable the PPE is to use. [Ex. 0200; emphasis included in
original]
ULCC had similar comments:
Preliminarily, there is NO showing in the subject notice of rule
making that . . . allowing a body belt and lanyard for fall
protection from aerial devices . . . creates a risk which merits
modification of existing practice. It is our industry's experience
that line clearance tree trimmers are not being injured by virtue of
using body belts (OSHA cites no evidence, nor contrary evidence of
any such bucket fall hazard or hazard from body belt lanyards over
two feet long in line clearance tree trimming), and that lack of
compliance with PPE use requirements is directly proportional to how
hard or uncomfortable the PPE is to use. Between 1984 and 2002,
there were 34 OSHA-recorded fatalities in Tree Trimming (SIC 0783)
involving aerial device operators and falls. The details of these
accidents illustrate where the greatest problems lie:
23 of 34 fatalities were caused by catastrophic
mechanical failures of some part of the aerial device that slammed
the victim to the ground from considerable height. Fall protection,
or lack of it, was not a factor in these fatalities.
5 of 34 fatalities were caused by a tree or limb
striking the aerial lift boom, again causing failure of the aerial
device. Again, fall protection was not a factor.
6 of 34 fatalities were caused by unsecured falls from
the aerial device, and probably would have been prevented by the use
of any means of fall protection.
At a recent meeting of the Tree Care Industry Association Safety
Committee (a tree care industry trade association), with the safety
directors of 20 of the largest tree care companies representing well
over 60,000 tree care employees present, a survey was taken as to
whether these companies had any experience with aerial lift
operators being injured from secured falls out of buckets. None did.
For them, the more profound problem was the operator who disobeyed
company policy and failed to wear any fall protection. [Ex. 0174;
emphasis included in original]
In its posthearing comments, ULCC further argued that the one accident
OSHA described, in which an employee slipped out of a body belt,
occurred to a line worker, not a line-clearance tree trimmer, and that
this single accident "is statistically insignificant, insufficiently
documented on the record, and in no way probative of any problem of
line clearance tree trimmers falling from aerial lifts" (Ex. 0502).
ULCC further suggested that OSHA's proposal ignored the suspension-
trauma risk associated with full body harnesses (Exs. 0481, 0502).
(OSHA describes the hazards related to prolonged suspension in fall
protection equipment later in this section of the preamble.)
OSHA rejects these assertions. OSHA closely examined issues related
to the use of body belts in arresting falls in its Subpart M rulemaking
(59 FR 40702-40703). In that rulemaking, the Agency concluded that
"evidence in the record clearly demonstrates that employees who fall
while wearing a body belt are not afforded the level of protection they
would be if the fall occurred while the employee was wearing a full
body harness" (59 FR 40703). In addition, the Agency pointed to
"evidence of injuries resulting from the use of body belts" in fall
arrest systems (id.). Also, as mentioned by ULCC, there is evidence in
this rulemaking of an incident in which an employee, working from an
aerial lift while wearing a body belt in a fall arrest system, slipped
from the belt in a fall (Ex. 0003 \114\). Contrary to the tree care
industry's suggestion, OSHA need not show that injuries are presently
occurring to line-clearance tree trimmers because of falls into body
belts; it is sufficient that the Agency found that tree trimming
employees are exposed to a significant risk of injury under the
existing standard and that the final rule will substantially reduce
that risk. (See Section II.D, Significant Risk and Reduction in Risk,
earlier in this preamble, for OSHA's response to the argument that the
Agency is required to demonstrate a significant risk for each of the
hazards addressed by this rulemaking.) ULCC's own analysis confirms
that line-clearance tree trimmers are exposed to fall hazards (Ex.
0174). Nearly 18 percent of falls from aerial lifts were of the type
that, if the employee had been wearing a body belt in a personal fall
arrest system, he or she would have been exposed to the serious
hazards, described earlier, that
are associated with using body belts in fall arrest systems (id.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\ The description of this accident is available at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170155857.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency acknowledges the suspension risk from body harnesses
identified by ULCC. When an employee is suspended in a body belt or
harness, a number of adverse medical effects can occur, including upper
or lower extremity numbness; abdominal, shoulder, or groin pain;
respiratory distress; nausea; dizziness; and arrhythmias (Ex. 0088). At
least one of the adverse effects, orthostatic incompetence, can lead to
death (Ex. 0481). It is because of these hazards that Sec.
1926.502(d)(20) in Subpart M requires the employer to provide for
prompt rescue of employees in the event of a fall or to assure that
employees are able to rescue themselves. In any event, the hazards
associated with prolonged suspension in a body belt are substantially
more severe than the hazards associated with suspension in a harness.
In 1985, the U.S. Technical Advisory Group on Personal Equipment for
Protection Against Falling stated, in comments on another OSHA
rulemaking: "The length of time which a fallen person can tolerate
suspension in a body belt is measured in a very few minutes under the
most favorable conditions" (Ex. 0084). In addition, a 1984 U.S. Air
Force literature review recounted one study that found that "two
subjects evaluated in . . . waist belt[s] with shoulder straps
tolerated suspension for 1 min 21 sec and 3 min" (Ex. 0088).\115\ That
same study showed that subjects suspended in full body harnesses could
tolerate suspension for approximately 20 to 30 minutes (id.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\ Hearon, B.F., Brinkley, J.W., "Fall Arrest and Post-Fall
Suspension: Literature Review and Directions for Further Research,"
AFAMRL-TR-84-021, April 1984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The tree care industry commented that, to the extent injuries are
occurring, they are caused by the failure of employees to use any fall
protection, rather than by the use of body belts. (See, for example,
Exs. 0174, 0200.) This argument supports, rather than undermines, a
requirement for harnesses in personal fall arrest systems. To the
extent better enforcement of fall protection requirements by employers
is a critical component of protecting employees in aerial lifts,
harnesses are preferable to body belts. It is not always possible to
detect from the ground whether an employee is wearing a body belt, but
it is relatively easy to determine if an employee is wearing a body
harness (Tr. 972-973). If employees initially resist the use of body
harnesses, as suggested by some commenters (see, for example, Exs.
0174, 0200, 0219), employers must be proactive in communicating the
need for, and ensuring the use of, the required equipment.
The Agency concludes that the use of a 0.9-meter shock-absorbing
lanyard with a body belt, as proposed by the tree trimming industry, is
not an adequate substitute for the use of a harness in a fall arrest
system. OSHA has not been persuaded to abandon its finding in the
Subpart M rulemaking that body belts present unacceptable risks in fall
arrest situations and should be prohibited as components of fall arrest
equipment. OSHA is adopting in the final rule the requirement proposed
in paragraph (b)(1) that personal fall arrest equipment meet Subpart M
of Part 1926. This provision appears in final Sec. 1926.954(b)(1)(i).
ULCC noted what it perceived as an implied, but unstated, revision
in the proposal to the provisions contained in the general industry
aerial lift standard (Sec. 1910.67(c)(2)(v)) requiring employees
working in aerial lifts to use body belts and lanyards. (See, for
example, Ex. 0174.)
In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA explained that it was relying
on the provisions in the aerial lift standards to establish the
employer's duty to provide fall protection for employees, but that
Subpart M would govern the criteria fall arrest equipment must meet (70
FR 34850). In other words, for work covered by this rule, body belts
would not be permitted in personal fall arrest systems. The ULCC
commented: "OSHA's suggestion that [the aerial lift standard]
describes only the `duty' to use fall protection rather than the kind
of fall protection, respectfully, is a makeweight" (Ex. 0502).
In light of ULCC's comments, the Agency is concerned that some
employers reading the final rule may mistakenly assume that the body
belts required by Sec. Sec. 1910.67(c)(2)(v) and 1926.453(b)(2)(v)
remain acceptable for use in personal fall arrest systems. In addition,
the Agency wants to make it clear in the final rule that work-
positioning equipment is unacceptable from the horizontal working
surface of an aerial lift. Employees working from aerial lifts covered
by the final rule must be protected using either a fall restraint
system or a personal fall arrest system. Therefore, OSHA is adding a
provision in final Sec. Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(1) and
1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(A) providing that employees working from aerial
lifts be protected with a fall restraint system or a personal fall
arrest system and that the provisions of the aerial lift standards
requiring the use of body belts and lanyards do not apply. This
provision clearly states the requirement contained in the proposal. As
a consequence of this change, the final rule does not include the text
in Note 1 to proposed Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(iii)(C) and Note 1 to
proposed Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii) referring to fall protection for
aerial lifts or referencing the general industry and construction
standards on aerial lifts. (The corresponding notes in the final rule
are Note 1 to Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(2) and (g)(2)(iv)(C)(3) and
Note 1 to Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(B) and (b)(3)(iii)(C).)
OSHA is adopting revised requirements for work-positioning
equipment in Sec. 1926.954(b)(2).\116\ Section 1926.959 of existing
Subpart V contains requirements for body belts, safety straps,\117\ and
lanyards.\118\ This equipment was traditionally used as both work-
positioning equipment and fall arrest equipment in the maintenance and
construction of electric power transmission and distribution
installations. However, fall arrest equipment and work-positioning
equipment present significant differences in the way they are used and
in the forces they place on an employee's body. With fall arrest
equipment, an employee has freedom of movement within an area
restricted by the length of the lanyard or other device connecting the
employee to the anchorage. In contrast, and as explained earlier, work-
positioning equipment is used on a vertical surface to support an
employee in position while he or she works. The employee "leans" into
this equipment so that he or she can work with both hands free. If a
fall occurs while an employee is wearing fall arrest equipment, the
employee will free fall up to 1.8 meters (6 feet) before the slack is
removed and the equipment begins to arrest the fall. In this case, the
fall arrest forces can be high, and they need to be spread over a
relatively large area of the
body to avoid injury to the employee. Additionally, the velocity at
which an employee falls can reach up to 6.1 meters per second (20 feet
per second). Work-positioning equipment is normally used to prevent a
fall from occurring in the first place. If the employee slips and if
the work-positioning equipment is anchored, the employee will only fall
a short distance (no more than 0.6 meters (2 feet) under paragraph
(b)(3)(iv) of final Sec. 1926.954). This distance limits the forces on
the employee and the maximum velocity of a fall. Additionally, because
of the way the equipment is used, the employee should not be free
falling. Instead, the work-positioning equipment will be exerting some
force on the employee to stop the fall, thereby further limiting the
maximum force and velocity. As long as the employee is working on a
vertical surface, the chance of an employee using work-positioning
equipment falling out of, or being suspended at the waist in, a body
belt is extremely low.
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\116\ In Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(ii), OSHA proposed to require body
belts and positioning straps for work positioning to meet Sec.
1926.954(b)(2). The final rule duplicates the requirements of Sec.
1926.954(b)(2) in Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(iii) rather than referencing
them.
\117\ "Safety straps" is an older, deprecated term for
"positioning straps."
\118\ Existing Sec. 1926.500(a)(3)(iii) states that additional
performance requirements for personal climbing equipment, lineman's
body belts, safety straps, and lanyards are provided in subpart V.
OSHA is revising the language in this provision to make it
consistent with the terms used in final Subpart V. Furthermore,
because the Agency is adopting, in subpart V, an additional
requirement for fall arrest equipment used by employees exposed to
electric arcs (as described earlier in this section of the
preamble), OSHA is adding fall arrest equipment to the list of
equipment in Sec. 1926.500(a)(3)(iii). As revised, Sec.
1926.500(a)(3)(iii) states that additional performance requirements
for fall arrest and work-positioning equipment are provided in
Subpart V.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the final rule, OSHA is applying requirements to personal fall
arrest systems that differ from the requirements that apply to work-
positioning equipment. As discussed previously, personal fall arrest
systems must meet subpart M of part 1926, as required by paragraph
(b)(1)(i), supplemented by the requirement in final paragraph
(b)(1)(ii) that the equipment withstand exposure to electric arcs.
Work-positioning equipment must meet the requirements contained in
paragraph (b)(2) of the final rule. Employers engaged in electric power
transmission and distribution work may use the same equipment for fall
arrest and for work positioning provided the equipment meets both sets
of requirements. In fact, as noted in the preamble to the proposal,
several manufacturers market combination body harness-body belt
equipment, which can be used as fall arrest systems by employees
working on horizontal surfaces or as work-positioning systems
supporting employees working on vertical surfaces (70 FR 34850).
Paragraph (b)(2) of the final rule is based on existing Sec.
1926.959 and ASTM F887-04, Standard Specifications for Personal
Climbing Equipment, which was the latest edition of the national
consensus standard applicable to work-positioning equipment when OSHA
developed the proposed rule (Ex. 0055). Although OSHA is adopting
requirements derived from the ASTM standard, the final rule is written
in performance-oriented terms. Detailed specifications contained in the
ASTM standard, which do not directly impact the safety of employees,
were not included in the final rule. The Agency believes that this
approach will retain the protection for employees afforded by the ASTM
standard, while giving employers flexibility in meeting the OSHA
standard and accommodating future changes in the ASTM standard without
needing to change the OSHA standard. This is similar to the approach
OSHA took in final Sec. 1926.97, discussed previously.
While the ASTM standard does not cover lanyards, paragraph (b)(2),
as proposed, would have applied many of the requirements based on the
ASTM standard to lanyards. Existing Sec. 1926.959 imposes the same
basic requirements on lanyards.
OSHA requested comment on whether any of the proposed requirements
for work-positioning equipment should not be applicable to lanyards.
Some commenters supported the Agency's proposal. (See, for example,
Exs. 0211, 0230.) For instance, IBEW stated:
[L]anyards used for fall protection for electric power
transmission and distribution work [already] meet the requirements
of ASTM F887-04. Therefore these requirements, as proposed, should
be applicable to lanyards used for work positioning equipment. [Ex.
0230]
However, Buckingham Manufacturing Company, a manufacturer of work-
positioning equipment used by line workers, opposed the application of
some of the proposed requirements for work-positioning equipment to
lanyards:
Buckingham Mfg. recommends including a section on lanyards to
remove requirements outlined in the referenced sections that are not
applicable to lanyards such as: (b)(2)(vii) and including at least
criteria such as strength requirements for the rope or webbing used
to manufacture . . . a lanyard, the minimum number of rope tucks for
rope lanyards, the length of stitching for turnover at ends of web
lanyards, stitching used be of a contrasting color to facilitate
visual inspection, etc. [Ex. 0199]
ASTM F887-04 refers to the straps used with work-positioning
equipment as "positioning straps," not lanyards.\119\ That consensus
standard uses the term "lanyard" only with respect to personal fall
arrest equipment. In addition, subpart M uses the term "lanyard" only
in the requirements applicable to personal fall arrest systems in Sec.
1926.502(d). However, existing Sec. 1926.959 applies to "body belts,
safety straps, and lanyards" used for either work positioning or fall
arrest. Because the term "lanyard" is most typically used with
reference to fall arrest equipment, OSHA is concerned that using that
term in requirements for work-positioning equipment could lead
employers or employees to believe that work-positioning equipment is
acceptable for use in fall arrest situations, for example, when an
employee is working from a horizontal surface. For these reasons, OSHA
decided to use the term "positioning strap" instead of lanyard in
final paragraph (b)(2) to describe the strap used to connect a body
belt to an anchorage in work-positioning equipment. Thus, any strap
used with work-positioning equipment is a "positioning strap" for the
purposes of paragraph (b)(2). This language also should address
Buckingham Manufacturing's concerns that some of the proposed
requirements were inapplicable to lanyards. The Agency believes that
Buckingham Manufacturing's comment was referring to lanyards used with
personal fall arrest systems, which OSHA recognizes may not meet all of
the requirements for positioning straps in final Sec. 1926.954(b)(2).
Paragraph (b)(2)(vii) contains specifications for positioning straps
that are essential to electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work, including requirements for electrical performance,
strength, and flame resistance (Ex. 0055). Lanyards, which are used
with personal fall arrest systems, have to meet appropriate strength
and, if necessary, arc-resistance requirements under subpart M and
final Sec. 1926.954(b)(1)(ii).
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\119\ ASTM F887-12\e1\ uses the term "adjustable positioning
lanyards" for equipment used as part of certain positioning
devices. OSHA treats these lanyards as "positioning straps" under
the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (b)(2)(i), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, requires hardware for body belts and
positioning straps to be made from drop-forged steel, pressed steel,
formed steel, or equivalent material. This hardware also must have a
corrosion-resistant finish. Surfaces must be smooth and free of sharp
edges. These requirements ensure that the hardware is durable, strong
enough to withstand the forces likely to be imposed, and free of sharp
edges that could damage other parts of the work-positioning equipment.
These requirements are equivalent to existing Sec. 1926.959(a)(1),
except that the existing standard does not permit hardware to be made
of any material other than drop-forged or pressed steel. Although ASTM
F887-04 requires hardware to be made
of drop-forged steel,\120\ OSHA explained in the preamble to the
proposal that, while the drop-forged steel process produces hardware
that more uniformly meets the required strength criteria and will
retain its strength over a longer period than pressed or formed steel,
it is possible for other processes to produce hardware that is
equivalent in terms of strength and durability (70 FR 34851).
Paragraphs (d)(1) and (e)(3) of Sec. 1926.502 already permit
"connectors" (that is, "hardware" as that term is used in this
final rule) to be made of materials other than drop-forged or pressed
steel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\ The current edition of this standard, ASTM F887-12\e1\,
also requires hardware to be made from drop-forged steel in Section
15.4.1.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA invited comments on whether alternative materials would
provide adequate safety to employees. Most commenters responding to
this issue supported the proposed language accepting the use of
equivalent materials. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0162, 0173, 0175,
0186, 0230.) For instance, Ms. Salud Layton of the Virginia, Maryland &
Delaware Association of Electric Cooperatives commented:
We support the flexibility OSHA [is] offering in this area.
Allowing hardware to be made of material other than drop-forged or
pressed steel allows for potential alternatives to be evaluated for
use. Other material, however, must meet the strength and durability
criteria of drop-forged or pressed steel materials. [Ex. 0175]
Other commenters supported the proposal because it would permit the use
of alternative materials that might be developed in the future (Exs.
0162, 0186, 0230). Mr. Daniel Shipp with ISEA commented that the "use
of non-ferrous materials, including high-tensile aluminum with [a]
protective anodize coating, is common" and noted that there are
"criteria [available] for evaluating the equivalence between forged
alloy steel and other materials" (Ex. 0211).
Although OSHA received no outright opposition to the proposal, ASTM
Committee F18 on Electrical Protective Equipment for Workers, the
committee responsible for developing ASTM F887, submitted the following
statement from Mr. Hans Nichols, P.E., Metallurgical Consulting:
My opinion is that forgings are superior to stampings. The
principal advantage of forgings is control of grain direction to
match the part geometry. The grain direction of a stamping will be
oriented transverse to the part in some areas. Since the mechanical
properties, i.e.--yield strength and impact strength, are lower in
the transverse direction, this area of the part would be a weak
point. [Ex. 0148]
OSHA agrees that some materials have advantages over others and
expects that manufacturers typically base their design decisions on
factors such as these. However, the fact that forgings may result in
more uniform strength throughout a material than stampings is not
relevant to the overall strength of hardware. It is the area of least
strength that determines whether hardware has sufficient overall
strength, and the design-test requirements in the final rule (discussed
later in this section of the preamble) ensure that hardware, and the
entire work-positioning system, are sufficiently strong. In other
words, the testing requirements in the rule ensure that the weakest
part of the weakest piece of the system will not fail under conditions
likely to be encountered during use. In addition, the final rule
requires that the hardware be made of material that has strength and
durability equivalent to that of drop-forged, pressed, or formed steel,
materials used successfully for work-positioning equipment for decades.
Therefore, OSHA is including paragraph (b)(2)(i) in the final rule
substantially as proposed.
Paragraph (b)(2)(ii), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, requires buckles to be capable of
withstanding an 8.9-kilonewton (2,000-pound-force) tension test with a
maximum permanent deformation no greater than 0.4 millimeters (0.0156
inches). This requirement, which also can be found in existing Sec.
1926.959(a)(2), will ensure that buckles do not fail if a fall occurs.
Paragraph (b)(2)(iii), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, requires that D rings be capable of
withstanding a 22-kilonewton (5,000-pound-force) tensile test without
cracking or breaking. (A D ring is a metal ring in the shape of a
"D." See Figure 2, which shows a snaphook and a D ring.) This
provision, which is equivalent to existing Sec. 1926.959(a)(3), will
ensure that D rings do not fail if a fall occurs.
Paragraph (b)(2)(iv), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, is equivalent to existing Sec.
1926.959(a)(4) and requires snaphooks to be capable of withstanding a
22-kilonewton (5,000-pound-force) tension test without failure. A note
following this provision indicates that distortion of the snaphook
sufficient to release the keeper is considered to be tensile failure.
The language of the note in the final rule was revised from the
proposal to make it clear that such distortion is only one form of
failure. The snaphook breaking completely is a more obvious failure not
mentioned in the note.
Paragraph (b)(2)(v), which is being adopted without change from the
proposal, prohibits leather or leather substitutes from being used
alone as a load-bearing component of a body-belt and positioning-strap
assembly. This is a new requirement for Subpart V and was derived from
ASTM F887-04, Sections 14.2.1 and 15.2.1.\121\ The requirement is
necessary because leather and leather substitutes do not retain their
strength as they age. Because this loss in strength is not always easy
to detect by visual inspection, it can lead to failure under fall
conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\ These requirements are also contained in the latest
edition, ASTM F887-12\e1\, in Sections 14.2.1 and 15.2.1.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (b)(2)(vi), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, requires that plied fabric used in
positioning straps and in load-bearing portions of body belts be
constructed so that no raw edges are exposed and the plies do not
separate. This new requirement, which also is based on ASTM F887-04, in
this instance, Sections 14.2.2 and 15.2.2, will prevent plied fabric
from separating, which could cause it to fail under fall
conditions.\122\
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\122\ These requirements are also contained in the latest
edition, ASTM F887-12\e1\, in Sections 14.2.2 and 15.2.1.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although work-positioning equipment used in electric power
transmission and distribution work is not to be used as insulation from
live parts, positioning straps could come into accidental contact with
live parts while an employee is working. Thus, OSHA deems it important
for this equipment to provide a specified level of insulation.
Accordingly, the Agency proposed, in paragraphs (b)(2)(vii)(A) and
(b)(2)(vii)(B), to require positioning straps to be capable of passing
dielectric and leakage current tests.\123\ Similar requirements are
found in existing Sec. 1926.959(b)(1). The voltages listed in the
proposed paragraphs were alternating current. A note following proposed
paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B) indicated that equivalent direct current tests
also would be acceptable.
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\123\ The dielectric and leakage-current tests required by these
paragraphs involve attaching electrodes to the fall protection
equipment, applying a test voltage across the electrodes, and
checking for deterioration (in the case of the dielectric test) or
measuring leakage current (in the case of the leakage-current test).
ASTM F887-12\e1\ includes test methods for these two tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the preamble to the proposed rule, OSHA explained that ASTM
F887-04 did not require positioning straps to pass a withstand-voltage
test (70 FR
34851). Instead, the consensus standard stated in a note that the
fabric used in the positioning straps must pass a withstand-voltage
test. The Agency invited comment on whether performing electrical tests
on positioning straps is necessary for employee safety in electric
transmission and distribution work (that is, whether the requirements
proposed in paragraphs (b)(2)(vii)(A) and (b)(2)(vii)(B) were
necessary).\124\ A number of commenters responded to this question.
Some commenters supported OSHA's proposal. (See, for example, Exs.
0148, 0230.) For instance, IBEW explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\ The preamble to the proposal asked specifically about the
withstand test requirement proposed in paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(A);
however, most commenters responded to the question of whether there
is a need to perform electrical tests on positioning straps (the
withstand test and the leakage test proposed in paragraph
(b)(2)(vii)(B)).
Positioning straps should offer a minimum level of insulation in
the event [the] strap comes in contact with energized parts. The
manufacturing specifications from ASTM F887-04 do not ensure the
positioning strap actually offers any level of insulation. As stated
in the proposal, the ASTM requirements only require the fabric used
to make the strap be tested for leakage current. Other products used
[in] the manufacture of the strap could . . . jeopardize the
electrical [insulation] integrity of the fabric. Therefore, the
leakage current of the finished product will not be known without a
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
separate test. [Ex. 0230]
ASTM commented that "requirements in ASTM F887 04 for leakage
current and withstand testing of the positioning strap material in
Sections 15.3.1 and 15.3.1--Note 2 are adequate for the performance of
the positioning strap" (Ex. 0148). The organization recommended that
the ASTM language "be repeated in the Final 1926.954, or incorporated
by reference" (id.).
Other commenters did not see a need to perform electrical tests on
positioning straps. (See, for example, Exs. 0162, 0173, 0186, 0219.)
For instance, Mr. Anthony Ahern with Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives
argued: "Given the environment these devices will be used in, within 5
minutes of being used the first time they will probably have enough
dirt and wood preservative ground into them that they couldn't pass
such a test again" (Ex. 0186). He also noted that this equipment has
been in service for years and he is not aware of any accidents that
have occurred due to the breakdown of a positioning strap (id.). Mr.
Allen Oracion with Energy United EMC maintained that positioning straps
will be separated from energized parts by at least the minimum approach
distance, making withstand tests unnecessary (Ex. 0219).
OSHA believes that requiring positioning straps to be capable of
passing the electrical tests in proposed Sec. 1926.954(b)(2)(vii)(A)
and (b)(2)(vii)(B) will provide an additional measure of protection to
employees if a conductor or other energized part slips and lands on the
strap or if the strap slips from the employee's hand and lands on an
energized part. In response to Mr. Oracion's comment, the Agency notes
that the minimum approach distance will not always protect employees
exposed to electric-shock hazards. For example, minimum approach
distances do not apply to conductors on which work is being performed
by employees using rubber insulating gloves (as explained under the
discussion of Sec. 1926.960(c)(1) of the final rule). The proposed
withstand- and leakage-testing requirements will confirm that the
fabric used in the manufacture of the strap will provide insulation
from electrical contact and that the manufacturing process that created
the strap did not compromise the fabric's insulating properties.
Although the equipment may become contaminated during use, as noted by
Mr. Ahern, the inspection requirements in Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(i) of
the final rule (discussed later in this section of the preamble) will
ensure that any contamination that can affect the insulating properties
of the equipment will be identified and removed. In addition, any
contamination will normally be on the portion of the positioning strap
in contact with a pole; the remaining portion of the strap will still
provide a measure of protection.
The testing requirements in final paragraphs (b)(2)(vii)(A) and
(b)(2)(vii)(B) are also equivalent to the tests required by ASTM F887-
12\e1\ (Section 15.3.1 and Note 2). It is not clear why ASTM included
the requirement that positioning straps pass a withstand test in a note
rather than in the rule itself. OSHA is including the requirement that
positioning straps be capable of passing a withstand test in the text
of final Sec. 1926.954(b)(2)(vii)(A) to make it clear that this
provision is mandatory. The Agency believes that straps currently being
manufactured and used usually meet the final provisions. There is no
evidence in the rulemaking record that current positioning straps do
not meet these requirements. Therefore, OSHA is including paragraphs
(b)(2)(vii)(A) and (b)(2)(vii)(B) in the final rule as proposed.
Paragraphs (b)(2)(vii)(C) and (b)(2)(vii)(D), which are being
adopted without substantive change from the proposal, contain new
requirements for positioning straps to be capable of passing tension
tests and buckle-tear tests. These tests are based on ASTM F887-04,
sections 15.3.2 and 15.3.3, and will ensure that individual parts of
positioning straps have adequate strength and will not fail during a
fall.\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\ These requirements are also contained in the latest
edition, ASTM F887-12\e1\, in Section 15.3.2 and 15.3.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(E) requires positioning straps to be capable
of passing a flammability test (described in Table V-1). This
requirement, and the test in Table V-1, are based on ASTM F887-04,
Section 15.3.4.\126\ If an electric arc occurs while an employee is
working, the work-positioning equipment must be capable of supporting
the employee in case he or she loses consciousness. It is particularly
important for the positioning strap to be resistant to igniting,
because, once ignited, it would quickly lose its strength and fail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\126\ This requirement is also contained in the latest edition,
ASTM F887-12\e1\, in Section 15.3.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Pat McAlister with Henry County REMC questioned the "value in
the proposed arc testing requirement" because his company was "not
aware of any situation where exposure to thermal energy has contributed
to failure of" positioning straps (Ex. 0210).
OSHA responds that, although paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(E) will help
ensure that positioning straps do not fail if an electric arc occurs,
the standard just requires positioning straps to be capable of passing
a flammability test; the standard does not require electric-arc
testing. As noted later in the discussion of Sec. 1926.960(g) of the
final rule, electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
work exposes employees to hazards from electric arcs. Paragraph
(b)(2)(vii)(E) of Sec. 1926.954 protects against some of those
hazards, including ignition of the positioning strap, which could lead
to failure of the strap and burns to the employee. ASTM F887 has
required positioning straps to be capable of passing a flammability
test since 1988, so the Agency is not surprised that Mr. McAlister is
not aware of failures of positioning straps in electric-arc exposures.
Having ASTM adopt a requirement for positioning straps to pass a
flammability test is evidence that the consensus of industry opinion is
that such testing is necessary. Therefore, OSHA is including paragraph
(b)(2)(vii)(E) in the final rule as proposed. (OSHA, however, has made
nonsubstantive, clarifying changes to final Table V-1.)
Paragraph (b)(2)(viii), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, requires the cushion part of a body belt to
be at least 76 millimeters (3 inches) wide, with no exposed rivets on
the inside. This requirement is equivalent to existing Sec.
1926.959(b)(2)(i) and (ii).
Existing Sec. 1926.959(b)(2)(iii), which requires the cushion part
of the body belt to be at least 0.15625 inches thick if made of
leather, was omitted from the final rule. The strength of the body belt
assembly, which this existing provision addresses, is now adequately
addressed by the performance-based strength criteria specified in final
Sec. 1926.954(b)(2)(xii) (discussed later in this section of the
preamble). Additionally, as noted previously, load-bearing portions of
the body belt may no longer be constructed of leather alone under
paragraph (b)(2)(v) of the final rule.
Paragraph (b)(2)(ix), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, requires that tool loops on a body belt be
situated so that the 100 millimeters (4 inches) at the center of the
back of the body belt (measured from D ring to D ring) are free of tool
loops and other attachments. OSHA based this requirement on ASTM F887-
04, Section 14.4.3, which is similar to existing Sec. 1926.959(b)(3).
This requirement will prevent spine injuries to employees who fall onto
their backs while wearing a body belt, which could happen to an
employee walking on the ground before or after climbing a pole.
Existing Sec. 1926.959(b)(2)(iv) requires body belts to contain
pocket tabs for attaching tool pockets. ASTM F887-04 also contained a
requirement that body belts have pocket tabs. In the proposal, OSHA
stated that it did not consider provisions regarding pocket tabs to be
necessary for the protection of employees; the Agency believed that
these requirements ensured that body belts were suitable as tool belts,
but did not contribute significantly to the safety of employees (70 FR
34851).
ASTM Committee F18 on Electrical Protective Equipment for Workers
clarified the purpose of the requirements for pocket tabs in the
consensus standard as follows:
[Pocket tabs are] addressed in ASTM F887-04, Section
14.4.1\[127]\ as follows: "The belt shall have pocket tabs
extending at least 1\1/2\ (3.8 cm) down, and with the
point of attachment at least 3 in. (7.6 cm) back of the inside of
the circle dee rings on each side for the attachment of pliers or
tool pockets. On shifting dee belts, the measurement for pocket tabs
shall be taken when the dee ring section is centered."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\ Section 14.3.1 in ASTM F887-12\e1\ contains an identical
requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
The primary reason for the specific placement of these pocket
tabs is to assist in eliminating the interference of tools being
carried on the belt with the proper engagement of a positioning
strap snaphook into the body belt dee ring.
Therefore, this detail is important for the safety of employees
using these body belts. [Ex. 0148]
The committee recommended that OSHA either adopt the ASTM language or
incorporate it by reference.
OSHA does not believe that pocket tabs are a hazard. The tabs are
flush with the body belt and extend down from it. They do not interfere
with the attachment of snaphooks to the D rings. OSHA agrees that tool
pockets fastened to the tabs, or the tools in those pockets, could
interfere under certain conditions. For example, a large tool or pocket
could interfere with the attachment of snaphooks and D rings even with
the tabs positioned as required by the consensus standard. The Agency
believes that this hazard is better addressed by the general
requirement in final paragraph (b)(3)(i) (discussed later in this
section of the preamble) that work-positioning equipment be inspected
to ensure that it is in safe working condition before use. In addition,
the ASTM committee did not explain why tabs are necessary in the first
place. Therefore, OSHA is not adopting the committee's recommendation
to add the ASTM requirement on pocket tabs in the final rule.
Existing Sec. 1926.959(b)(3) permits a maximum of four tool loops
on body belts. As explained in the preamble to the proposal, OSHA does
not believe that this provision is necessary for the protection of
employees (70 FR 34851). Like existing Sec. 1926.959(b)(2)(iv), this
requirement ensures only that body belts are suitable as tool belts.
OSHA received no comments on the proposed removal of this requirement,
and the final rule removes this requirement from subpart V.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\ Existing Sec. 1926.959(b)(3) also requires the 100-
millimeter (4-inch) section of the body belt in the middle of the
back to be free of tool loops and other attachments. This portion of
the existing paragraph is retained as Sec. 1926.954(b)(2)(ix) in
the final rule, as described previously.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (b)(2)(x), which is being adopted without change from the
proposal, requires copper, steel, or equivalent liners to be used
around the bars of D rings. This provision, which duplicates existing
Sec. 1926.959(b)(4), will prevent wear between the D ring and the body
belt fabric. Such wear could contribute to failure of the body belt
during use.
In paragraph (b)(2)(xi), OSHA proposed that snaphooks used as part
of work-positioning equipment be of the locking type. A snaphook has a
keeper designed to prevent the D ring to which it is attached from
coming out of the opening of the snaphook. (See Figure 1.) However, if
the design of the snaphook is not compatible with the design of the D
ring, the D ring can roll around, press open the keeper, and free
itself from the snaphook. (See Figure 2.)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.000
For many years, ASTM F887 had a requirement that snaphooks be
compatible with the D rings with which they were used. Even with this
requirement, however, accidents resulting from snaphook roll-outs still
occurred. As OSHA explained in the preamble to the proposal, several
factors account for this condition (70 FR 34852). First, while one
manufacturer can (and most do) thoroughly test its snaphooks and its D
rings to ensure "compatibility," no manufacturer can test its
hardware in every conceivable combination with other manufacturers'
hardware, especially since some models of snaphooks and D rings are no
longer manufactured. While an employer might be able to test all of the
different hardware combinations with its existing equipment, the
employer normally does not have the expertise necessary to conduct such
tests in a comprehensive manner. Second, snaphook keepers can be
depressed by objects other than the D rings to which they are attached.
For example, a loose guy (a support line) could fall onto the keeper
while an employee is repositioning himself or herself. This situation
could allow the D ring to escape from the snaphook, and the employee
would fall as soon as he or she leaned back into the work-positioning
equipment. The locking-type snaphooks OSHA proposed to require will not
open unless employees release the locking mechanisms.
A few commenters objected to the requirement for locking snaphooks,
maintaining that existing pole straps with nonlocking snaphooks have
been used safely and effectively for many years. (See, for example,
Exs. 0210, 0225.) Mr. Jonathan Glazier with the National Rural Electric
Cooperative Association (NRECA) questioned the safety benefits of
locking snaphooks, commenting:
Is the cost of replacing the thousands of non-locking snaphooks
in use today outweighed by the benefit? Certainly workers are
familiar with the rudimentary technology presented by non-locking
snaphooks, so the danger they present is low. [Ex. 0233]
A majority of the rulemaking participants who commented on this
issue agreed that the proposed requirement for locking snaphooks was
justified. (See, for example, Exs. 0167, 0169, 0213; Tr. 579.) For
instance, Quanta Services commented that "the current requirement [to
use] snaphooks compatible with the particular D rings with which they
are used is not sufficient because accidents from snaphook rollover
still occur" and agreed with OSHA that the proposal to require locking
snaphooks "will provide greater protection" (Ex. 0169).
Snaphook rollout is a recognized hazard, as indicated by updated
requirements in the consensus standard. The ASTM committee believed
that the former requirement for compatibility between snaphooks and D
rings was inadequate to protect employees; thus, the committee included
a requirement for locking snaphooks in ASTM F887-04 (Ex. 0055).
Evidence in the record indicates that the committee was correct; one
exhibit showed that two workers were killed when the snaphooks they
were using apparently rolled out (Ex. 0003).\129\ OSHA considered the
record on this issue and concluded that the proposed requirement for
locking snaphooks is justified; therefore, the Agency is including the
proposed provision in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\ Descriptions of these two accidents can be viewed at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=922336&id=14340061.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Lee Marchessault with Workplace Safety Solutions recommended
that the term "double locking type" be used rather than "locking
type" (Ex. 0196; Tr. 579). His comment addressed the reference to
locking snaphooks in proposed paragraph (b)(3)(vi) (discussed later in
this section of the preamble), but, because paragraph (b)(2)(xi)
contains the requirement that snaphooks on positioning straps be of the
locking type, his comment applies equally here.
The devices specified in the standard are "locking snaphooks."
They are also known as "double-locking snaphooks." However, this
latter term is a misnomer. There is only a single locking mechanism.
The keeper, which "keeps" the snaphook on the D ring, is not self-
locking. Consequently, these devices are correctly known as "locking
snaphooks," and OSHA is using this term in the final rule.
In issuing the proposal, OSHA recognized that there might be
thousands of existing nonlocking snaphooks currently in use and
requested comment on whether it should phase in the requirement for
locking snaphooks for older equipment or allow employers to continue
using existing equipment that otherwise complies with the standard
until it wears out and must be replaced.
Several commenters recommended grandfathering existing equipment
and requiring that only newly purchased positioning straps be equipped
with locking snaphooks. (See, for example, Exs. 0162, 0175, 0210, 0224,
0225, 0227, 0233.) For instance, the Virginia, Maryland & Delaware
Association of Electric Cooperatives commented:
[G]randfathering existing equipment for those companies that
have not started utilizing locking snap-hooks is prudent. For
companies currently using older equipment, the requirement should be
that as the older equipment is phased out or worn out, new equipment
must be the locking snap-hook type. [Ex. 0175]
In addition, Mr. Glazier with NRECA was concerned that requiring an
immediate switch to locking snaphooks could lead to a shortage of
compliant equipment (Ex. 0233).
Other commenters argued that there should be little or no phase-in
period because nonlocking snaphooks have not been available for over 10
years and because employees would be left at risk. (See, for example,
Exs. 0148, 0199, 0212.) TVA commented that it had "prohibited
nonlocking snaphooks for a number of years" before OSHA's proposal
(Ex. 0213). The Southern Company and ASTM Committee F18 recommended a
phase-in period of no more than 12 months (Exs. 0148, 0212). Buckingham
Manufacturing Company recommended a phase-in period of no more than 3
months (Ex. 0199).
According to the ASTM committee, manufacturers stopped producing
nonlocking snaphooks before 1998 (Ex. 0148). In addition, evidence in
the record indicates that the average useful life of a body belt or
body harness is 5 years (Ex. 0080). The Agency believes that the useful
life of positioning straps (to which snaphooks are affixed) also is
approximately 5 years because they are made from the same materials and
are subject to the same conditions of use. Thus, any nonlocking
snaphooks still remaining in use are substantially beyond their
expected useful life and are probably in need of replacement. In
addition, there is evidence in the record that the vast majority of
positioning straps in use already have locking snaphooks. Mr. James
Tomaseski of IBEW testified that, based on a survey of the union's
members, 80 percent of electric utilities and contractors performing
work covered by the final rule require the use of locking snaphooks
(Tr. 976). He also testified that locking snaphooks are used even by
companies that do not require them and that there will not be a problem
with availability (Tr. 975-976). Therefore, OSHA concludes that a
phase-in period of 90 days should be adequate to comply with the
requirement. Compliance with paragraph (b)(2)(xi) is required on the
effective date of the final rule: July 10, 2014.
OSHA proposed three requirements for locking snaphooks to ensure
that keepers do not open without employees intentionally releasing
them. First, for the keeper to open, a locking mechanism would have to
be released, or a destructive force would have to be impressed on the
keeper (paragraph (b)(2)(xi)(A)). Second, a force in the range of 6.7 N
(1.5 lbf) to 17.8 N (4 lbf) would be required to release the locking
mechanism (paragraph (b)(2)(xi)(B)). Third, with a force on the keeper
and the locking mechanism released, the keeper must be designed not to
open with a force of 11.2 N (2.5 lbf) or less, and the keeper must
begin to open before the force exceeds 17.8 N (4 lbf) (paragraph
(b)(2)(xi)(C)).\130\ These requirements are based on ASTM F887-04,
section 15.4.1.\131\ Proposed paragraph (b)(2)(xi)(C), relating to the
spring tension on the keeper, was equivalent to existing Sec.
1926.959(b)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\ In proposed paragraphs (b)(2)(xi)(B) and (b)(2)(xi)(C),
the metric units were not equal to the English units. The metric
units were corrected in the final rule.
\131\ These requirement are also contained in the latest
edition, ASTM F887-12\e1\, in Section 15.4.2.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Daniel Shipp with ISEA objected to these proposed requirements
and maintained that the provisions on work-positioning equipment should
be consistent with Sec. 1910.66 (Powered platforms for building
maintenance), Appendix C, and Sec. 1926.502 (Fall protection systems
criteria and practices), commenting:
Neither of these [existing] standards set forth detailed
specifications for the forces required to actuate the locking and
gate mechanisms of snaphooks. The determining factors that relate
most closely to incidents of accidental disengagement of a snaphook
from its connector are (a) the compatibility in size and shape of
the connecting element, and (b) the tensile strength of the gate in
the closed and locked position, which are fully discussed in 1910.66
and 1926.502. It is difficult to envision one range of force
requirements that would apply equally to all locking snaphooks
because of the wide variety of existing and possible snaphook
designs.
OSHA should limit its regulation of self-closing and self-
locking snaphooks to use in work positioning applications that
follow existing fall protection regulations. The addition of further
restrictive requirements will have the effect of possibly
eliminating otherwise safe and efficient equipment from the
marketplace without any demonstrable improvement in worker safety.
[Ex. 0211]
It is not clear from Mr. Shipp's comment whether he opposes the
requirement that snaphooks be of the locking type. If he does, there is
ample evidence in the record, as discussed previously, to support the
adoption of a requirement for locking snaphooks. Therefore, the Agency
will focus on his comments relating to the forces used to unlock and
open keepers. The proposed paragraphs ensure the adequacy of the
locking mechanism by requiring a destructive force to open the keeper
if it is not first unlocked and by specifying the minimum force
required to open the locking mechanism. The proposed paragraphs also
ensure that the keeper does not open unintentionally if the locking
mechanism is opened accidentally (for example, by a loose conductor
striking it), or if it breaks.
In addition to specifying minimum forces, the proposed paragraphs
specified the maximum forces necessary to open the locking mechanism
and the keeper when the locking mechanism is open. Because this
equipment is frequently used with rubber insulating gloves and leather
protectors, employees have limited dexterity when they are opening and
closing keepers (Ex. 0173). Snaphook keepers that are too difficult to
unlock or open by employees wearing rubber insulating gloves could
interfere with connecting a snaphook to a D ring and lead to falls. In
addition, employees develop a rhythm, buckling and unbuckling the
positioning straps into the D rings of their body belts (see, for
example, 269-Ex. 3-11). Snaphook keepers that are too difficult to
unlock or open will interfere with this rhythm, potentially leading to
falls. These conditions are not present for employees working from
power platforms covered by Sec. 1910.66 or in general construction
work covered by Sec. 1926.502.
As noted previously, existing subpart V already requires the
opening force on the keeper to be within the range specified in the
proposal. Also, the inclusion of similar provisions in ASTM F887 is
evidence that the ASTM committee concluded that there is a need for the
requirements proposed in paragraph (b)(2)(xi). For these reasons,
OSHA is including paragraphs (b)(2)(xi)(A), (b)(2)(xi)(B), and
(b)(2)(xi)(C) in the final rule as proposed. (As previously noted, OSHA
has corrected the metric units in these provisions in the final rule.)
Mr. Frank Owen Brockman of Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative
Corporation recommended that OSHA prohibit the use of any snaphook that
requires employees to remove gloves before opening the snaphook (Ex.
0173). As noted earlier, the objective performance requirements in
paragraph (b)(2)(xi) will ensure that snaphooks meeting the standard
are usable by employees wearing rubber insulating gloves and leather
protectors. The Agency does not believe that adding a requirement that
snaphooks be capable of being opened by an employee wearing gloves will
improve the safety of these devices. OSHA believes, however, that
employers will consider this facet of snaphook design when selecting
positioning straps, if only to minimize employee complaints.
Existing Sec. 1926.959(b)(7) requires body belts, safety straps,
and lanyards to be capable of passing a drop test in which a test load
is dropped from a specific height and the equipment arrests the fall.
The test consists of dropping a 113.4-kg (250-lbm) bag of sand a
distance of either 1.2 meters (4 feet) or 1.8 meters (6 feet), for
safety straps and lanyards, respectively.\132\
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\132\ As noted earlier, existing Sec. 1926.959 covers body
belts, safety straps, and lanyards as both fall arrest and work-
positioning equipment. Paragraph (b)(2) of final Sec. 1926.954
covers only work-positioning equipment. Lanyards, which are used in
fall arrest and are not covered in final Sec. 1926.954(b)(2), have
to be capable of withstanding higher forces as required by Sec.
1926.502(d)(9).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA explained in the preamble to the proposal that ASTM adopted a
different test in ASTM F887-04 (70 FR 34853). Under the existing OSHA
test, the bag of sand can be fitted with the body belt in different
ways, resulting in tests that are not necessarily consistent among
different testing laboratories. To overcome this problem, ASTM 887-04
adopted a drop test that uses a rigid steel mass of a specified design.
To compensate for differences between a rigid mass and the more
deformable human body, the ASTM standard uses a lower test mass, 100 kg
(220 lbm), and a shorter drop height, 1 meter (39.4 inches). OSHA
proposed to replace the drop test in existing Sec. 1926.959(b)(7) with
a test modeled on the test specified in the 2004 ASTM standard.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\ ASTM F887-12\e1\ specifies equivalent test procedures and
criteria for this equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed paragraph (b)(2)(xii)(A) would have required the test mass
to be rigidly constructed of steel or equivalent material having a mass
of 100 kg (220.5 lbm). OSHA explained in the proposal that this mass
was comparable to the 113.4-kg (250-lbm) bag of sand that must be used
under the existing OSHA standard (70 FR 34853). Even though the
proposed test mass was lighter than a heavy power line worker, OSHA
explained that the proposed test method would place significantly more
stress on the equipment than an employee of the same mass because the
test drop was greater than the maximum permitted free-fall distance and
because the test mass was rigid (id.).
Proposed paragraphs (b)(2)(xii)(B) and (b)(2)(xii)(C) specified the
means used to attach body belts and positioning straps during testing.
These provisions would ensure that the work-positioning equipment being
tested was properly attached to the test apparatus.
Proposed paragraph (b)(2)(xii)(D) provided for the test mass to be
dropped an unobstructed distance of 1 meter (39.4 inches). OSHA
explained in the preamble that, for positioning straps, this distance
was equivalent (given the rigid test mass) to the existing standard's
test distance of 1.2 meters (4 feet) (70 FR 34853).
Proposed paragraphs (b)(2)(xii)(E) and (b)(2)(xii)(F) specified the
following acceptance criteria for tested equipment: (1) Body belts
would have had to arrest the fall successfully and be capable of
supporting the test mass after the test, and (2) positioning straps
would have had to successfully arrest the fall without breaking or
allowing an arresting force exceeding 17.8 kilonewtons (4,000 pounds-
force). Additionally, the proposal provided that snaphooks on
positioning straps not distort sufficiently to allow release of the
keeper.
OSHA requested comment on whether the proposed test was reasonable
and appropriate and, more specifically, whether the requirement for a
rigid test mass of 100 kg (220.5 lbm) dropped a distance of 1 meter
(39.4 inches) was sufficiently protective.
Most rulemaking participants who commented on this issue supported
the proposed requirements. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0199, 0230.)
For instance, IBEW commented:
This change has been accepted in the ASTM standard. The ASTM
Technical Subcommittee realized more consistent results were
necessary, and therefore, through experimentation with different
test methods, developed the test method using a specific design of a
rigid steel mass. OSHA should recognize this test method as the best
industry practice. [Ex. 0230]
Two commenters noted that the test mass specified in the proposed
rule was adequate for workers weighing up to 140 kg (310 lbm) (Exs.
0199, 0211). Mr. James Rullo of Buckingham Manufacturing explained:
The standard conversion factor used in the industry for the sand
bag to steel mass is 1.4 which when applied to the 220.5 lbm equates
to 310 lbm. That would seem to cover the general range of line
workers. In addition, the straight drop with the wire cable imposes
forces on the equipment which we believe to be more severe than most
falls that might be experienced by line workers. [Ex. 0199]
Mr. Daniel Shipp with ISEA supported the proposal's requirement for
testing with a 100-kg rigid test mass, but recommended a modification
for workers weighing more than 140 kg:
ISEA supports the change to a test mass of rigid steel
construction, weighing 100 kg (220 lb). Our members' experience in
testing fall protection products leads us to conclude that the rigid
mass will produce more repeatable results than testing with a sand-
filled bag. However, we believe the 100 kg test mass should only be
sufficient to qualify products for use by employees with a maximum
body weight up to 140 kg (310 lb). For employees with weights
greater [than] 140 kg (310 lb), including body weight, clothing,
tools and other user-borne objects, the test should be modified to
increase the test mass proportionately greater than 100 kg (220 lb).
For example, for a worker with an all-up weight of 160 kg (354 lb),
the test mass should be increased to 114 kg (251 lb). [Ex. 0211]
The ASTM committee and the fall-protection equipment-manufacturing
industry recognize the proposed tests as being reasonable and adequate.
As some of the commenters noted, the proposed test mass will impose
sufficient stress on work-positioning equipment for a worker weighing
140 kg (310 lbm), including tools and equipment. However, OSHA
concludes that the proposed test is insufficiently protective for
workers weighing more than 140 kg when fully equipped. Therefore, the
Agency is adopting paragraph (b)(2)(xii)(A) as proposed, except that
the final rule requires work-positioning equipment used by employees
with an equipped weight of more than 140 kg to be capable of passing
the same test, but with a test mass of proportionally greater mass
(that is, the test mass must equal the mass of the equipped worker
divided by 1.4). With this change, the final rule will ensure that
work-positioning equipment will adequately protect even the heaviest
workers. OSHA believes that, if any equipped worker has a mass greater
than 140 kg, the employer will order work-positioning equipment that is
adequate for the increased mass and that
manufacturers will supply work-positioning equipment that has been
tested with a mass that conforms to the standard.
In the final rule, OSHA is adopting the remaining provisions in
Sec. 1926.954(b)(2)(xii), namely paragraphs (b)(2)(xii)(B) through
(b)(2)(xii)(F), without substantive change from the proposal.
OSHA proposed three notes to paragraph (b)(2). The first note
indicated that paragraph (b)(2) applies to all work-positioning
equipment used in work covered by subpart V. The Agency is not
including this note in the final rule as it is unnecessary.
The Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives suggested that, instead of the
specific provisions proposed in paragraph (b)(2), the standard require
only that belts be certified to ASTM F887-04 (Ex. 0186). A note to
final paragraph (b)(2) (Note 2 in the proposal), which appears after
final paragraph (b)(2)(xii)(F), provides that, when used by employees
weighing no more than 140 kg (310 lbm) fully equipped, body belts and
positioning straps that conform to ASTM F887-12 \e1\, the most recent
edition of that standard, are deemed to be in compliance with paragraph
(b)(2). This note clearly informs employers that body belts and
positioning straps meeting that consensus standard also meet the
testing requirements in OSHA's final rule. To avoid confusion, the
Agency removed the phrase "the manufacturing and construction
requirements of," which modified "paragraph (b)(2) of this section"
and which appeared in the proposal, from the language of this note in
the final rule. The purpose of this phrase was to describe the contents
of paragraph (b)(2) rather than restrict the application of the note.
The Agency restricted the application of the note in the final rule to
body belts and safety straps used by employees weighing no more than
140 kg (310 lbm), as the ASTM standard does not address this aspect of
the final rule.\134\
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\134\ Body belts and safety straps that meet ASTM F887-12\e1\,
but with the test weight adjusted as required by Sec.
1926.954(b)(2)(xii)(A), will be deemed to be in compliance with
final Sec. 1926.954(b)(2).
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Note 2 in the proposal provided that work-positioning equipment
meeting the consensus standard also needed to meet proposed paragraphs
(b)(2)(iv), which specified tensile testing for snaphooks, and
(b)(2)(xi), which required snaphooks to be of the locking type. ASTM
Committee F18 stated that ASTM F887-04 contained nearly identical
requirements and suggested that the note omit references to those two
proposed paragraphs (Ex. 0148). OSHA agrees that ASTM F887-04
adequately covered all the requirements in final paragraph (b)(2), and
OSHA removed the two referenced paragraphs (paragraphs (b)(2)(iv) and
(b)(2)(xi)) from the note in the final rule. In addition, the Agency
reviewed the latest edition of the ASTM standard, ASTM F887-12\e1\, and
found that it also adequately addresses all of the design requirements
in the final rule. Consequently, the note in the final rule states
that, when used by employees weighing no more than 140 kg (310 lbm)
fully equipped, body belts and positioning straps meeting this later
edition of the consensus standard will be deemed as complying with
paragraph (b)(2).
OSHA also proposed a third note to paragraph (b)(2) indicating that
body belts and positioning straps meeting Sec. 1926.502(e) on
positioning device systems would be deemed to be in compliance with the
manufacturing and construction requirements of paragraph (b)(2) of
proposed Sec. 1926.954, provided that the equipment also conformed to
proposed paragraph (b)(2)(vii), which contained provisions addressing
electrical and flame-resistance tests for positioning straps, as well
as requirements for positioning straps to be capable of withstanding a
tension test and a buckle-tear test. The preamble to the proposal
explained that body belts and positioning straps that are parts of
positioning device systems addressed by Sec. 1926.502(e) serve the
same function as work-positioning equipment used for work covered by
subpart V (70 FR 34853). OSHA originally believed that body belts and
positioning straps that met the design criteria specified by Sec.
1926.502(e), as well as the provisions in proposed Sec.
1926.954(b)(2)(vii), would generally be sufficiently strong for power
line work.
OSHA reexamined the need for, and appropriateness of, proposed Note
3 to Sec. 1926.954(b)(2) in light of the rulemaking record for subpart
V. As indicated by Mr. Daniel Shipp with ISEA, Sec. 1926.502(e) does
not contain requirements comparable to those in final Sec.
1926.954(b)(2)(xi)(B) and (b)(2)(xi)(C) for the minimum and maximum
opening and closing forces for snaphook keepers and locking mechanisms.
As explained in the discussion of final Sec. 1926.954(b)(2)(xi)
earlier in this section of the preamble, OSHA believes that snaphooks
must meet these performance requirements to be adequately protective in
the conditions encountered by employees performing work covered by
Subpart V. In addition, Sec. 1926.502(e) does not contain requirements
comparable to several other provisions of final Sec. 1926.954(b)(2),
including those prohibiting leather in load-bearing components of body-
belt and positioning-strap assemblies (paragraph (b)(2)(v)),
prohibiting tool loops in the center 100 millimeters (4 inches) of the
back of a body belt (paragraph (b)(2)(ix)), and requiring a maximum
arresting force during the drop test (paragraph (b)(2)(xii)(F)). OSHA
believes that these also are important requirements necessary for the
safety of employees performing work covered by Subpart V. Consequently,
OSHA is not including Note 3 to proposed Sec. 1926.954(b)(2) in the
final rule.
Some commenters were concerned that the proposal required the tests
in paragraph (b)(2) to be conducted by the employer. (See, for example,
Exs. 0169, 0175, 0186.) OSHA notes that the final rule states that
work-positioning equipment must be "capable" of passing these tests.
The tests in the final rule could be performed by the manufacturer on
samples that are representative of the finished product. However, it
will be the employer's responsibility to ensure that it selects, and
has its employees use, a type of equipment that has been subject to
adequate testing by the manufacturer. The final rule does not require
employers to conduct the tests specified by paragraph (b)(2) when the
manufacturer conducts such testing. Employers will be able to
determine, in most instances, whether work-positioning equipment meets
the OSHA standard simply by ensuring that the manufacturer has tested
the equipment in accordance with the OSHA standard or ASTM F887-12
\e1\. The tests required by paragraph (b)(2) are potentially
destructive and should never be performed on work-positioning equipment
that will be used by employees (Exs. 0055, 0072).
Paragraph (b)(3) addresses the care and use of fall protection
equipment. As OSHA explained in the preamble to the proposal, fall
protection equipment provides maximum protection only when it is
properly used and maintained (70 FR 34853). Existing Sec.
1926.951(b)(3) requires this equipment to be inspected each day before
use. OSHA believed that this requirement had to be supplemented by
additional requirements to protect employees fully from fall hazards
posed by electric power transmission and distribution work and,
therefore, proposed to add requirements to subpart V, borrowed from
existing Sec. 1910.269(g)(2) and Sec. 1926.502(d) and (e), regulating
the care and use of fall protection equipment.
Paragraph (b)(3)(i) requires the employer to ensure that work-
positioning equipment is inspected before use each day to determine if
it is in safe working condition. (Paragraph (d)(21) of Sec. 1926.502
already contains a similar requirement for fall arrest equipment that
applies, and will continue to apply, to work covered by Subpart V.)
Paragraph (b)(3)(i) also prohibits the use of work-positioning
equipment that is not in safe working condition. The proposal was
worded to prohibit the use of "defective equipment." OSHA replaced
this term in the final rule with "equipment that is not in safe
working condition" and added "work-positioning" before "equipment"
to clarify that this provision applies to any condition that would make
work-positioning equipment unsafe. This language also makes it
consistent with the requirement in this paragraph to inspect the
equipment to determine if it is in "safe working condition." This
paragraph ensures that protective equipment will be capable of
protecting employees when needed. This requirement is similar to
existing Sec. 1926.951(b)(3), except that the prohibition on the use
of unsafe equipment is now stated explicitly. A thorough inspection of
fall protection equipment can detect defects such as cracked snaphooks
and D rings, frayed lanyards, loose snaphook keepers, and bent buckles.
A note to this paragraph states that a guide to the inspection of this
equipment is included in Appendix F.
Paragraph (b)(3)(ii) requires personal fall arrest systems to be
used in accordance with Sec. 1926.502(d). Paragraph (d)(21) of Sec.
1926.502 provides: "Personal fall arrest systems shall be inspected
prior to each use for wear, damage and other deterioration, and
defective components shall be removed from service." Removing
"defective" equipment from service in accordance with Sec.
1926.502(d)(21) will ensure that employees are not using fall arrest
equipment that is not in safe working condition.\135\
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\135\ Subpart M, Appendix C, section II, paragraph (g) provides
examples of defects that require removing equipment from service.
Such defects include cuts, tears, abrasions, mold, or undue
stretching; alterations or additions which might affect the
efficiency of the equipment; damage due to deterioration; contact
with fire, acids, or other corrosives; distorted hooks or faulty
hook springs; tongues unfitted to the shoulder of buckles; loose or
damaged mountings; nonfunctioning parts; or wearing or internal
deterioration in the ropes.
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OSHA explained in the proposal that personal fall arrest equipment
is sometimes used as work-positioning equipment such that the employee
can lean into the body harness and perform work (70 FR 34854). In this
scenario, the normal attachment point would be at waist level.
Paragraph (d)(17) of Sec. 1926.502 requires the attachment point for
body harnesses to be located in the center of the employee's back near
shoulder level or above his or her head. As the Agency explained in the
preamble to the proposal, such an attachment could prevent the employee
from performing his or her job while the employee is using work-
positioning equipment (id.), so OSHA proposed to exempt fall arrest
equipment used as work-positioning equipment from this requirement if
the equipment was rigged so that the maximum free-fall distance was no
greater than 0.6 meters (2 feet).
Mr. Daniel Shipp with ISEA agreed with the proposal, commenting:
ISEA agrees with the proposed change to allow frontal-attachment
for personal fall arrest on equipment that is used for work
positioning, with a maximum permissible free fall distance of 0.6 m
(2 ft). [Ex. 0211]
OSHA reconsidered including this exception in the regulatory text
of paragraph (b)(3)(ii) and concluded that it is unnecessary. Fall
arrest equipment that is rigged for work positioning is considered to
be work-positioning equipment for the purposes of final Sec.
1926.954(b). When fall protection equipment is rigged for work
positioning, the equipment must meet the requirements in paragraph (b)
that apply to work-positioning equipment, and the provisions that apply
to fall arrest systems, including the anchorage requirement in Sec.
1926.502(d)(17), are not applicable. When fall protection equipment is
rigged to arrest falls, the equipment is considered to be a fall arrest
system, and the provisions for those systems apply. OSHA included a
note to paragraph (b)(3)(ii) to clarify this point.
In paragraph (b)(3)(iii), OSHA proposed to require the use of a
personal fall arrest system or work-positioning equipment by employees
working at elevated locations more than 1.2 meters (4 feet) above the
ground on poles, towers, and similar structures if other fall
protection has not been provided. As OSHA clarified in the proposal,
the term "similar structures" includes any structure that supports
electric power transmission or distribution lines or equipment, such as
lattice substation structures and H-frame wood transmission structures
(70 FR 34854). A similar requirement is in existing Sec.
1910.269(g)(2)(v). (In existing Sec. 1926.951(b)(1), OSHA requires
fall protection for "employees working at elevated locations," but
does not specify a height at which such protection becomes necessary.)
Note 1 to proposed paragraph (b)(3)(iii) indicated that these fall
protection requirements did not apply to portions of buildings,
electric equipment, or aerial lifts, and referred to the relevant
portions of the construction standards that do apply in those instances
(that is, subpart M for walking and working surfaces generally and
Sec. 1926.453 for aerial lifts).\136\
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\136\ As noted earlier, the corresponding note in the final rule
does not pertain to fall protection for employees in aerial lifts or
reference Sec. 1926.453.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many rulemaking participants commented on the proposed requirement
to use fall protection starting at 1.2 meters (4 feet) above the
ground. (See, for example, Exs. 0173, 0183, 0186, 0196, 0202, 0210,
0219, 0229, 0233, 0239; Tr. 575-576.) Two commenters recommended that
Subpart V mirror the Subpart M "6-foot rule," in other words, that
fall protection not be required until an employee is 1.8 meters (6
feet) or more above the ground (Exs. 0196, 0219; Tr. 575-576). Lee
Marchessault with Workplace Safety Solutions commented:
[The proposal] requires fall protection when working at heights
greater than 4 feet, however the referrence [sic] to 1926 subpart M
requires 6 feet and therefore the fall protection system is designed
to engage at distances not more than 6 feet. This renders the system
useless for a 5 foot fall in some cases. An example may be working
on a trash platform of a hydro generation facility cleaning racks
that are 4.5 feet off the lower walking surface. A fall restraint
system works best, but workers are allowed to use a harness and 6
foot lanyard. [Ex. 0196]
Mr. Marchessault suggested in testimony at the 2006 public hearing that
using different length lanyards for different jobs would not be
feasible (Tr. 576). The Virginia Maryland & Delaware Association of
Electric Cooperatives commented that it did not see a need for OSHA to
set any height threshold for fall protection in the standard,
explaining: "Line work is inherently different than other occupations
with climbing a necessary skill required in the trade. Therefore,
specification of a distance does not add additional safety to the
employee" (Ex. 0175).
Other commenters supported the proposed 1.2-meter height or stated
that it generally has not presented problems since it was adopted in
existing Sec. 1910.269. (See, for example, Exs. 0186, 0211, 0213,
0230.) IBEW commented that "[t]he 1910.269 requirement [for fall
protection starting at] 1.2 meters (4 feet) has proven not [to] be
problematic. The addition of 2 feet will not offer anything to the
requirement" (Ex. 0230).
Most of the comments relating to the starting height for fall
protection were from electric cooperatives or their representatives who
recommended that OSHA not require fall protection until 3 meters (10
feet) above the ground for employees who are undergoing training. (See,
for example, Exs. 0183, 0186, 0202, 0210, 0229, 0233, 0239.) For
instance, Mr. Anthony Ahern of Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives
commented:
[F]or training purposes it would be nice to have the option of
going to 10 feet without fall protection . . . under close
supervision. At a height of only 4 [feet] a climber really does not
get a sense of height. Using fall arrest equipment at higher levels
gives the new climber a false sense of security, can hinder mobility
and make it more difficult to move around the pole. Being able to
work new climbers up to 10 [feet] after demonstrating basic
abilities at lower levels would give the new climber a better sense
of working at heights and make it easier for trainers to determine
which [climbers] need additional training or who simply can not
handle working on a pole. [Ex. 0186]
NRECA maintained that "in the highly-supervised and specially-equipped
environment of linemen training, the extra height adds very little, if
any extra danger" (Ex. 0233).
As previously noted, the current requirement in Sec.
1910.269(g)(2)(v) for fall protection starts at 1.2 meters (4 feet),
and multiple commenters indicated that this provision is not causing
problems. (See, for example, Exs. 0186, 0230.) Adjustable-length
lanyards, retractable lanyards, and work-positioning equipment can
serve to accommodate the varying heights at which an employee will be
working (Ex. 0211). In addition, the relevant paragraph in the final
rule (Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(B)) does not apply to the example
provided by Mr. Marchessault (the "trash platform of a hydro
generation facility"), as such work locations are not "poles, towers,
or similar structures." OSHA is not persuaded by the speculation that
employees undergoing training experience a "false sense of security"
or that employees using fall protection cannot be successfully trained
in the use of free-climbing techniques. Employees undergoing training
can use combination body belt-body harness systems that attach both to
a retractable lanyard anchored to the top of a pole (for fall arrest)
and to a positioning strap (for work positioning). This arrangement
will ensure protection for the trainees until they master climbing
techniques. Any sense of security the employee experiences using such
equipment would not be "false," but rather would be based on real
protection. There is evidence in the record that unprotected employees
in training to climb wood poles have been injured (Ex. 0003 \137\).
Several of these employees were climbing wood poles with wood chips at
the base of the pole. The chips did not protect the employees, and they
received serious injuries, for which all but one were hospitalized.
OSHA has previously taken the position that wood chips do not provide
adequate fall protection for employees, and the evidence in this
rulemaking does not support a different conclusion. Under final Sec.
1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(B), employers must provide employees with
appropriate fall protection when they are in training to climb wood
poles.\138\
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\137\ See, for example, the descriptions of five accidents at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170157069&id=170181432&id=170175269&id=170176630&id=170204267.
\138\ As stated in Note 2 to paragraphs (b)(3)(iii)(B) and
(b)(3)(iii)(C), employees who have not completed training in
climbing and the use of fall protection are not considered
"qualified employees" for the purposes of paragraph
(b)(3)(iii)(C), which permits qualified employees to climb without
fall protection in limited situations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 1.2-meter threshold provides additional safety when compared to
higher thresholds. The speed with which an employee will strike the
ground increases with increasing height. An extra 0.6 meters (2 feet)
in height increases fall velocity by over 20 percent, substantially
increasing the potential severity of any injuries the employee
receives. An extra 1.8 meters (6 feet) in height increases fall
velocity by nearly 50 percent. After considering the comments in the
record, OSHA concluded that the rationales offered by these commenters
do not justify increasing the severity of the fall hazard by increasing
the height threshold. Therefore, OSHA is adopting the proposed
requirement for fall protection to start at 1.2 meters (4 feet) and,
for the reasons described previously, is not adopting a less protective
threshold for employees undergoing training.
Southern Company suggested that OSHA reference IEEE Std 1307-2004,
Standard for Fall Protection for Utility Work, for work on
transformers, circuit breakers, and other large equipment. That
standard requires fall protection at heights of 3.05 meters (10 feet)
and higher (Ex. 0212).
The duty to provide fall protection for work on electric equipment,
such as transformers and capacitors, is not in Subpart V or Sec.
1910.269, but rather in Part 1926, Subpart M, and Part 1910, Subpart D,
for construction and general industry, respectively. The application of
Subpart D rather than Sec. 1910.269 to walking-working surfaces other
than poles, towers, and similar structures was explained in the
preamble to the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 final rule (59 FR 4374) and in
letters of interpretation.\139\ The consensus standard's requirement
for fall protection at heights over 3.05 meters conflicts with the more
protective requirements in Subparts M and D. Also, for reasons noted
earlier, the Agency concluded that an increase in the 1.2-meter (4-
foot) and 1.8-meter (6-foot) threshold heights for initiating fall
protection in Subparts D and M, respectively, is not warranted. It
should be noted that IEEE Std 1307 is included in Appendix G, and
employers may find that it contains useful information on how to
provide fall protection for work covered by subpart V. However, OSHA
concludes that a nonmandatory reference to the consensus standard for a
situation to which Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii) does not apply, as
recommended by Southern Company, would be inappropriate and misleading.
Note 1 to proposed Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii) stated that "[t]he duty
to provide fall protection associated with walking and working surfaces
is contained in subpart M of this part." However, the relevant portion
of existing Sec. 1926.500(a) seems to indicate otherwise, stating that
requirements relating to fall protection for employees engaged in the
construction of electric transmission and distribution lines and
equipment are provided in subpart V (see Sec. 1926.500(a)(2)(vi)).
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\139\ See, for example, the October 18, 1995, letter to Mr.
Lonnie Bell
(http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21981)
and the December 18, 1997, letter to Mr. Dimitrios Mihou
(http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=22508).
As was clear from Note 1 to proposed Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii),
OSHA was proposing that the duty to provide fall protection for
general walking working surfaces, that is, everything other than
aerial lifts and poles, towers, and similar structures, would be
covered by subpart M. To clarify this point, in the final rule, OSHA
is revising Sec. 1926.500(a)(2)(vi) so that the subpart V exemption
applies only to the duty to provide fall protection for aerial lifts
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and poles, towers, and similar structures.
Existing Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v) permits travel-restricting
equipment as an alternative to fall arrest or work-positioning systems.
OSHA proposed to omit the use of travel-restricting equipment as a
recognized fall protection system for electric power transmission and
distribution work on poles, towers, and similar structures. In the
preamble to the proposal, the Agency explained that travel-restricting
equipment is only appropriate for work
on open-sided platforms, where employees can walk around the working
surface with the travel-restricting equipment keeping them from
approaching too close to an unguarded edge (70 FR 34854). When it
published the proposal, the Agency did not believe that this type of
working surface could be found on poles, towers, or similar structures
(id.). Therefore, OSHA did not include travel-restricting equipment as
an acceptable fall protection system in proposed Sec.
1926.954(b)(3)(iii) and proposed to remove the reference to travel-
restricting equipment in existing Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v), but invited
comments on this omission.
Many commenters argued that there are surfaces used in work covered
by Subpart V for which travel-restricting equipment is appropriate and
recommended that OSHA restore travel-restricting equipment as an
alternative form of fall protection. (See, for example, Exs. 0126,
0173, 0183, 0201, 0202, 0210, 0225, 0229, 0230, 0233, 0239.) However,
few of these commenters provided specific, relevant examples. IBEW
commented that travel-restricting equipment is sometimes used when an
employee is transferring from a crossarm to a hook ladder or working or
climbing above an energized circuit (Ex. 0230). In addition, Duke
Energy asserted that the top of large transformers and rooftop
installations were places where travel-restricting equipment could be
used (Ex. 0201).
OSHA concludes that the examples provided by IBEW and Duke Energy
are not relevant because the paragraph at issue does not apply to the
tops of transformers or rooftops. Also, travel-restricting equipment,
which is used to protect employees from fall hazards at unprotected
edges, is not an appropriate form of fall protection for employees
transferring from one location to another or for employees working or
climbing above energized equipment.
Several commenters maintained that open-sided platforms are found
on electric utility structures. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0183,
0202, 0229, 0233, 0239.) One of them, BGE, commented that it still has
some open-sided platforms on switch structures (Ex. 0126).
OSHA previously concluded that equipment that can prevent an
employee from falling, such as fall restraint equipment, is an
acceptable form of fall protection. This conclusion is consistent with
Agency policy as indicated in several letters of interpretation. (See,
for example, letter dated November 2, 1995, to Mr. Mike Amen,
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21999,
and letter dated August 14, 2000, to Mr. Charles E. Hill,
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24110.)
The term "travel
restricting equipment" appears only in existing Sec. 1910.269; the
equivalent terms "restraint system" and "tethering system" are used
consistently throughout other OSHA standards, such as Sec.
1926.760(a)(1), and official letters of interpretation (id.). The term
"fall restraint system," as defined in Sec. 1926.751 (in the steel
erection standard), is a broad term that OSHA generally uses to refer
to any equipment that prevents employees from falling. Thus, "fall
restraint" includes travel-restricting equipment, tethering systems,
and other systems that prevent falls from occurring. On the basis of
comments received on travel-restricting equipment, OSHA believes that
there are situations in which fall restraint systems can be used to
protect employees performing work on poles, towers, and similar
structures; therefore, the final rule includes these systems as an
acceptable form of fall protection.
In reviewing the rulemaking record for Sec. 1926.954, the Agency
noted situations in which commenters appeared confused about the proper
use of the various forms of fall protection. For example, the tree care
industry believed that it was acceptable for employees working from
aerial lifts to use work-positioning equipment (Exs. 0174, 0200, 0502,
0503), and IBEW condoned the use of travel-restricting equipment in
what appear to be fall-arrest situations (Ex. 0230). OSHA adopted two
changes in the final rule to clarify these terms. First, in Sec. Sec.
1910.269(x) and 1926.968, OSHA is defining the three forms of fall
protection listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iii) of the final rule.
The final rule defines "personal fall arrest system" as a system
used to arrest an employee in a fall from a working level. This
definition is borrowed from Sec. 1926.500(b) in subpart M. The Agency
is not, however, including the descriptive text following the
definition in Sec. 1926.500(b), which describes the various parts of
personal fall arrest systems. Although this description is not a
necessary part of the definition, OSHA notes that it describes personal
fall arrest systems as consisting of an anchorage, connectors, and a
body harness and indicates that such equipment may include a lanyard,
deceleration device, lifeline, or suitable combinations of these.
The final rule defines "work-positioning equipment" as a body
belt or body harness system rigged to allow an employee to be supported
on an elevated vertical surface, such as a utility pole or tower leg,
and work with both hands free while leaning. This definition is based
on the definition of "positioning device system" in Sec. 1926.500(b)
in subpart M. However, OSHA is replacing the example of vertical
surface work in the subpart M definition with examples of vertical
surfaces that are commonly found in electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work and that are covered by the final
rule.
Finally, the final rule defines "fall restraint system" as a fall
protection system that prevents the user from falling any distance.
This definition is borrowed from Sec. 1926.751, which specifies
definitions for the steel erection standard in subpart R of part 1926.
The Agency is not including the descriptive text following the
definition, which describes the various parts of fall restraint
systems. Although this description is not a necessary part of the
definition, OSHA notes that it describes such systems as consisting of
either a body belt or body harness, along with an anchorage, connectors
and other necessary equipment. The final rule does not specify strength
requirements for fall restraint systems; however, the system must be
strong enough to restrain the worker from exposure to the fall
hazard.\140\
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\140\ OSHA recommended more specific strength criteria in a
letter of interpretation dated November 2, 1995, to Mr. Mike Amen
(http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21999).
This letter stated: "OSHA has
no specific standards for restraint systems, however, we suggest
that as a minimum, fall restraint systems should have the capacity
to withstand at least twice the maximum expected force that is
needed to restrain the person from exposure to the fall hazard. In
determining this force, consideration should be given to site-
specific factors such as the force generated by a person walking,
leaning, or sliding down the working surface."
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Second, OSHA is adding the phrase "as appropriate" to the
requirement in paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(B) to provide a personal fall
arrest system, work-positioning equipment, or fall restraint system on
poles, towers, or similar structures. This addition will make it clear
that the system the employer chooses to implement must be appropriate
for the situation, as indicated by the respective definitions. For
example, because work-positioning equipment, by definition, is to be
used on a vertical working surface, it would be inappropriate to use
this equipment on horizontal working surfaces, such as a crossarm or
horizontal tower arm.
With these modifications, the relevant provision in the final rule,
which is in paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(B), states that, except as provided
in paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C), each employee in elevated locations more
than 1.2 meters (4 feet) above the ground on poles, towers, or similar
structures must use a personal fall arrest system, work-positioning
equipment, or fall restraint system, as appropriate, if the employer
has not provided other fall protection meeting Subpart M.
In the final rule, OSHA also added the phrase "meeting subpart M
of this part" to clarify that the requirements of Subpart M apply to
other forms of fall protection. The Agency is making a corresponding
clarification in final Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(2) that "other fall
protection" must meet the general industry fall protection
requirements in subpart D.
The Southern Company recommended that OSHA not specify the type of
fall protection equipment to be used for open-sided platforms (Ex.
0212).
The language OSHA is adopting in paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(B) of the
final rule provides the employer some latitude in deciding which form
of fall protection is appropriate for employees working at elevated
locations on poles, towers, and similar structures. However, the rule
requires that the selected fall protection equipment be appropriate for
the fall hazard. Using equipment for an application for which it is not
designed exposes employees to hazards that were not considered in the
design of the equipment. For example, an employee using work-
positioning equipment in a fall-arrest situation could fall out of the
equipment or be injured by fall-arrest forces. Thus, the Agency
concludes that employers must select fall protection equipment that is
appropriate for the hazard to which the employee is exposed.
Consequently, an employee exposed to a fall hazard on an open-sided
platform more than 1.2 meters (4 feet) above the ground must use either
a fall arrest system or a fall restraint system, with the fall
restraint system eliminating exposure to the fall hazard altogether.
Proposed paragraph (b)(3)(iii) included an exemption from fall
protection requirements for qualified employees climbing or changing
locations on poles, towers, or similar structures unless conditions,
such as ice or high winds, could cause the employee to lose his or her
grip or footing. Two rulemaking participants objected to the proposed
provision allowing qualified employees to climb or change location
without using fall protection (Exs. 0130, 0196; Tr. 576-579). NIOSH
recommended "that fall protection equipment be used by all employees,
including qualified employees, climbing or changing location on poles,
towers, and other walking/working surfaces that present a potential
fall hazard in both general industry and construction" (Ex. 0130).
NIOSH supported its recommendation with a report that summarized
surveillance data and investigative reports of fatal work-related falls
from elevations (Ex. 0144). The first report noted that, according to
National Traumatic Occupational Fatalities surveillance-system data, 23
percent of fatal falls in the transportation/communications/public
utilities sector were from structures, predominantly poles and towers.
This report provided detailed information about two fatalities
involving employees performing work on poles or towers covered by this
final rule:
A power line worker died in a fall from a utility pole. As
he was securing his positioning strap around the pole, he contacted a
120-volt conductor and fell as he tried to free himself from the
conductor. He landed on his head and died of a broken neck.
A painter died in a fall from an electric power
transmission tower. As the employee unhooked his lanyard to reposition
himself on the tower, he lost his balance and fell to the ground. He
died of massive internal trauma sustained in the fall.
In both of these cases, NIOSH recommended evaluating the
possibility of using 100-percent fall protection, including using fall
protection while employees climb and relocate.
Lee Marchessault of Workplace Safety Solutions also recommended
requiring fall protection for employees climbing or changing location
on poles, towers, or similar structures, commenting:
I have asked line workers in many companies if they have
"cutout" (gaffs released and fallen to some extent from a pole).
\[141]\ The answer is almost universal, most (more than 90%) have
cutout at lease once. The resulting injury is usually a nasty sliver
from a treated wood pole or minor bruises or broken bones. This is a
known hazard and yet it is allowed to continue even though there are
devices that prevent this injury. This section should be eliminated
from this regulation and replaced with "fall restraint devices are
required from the ground for climbing poles or similar structures
more than 6 feet and these devices shall be of a type that cannot be
defeated where practicable". In other words, systems modifying
existing pole straps, or pole mounted devices that need to be
installed once you arrive would not be allowed because free-climbing
is still or may still be done. Pole top mounted retractable devices
protect from free fall but will not prevent slowly slipping down the
pole picking up slivers from every gaff cut along the way. A system
such as or similar to Buckingham's Bucksqueeze fall protection belt
would meet this requirement. Regarding towers and structures, there
is equipment or options available for most circumstances. [Ex. 0196]
\141\ A line worker using positioning equipment on a wood pole
uses pole climbers, leg irons that are strapped to the worker's
legs. A gaff, or spike, protrudes from the leg iron. The gaffs
penetrate the wood of the pole and support the weight of the worker.
A cutout occurs when the gaff slips out of the wood, allowing the
worker to fall.
Mr. Marchessault recognized, however, that there may be times when it
is not feasible to provide protection and suggested that the standard
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
account for those situations (Tr. 595).
Other rulemaking participants supported the proposed provision in
paragraph (b)(3)(iii) that permitted qualified employees to free climb
without fall protection. (See, for example, Exs. 0167, 0185, 0212.) For
instance, Mr. John Vocke with Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)
recommended that OSHA retain the exception allowing employees to free
climb poles and towers, commenting:
PG&E submits that the "free climbing" of utility poles and/or
towers should continue to be permitted by the OSHA regulations. As
more cable television, telephone and communication equipment is
situated on utility poles, safe climbing space on these structures
becomes a consideration. In order for line workers to access
overhead electric facilities, in some instances, free climbing is a
safer alternative. [Ex. 0185]
Whether to provide fall protection for employees climbing poles,
towers, and similar structures was an issue in the 1994 Sec. 1910.269
rulemaking. Participants in that rulemaking submitted substantial
evidence on the need for, and feasibility of, providing such
protection. Based on accident data submitted to that record in several
exhibits, the Agency found that employees are at risk of injury when
free climbing:
[T]hese exhibits demonstrate that electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution workers face a significant risk of
serious injury due to falls under current industry practices. To
determine the extent to which they face hazards addressed by
proposed Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v), OSHA analyzed fall accidents
included in various exhibits contained in the rulemaking record. . .
. [E]mployees do fall while climbing poles, towers, or similar
structures--26 percent of the falling accidents related to Sec.
1910.269 occurred in this manner. The evidence in the record
indicates that climbing a pole, tower, or similar structure is not
as safe, under current industry practices, as some of the hearing
witnesses testified. Therefore, the
Agency has decided that the final standard must provide additional
protection beyond that provided by the existing industry practices.
. . . [59 FR 4373]
Although OSHA concluded that it was not always safe to free climb,
the Agency "accepted the position that it is not always necessary for
a qualified employee to use a pole strap when climbing an unstepped
wooden pole" (id.) Therefore, in existing Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v),
OSHA adopted a rule, identical to that proposed in paragraph
(b)(3)(iii), that allowed free climbing "unless conditions . . . could
cause the employee to lose his or her grip or footing." OSHA believed
that the rule adopted in Sec. 1910.269 would ensure that employees
were protected when conditions were most likely to lead to falls.
The Agency examined the accident information in the current record
to determine if the rule in existing Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v) has
reduced climbing-related accidents. Table 3 presents relevant accident
information from the 1994 record, and from the record in this
rulemaking, to show the number of fall accidents occurring over time.
Table 3--Falls by Year
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of accidents \2\
Type of fall \1\ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1981-1989 1991-1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Climbing \3\.................... 11 15 3 5 2 3 1 3
At work location................ 7 5 0 0 0 0 0 1
Other (not stated).............. 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Failure of Structure............ 12 6 0 0 1 2 0 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: 1. The table only includes falls from poles, towers, and similar structures.
2. Each accident involves the death or serious injury of one or more employees.
3. Climbing includes descending and changing location.
Sources: 1981-1989--Table 1 in the preamble to the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 final rule (59 FR 4373).
1991-1999--Exs. 0003 and 0400.
The number of accidents in the years 1991 through 1999 are based on
OSHA IMIS data. Because IMIS reports are based on investigations
resulting from employer reports of accidents, and because employers are
not required to report accidents that do not involve a fatality or the
hospitalization of three or more employees, it is likely that IMIS data
substantially undercount the number of nonfatal injuries. Even without
adjusting for potential undercounting, however, the table shows that
employees still face a significant risk of being severely injured in a
fall while climbing poles, towers, or similar structures. In the 3
years before Sec. 1910.269 was promulgated, employees climbing poles,
towers, or similar structures experienced five accidents per year, on
average. In the first 6 years after that standard was promulgated,
there were approximately three accidents per year, on average, for a
reduction of two accidents per year, on average.\142\ This is in sharp
contrast to the reduction in the number of falls experienced by
employees at the work location on poles, towers, and similar
structures. This type of accident has largely disappeared since OSHA
issued Sec. 1910.269.
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\142\ OSHA examined accident data for electric utilities for the
years 2009 and 2010. In that industry alone, four employees were
injured (three fatally) when they fell from structures supporting
overhead power lines. (See the descriptions of these four accidents at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=202469680&id=202489316&id=201491990&id=201859964.)
In half the cases, the employees were climbing or changing location.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, more than a third of the falls experienced by
employees climbing wood structures occurred when the employee's gaff
cut out of the wood and caused the employee to fall to the ground (Exs.
0003, 0004). This is also the experience reported by Mr. Marchessault
of Workplace Safety Solutions (Tr. 578). Federal and State compliance
records reported that the poles involved in two of the gaff cutout
accidents reflected in Table 3 had no observable defects (Ex.
0003\143\). Even though both of those accidents occurred before Sec.
1910.269 was promulgated, it is likely that nothing in that standard
would have prevented those accidents. Based on the comments, Mr.
Marchessault's testimony, and the accident descriptions in the record,
OSHA concludes that gaff cutout is pervasive, cannot be reliably
predicted, and can lead to death or serious physical harm. (Mr.
Marchessault described the injuries as "slivers" in his testimony,
but injuries from gaff cutout accidents have included such serious
injuries as severe fractures, a concussion, and a collapsed lung for
which the injured employees were hospitalized (Exs. 0003, 0400).\144\)
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\143\ See the descriptions of the two accidents at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170374144&id=170611693.
\144\ OSHA also has documentation, not included in this
analysis, of three instances in which employees were killed when
they fell from utility poles as a result of gaff cutout
(http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170252852&id=14422471&id=14412209).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The current rule in Sec. 1910.269 requires employers to protect
employees from falling while climbing or changing location under
specified circumstances, and evidence in this record indicates that in
many, if not all, circumstances it is feasible for employees to climb
and change locations while protected. For example, Mr. Marchessault of
Workplace Safety Solutions testified that there are "equipment options
available for most circumstances [involving employees climbing or
changing location]" (Tr. 576); Mr. Steven Theis of MYR testified that
he was aware that one utility required 100-percent fall protection (Tr.
1357); and IBEW noted that some employers require "fulltime attachment
while climbing and working on a wood pole" \145\ (Ex. 0230). According
to an IBEW survey of 102 IBEW construction locals, more than a quarter
of 93 locals responding to one question in the survey reported that
"the employer require[s] continuous attachment to the pole when
climbing," and nearly a third of 91 locals responding to another
question reported that "the employer require[s] continuous attachment
to the
structure when climbing" (Ex. 0230). The preamble to the 1994 final
rule for Sec. 1910.269 noted that the Electrical Division of the
Panama Canal Commission and Ontario Hydro in Canada required fall
protection for their employees while they work on elevated structures
(59 FR 4372-4373).
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\145\ OSHA concludes that, in describing the "climbing" of
poles or structures, rulemaking participants used the term
"climbing" broadly to indicate any employee movement, including
"changing location," on poles or structures, as climbing a pole or
structure to get to the working position involves the same
horizontal and vertical movements as changing location vertically or
horizontally on a pole or structure. OSHA also concludes that, in
this context, rulemaking participants used the term "working"
narrowly to indicate the activity of working in stationary positions
on poles or structures and not broadly to also indicate the activity
of climbing or changing location on poles or structures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are several new forms of work-positioning equipment that can
provide continuous attachment for employees climbing or changing
location on poles, towers, and similar structures. The preamble to the
proposal noted the Pole Shark and Pole Choker (70 FR 34855).\146\ Two
commenters pointed to the BuckSqueeze as another work-positioning
system that can provide continuous attachment while employees are
climbing or changing location on wood structures (Ex. 0199; Tr.
578).\147\ A video of this equipment being used demonstrates that an
employee proficient in its use can ascend and descend poles with
relative ease while being protected from falling (Ex. 0492). Rulemaking
participants indicated that fall protection equipment is available to
protect employees climbing or changing location on towers and similar
structures (Exs. 0144, 0196). This equipment includes rail and rope-
grab systems to which an employee can attach a harness and a lanyard,
retractable lanyards attached above the employee, and double-lanyard
systems (Ex. 0199; Tr. 578, 587 \148\). OSHA believes that these, and
similar new, devices make it easier to provide fall protection for
employees climbing or changing location on poles, towers, and similar
structures, as evidenced by the growing prevalence of employers
requiring 100-percent attachment. Therefore, OSHA concludes that
employees climbing or changing location on poles, towers, and similar
structures can use fall protection under more conditions than required
by existing Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\146\ A Pole Shark is a device that uses jaws and a spur wheel
to grip the pole and provide an anchorage for climbing wood poles. A
Pole Choker is a pole strap with an integrated choker strap. The
employee tightens the choker strap against the pole to prevent the
pole strap from sliding down the pole. Note that, throughout this
notice, references to these and other products are examples only and
do not constitute an endorsement by OSHA.
\147\ A BuckSqueeze is a pole strap with an integrated choker
strap. The employee tightens the choker strap against the pole to
prevent the pole strap from sliding down the pole.
\148\ Mr. Marchessault described a double-strap system for use
on a pole (Tr. 587). OSHA believes that employers can adapt this
system, using lanyards in place of positioning straps, for use on a
tower or similar structure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, OSHA also concludes that there may be circumstances that
preclude the use of fall protection while employees are climbing or
changing location. For example, Mr. James Tomaseski of IBEW testified,
"[O]n congested poles, to be able to ascend the pole to your working
area could be a major task in itself. On the congested poles it is
enough of a task already, but adding to the point that you have to stay
connected the entire time, it would be at best difficult" (Tr. 977).
Mr. Theis of MYR Group echoed these concerns:
[Employees] are using [pole chokers] now. And some of the guys
are telling us they can't be used in all situations. In a lot of
situations, they can be. When they start getting into a very
congested pole, very congested area, they become more cumbersome
than they are of any benefit. [Tr. 1357]
Consequently, OSHA decided to modify the provision proposed in
paragraph (b)(3)(iii) (paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C) in the final rule) to
require fall protection even for qualified employees climbing or
changing location on poles, towers, or similar structures, unless the
employer can demonstrate that the conditions at the worksite would make
using fall protection infeasible or would create a greater hazard for
employees climbing or changing location on these structures while using
fall protection. This rule will ensure that 100-percent fall protection
is the default procedure when employees are working on these structures
and, therefore, will better protect employees than the current
requirement. Based on the rulemaking record, OSHA would consider it
feasible to use fall protection while climbing or changing location on
a structure with few or no obstructions. Employers may, however, make
reasonable determinations of what conditions, for example, the degree
of congestion on a pole, would result in a greater hazard for employees
climbing with fall protection than without fall protection. Employers
making these determinations must consider the use of devices that
provide for continuous attachment and should account for other
conditions that would make climbing or changing location without fall
protection unsafe, including such conditions as ice, high winds, and
the other conditions noted in existing Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v). In
addition, OSHA notes that this provision does not affect fall
protection requirements in final Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(B) for
employees once they reach the work location.
Because the final rule permits qualified employees to climb or
change location without fall protection under limited circumstances,
the Agency anticipates that it will be necessary for employees to
occasionally defeat the continuous attachment feature on the fall
protection equipment. Therefore, OSHA decided not to require the
equipment used to meet paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C) of the final rule to be
incapable of being defeated by employees, as recommended by Mr.
Marchessault (Ex. 0196).
Even though under existing Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(v) there already
are some circumstances in which employers must provide equipment that
will protect employees who are climbing or changing location on
structures, OSHA believes that many employers covered by the final rule
will need additional time to explore options to select equipment that
best protects their employees while climbing or changing location. In
some cases, the equipment employers currently are providing may not be
ideal for everyday use. In addition, employers will need time to train
employees to become proficient in the use of any new equipment. Before
employees gain proficiency, it is possible that not only will they have
difficulties climbing or changing location on structures, but the
equipment may distract them from climbing or changing location safely.
As noted by Mr. Gene Trombley, representing EEI in the 1994 rulemaking,
"To suddenly try to require them to change years and years of training
and experience would, I feel, cause a serious reduction in that high
level of confidence and ability" (DC Tr. 853, as quoted in the
preamble to the 1994 rulemaking, 59 FR 4372).\149\ Therefore, OSHA is
giving employers until April 1, 2015, to comply with the new
requirements in Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(C) of the final rule. This
delay should provide sufficient time for employers to: Evaluate the
various types of fall protection equipment that employees climbing or
changing location can use; select and purchase the type of equipment
that best satisfies their needs; train employees in the use of this
equipment; and certify that the employees demonstrated proficiency in
using the equipment.
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\149\ This transcript is available for inspection and copying in
OSHA's Docket Office, Docket No. S-015, U.S. Department of Labor,
200 Constitution Avenue NW., Room N2625, Washington, DC 20210;
telephone (202) 693-2350. (OSHA's TTY number is (877) 889-5627.)
OSHA Docket Office hours of operation are 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.,
ET.
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In the intervening period, paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C) of the final
rule will apply the existing rule from Sec. 1910.269, which permits
qualified employees to climb and change location without fall
protection as long as there are no conditions, such as ice, high winds,
the
design of the structure (for example, no provision for holding on with
hands), or the presence of contaminants on the structure, that could
cause the employee to lose his or her grip or footing. The conditions
specifically listed in the standard are not the only ones warranting
the use of fall protection for climbing and changing position. Other
factors affecting the risk of an employee's falling include the level
of competence of the employee, the condition of a structure, the
configuration of attachments on a structure, and the need to have both
hands free for climbing. Moreover, if the employee is not holding onto
the structure (for example, because the employee is carrying tools or
equipment in his or her hands), the final rule requires fall
protection. Video tapes entered into the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking
record by EEI (269-Ex. 12-6), which EEI claimed represented typical,
safe climbing practices in the utility industry, show employees using
their hands to provide extra support and balance.\150\ Climbing and
changing location in this manner will enable an employee to continue to
hold onto the structure in case his or her foot slips. When employees
are not using their hands for additional support, they are much more
likely to fall as a result of a slip.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\ Exhibits in the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking record
(denoted as "269-Ex") also are available in Docket Number S-015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All of these revisions, including the revisions related to fall
protection for employees working from aerial lifts described earlier in
this section of the preamble, appear in final Sec.
1926.954(b)(3)(iii).
Paragraph (e)(1) of Sec. 1926.502 limits the maximum free-fall
distance for work-positioning systems to 0.6 meters (2 feet). OSHA
proposed to adopt this same limit in Sec. 1926.954. However, in
electric power transmission and distribution work, permanent anchorages
are not always available. Many utility poles provide no attachment
points lower than the lowest crossarm. If an employee is working below
the crossarm, there would be no place on the pole where he or she can
attach the work-positioning equipment. The preamble to the proposed
rule explained that, in such cases, work-positioning equipment still
provides some degree of fall protection in that the equipment holds the
employee in a fixed work position and keeps him or her from falling (70
FR 34855). Therefore, OSHA proposed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv) to require
work-positioning equipment to be rigged so that the employee could free
fall no more than 0.6 meters (2 feet), unless no anchorage was
available. In the preamble to the proposed rule, OSHA requested comment
on whether proposed paragraph (b)(3)(iv) would provide sufficient
protection for employees and on whether portable devices (such as a
Pole Shark, Pole Choker, or similar device) could be used as suitable
anchorages.
Some commenters objected to the proposed requirement that work-
positioning equipment be rigged with a maximum free fall of 0.6 meters
(2 feet) insofar as it would apply when employees are working above
equipment that could serve as an anchorage. (See, for example, Exs.
0201, 0230.) For instance, IBEW noted that an employee using work-
positioning equipment might be much more than 0.6 meters above a
potential attachment point, such as a neutral bolt (Ex. 0230). The
union claimed that, if the employee used this attachment point, the
free-fall distance would have to be more than 0.6 meters for the
employee to reach the work.
OSHA acknowledges these concerns, but believes they can be
eliminated by the use of portable devices. With portable devices,
employees will not have to rely on anchorages on poles or structures
because the employees would have anchorages that are part of the work-
positioning equipment. Thus, it would always be possible to rig the
equipment to accommodate a free fall of no more than 0.6 meters.
Many commenters opposed requiring portable devices to provide
anchorages for employees on poles, towers, and similar structures.
(See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0127, 0149, 0151, 0162, 0171, 0173, 0175,
0177, 0186, 0200, 0209, 0227.) Some of these commenters maintained that
these devices do not meet the strength requirements for anchorages.
(See, for example, Exs. 0177, 0227.) For instance, Mr. Thomas Taylor
with Consumers Energy commented that "the specified portable devices
do not meet the specifications for anchorages in Subpart M and were
never designed to be used for that purpose" (Ex. 0177). Several
commenters argued that these devices are not always effective, are
difficult or impossible to use in some circumstances, are unnecessary,
and could even increase the risk to employees. (See, for example, Exs.
0125, 0127, 0149, 0151, 0171, 0175, 0186, 0200.) For instance, Ms. Jill
Lowe of the Employers Electrical and Communication Safety Committee of
Washington and Oregon commented:
The use of an anchorage device [such as] the pole shark, would
not be an effective anchor when working on a structural member or
sitting on a cross arm. The device would only be effective when
climbing a pole without obstructions or working in a position on a
pole below a cross arm or structural member. It must also be
acknowledged that some of these devices could not physically be used
due to limited space available on the pole at the work position
(i.e.: Secondaries, crossarm braces, etc.) . . . .
More information and data would be required before mandating the
use of this type of equipment. For example, how many actual injuries
have been recorded in a fall where a worker is belted in on the
pole? Would this add weight or further encumber the worker when
climbing the pole? These types of devices could be effective in
severe ice conditions, but for day to day use, would not provide the
desired efficacies and would impede climbing, add to maneuvering
difficulties and could increase risk factor(s). [Ex. 0151]
Ms. Salud Layton of the Virginia, Maryland & Delaware Association of
Electric Cooperatives argued that these devices pose a greater hazard
because they increase "the amount of time spent on the pole, the
complexity of the work performed on the pole, and the number of
opportunities to make mistakes while doing unnecessary jobs not related
to the original reason the pole was actually climbed" (Ex. 0175).
Mr. Anthony Ahern with the Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives
provided the following explanation for his argument that these devices
can be difficult to use and could potentially increase the risk to
employees:
Some of these devices, especially the pole-shark, are large and
very awkward to use. They are very difficult to maneuver into a
narrow space and greatly limit movement on the pole. It is next to
impossible for a lineman to turn around far enough with one of these
devices to be able to reach the end of a ten foot cross arm or a
davit arm or even work on a transformer bank mounted on a cluster
rack. If two or more workers are working in the same area on a pole,
these devices can really create a lot of interference. Also, quite
often a second safety is required to be used with these devices so
that the climber can transition past cables, cross arms or other
equipment on a pole. This means an extra snap hook in the D-rings
and increases the possibility of an accident because the lineman
grabs the wrong one. These devices are also much more difficult to
operate with rubber gloves on than a conventional safety strap. [Ex.
0186]
However, some commenters suggested that these types of devices
could be used as anchorages. (See, for example, Ex. 0199; Tr. 1338,
1357.) A video submitted to the record shows one of these devices
successfully supporting an employee who had fallen from a pole (Ex.
0492).
OSHA concludes that the concerns of commenters who argued that
portable anchorage equipment is difficult to use or poses increased
hazards are unwarranted. As noted earlier, some employers already
require 100-percent attachment. The testimony of Messrs. Marchessault
(of Workplace Safety Solutions) and Theis (of MYR Group) offer evidence
that Pole Sharks, Pole Chokers, and similar devices can be, and have
been, used successfully as anchorages (Tr. 576-579, 1338, 1357). The
videotape of one of these devices in use clearly demonstrates that the
particular device is reasonably light and not significantly more
difficult to use than the traditional positioning straps currently used
by power line workers (Ex. 0492). Some of these devices occupy about
the same space on a pole or structure as a positioning strap and,
therefore, should fit wherever those straps fit (id.). Evidence also
indicates that, with training, employees can use these devices
proficiently (Ex. 0199; Tr. 576-579).
Mr. Ahern's example of an employee using positioning equipment to
reach the end of a 3-meter (10-foot) crossarm supports the need for
employees to use an anchorage at the work location. The end of the
crossarm would be about 1.4 meters (4.6 feet) from the edge of the
pole. To perform such work, a 2-meter-tall (6.5-foot-tall) employee
would have to be in a nearly horizontal position to reach the end of
the arm. This position increases the likelihood of gaff cutout, because
the gaffs would be at an angle to the force applied by the employee's
weight, which would be applied in a vertical direction. A gaff is
designed to penetrate the wood when force is applied along its length.
When force is applied perpendicular to the length of the gaff, it can
twist the gaff out of the wood. In addition, to the extent it is
impossible to reach the end of the crossarm with some of these devices,
other methods of working from the pole can be used. For example, the
employee could work from a pole-mounted platform, which would both
enable the employee to reach further from the pole and provide an
anchorage for the fall protection equipment (269-Ex. 8-5). Thus, the
Agency concludes that there is greater need for an anchorage when work
is performed in such positions.
The examples of working on a crossarm or a structural member
provided by Ms. Lowe with the Employers Electrical and Communication
Safety Committee of Washington and Oregon are inapposite. As noted
earlier, work-positioning equipment is inappropriate for use in these
situations; such equipment may be used only on vertical structural
members. It is not clear why Pole Sharks, Pole Chokers, or similar
devices, which are designed to supplement or replace traditional
positioning straps, could not be used on vertical members in the same
way a traditional positioning strap can be used.
OSHA concludes that the accident information in the record
indicates that there is a need for employees to use an anchorage to
keep them from falling while they are at the work location (Exs. 0002,
0400). Two of the gaff cutout accidents included in Table 3 occurred
while an employee was at the work location. One commenter stated that
one of his company's eight fall accidents occurred while an employee
was at the work position (Ex. 0209). Although the total number of
accidents is not great, these accidents are easily preventable.
The final rule, in paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C), already requires
employees to be protected while climbing. The same equipment that
protects an employee climbing a pole can serve as an anchorage and can
prevent him or her from falling while at the work location as well (Ex.
0492; Tr. 576-579). As a result, OSHA does not believe there will often
be problems finding or providing anchorage points for work-positioning
equipment that can satisfy the 0.6-meter maximum free-fall requirement.
The Agency notes that Consumers Energy incorrectly identified the
relevant strength requirements for anchorages used with work-
positioning equipment. Paragraph (b)(1)(i) of final Sec. 1926.954
applies Subpart M only to fall arrest equipment. Paragraph (b)(3)(v) of
final Sec. 1926.954, described later in this section of the preamble,
requires anchorages used with work-positioning equipment to be capable
of supporting at least twice the potential impact load of an employee's
fall, or 13.3 kilonewtons (3,000 pounds), whichever is greater. OSHA
concludes that it is feasible with available technology for portable
anchorage devices to meet the tensile-strength requirement in paragraph
(b)(3)(v) of the final rule. The materials, including straps, buckles,
rivets, snaphooks, and other hardware, that are, or could be, used in
anchorages also are used in positioning straps for work-positioning
equipment (Exs. 0055, 0492), which paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(C) of the
final rule requires to have greater tensile strength than required by
paragraph (b)(3)(v) of the final rule. In addition, Mr. Lee
Marchessault with Workplace Safety Solutions testified about the
experience of a line worker he had been training (Tr. 577-578). The
line worker, who had been using a portable anchorage device (the
BuckSqueeze) during the training exercise, experienced a gaff cutout,
but was not injured because the device successfully arrested the fall
(id.). The videotape Mr. Marchessault submitted for the record depicted
this equipment as successfully arresting the fall of the worker who had
been using it (Ex. 0492). Portable anchorage devices are designed to
arrest an employee's fall into work-positioning equipment; thus, the
devices almost certainly meet the strength requirements in ASTM F887-
04, which, as noted earlier, are equivalent to OSHA's strength
requirements for work-positioning equipment. In fact, the latest
edition of the consensus standard, ASTM F887-12\e1\, contains
equivalent strength requirements for what it calls "wood pole fall
restriction devices." \151\ OSHA has included a note following
paragraph (b)(3)(v) of the final rule to indicate that wood-pole fall-
restriction devices meeting ASTM F887-12\e1\ are deemed to meet the
anchorage-strength requirement when they are used in accordance with
manufacturers' instructions.
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\151\ Section 15.3.2 of ASTM F887-12\e1\ requires these devices,
when new, to have a breaking strength of 13.3 kilonewtons (3,000
pounds). Section 24 of that standard describes test procedures for
these devices to ensure that they will successfully arrest a fall.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For these reasons, paragraph (b)(3)(iv) in the final rule requires
work-positioning systems to be rigged so that an employee can free fall
no more than 0.6 meters (2 feet). OSHA is not including the proposed
exemption for situations in which no anchorage is available. In view of
the availability of wood-pole fall-restriction devices, OSHA expects
that in most, if not all, circumstances, anchorages will not only be
available, but will be built into work-positioning equipment to permit
compliance with this provision, as well as paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C) of
the final rule. However, because the Agency believes that employers
will purchase equipment that complies with both paragraphs
(b)(3)(iii)(C) and (b)(3)(iv), OSHA is requiring compliance with both
of these paragraphs starting on April 1, 2015. This delay should
provide employers with sufficient time to evaluate, and then purchase,
compliant equipment.
Final paragraph (b)(3)(v), which is being adopted without
substantive change from the proposal, requires anchorages used with
work-positioning equipment to be capable of sustaining at least twice
the potential impact load of an employee's fall, or 13.3 kilonewtons
(3,000 pounds), whichever is greater.
This provision, which duplicates Sec. 1926.502(e)(2), will ensure that
an anchorage will not fail when needed to stop an employee's fall.
Comments on the technological feasibility of this provision are
addressed in the summary and explanation for paragraph (b)(3)(iv),
earlier in this section of the preamble.
Final paragraph (b)(3)(vi), which is being adopted without
substantive change from the proposal, provides that, unless a snaphook
is a locking type and designed specifically for the following
conditions, snaphooks on work-positioning equipment not be engaged to
any of the following:
(1) Webbing, rope, or wire rope;
(2) Other snaphooks;
(3) A D ring to which another snaphook or other connector is
attached;
(4) A horizontal lifeline; or
(5) Any object that is incompatibly shaped or dimensioned in
relation to the snaphook such that accidental disengagement could occur
should the connected object sufficiently depress the snaphook keeper to
allow release of the object.
This paragraph, which duplicates Sec. 1926.502(e)(8), prohibits
methods of attachment that are unsafe because of the potential for
accidental disengagement of the snaphooks during use.
6. Section 1926.955, Portable Ladders and Platforms
Final Sec. 1926.955 addresses portable ladders and platforms.
Paragraph (a) provides that requirements for portable ladders used in
work covered by Part 1926, Subpart V are contained in Part 1926,
Subpart X, except as noted in Sec. 1926.955(b). Proposed paragraph (a)
also provided that the requirements for fixed ladders in subpart D of
part 1910 (Sec. 1910.27) applied to fixed ladders used in electric
power transmission and distribution construction work. OSHA is
including proposed paragraph (a) in the final rule with one change--
deleting the second provision.
Fixed ladders used in electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work are permanent ladders. They are the same ladders
irrespective of whether the work being performed on them is
construction work covered by subpart V or maintenance work covered by
Sec. 1910.269. In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA explained that
the Agency believed that the Part 1910, Subpart D standards should
apply to these ladders during construction, as well as during
maintenance work (70 FR 34855), but requested comments on whether the
proposed incorporation of the general industry standard for fixed
ladders was warranted, especially in light of the 1990 proposed
revision to Part 1910, Subpart D (55 FR 13360, Apr. 10, 1990). OSHA
recently reproposed the revision of that subpart (75 FR 28862, May 24,
2010).
A few commenters responded to this issue. (See, for example, Exs.
0162, 0212, 0227, 0230.) Southern Company was concerned about the
proposed incorporation of Subpart D, commenting:
We question the use of 1910.27 for fixed ladders since OSHA
proposed the revision of this standard over 15 years ago and there
has been no action to date. Due to the time that has elapsed since
OSHA published the proposed revisions to 1910 Subpart D and the
revisions that have been made to the national consensus standards
for all types of ladders, OSHA may wish to consider reopening the
rulemaking prior to proceeding with the revisions to Subpart D. We
recommend that OSHA not reference Subpart D as a part of the
revisions to Subpart V and 1910.269 until work on the revision to
Subpart D is completed. [Ex. 0212]
Southern Company also asked OSHA to explain "why the provisions of
1910 Subpart D should be applied to fixed ladders instead of the fixed
ladder requirements of 1926.1053" (id.). Southern Company asserted
that the construction standard contained requirements that are not
found in the general industry standard, but that contribute to employee
safety (id.).
EEI recommended that neither Sec. 1926.955(a) nor the
corresponding provision in the general industry standard, Sec.
1910.269(h)(1), incorporate part 1910, subpart D by reference until
OSHA finalizes revisions to part 1910, subpart D (Ex. 0227). EEI
asserted that there were discrepancies between the requirements for
fixed ladders in existing part 1910, subpart D, the 1990 proposed part
1910, subpart D, and the then-current ANSI standard for fixed ladders,
ANSI A14.3-2002, American National Standard for Ladders--Fixed--Safety
Requirements (id.). EEI also asserted that the existing general
industry standard contained outdated design requirements (id.).
OSHA accepts EEI's and Southern Company's recommendation not to
apply the requirements for fixed ladders in Sec. 1910.27 to fixed
ladders used in the construction of electric power transmission and
distribution installations, though not for the reasons these commenters
stated. OSHA believes that the use of fixed ladders in the construction
of transmission and distribution installations is not unique. As such,
the requirements that apply to fixed ladders in the construction of
electric power transmission and distribution installations should be
the same as the requirements that apply generally to construction work
(including, as Southern Company noted, the requirements contained in
Sec. 1926.1053).
Because OSHA is not including the cross-reference to subpart D for
fixed ladders in the final rule and because the remaining provisions in
Sec. 1926.955(a) apply only to portable ladders and platforms, OSHA is
revising the title of Sec. 1926.955 to "Portable ladders and
platforms" to more accurately reflect the contents of this section.
OSHA also accepts EEI's and Southern Company's recommendation not
to reference in final Sec. 1910.269(h) the part 1910, subpart D
provisions for fixed ladders because, as with final Sec. 1926.955,
Sec. 1910.269(h) in the final rule covers only portable ladders and
platforms. Therefore, OSHA is revising the title of Sec. 1910.269(h)
to "Portable ladders and platforms" and is revising the regulatory
text of final Sec. 1910.269(h)(1) to clarify that the paragraph
applies to portable ladders and platforms, not fixed ladders. These
changes make final Sec. 1910.269(h) consistent with final Sec.
1926.955.
MYR Group also had concerns about applying the general industry
standards to construction work. MYR Group maintained that contractors
would have little control over fixed ladders provided by host employers
(Ex. 0162).
The Agency notes that an employer whose employees are performing
the work must adhere to OSHA standards. If, for example, an electric
utility's fixed ladder does not comply with Part 1926, Subpart X, then
a contractor whose employees would be using that ladder must take
whatever measures are necessary to protect its employees and comply
with Part 1926, Subpart X. Such measures include enforcing any
contractual language requiring the utility to address any noncompliant
ladders, using other means of accessing the work area, such as portable
ladders or aerial lifts, and repairing or replacing the ladder.
IBEW recommended that OSHA consider the specifications for fixed
ladders in IEEE Std 1307, Standard for Fall Protection for Utility
Work, when finalizing the language for subpart V and Sec. 1910.269
(Ex. 0230).The union wrote:
[T]he committee responsible for developing the standard went
through great pains to research ladders, step bolts, and other
climbing devices commonly installed on electrical structures.
Lineman climbing boots and other equipment was looked at for the
purpose of establishing ladder and step
bolt criteria that would be compatible with the worker safety
equipment. [Ex. 0230]
OSHA rejects IBEW's recommendation to adopt requirements based on
IEEE Std 1307. Although that consensus standard contains requirements
for structures found in electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work (for example, utility poles and towers), those
structures are not unique to the electric power industry; and the
Agency believes, therefore, that this rulemaking is not the proper
vehicle to regulate them. The same types of structures are found in
other industries, in particular, the telephone and cable-television
industries. Utility poles and towers are used to support telephone
lines, cable television lines, communications antennas, and other
equipment used by these industries. OSHA notes that its recently
proposed revision of part 1910, subpart D includes requirements for
fixed ladders on towers and for step bolts on towers and poles (see
proposed Sec. 1910.24, Step bolts and manhole steps; 75 FR 29136).
Paragraph (b) of the final rule establishes requirements for
special ladders and platforms used for electrical work. Because the
lattice structure of an electric power transmission tower and overhead
line conductors generally do not provide solid footing or upper support
for ladders, OSHA is exempting portable ladders used on structures or
conductors in conjunction with overhead line work from the general
provisions of Sec. 1926.1053(b)(5)(i) and (b)(12), which address
ladder support and the use of ladders near exposed electric equipment.
As noted in the preamble to the proposal, an example of a type of
ladder exempted from these provisions is a portable hook ladder used by
power line workers to work on overhead power lines (70 FR 34855).\152\
These ladders are hooked over the line or other support member and then
are lashed in place at both ends to keep them steady while employees
are working from them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\152\ Existing Sec. 1926.1053(b)(12) provides that "[l]adders
shall have nonconductive siderails if they are used where the
employee or the ladder could contact exposed energized electrical
equipment, except as provided in Sec. 1926.951(c)(1) of this
part." In this final rule, OSHA is replacing the reference to Sec.
1926.951(c)(1) with a reference to the corresponding provision in
the final rule, Sec. 1926.955(c), and to final Sec. 1926.955(b),
which exempts special ladders used for electrical work from the
requirement for nonconductive siderails.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(4) and (c) provide employees
with protection that is similar to the protection afforded to employees
by Sec. 1926.1053(b)(5)(i) and (b)(12). These provisions require that
these special ladders and platforms be secured, specify the acceptable
loads and proper strength of this equipment, and provide that the
ladders be used only for the particular types of application for which
they are designed. These provisions thereby ensure that employees are
adequately protected when using the ladders covered by the final rule.
In the Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking, OSHA concluded that these alternative
criteria provide for the safe use of this special equipment, and the
Agency is extending the application of these alternative criteria to
work covered by Subpart V (59 FR 4375). It should be noted that the
requirements for portable ladders in final paragraphs (b)(1) through
(b)(4) apply in addition to requirements in Sec. 1926.1053 for
portable ladders. OSHA revised the language in the final rule to
clarify that the requirements in Sec. 1926.1053, except for paragraph
(b)(5)(i) and (b)(12), apply to portable ladders used on structures or
conductors in conjunction with overhead line work and that the
requirements in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(4) apply only to portable
ladders and platforms used in this manner.
Paragraph (b)(1) of final Sec. 1926.955 requires portable
platforms to be capable of supporting without failure at least 2.5
times the maximum intended load in the configurations in which they are
used. Paragraph (b)(1) in the proposed rule also applied this
requirement to portable ladders. However, Sec. 1926.1053(a)(1), which
also applies, already specifies the strength of portable ladders.
Having two standards with different strength requirements for portable
ladders would be confusing. Consequently, OSHA revised Sec.
1926.955(b)(1) in the final rule so that it covers only portable
platforms.
Paragraph (b)(2) of final Sec. 1926.955 prohibits portable ladders
and platforms from being loaded in excess of the working loads for
which they are designed. It should be noted that, with respect to
portable ladders, compliance with this provision constitutes compliance
with Sec. 1926.1053(b)(3).
Paragraph (b)(3) of final Sec. 1926.955 requires portable ladders
and platforms to be secured to prevent them from becoming accidentally
dislodged.\153\ Accordingly, with respect to portable ladders, OSHA
concludes that compliance with Sec. 1926.955(b)(3) constitutes
compliance with Sec. 1926.1053(b)(6), (b)(7), and (b)(8).\154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\ It should be noted that, to meet paragraph (b)(3),
employers must ensure that portable ladders and platforms are always
secured when in use, regardless of the conditions of the surface on
which the ladder is placed. For example, when a conductor platform,
such as a cable cart, is suspended from a line conductor by a
trolley or hooks, the platform must be secured to the conductor so
that it cannot fall if the trolley or hooks become dislodged.
\154\ It should also be noted that Sec. 1926.1053(b)(1), which
requires that portable ladders be secured in certain situations,
applies additional requirements when portable ladders are used to
access an upper landing surface. Therefore, compliance with final
Sec. 1926.955(b)(3) does not constitute compliance with these
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (b)(4) of final Sec. 1926.955 requires portable ladders
and platforms to be used only in applications for which they are
designed. It should be noted that, with respect to portable ladders,
compliance with this provision constitutes compliance with Sec.
1926.1053(b)(4).
Paragraph (c) prohibits the use of portable metal, and other
portable conductive, ladders near exposed energized lines or equipment.
This paragraph addresses the hazard to employees of contacting
energized lines and equipment with conductive ladders. However, as
noted in the preamble to the proposal, in specialized high-voltage
work, the use of nonconductive ladders could present a greater hazard
to employees than the use of conductive ladders (70 FR 34855-34856). In
some high-voltage work, voltage can be induced on conductive objects in
the work area. When the clearances between live parts operating at
differing voltages, and between the live parts and grounded surfaces,
are large enough that it is relatively easy to maintain the minimum
approach distances required by Sec. 1926.960(c)(1), electric shock
from induced voltage on objects in the vicinity of these high-voltage
lines can pose a greater hazard. Although these voltages do not
normally pose an electrocution hazard, the involuntary muscular
reactions caused by contacting objects at different voltages can lead
to falls. Using a conductive ladder in these situations can minimize
the voltage differences between objects within an employee's reach,
thereby reducing the hazard to the employee. Therefore, the final rule
permits a conductive ladder to be used if an employer can demonstrate
that the use of a nonconductive ladder would present a greater hazard
to employees.
7. Section 1926.956, Hand and Portable Power Equipment
Final Sec. 1926.956 addresses hand and portable power equipment.
The title of this section in the proposal was "Hand and portable power
tools." OSHA revised the title to comport with the scope of the
requirements in this section, which address equipment generally and not
just tools. Paragraph
(a) of this section of the final rule provides that electric equipment
connected by cord and plug is covered by paragraph (b), portable and
vehicle-mounted generators used to supply cord- and plug-connected
equipment are governed by paragraph (c), and hydraulic and pneumatic
tools are covered by paragraph (d). OSHA took all of the requirements
in this section from existing Sec. 1910.269(i).
Electric equipment connected by cord and plug must satisfy the
requirements in paragraph (b). Proposed paragraph (b)(1) stated that
cord- and plug-connected equipment supplied by premises wiring is
covered by Subpart K of Part 1926. OSHA is not including this proposed
requirement in the final rule because, first, OSHA determined that the
language in proposed paragraph (b) improperly emphasized "premises
wiring." The purpose of the proposed provision was to clarify that
equipment covered by Subpart K would continue to be covered by that
Subpart (70 FR 34856). However, OSHA derived the proposed provision
from the corresponding provision in existing Sec. 1910.269(i). That
provision was, in turn, derived from Sec. 1910.302(a)(1), which
specifies the scope of part 1910, subpart S, and provides that the
subpart's "design safety standards for electric utilization of
systems" apply to "electrical installations and utilization equipment
installed or used within or on buildings, structures, and other
premises" (that is, premises wiring). Section 1926.402, which
specifies the scope of Subpart K, does not use the term "premises
wiring." Second, proposed Sec. 1926.956(b)(1), and its counterpart in
existing Sec. 1910.269(i)(2)(i), are unnecessary because these
provisions simply refer to requirements that already apply. Therefore,
to remove any ambiguity, the Agency is not including proposed Sec.
1926.956(b)(1) in the final rule and is removing existing Sec.
1910.269(i)(2)(i) and is replacing the reference in existing Sec.
1910.269(i)(2)(ii) (final Sec. 1910.269(i)(2)) to any cord- and plug-
connected equipment supplied by other than premises wiring with a
reference to cord- and plug-connected equipment not covered by Subpart
S.
Pursuant to proposed paragraph (b)(2), equipment not covered by
subpart K had to have the tool frame grounded, be double insulated, or
be supplied by an isolating transformer with an ungrounded secondary.
The proposed rule (and existing Sec. 1926.951(f)(2)(iii)) did not
specify any limit on the secondary voltage of the isolating
transformer. OSHA is promulgating this paragraph in the final rule
(final paragraph (b)(3)) with one substantive change--if an isolating
transformer with an ungrounded secondary is used to comply with this
provision, its secondary voltage is limited to 50 volts.
In the preamble to the proposed rule, OSHA noted the widespread
availability of double-insulated tools and requested comment on whether
the option permitting tools to be supplied through an isolating
transformer was still necessary (75 FR 34856). Several commenters
responded to this request. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0186, 0201,
0209, 0212, 0213, 0227, 0230.)
Most of these comments supported retaining the proposed option that
permits cord- and plug-connected equipment to be supplied by an
isolating transformer. (See, for example, Exs. 0201, 0209, 0212, 0213,
0227.) For instance, Duke Energy stated: "OSHA should continue to
allow the third option of isolating transformers. While most
applications are covered by grounding or double insulating, there are
unique situations where neither of these is possible and an isolating
transformer may be necessary to protect employees" (Ex. 0201). TVA
commented, without elaboration, that "[d]uring plant outages there are
situations where the use of isolating transformers provides the best
employee safety" (Ex. 0213). Southern Company relied on OSHA's
statement in the preamble to the proposal \155\ that using isolating
transformers is "an effective means of protecting employees from
shock" (Ex. 0212).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\155\ See 70 FR 34856.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other commenters asserted that using isolating transformers was an
outdated form of protection. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0186, 0230.)
For instance, Mr. Anthony Ahern of Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives
wrote:
Isolating transformers are not needed today. Almost all tools
today are either double insulated or equipped with a grounding (3
wire) cord and plug. OSHA already has rules which cover the use and
maintenance of these types of tools. Further, battery operated and
gas powered tools are becoming more and more common and hydraulic
tools are commonly used with bucket trucks. [Ex. 0186]
IBEW commented, "Double insulated hand tools are the industry
standard. It would be difficult to find tools that are not double
insulated or the tool frame is not grounded" (Ex. 0230). IBEW stated,
however, that isolating transformers continue to be an option "[i]f
other types of tools continue to be used" (id.).
OSHA determined that the proposed option permitting cord- and plug-
connected equipment to be supplied by an isolating transformer was
insufficiently protective and that this option will only provide
sufficient protection against ground faults when the isolation
transformer has an ungrounded secondary of no more than 50 volts. OSHA
is imposing the 50-volt limit on isolation transformers because,
although OSHA stated in the preamble to the proposal that each of the
three options (grounding, double insulation, and isolation) provided
protection from electric shock (70 FR 34856), OSHA recognized in other
standards the limited protection provided by isolating
transformers.\156\ If unlimited voltages are permitted with respect to
the isolating transformer option, employees working with cord- and
plug-connected equipment operating at higher voltages would be exposed
to a serious electric-shock hazard when a second ground fault occurs.
Even if equipment is supplied by an isolating transformer with an
ungrounded secondary, there will always be a path to ground for the
circuit conductors. This path will be caused by leakage or by
capacitive or inductive coupling. Depending on the location of this
path, one of the circuit conductors could have a voltage to ground as
high as the full circuit voltage. Thus, while the corresponding
electrical standards for general industry and construction at
Sec. Sec. 1910.304(g)(6)(vi) and (g)(6)(vii) and 1926.404(f)(7)(iv),
respectively, permit all three options, the standards (in Sec. Sec.
1910.304(g)(6)(vii)(A) and 1926.404(f)(7)(iv)(C)(6)) also limit the
secondary voltage on the isolating transformer to 50 volts or less.
Fifty volts or less is widely recognized as a generally safe voltage.
(See, for example, Exs. 0076, 0077, 0532.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\ OSHA notes that TVA did not address the safety of using an
isolating transformer with a secondary voltage of more than 50 volts
during a plant outage. However, pursuant to the final rule, if TVA
uses such a transformer during a plant outage or otherwise, that
transformer must have a secondary voltage of not more than 50 volts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (c) of final Sec. 1926.956 requires portable and
vehicle-mounted generators used to supply cord- and plug-connected
equipment covered by paragraph (b) to meet several requirements. Under
paragraph (c)(1), the generator may only supply equipment on the
generator or the vehicle (for example, lights mounted on the generator
or vehicle) and cord- and plug-connected equipment through receptacles
mounted on the generator or the vehicle. Paragraph (c)(2) provides that
non-current-carrying metal parts of
equipment, and the equipment grounding conductor terminals of the
receptacles, must be bonded to the generator frame. Paragraph (c)(3)
requires that the frame of vehicle-mounted generators be bonded to the
vehicle frame. Finally, paragraph (c)(4) requires the neutral conductor
to be bonded to the generator frame. The final rule clarifies that
these requirements apply only when Subpart K does not apply, as
explained in the discussion of Sec. 1926.956(b), earlier in this
section of the preamble. The requirements in this paragraph are similar
to the corresponding Subpart K requirements, which are contained in
Sec. 1926.404(f)(3).
Final paragraph (d), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, applies to pneumatic and hydraulic tools.
Paragraph (d)(1) of Sec. 1926.302 requires the fluids used in
hydraulic-powered tools to be fire resistant. As explained in the
preamble to the proposed rule, insulating hydraulic fluids are not
inherently fire resistant, and additives that could make them fire
resistant generally make the hydraulic fluid unsuitable for use as
insulation (70 FR 34856). Because of these characteristics and because
hydraulic fluids must be insulating to protect employees performing
power transmission and distribution work, existing Sec. 1926.950(i)
exempts insulating hydraulic fluids from Sec. 1926.302(d)(1).
OSHA proposed to continue this exemption in Sec. 1926.956(d)(1),
but was concerned by several accidents described in the record that
occurred when insulating hydraulic fluid ignited and burned employees
(Ex. 0002). The Agency requested information on whether fire-resistant
insulating hydraulic fluids were available or were being developed.
OSHA did not receive any information about the availability or
progress with the development of fire-resistant insulating hydraulic
fluid; consequently, OSHA is including the existing exemption for
insulating hydraulic fluids in the final rule. The Agency believes that
the most serious hazard faced by an employee performing work covered by
subpart V is electric shock. The Agency also reviewed the accidents in
the record (such as Exs. 0002, 0003, 0004, and 0400) and concluded
that, although insulating hydraulic fluid poses a substantial risk of
igniting and burning workers, the risk of electric shock with
uninsulated hydraulic equipment poses a greater risk of harm. OSHA
encourages employers and manufacturers to develop insulating fluid that
also is fire-resistant and will reexamine this issue if such fluids
become available.
Final paragraph (d)(2) provides that safe operating pressures may
not be exceeded. This requirement protects employees from the harmful
effects of tool failure. If hazardous defects are present, no operating
pressure would be safe, and the tools could not be used. In the absence
of defects, the maximum rated operating pressure (which may be
specified by the manufacturer or by hydraulics handbooks) is the
maximum safe pressure. OSHA included a note to this effect in the final
rule.
If a pneumatic or hydraulic tool is used where it may contact
exposed energized parts, the tool must be designed and maintained for
such use under final paragraph (d)(3). In addition, under paragraph
(d)(4), hydraulic systems for tools that may contact exposed live parts
during use must provide protection against loss of insulating value,
for the voltage involved, due to the formation of a partial vacuum in
the hydraulic line. Under paragraph (d)(5), a pneumatic tool used on
energized electric lines or equipment or used where it may contact
exposed live parts must provide protection against the accumulation of
moisture in the air supply. These three requirements protect employees
from electric shock by restricting current flow through hoses.
OSHA included a note following paragraph (d)(4) of the final rule
addressing the use of hydraulic lines that do not have check
valves.\157\ If such lines are located in such a manner that the
highest point on the hydraulic system is more than 10.7 meters (35
feet) above the oil reservoir, a partial vacuum can form inside the
line. A partial vacuum can cause a loss of insulating value, possibly
resulting in an electrical fault and consequent hydraulic system
failure while an employee is working on a power line. During the
rulemaking on the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 final rule, IBEW reported two
accidents that resulted from such an occurrence (269-DC Tr. 613).
Therefore, OSHA inserted the note when the Agency adopted existing
Sec. 1910.269(i)(4)(iii), which is mirrored in final Sec.
1926.956(d)(4).\158\
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\157\ A check valve blocks reverse flow of the hydraulic fluid
and prevents the formation of a partial vacuum.
\158\ OSHA notes that whether a partial vacuum will result in
the loss of insulating value that triggers actions to prevent the
formation of a partial vacuum depends on the voltage involved.
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Final paragraphs (d)(6) and (d)(7) provide work-practice
requirements to protect employees from the accidental release of
pressure and from the injection of hydraulic oil (which is under high
pressure) through the skin and into the body. The first of these two
provisions requires the release of pressure before connections in the
lines are broken, unless quick-acting, self-closing connectors are
used. In the case of hydraulic tools, the spraying hydraulic fluid
itself, which is flammable, poses additional hazards. Final paragraph
(d)(7) requires employers to ensure that employees do not use any part
of their bodies, such as a finger, to try to locate or stop a hydraulic
leak. This provision in the final rule has been reworded to clarify
that the employer has responsibility for compliance.
Final paragraph (d)(8) provides that hoses not be kinked. Kinks in
hydraulic and pneumatic hoses can lead to premature failure of the hose
and to sudden loss of pressure. If this loss of pressure occurs while
the employee is using the tool, an accident could result in harm to
employees. For example, a hydraulic or pneumatic tool supporting a load
could drop the load onto an employee on a sudden loss of pressure.
NIOSH suggested that OSHA "consider an additional safeguard
against the unintentional release of hydraulic oil--the use of hoses
that are color coded by the [operating pressure] they can withstand,
thus reducing the hazard of skin absorption or fire" (Ex. 0130). NIOSH
did not submit any evidence that employers are using hoses of improper
rating on hydraulic equipment. Consequently, the Agency is not adopting
a requirement to color code hydraulic hoses according to safe operating
pressure. However, NIOSH submitted evidence that an employer performing
maintenance on an insulating hydraulic tool improperly replaced a
nonconductive hose with a hose that was conductive because of its metal
reinforcement (Ex. 0139). Although OSHA is not adopting a color-coding
requirement in the final rule, the Agency advises manufacturers to
clearly distinguish between conductive and nonconductive hoses.
Section 1926.957, Live-Line Tools
Final Sec. 1926.957 is equivalent to existing Sec. 1910.269(j)
and contains requirements for live-line tools (some of which are
commonly called "hot sticks"). This type of tool is used by qualified
employees to handle energized conductors. The tool insulates the
employee from the energized line. For example, a wire tong, which is a
slender insulated pole with a clamp on one end, is used to hold a
conductor at a distance while work is being performed. Common types of
live-line tools include
wire tongs, wire-tong supports, tension links, and switch, fuse, and
tie sticks.
Mr. Leo Muckerheide of Safety Consulting Services was concerned
that proposed Sec. 1926.957 did not address all types of live-line
tools, stating:
There is no definition given for a live-line tool except in the
preamble. It states that such a tool is used to handle energized
conductors and then gives some examples. There are other work
practices, such as installing personal protective grounds, checking
for voltage, pulling fuses or cutouts, removing or installing pins
on suspension insulators, removing or installing jumpers, etc.,
where an insulated tool (switch/fuse/hot stick) is utilized. The
insulating characteristics of these insulated tools (switch/fuse/hot
stick) is critical to the accomplishment of such activities without
injury to the worker. Any insulated tool (switch/fuse/hot stick)
that is used on an energized circuit or a normally energized circuit
in a manner that places a part of the tool inside the minimum
approach distance . . . should be considered a live-line tool. The
worker is depending on the insulating characteristics of the tool
for protection. [Ex. 0180]
He recommended that OSHA expand this section to include these other
insulated tools (id.).
OSHA notes that the lists of live-line tools provided here and in
the preamble to the proposal (70 FR 34853) are not exhaustive. Also,
OSHA added some of Mr. Muckerheide's examples to the list in the first
paragraph of the summary and explanation for final Sec. 1926.957.
Final Sec. 1926.957, and its general industry counterpart, final Sec.
1910.269(j), cover any tool that is designed to contact an energized
part and insulate the worker from that part. IEEE Std 516-2003, IEEE
Guide for Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines, defines
"insulating tool or device" as a tool or device "designed primarily
to provide insulation from an energized part or conductor" (Ex.
0041).\159\ This definition is consistent with OSHA's use of the term
"live-line tool." The Agency believes that the term is well
understood by the regulated community and that the guidance provided in
this preamble makes the Agency's meaning of the term clear. Therefore,
OSHA concludes that it is not necessary to define "live-line tool" in
the final rule.
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\159\ IEEE Std 516-2009 contains the same definition (Ex. 0532).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (a), which is being adopted without change from the
proposal, requires live-line tool rods, tubes, and poles to be designed
and constructed to withstand 328,100 volts per meter (100,000 volts per
foot) for 5 minutes if made of fiberglass-reinforced plastic (FRP),
246,100 volts per meter (75,000 volts per foot) for 3 minutes if made
of wood, or other tests that the employer can demonstrate are
equivalent. The voltage per unit length varies with the type of
material because different insulating materials are capable of
withstanding different voltages over equal lengths. For example, a
higher design standard for wood would cause most wood to fail to meet
the specification, while a lower design specification would allow
substandard products into service. Since the withstand voltages in
final paragraph (a) are consistent with the withstand voltages in
existing Sec. 1910.269(j)(1) and ASTM F711-02 (2007), Standard
Specification for Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod and Tube Used
in Live-Line Tools, OSHA expects that tools currently in use in the
industry will continue to be acceptable. A note in the final regulatory
text provides that tools that meet ASTM F711-02 (2007) will be deemed
to comply with paragraph (a)(1) of final Sec. 1926.957. Together with
the minimum approach distances in Sec. 1926.960(c)(1), final paragraph
(a) of Sec. 1926.957 protects employees from electric shock when they
are using these tools.
Mr. Frank Owen Brockman with Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative
Corporation recommended that the standard not contain provisions for
live-line tools made of wood (Ex. 0173). He maintained that these tools
are outdated and should no longer be in service (id.).
OSHA believes that wood live-line tools likely are no longer in
service and are no longer being manufactured. However, the Agency has
no evidence in the record that there are no wood live-line tools
currently in service. As long as they meet the requirements in final
Sec. 1926.957, they can effectively protect employees from electric
shock. Therefore, OSHA is including in the final rule without change
the proposed requirements for live-line tools made of wood.
Paragraph (b) addresses the condition of tools. The requirements in
this paragraph duplicate the requirements in existing Sec.
1910.269(j)(2) and will ensure that live-line tools remain in a safe
condition after they are put into service. Paragraph (b)(1), which is
being adopted without change from the proposal, requires live-line
tools to be wiped clean and visually inspected for defects before each
day's use. Wiping the tool removes surface contamination that could
lower the insulating value of the tool. Inspecting the tool will
identify any obvious defects that could also adversely affect the
insulating value of the tool.
Paragraph (b)(2), which is being adopted without change from the
proposal, provides that a tool be removed from service if any
contamination or defect that could adversely affect its insulating
qualities or mechanical integrity is present after the tool is wiped
clean. This paragraph protects employees from the failure of live-line
tools during use. Tools removed from service must be examined and
tested under final paragraph (b)(3) before being returned to service.
During the rulemaking on existing Sec. 1910.269, OSHA found that,
while there was no evidence in the record of any injuries related to
the failure of a hot stick, evidence did indicate that these tools have
failed in use (without injury to employees) and that employees depend
on their insulating value while using them to handle energized
conductors (59 FR 4378). The Agency believes that live-line tools are
not typically used to provide protection for employees in the rain
(when work is normally suspended), which probably accounts for the lack
of injuries in the record.\160\ However, live-line tools might be used
under wet conditions, in which case it is necessary to ensure that
these tools will retain their insulating qualities when they are wet.
In addition, employee safety is dependent on the insulating integrity
of the tool--failure of a live-line tool would almost certainly lead to
serious injury or death whenever the tool is the only insulating
barrier between the employee and a live part. Therefore, OSHA is
adopting rules on the periodic examination and testing of live-line
tools to ensure that the live-line tools employees use are safe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\160\ A contaminated tool will fail more easily when wet than
when dry (Ex. 0532). Tools are supposed to be wiped before use, in
part to remove moisture.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although visual inspection can detect the presence of hazardous
defects and contamination, the Agency concluded, on the basis of the
1994 rulemaking record for existing Sec. 1910.269, that the daily
inspections required by final paragraph (b)(1) might not detect all
defects and contamination (59 FR 4378). Referring to live-line tools
that had failed in use, a Georgia Power Company study submitted to that
1994 rulemaking record stated: "Under visual inspection all the sticks
appeared to be relatively clean with no apparent surface
irregularities" (269-Ex. 60). These tools passed a dry voltage test,
but failed a wet voltage test.\161\ While the study
further noted that the surface luster on the sticks was reduced,
apparently the normal visual inspection alone did not detect the
defects that caused those tools to fail.
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\161\ A so-called "dry test" of a live-line tool is an
electrical test performed on the tool after it is stored under
ambient, low-humidity, test conditions for 24 hours. A so-called
"wet test" is an electrical test performed on the tool after the
tool is placed in a high-humidity (at least 93-percent humidity)
chamber for 168 hours. After conditioning and before testing, the
tool is wiped with a dry cloth. Thus, the outside of the tool is dry
during both tests.
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To address these concerns, OSHA is adopting requirements in
paragraph (b)(3) for the thorough examination, cleaning, repair, and
testing of live-line tools on a periodic basis. These provisions are
adopted in the final rule without substantive change from the proposal.
The tools must undergo this process on a 2-year cycle and whenever the
tools are removed from service on the basis of the daily
inspection.\162\
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\162\ When an employer removes a tool from service under final
paragraph (b)(2) and inspects and tests it under final paragraph
(b)(3), the 2-year cycle begins again on the date of the test.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule first requires a thorough examination of the live-
line tool for defects (paragraph (b)(3)(i)). After the examination, the
tool must be cleaned and waxed if no defects or contamination are
found; if a defect or contamination that could adversely affect the
insulating qualities or mechanical integrity of the live-line tool is
found during the examination, the tool must be repaired and refinished
or permanently removed from service as specified by final paragraph
(b)(3)(ii). In addition, under final paragraph (b)(3)(iii), a tool must
be tested: (1) After it has been repaired or refinished, regardless of
its composition; or (2) after an examination is conducted in accordance
with final paragraph (b)(3)(i) that results in no repair or refinishing
being performed (although no testing is required if the tool is made of
FRP rod or foam-filled FRP tube and the employer can demonstrate that
the tool has no defects that could cause it to fail in use).
In accordance with final paragraph (b)(3)(iv), the test method used
must be designed to verify the tool's integrity along its full working
length and, if the tool is made of FRP, its integrity under wet
conditions. The performance criteria specified by final paragraph (a)
are "design standards" that must be met by the manufacturer. The test
voltages and test duration used during the manufacturing process are
not appropriate for periodic retesting of the hot sticks because live-
line tools may sustain damage during such tests. Accordingly, the in-
service tests required by final paragraph (b)(3)(v) are designed to
assure as much employee protection as possible without damaging the
tools. For tools with both hollow and foam-filled sections, the filled
section is typically considered to constitute the insulating portion of
the tool, which, for the purposes of final paragraph (b)(3)(iv), is the
working length of the tool.
Under final paragraph (b)(3)(v), the test voltages must be 246,100
volts per meter (75,000 volts per foot) for fiberglass tools or 164,000
volts per meter (50,000 volts per foot) for wood tools, and, in both
cases, the voltage must be applied for 1 minute. Other tests are
permitted if the employer can demonstrate that they provide equivalent
employee protection.
A note to paragraph (b) of the final rule states that guidelines
for the inspection, care, and testing of live-line tools are specified
in IEEE Std 516-2009.
Mr. Stephen Frost with Mid-Columbia Utilities Safety Alliance
commented that the IEEE standard does not contain test criteria for FRP
tools with hollow sections, but supported OSHA's proposal to adopt the
same language as existing Sec. 1910.269 (Ex. 0184).
OSHA reviewed the test procedures in IEEE Std 516-2009 and found
that they do address hollow, as well as foam-filled, live-line tools.
The Agency believes that these tests can be used by the employer as
appropriate for the different sections of multiple-section tools.
Mr. Leo Muckerheide of Safety Consulting Services commented that
existing Sec. 1910.269(j)(2)(iii) references a 1994 edition of the
2003 IEEE standard that OSHA referenced in the note to proposed
paragraph (b). He also noted that the "wet" test procedure in an ASTM
standard differs from the one in the IEEE standard. Mr. Muckerheide
explained:
[Paragraph (j)(2)(iii)(D) of existing Sec. 1910.269 and
proposed Sec. 1926.957(b)(3)(iv)] require the integrity testing of
fiberglass-reinforced plastic tools under "wet conditions" but it
does not define "wet conditions". The note for paragraph
1926.957(b)(3)(iv) refers to IEEE Std 516-2003 while the note for
1910.269(j)(2)(iii)(D) refers to IEEE Std 978-1984. IEEE Std 978-
1984 is no longer supported by IEEE. There is also an ASTM standard,
F711-02, that establishes specifications for live-line tools. Both
have a test protocol for "wet conditions". However, they are not
identical. One specifies a 7 day 93% humidity test and the other a
fine mist of distilled water. [Ex. 0180]
He recommended that both Sec. 1910.269 and subpart V require testing
under wet conditions to conform to the "current version of IEEE Std
516."
OSHA notes that the test procedure and criteria in ASTM F711 are
design or acceptance tests for new live-line tools, while the tests in
the IEEE standard are in-service tests. As noted earlier, design and
acceptance tests generally are more severe than in-service tests and
can damage tools if repeated on a regular basis. A tool in new
condition should perform at an optimal level. Once a tool has been in
service for a while, it will typically exhibit reduced performance
because the tool deteriorates as it is handled--it develops microscopic
scratches and becomes contaminated with creosote and other substances.
To account for this deterioration, in-service testing frequently uses
different test procedures or test criteria, or both. In the final
standard, the Agency provides employers flexibility in adopting test
procedures and criteria. Thus, test procedures and criteria are
acceptable as long as they meet the performance requirements of the
standard, that is, they "verify the tool's integrity along its entire
working length and, if the tool is made of fiberglass-reinforced
plastic, its integrity under wet conditions." As explained in detail
under the summary and explanation for final Sec. 1926.97, earlier in
this section of the preamble, OSHA is adopting performance requirements
rather than incorporating consensus standards by reference for a number
of reasons, including allowing greater compliance flexibility and
reducing the need to update the OSHA standards as frequently.
As explained in the summary and explanation for Appendix G, later
in this section of the preamble, OSHA is updating the consensus
standards specified in nonmandatory references throughout final Sec.
1910.269 and final subpart V. In this case, the note to final Sec.
1910.269(j)(2) includes an updated reference to IEEE Std 516-2009 to
match the corresponding note to final Sec. 1926.957(b). (See the
summary and explanation of Sec. 1926.97, earlier in this preamble, for
a discussion of OSHA's approach regarding future updates of the
consensus standards referenced in this final rule.)
Section 1926.958, Materials Handling and Storage
Final Sec. 1926.958 is equivalent to existing Sec. 1910.269(k)
and contains requirements for materials handling and storage. Final
paragraph (a) clarifies that material-handling and material-storage
requirements in Part 1926, including those in Subparts N and CC, apply.
Proposed paragraph (a) referenced only Subpart N.\163\ However, OSHA
recently
revised its cranes and derricks standard, former Sec. 1926.550, which
was in subpart N when OSHA published the proposed rule for subpart V.
The recently published cranes and derricks final rule moved the
requirements for cranes and derricks into a new subpart, subpart CC of
part 1926 (75 FR 47906, Aug. 9, 2010).\164\ Consequently, the Agency is
including a reference to this new subpart in final Sec. 1926.958(a).
Work performed under subpart V is exempt from certain requirements in
subpart CC. For example, Sec. 1926.1408(b)(5) exempts cranes and
derricks used in subpart V work from Sec. 1926.1408(b)(4), which
requires employers to adopt one of several encroachment-prevention
measures for certain work near overhead power lines. Any exemptions in
subpart CC for subpart V work continue to apply; those exemptions are
not affected by this final rule.
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\163\ When subpart V was originally promulgated in 1972, that
final rule also added a standard for aerial lifts to subpart N. That
aerial lift standard, which originally appeared at Sec. 1926.556,
eventually was redesignated as Sec. 1926.453, in subpart L. It
should be noted that, except for Sec. 1926.453(b)(2)(v), the aerial
lift standard still applies to work covered by subpart V even though
it is not referenced in final Sec. 1926.958 or final Sec.
1926.959. (See Sec. 1926.950(a)(2).) See, also, the summary and
explanation for final Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii) for a discussion of
why the fall protection requirement in Sec. 1926.453(b)(2)(v) does
not apply to work covered by Subpart V.
\164\ Subpart CC applies to power-operated equipment, when used
in construction, that can hoist, lower, and horizontally move a
suspended load. The discussion of Subpart CC in the preamble to the
Subpart V final rule refers to this equipment as "cranes and
derricks."
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It should be noted that Subparts H and O of OSHA's construction
standards also contain requirements pertaining to material handling and
storage. For example, Sec. 1926.602 covers material-handling
equipment. These provisions continue to apply even though they are not
specifically mentioned in final Sec. 1926.958(a). (See final Sec.
1926.950(a)(2).) To make this clear in the final rule, OSHA reworded
Sec. 1926.958(a) in the final rule to require material handling and
storage to "comply with applicable material-handling and material-
storage requirements in this part, including those in subparts N and CC
of this part."
Paragraph (b) addresses the storage of materials in the vicinity of
energized lines and equipment. Paragraph (b)(1), which is being adopted
without substantive change from the proposal, contains requirements for
areas to which access is not restricted to qualified employees only. As
a general rule, the standard does not permit materials or equipment to
be stored in such areas within 3.05 meters (10 feet) of energized lines
or exposed parts of equipment. This clearance distance must be
increased by 0.10 meters (4 inches) for every 10 kilovolts over 50
kilovolts. The distance also must be increased to account for the
maximum sag and side swing of any conductor and to account for the
height and movement of material-handling equipment. Maintaining these
clearances protects unqualified employees from contacting energized
lines or equipment with materials being handled. Storing materials at
the required distances also will facilitate compliance with provisions
elsewhere in the construction standards that require material-handling
equipment to maintain specific distances from energized lines and
equipment, such as Sec. 1926.600(a)(6).\165\
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\165\ OSHA's revised standard for cranes and derricks at subpart
CC requires minimum clearance distances for cranes and derricks,
which, under certain conditions, are greater than the distances
specified by final Sec. 1926.958(b)(1). Therefore, employers
covered by subpart V must be knowledgeable about these requirements
when they store materials that are lifted by equipment covered under
subpart CC and may need to adjust the clearance distances for
storing materials away from energized lines and equipment
accordingly. (For work covered by subpart V, compliance with final
Sec. 1926.959 is deemed compliance with the relevant requirements
in subpart CC (per Sec. 1926.1400(g)). However, employers must
comply with subpart CC clearance distances for work performed by
unqualified employees because subpart V does not contain electrical
safety-related work practices for those workers. See final Sec.
1926.950(a)(1)(ii).)
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The work practices unqualified workers must use in handling
material stored near energized lines, including in areas addressed by
final Sec. 1926.958(b)(1), are addressed elsewhere in Part 1926,
including subparts K and CC of part 1926. The general approach taken in
this revision of subpart V is to provide safety-related work practices
for qualified employees to follow when they are performing electric
power transmission and distribution work, including work in areas
addressed by final Sec. 1926.958(b)(1). (See the summary and
explanation for final Sec. 1926.950(a)(1)(ii).)
Mr. Kenneth Brubaker was concerned that unqualified employees
storing materials near energized lines or equipment could not determine
the relevant voltage and recommended specifying clearance distances
that did not require calculations based on voltage (Exs. 0099, 0100).
OSHA is not adopting Mr. Brubaker's recommendation. As noted under
the summary and explanation for final Sec. 1926.950(a)(1)(ii), subpart
V does not apply to electrical safety-related work practices for
unqualified employees. Paragraph (b)(1) of final Sec. 1926.958
specifies minimum clearance distances between energized lines or
exposed energized parts and stored material or equipment. The
electrical safety-related work practices used by unqualified employees
handling the stored material or equipment are addressed in subparts of
part 1926 other than subpart V. In any event, the employer is
responsible for determining where to store material and equipment so as
to comply with final Sec. 1926.958(b)(1), which addresses Mr.
Brubaker's concern that unqualified employees will be determining these
distances.
Paragraph (b)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, governs the storage of materials in areas restricted
to qualified employees. If the materials are stored where only
qualified workers have access to them, the materials may be safely
stored closer to the energized parts than 3.05 meters (10 feet),
provided that the employees have sufficient room to perform their work.
Therefore, to ensure that enough room is available, paragraph (b)(2)
prohibits material from being stored in the working space around
energized lines or equipment. A note to this paragraph clarifies that
requirements for the size of the working space are contained in Sec.
1926.966(b). (See the discussion of final Sec. 1926.966(b) later in
this preamble for an explanation of requirements for access and working
space.)
Working space under this provision is the clear space that must be
provided around the equipment to enable qualified employees to work on
the equipment. The minimum working space specifies the minimum distance
an obstruction can be from the equipment. For example, if a switchboard
is installed in a cabinet that an employee will enter, the inside walls
of the cabinet must provide sufficient minimum working space to enable
the employee to work safely within the cabinet.
The minimum approach distance that must be maintained from a live
part is the minimum dimension of the space around the equipment that a
qualified employee is not permitted to enter, except under specified
conditions. Note that the minimum approach distance a qualified
employee must maintain from an energized part (covered in final Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)) is smaller than the working space that is required to
be provided around the part. Accordingly, the employee must enter the
working space and still maintain the minimum approach distance unless
one of the exceptions specified in Sec. 1926.960(c)(1) applies.
Employers must ensure that materials are stored outside the working
space so that employees can quickly
escape from the space if necessary. In addition, sufficient room must
be available in the working space to allow employees to move without
violating the minimum approach distance.
Section 1926.959, Mechanical Equipment
Requirements for mechanical equipment are contained in Sec.
1926.959. Paragraph (a) sets general requirements for mechanical
equipment used in the construction of electric power transmission or
distribution lines and equipment. Paragraph (a)(1) provides that
mechanical equipment must be operated in accordance with applicable
requirements in part 1926, including subparts N, O, and CC, except for
one requirement pertaining to the operation of mechanical equipment
near energized power lines at Sec. 1926.600(a)(6), which does not
apply to operations performed by qualified employees. Accordingly,
Sec. 1926.600(a)(6) continues to apply to operations performed by
unqualified employees. Final subpart V contains requirements for the
operation of mechanical equipment by qualified employees near energized
power lines and equipment. While the final rule allows qualified
employees to operate equipment closer to energized lines and equipment
than permitted for unqualified employees by Sec. 1926.600(a)(6), the
final rule also contains the relevant safeguards for protecting these
employees. These safeguards include special training for qualified
employees (see Sec. 1926.950(b)(2)) and the use of special safety
procedures for operations involving mechanical equipment (see Sec.
1926.959(d)). Therefore, OSHA believes that the final rule will provide
more appropriate protection for qualified electric power transmission
and distribution workers than Sec. 1926.600(a)(6). OSHA revised the
language of final Sec. 1926.959(a)(1) from the proposal to clarify
this point and to be more consistent with final Sec. 1926.958(a).
OSHA proposed to exempt subpart V operations performed by qualified
employees from Sec. 1926.550(a)(15) in subpart N, which specified
minimum approach distances for cranes and derricks. As noted earlier,
however, after OSHA published proposed subpart V, the Agency revised
its standard for cranes and derricks. The revised requirements for
cranes and derricks were relocated to subpart CC. In the cranes and
derricks rulemaking, OSHA concluded that the provisions for operating
cranes and derricks near overhead power lines in subpart CC were
reasonable and appropriate and were more protective of employees than
comparable provisions in existing subpart V. However, the Agency also
concluded that existing Sec. 1910.269(p) was just as protective of
employees as the requirements for operating cranes and derricks near
power lines adopted in subpart CC. (See 75 FR 47921, 47930, 47965-
47966.) Accordingly, OSHA deemed compliance with existing Sec.
1910.269(p) as compliance with Sec. Sec. 1926.1407 through 1926.1411.
(See Sec. 1926.1400(g).) The exemptions for subpart V work specified
in subpart CC (or elsewhere in part 1926) continue to apply; however,
as explained later in this section of the preamble, the Agency revised
several provisions in subpart CC to incorporate changes to subpart V in
this final rule.
Paragraph (a)(2) of final Sec. 1926.959 requires that the critical
safety components of mechanical elevating and rotating equipment
receive a thorough visual inspection before use on each shift. Although
the inspection must be thorough, it is not necessary to disassemble the
equipment. The note following this paragraph describes what equipment
parts OSHA considers to be critical safety components, that is, any
part for which failure would result in a free fall or free rotation of
the boom. These parts are critical to safety because failure would
immediately pose serious hazards to employees, as can be seen in
several aerial-lift accidents in the record (Ex. 0004 \166\). This
provision is adopted as proposed.
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\166\ See, for example, the seven accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=951145&id=200200137&id=928168&id=908343&id=837740&id=14244818&id=564765.
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Paragraph (a)(3), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, prohibits the operator of an electric line truck
from leaving his or her position at the controls while a load is
suspended, unless the employer can demonstrate that no employee,
including the operator, would be endangered if the operator left his or
her position. This provision ensures that the operator will be at the
controls if an emergency arises that necessitates moving the suspended
load. For example, due to wind or unstable soil, the equipment might
start to tip over. Having the operator at the controls ensures that
corrective action can be taken quickly enough to prevent an accident.
Paragraph (b) sets requirements for outriggers. As proposed,
paragraph (b)(1) would have required that mobile equipment \167\
provided with outriggers be operated with the outriggers extended and
firmly set "as necessary for the stability of the specific
configuration of the equipment." The manufacturer normally provides
limits for various configurations to ensure the stability of the
equipment, but these limits can also be derived through engineering
analysis.
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\167\ Paragraphs (p)(1)(ii) and (p)(2) of existing Sec.
1910.269 use the term "vehicular equipment," which is not defined
in existing Sec. 1910.269(x). Existing paragraph (p)(1)(ii)
requires reverse-signal alarms under certain conditions. This
paragraph "is based on existing Sec. Sec. 1926.601(b)(4) and
1926.602(a)(9)(ii)" (59 FR 4399). Existing Sec. 1926.601(b)(4)
contains a reverse-signal-alarm requirement applicable to motor
vehicles, and existing Sec. 1926.602(a)(9)(ii) contains a similar
requirement applicable to earthmoving and compacting equipment.
Because those construction standards apply to motor vehicles and
earthmoving and compacting equipment, the term "vehicular
equipment" in existing Sec. 1910.269(p)(1)(ii), which OSHA drew
from those construction standards, means motor vehicles and
earthmoving and compacting equipment.
Existing Sec. 1910.269(p)(2) generally requires vehicular
equipment, if provided with outriggers, to be operated with the
outriggers extended and firmly set. Thus, "vehicular equipment" in
existing Sec. 1910.269(p)(2) applies more broadly to mobile
equipment fitted with outriggers.
In the final rule, OSHA is clarifying these two provisions in
Sec. 1910.269 and the provision in Sec. 1926.959(b), which
corresponds to existing Sec. 1910.269(p)(2). First, OSHA is
replacing the term "vehicular equipment" in the introductory text
to paragraph (p)(1)(ii) with "motor vehicle or earthmoving or
compacting equipment" to make it clear that Sec.
1910.269(p)(1)(ii) applies to the same equipment as Sec. Sec.
1926.601(b)(4) and 1926.602(a)(9)(ii). Second, the Agency is using
the term "mobile equipment" in final Sec. Sec. 1910.269(p)(2)(i)
and 1926.959(b)(1) in place of the term "vehicular equipment."
"Mobile equipment," as used in these paragraphs, means mechanical
equipment that is mounted on a body, such as a truck, that is used
to transport the equipment.
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Mr. Frank Owen Brockman with Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative
Corporation commented that outriggers "should be used any time the
boom is out of the cradle" (Ex. 0173).
In considering this comment, OSHA examined accidents in the record
involving overturned mobile equipment. There were several such
accidents in the record involving equipment that overturned, and at
least two of them occurred because the outriggers were not set (Exs.
0002, 0400 \168\). Based on these accidents, OSHA believes that, even
if employees setting up mobile mechanical equipment expect to operate
the equipment within its stability limits, they may inadvertently go
beyond those limits while operating the equipment. Consequently, the
Agency agrees with Mr. Brockman that outriggers should always be set,
at least when it is possible to do so. Therefore, in paragraph (b)(1)
of the final rule, OSHA is requiring the outriggers of mobile
equipment to be extended and firmly set, except as permitted in
paragraph (b)(3), which provides for the safe operation of the
equipment when the work area or terrain precludes the use of
outriggers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\168\ See the two accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170872162&id=201403771.
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The second sentence of proposed paragraph (b)(1) would have
prohibited outriggers from being extended or retracted outside the
clear view of the operator unless all employees were outside the range
of possible equipment motion. There were no comments on this provision,
and OSHA is including this requirement as paragraph (b)(2) in the final
rule. This requirement will prevent injuries caused by extending
outriggers into employees.
If the work area or terrain precludes the use of outriggers,
proposed paragraph (b)(2) would have permitted the operation of the
equipment only within the maximum load ratings specified by the
manufacturer for the particular equipment configuration without
outriggers. There were no comments on this provision, and OSHA is
including this requirement in paragraph (b)(3) in the final rule. The
requirements contained in paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(3) will ensure the
stability of the equipment while loads are being handled, thereby
preventing equipment tipovers, which could harm employees.
Paragraph (c), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires mechanical equipment used to lift or move
lines or other material to be operated within its maximum load rating
and other design limitations for the conditions under which it is being
used. As OSHA explained in the preamble to the proposal, it is
important for mechanical equipment to be used within its design
limitations so that the lifting equipment does not fail during use and
harm employees (70 FR 34858).
In electric-utility operations, contact between live parts and
mechanical equipment causes many fatalities each year. A sample of
typical accidents involving the operation of mechanical equipment near
overhead lines is given in Table 4. Industry practice (Exs. 0041, 0076,
0077), and existing rules in Subpart V (Sec. Sec. 1926.952(c) and
1926.955(a)(5)(ii)), require that mechanical equipment be kept from
exposed energized lines and equipment at distances generally greater
than or equal to those proposed in Table V-2 (AC Live-Line Work Minimum
Approach Distance). However, incidents involving contact between
mechanical equipment and energized parts still occur during the
hundreds of thousands of operations performed near overhead power lines
each year (Ex. 0017). If the equipment operator is distracted briefly
or if the distances involved or the speed of the equipment towards the
line is misjudged, contact with the lines is likely to occur,
especially when the minimum approach distances are small. Because these
types of contacts cannot be totally avoided, OSHA believes that
additional requirements, beyond provisions for maintaining minimum
approach distances, are necessary for operating mechanical equipment
near exposed energized lines. Paragraph (d) of final Sec. 1926.959
addresses this issue.
Table 4--Accidents Involving the Operation of Mechanical Equipment Near Overhead Lines
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of fatalities
------------------------------------
Type of equipment Grounded Types of accident
Total ---------------------------
Yes No ?
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boom Truck/Derrick Truck................. 9 2 ....... 7 Boom contact with energized line.
Pole contact with energized line.
Aerial Lift.............................. 8 ....... 1 7 Boom contact with energized line.
....... ....... ....... ....... Lower boom contact with energized
line.
....... ....... ....... ....... Employee working on deenergized
line when upper boom contacted
energized line.
....... ....... ....... ....... Electric current arced from a
winch on a lift used on an
energized line to nearby ground.
Vehicle.................................. 2 ....... 1 1 Line fell on vehicle.
....... ....... ....... ....... Unknown type of vehicle and type
of accident.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................................ 19 2 2 15 .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: OSHA accident investigation data (269-Exs. 9-2 and 9-2A).
Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI proposed a complete revision of proposed
paragraph (d) (Exs. 0155, 0471; Tr. 1249-1253). OSHA decided not to
adopt this proposal. The Agency addresses his specific concerns and
recommendations in the following discussion of the individual
provisions of proposed paragraph (d).
Proposed paragraph (d)(1) would have required that the minimum
approach distances in Table V-2 through Table V-6 be maintained between
the mechanical equipment and live parts while the equipment was being
operated near exposed energized lines or equipment. This provision
would ensure that sufficient clearance is provided between the
mechanical equipment and the energized part to prevent an electric arc
from occurring and energizing the equipment. The requirement to
maintain a minimum approach distance also lessens the chance that the
mechanical equipment will strike the lines and knock them to the
ground. (See 70 FR 34858-34859; 59 FR 4400-4401.)
Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI objected to the prohibition against taking
mechanical equipment inside the minimum approach distance (MAD),
commenting:
[The proposal] requires that mechanical equipment can not be
allowed within the minimum approach distance. However, the electric
utility industry routinely works near MAD, at MAD, and takes
mechanical equipment into MAD during many industry accepted work
practices many times per day. [Ex. 0155]
Mr. Erga argued that proper work methods and grounding would
prevent accidents involving mechanical equipment contacting overhead
power lines. He expanded on his comments in his posthearing submission:
During cross examination at the public hearing on March 2006,
speakers from EEI, NECA, IBEW and others, testified that qualified
workers routinely take mechanical equipment into the Minimum
Approach Distance (MAD). In cross examination of Mr. Tomaseski, IBEW
Director of Safety, was asked, "is mechanical equipment taken
inside the minimum approach distance at times?" Mr. Tomaseski
replied "regularly,"
and he further stated "it could be (the standard) rewritten to
offer a better level of safety."
This standard industry practice of taking mechanical equipment
into MAD occurs when qualified workers are setting new poles,
installing transformers, installing equipment and moving conductors
with mechanical equipment. This practice is safe and effective if
[proper work methods are used].
Table IV-5 "Accidents Involving the Operation of Mechanical
Equipment Near Overhead Lines," page 34859 of the Federal Register,
dated June 15, 2005, details fatalities around mechanical equipment
that were grounded, ungrounded, or not known. However, the table
does not detail how the equipment was grounded, if proper cover-up
was used or if any safety precaution was taken. To date there has
never been a documented case of a worker being injured or killed
around properly grounded mechanical equipment, or when the proper
work methods . . . have been used.
And, as clearly seen in the IEEE paper 91 SM 312-9 PWRD "Tests
Results of Grounding Uninsulated Aerial Lift Vehicles Near Energized
Lines" (Attachment 1), whether the vehicle was left ungrounded or
grounded to a temporarily driven ground rod, neither of these two
practices provided any worker protection. However, when the vehicle
was grounded to a proper ground source, electrical hazards to
workers were greatly reduced to survival levels. Use of insulated
cover-up on the exposed energized lines and equipment, or the use of
insulated and tested mechanical equipment are industry accepted and
safe work procedures which should be supported by OSHA. [Ex. 0471]
OSHA does not dispute Mr. Erga's evidence regarding the
effectiveness of grounding and addresses that issue in the discussion
of paragraph (d)(3)(iii), later in this section of the preamble.
Although Mr. Erga maintains that "qualified workers routinely take
mechanical equipment into the Minimum Approach Distance" (Ex. 0471),
OSHA does not consider this a valid reason for eliminating proposed
paragraph (d)(1) from Sec. 1926.959. Mr. Erga did not demonstrate that
it is infeasible to comply with proposed paragraph (d)(1). In fact,
when performing tasks such as installing poles or equipment, employers
can use temporary arms or other live-line tools to move the lines far
enough away from mechanical equipment so that the equipment maintains
the required minimum approach distance (269-Ex. 8-5). Moreover,
insulated aerial lifts (discussed later in this section of the
preamble) can be used to install equipment and move conductors (id.)
Mr. Erga also maintains that grounding mechanical equipment and
other safety precautions, such as insulating the lines with coverup,
provide better protection than the proposed rule. However, he did not
explain how grounding, insulated coverup, or any of the other practices
he recommended protect employees from conductors being knocked down as
a result of contact by mechanical equipment. The practices he
recommended can help protect employees who contact energized equipment;
however, those practices do not protect employees from being injured or
killed by energized lines contacting them directly or energizing the
earth around them.
Proposed Sec. 1926.959(d)(1) was equivalent to existing Sec.
1910.269(p)(4)(i). Mr. Erga was the only rulemaking participant in
either this rulemaking or the 1994 rulemaking to object to the
prohibition against taking mechanical equipment into the minimum
approach distance. OSHA concludes that this provision of proposed
paragraph (d)(1) is reasonably necessary and appropriate and is
including it in the final rule.
The proposal specified minimum approach distances in proposed Table
V-2 through Table V-6. However, in the final rule, Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)(i) requires the employer to establish minimum approach
distances. (See the summary and explanation of Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(i),
later in this section of the preamble.) Accordingly, final Sec.
1926.959(d)(1) requires mechanical equipment to maintain "the minimum
approach distances, established by the employer under Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)(i)" rather than "the minimum approach distances of
Table V-2 through Table V-6," as proposed.
Mr. Erga questioned whether proposed paragraph (d)(1) allowed a
qualified employee to "use insulating protective material to cover the
line and then go into [the minimum approach distance] with a conductive
boom" (Ex. 0155). The word "exposed" is defined in final Sec.
1926.968 as "[n]ot isolated or guarded." The word "isolated" is
defined in final Sec. 1926.968 as "Not readily accessible to persons
unless special means for access are used." (See the summary and
explanation for final Sec. 1926.960(b)(3) for a discussion of this
definition.) The word "guarded" is defined in final Sec. 1926.968 as
covered, fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected, by means of suitable
covers or casings, barrier rails or screens, mats, or platforms,
designed to minimize the possibility, under normal conditions, of
dangerous approach or inadvertent contact by persons or objects. A note
following the definition of "guarded" explains that conductors that
are insulated, but not otherwise protected, are not guarded. Thus,
energized lines and equipment that are protected only by rubber
insulating equipment are neither guarded nor isolated from the
mechanical equipment and would, consequently, still be "exposed" for
purposes of final paragraph (d)(1). Therefore, under these conditions,
employers must ensure that mechanical equipment complies with the
minimum approach distance.
Proposed paragraph (d)(1) provided an exception permitting the
insulated portion of an aerial lift operated by a qualified employee
located in the lift to breach the minimum approach distance. The Agency
is adopting this exception in final paragraph (d)(1) with only minor
editorial changes. As OSHA noted in the preamble to the proposal,
aerial lifts are designed to enable an employee to position himself or
herself at elevated locations with a high degree of accuracy (70 FR
34859). The aerial-lift operator is in the bucket next to the energized
lines and, therefore, can easily judge the approach distance. This
requirement minimizes the chance that the equipment will contact an
energized line and that the energized line will be struck down should
such contact occur. Furthermore, the employee operating the lift in the
bucket would be protected under the provisions of final Sec. 1926.960
from the hazards of contacting the live parts. As the aerial lift is
insulated, employees on the ground are protected from electric shock in
case the aerial lift contacts the lines, provided that the contact is
made above the insulated section of the boom. OSHA further noted in the
preamble to the proposal that Sec. 1926.959(c) \169\ and other
provisions would protect employees against the possibility that the
aerial lift would strike down the power line (id.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\169\ Paragraph (c) of final Sec. 1926.959 requires mechanical
equipment used to lift or move lines to be used within its maximum
load rating and other design limitations. This provision will ensure
that an aerial lift used to move an overhead line conductor is
designed for that purpose and operated in a manner that will not
cause the conductor to fail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two commenters requested clarification of the exception specified
in proposed paragraph (d)(1) for parts of insulated aerial lifts (Exs.
0186, 0192). Mr. Anthony Ahern of Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives
requested clarification regarding the portion of the boom of an aerial-
lift truck that would be considered uninsulated (Ex. 0186). He noted
that some aerial devices have second insulated inserts in the lower
portion of their booms and that some companies treat these inserts as
secondary protection and do not regularly dielectrically test them
(id.). In
addition, an aerial-lift manufacturer, Altec Industries, offered these
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
comments:
It is important to clarify that insulated aerial lifts have
conductive components located above their insulated sections. The
insulated aerial lift allows a qualified employee using appropriate
PPE to approach within the minimum approach distance to a single
unguarded energized conductor. However the minimum approach distance
to other unguarded conductors at different potentials remain in
effect. The qualified employee may not approach, or take any
conductive object, including conductive portions of an insulated
aerial lift (e.g., material handling system) that are located above
its insulated section, into the minimum approach distance of two
unguarded conductors at different electrical potential. [Ex. 0192]
Altec recommended that the exception be worded, in part: "the
insulated portion of an aerial lift operated by a qualified employee in
the lift is exempt from this requirement if the applicable minimum
approach distance ARE maintained between the CONDUCTIVE PORTIONS OF THE
AERIAL LIFT LOCATED ABOVE INSULATION, THE uninsulated portions of the
aerial lift and exposed objects at a different potential" (id.;
emphasis in original).
Final paragraph (d)(1) will protect employees on the ground by
ensuring that the equipment does not become energized and that the
overhead power lines are not knocked to the ground. Both of these
conditions pose hazards for ground workers. For the purposes of final
paragraph (d)(1), OSHA considers "the insulated portion of an aerial
lift" to be that portion of an insulated aerial lift that is on the
end of the insulated boom section farthest from the vehicle supporting
the aerial lift. This is the portion of the aerial device that is
insulated from the vehicle. If contact with an energized line is made
on this portion of the boom, employees on the ground are
protected.\170\ The Agency does not believe that Altec's recommended
language would further clarify this requirement. In addition, OSHA does
not consider insulated inserts that the employer does not deem to be
insulation, or does not maintain, to be part of the insulated portion
of the aerial lift as specified by final paragraph (d)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\170\ Requiring the equipment to be operated by an employee in
the aerial lift, who has better control over the distance between
the equipment and the power line than an operator on the ground,
also ensures that the line is not knocked down.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It should be noted that, even if the exception in final paragraph
(d)(1) for the insulated portions of aerial lifts applies, the employee
must still maintain the minimum approach distances to the extent
required in final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1). In addition, final Sec.
1926.959(d)(1) requires the conductive portions of the boom to
continuously maintain the minimum approach distances from conductive
objects at potentials different from that on which the employee is
working. It should also be noted that the insulating portion of the
boom can be bridged by improper positioning of the boom or by
conductive objects suspended from the aerial lift platform. For
example, the insulating portion of the boom will be bridged when it is
resting against a grounded object, such as a utility pole, or when the
employee in an aerial bucket is holding onto a grounding jumper. For
purposes of final Sec. 1926.959(d)(1), OSHA does not consider any part
of the aerial lift to be insulated when the insulation is bridged.
Paragraph (d)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires a designated employee to observe the
operation and give timely warnings to the equipment operator before the
minimum approach distance is reached. There is an exception to this
requirement for situations in which the employer can demonstrate that
the operator can accurately determine that the minimum approach
distance is being maintained. As OSHA explained in the preamble to the
proposal, determining the distance between objects that are relatively
far away from an equipment operator who is standing on the ground can
sometimes be difficult (70 FR 34859). For example, different visual
perspectives can lead to different estimates of the distance, and lack
of a suitable reference point can result in errors (269-Ex. 8-19). In
addition, an operator may not be in the best position to observe the
clearance between an energized part and the mechanical equipment
because, for example, an obstruction may block his or her view.
An aerial-lift operator would not normally need to judge the
distance between far away objects. In most cases, an aerial-lift
operator is maintaining the minimum approach distance from energized
parts relatively close to himself or herself, and it should be easy for
him or her to stay far enough away from these parts. In such cases, the
employer would normally be able to demonstrate that the employee can
maintain the minimum approach distance without an observer. However,
even an aerial-lift operator may have difficulty maintaining the
minimum approach distances in certain circumstances. For example, the
congested configuration of some overhead power lines may necessitate
maintaining clearance from more than one conductor at a time, or an
aerial-lift operator may need to judge the distance between the lower,
uninsulated portion of the boom and a conductor that is located well
below the operator. In these situations, in which it is unlikely that
an employer could demonstrate that the operator could accurately
determine that the required distance is being maintained, an observer
is required.
Final paragraph (d)(3) will protect employees, primarily employees
on the ground, from electric shock in case contact is made between the
mechanical equipment and the energized lines or equipment. This
paragraph requires employers to take one of three alternative
protective measures if the equipment can become energized. The first
option (paragraph (d)(3)(i)) requires that energized lines or equipment
exposed to contact with the mechanical equipment be covered with
insulating protective material that will withstand the type of contact
that could be made during the operation. The second option (paragraph
(d)(3)(ii)) requires the mechanical equipment to be insulated for the
voltage involved. Under this option, the mechanical equipment must be
positioned so that uninsulated portions of the equipment cannot come
within the applicable minimum approach distance of the energized line
or equipment.\171\
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\171\ This provision contrasts with final paragraph (d)(1),
which prohibits mechanical equipment (except, in some situations,
the insulated portion of an aerial lift) from being taken closer
than the minimum approach distance to exposed energized lines and
equipment, but allows the equipment to be positioned so that it is
possible to breach that distance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI was concerned about the requirement in
proposed paragraph (d)(3)(ii) that insulated equipment be positioned so
that its uninsulated portions cannot approach energized lines or
equipment closer than the minimum approach distance, commenting:
OSHA 1910.269(p)(4) is currently being read word for word that
when using the insulated portion of mechanical equipment, the un-
insulated portion cannot possibly ever reach into [the minimum
approach distance]. This requires the truck to be positioned so far
away that it cannot lift anything, and is often impractical since
the truck may need to be 30 feet from the pole or line to keep the
possibility of the un-insulated portion entering [the minimum
approach distance]. [Ex. 0155]
Paragraph (d)(3)(ii) in the final rule, which applies to insulated
equipment, requires the mechanical equipment to be positioned so that
the uninsulated
portion cannot approach any closer than the minimum approach distance.
OSHA understands that this may not always be practical, depending on
the work to be performed, the location of the energized lines and
equipment, and available operating positions for the mechanical
equipment. However, the Agency notes that this paragraph presents one
of three options that employers may take to comply with final paragraph
(d)(3). The first and third options, in final paragraphs (d)(3)(i) and
(d)(3)(iii), permit mechanical equipment, including insulated
equipment, to be positioned more closely to energized lines and
equipment provided that employers take the precautions specified in
those paragraphs. (Note that final paragraph (d)(1) still generally
requires mechanical equipment to be operated so that the minimum
approach distances, established by the employer under final Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)(i), are maintained from exposed energized lines and
equipment, regardless of where the equipment is positioned.)
The third compliance option, specified in final paragraph
(d)(3)(iii), is for each employee to be protected from the hazards that
could arise from contact of mechanical equipment with the energized
lines or equipment. The measures used must ensure that employees will
not be exposed to hazardous differences in electric potential. Based on
the Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking record, OSHA concluded that vehicle
grounding alone could not always provide sufficient protection against
the hazards of mechanical equipment contact with energized power lines
(59 FR 4403). However, the Agency recognized the usefulness of
grounding as a protective measure against electric shock when it is
used with other techniques. Therefore, proposed paragraph (d)(3)(iii),
which was equivalent to existing Sec. 1910.269(p)(4)(iii)(C),
required:
(1) Using the best available ground to minimize the time the lines
or equipment remain energized,
(2) Bonding equipment together to minimize potential differences,
(3) Providing ground mats to extend areas of equipotential, and
(4) Using insulating protective equipment or barricades to guard
against any remaining hazardous electrical potential differences.
To comply with the third compliance option in final paragraph
(d)(3)(iii), the employer must use all of these techniques, unless it
can show that it is using other methods that protect each employee from
the hazards that could arise if the mechanical equipment contacts the
energized lines or equipment. The techniques listed in paragraph
(d)(3)(iii): (1) minimize differences in electrical potential, (2)
minimize the time employees would be exposed to hazardous electrical
potentials, and (3) protect against any remaining hazardous electrical
potentials. The performance-oriented requirements in final paragraph
(d)(3)(iii) assure that employees are protected from the hazards that
could arise if the mechanical equipment contacts energized parts.
Information in Appendix C to final subpart V provides guidelines for
employers and employees that explain various measures for protecting
employees from hazardous differences in electrical potential and how to
use those measures. A note referencing this appendix is included after
final paragraph (d)(3)(iii).
Mr. Erga objected to proposed paragraph (d)(3)(iii). He recommended
that mechanical equipment always be grounded "cradle to cradle," that
is, from the time the boom lifts out of the cradle until it returns
(Tr. 1237) and that it always be grounded when it comes within 3 meters
(10 feet) of energized lines or equipment (Tr. 1252). He recommended
further that the standard provide three options to supplement this
grounding requirement: (1) that the lines or equipment be covered, (2)
that the mechanical equipment be insulated, or (3) that barricades,
ground mats, and rubber insulating gloves be used (Tr. 1252).
OSHA concludes that it is not always necessary to ground mechanical
equipment operated near energized lines or equipment. Under the first
option in final paragraph (d)(3), the energized lines or equipment are
covered with insulating protective material that will withstand the
type of contact that could be made during the operation. This option
should prevent the mechanical equipment from becoming energized, and
the Agency, therefore, concludes that grounding is unnecessary for this
option. Under the second option in final paragraph (d)(3), the
uninsulated portion of insulated mechanical equipment must be
positioned so that it cannot approach any closer than the minimum
approach distance. This option also should prevent the mechanical
equipment from becoming energized, and the Agency concludes that
grounding is unnecessary under this option as well.
The third option in final paragraph (d)(3) requires that mechanical
equipment be grounded unless the employer can demonstrate that other
methods in use will protect each employee from the hazards that could
arise if the mechanical equipment contacts the energized lines or
equipment. In his comments, Mr. Erga referred to an IEEE paper on
grounding, explaining:
IEEE paper 91 SM 312-9 PWRD "Test results of grounding un-
insulated aerial lift vehicles near energized distribution lines" .
. . clearly shows mechanical equipment grounded to the best
available ground reduces the voltage and current exposed to the
worker by more than 96%. The ESCI staff knows of no electrical
worker ever killed or injured around properly grounded mechanical
equipment that has become accidentally energized. [Ex. 0155;
emphasis included in original]
The IEEE paper to which Mr. Erga referred clearly shows that using the
best available ground provides the most protection for employees and,
therefore, supports the requirement in final paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(A)
to ground the mechanical equipment to the best available ground (Ex.
0472). However, the paper also demonstrates that this ground is
insufficient by itself to protect employees fully. With grounding
alone, the current through a resistor of more than 900 ohms is high
enough to injure and possibly kill an employee. OSHA has considered the
minimum resistance of an employee to be 500 ohms, not 1,000 ohms, as
specified in the paper (59 FR 4406). As NIOSH states in its Publication
No. 98-131, Worker Deaths by Electrocution: A Summary of NIOSH
Surveillance and Investigative Findings, "High-voltage electrical
energy quickly breaks down human skin, reducing the human body's
resistance to 500 Ohms" (Ex. 0141). Using Ohm's Law, current is
inversely proportional to resistance, and the current through a 500-ohm
resistor would be nearly twice the current shown in the IEEE paper. In
addition, the testing for the IEEE paper was performed with a 7,200-
volt power line. Distribution and transmission lines of higher
voltages, which are not uncommon, would result in even higher currents
through a resistor. Thus, the evidence provided by Mr. Erga
demonstrates the need for additional measures beyond grounding, such as
the measures required by the final rule.
As noted earlier, final paragraph (d)(3)(iii) requires the employer
to take specified measures unless it can demonstrate that the methods
in use protect each employee from the hazards that could arise if the
equipment contacts the energized line or equipment. Mr. Erga's proposal
would require only two of those measures: Grounding and one of three
additional measures, two of which are comparable to measures required
by final paragraph (d)(3)(iii). OSHA continues to believe that all of
the measures listed in final
paragraph (d)(3)(iii) will protect employees from hazardous differences
in electrical potential as explained in the preamble to the 1994 Sec.
1910.269 final rule (59 FR 4402-4403). Employers are free to use other
protective measures, including those proposed by Mr. Erga, but these
employers must demonstrate that the methods in use protect each
employee from the hazards that could arise if the equipment contacts an
energized line or equipment. OSHA concludes that it is important for
employers that do not implement all of the measures required by final
paragraph (d)(3)(iii) to evaluate their systems, and the alternative
measures they select, to ensure that employees are protected.
Therefore, OSHA is not adopting Mr. Erga's recommended changes to
paragraph (d)(3)(iii).
OSHA is including paragraph (d)(3) in the final rule substantially
as proposed. The Agency has, however, made technical changes to the
proposed language to clearly distinguish between references to
mechanical equipment and references to energized equipment. Several
provisions in proposed paragraph (d)(3) used the word "equipment"
without specifying whether it meant the mechanical equipment itself or
the energized equipment that the mechanical equipment could contact.
Although the language was clear from the context, the final rule
consistently states which term applies. Also, in two places, proposed
paragraph (d)(3) used the term "energized lines" when OSHA meant
"energized lines or equipment." The final rule corrects these
oversights. In addition, final paragraph (d)(3)(ii) requires mechanical
equipment to maintain "the minimum approach distances, established by
the employer under Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(i)," rather than "the minimum
approach distances specified in Table V-2 through Table V-6," as
proposed.
11. Section 1926.960, Working on or Near Exposed Energized Parts
Paragraph (a) specifies the scope of Sec. 1926.960 of the final
rule. This section applies to work on exposed live parts and work near
enough to such parts to expose the employee to any hazard they present.
Many of the provisions in this section have been taken directly from
existing Sec. 1910.269(l).
Paragraph (b) contains general requirements for working on or near
live parts. OSHA is adopting paragraph (b)(1) in this final rule
without change from the proposal. This paragraph requires employees
working on, or with, exposed energized lines or parts of equipment (at
any voltage), and employees working in areas containing unguarded,
uninsulated energized lines or parts of equipment operating at 50 volts
or more, to be qualified employees. Without proper training in the
construction and operation of the lines and equipment and in the
electrical hazards involved, workers performing this type of work are
at risk of being electrocuted and also may expose others to injury. In
areas containing unguarded live parts energized at 50 volts or more,
untrained employees would not be familiar with the practices that are
necessary to recognize and avoid contact with these parts.
Commenting on the language in proposed paragraph (b)(1), Mr. Tommy
Lucas with TVA questioned what OSHA means by "areas containing
unguarded, uninsulated energized lines or parts of equipment" (Ex.
0213). He noted that the "area" at issue could be the room, yard, or
building in which the equipment is located.
Paragraph (e) of Sec. 1926.966 of the final rule contains
requirements for guarding rooms containing electric supply equipment in
substations. Paragraphs (u)(4) and (v)(4) of existing Sec. 1910.269
contain corresponding requirements for maintenance work in substations
and generating plants. These provisions generally require live parts
operating at 50 volts or more to be in rooms or spaces enclosed within
fences, screens, partitions, or walls so as to minimize the possibility
that unqualified persons will enter. (See existing Sec.
1910.269(u)(4)(ii) and (v)(4)(ii) and final Sec. 1926.966(e)(2).)
These are the areas to which final Sec. 1926.960(b)(1)(ii) (and the
corresponding requirement in final Sec. 1910.269(l)(1)(ii)) refer.
The definition of "qualified employee" contains a note to
indicate that employees who are undergoing on-the-job training are
considered to be qualified if they have demonstrated an ability to
perform duties safely and if they are under the immediate supervision
of a qualified employee. (See the discussion of this definition under
the summary and explanation of final Sec. 1926.968.) Therefore,
employees in training, who have demonstrated an ability to perform
duties safely and are under the direct supervision of a qualified
employee, are permitted to perform the types of work described in
paragraph (b)(1). OSHA believes that close supervision of trainees will
permit employers to correct errors before they cause accidents.
Allowing these workers to perform tasks under workplace conditions also
may better prepare the employees to work safely.
Paragraph (b)(2), which is similar to the last sentence of the
introductory text of existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(1), is being adopted in
the final rule without change from the proposal. This paragraph
requires lines and equipment to be considered and treated as energized
unless they have been deenergized under the provisions of final Sec.
1926.961. Existing Sec. 1926.950(b)(2) requires electric lines and
equipment to be considered energized until determined to be deenergized
by tests or other appropriate means. The existing standard does not
specify what those appropriate means are. However, even if the line or
equipment is tested and found to be deenergized, it may become
reenergized through contact with another source of electric energy or
by someone reenergizing it at its points of control. So Sec. 1926.961
of the final rule contains requirements for deenergizing electric power
transmission and distribution lines and equipment. Unless the
procedures contained in that section have been followed, lines and
equipment cannot reliably be considered as deenergized.
Two-Person Rule
If an employee working on or near energized electric power
transmission or distribution lines or equipment is injured by an
electric shock, a second employee will be needed to provide emergency
care to the injured employee. As noted under the summary and
explanation of final Sec. 1926.951(b), discussed earlier in this
section of the preamble, CPR must begin within 4 minutes after an
employee loses consciousness as a result of an electric shock. OSHA is
requiring the presence of a second employee during certain types of
work on or near electric power transmission or distribution lines or
equipment to ensure that CPR begins as soon as possible and to help
ensure that it starts within the 4-minute timeframe. (Note that final
Sec. 1926.951(b) requires at least two people trained in first-aid
procedures, including CPR, for field work involving two or more
employees at a work location.)
OSHA proposed, in paragraph (b)(3)(i) of Sec. 1926.960, to require
the presence of at least two employees during the following types of
work:
(1) Installation, removal, or repair of lines energized at more
than 600 volts,
(2) Installation, removal, or repair of deenergized lines if an
employee is exposed to contact with other parts energized at more than
600 volts,
(3) Installation, removal, or repair of equipment, such as
transformers, capacitors, and regulators, if an employee is exposed to
contact with parts energized at more than 600 volts,
(4) Work involving the use of mechanical equipment, other than
insulated aerial lifts, near parts energized at more than 600 volts,
and
(5) Other work that exposes an employee to electrical hazards
greater than, or equal to, the electrical hazard posed by these
operations.
However, OSHA also proposed exemptions to the two-person
requirement to account for work that the Agency believed could be
performed safely by a single employee or that must be performed as
quickly as possible for public-safety purposes. These exemptions were
proposed in paragraph (b)(3)(ii) for the following operations:
(1) Routine circuit switching, if the employer can demonstrate that
conditions at the site allow safe performance of this work,
(2) Work performed with live-line tools if the employee is in a
position from which he or she is neither within reach of nor exposed to
contact with energized parts, and
(3) Emergency repairs to the extent necessary to safeguard the
general public.
OSHA based the proposed two-person rule on existing Sec.
1910.269(l)(1)(i) and (l)(1)(ii). OSHA explained in the preamble to the
proposal that the first four work operations listed in proposed
paragraph (b)(3)(i) were the operations that expose employees to the
greatest risk of electric shock, as demonstrated by the 1994 Sec.
1910.269 rulemaking record (70 FR 34861). OSHA proposed the fifth and
last category in paragraph (b)(3)(i) to cover additional types of work
that pose equal or greater electrical hazards. The preamble to the
proposal noted that operations covered under existing Sec.
1910.269(l)(1)(i) are performed during construction, as well as during
maintenance (id.). The preamble further noted that construction
operations are similar to the operations performed during maintenance
work and that the Agency believed that these operations involved the
same hazards (id.). For example, using mechanical equipment near a
7200-volt overhead power line during construction of a new line poses
hazards that are equivalent to the hazards posed during the use of
mechanical equipment to replace a damaged pole on an existing line of
the same voltage. Thus, OSHA proposed to extend the existing general
industry requirement to construction.
The proposed requirement for at least two employees to be present
during certain operations generally would not have applied if the
voltage of the energized parts involved was 600 volts or less. In the
proposal, OSHA requested comments on whether the final rule should
extend the application of the two-person rule to any operations
involving work on installations operating at 600 volts or less.
Most commenters opposed changing the proposed rule to require two
persons for work on energized lines or parts operating at 600 volts or
less. (See, for example, Exs. 0175, 0177, 0209, 0210, 0212, 0219, 0224,
0227.) Some of these rulemaking participants likened this work to the
work performed by electricians, for which consensus standards do not
require the presence of two people. (See, for example, Exs. 0175, 0209,
0212.) For instance, Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, Maryland &
Delaware Association of Electric Cooperatives commented:
We do not see the need for a second person on the job site for
voltages below 600 Volts. . . . This work is generally easier and
less hazardous. Work below 600 volts is generally similar to
electricians work. Neither the NEC nor NESC require two employees to
be present when working these voltages. Most electricians isolate
themselves only thru the use of insulated tools. Utilities commonly
exceed that level of protection by requiring the use of Class 0
gloves, in addition to the use of insulated tools. This combination
effectively negates the need for a second person. The use of
insulated tools with Class 0 gloves helps with protection and also
eliminates the need for a second person. [Ex. 0175]
Mr. Allan Oracion with Energy United EMC similarly commented that work
at voltages of 600 volts and less is less hazardous than work at higher
voltages and that there is little potential for injury during "low-
voltage" work as long as other applicable OSHA standards are followed
(Ex. 0219). Others argued that a requirement for a second person would
be costly and impractical without substantial benefits. (See, for
example, Exs. 0177, 0224, 0227.) EEI commented:
EEI submits that there is no need for further precautions to be
required for such work, provided that the required insulated cover-
up materials are used and personal protective equipment is being
worn by employees while working on lines and equipment energized at
less than 600 volts. One moderately sized utility forecasts that if
it is required to replace existing one-person crews with two-person
operations due [to] a revision in this requirement, the cost to the
company would be approximately $ 3.8 million annually. OSHA has
shown no data supporting a change in the requirements for work at
less than 600 volts, including none showing that the benefit, if
any, to be derived from unspecified additional precautions would be
reasonably related to the cost. [Ex. 0227]
In responding to OSHA's request for comments on whether to require two
persons for work at voltages of 600 volts or less, Consumers Energy
noted that its accident experience indicated that employees who work
alone have a significantly lower injury incidence rate than employees
working together (Ex. 0177). Also on this issue, Siemens Power
Generation commented that "OSHA should allow the employer to evaluate
the hazard and determine which situations meet the need for a two
person rule" (Ex. 0163).
Some commenters maintained that a second person should be present
when work is performed on equipment energized at 600 volts or less.
(See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0161, 0197, 0230.) Mr. Brad Davis of BGE
suggested that "the same care should be taken at all voltage levels"
(Ex. 0126). Mr. James Junga with Local 223 of the UWUA maintained that
two persons should be required for all work on voltages of 480 volts or
more, commenting:
Working on secondary voltage at or above 480 volts should also
require two qualified persons. I believe this voltage is extremely
dangerous and should not be performed by one person [because of] the
quick response that is necessary for a person who gets in contact
with energized equipment operating at 480 volts. [Ex. 0197]
IBEW recommended that two-person crews always be required for
construction work covered by Subpart V and that Sec. 1910.269 be
amended to include limitations on the work that can be performed by
employees working alone on voltages of 600 volts or less, explaining:
First and foremost, contractor crews, unless assigned only to
perform minor maintenance, should never employ a one person crew.
Contractor crews are generally performing new construction type work
that usually requires several employees on each job. For the
purposes of 1926 Subpart V, reference to a one person crew should
not be included.
For the purpose of 1910.269 and maintenance work, this section
should be clarified. Just because the work involves voltages under
600 volts, there should be limitations as to how much a one person
crew can perform. For example, the job requires open wire 1/0
aluminum secondary conductors that were burned down by a tree limb
to be reinstalled up a pole. This will include clearing the downed
tree parts, splicing the conductors, and sagging and dead-ending the
conductors. Some of this work will even be performed de-energized,
but exposure to other energized conductors is a possibility. There
is no reason to put one person in this situation. [Ex. 0230]
OSHA does not agree with the comments suggesting that work on
circuit parts energized at 600 volts and less is safe. When Sec.
1910.269 was promulgated in 1994, the Agency concluded that there was
"insufficient
evidence in the record as to whether or not it is safe for qualified
employees to work alone on live parts energized at" 600 volts or less
(59 FR 4381). In developing the subpart V proposal, OSHA examined more
recent accident data. Table 5 shows the number of electrocutions for
various voltage ranges for the years 1991 through 1998. In the years
1991 to 1994, an average of 3 fatalities occurred per year involving
voltages of 600 volts or less. For the years 1995 to 1998, when Sec.
1910.269 was fully in effect, the average dropped slightly to 2.5
fatalities per year.
Table 5--Fatalities by Voltage and Year
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
100 kV and
Year 600 V or less 601 V to 20 kV 20 to 80 kV higher
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1991............................................ 3 24 2 1
1992............................................ 5 24 2 0
1993............................................ 3 23 3 1
1994............................................ 1 21 2 2
1995............................................ 2 22 4 5
1996............................................ 4 16 0 2
1997............................................ 1 6 3 1
1998............................................ 3 13 0 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: OSHA database of electric power generation, transmission, and distribution accidents (Ex. 0004). These
data include only cases involving electrocution in which the voltage was indicated in the accident abstract.
These data indicate that, in general, there is a substantial risk
of death for employees working on voltages of 600 volts or less.
Although it appears as though exposures to live parts energized at 600
volts or less result in relatively few accidents, OSHA concludes that
these voltages are capable of killing workers. Consumers Energy's
injury rates are not relevant here. The primary purpose of the two-
person rule is the prevention of electrocution. Electrocutions are the
result of electric shocks, which are a very low probability event, and
have no significant effect on injury rates even when they occur in
substantial numbers among all employees performing work addressed by
the final rule.\172\
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\172\ Electric shocks are responsible for a tiny proportion of
the total number of injuries suffered by workers in the electric
utility industry, as shown in "Assessment of the Benefits of the
Proposed Standard on Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and
Distribution; Coding Results and Analysis," which is an analysis of
reports of injuries in the electric utility industry for calendar
year 1989 (Ex. 0081). As this report shows, the leading categories
for nature of injury are sprains and strains, lacerations,
contusions, and scratches and abrasions, which together accounted
for over 70 percent of the injuries. Electric shock accounted for
only 0.7 percent of the injuries.
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In addition, the types of work commonly assigned to crews of more
than one employee include line installation and removal and the use of
mechanical apparatus to lift or position material (59 FR 4380). This
heavy type of work seems more likely to cause sprains and strains,
lacerations, contusions, and scratches and abrasions, which form the
majority of line worker injuries, than the lighter type of work
commonly assigned to employees working alone, such as switching (Ex.
0081). OSHA, therefore, concludes that it is unlikely that the
increased incidence rates experienced by Consumers Energy for employees
working together are due to an increased incidence of electric shock.
OSHA does not believe, and it is illogical to suggest, that an employee
working alone is less likely to die as the result of an electric shock
than an employee working in an environment in which another employee is
available to provide emergency assistance in the event of a shock
incident.
OSHA also disagrees with comments arguing that requirements for
proper use of electrical protective equipment and other safety-related
work practices make safe any work performed on circuit parts energized
at 600 volts or less. The use of personal protective equipment and
compliance with other OSHA-required work practices may well protect
against hazards posed by these voltages; however, in the 1994 Sec.
1910.269 final rule, the Agency adopted the two-person rule to
supplement work practice and PPE requirements for certain types of
electrical work.
In the rulemaking on the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 final rule, OSHA
examined the record to determine what operations posed sufficient
residual risk to warrant the presence of a second person. The Agency
found that some work involving installations operating at more than 600
volts posed hazards requiring the presence of a second person, but
other work was safe enough for an employee to perform alone. In this
rulemaking, OSHA is using the same approach to examine the need for a
second person at voltages of 600 volts and less. Because there are
relatively few accidents involving circuit parts energized at 600 volts
or less, the Agency believes it is reasonable to assume, at these
voltages, that there are few types of work that cannot be safely
performed without the presence of a second person. However, OSHA agrees
with IBEW that some low-voltage operations require at least two
persons. There are many types of low-voltage work in which employees
suffer electric shock, including installation, repair, and testing.
Employees have sustained low-voltage electric shocks working on
transformers, circuit breakers, and conductors.
Although the Agency is in general agreement with IBEW about the
need for two persons for some work involving parts energized at 600
volts or less, OSHA decided not to require the presence of a second
person during any specific types of work at such voltages because the
record does not specifically indicate which low-voltage operations are
hazardous enough to warrant a second-person requirement (except when a
worker could contact lines or circuit parts energized at more than 600
volts while working on parts energized at less than 600 volts).
IBEW listed the following factors that limit when a one-person crew
performs work: complexity of the tasks, hot-stick versus the rubber-
glove work method, voltage-range limitations, limited time spent on a
specific task, maintenance work only, and other factors (Ex. 0230). As
already noted, with respect to low-voltage work, the union further
commented:
Just because the work involves voltages under 600 volts, there
should be limitations as to how much a one person crew can perform.
For example, the job requires open wire 1/0 aluminum secondary
conductors that were burned down by a tree limb to be reinstalled up
a pole. This will include clearing the downed tree parts, splicing
the conductors, and sagging and dead-ending the conductors. Some of
this work will even be performed de-energized, but exposure to other
energized conductors is a possibility. There is no reason to put one
person in this situation. [Id.].
IBEW's comments do not provide the specificity about hazardous low-
voltage tasks that the Agency determined is missing from the record.
The purpose of the second-person requirement is to prevent fatalities
from electric shock. Thus, the complexity of the job and time spent
during the deenergized portion of the work have no bearing on the
likelihood of an electric shock occurring and, accordingly, no bearing
on whether OSHA should require a second person. Finally, in IBEW's
specific example of low-voltage work, a second person is already
required under the final rule if the employee is exposed to parts
energized at more than 600 volts.\173\ The remaining factors listed by
IBEW do not appear to be related to the causes of low-voltage
electrical accidents in the record. Although OSHA is not adopting any
two-person requirements for work exposing employees to contact with
lines or circuit parts energized at 600 volts or less, the Agency
anticipates that, in certain situations, an employer will need to
ensure that at least two trained persons are present for such work to
satisfy the employer's obligations under the general duty clause of the
OSH Act (Section 5(a)(1)). (See Chapter 4, Section III of OSHA's Field
Operations Manual (FOM), CPL 02-00-150
(http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=DIRECTIVES&p_id=4935),
for a discussion of general duty clause violations.)
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\173\ Final paragraph (b)(3)(i)(B) requires the presence of a
second employee when an employee installing deenergized lines is
exposed to contact with parts energized at more than 600 volts. The
operating voltage of the deenergized line has no bearing on whether
a second person is required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IBEW pointed to new construction as an example of work
necessitating the presence of more than one worker. New construction
involves the installation of lines and equipment. Final paragraph
(b)(3)(i) requires a second person for installation of lines or
equipment if an employee is exposed to contact with other parts
energized at more than 600 volts. IBEW's recommendation would also
require a second person when an employee is exposed to electric-shock
hazards of 600 volts or less and when electric-shock hazards are not
present at all. OSHA decided against requiring a second person for
lower voltage work for the reasons explained previously.
Mr. Junga recommended that the standard require a second person
when "work is to be performed on electrical lines operating at primary
voltages" (Ex. 0197). He stated:
If a person working alone gets in contact with energized primary
voltages and they are working alone they will die. No one will be
there to assist, provide CPR, use an AED, provide first aid or even
call for help. [Id.]
OSHA decided not to adopt Mr. Junga's recommendation. The Agency
believes that the language adopted in final Sec. 1926.960(b)(3)(i)
adequately captures work in which employees are exposed to contact with
parts energized at more than 600 volts (primary voltage). The
exceptions to the two-person rule, adopted in final Sec.
1926.960(b)(3)(ii), generally are limited to work that does not expose
the employee to contact with parts energized at more than 600
volts.\174\ OSHA believes that final Sec. 1926.960(b)(3) ensures that
employees at a substantial risk of electric shock are protected by the
presence of a second person.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\174\ Under final Sec. 1926.960(b)(3)(ii)(C), one employee
working alone may perform emergency repair work involving parts
energized at more than 600 volts, but only to the extent necessary
to safeguard the general public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Daniel Shipp with ISEA recommended that OSHA require the
presence of a second person whenever fall hazards are present in
combination with electric-shock hazards (Ex. 0211). He pointed to risks
associated with prolonged suspension in personal fall protection
equipment, commenting:
In a recent Safety and Health Information Bulletin, OSHA
describes the hazard of prolonged suspension in a full body harness
following a fall event. OSHA SHIB 03-24-2004 cites the hazard of
orthostatic intolerance, recommending prompt rescue of suspended
personnel, especially when other complicating factors may be
present. A fall precipitated by exposure to an energized electrical
source will require immediate rescue of the incapacitated employee
and removal to a safe working level where medical aid can be
administered. [Id.]
OSHA recognizes the hazards associated with prolonged suspension in
full body harnesses. Therefore, Sec. 1926.502(d)(20), which applies to
personal fall arrest equipment, requires employers to provide for
prompt rescue of employees in the event of a fall or assure that
employees are able to rescue themselves. The Agency believes that final
Sec. 1926.960(b)(3) will assure the rescue of employees exposed to
electric-shock hazards of more than 600 volts. Also, as explained
previously, under Section 5(a)(1) of the OSH Act, employers may need to
adopt additional measures beyond the measures required in final subpart
V to assure prompt rescue of employees exposed to lower voltage
electric-shock hazards. Because hazards associated with suspension in
full body harnesses already are covered in Sec. 1926.502(d)(20), OSHA
sees no need to address them further in subpart V.
For all of these reasons, OSHA concludes that the evidence in this
rulemaking record does not support adding a two-person requirement for
any operation that existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(1) permits an employee to
perform alone.
Some commenters requested clarification of the relationship between
the two-person rule in paragraph (b)(3) and the requirements on minimum
approach distances, which are discussed later in this section of the
preamble (Exs. 0209, 0230; Tr. 903). Mr. Thomas Frank of Ameren
Corporation requested that OSHA revise the language so that the two-
person rule applies only when an employee performs work within the
applicable minimum approach distance (Ex. 0209). In addition, Mr. Edwin
Hill with IBEW suggested that there is confusion in the industry about
the applicability of minimum approach distances to employees working
alone, commenting:
The current language in 1910.269 is many times misunderstood.
[S]ome people believe that a worker can get closer than the minimum
approach distance to an energized primary conductor when working
alone. This should not be true. . . .
If the standard is going [to] allow a one person crew to work
around energized primary conductors of voltages greater than 600
volts, then it should be clear that minimum approach distances must
be maintained. In the case of underground distribution equipment,
the same detailed restrictions should be explained. Many times
during an underground circuit outage, a worker opens the equipment
doors and is within the minimum approach distances of the energized
cables, both "live front terminations" and "dead front elbows".
The established minimum approach distances should be maintained at
all times, in any work situation, to ensure worker safety. If these
distances cannot be maintained, rubber insulating cover-up equipment
should be installed. [Ex. 0230]
In this regard, paragraph (b)(3) does not excuse compliance with
otherwise applicable minimum approach-distance requirements. OSHA
previously clarified existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(1), from which it
adopted final paragraph (b)(3), explaining that an employee is
"exposed to contact" for purposes of Sec. 1910.269(l)(1) when he or
she is in a working position from which he or she can reach or take a
conductive object within the electrical component of the minimum
approach distance.\175\ (See the summary and explanation for final
Sec. 1926.960(c)(1) later in this section of the preamble for a
discussion of the
electrical component of the minimum approach distance.) OSHA notes that
an employee who is "exposed to contact" with an energized part under
this interpretation is still "exposed to contact" with the energized
part even when insulation covers the part, the employee, or both. (See
final Sec. Sec. 1910.269(x) and 1926.968 (defining "exposed" as not
isolated \176\ or guarded;\177\ merely covering a conductor or an
employee with insulation does not provide guarding or isolation).)
\178\ The Agency also notes that a second employee may be required when
employees can reach or take a conductive object into the electrical
component of the minimum approach distance as they are approaching or
leaving their final work positions or moving from one work position to
another.
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\175\ See the letter of interpretation dated October 18, 1995,
to Mr. Lonnie Bell,
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21981.)
\176\ The proposed rule and existing Sec. 1910.269 did not
define "isolated." However, existing Subpart V did define that
term in Sec. 1926.960 as "not readily accessible to persons unless
special means of access are used." This definition is identical to
the definition of this term in OSHA's electrical standards for
general industry (Sec. 1910.399) and construction (Sec. 1926.449)
and in the 2002 NESC (Ex. 0077). This definition also is consistent
with the use of the term "exposed to contact" in final paragraph
(b)(3). OSHA believes that defining "isolated" will help clarify
the final rule. Consequently, OSHA included the definition of
"isolated" in final Sec. Sec. 1910.269(x) and 1926.968. The
Agency also included "exposed to contact" as a synonym in the
definition of "exposed" to clarify that the definition of
"exposed" also applies to the term used in final paragraph (b)(3).
\177\ Section 1926.968 defines "guarded" as "[c]overed,
fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected, by means of suitable
covers or casings, barrier rails or screens, mats, or platforms,
designed to minimize the possibility, under normal conditions, of
dangerous approach or inadvertent contact by persons or objects."
Subpart V recognizes two methods of guarding: barriers (or
enclosures), which serve to "minimize the possibility . . . of . .
. inadvertent contact," and guarding by location, which serves to
"minimize the possibility . . . of dangerous approach." As
explained in the note to final Sec. 1926.966(f)(1), the 2002 NESC
contains guidelines for the dimensions of clearance distances about
electric equipment in substations. OSHA considers these clearance
distances as minimizing the possibility of dangerous approach for
employees and considers energized parts conforming to the clearance
distances in the 2002 NESC to be guarded, unless employees bypass
those distances (for example, by accessing a "guarded" area). (See
also the summary and explanation for final Sec. 1926.966(f)(1)
later in this section of the preamble.)
\178\ IEEE Std 516 further clarifies the treatment of insulated
cables (Exs. 0041, 0532). For example, Section 4.9.1 of IEEE Std
516-2009 states:
The following are considered to be live parts at their normal
operating voltage unless they are properly grounded:
* * * * *
--Conductors--insulated unless they have solidly grounded and
tested shields (The condition of the conductor insulation exposed to
weather is unknown and may be damaged or defective.) [Ex. 0532]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Junga with UWUA Local 223 was concerned that "[e]mployers are
pushing for more one-person crews and asking [them] to do more [of] the
work that historically has been performed by two or more qualified
persons" (Ex. 0197).
In response, OSHA reiterates that the exceptions from the two-
person rule, which are specified in final paragraph (b)(3)(ii) and are
based on existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(1)(ii), will be interpreted and
applied narrowly. Paragraph (b)(3)(ii)(A) permits an employee to work
alone to perform routine circuit switching, as long as the employer can
demonstrate that conditions at the site allow safe performance of this
work. Employees have been injured during switching operations when
unusual conditions, such as poor lighting, bad weather, or hazardous
configuration or state of repair of the switching equipment, were
present (269-Ex. 9-2). If there is poor lighting, for example, the
employer may be unable to demonstrate that the operation can be
performed safely by one employee; the employer could, however, elect to
provide supplemental lighting adequate to make it safe for an employee
to work alone.
Paragraph (b)(3)(ii)(B) permits one employee to work alone with
live-line tools if the employee is positioned so that he or she is
neither within reach of, nor otherwise exposed to contact with,
energized parts. Accidents involving hot-stick work have typically
occurred only when the employee was close enough to energized parts to
be injured--either through direct contact or by contact through
conductors being handled (269-Ex. 9-2).
Finally, paragraph (b)(3)(ii)(C) permits one employee to work alone
on emergency repairs necessary to safeguard the general public. OSHA
will generally consider situations in which there is a downed energized
power line, an energized power line on an occupied vehicle, or a
service outage to life-support equipment to be emergency situations for
which an employee can work alone to safeguard the public. Whether
outages to street lights, traffic lights, or homes are emergency
situations for purposes of final paragraph (b)(3)(ii)(C) depends on
many factors, including the extent and expected duration of the outage
and the availability of alternative means of protecting the public,
such as the availability of police or other officials to manage or stop
traffic at intersections in the absence of working stoplights. Because
hospitals and similar patient-care facilities usually have backup
generators, outages of circuits supplying these facilities will not
generally be deemed to fall under final paragraph (b)(3)(ii)(C).
Minimum Approach Distances
Paragraph (c)(1) in the final rule sets requirements for minimum
approach distances. Paragraph (c)(1)(i) requires employers to establish
minimum approach distances no less than the distances computed by the
equations set in Table V-2 for ac systems or Table V-7 for dc systems.
(The equations in Table V-2 in the final rule are described and
explained later in this section of the preamble.) Paragraph (c)(1)(iii)
of the final rule requires the employer to ensure that no employee
approaches, or takes any conductive object, closer to exposed energized
parts than the employer's established minimum approach distance, except
as permitted in paragraphs (c)(1)(iii)(A), (c)(1)(iii)(B), and
(c)(1)(iii)(C) (as explained later in this section of the preamble).
Table V-2 provides equations for the employer to use to compute
minimum approach distances under paragraph (c)(1)(i). The equations
vary depending on voltage and, for phase-to-phase voltages of more than
72.5 kilovolts, on whether the exposure is phase-to-phase or phase-to-
ground.
Paragraph (c)(1)(ii) in the final rule provides that, no later than
April 1, 2015, for voltages over 72.5 kilovolts, the employer determine
the maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-
ground, through an engineering analysis or assume a maximum anticipated
per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, in accordance with
Table V-8. The employer must make any engineering analysis conducted to
determine maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage available
upon request to affected employees and to the Assistant Secretary or
designee for examination and copying. When the employer uses portable
protective gaps to control the maximum transient overvoltage, final
paragraph (c)(1)(ii) also requires that the value of the maximum
anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, must
provide for five standard deviations between the statistical sparkover
voltage of the gap and the statistical withstand voltage corresponding
to the electrical component of the minimum approach distance.
Under Appendix B to existing Sec. 1910.269, employers use
engineering analyses to determine any reductions in maximum transient
overvoltages below the maximum values listed in Table R-7 and Table R-
8. Also under Appendix B to existing Sec. 1910.269, when an employer
is using portable protective gaps, it determines minimum approach
distances using a specific methodology
that provides for five standard deviations between the statistical
sparkover voltage of the gap and the statistical withstand voltage
corresponding to the electrical component of the minimum approach
distance at the worksite. OSHA incorporated both of these performance
requirements in final paragraph (c)(1)(ii). To explain terms used in
final paragraph (c)(1)(ii), OSHA also added definitions of
"statistical sparkover voltage" and "statistical withstand voltage"
to final Sec. 1926.968. Statistical sparkover voltage is a transient
overvoltage level that produces a 97.72-percent probability of
sparkover (in other words, two standard deviations above the voltage at
which there is a 50-percent probability of sparkover). Statistical
withstand voltage is a transient overvoltage level that produces a
0.14-percent probability of sparkover (in other words, three standard
deviations below the voltage at which there is a 50-percent probability
of sparkover). OSHA based both definitions on definitions in IEEE Std
516-2009 (Ex. 0532).
Table V-7 contains minimum approach distances for dc systems. In
Table V-7, the applicable minimum approach distance depends on the
maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage and the maximum
line-to-ground voltage. In accordance with final paragraph (c)(1)(ii)
and Table V-8, an employer using Table V-7 must determine the maximum
anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage through an engineering
analysis that is made available upon request to affected employees and
to the Assistant Secretary or designee for examination and copying or
must assume a maximum per-unit transient overvoltage of 1.8.
Paragraph (c)(1)(i) makes it clear that the required minimum
approach distances are based on engineering principles that OSHA
adopted in the final rule. The Agency is adopting the equations and the
engineering principles behind the minimum approach distances rather
than just setting distances as it did when it promulgated Sec.
1910.269 in 1994. This paragraph also ensures that the minimum approach
distance maintained by each employee is appropriate for the workplace
rather than for the industry in general. OSHA believes that this
approach will better protect each employee than existing Sec. 1910.269
and the proposed rule.
The minimum approach distances set by Table V-2 for phase-to-phase
system voltages of 72.5 kilovolts and less do not vary based on
worksite conditions provided the altitude is 900 meters (3,000 feet) or
less above sea level. Therefore, OSHA calculated the minimum approach
distances for these voltages and listed them in Table V-5 in the final
rule. Note 1 in Table V-2 provides that, for voltages up to 72.5
kilovolts, employers may use the precalculated minimum approach
distances in Table V-5 provided the worksite is at an elevation of 900
meters or less.
Minimum approach distances for phase-to-phase system voltages of
more than 72.5 kilovolts will vary depending on conditions present at
the worksite and possibly the work practices used by employees.
Parameter C in the equation for these voltages varies depending on
whether an insulated tool or conductive object is in the approach
distance (gap) between the employee and the energized part (if the
employee is at ground potential or at the potential of a different
energized part) or between the employee and ground (if the employee is
at the potential of the energized part). For phase-to-ground exposures,
if the employer can demonstrate that there is only air in this gap,
then C equals 0.01. For phase-to-phase exposures, if the employer can
demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap and that no large
conductive object is in the gap, then C equals 0.01. In all other
cases, C equals 0.011. When an employee is climbing on a structure or
performing live-line barehand work, OSHA expects that there normally
will only be air present in the gap, and the equation will produce a
smaller minimum approach distance than if the employee is using an
insulated tool to work on energized parts.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\179\ Live-line barehand work is work performed with the
employee at the same potential as one of the phase conductors. The
employee is insulated, by air or another insulating medium, from the
other phase conductors and from ground.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The saturation factor, a, in the equation for system voltages of
more than 72.5 kilovolts varies depending on whether the exposure is
phase-to-ground or phase-to-phase. For phase-to-ground exposures, the
saturation factor will be reduced slightly, resulting in smaller
minimum approach distances. As explained in Note 3 in Table V-2, unless
the employer can demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap and
that no large conductive object is in the gap, the employer must
calculate the saturation factor using the phase-to-ground equations
(with the peak voltage for phase-to-phase exposures), even for phase-
to-phase exposures.
Finally, T \180\ in the equation for phase-to-phase system voltages
of more than 72.5 kilovolts represents the maximum phase-to-ground
anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, which can vary from
worksite to worksite.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\180\ T is the ratio of the 2-percent statistical switching
overvoltage expected at the worksite to the nominal peak line-to-
ground voltage of the system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For voltages over 72.5 kilovolts, employers may use the minimum
approach distances in the tables in Appendix B provided the worksite is
at an elevation of 900 meters or less. The tables in Appendix B contain
minimum approach distances for various values of T. In accordance with
final paragraph (c)(1)(ii), the employer must determine T through
engineering analysis or use the maximum T from Table V-8.
For phase-to-phase system voltages of more than 5,000 volts, the
altitude-correction factor applies when the worksite is at an elevation
of more than 900 meters above sea level. When the worksite is at these
higher elevations, the employer must use the appropriate altitude
correction factor from Table V-4 when calculating minimum approach
distances. Table V-2 explains how to apply the altitude correction
factors in computing minimum approach distances.
As noted earlier, paragraph (c)(1)(i) requires employers to
establish minimum approach distances. Because the elevation and maximum
transient overvoltage may vary from worksite to worksite, each minimum
approach distance established by the employer must be appropriate for
the worksite involved. Employers can avoid establishing separate
distances for every worksite by using worst-case values for elevation
and T or by grouping worksites by ranges for elevation and T.
Paragraph (c)(1) of proposed Sec. 1926.960 would have required
employers to ensure that employees maintain minimum approach distances
from exposed energized parts. Proposed Table V-2 through Table V-6
specified the minimum approach distances. This proposed provision was
borrowed from existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(2), although, as described
later, OSHA proposed to make minor changes to the minimum approach
distances listed in the existing Sec. 1910.269 tables.
Electric power systems operate at a given nominal voltage. However,
the actual voltage on a power line varies above and below that nominal
voltage. For brief periods, the instantaneous voltage on a line can be
3 or more times its nominal value (Ex. 0532).
The safe minimum approach distance assures that an electric arc
will not
form, even under the most severe transient overvoltages that can occur
on a system and even when the employee makes errors in maintaining the
minimum approach distance. To determine what this distance is for a
specific voltage, OSHA must first determine the size of the air gap
that must be present to prevent arc-over during the most severe
overvoltage that can reasonably be expected to occur on the system.
This gap is the electrical component of the minimum approach distance.
To determine the minimum safe approach distance, OSHA must add extra
distance to account for ergonomic considerations (that is, human
error).
The electrical component depends on five factors:
(1) The maximum voltage,
(2) The wave shape of this voltage,
(3) The configuration of the "electrodes" forming the end points
of the gap,
(4) The insulating medium in the gap, and
(5) The atmospheric conditions.
In existing Sec. 1910.269, and in the proposal for this
rulemaking, OSHA borrowed its approach for setting minimum approach
distances from a consensus standard, namely the NESC. OSHA based the
minimum approach distances in existing Sec. 1910.269 on the 1993
edition of the NESC. In this rulemaking, OSHA proposed to adopt
slightly revised minimum approach distances for both Sec. 1910.269 and
subpart V; the revised minimum approach distances in the proposal were
drawn from the updated, 2002 edition of the NESC.
To develop the minimum approach distance tables for the 1993
standard, NESC Subcommittee 8 adopted the following principles:
ANSI/IEEE Std 516 was to be the electrical basis of the
NESC Rules for approach distances for alternating- and direct-current
voltages above 72.5 kilovolts.\181\ Distances for lower voltages were
to be based on ANSI/IEEE Std 4. The application of ANSI/IEEE Std 516
included the formula used by that standard to derive electrical
clearance distances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\181\ ANSI/IEEE Std 516-1987 (the edition in effect when NESC
Subcommittee 8 revised the minimum approach distances for the 1993
NESC) listed values for the electrical component of the minimum
approach distance, both for air alone as an insulating medium and
for live-line tool sticks in air, that were accepted as being
accurate when the standard was adopted (by IEEE) in 1987.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Altitude correction factors were to be in accordance with
ANSI/IEEE Std 516.
The maximum design transient-overvoltage data to be used
in the development of the basic approach distance tables were:
3.0 per unit for voltages of 362 kilovolts and less
2.4 per unit for 500 to 550 kilovolts
2.0 per unit for 765 to 800 kilovolts
All phase-to-phase values were to be calculated from the
EPRI Transmission Line Reference Book for 115 to 138 kilovolts.
An ergonomic-movement factor (inadvertent component) that
accounted for errors in judging the approach distance was to be added
to all basic electrical approach distances (electrical component) for
all voltage ranges. A distance of 0.31 meters (1 foot) was to be added
to all voltage ranges for the ergonomic component. An additional 0.3
meters (1 foot) was to be added to voltage ranges below 72.6 kilovolts.
The voltage reduction allowance for controlled maximum
transient overvoltage was to be such that the minimum allowable
approach distance was not less than the approach distance specified for
the highest voltage listed for the given range.
The transient overvoltage tables were to be applied only
at voltage ranges inclusive of 72.6 to 800 kilovolts. All tables were
to be established using the higher voltage of each separate voltage
range.
After publication of OSHA's proposed rule in 2005, the IEEE
technical committee responsible for revising Standard 516 identified
what in its view was an error in calculating the minimum approach
distances in the IEEE standard that potentially affected the validity
of the minimum approach distances in the 2002 NESC and OSHA's proposed
rule. IEEE Std 516 was revised in 2009 to address the issue identified
by the technical committee. (The error identified by the IEEE committee
is discussed, at length, later in this section of the preamble.) In
light of the IEEE revision process, OSHA twice reopened the record on
subpart V, first in October 2008 and again in September 2009, to
solicit additional comments on minimum approach distances. (See 73 FR
62942, Oct. 22, 2008; 74 FR 46958, Sept. 14, 2009.) The Agency
requested information on whether there was an error in the method OSHA
used to calculate the proposed minimum approach distances and on what
basis OSHA should set minimum approach distances. A public hearing was
held on these issues in October 2009.
In response to the issues OSHA raised about the minimum approach
distances, EEI, IBEW, and the NESC urged the Agency to delay issuing
revised minimum approach distances until after IEEE approved the next
update of the NESC in 2012.\182\ (See, for example, Exs. 0545.1,
0551.1, 0552.1; Tr2. 40-41, 72-75, 151-154.) The commenters maintained
that, in writing the respective standards, the NESC subcommittees give
greater weight to the practical effects of its rules than does the IEEE
subcommittee responsible for IEEE Std 516. The commenters also
maintained that an OSHA standard setting minimum approach distances
that turn out to be different from the distances in the 2012 NESC could
cause confusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\182\ IEEE approved the 2012 NESC on April 14, 2011, and ANSI
approved the 2012 NESC as an American National Standard on June 3,
2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The chair of Subcommittee 8 of the NESC, Mr. James Tomaseski,
testified that the NESC serves as the authority on safety requirements
for electric power systems, that (at the time of his testimony) the
NESC had yet to act on the revised methodologies in IEEE Std 516-2009
for calculating minimum approach distances, and that NESC Subcommittee
8 would transcribe the engineering information contained in the 2009
IEEE 516 standard into a user-friendly format (Tr2. 34-41).\183\ He
stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\183\ The 2012 NESC adopts the 2009 IEEE Std 516 distances for
certain voltage ranges and values of T and permits an engineering
determination of minimum approach distances as an alternative.
NESC's Subcommittee 8 has the task of trying to make sense of
and keep up with this evolving problem [of adopting adequate minimum
approach distances]. Simply put, the IEEE 516 MAD Tables as they are
published today in that [2009] guide are confusing.
This takes us to the point what Subcommittee 8 recommends to
OSHA for this Rule making. The agency should realize this is a
difficult issue, not only for the Technical Subcommittee responsible
for the different Codes, but most importantly for the users of the
Rules. The MAD concept has been around for a long time. Even though
new engineering principles continue to be developed, industry
performance associated with these rules [has] to be considered.
* * * * *
When OSHA revise[s] this Rule, these changes are somewhat
permanent. This rule will probably not be revised again for a long
time. Subcommittee 8 wants to do their part to make sure the MAD
[c]oncepts get fixed correctly this time. The NESC Subcommittee 8
recommends that OSHA leave the record open until the time the
Subcommittee has the opportunity to review public comments as to
what MAD values should be in the NESC. [Tr2. 39-41]
IBEW also maintained that the OSHA standard should be consistent
with the 2012 NESC (Tr2. 151-152). Testifying on behalf of IBEW, Mr.
Donald Hartley stated:
The IBEW believes the responsibility for developing [minimum
approach distances resides with] the NESC. Technical Subcommittee 8
on Work Rules, the body responsible for writing Part IV of the NESC
where MAD Rules and Tables are located, should [set the rules] for
OSHA to follow.
The NESC is adopted by many states in the U.S. The U.S. [Rural]
Electric Service requires member cooperatives to follow the NESC if
they receive government loans. Many public power utilities,
municipalities are not covered by OSHA. The NESC in these instances
becomes the rule to follow.
* * * * *
The IBEW strongly recommends that OSHA keep this record open
until Subcommittee 8 has the opportunity to review public comment on
this issue and develop final Code Language on the MAD principles and
Rules. [Id.]
EEI argued that, if OSHA failed to follow NESC action on minimum
approach distances, the final rule could differ from the 2012 NESC and
create confusion for the electric utility industry (Ex. 0545.1). Mr.
Stephen Yohay, counsel for EEI, described the potential for confusion
over differing standards as follows:
The other question you asked is whether [there is] confusion in
the industry [resulting from the fact that there are currently
differences between the minimum approach distances in the existing
OSHA standards and the distances in the consensus standards], and I
am going to answer this anecdotally based on my experience in
representing employers in this industry.
I have often, not often, but more than occasionally heard
confusion expressed as to which standards are the applicable
standards, whether they are the OSHA standards, whether they are the
NESC standards. And as you heard Mr. Tomaseski say various companies
adopt different [distances] for their own work practices.
Now when you throw in the element of State plans, you further
confuse the mix. So I think there is some confusion and I think you
all heard him say here earlier, and I think we all agree it is time
for there to be consistency. [Tr2. 102-103]
EEI also pointed out that Section 6(b)(8) of the OSH Act requires
OSHA to explain deviations from national consensus standards (Ex.
0545.1). Mr. Charles Kelly testified to this point on behalf of EEI, as
follows:
Section 6(b)(8) of the Act expresses that OSHA standards should
not deviate from National Consensus Standards without an adequate
statement of reason.
The NESC Committee may or may not adopt the precise distances
stated in the IEEE documents. Therefore, if OSHA incorporates the
IEEE distances in a final standard that is promulgated in the next
year or so, OSHA [may] soon find its final standard at odds with
even the newest version of the NESC.
The NESC, however, is well recognized as the preeminent National
Consensus Standard on clearance distances for electric utility work
on high voltage lines and equipment. Such a result could only create
confusion in the industry. [Tr2. 73]
Mr. Kelly also maintained that the NESC gives greater weight to the
practical application of its rules than does IEEE and that OSHA should
adhere to its past practice of basing its rules for minimum approach
distances on the NESC, testifying:
[B]y virtue of the nature of its membership and the mission of
its Subcommittee 8, we daresay with due respect to IEEE Committee
516, that the NESC's final standards on Work Rules tend to give more
attention to the practical impact that its Rules will have in the
workplace than do IEEE Technical Standards.
[T]he 516 Standard is basically an engineering standard and
built that way on the technical issues whereby the NESC Subcommittee
8 Standard; it deals with the Work Rules and Worker Protection more
specifically.
* * * * *
The usual cycle, and as I mean the historical cycle that OSHA
has followed, is that the IEEE 516 Standard develops its standard,
ballots it and publishes the standard over a period of time.
The NESC Subcommittee 8 reviews 516, develops their standard,
tables, ballots, and publishes it in that order. Then OSHA usually
comes in and reviews the documented proof by both groups, and
incorporates the NESC document into its particular Rule.
The above scenario reflects the past practices used by OSHA in
its development of standards affecting electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work. [Tr2. 73-74]
Although the Agency considered the commenters' suggestion to hold
the record for this rulemaking open until IEEE approved the 2012 NESC,
OSHA concludes that it is unnecessary to reopen the record to consider
the 2012 NESC in this rulemaking. First, OSHA does not agree that
adopting minimum approach distances that differ from the distances in
the 2012 NESC will produce widespread confusion or lead to additional
risk for employees in the electric power industry. As acknowledged by
some of the rulemaking participants, the distances in existing Sec.
1910.269 and Subpart V differed from the 2009 edition of the NESC.
(See, for example, Tr2. 53, 102-103.) In fact, Mr. Tomaseski presented
slides showing that there were many differences between the NESC, IEEE
Std 516, and the OSHA standards (Ex. 0568). Rulemaking participants
testified that they were not aware of any specific safety problems
arising in the industry by virtue of these discrepancies. (See, for
example, Tr2. 58, 102, 104). Also, counsel for EEI admitted that
"[e]mployers are at least following OSHA standards. . . . Some are
exceeding the values that are in the OSHA standards and adopting more
conservative standards" (Tr2. 104). In any event, evidence in the
record indicates that consensus standards are constantly evolving (see
for example, Tr2. 39-40, 142-143); therefore, if the Agency were to
adopt the minimum approach distances from the 2012 NESC, it is likely
that there would be differences between the OSHA standard and
subsequent editions of the NESC.
OSHA does not believe there is merit to the commenters' suggestion
that the existence of State plan programs will be an additional source
of confusion for employers. As noted in Section XI, State-Plan
Requirements, later in this preamble, States with OSHA-approved
occupational safety and health plans must adopt standards that are
equivalent to, and at least as protective as, this final rule within 6
months of its promulgation. Thus, States with State plans will adopt
provisions on minimum approach distances that are at least as
protective as the provisions in this final standard. On a technical
issue such as minimum approach distances, OSHA expects that most States
with State plans will choose to incorporate the federal provision as
promulgated in this final rule, although it is possible that one or
more of these States will adopt more protective provisions. Even if
some States do adopt more protective standards, OSHA does not believe
that the resultant differences will result in any significant confusion
for employers.
Public electric utilities in States with State occupational safety
and health plans, including plans that cover only State and local
government employees, will be required to comply with the applicable
State plan standards. Public electric utilities in other States are not
covered by a State plan or by the Federal OSHA standard and may choose
to adhere to the NESC. Private-sector electric utilities must comply
with the Federal or State plan OSHA standards that cover their
worksites. This scheme is well established, and OSHA does not believe
that employers will have difficulty determining the applicable
requirements.
As noted earlier, IBEW suggested that a conflict between the OSHA
and the 2012 NESC minimum approach distances could be problematic for
loan recipients in the United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA)
Rural Development Electric Programs because, according to the union,
utilities receiving USDA loans must comply with the NESC as a condition
of their loans (Tr2. 151). These USDA programs
provide loans for electric services that meet certain standards, and
IBEW is correct that the NESC is among the standards that these
services must meet (7 CFR 1724.50). However, even if the loan programs
require compliance with the minimum approach distances in the NESC,
employers can meet both the OSHA and USDA loan-program requirements
simply by adopting the more conservative (that is, larger) minimum
approach distances. Therefore, differences between the minimum
approach-distance provisions in this final rule and the minimum
approach distances in the 2012 NESC should not be a problem for
participants in the USDA programs.
Second, the Agency does not believe that considering public input
on the 2012 NESC will result in a standard that is more protective than
the final rule. The NESC minimum approach distances are based on the
minimum approach distances in IEEE Std 516-2009, on which OSHA already
solicited public comment and provided opportunity for additional input
at a public hearing (74 FR 46958). The 2012 NESC does not include any
additional support for the IEEE minimum approach distances, which, as
explained later in this section of the preamble, OSHA rejected. In
addition, reopening the record for this rulemaking would further delay
the final rule. Therefore, OSHA concludes that reopening the record to
gather additional public comment on the 2012 NESC minimum approach
distances is unwarranted.
Finally, in response to the commenters' references to Section
6(b)(8) of the OSH Act the Agency concludes that, with respect to
minimum approach distances, this final rule "will better effectuate
the purposes of [the] Act" than the 2012 edition of the NESC. (See the
discussion under the heading OSHA's requirements on minimum approach
distances better effectuate the purpose of the OSH Act than the
national consensus standard, later in this section of the preamble.)
Some commenters maintained that the minimum approach distances in
the 2005 proposed rule, which were based on the 2002 NESC, were safe
despite any technical errors potentially made in calculating those
distances. (See, for example, Ex. 0545.1; Tr2. 79-82.) The commenters
argued that industry experience establishes the safety of the existing
minimum approach distances in Sec. 1910.269. (See, for example, Exs.
0545.1, 0551.1.)
American Electric Power argued against adopting minimum approach
distances different from the minimum approach differences in OSHA's
proposal, relying on calculations they made that were taken from a
paper by Vaisman et al.\184\ (Ex. 0550.1). American Electric Power
described this method as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\184\ Vaisman, R., Fonseca, J. R., Andrade, V. H. G., Almeida,
M. A., Hattori, H. K., Melo, M. O. B. C., Teivelis, F., Fernandes,
J. H. M., Silva, J. T. S., Dias, L. E. N., Esmeraldo, P. C. V., and
Samico, R. A. M., "Switching Impulse Strength of Compact
Transmission Lines," IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 8,
No. 3, July 1993 (Ex. 0555).
The method is based on calculating V50[percnt]
(critical flashover[\185\] voltage--CFO) and determining distances
from the V50[percnt] value of conductor-to-
conductor gap test data. The V50[percnt] is
derived from the required VW (withstand voltage), using
the line-to-line overvoltage factor, TL-L. The required
distance for [minimum air insulation distance] and MAD is then taken
from . . . Figure 13 in an IEEE paper by Vaisman [footnote omitted]
et al., 1993, which represents conductor-to-conductor gap test data
from five different laboratories. The test data is based on [alpha]
= 0.50 (ratio between the negative impulse crest and the phase to
phase voltage) which provides more conservative results for
V50[percnt] than [alpha] = 0.33 (Figure 12 of
the aforementioned Vaisman paper). [Id.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\185\ IEEE Std 516-2009 defines "flashover" as "[a]
disruptive discharge through air around and over a surface of solid
or liquid insulation, between parts at different potential or
polarity, produced by application of voltage wherein the breakdown
path becomes sufficiently ionized to maintain an electric arc" (Ex.
0532). That standard defines "sparkover" as "[a] disruptive
discharge between preset electrodes in either a gaseous or a liquid
dielectric" (id.). Thus, the more technically correct term for an
electrical discharge across an air gap is "sparkover." However,
the term "flashover" has been used historically for either event,
and this preamble uses these terms interchangeably. The critical
flashover distance, V50 or
V50[percnt], is the distance that will
flashover 50 percent of the time at a given voltage.
American Electric Power calculated V50[percnt] to
be 2421 kilovolts for an 800-kilovolt power line (id.). From Figure 13
of the Vaisman paper, American Electric Power determined that the
corresponding minimum air-insulation distance (the electrical component
of the minimum approach distance) was 6.52 meters (21.4 feet) and that
the minimum approach distance (with the ergonomic component included as
explained later in this section of the preamble) was 6.82 meters (22.4
feet). American Electric Power contrasted this with the corresponding
7.91-meter (26-foot) minimum approach distance proposed by OSHA and
concluded that the proposed value was adequately protective (id.).
(See, also, Ex. 0545.1, in which EEI makes a similar argument based on
the Vaisman paper.)
As explained in greater detail later in this section of the
preamble, OSHA concludes that the proposed minimum approach distances
do not provide adequate safety for employees. In addition, OSHA finds
that there are two basic problems with American Electric Power's
comparison of the proposed 800-kilovolt minimum approach distance and
what it considers to be a safe approach distance. First, as is clear
from the Vaisman paper (Ex. 0555), the distances in Figure 13 of that
paper (which correspond to [alpha] = 0.50) are less conservative than
the distances in Figure 12 of that paper (corresponding to [alpha] =
0.33).\186\ The air-insulation distance from Figure 12 appears to be
about 7.8 meters (25.6 feet). Adding the 0.31-meter (1-foot) ergonomic
component yields a comparable minimum approach distance of 8.11 meters
(26.6 feet), which is clearly more protective than the 7.91-meter (26-
foot) minimum approach distance proposed by OSHA in 2005.\187\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\186\ American Electric Power commented that an [alpha] of 0.50
"provides more conservative results for V50[percnt]
than [alpha] = 0.33" (Ex. 0550.1). This comment may be true, but it
is irrelevant. For a given V50[percnt], an
[alpha] of 0.33 produces a more conservative (that is, greater)
minimum approach distance, as is the case here.
\187\ The quality of Figures 12 and 13 in the original Vaisman
paper is poor, and it is difficult to accurately determine the
distance (Ex. 0555). The figures included in American Electric
Power's and EEI's exhibits, which apparently recreated Figure 13
from the Vaisman paper, were of much better quality (Exs. 0550.1 and
0545.1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the testing that serves as the basis for Figures 12 and 13
of the Vaisman paper determined the switching impulse strength of two
conductors in parallel (Ex. 0555). From the paper's description of the
test procedure, OSHA concludes that the testing did not account for
different configurations that could be present during live-line work or
for the presence of workers and the tools and equipment they would be
using to perform this work. As explained later in this section of the
preamble, different electrode configurations and the presence of
workers and other conductive objects in the gap between them can reduce
the electrical strength of the air gap substantially. Thus, although
American Electric Power's and EEI's approach may validly estimate the
strength of a power line while no work is being performed, OSHA
concludes that this approach fails to represent employee exposure
adequately.
For reasons described later in this section of the preamble, the
Agency concludes that there is a significant risk to employees from the
minimum approach distances contained in existing Sec. 1910.269 and
Subpart V. In addition, OSHA concludes that it has enough information
in the rulemaking record to set appropriate minimum approach-distance
requirements.
Consequently, the Agency decided that it is necessary and appropriate
to include revised minimum approach-distance provisions in this final
rule.
The ergonomic component of MAD. The ergonomic-movement component of
the minimum approach distance is a safety factor designed to ensure
that the employee does not breach the electrical component of the
minimum approach distance in case he or she errs in judging and
maintaining the minimum approach distance. In developing the minimum
approach distance tables for its 1993 standard, the NESC subcommittee
based the ergonomic-movement factor (the ergonomic component of MAD) on
relevant data, including a typical arm's reach of about 610 millimeters
(2 feet) and a reaction time to a stimulus ranging from 0.2 to more
than 1.0 second (269-Ex. 8-19). As OSHA explained in the preamble to
the proposal, the ergonomic-movement factor must be sufficient for the
employee to be able to recognize a hazardous approach to an energized
line and withdraw to a safe position so that he or she does not breach
the air gap required for the electrical component of the minimum
approach distance (70 FR 34862). Thus, the ergonomic-movement distance
should equal the response time multiplied by the average speed of an
employee's movement plus the stopping distance.\188\ The maximum reach
(or range of movement) may place an upper bound on the ergonomic
component. The NESC subcommittee developing the 1993 standard used this
information as a basis for selecting appropriate distances for two
major voltage ranges: 1.1 to 72.5 kilovolts and 72.6 kilovolts and
more.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\188\ This calculation is comparable to the calculation of total
braking distance for a motor vehicle. This distance equals the
initial speed of the vehicle times the driver's reaction time plus
the stopping distance of the vehicle after the driver applies the
brakes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For system voltages up to 72.5 kilovolts, phase-to-phase, much of
the work is performed using rubber gloves, and the employee is working
within arm's reach of energized parts. The ergonomic component of the
minimum approach distance must account for this condition since the
employee may not have time to react and position himself or herself out
of danger. A distance of 0.61 meters (2 feet) for the ergonomic
component appears to meet this criterion and was, therefore, adopted by
the NESC subcommittee developing the 1993 standard. This ergonomic
component remained the same in the 2007 NESC, except that the standard
applied it to voltages as low as 751 volts instead of 1100 volts (Ex.
0533).\189\ OSHA used this value in existing Sec. 1910.269 for
voltages of 1.1 to 72.5 kilovolts and proposed to use it in Subpart V
for voltages of 751 volts to 72.5 kilovolts. There were no objections
to this distance on the record.\190\ Therefore, for voltages of 751
volts to 72.5 kilovolts, the final rule adopts a 0.61-meter (2-foot)
ergonomic-movement component of the minimum approach distance, as
proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\189\ At all voltages, the values for the ergonomic component of
the minimum approach distance are the same in the 2012 NESC as they
are in the 2007 NESC.
\190\ EEI did, however, object to what it mistakenly believed
was a proposed increase in the ergonomic component over what was
adopted in existing Sec. 1910.269 (Exs. 0227, 0501; Tr. 1056-1082).
OSHA discusses these comments later in this section of the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As OSHA explained in the preamble to the proposed rule, the
applicable work practices change for operations involving lines
energized at voltages over 72.5 kilovolts (70 FR 34862; 269-Exs. 64,
65). Generally, live-line tools are employed to perform the work while
equipment is energized. These tools hold the energized part at a fixed
distance from the employee, ensuring that the minimum approach distance
is maintained during the work operation. Even when live-line tools are
not used, as during live-line barehand work, employees use work methods
that more tightly control their movements than when they perform rubber
glove work, and it is usually easier to plan how to keep employees from
violating the minimum approach distance. For example, employees
planning a job to replace spacers on a 500-kilovolt overhead power line
can circumscribe an envelope (or bounds) of anticipated movement for
the job and ensure that the working position they select keeps this
envelope entirely outside the minimum approach distance. Thus, all the
employees' movements during the job can easily be kept within the
envelope. Additionally, there is limited or no exposure to conductors
at a potential different from the one on which work is being performed
because the distance between conductors is much greater than the
distance between conductors at lower voltages and higher voltage
systems do not present the types of congestion that are found commonly
on lower voltage systems. Consequently, a smaller ergonomic component
is appropriate for higher voltages. The NESC subcommittee developing
the 1993 standard accepted a value of 0.31 meters (1 foot) for this
component. This ergonomic component also remained the same in the 2007
NESC (Ex. 0533). OSHA used this value in existing Sec. 1910.269 and
proposed it in this rulemaking. There were no comments on this issue in
this rulemaking, therefore, OSHA is adopting the proposed ergonomic-
movement component of 0.31 meters (1 foot) for voltages over 72.5
kilovolts.\191\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\ In the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking, OSHA adopted an
ergonomic-movement factor based on English units of 1 foot or 2
feet, depending on voltage. It should be noted that, to three
significant digits, 0.305 meters is 1.00 foot and 0.610 meters is
2.00 feet. In this final rule, OSHA used metric units and rounded
0.305 meters up to 0.31 meters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EEI misconstrued OSHA's proposal as increasing the ergonomic-
movement component in existing Sec. 1910.269 by 0.61 meters (2 feet),
for a total ergonomic component of 1.22 meters (4 feet) for voltages up
to 72.5 kilovolts (Exs. 0227, 0392; Tr. 1056-1082). Testifying on
behalf of EEI, Mr. Clayton Abernathy of OG&E Energy Corporation
described how increasing the minimum approach distance by 0.61 meters
would restrict some of the work performed by his company's employees
(Tr. 1056-1082).
The ergonomic components of the minimum approach distances in
OSHA's proposal were the same as the ergonomic components used for the
minimum approach distances in existing Sec. 1910.269 for voltages over
1,000 volts. The ergonomic component for voltages between 751 volts and
72.5 kilovolts (the voltages addressed by EEI's comments) is 0.61
meters. The ergonomic component of the proposed minimum approach
distances for those voltages was not, contrary to EEI's suggestion,
greater than that value. It appears that EEI's objections were aimed at
two other proposed requirements: (1) Proposed Sec. 1926.960(c)(2)(ii),
which provided that, when using rubber insulating gloves or rubber
insulating gloves with sleeves for insulation against energized parts,
employees put on and take off their rubber insulating gloves and
sleeves when they are in positions from which they cannot reach into
the minimum approach distance, and (2) proposed Sec. 1926.960(d)(2),
which provided that employees performing work near exposed parts
energized at 601 volts to 72.5 kilovolts either work from positions
from which they cannot reach into the minimum approach distance or use
specified protective measures or work methods. OSHA addresses EEI's
concerns with these proposed provisions later in this section of the
preamble.
Finally, OSHA addresses some confusion expressed by commenters
during the rulemaking about whether
the ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance should be used
in determining whether a line worker is exposed to phase-to-phase or
phase-to-ground voltage (Tr. 1060-1061, 1076-1077).
As noted earlier in this section of the preamble, under the summary
and explanation for final Sec. 1926.97(c)(2)(i) and Table E-4, the
final rule permits insulating protective equipment to be rated for
phase-to-ground voltage if "[t]he electric equipment and devices are
insulated . . . so that the multiphase exposure on a grounded wye
circuit is removed" (Table E-4, Note 1).\192\ Existing Sec. 1910.137
and Table I-5 contain the same provisions. OSHA policy with regard to
whether there is multiphase exposure under existing Sec. 1910.137 is
discussed in a September 27, 2005, letter of interpretation to Mr.
Edwin Hill, IBEW President.\193\ This letter explains how to determine
whether multiphase exposure exists:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\192\ Note that the word "exposure" in the note relates to the
maximum voltage that can appear across the insulation, and not to
whether an energized part is "exposed." The definition of
"exposed" in final Sec. 1926.968 applies only to the use of that
term in Subpart V. It does not apply to final Sec. 1926.97.
\193\ This letter is available on OSHA's Web site at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=25133.
Phase-to-phase exposure exists whenever it is foreseeable that
an employee or the longest conductive object he or she may handle
can simultaneously breach the electrical components of the MADs of
live parts energized at different phase potentials, taking into
account such factors as: The nature of the work being performed, the
physical configuration and spacing of the conductors, the proximity
of grounded objects or other circuit conductors, the method of
approach to the conductors, the size of the employee, the tools and
equipment being used, and the length of the conductive object. In
addition, the employer must always consider mechanical loads and
other conditions, such as wind and ice, that could cause a conductor
to move or a support to fail. Notably, the determination of whether
or not multiphase exposure exists is made without regard to
insulation that may be covering the live part or the employee. This
is because the exposure determination must be made prior to the
selection of insulation in order to ensure that the insulation
selected is adequate to protect employees from the electrical
hazard. Moreover, it must be noted that phase-to-phase exposure
involves not only the hazard of electric shock to the employee, but
also arc flash and arc blast hazards from phase-to-phase contact of
conductive objects, such as could occur if an employee dropped a
conductive object onto or within the electrical components of the
MADs of live parts energized at different phase potentials.
[Figures] illustrating when phase-to-phase exposure exists can be
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
found at the conclusion of this letter. . . .
Figure 3 and Figure 4 are the figures from that letter:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.002
The 0.61-meter ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance
is labeled "2 feet" in these figures. As can be seen from the
explanation and figures in the letter of interpretation, the ergonomic
component of the minimum approach distance has no bearing on whether
there is multiphase exposure. The rating required for the insulating
protective equipment installed on the phase conductors depends on the
electrical component of the minimum approach distance (which, in turn,
depends on the voltage on the power line, as discussed later in this
section of the preamble), the distance between the phase conductors,
and the reach of the employee and any conductive object he or she may
handle while working. As noted in the letter to Mr. Hill, when
multiphase exposure exists, the insulating protective equipment used to
remove multiphase exposure must be rated for the phase-to-phase voltage
at a minimum.\194\ In addition, the preamble to the 1994 Sec. 1910.269
rulemaking noted that "until the multiphase exposure has actually been
removed, the phase-to-phase voltage remains the maximum use voltage"
(59 FR 4328). After the insulating protective equipment covering the
conductors not being worked on is in place, the rubber insulating
gloves and sleeves need only be rated for the phase-to-ground voltage.
This is current OSHA policy under existing Sec. Sec. 1910.137 and
1910.269 and will continue to be the policy of the Agency under this
final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\194\ It should be noted that the insulating values of two
insulating materials in series are not additive (Exs. 0041, 0532;
269-Ex. 60). At least one layer of insulation must be rated for the
maximum voltage for the exposure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The electrical component of MAD--general. The differences between
the minimum approach distances under existing Sec. 1910.269 and the
minimum approach distances under this final rule are the result of
changes in the way the Agency is calculating the electrical components
of the minimum approach distances. As described previously, this final
rule adopts the ergonomic components of the minimum approach distances
used in existing Sec. 1910.269. In addition, as explained later in
this section of the preamble, the number of variables (such as
elevation, maximum transient overvoltage, type of exposure, and type of
insulating medium) involved in determining the appropriate minimum
approach distance in any particular set of circumstances makes setting
minimum approach distances exclusively by means of tables unmanageable.
This approach would require one set of tables for each potential set of
variables. Consequently, the final rule requires the employer to
establish an appropriate minimum approach distance based on equations
that OSHA is adopting in Table V-2. The final rule also contains a
table, Table V-5, that specifies alternative minimum approach distances
for work done at elevations not exceeding 900 meters (3,000 feet) for
system voltages of 72.5 kilovolts and less. Finally, Appendix B to
final subpart V contains tables of minimum approach distances, for
varying maximum transient overvoltages for system voltages above 72.5
kilovolts, that employers may use for work done at elevations not
exceeding 900 meters.
Some rulemaking participants questioned the need for any changes to
the minimum approach distances in existing Sec. 1910.269. (See, for
example, Exs. 0227, 0545.1, 0551.1, 0552.1; Tr2. 71.) For instance, Mr.
Charles Kelly with EEI testified:
[U]nder Sections 3(8) and 6(b) of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, as long interpreted by the Supreme Court, OSHA [is]
required to show that the change[s] in the clearance distances are,
as a matter of substantial evidence, reasonably necessary to protect
employees, and that they would reduce or eliminate a significant
risk for employees.
As several people have stated previous to our testimony, we are
not aware that the existing MAD distances, even though they may have
been mathematically incorrect for decades, have shown to be unsafe
in that they have contributed to accidents or placed employees at
substantial risk of harm. We doubt seriously that a desire to make a
technical mathematical correction is enough to satisfy this
requirement. [Tr2. 71-72]
IBEW also maintained that the minimum approach distances in existing
Sec. 1910.269 are adequate:
It is important to look at how the use [of] MAD values,
regardless of the origin and year of publication, have protected
workers performing tasks in the vicinity of energized power lines.
The IBEW regularly reviews accidents occurring in the electric
utility industry. We cannot remember a single accident caused by
inadequate MAD values. OSHA 1910.269 MAD values have proven to
protect workers as they were intended to do. The obvious question
then is why change successful MAD values? Based on industry
performance, we do not see why changes are necessary. [Ex. 0551.1]
As OSHA explained in Section II.D, Significant Risk and Reduction
in Risk, earlier in this preamble, the Agency need not make hazard-
specific or provision-specific risk findings. In any event, the Agency
concludes that the electric-shock hazards faced by employees performing
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work are
serious and significant and that the changes to the minimum approach-
distance provisions in this final rule are reasonably necessary and
appropriate to reduce a significant risk to employees.
OSHA finds that employees are being injured by the dielectric
failure of air (that is, sparkover) between them (or a conductive
object they are handling) and conductive objects at a different
potential. It is widely recognized that electric current can arc over
distances and that it is necessary only to come too close to, rather
than contact, an energized object to sustain an electric shock. In
fact, some of the accidents in the record occurred when an employee
brought a conductive object or himself or herself too close to an
energized part and electric current arced to the object or employee
(Exs. 0002,\195\ 0003 \196\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\195\ See, for example, the five accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=908012&id=170220602&id=564740&id=14496384&id=14418321.
\196\ See, for example, the three accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=200000453&id=201350485&id=596304.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency does not believe that it is necessary to show that the
specific minimum approach distances in the existing standards have led
to accidents. Instead, it is only necessary to show that the
probability of sparkover at the worksite, given the existing minimum
approach distances, is significant. The sparkover voltage between two
objects at different potentials is recognized as following a normal
distribution (Ex. 0532). The withstand voltage for an air gap between
two objects at different potentials is three standard deviations below
the statistical mean sparkover voltage. This represents approximately a
1 in 1,000 probability that the air gap will fail dielectrically and
spark over.\197\ The withstand distance is the distance between two
objects corresponding to a given withstand voltage. (In other words,
the withstand distance is the shortest distance between two objects
that will spark over at a given voltage approximately one time in
1,000.) Consensus standards have based the electrical component of the
minimum approach distance on the withstand distance corresponding to
the maximum voltage that can occur at the worksite. (See, for example,
Exs. 0076, 0077, 0532, 0533.) When the electrical component of the
minimum approach distance is less than the withstand distance for the
maximum voltage at the worksite, the probability of sparkover is
greater than 1 in 1,000. OSHA, therefore, concludes that employees are
at significant risk of injury whenever the electrical component of the
minimum approach distance is less than the withstand distance for the
maximum voltage that can occur at the worksite. As explained in detail
later in this section of the preamble, several of the minimum approach
distances contained in the existing OSHA standards and in the proposed
rule represent a significant risk of injury under this criterion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\197\ The probability of sparkover at the withstand voltage is
0.14 percent or 1.4 in 1,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The electrical component of MAD--tools and conductive objects in
the air gap. The methodology used to develop the proposed minimum
approach distances, which were based on the 2002 NESC, did not account
for tools in the air gap. As noted in the 2009 reopening notice, the
presence of an insulated tool in the air gap reduces the air gap's
dielectric strength (74 FR 46961). IEEE Std 516-2009 (Ex. 0532)
generally provides two values for the electrical component of the
minimum approach distance: One in air (called MAID \198\) and one with
a tool in the air gap (called MTID \199\). However, that consensus
standard does not provide minimum tool-insulation distances for either:
(1) Any exposures (phase-to-ground or phase-to-phase) at voltages of
72.5 kilovolts or less or (2) phase-to-phase exposures at voltages of
more than 72.5 kilovolts. In the 2009 reopening notice, the Agency
requested comments on whether any of the minimum approach distances in
the final rule should be based on minimum tool-insulation distances
rather than minimum air-insulation distances. A similar question was
raised in the 2008 reopening notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\198\ MAID is the minimum air-insulation distance.
\199\ MTID is the minimum tool-insulation distance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Scenario 1--exposures at 72.5 kilovolts and less. Rulemaking
participants generally opposed basing minimum approach distances for
voltages of 72.5 kilovolts and less on minimum tool distances. (See,
for example, Exs. 0543.1, 0545.1, 0548.1, 0550.1; Tr2. 88.) For
instance, Pike Electric commented, "Pike utilizes proper rubber
protective cover-up at . . . voltages [of 72.5 kilovolts and lower].
This technique would eliminate the hazard of employee exposure to
energized lines and equipment, so there is no need to utilize a MAD
approach using tool insulation distances" (Ex. 0543.1). EEI and
Southern Company argued that only one set of minimum approach distances
is necessary for work on systems operating at voltages of 72.5
kilovolts and less because, based on IEEE Std 516-2009, minimum tool
distances and minimum air distances are the same at those voltages
(Exs. 0545.1, 0548.1). American Electric Power maintained that, for
voltages at or less than 72.5 kilovolts, MAD has not been based on
minimum tool distances in the past, so doing so now could potentially
confuse workers (Ex. 0550.1).
IEEE Std 516-2009 defines MTID as "the required undisturbed air
insulation distance that is needed to prevent a tool flashover at the
worksite during a system event that results in the maximum anticipated
TOV" (Ex. 0532). Although the specified minimum tool distances in IEEE
Std 516-2009 are the same as the corresponding minimum air-insulation
distances for voltages of 72.5 kilovolts and less, the consensus
standard includes the following disclaimer in Section 4.5.2.1: "The
MTID for ac and dc line-to-line voltages at and below 72.5 kV has not
been determined. Industry practices normally use an MTID that is the
same as or greater than the MAID" (id.; emphasis added). Thus, IEEE
Std 516-2009 does not indicate that the minimum air- and tool-
insulation distances are the same, nor does it contain tables with
minimum tool-insulation distances for voltages of 72.5 kilovolts and
less. According to IEEE Std 516-2009, electrical testing at higher
voltages indicates that the dielectric strength of an air gap is lower
when an insulating tool is present across the gap or when a conductive
object is present within the gap (id.). OSHA concludes that minimum
approach distances for voltages of 72.5 kilovolts and less should be
conservative enough so that the gap will withstand the electric
potential across it even if a tool bridges the gap or a conductive
object is present within it. As explained later in this section of the
preamble, the final rule specifies minimum approach distances that meet
this criterion. Because the final rule does not adopt separate minimum
approach distances for exposures with and without tools at 72.5
kilovolts and less, the concerns about confusion at these voltages are
unfounded.
Scenario 2--phase-to-ground exposures at more than 72.5 kilovolts.
Some commenters maintained that the final rule should follow the
practice of
the 2007 NESC and base minimum approach distances for phase-to-ground
exposures at voltages of 72.6 kilovolts and higher on the minimum tool
distance. (See, for example, Exs. 0519, 0521, 0528, 0543.1.) For
instance, Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI commented:
The MAD for voltages above 72.6 kV should be based on the
minimum tool distance as published in the 2007 NESC. Live line work
is conducted with tools, workers and equipment within the electrical
field of energized lines and equipment[,] and the minimum tool
distance is correct information to be provided to the industry. [Ex.
0521]
Others suggested that the final rule include two sets of minimum
approach distances for phase-to-ground exposures at voltages exceeding
72.5 kilovolts: One each for work performed with and without tools in
the air gap. (See, for example, Exs. 0545.1, 0548.1, 0575.1; Tr2. 88.)
For instance, Mr. Charles Shaw with Southern Company commented:
In the proposed rule, OSHA is using minimum air insulation
distances when a line worker is using a tool in the air gap.
Allowing the minimum air insulation distance plus an inadvertent
movement factor to be used as the live-line tool distance is an
incorrect interpretation of the science behind the IEEE method. At a
minimum, the note in the [Subpart] V and [Sec. 1910.269] tables
that states that the referenced distances are for "live-line tool
distances" should be removed since they are not.
However, we recommend that OSHA include two sets of minimum
approach distances for phase to ground work on voltages above 72.5
kV, one for work performed without tools in the air-gap and one for
work performed with tools in the air gap. These distances should be
based on MAID and MTID respectively using the method shown in IEEE
516-2009. [Ex. 0548.1]
Some commenters suggested that separate sets of air and tool
minimum approach distances might be necessary for phase-to-ground
exposures above 72.5 kilovolts because basing minimum approach
distances solely on minimum tool distances could prevent employees from
performing activities such as climbing and inspection with lines or
equipment energized. (See, for example, Ex. 0549.1, 0573.1; Tr2. 54-
55.)
EEI submitted evidence that approximately 23 percent of the
insulators installed on transmission systems, and 25 percent of
insulators installed on systems operating at 345 kilovolts and more,
would be too short to accommodate the IEEE standard's minimum approach
distances for tools (Ex. 0575.1). EEI noted that "there have been no
reported safety events or flashovers with the current insulator
lengths" \200\ and maintained that using MAD for tools would force
employers to perform routine inspections under deenergized conditions
(id.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\200\ OSHA is unsure what EEI meant by "safety event," but
assumes that it means accident or near miss.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minimum approach distances in the 2007 NESC and IEEE Std 516-2009
are generally based on a substantial body of electrical tests run on
air gaps with and without objects in them (Ex. 0532; Tr2. 38).\201\ A
1968 IEEE Committee Report entitled "Recommendations for Safety in
Live Line Maintenance," and a 1973 IEEE Committee Report entitled
"Live-Line Maintenance Methods," presented a formula, based on that
testing, for calculating minimum safe distances for energized power
line work (Exs. 0556, 0558). This formula, which is given later in this
section of the preamble, generally provides for a 10-percent increase
in distance to account for the presence of tools across the air gap.
\202\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\201\ As noted later in this section of the preamble, the 2012
NESC distances are identical to corresponding minimum approach
distances in IEEE Std 516-2009.
\202\ The equation included a factor, C2, equal to
"1.1, composed of 1.06 for live-line tool-to-air withstand distance
ratio plus intangibles" (Ex. 0556).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IEEE Std 516-2009, in Section 4.7.9.2, recognizes the effect that a
large floating object has on minimum approach distances:
When a large floating object, not at ground or the conductor
potential, is in the air gap, additional compensation may be needed
to provide for the size and location of the floating object in the
air gap. [Ex. 0532]
IEEE Std 516-2009 accounts for this effect by reducing the withstand
voltage by 10 percent for phase-to-phase exposures on systems operating
at more than 72.5 kilovolts (id.). This approach effectively increases
the minimum approach distance by at least 10 percent. Although IEEE Std
516-2009 applies a floating-object correction factor only to phase-to-
phase exposures, the effect (as noted in the quoted passage) also
applies to phase-to-ground exposures.
In light of the comments received and the other information in the
record, OSHA concludes that, for phase-to-ground exposures at voltages
of more than 72.5 kilovolts, basing minimum approach distances on
minimum air-insulation distances will not provide sufficient protection
for employees when insulated tools or large conductive objects are in
the air gap. Minimum air-insulation distances are based on testing air
gaps with only air between the electrodes, which does not account
adequately for the presence of tools (Ex. 0532). Therefore, the
provisions adopted in the final rule ensure that minimum air-insulation
distances are applied only when air alone serves as the insulating
medium protecting the worker. For phase-to-ground exposures at voltages
of more than 72.5 kilovolts, Table V-2 requires employers to establish
minimum approach distances that are based on the minimum air-insulation
distance "for phase-to-ground exposures that the employer can
demonstrate consist only of air across the approach distance."
Otherwise, the minimum approach distances for these exposures must be
based on the minimum tool-insulation distance.
Scenario 3--phase-to-phase exposures at more than 72.5 kilovolts.
The third and final scenario the Agency has to address is the presence
of tools or other insulation across a phase-to-phase air gap at
voltages of more than 72.5 kilovolts. Rulemaking participants
maintained that, for voltages of more than 72.5 kilovolts, minimum
approach distances based on minimum tool-insulation distances are
unnecessary because the phase-to-phase air gap is rarely, if ever,
bridged by an insulated tool. (See, for example, Exs. 0545.1, 0548.1,
0550.1, 0551.1; Tr2. 89, 157). For instance, Dr. Randy Horton,
testifying on behalf of EEI, stated:
[EEI is] unaware of any live-line working scenario situations
above 72.5 kV where the phase-to-phase air gap is bridged by live-
line tool. Most work practices are developed to work on only one
phase at a time per structure, phase to ground. [Tr2. 89]
Thus, the rulemaking record indicates that, for voltages over 72.5
kilovolts, tools or other objects infrequently, if ever, bridge the gap
between two phases. Considering how rare the practice of spanning the
air gap is, OSHA decided against adopting generally applicable minimum
approach distances that account for tools in the gap for phase-to-phase
exposures at these voltages. However, there is still a need to account
for conductive bodies in the air gap in the limited circumstances in
which they are present, for example, when an employee is moving between
phases in an aerial lift. Therefore, OSHA is including provisions in
the final rule ensuring that the phase-to-phase minimum approach
distance for voltages over 72.5 kilovolts takes account of any objects
that will be present in the air gap. Table V-2 requires the employer to
establish minimum approach distances that are based on the minimum air-
insulation distance as long as "the employer can demonstrate that no
insulated tool spans
the gap and that no large conductive object is in the gap."\203\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\203\ Two variables in the equation for minimum approach
distances account for tools or large conductive bodies in the air
gap. The variable C is 0.01 for exposures that the employer can
demonstrate are with air only between the employee and the energized
part if the employee is at ground potential or between the employee
and ground if the employee is at the potential of the energized
part, or 0.011 otherwise. Because it is rare that tools or large
conductive bodies are in the air gap between phases, employers
should not have difficulty making this demonstration for phase-to-
phase exposures. The second variable, the saturation factor, a, is
calculated differently when an insulated tool spans the gap or a
large conductive object is in the gap. For phase-to-phase exposures,
the final rule requires this factor generally to be based on air
only in the gap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The electrical component of MAD--maximum transient overvoltages.
Existing Sec. 1910.269 and OSHA's 2005 proposal specified maximum
transient overvoltages of 3.0 per unit for voltages up to 362
kilovolts, 2.4 per unit for voltages in the 550-kilovolt range (500 to
550 kilovolts, nominal\204\), and 2.0 per unit for voltages in the 800-
kilovolt range (765 to 800 kilovolts, nominal). These are known as
"industry-accepted values" of maximum per-unit overvoltage (Ex.
0532). The IEEE committee and the electric utility industry, as
evidenced by the 1993 through 2002 NESC and pre-2003 editions of IEEE
Std 516, believed that these were the highest transient overvoltages
possible. However, the 2007 NESC and IEEE Std 516-2009 recognize that
even higher maximum per-unit transient overvoltages can exist (Exs.
0532, 0533).\205\ Therefore, OSHA requested comments on how, if at all,
the final rule should address the possibility of higher maximum
transient overvoltages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\204\ Table R-7 and Table R-8 in existing Sec. 1910.269 and
Table V-1 and Table V-2 in existing subpart V list the upper bound
of this voltage range as 552 kilovolts. Table R-6 in existing Sec.
1910.269 lists the upper bound of this voltage range as 550
kilovolts, which is the correct value (Ex. 0532). The final rule
uses 550 kilovolts as the upper bound of this voltage range.
\205\ Table 441-2 of the 2007 NESC contains minimum approach
distances with maximum transient overvoltages higher than the
industry-accepted values, though the higher values do not apply when
certain conditions are met (Ex. 0533). Section 4.7.4.3 of IEEE Std
516-2009 lists the industry-accepted values for maximum transient
overvoltages. However, it also states that, if certain assumptions
about the operation of the system are not met, "the values listed
in the table may not be valid, and an engineering evaluation should
be performed to determine [the maximum per-unit transient
overvoltage]" (Ex. 0532).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
No rulemaking participants disputed that overvoltages beyond those
accounted for in the proposed standard were possible. Pike Electric
recommended that minimum approach distances be calculated for the
highest possible transient overvoltage (Ex. 0543.1). IBEW suggested
that, if the higher per-unit overvoltage factors are included, specific
instructions for using those higher factors also should be included in
the final rule (Ex. 0551.1; Tr2. 158).
Electric utility representatives argued that, even though higher
overvoltages are possible, their industry does not widely recognize
that higher overvoltages exist. (See, for example, Exs. 0545.1, 0548.1,
0549.1, 0550.1; Tr2. 90-93.) These rulemaking participants urged OSHA
to base the final standard on the existing industry-accepted values
upon which the proposal was based (id.). For example, Southern Company
stated, "Although IEEE 516-2003 and IEEE 516-2009 recognize the
possibility of higher surge values, the concept that such surges exist
is not widely accepted in the Industry" (Ex. 0548.1).
Dr. Randy Horton, testifying on behalf of EEI, explained this
position as follows:
Over the years, none of the field-measured over-voltages on
actual operating systems has produced results which exceed the
industry accepted T values (transient overvoltage values). The
documentation of these measurements and of numerous simulations,
encompassing all current transmission operating voltages, and the
results have consistently supported the accepted T values. [Tr2. 90]
However, Dr. Horton acknowledged that one utility (Bonneville Power
Administration, or BPA) measured overvoltages above 3.0 per unit on one
of its 230-kilovolt circuits (id.). As he noted, BPA tested that
circuit in response to sparkovers on rod gaps placed on the circuit to
protect it from lightning strikes (Tr2. 90-91). Dr. Horton argued that
the measured overvoltages on that circuit were unrealistic because: (1)
The gaps on the circuit flashed over at overvoltages less than 3.0 per
unit during testing; (2) the circuit breaker characteristics and
performance, including pole-closing spans and breaker current, were
unrealistic; and (3) monitoring inaccuracies could have occurred,
leading to measurements that were too high. (See, for example, Exs.
0546.1, 0575.1; Tr2. 90-92.) EEI recommended adhering to the industry-
accepted overvoltage values. However, it noted that, if OSHA elected to
account for the values of maximum per-unit overvoltage from the BPA
measurements, the final rule should just include a footnote similar to
that contained in IEEE Std 516-2009, noting: "At 242 kV, it is assumed
that automatic instantaneous reclosing is disabled. If not, the values
shown in the table may not be valid, and an engineering evaluation
should be performed to determine `T' " (Ex. 0545.1; Tr2. 93).
In its posthearing submission, EEI offered evidence suggesting that
the industry-accepted values of maximum per-unit transient overvoltage
are reasonable (Ex. 0575.1). In this submission, EEI reported results
of testing on several other systems of varying voltages, none of which
exceeded the industry-accepted values. EEI explained:
The field tests were conducted for energization, reclosings and
with or without shunt reactors. Attempts were made to obtain the
worst possible overvoltages during the field tests. For all cases,
listed above, the expected overvoltages, now, would be lower since
the system has matured and at each bus, the source strength has
increased considerably. . . .
The IEEE Transactions Papers on the aforementioned information
are provided below. Additional IEEE Transactions Papers references
are attached for switching overvoltage field tests on system voltage
levels of 220 kV, 345 kV and 500 kV by various power companies,
including American Electric Power. All papers show that:
Without breaker closing resistors, the maximum
switching overvoltages do not exceed 3.0 pu.
With closing resistor, the maximum switching
overvoltages are near 2.0 pu. And, with control closings the maximum
switching overvoltages do not exceed 1.6 pu.
Calculated overvoltages are generally much higher than
those by the field measured values . . . [Id.]
EEI also pointed to an excerpt from International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) Standard 61472 as evidence that higher maximum
transient overvoltages are possible, but unlikely (id.). This IEC
excerpt reads as follows:
B.2.2 Overvoltages under abnormal conditions.
Among the possible abnormal conditions which can lead to very
high overvoltages, restrikes between the contacts of circuit
breakers during opening is considered, and in particular the
following conditions may be of concern:
-single or three-phase opening of no load lines;
-three-phase clearing of line-to-earth fault.
Such abnormal behaviour may lead to overvoltage amplitudes of
the same order or even higher than those under three-phase
reclosing.
However, the restrike probability of circuit breakers is
normally low, and is very low for the modern circuit breaker. So the
low probability of these events is not such as to influence the
probability distribution of the family considered (opening or fault
clearing) and thus the relevant Ue2 value. [Id.]
OSHA understands that the information in the record pertaining to
maximum transient overvoltages applies basically to voltages over 72.5
kilovolts.
IEEE Std 516-2009 does not include separate overvoltage factors for
voltages of 72.5 kilovolts and less (Ex. 0532). For voltages of 72.5
kilovolts and less, IEEE Std 516-2009 relies on a maximum transient
overvoltage of 3.0 per unit and does not recognize the possibility of
higher values. Section 4.8.1d of IEEE Std 516-2009 states, "Shunt-
connected devices, such as transformers, and reactors will tend to
reduce the trapped charge on the line and, therefore, limit the
overvoltages due to reenergization" (id.). Such shunt-connected
devices are not only pervasive on systems of 72.5 kilovolts and less,
but are a necessary part of the distribution systems that form the
overwhelmingly predominant portion of these systems (see, for example,
269-Ex. 8-13). Even for the 45- and 69-kilovolt systems that are
sometimes used in transmission circuits, there is no evidence in the
record that maximum transient overvoltages exceed 3.0 per unit.
Consequently, the final rule adheres to a maximum transient overvoltage
of 3.0 per unit for systems with a nominal phase-to-phase voltage of
72.5 kilovolts or less. OSHA calculated the values in Table V-3, which
are the electrical components of the minimum approach distances, using
a maximum transient overvoltage of 3.0 per unit.
For voltages of more than 72.5 kilovolts, no rulemaking participant
disputed the fact that maximum transient overvoltages based on
engineering calculations can exceed those on which the proposed rule
was based. (See, for example, Exs. 0532, 0575.1.) It also is clear that
maximum transient overvoltages exceeding industry-accepted values are
possible as IEEE Std 516-2009, IEC Standard 61472, and the BPA report
show. (id.) The evidence in the record indicates that most systems do
not, however, exceed the industry-accepted values on which the proposal
was based. (See, for example, Exs. 0545.1, 0549.1, 0575.1; Tr2. 90-93.)
This is the major argument relied on by the commenters that urged OSHA
to base the final rule on industry-accepted values of maximum transient
overvoltage (id.).
The Agency considered all of the comments and record evidence on
this issue and concluded that the arguments against relying on BPA's
report are not strong enough to justify ignoring it for purposes of
this final rule. First, EEI argued that, in the BPA scenario, during
testing the gaps on the circuit flashed over at overvoltages less than
3.0 per unit (see, for example, Tr2. 91). The magnitude of the
overvoltage during these gap sparkovers is irrelevant. In one series of
tests, the measured overvoltages for two of the tests in which three
gaps arced over were lass than 3.0 per unit. However, measured
overvoltages on at least one phase exceeded 3.0 per unit during 10 of
the tests, including both tests involving sparkovers.\206\ For this
circuit, the testing found overvoltages as high as 3.3 per unit. The
BPA report explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\206\ The measured overvoltages on the phases with gap
sparkovers were under 3.0 per unit, but the measured overvoltages on
the phases without gap sparkovers during the same tests exceeded 3.0
per unit. For example, during test 5-25, the overvoltage on the
phase with the gap sparkover was 2.83 per unit, and the overvoltage
on one of the other two phases was 3.30 per unit.
Rod gap flashovers occurred . . . during the last two tests of
[one test series]. . . . [S]ignificantly higher overvoltages were
measured on [the] phases [with flashovers] during other tests in the
series, but the gaps did not flash over. This demonstrates the
highly statistical nature of . . . gap flashover . . . . [Ex.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
0575.1]
Thus, that the measured overvoltages for the sparkovers were less than
3.0 per unit has no bearing on whether overvoltages exceeding 3.0 per
unit are possible.
Second, EEI's argument that the circuit breaker characteristics
were unrealistic are unpersuasive. EEI argued that, because "[t]he
field tests were conducted with individual phase breaker pole
control," the pole-closing span \207\ was exceedingly large and
unrealistic (id.). Although BPA controlled the opening and closing of
the circuit breakers during testing to "measure overvoltage levels
that can occur on a long transmission line during high speed
reclosing," there is no indication in the BPA report that it varied
the closing spans for the individual poles on the circuit breakers
(id.). The report states:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\207\ The circuit-breaker pole-closing span is the maximum
closing time difference between the phases.
[The relevant test series] involved three-phase reclosing into
trapped charge on the Big Eddy-Chemewa 230-kV line. Breaker opening
was controlled and synchronized to generate the same polarity and
magnitude trapped charge on each phase for each test shot. Testing
began by switching from the Big Eddy end, varying the closing time
of the breaker uniformly over a complete 60 Hz cycle by increments
of 18 electrical degrees (\1/20\ cycle). After these 20 tests, 4
additional tests were performed in an attempt to generate a maximum
possible overvoltage. This same procedure was then repeated from the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chemewa end of the line. [Id.]
Thus, it appears that BPA took measures to synchronize the switching of
the poles in each circuit breaker. The report mentioned that the
circuit breaker at the Big Eddy end was "constructed with each phase
in its own tank" (id.). The pole-closing span for this circuit breaker
was 3.7 milliseconds. The circuit breaker at Chemewa was "constructed
with all three contacts in a single tank" (id.). The pole-closing span
for this circuit breaker was 0.24 milliseconds, significantly shorter
than the pole-closing span for the Big Eddy circuit breaker. Measured
overvoltages exceeded 3.0 per unit during tests with switching
performed at both locations. Thus, OSHA concludes that pole-closing
spans did not contribute to measured overvoltages exceeding 3.0 per
unit during BPA testing. BPA did not indicate that the pole-closing
span for either circuit breaker was unusual, and EEI did not submit any
evidence that would demonstrate that circuit breakers of any type of
construction generally have shorter pole-closing spans. Consequently,
the Agency concludes that, even if the pole-closing span did contribute
to the measured overvoltages in BPA's testing, circuit breakers in
other installations could have similarly long pole-closing spans with
correspondingly high maximum transient overvoltages.
Furthermore, although the difference in time taken for each pole to
close might affect the phase-to-phase overvoltage, that value was not
measured during the BPA tests. Because pole-closing spans only affect
the offset between phases and should have no substantial effect on the
behavior of the transient voltage on a single phase, long pole-closing
spans should have little effect on phase-to-ground overvoltages (that
is, the overvoltage on a single phase). As explained later, the report
clearly states that the main cause of the unexpectedly high maximum
transient overvoltages was "prestrike." OSHA, therefore, concludes
that prestrike, not pole-closing spans, were the primary cause of the
high maximum transient overvoltages.
EEI, through Dr. Horton, also expressed concern about the
performance of the circuit breakers in the BPA report, because the
circuit breaker current showed evidence of prestrikes (Tr2. 91).
Restrike and prestrike may occur during the opening of circuit
breakers. The current and voltage across the contacts of a circuit
breaker vary with time. When the contacts are closed, the voltage
across them is very close to zero, and the current oscillates at 60
cycles per second. When the contacts are open, the voltage oscillates,
and the current is zero. As the contacts of a circuit breaker open or
close, current can arc across them. When the current drops to zero,
the arcing stops. However, if the voltage across the contacts from
reflected traveling waves exceeds the dielectric strength of the gap
between the contacts, arcing can recur. Arcing that occurs after the
initial arc is extinguished as the circuit breaker is opening is called
"restrike." Arcing that occurs as the contacts close, but before they
are touching, is called "prestrike."
Whether a circuit breaker is subject to restrikes or prestrikes is
dependent on the design of the circuit breaker, maintenance of the
circuit breaker, and the characteristics of the circuit to which the
breaker is connected. Prestrikes and restrikes can lead to high
transient overvoltages that can damage equipment. Therefore,
manufacturers design circuit breakers to resist restrikes and
prestrikes. However, the probability that these events will occur can
be affected by maintenance and circuit design. Poor circuit breaker
maintenance can lead to longer pole-opening times and can increase the
probability that prestrike or restrike will occur. Similarly, circuit
designs can shorten the time in which traveling waves reach the breaker
contacts, which also can increase the probability of prestrikes or
restrikes.
The circuit breakers that were the subject of BPA's testing
exhibited prestrikes during testing (Ex. 0575.1). Commenting on this,
Dr. Horton stated:
The line breaker performance appears suspicious. The breaker
current shows pre-strikes with abrupt interruptions and subsequent
re-ignitions [Tr2. 91]
However, the BPA report explained why the prestrikes occurred:
During Test Series V, it was found that the sending end can
experience significant overvoltages that were previously assumed to
occur only out on the line or at the receiving end. During breaker
prestrike, a current wave (initiated by arcing across the contacts)
travels down the line to the receiving (open) end where it is
reflected. As the reflected wave travels back toward the sending end
of the line, it reduces the current to near zero along the line.
When the reflected current wave reaches the sending end of the line,
it creates a current zero and allows the prestrike arc between the
breaker contacts to extinguish, isolating the line voltage from the
bus voltage. After the arc extinguishes, the line voltage often
increases due to traveling voltage waves that continue to be
reflected from the receiving end. The voltage across the breaker
then builds up until another prestrike occurs. The next prestrike
occurs at a lower breaker cross voltage because the breaker contacts
are closer together. In Test Series V, the majority of breaker
closings resulted in only a single prestrike. However, in a few
tests, up to four prestrikes occurred on one phase during a single
closing operation. [Ex. 0575.1]
BPA found this information useful, explaining:
This field test has also provided a considerable amount of data
on 230-kV SF6 breaker prestrikes. Typical characteristics
of the dielectric strength across the breaker contacts have now been
developed and can be used for statistical switching surge studies.
Additional information has also been obtained about another property
of 230-kV SF6 breakers--where the prestrike arc is
extinguished by the traveling current wave during line switching.
The test results show that when the prestrike arc extinguishes, the
voltage at the sending end of a line reaches values that are much
higher than were previously expected. [Id.]
In light of this explanation in the BPA report itself, OSHA
concludes that the existence of prestrikes does not invalidate the BPA
report's findings. In fact, the prestrikes were the cause of the
unexpectedly high maximum transient overvoltages. The Agency
anticipates that any workplace where prestrikes occur during switching
operations, particularly during reclosing, can experience similarly
high maximum transient overvoltages.
EEI's third and final concern about the BPA report was that
"inaccuracies in the monitoring system and in the waveform calibration
[could have resulted] in unrealistic over-voltage readings" (Tr2. 91).
However, there is no evidence in either BPA's report or in OSHA's
rulemaking record that such inaccuracies existed during the BPA tests.
For the foregoing reasons, OSHA does not accept EEI's criticism of
the BPA report and finds that it provides substantial evidence of the
existence of maximum transient overvoltages higher than industry-
accepted values.
IEEE Std 516-2009 does not account for the possibility of circuit-
breaker restrikes. In Section 4.7.4.3, IEEE Std 516-2009 explains its
approach for addressing maximum transient overvoltages, as follows:
(a) At all voltage levels, it is assumed that circuit breakers
are being used to switch the subject line while live work is being
performed. This further assumes that the restrike probability of a
circuit breaker is low and consequently extremely low while a worker
is near the MAD and that it can, therefore, be ignored in the
calculation of T. If devices other than circuit breakers are being
utilized to switch the subject line while live work is being
performed, then the values listed in the table may not be valid, and
an engineering evaluation should be performed to determine T.
(b) At 242 kV, it is assumed that automatic instantaneous
reclosing is disabled. If not, the values shown in the table may not
be valid, and an engineering evaluation should be performed to
determine T. [Ex. 0532]
OSHA has serious concerns about the validity of the assumptions on
which this IEEE standard relies to support its general application of
the industry-accepted values for maximum transient overvoltages.
Indeed, with all the caveats in these paragraphs of the IEEE standard,
it is clear that even the drafters of that standard did not believe in
the universal applicability of its key assumptions. IEEE Std 516-2009
recognizes that switching can be performed using devices other than
circuit breakers and recommends an engineering analysis if such devices
are used. The Agency concludes that the prestrike experience reported
by BPA demonstrates that the occurrence of prestrikes is likely to be a
consequence of the design of the circuit breaker and the circuit
involved, rather than a low probability event for each circuit breaker
on every circuit. The BPA report explained that the occurrence of
prestrikes was influenced heavily by the magnitude of the trapped
charge on the line and the speed of the initial and repeated reflected
traveling wavefronts (Ex. 0575.1). Because the cause of prestrikes and
restrikes are the same, the Agency believes that restrikes are
similarly influenced. In this regard, prestrikes and restrikes are the
same type of event, with prestrikes occurring during circuit breaker
opening and restrikes occurring during circuit breaker closing. Thus,
although the overall probability that circuit breakers in general will
restrike or prestrike may be low, OSHA concludes that the probability
that a particular circuit breaker will restrike or prestrike may be
high enough that it cannot be ignored.
Additionally, neither the IEEE standard nor Dr. Horton explained
why the IEEE committee chose to base maximum transient overvoltage on
the 2-percent statistical switching overvoltage expected at the
worksite, which is a probability-based assessment, while ignoring the
probability of restrikes (Ex. 0532).\208\ After all, if the probability
is low enough, then the potential for restrikes will not have a
significant effect on the 2-percent statistical switching overvoltage.
On the other hand, if it is high enough, then the 2-percent statistical
switching overvoltage will increase.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\ Section 4.7.4.2 of IEEE Std 516-2009 reads, in part, "The
line-to-ground maximum anticipated per-unit TOV (T) for live work is
defined as the ratio of the 2% statistical switching overvoltage
expected at the worksite to the nominal peak line-to-ground voltage
of the system."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to EEI's recommendation to permit employers to use
industry-accepted values in accordance with IEEE Std 516-2009, OSHA
concludes
that this alternative does not adequately account for higher maximum
transient overvoltages. Section 4.7.4.3b of IEEE Std 516-2009 indicates
that the industry-accepted values are valid only when reclosing is
blocked at 242 kilovolts (Ex 0532). Although the BPA testing was
performed on a 242-kilovolt circuit, there is no evidence in the record
indicating that maximum transient overvoltages higher than the
industry-accepted values are limited only to this voltage. In addition,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the IEEE standard, in Section E.2 of Appendix E, notes:
If restriking of the switching device is included [in the
determination of maximum transient overvoltage], then the resulting
overvoltages are essentially the same as those of reclosing into a
trapped charge. The only difference is the probability of
occurrence. [Id.]
Consequently, even if reclosing is blocked, the maximum transient
overvoltage may still exceed industry-accepted values.
OSHA concludes that it is not in the interest of worker safety to
adopt minimum approach-distance provisions based on the conditions
expected to be present in the workplaces of most, but not all,
employers covered by this final rule. Basing the rule on industry-
accepted values of maximum transient overvoltage, as EEI and other
commenters recommended, would result in some employees not receiving
adequate protection. In the extreme case, in which the maximum
transient overvoltage is 3.5 instead of the industry-accepted value of
3.0, the electrical component of the minimum approach distance would
sparkover nearly 50 percent of the time, rather than 0.1 percent of the
time, at the maximum overvoltage. OSHA designed the minimum approach-
distance provisions in this final rule to protect employees from the
conditions that are present in their specific workplaces. Under the
final rule, employers must select and adhere to minimum approach
distances based on the maximum transient overvoltages present at their
workplaces or base minimum approach distances on the highest maximum
transient overvoltage.
EEI and other commenters noted that IEEE recently established a
working group to examine maximum transient overvoltages and recommended
that OSHA rely on industry-accepted values for these overvoltages until
the committee reports its findings. (See, for example, Exs. 0545.1,
0548.1; Tr2. 92-93.) For instance, Dr. Horton, testifying on behalf of
EEI, stated:
In order to address the possibility of higher surge values, the
General Systems Subcommittee of the IEEE Transmission and
Distribution Committee has recently created a working group entitled
"Field Measured Over-Voltages and Their Analysis" to determine if
higher surge values actually exist, and if so, what is their upper
limits. This working group is chaired by myself (Dr. Randy Horton of
Southern Company) and is co-chaired by Dr. Albert Keri of American
Electric Power. Numerous experts and utilities from around the world
are involved in this work, and initial findings of the working group
will likely be available in the next 3 to 4 years. Until such time,
it is recommended that the industry accepted values (in other words
T equal to 3 per unit, 2.4 per unit, and 2.0 per unit, corresponding
to 362 kV and below, 363 kV to 550 kV, and 551 kV to 800 kV
respectively) be used as the maximum per unit transient over-voltage
values. [Tr2. 92-93]
The Agency concludes that it is not necessary to wait for the
findings of the new IEEE working group before proceeding with new
minimum approach-distance provisions. The Agency does not believe that
it is necessary to delay action on minimum approach distances until the
IEEE or any other standard-setting organization produces additional
information on this subject. OSHA believes that there is sufficient
information in the record, described earlier in this discussion of
maximum transient overvoltages, to form the basis of a final rule on
minimum approach distances that accurately accounts for the presence,
magnitude, and effect of maximum transient overvoltages. The Agency
concludes that BPA's experience proves the existence of maximum
transient overvoltages higher than the industry-accepted values; and,
although the consensus standards do not fully account for potentially
higher values in their minimum approach distances, the 2007 NESC and
the 2003 and 2009 editions of IEEE Std 516 recognize the existence of
such overvoltages (Exs. 0041, 0532, 0533, 0575.1). Consequently, for
purposes of Table V-6, and Table 7 through Table 14 in Appendix B to
subpart V, the Agency is adopting maximum per-unit transient
overvoltages of 3.5 for systems operating at 72.6 to 420 kilovolts, 3.0
for systems operating at 420.1 to 550.0 kilovolts, and 2.5 for systems
operating at 550.1 to 800 kilovolts. These values are the same values
as the highest maximum transient overvoltages recognized in the 2007
NESC and IEEE Std 516-2009 (Exs. 0532, 0533).
The electrical component of MAD--calculation methods for voltages
up to 72.5 kilovolts. OSHA based the minimum approach distances in
existing Sec. 1910.269 for voltages up to 72.5 kilovolts on ANSI/IEEE
Std 4 (59 FR 4383). Existing Sec. 1910.269 specifies "avoid contact"
as the minimum approach distance for voltages between 51 and 1,000
volts. To make the revised standards consistent with the 2002 NESC,
OSHA proposed in the 2005 proposal to adopt minimum approach distances
of 0.31 meters (1 foot) for voltages between 301 volts and 750 volts
and 0.65 meters (2 feet, 2 inches) for voltages between 751 volts and
15 kilovolts. The proposal specified "avoid contact" as the minimum
approach distance for 51 to 300 volts.
Two commenters objected to the requirement for employees to "avoid
contact" with lines energized at 50 to 300 volts (Exs. 0169, 0171).
Mr. Brooke Stauffer with NECA commented, "The `avoid contact'
requirement on lines energized at 50 to 300 volts is infeasible for
line construction and maintenance, because linemen must contact these
energized lines on a routine basis while doing their work" (Ex. 0171).
Quanta Services similarly asserted, "The `avoid contact' requirement
on lines energized at 50 to 300 volts presents a problem because
linemen will contact those lines on a routine basis while doing their
work" (Ex. 0169).
These comments do not indicate how employees are contacting
electric conductors and other circuit parts energized up to 300
volts.\209\ It is well recognized that these voltages are potentially
lethal. Exhibit 0002 alone describes at least 25 accidents in which
employees were killed because of contact with circuit parts energized
at 120 volts to ground.\210\ OSHA believes that, in the past, the
practice was for power line workers to use leather gloves rather than
rubber insulating gloves to handle these voltages, and it is possible
that these commenters are recommending that the standard permit that
practice. However, leather gloves do not insulate workers from
energized parts (Ex. 0002).\211\ Perspiration can saturate these gloves
during use, making them conductive. One of the accidents in the record
involved an employee handling a 120-volt conductor with leather gloves
(id.). Therefore, the final rule requires employees to avoid contact
with circuit parts energized at 50 to 300 volts.\212\ If it is
necessary for employees to handle exposed parts energized at these
voltages, they must do so in accordance with final Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)(iii)(A), (c)(1)(iii)(B), or (c)(1)(iii)(C); and any
insulating equipment used must meet the electrical protective equipment
requirements in final Sec. 1926.97.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\209\ In the proposed rule, the lowest voltage in the avoid-
contact range was 51 volts, not 50 volts as indicated by the two
commenters.
\210\ See the 25 accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=660118&id=817114&id=14307003&id=14311666&id=982645&id=14327944&id=894584&id=14351076
&id=14525430&id=201360062&id=601468&id=14251771&id=14251987&id=14257034&id=14371751&id=14523591&id=14383376&id=695437&id=514547&id=170080238
&id=14400782&id=14219851&id=764365&id=14505366&id=778332.
\211\ See, for example, the two accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=14371751&id=660118.
\212\ OSHA proposed 51 volts as the low end of the avoid-contact
range. The final rule adopts 50 volts as the low end for consistency
with Table R-6 in existing Sec. 1910.269 and IEEE Std 516-2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There were few comments on the minimum approach distances proposed
in 2005 for voltages of 301 volts to 72.5 kilovolts. Some commenters
objected to the small changes in minimum approach distances from
existing Sec. 1910.269 that were specified in the 2005 proposal. (See,
for example, Exs. 0227, 0543.1.) EEI maintained that the safety benefit
of slight changes was outweighed by the practical implications of
implementing revised minimum approach distances:
For the sake of an inch or two, OSHA ought not to change the
existing MAD tables. Such changes could require revising every
safety rule book and training curriculum in the industry, including
among line contractors, as well as related retraining of line
workers. The established clearance distances are well-known to
employees in the transmission and distribution industry, and
changing them for the sake of an additional inch or two can only
lead to confusion, with no significant safety benefit. As a
practical matter, it is not clear that such a small change will make
a significant difference in the safety of line workers. [Ex. 0227]
OSHA understands that changing minimum approach distances, even
slightly, may require employers to adjust their safety rules and
training. The Agency accounted for the cost of changing these safety
rules and training because of differences between existing Sec.
1910.269 and the final rule, including the revised minimum approach
distances (see Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis, later in this preamble).
Ignoring evidence that small increases in the electrical component
of the minimum approach distances are necessary would result in
shrinking the ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance,
thereby making work less safe for employees than if the ergonomic
component remained constant. As explained previously, OSHA designed
this final rule to ensure that the ergonomic component of the minimum
approach distance remains at least 0.31 meters (1 foot) or 0.61 meters
(2 feet), depending on the voltage.
OSHA proposed a minimum approach distance of 0.31 meters (1 foot)
for voltages of 301 through 750 volts. Although there were no comments
on this minimum approach distance, the Agency is adopting a slightly
larger distance. In Section 4.7.1.1, IEEE Std 516-2009 explained its
approach to setting the electrical component of the minimum approach
distance, as follows:
For ac and dc line-to-line and line-to-ground work between 300 V
and 5.0 kV, sufficient test data are not available to calculate the
MAID,\[213]\ which is less than 2 cm or 0.07 ft. For this voltage
range, it is assumed that MAID is 0.02 m or 0.07 ft . . . . [Ex.
0532]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\213\ IEEE Std 516-2009 assumes that MAID and MTID have the same
value in this voltage range. Using this approach, the electrical
component of the minimum approach distance would be the same in air
or along the length of an insulated tool.
Using this approach for voltages of 301 to 750 volts, OSHA added the
0.31-meter (1-foot) ergonomic component of the minimum approach
distance to the 0.02-meter (0.07-foot) electrical component, for a
total minimum approach distance of 0.33 meters (1.07 feet) in the final
rule.
As noted earlier, OSHA based the methodology for calculating the
electrical component of the minimum approach distance for voltages from
751 volts to 72.5 kilovolts in the 2005 proposal on IEEE Std 4. Table 6
lists the critical sparkover distances from that standard as listed in
IEEE Std 516-2009.
Table 6--Sparkover Distance for Rod-to-Rod Gap
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gap spacing from
60 Hz Rod-to-rod sparkover (kV peak) IEEE Std 4-1995
(cm)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
25.................................................. 2
36.................................................. 3
46.................................................. 4
53.................................................. 5
60.................................................. 6
70.................................................. 8
79.................................................. 10
86.................................................. 12
95.................................................. 14
104................................................. 16
112................................................. 18
120................................................. 20
143................................................. 25
167................................................. 30
192................................................. 35
218................................................. 40
243................................................. 45
270................................................. 50
322................................................. 60
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: IEEE Std 516-2009 (Ex. 0532).
To use the table to determine the electrical component of the
minimum approach distance, the employer would determine the peak phase-
to-ground transient overvoltage and select a gap from the table that
corresponds to that voltage as a withstand voltage rather than a
critical sparkover voltage. For voltages between 5 and 72.5 kilovolts,
the process for using Table 6 to calculate the electrical component of
the minimum approach distance, starting with the phase-to-phase system
voltage, was described generally as follows in Draft 9 of the 2009
revision to IEEE Std 516 (Ex. 0524):
1. Divide the phase-to-phase voltage by the square root of 3 to
convert it to a phase-to-ground voltage.
2. Multiply the phase-to-ground voltage by the square root of 2 to
convert the rms value of the voltage to the peak phase-to-ground
voltage.
3. Multiply the peak phase-to-ground voltage by the maximum per-
unit transient overvoltage, which, for this voltage range, is 3.0, as
discussed earlier in this section of the preamble. This is the maximum
phase-to-ground transient overvoltage, which corresponds to the
withstand voltage for the relevant exposure.\214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\214\ The withstand voltage is the voltage at which sparkover is
not likely to occur across a specified distance. It is the voltage
taken at the 3[sigma] point below the sparkover voltage, assuming
that the sparkover curve follows a normal distribution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Divide the maximum phase-to-ground transient overvoltage by 0.85
to determine the corresponding critical sparkover voltage. (The
critical sparkover voltage is 3 standard deviations (or 15 percent)
greater than the withstand voltage.)
5. Determine the electrical component of the minimum approach
distance from the table through interpolation.\215\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\215\ Draft 9 of IEEE Std 516 used curve-fitted equations rather
than interpolation to determine the distance. The two methods result
in nearly equivalent distances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These steps are illustrated in Table 7.
Table 7--Calculating the Electrical Component of MAD 751 V to 72.5 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum system phase-to-phase voltage (kV)
Step ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
15 36 46 72.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Divide by [radic]3........ 8.7................ 20.8............... 26.6............... 41.9
2. Multiply by [radic]2...... 12.2............... 29.4............... 37.6............... 59.2
3. Multiply by 3.0........... 36.7............... 88.2............... 112.7.............. 177.6
4. Divide by 0.85............ 43.2............... 103.7.............. 132.6.............. 208.9
5. Interpolate from Table 6.. 3+(7.2/10)*1....... 14+(8.7/9)*2....... 20+(12.6/23)*5..... 35+(16.9/26)*5
Electrical component of MAD 3.72............... 15.93.............. 22.74.............. 38.25
(cm).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This method is consistent with the method OSHA used to develop the
minimum approach distances for voltages of 751 volts to 72.5 kilovolts
in the 2005 proposal. Although OSHA received no comments on this
approach, the methodology contained in final IEEE Std 516-2009 added
one additional step (Ex. 0532). The distances in IEEE Std 4-1995 result
from 60-Hz impulse rod-to-rod tests. The extra step in IEEE Std 516-
2009 divides the phase-to-ground maximum transient overvoltage by 1.3
to account for the difference between the strength of an air gap under
60-hertz voltages and the strength under transient voltages.\216\ The
IEEE committee relied on two papers that are not in the current OSHA
record to develop the 1.3 factor.\217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\216\ A 60-hertz voltage cycles through its maximum, or peak,
voltage 60 times each second, and the value of the voltage forms a
sine wave. A transient overvoltage does not cycle, but generally
increases quickly as a single pulse.
\217\ These documents are (1) CIGR[Eacute]/SC 33, "Phase-to-
Phase Insulation Coordination," ELECTRA, no. 64, 1979; and (2)
Esmeraldo, P. C. V., and Fonseca, C. S., "Evaluation of the Phase-
to-Phase Overvoltage Characteristics due to Switching Surges for
Application on Risk of Failure Statistical Methods in Non-
Conventional Power Design," Paper 34.01, 6th ISH, New Orleans,
1989.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA is not adopting this part of the method that IEEE Std 516-2009
uses to calculate the electrical components of the minimum approach
distances for voltages from 751 volts to 72.5 kilovolts. First, the
Agency does not believe that there is sufficient information in this
record to support the 1.3 conversion factor, which was not used in
earlier editions of IEEE Std 516 and was not used in any version of the
NESC through the 2007 edition.\218\ Second, although OSHA raised this
issue in its September 2009 reopening notice, no commenters voiced
support for such a change in the OSHA rule. Finally, as previously
noted, for voltages of 72.5 kilovolts and lower, IEEE Std 516-2009
assumes that the electrical component of the minimum approach distance
is the same with tools in the air gap as it is for air alone. The
dielectric strength of an air gap is less with a tool in the gap than
it is when the gap is air, however (see, for example, Exs. 0556, 0558).
Thus, an increase in the electrical component of the minimum approach
distance is necessary to account for tools. OSHA does not believe that
a 60-hertz-to-transient conversion factor (which reduces MAD values) is
appropriate when no counterbalancing distance is added to account for
tools in the air gap. For these reasons, the Agency is adopting the
proposed methodology for determining the electrical component of the
minimum approach distance for voltages of 751 volts to 72.5 kilovolts.
As noted earlier, OSHA also is adopting the proposed ergonomic
component for this voltage range. Thus, the final rule incorporates
minimum approach distances for these voltages generally as proposed.
However, Table V-5 in the final rule breaks the proposed voltage range
of 751 volts to 15 kilovolts into two ranges--751 to 5,000 volts and
5.1 kilovolts to 15 kilovolts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\218\ The 2012 NESC adopts minimum approach distances from IEEE
Std 516-2009, which, as noted, uses the 1.3 conversion factor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the reasons described earlier under the discussion of the 301-
to 750-volt range, IEEE Std 516-2009 sets the electrical component of
the minimum approach distance at 0.02 meters for voltages of 301 to
5,000 volts.\219\ As can be seen from Table 6, this is the sparkover
distance for the smallest transient overvoltage listed in the table.
There is no evidence in the record that lower voltages will produce
larger sparkover distances. Consequently, there is no reason to believe
that the electrical component of the minimum approach distance will be
greater for voltages of 5,000 volts or less. In addition, rounding the
electrical component of the minimum approach distance to the nearest 25
millimeters (1.0 inch) results in a minimum distance of 25 millimeters.
As explained earlier, OSHA concludes that this value is reasonable and,
therefore, adopts 0.02 meter (1 inch) as the electrical component of
the minimum approach distance for this voltage range.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\219\ The electrical component of MAD is 0.02 meters (1 inch)
for all voltages from 301 volts to 5.0 kilovolts. However, the
ergonomic component of MAD is 0.305 meters (1 foot) for voltages up
to 750 volts and 0.61 meters for higher voltages as explained
earlier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The electrical component of MAD--calculation methods for voltages
over 72.5 kilovolts. As noted earlier, OSHA based its proposed minimum
approach distances on criteria adopted by NESC Subcommittee 8 in 1993.
The NESC based its criteria, at least in part, on IEEE Std 516-1987. As
noted in Appendix B to proposed Subpart V, OSHA used the following
equation, which was based on IEEE Std 516-1987, to calculate the
electrical component of the minimum approach distance for voltages of
72.6 to 800 kilovolts in the proposed rule:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.003
Where:
D = Electrical component of the minimum approach distance in air in
feet
C = 0.01 to account for correction factors associated with the
variation of gap sparkover with voltage
a = A factor relating to the saturation of air at voltages \220\ of
345 kilovolts or higher
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\220\ This voltage is the maximum transient overvoltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
pu = Maximum anticipated transient overvoltage, in per unit (p.u.)
Vmax = Maximum rms system line-to-ground voltage in kilovolts--this
value is the true maximum, that is, the normal highest voltage for
the range (for example, 10 percent above the nominal voltage).
Phase-to-ground exposures. For phase-to-ground exposures,
rulemaking participants agreed that the proposal's methodology for
calculating minimum approach distances was generally appropriate unless
insulated tools were present across the air gap. (See, for example,
Exs. 0521, 0527.1, 0529, 0575.1.) For instance, EEI commented, "The
existing MAID formula, based on rod-to-rod gap data, is acceptable for
all line-to-ground applications [through 800 kilovolts with a maximum
per-unit overvoltage of 2.44 per unit]" (Ex. 0527.1).
Therefore, the final rule requires employers to set minimum
approach distances based on Equation 1 for phase-to-ground exposures at
voltages of more than 72.5 kilovolts. Here is the full equation
contained in Table V-2, with the part that is equivalent to Equation 1
highlighted:
MAD = 0.3048(C + a)VL-GTA + M
The equation in Table V-2 is identical to Equation 1 except that it:
(1) Incorporates an altitude correction factor, A, as described later
in this section of the preamble, (2) converts the result to meters
through multiplication by 0.3048, and (3) adds the ergonomic component
of MAD, M to the electrical component of MAD given in Equation 1. In
addition, the table uses slightly different variable designations: VL-G
for Vmax and T for pu.
As explained earlier in this section of the preamble, OSHA decided
to specify minimum approach distances that account for the presence of
tools in the air gap unless the employer can demonstrate that there is
only air between the employee and the energized part or between the
employee and ground, as appropriate. (The air gap would be between the
employee and the energized part if the employee is at ground potential,
or at the potential of another energized part, or between the employee
and ground if the employee is at the potential of the energized part
during live-line barehand work.) Consequently, in the equation for
phase-to-phase system voltages of more than 72.5 kilovolts in Table V-
2, the term C must be adjusted depending on whether the minimum tool-
insulation distance or the minimum air-insulation distance will be used
as the electrical component of the minimum approach distance. According
to IEEE Std 516-2009, C is 0.01 for the minimum air-insulation distance
and 0.011 for the minimum tool-insulation distance. OSHA concludes that
these values of C are reasonable because they are supported by
scientific evidence (Exs. 0556, 0558) and because there were no other
values recommended in the rulemaking record for the proposal.
Therefore, these values are incorporated in Table V-2 in the final
rule.
There is one other minor issue that requires resolution before the
electrical components of the minimum approach distances for phase-to-
ground exposures can be calculated--that is, the determination of the
saturation factor, a. The proposed rule and IEEE Std 516-1987, which
formed the original basis for the calculation of phase-to-ground
minimum approach distances in existing Sec. 1910.269, relied on Figure
2 in "Recommendations for Safety in Live Line Maintenance" to
determine the saturation factor (269-Ex. 60; Ex. 0558). That figure
plotted the saturation factor against crest voltage. In preparing IEEE
Std 516-2009, the IEEE committee decided to use equations to represent
the saturation factor rather than reading it from the figure (Ex.
0532). The committee used a curve-fitting program to develop the
following equations for the saturation factor for calculating the
electrical components of the minimum approach distances for phase-to-
ground exposures: \221\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\221\ These equations calculate the saturation factor, a, for
any exposure for which Equation 1 is used to calculate the
electrical components of the minimum approach distances. However, as
explained later in this section of the preamble, the committee chose
to apply Equation 1 only to phase-to-ground exposures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.004
OSHA concludes that adopting IEEE's method of calculating the
saturation factor is reasonable because that method will lead to more
accurate and consistent determinations of minimum approach distances
for phase-to-ground exposures on system voltages of more than 72.5
kilovolts than approximating the saturation factor by reading it
directly from the graph, as was done to calculate the minimum approach
distances in existing Sec. 1910.269.\223\ Consequently, the Agency is
adopting these equations for calculating the saturation factor in Table
V-2 in the final rule for phase-to-ground exposures, except for the
1,600-kilovolt limitation for the last voltage range. As explained
later in this section of the preamble, the Agency concluded that
extrapolating the saturation factor beyond the 1,600-kilovolt maximum
switching impulse used during the experimental testing used to support
the IEEE method is reasonable and will better protect employees than
alternative approaches. For phase-to-ground exposures, this limit would
have no practical effect as the Agency anticipates that few, if any,
systems will have maximum phase-to-ground transient overvoltages
(VPeak) as high as 1,600 kilovolts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\222\ Through an apparent oversight, the IEEE equations for a
fail to cover 635.0 kilovolts.
\223\ The quality of the graph is poor, and the underlying data
is no longer available (Ex. 0532).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-phase exposures. For phase-to-phase exposures, OSHA based
the proposal on the 2002 NESC approach, which used the maximum phase-
to-phase transient overvoltage in Equation 1 for calculating the
electrical components of minimum approach distances for phase-to-phase
exposures. As noted in Appendix B to proposed Subpart V, OSHA used the
following equation to determine the phase-to-phase maximum transient
overvoltage based on a system's per-unit nominal voltage phase-to-
ground crest:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.005
Where:
pup = p.u. phase-to-phase maximum transient overvoltage, and
pug = p.u. phase-to-ground maximum transient overvoltage.
The value for pup was to be used for pu in Equation (1) for
calculating the phase-to-phase MADs.
Until approximately 2007, the technical committees responsible for
IEEE Std 516 and the NESC calculated minimum approach distances based
on these equations. Because OSHA was using the same methodology, the
Agency relied on the technical committees' calculations as they
appeared in IEEE Std 516-2003 and the 2002 NESC and proposed to include
those distances in Sec. 1910.269 and subpart V.
During the revision cycle for IEEE Std 516-2009, the IEEE technical
committee responsible for revising that standard identified what, in
the committee's view, was an error in the calculations of phase-to-
phase minimum approach distances for nominal voltages 230 kilovolts and
higher. At these voltages, the saturation factor, a, which appears in
Equation (1), varies depending on the voltage; that is, the value of a
increases with increasing voltage. The NESC subcommittee calculated the
phase-to-phase minimum approach distances for the 1993 NESC using a
value for the saturation factor, a, corresponding to the maximum phase-
to-ground transient overvoltage, rather than the maximum phase-to-phase
transient overvoltage.\224\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\224\ ANSI/IEEE Std 516-1987 did not contain distances for
phase-to-phase exposures. The NESC subcommittee derived them by
applying the IEEE equation, Equation (1), to the phase-to-phase
temporary overvoltages calculated using Equation (2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because, in its proposal, OSHA borrowed the minimum approach
distances from IEEE Std 516-2003 and the 2002 NESC, the Agency twice
solicited comments on whether changes to its rule were necessary in
light of the
errors identified by the IEEE committee (73 FR 62942, 74 FR 46958).
The consensus among rulemaking participants was that the proposed
rule's minimum approach distances for phase-to-phase exposures at
maximum transient overvoltages exceeding approximately 630 kilovolts
involved a mathematical error. (See, for example, Exs. 0521, 0524,
0526.1, 0528, 548.1; Tr2. 122-123, 139.) Draft 9 of the 2009 revision
of IEEE Std 516 derived formulas for the saturation factor, a, using a
curve-fitting program (Ex. 0524). When maximum phase-to-phase transient
overvoltages are less than 630 kilovolts, a is 0.0, and the
mathematical error is not present (id.). For higher maximum transient
overvoltages, a is a function of the peak voltage, which is higher for
phase-to-phase exposures than it is for phase-to-ground exposures (id.)
Because the proposed rule used an approach for calculating phase-
to-phase minimum approach distances that commenters generally agreed
was in error, OSHA decided to make changes in this final rule to
account for that mistake.
To determine the increased risk to employees, OSHA compared the
probability of sparkover for the electrical component of the largest
proposed minimum approach distance with the probability of sparkover
for the electrical component of the corrected minimum approach
distance.\225\ For systems operating at 800 kilovolts, the probability
of sparkover with the maximum phase-to-phase transient overvoltage at
the corrected electrical component of the minimum approach distance is
approximately 1 in 1,000. The probability of sparkover at the proposed
electrical component of the minimum approach distance is 64 in 100.
Clearly, the proposed minimum approach distance poses significant risk
to employees when the phase-to-phase transient overvoltage is at its
maximum. Because, for systems operating at 800 kilovolts, the minimum
approach distance in the existing standard is the same as the distance
in the proposed rule, the existing standard also poses a substantial
risk to employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\225\ The corrected minimum approach distance is the minimum
approach distance calculated with an extrapolated saturation factor
for the maximum phase-to-phase transient overvoltage in place of the
maximum phase-to-ground transient overvoltage. This is the method
used in IEEE Std 516 Draft 9 (Ex. 0524).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA calculated the probabilities of sparkover at the proposed
electrical component of the minimum approach distance and the corrected
minimum approach distance in the following manner. The minimum approach
distance proposed in Table V-2 for this exposure was 7.91 meters, and
the electrical component of this distance was 7.60 meters (7.91 meters
- 0.31 meters). The phase-to-phase maximum transient overvoltage at 800
kilovolts is 2,352 kilovolts.\226\ Draft 9 of the 2009 revision of IEEE
Std 516 derived formulas for the saturation factor, a, using a curve-
fitting program. Equation 59 in that draft standard provided the
following equation for a for maximum transient overvoltages of more
than 1,485 kilovolts:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\226\ Using Equation 2, the phase-to-phase maximum per-unit
transient overvoltage is 2.0 + 1.6, or 3.6, times the peak phase-to-
ground voltage. The peak phase-to-ground voltage is the maximum
system phase-to-phase voltage times [radic]2 divided by [radic]3.
Thus, the maximum transient overvoltage for a phase-to-phase
exposure for a maximum system voltage of 800 kilovolts (the highest
system voltage) is 3.6 x 800 x [radic]2 / [radic]3, or 2,352,
kilovolts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a = (TOV - 1,485) x 0.00000491 + 0.0055704,
where TOV is the maximum transient overvoltage (Ex. 0524).
This equation extrapolates a beyond the 1,600-kilovolt upper limit
on available rod-gap test data. Using this equation to determine a and
using that value in Equation 1, the withstand voltage corresponding to
7.60 meters is 1,966 kilovolts. The critical sparkover voltage for a
7.60-meter gap is 1,966 / 0.85, or 2,312, kilovolts. (See Step 4 in the
explanation of how to use Table 6 to determine the electrical component
of clearance earlier in this section of the preamble.) The probability
of sparkover for this distance at the maximum transient overvoltage of
2,352 kilovolts is 64 percent.\227\ This percentage means that the
electrical component of the proposed minimum approach distance at 800
kilovolts has a probability of 64 percent of sparking over at the
industry-accepted maximum per-unit transient overvoltage of 2.0.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\227\ The probability of sparkover is determined by normalizing
the mean (average) sparkover voltage and the standard deviation and
looking up those two normalized parameters in standard distribution
tables. The critical sparkover voltage (that is, the mean voltage
that will spark over) is 2,312 kilovolts. The standard deviation is
5 percent of this value, or 115.6 kilovolts. The maximum transient
overvoltage corresponding to the industry-accepted value of 2.0 per
unit at 800 kilovolts is 2,352 kilovolts, or 0.346 standard
deviations above the mean voltage at sparkover. The probability of
sparkover can be determined from normal distribution tables for a Z
of 0.346.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There were three basic methods submitted to the record for
calculating minimum approach distances for phase-to-phase exposures.
The first method was the one OSHA used in developing the proposed rule.
As described earlier in this section of the preamble, that method used
Equation (1) and Equation (2) to determine the minimum approach
distance, but without adjusting the saturation factor, a, in Equation
(1) to account for the increase between the phase-to-ground and phase-
to-phase maximum transient overvoltage. For the reasons already
explained, OSHA concludes that this method is invalid and would expose
employees to an unreasonable increase in risk for phase-to-phase
exposures at maximum transient overvoltages higher than 630 kilovolts.
Consequently, the Agency decided against adopting this method in the
final rule.
The second method, adopted by IEEE Std 516-2009, uses equations
based on the paper by Vaisman,\228\ and two papers by Gallet,\229\ to
determine minimum approach distances (Ex. 0532). OSHA refers to this
method as the "IEEE method" in the following discussion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\228\ Vaisman, op cit.
\229\ Gallet, G., Leroy, G., Lacey, R., and Kromer, I.,
"General expression for positive switching impulse strength valid
up to extra line air gaps," IEEE Transaction on Power Apparatus and
Systems, vol. PAS-94, pp. 1989-1993, Nov./Dec. 1975 (Ex. 0560); and
Gallet, G., Hutzler, B., and Riu, J-P., "Analysis of the switching
impulse strength of phase-to-phase air gaps," IEEE Transactions on
Power Delivery, vol. PAS-97, no. 2, Mar./Apr. 1978 (Ex. 0553).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The formula used in IEEE Std 516-2009 for calculating phase-to-
phase minimum approach distances for voltages of 72.6 kilovolts and
higher is derived from testing that replicates line configurations
rather than live-line work. Accordingly, the underlying formula in IEEE
Std 516-2009 originally was intended for determining appropriate
conductor spacing rather than for determining minimum approach
distances appropriate for employees performing live-line work. To
account for the presence of an employee working in an aerial lift
bucket within the air gap between the two phase conductors, the IEEE
committee incorporated the concept of a floating electrode in the air
gap. The committee's approach to determining the electrical component
of the minimum approach distance can be summarized as follows:
1. Start with a formula to calculate the critical sparkover voltage
for the distance between two conductors.
2. Modify the formula to account for a 3.3-meter floating electrode
representing an employee working within an aerial lift bucket between
the phase conductors.
3. Modify the formula to convert the critical sparkover voltage to
a withstand voltage.
4. Determine the maximum transient overvoltage on the line, and
substitute that value for the withstand voltage.
5. Rearrange the equation to solve for distance.
In more technical detail, this approach is described as follows:
1. The equation for calculating the critical sparkover voltage for
a given distance between two conductors includes a gap factor, k. This
factor depends on several variables:
alpha = the proportion of the negative switching impulse voltage to the
total phase-to-phase impulse voltage,
Ddesign L-L = the design phase-to-phase clearance, and
H = the average height of the phase above the ground.
Table 8 shows the values recommended by IEEE Std 516-2009 for these
variables and the resultant gap factors.
Table 8--IEEE Std 516-2009 Gap Factors (k)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-phase voltage alpha Ddesign L-L/H k
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<= 242 kV........................................... 0.33 0.8 1.451
> 242 kV............................................ 0.41 0.8 1.530
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IEEE Std 516-2009 uses the following equation to calculate the
critical sparkover voltage for the designed gap between two phase
conductors:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.006
Where:
V50 = the critical sparkover voltage in kilovolts,
k = the gap factor from Table 8, and
Dl-l = the sparkover distance in meters.
2. When an employee performs live-line barehand work, the employee
typically is positioned between two or more phase conductors. The
employee could be working, for example, from an aerial lift platform or
a conductor cart. These devices and the worker are both conductive. The
presence of a conductive object in the air gap between the two
electrodes (which, in this case, are the two conductors) reduces its
dielectric strength. IEEE Std 516-2009 introduces a constant,
KF, to account for the presence of the employee and other
conductive objects in the air gap. In that consensus standard,
KF equals 0.9 to accommodate a 3.3-meter conductive object
in the air gap. This value is equivalent to a 10-percent reduction in
the dielectric strength of the gap.
With this factor included, the equation for the critical sparkover
voltage is:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.007
3. IEEE sets the withstand voltage at a level that is 3[sigma]
lower than the critical sparkover voltage, as indicated in the
following equation:
VW = (1-3[sigma])V50
Where:
VW = the withstand voltage,
V50 = the critical sparkover voltage, and
[sigma] = 5 percent for a normal distribution.
4. To solve for the electrical component of the clearance, the
maximum transient overvoltage is substituted for the withstand voltage.
The IEEE committee used the following equation to calculate the maximum
transient overvoltage on the line:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.047
Where:
TL-L = the phase-to-phase maximum transient overvoltage in per unit,
and
TL-G = the phase-to-ground maximum transient overvoltage in per
unit.
5. Substituting the values of the various constants and solving
these equations for distance, IEEE Std 516-2009 uses the following
equations to calculate the minimum air-insulation distance:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.008
Where:
DL-L = the minimum air-insulation distance (the minimum distance
needed to prevent sparkover with air alone as the insulating
medium),
TL-G = the phase-to-ground maximum transient overvoltage in per
unit, and
VL-L = the rms phase-to-phase system voltage.
Testifying on behalf of EEI, Dr. Horton explained the IEEE method
as follows:It is well recognized that the dielectric strength of a
given electrode geometry is different for line-to-ground surges than
for line-to-line surges. A phase-to-phase surge between two phases is
the voltage difference between the phase-to-ground surges which may be
of opposite polarity and displaced in time, (and many times are)
whereas a maximum phase-to-ground surge is considered uni-polar.
* * * * *
[The surges from the two phases] are displaced by some amount of
time. . . .
The resulting line-to-line surge . . . will stress a given air
gap geometry differently than either of the line-to-ground surges
that the resulting waveform is comprised of. Unlike line-to-ground
insulation characteristics of a given electrode geometry, which
depend primarily on the gap spacing, line-to-line insulation
characteristics . . . are more complex because one of the surges has
a positive polarity with respect to ground while the other has a
negative polarity with respect to ground.
The resulting insulation strength is a function of alpha, which
again, is the ratio of the negative surge to the sum of the negative
and positive surge.
The IEEE recently tried to address this limitation [in IEEE Std
516-2009] by developing a method based on a modified version of the
Gallet equation. The upper voltage limit of the resulting equation
is 3500 kV peak or air gap distances of up to 15 meters. This
limitation is well within the typical range of live-line working
scenarios in the United States.
Historically, IEEE Standard 516 has used rod-to-rod electrode
geometry data for determining line-to-ground MAID. One reason for
this is that the test data that the method is based on represents a
rod-to-rod electrode configuration.
In addition, the line-to ground [testing] that was performed
showed that the rod-to-rod results were in the middle range for a
wide range of conductor configurations. The rod-to-rod data
presented neither the worst case nor the best. Thus, it was chosen
as a reasonable representation of all the possible gap
configurations to which a line worker might be exposed while
performing tasks, which are characterized as line-to-ground.
When considering line-to-line minimum air insulation distances,
a rod-to-rod gap may not be the most appropriate. Typically, the
worker will bond onto one phase and will not need to bridge the gap
to the other phase. Since the shape of the adjacent electrode
remains unchanged during the task, (in other words it remains a
conductor) the resulting air gap geometry more closely resembles
that of a conductor-to-conductor. The effect of the change in
geometry of the phase to which the worker is bonded is dealt with in
the new IEEE method by introducing an additional factor that
accounts for the effect of large conductive objects floating in the
air gap. [Tr2. 83-86]
No rulemaking participant recommended that OSHA adopt the IEEE
method for calculating minimum air-insulation distances for phase-to-
phase exposures at more than 72.5 kilovolts. In addition, the Agency
has several concerns with the approach taken in that consensus
standard. First, the IEEE method relies on test data for an electrode
configuration that is not comparable to the rod-to-rod gap used for
phase-to-ground exposures on which OSHA based the minimum approach
distances in existing Sec. 1910.269. Second, the choices for some of
the parameters used in the equations for the electrical component of
the minimum approach distance appear to be arbitrary. Third, the IEEE
method is based on papers that explore the dielectric strength of
electric power lines rather than the dielectric strength of circuit
parts configured as they would be when employees are performing live-
line barehand work.
(1) Conductor-to-conductor-based method does not accurately model
employee exposure. OSHA considered the evidence in the record and
concludes that the IEEE method, which is based on testing on conductor-
to-conductor electrodes, does not accurately model employee exposure.
As noted by Dr. Horton, the approach taken by existing Sec. 1910.269
and earlier editions of IEEE Std 516 based the calculation of minimum
air-insulation distances for both phase-to-ground and phase-to-phase
exposures on phase-to-ground testing of rod-to-rod electrodes (Tr2.
85).\230\ By adopting the approach taken in IEEE Std 516-1987 in
promulgating existing Sec. 1910.269, OSHA deemed it reasonable to rely
on rod-to-rod gap data (59 FR 4383-4384). The record in this rulemaking
contains reports of tests on a variety of electrode configurations,
showing clearly that the dielectric strength of air varies with the
configuration (269-Ex. 60; Exs. 0553, 0554). In reviewing the record,
OSHA has again concluded that phase-to-ground rod-to-rod gap test data
forms a reasonable basis for the determination of minimum approach
distances because it falls in the middle range of various electrode
configurations (that is, it is neither the best case nor the worst). In
addition, OSHA believes that employees performing work on energized
lines are rarely exposed to the worst-case configuration, rod-to-plane
electrodes, or to the best-case configuration, sphere-to-sphere
electrodes. Thus, an exposure representing the middle range of various
electrode configurations is reasonable for a model based on phase-to-
ground testing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\230\ Typical configurations include rod-rod, rod-plane, and
conductor-plane. The terminology refers to the configuration of the
two electrodes. For example, in a rod-plane configuration, one of
the electrodes is a rod perpendicular to an electrode in the shape
of a plane.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A paper by Gallet \231\ reports on a variety of phase-to-phase gap
factors, including supported busbars and asymmetrical geometries, as
shown in the following table (Ex. 0553):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\231\ Gallet, G, Hutzler, B., and Riu, J-P., op cit.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electrode geometry alpha = 0.5 alpha = 0.33
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rings or large, smooth 1.80 1.70
electrodes.....................
Crossed conductors.............. 1.65 1.53
Rod-rod or conductor-conductor.. 1.62 1.52
Supported busbars............... 1.50 1.40
Asymmetrical geometries......... 1.45 1.36
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table reprinted with permission from the Institute for Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE). OSHA revised the table from IEEE's
original.
Although the performance during phase-to-phase tests are the same
for rod-to-rod and conductor-to-conductor electrodes, OSHA concludes
that phase-to-phase exposures are more likely to correspond to
asymmetrical geometries, which, as can be seen from the table in the
Gallet paper, have a lower dielectric strength than rod-to-rod or
conductor-
to-conductor electrodes.\232\ Employees performing live-line barehand
work face a wide variety of exposure conditions reflecting a number of
different electrode configurations. Several of these electrode
configurations are not equivalent to conductor-to-conductor electrodes.
Employees working on energized supported busbars could experience
phase-to-phase exposures. Additionally, during live-line barehand work
on energized conductors, employees are working on the conductors, and
the installation may be configured differently when maintained or
installed. For example, a damaged portion of a bundled conductor may
protrude from the bundle, or an employee may be holding an armor rod
perpendicular to the conductor. The equipment used to position the
employee also can affect the shape of one of the electrodes. The Agency
believes that these examples may more closely resemble asymmetrical
geometries. Consequently, the gap factor for those electrode
configurations, as shown in the table, would be lower than the gap
factor used in IEEE Std 516-2009. The IEEE standard reduced the gap
factor by accounting for a conductive object in the gap. However, the
Agency believes that such a reduction also would be necessary when
another conductive object is in the air gap while an employee is
working on an energized conductor, which could occur as equipment is
transferred to the employee or if a second worker is in the air gap.
Thus, OSHA concludes that a model based on phase-to-phase testing
should be based on asymmetrical electrode geometries and that the IEEE
committee's choice of a conductor-to-conductor gap is not appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\232\ Dielectric strength is proportional to the gap factor.
Thus, a smaller gap factor yields a lower dielectric strength.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) The values of some of the parameters used in the IEEE method
appear to be arbitrary. The ratio of the negative switching impulse
voltage to the total phase-to-phase impulse voltage is designated as
alpha. Dr. Horton described this parameter, and its importance, as
follows:
A phase-to-phase surge between two phases is the voltage
difference between the phase-to-ground surges which may be of
opposite polarity and displaced in time, (and many times are)
whereas a maximum phase-to-ground surge is considered uni-polar.
[Figure 5] shows how two separate phase-to-ground surges combine
to form a line-to-line surge. . . .
[W]e have one [transient] for phase 1 and we have . . . one for
phase 2, and . . . they are displaced by some amount of time. The
resulting transient overvoltage or surge that would be across the
air gap, which would be the line-to-line air gap, would be . . . a
combination of the [two] curve[s]. [Tr2. 83-84]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.009
The IEEE committee used an alpha of 0.33 for system voltages up to
242 kilovolts. However, the committee used a value of 0.41 for higher
system voltages. It described the rationale for this latter decision
with a quote from the Vaisman paper:
\233\ Figure 5, which is a copy of Figure 4 from Ex. 0545.1, was
included in the presentation by Dr. Horton at the October 28, 2009,
public hearing. (See, also, Ex. 0567.) EEI identified the source of
this figure as EPRI Transmission Line Reference Book: 115-345-kV
Compact Line Design, 2007 (Blue Book).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In [extra-high voltage] systems, where there is efficient
overvoltage control and hence the overvoltage factor a tends to lie
in the range of 0.41 to 0.50, the ratio between the line-to-line
(D1) and the line-to-ground (D) clearance equal to 2.0 is the one
which provides a more balanced distribution of flashovers between
the two gaps. [Ex. 0532]
OSHA has two concerns about this choice. First, the paper does not
indicate that an alpha of 0.41 is the smallest expected for these
systems. A smaller value of alpha will produce a smaller value for the
gap factor, k, and, consequently, a larger electrical component of the
minimum approach distance.\234\ Second, it is not clear why efficient
overvoltage control has any effect on alpha. Overvoltage control limits
the maximum transient overvoltage on each individual phase, but it does
not necessarily limit the delay between the peak transient overvoltage
on each phase, which appears as [Delta]Tcr in Figure 5. The
Vaisman paper also explored the effect of [Delta]Tcr, which
is not accounted for in the IEEE method:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\234\ In the IEEE method, the critical sparkover voltage,
V50, is directly proportional to k, and the minimum air-
insulation distance (the electrical component of the minimum
approach distance) is inversely proportional to V50.
Thus, the electrical component of the minimum approach distance is
inversely proportional to k.
In other tests, where only the negative wave was displaced, the
observed reductions were:
Table 2--Reduction in [V50] When Displacing the Negative Wave
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[alpha] Desired [alpha] Obtained [Delta]Tcr (ms) Reduction (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.33................................................ 0.28 1 1.5
0.50................................................ 0.43 1 3.1
0.33................................................ 0.22 2 4.0
0.50................................................ 0.36 2 8.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevertheless, under these conditions, besides the shift between
impulses, there was also a decrease of [alpha].
From all the results a maximum reduction of 8.7% in the value of
U50 can be observed when the positive and negative components of
phase-to-phase overvoltage are not synchronized [Ex. 0555].
From Figure 5, it is clear that the maximum overvoltage occurs when
the positive and negative transient waves are synchronized, that is,
when [Delta]Tcr = 0. In addition, it is clear from the BPA
report that the poles of a circuit breaker do not trip simultaneously
(Ex. 0575.1). In addition, circuit characteristics also may contribute
to the size of [Delta]Tcr. The [Delta]Tcr range
shown in the Vaisman paper does not seem unreasonable. Thus, from this
paper, on which the IEEE committee relied, it appears that the maximum
phase-to-phase transient overvoltage should be calculated, as shown by
Table 2 in the Vaisman paper, by using an alpha of 0.50 and reducing
the critical sparkover voltage by 8.7 percent. In this case, the peak
overvoltage on each phase has the same value, which seems reasonable if
the phases are identical in most respects, but displaced by 2
milliseconds, which, based on the BPA report, also seems reasonable.
(3) The IEEE method is based on papers on the design of lines
rather than employee safety during maintenance. Finally, OSHA has a
concern that the IEEE method is based almost exclusively on papers that
explore the dielectric strength of lines. Employees perform work on
energized lines and equipment. In addition, the lines on which
employees work during maintenance and repair may not be in the same
condition as the lines were when they were first installed. The Agency
believes that it is appropriate to base minimum approach distances for
workers on papers and scientific data derived from actual working
conditions.
The Agency agrees with Dr. Horton and EEI that phase-to-phase
overvoltages are more complicated than phase-to-ground overvoltages.
However, the Gallet formula on which the IEEE method is based models
phase-to-ground, as well as phase-to-phase, critical sparkover
voltages. In addition, the IEEE committee chose not to use it for
phase-to-ground exposures, presumably because the papers supporting the
method for phase-to-ground exposures examined the safety of employees
performing live-line maintenance.\235\ OSHA believes that these papers
support the method used in the final rule to calculate minimum approach
distances for phase-to-phase exposures, as well as phase-to-ground
exposures. Therefore, for all the foregoing reasons, OSHA concludes
that the IEEE approach does not reasonably represent the range of
overvoltages or the dielectric strength of air gaps that a worker will
encounter during phase-to-phase exposures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\235\ IEEE Std 516-2009 listed three papers that supported the
method used for phase-to-ground exposures:
Elek, A., and Simpson, J. W., "Safe clearance and protection
against shocks during live-line work," AIEE Transaction on Power
Apparatus and Systems, vol. 80, pt. III, pp. 897-902, Feb. 1962.
IEEE Committee Report, "Live-line maintenance methods," IEEE
Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol. PAS-92, pp. 1642-
1648, Sept./Oct. 1973.
IEEE Committee Report, "Recommendations for safety in live-line
maintenance," IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems,
vol. PAS-87, no. 2, pp. 346-352, Feb. 1968.
All three of these papers examined minimum approach distances
for live-line work (Ex. 0532).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The third method, described in Drafts 9 and 10 of IEEE Std 516 and
incorporated in this final rule, uses Equation (3) \236\ to determine
the maximum per-unit transient overvoltage, calculates the saturation
factor, a, based on the maximum phase-to-phase transient overvoltage,
and uses Equation (1) \237\ to determine the minimum approach distance
(Exs. 0524, 0525). The calculation of the saturation factor uses a
curve-fitted equation, which extrapolated the value for that factor
beyond the 1,600-kilovolt limitation on the test data noted earlier.
OSHA refers to this method as the "extrapolation method" in the
following discussion. In comments responding to the 2008 reopening
notice, Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI supported the adoption of this method
because it corrects the calculation error present in the 2003 edition
of IEEE Std 516 (Ex. 0521).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\236\ TL-L = 1.35TL-G + 0.45. OSHA is
adopting this equation in Table V-2. Drafts 9 and 10 of IEEE Std 516
and final IEEE Std 516 adopt this equation for calculating the
phase-to-phase maximum per-unit transient overvoltage (Exs. 0524,
0525, and 0532), and there is no evidence in the record to indicate
that it does not accurately represent the phase-to-phase maximum
per-unit transient overvoltage.
\237\ D = (C + a) x pu x Vmax.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other rulemaking participants objected to the extrapolation of the
saturation factor. (See, for example, Exs. 0545.1, 0548.1; Tr2. 77-79.)
These rulemaking participants maintained that there was no test data to
support extrapolating this factor and argued that other methods of
estimating the dielectric strength of air demonstrated that
extrapolating the saturation factor would result in minimum approach
distances that are "dangerously inaccurate" (Ex. 0548.1). The
Southern Company explained its objections as follows:
[T]here are at least two methods of estimating the dielectric
strength of air gaps that show that extrapolating the saturation
factor, "a", beyond the test data [reference omitted] for which it
was based is not valid. A comparison of the MAID values computed
using the [extrapolation] formula and those of Gallet and CRIEPI
[238] [references omitted] show that extrapolating test
points beyond the 1650 kV range is dangerously inaccurate. [Id.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\238\ Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry.
The Southern Company described how it "manipulated" the formulas and
plotted the results, comparing the extrapolation method with the other
two methods (the Gallet and CRIEPI formulas), as shown in Figure 6.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.010
Southern Company included a second figure (not shown here) consisting
of the area beyond 1,600 kilovolts, where test data is unavailable to
support either Equation (1) or the determination of the saturation
factor, a. The commenter concluded:
[These figures] show that three methods agree rather closely for
transient overvoltages less than 1600 kV (the limitation of the
[Drafts 9 and 10] IEEE method). However, at approximately 1800 kV,
the results found using the Gallet and CRIEPI formulas diverge
significantly from the [extrapolation] method. The reason for this
is primarily due to the fact that the Gallet and CRIEPI formulae are
based on test data in this voltage range, whereas, the
[extrapolation] formula is not. [Id.]
OSHA notes that there is a similar divergence between these
formulas at voltages from 600 to 750 kilovolts. The following table
shows minimum air-insulation distances for two voltages \239\ using the
Equation (1) extrapolation method and Southern Company's modified
Gallet formula:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\239\ OSHA chose 592.8 and 2,149 kilovolts (which correspond to
systems of 161 kilovolts at 3.0 per-unit maximum transient
overvoltage and 800 kilovolts at 2.1 per-unit maximum transient
overvoltage) because these values generally represent the low and
high end of the voltage range covered by Figure 6. In addition,
there is rod-gap test data supporting the current method at 592.8
kilovolts, but not at 2,149 kilovolts.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Equation (1) based on
Voltage extrapolation method \1\ Modified gallet formula Percent difference
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
592.8 kV.......................... 1.28 meters................ 1.50 meters................ 17
2149.0 kV......................... 9.23 meters................ 10.68 meters............... 16
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Based on IEEE Standard 516 Draft 9 (Ex. 0524).
This table shows a substantial difference between the Southern
Company's modified Gallet formula and the extrapolation method at
voltages where test data exist. Southern Company's modified Gallet
formula produces minimum approach distances that are much higher at
voltage levels where test data exist than they are where test data do
not exist. Because the modified Gallet formula does not accurately
produce minimum approach distances where test data exists, there is no
reason to believe that it will accurately calculate minimum approach
distances where there is no test data. Therefore, OSHA concludes that
it cannot rely on the Southern Company's analysis to show that the
extrapolation method does not provide adequate employee
protection.\240\ The results of this comparison are not surprising. The
curves representing these formulas have slightly different shapes. In
comparison to Equation (1), in which the saturation factor increases
nearly linearly before and after extrapolation, the Gallet formula
results in a small increase in the saturation factor at lower voltages,
but a large increase at higher voltages. Thus, despite the similarity
in appearance between the two equations, OSHA concludes that, compared
to the extrapolation method, the modified Gallet formula does not
equally represent the strength of the air gap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\240\ The Agency did not compare the modified CRIEPI formula as
there is no evidence in the record to suggest that OSHA base the
final rule on that formula.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further exploration of the modified Gallet and CRIEPI formulas
sheds additional light on this issue. The Gallet formula uses a gap
factor as one parameter. Southern Company used a gap factor of 1.3 in
its comparison. Although the comment stated that Southern Company based
the gap factor on rod-to-rod electrode configurations,
there is no record support for this value. The lowest value for the gap
factor provided in the Gallet paper was 1.36 (Ex. 0553). Had Southern
Company used a gap factor of 1.33 instead,\241\ the differences between
the equations would be generally smaller, and the high-voltage
"difference" noted by Southern Company would not be apparent until
approximately 2,100 kilovolts. At system voltages higher than 242
kilovolts, IEEE Std 516-2009 uses a gap factor equivalent to 1.377,
which results in smaller rather than larger minimum air-insulation
distances at voltages between approximately 800 and 2,200 kilovolts
(Ex. 0532). Therefore, the Agency is rejecting Southern Company's
argument that the modified Gallet and CREIPI formulas show that the
extrapolation method is not sufficiently protective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\241\ With no record support for a gap factor of 1.3, it appears
that Southern Company chose the gap factor arbitrarily. In this
example, OSHA has chosen an equally arbitrary gap factor simply to
show how the curves can be manipulated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The concern about the lack of test data appears to be unfounded, at
least for the range of overvoltages addressed by the final rule. The
largest overvoltage addressed by the final rule is approximately 2,500
kilovolts, which corresponds to an 800-kilovolt system with a phase-to-
ground maximum per-unit transient overvoltage of 2.5 pu. The test data
for rod-to-rod gaps extends to 1,600 kilovolts. Thus, the data cover
about two thirds of the voltage range covered by the final rule, and
the test data provide substantial support for maximum transient
overvoltages of 1,600 kilovolts (which corresponds to an 800-kilovolt
system with a 1.5 per-unit maximum transient overvoltage) regardless of
whether the exposure is phase-to-phase or phase-to-ground. In addition,
the saturation factor varies almost linearly with voltage, as can be
seen from the table and graphs of voltage vs. saturation factor in the
IEEE reports on which Equation (1) is based (Exs. 0556, 0558). Figure 7
reproduces the relevant graphs in those papers.\242\ Thus, an
extrapolation of the saturation factor likely will produce reasonable
results.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\242\ This graph is Figure 1 in Ex. 0556 and Figure 2 in Ex.
0558.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.011
BILLING CODE 4510-26-C
In addition, as noted earlier, the Gallet and CRIEPI formulas, the
other two formulas described by Southern Company for determining
sparkover voltages, have a similar shape. (See Figure 6.) The
extrapolation method might not be as conservative at the highest
voltages as the Gallet and CRIEPI formulas. However, because the
modified Gallet and CREIPI formulas rely on a gap factor that is
unsupported on the record, and because the gap factor adopted in IEEE
Std 516-2009 yields minimum approach distances that are less
conservative than the extrapolation method, the Agency believes that
the extrapolation method will provide adequate protection for workers.
For these reasons, OSHA concludes that it is reasonable to extrapolate
the test data to determine minimum approach distances. Consequently,
the final rule adopts the extrapolation method of determining minimum
approach distances by providing equations for calculating the
saturation factor, a, as described in the following paragraphs.
Drafts 9 and 10 of the 2009 revision of IEEE Std 516, as well as
the approved edition of that standard, provided linear equations for
the saturation factor. These equations varied depending on the voltage
range (Exs. 0524, 0525, 0532). IEEE Std 516-2009 limits the
equation for the highest range to transient overvoltages of 1,600
kilovolts (Ex. 0532).\243\ Drafts 9 and 10 of the 2009 revision of that
IEEE standard extrapolated the saturation factor by applying the
equation for the highest voltage range without limit (Exs. 0524, 0525).
OSHA notes that Drafts 9 and 10 of IEEE Std 516 used slightly different
equations for the calculation of the saturation factor than does IEEE
Std 516-2009 (Exs. 0524, 0525, 0532). The Agency compared the results
of the two sets of equations with the data from the original IEEE
reports on which Equation (1) is based and determined that the
equations from IEEE Std 516-2009 fit the data precisely. However, IEEE
Std 516-2009 notes:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\243\ It should be noted that, despite the 1,600-kilovolt
limitation, IEEE Std 516-2009 apparently applies this equation to
1,633 kilovolts (the maximum transient overvoltage on an 800-
kilovolt system with a 2.5 per-unit maximum transient overvoltage)
in the minimum approach distance tables in Appendix D of that
standard.
[T]here is a different value of the "a" [saturation] factor
for same voltage used to calculate MAID and MTID. To avoid having
values of the "a" factors for MAID and MTID, the working group
decided to use only the MTID "a" factor since it matches the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
values of the "a" factor shown on the figure. [Ex. 0532]
Thus, the IEEE standard bases the saturation factor on the withstand
voltages with tools in the gap. OSHA believes that this approach is
appropriate for phase-to-ground exposures. However, for phase-to-phase
exposures, which almost never involve tools across the gap, the Agency
believes that this approach is unnecessarily conservative. Draft 9 of
the IEEE standard uses equations for the saturation factor based on
test data for air gaps without tools. Therefore, the final rule bases
the saturation factor on: (1) The equations from IEEE Std 516-2009 for
phase-to-ground exposures and (2) the equations in Draft 9 of that
standard for phase-to-phase exposures. Therefore, Table V-2 applies the
equations for the saturation factor, a, from IEEE Std 516-2009 to
phase-to-ground exposures, while using the equations for this factor
from Draft 9 of that standard for phase-to-phase exposures. To
extrapolate the saturation factor to the highest voltage addressed by
the final rule, OSHA is extending the application limit of Equation 59
from IEEE Std 516-2009. The Agency based these equations on the
assumption that no insulated tool or large conductive object are in the
gap. Note 3 to Table V-2 indicates that, if an insulated tool spans the
gap or if a large conductive object is in the gap, employers are to use
the equations for phase-to-ground exposures (with VPeak for phase-to-
phase exposures).
Circuits operating at 362.1 to 420 kilovolts. In the 2009 reopening
notice, OSHA noted that IEEE Std 516-2009 included an additional
voltage range, 362.1 to 420 kilovolts, in its minimum approach distance
tables; this range did not appear in OSHA's proposed rule (74 FR
46962). The Agency requested comments on whether it should add this
voltage range to the minimum approach tables in the final rule.
Rulemaking participants recommended adding this voltage range to the
OSHA standard, though no electric utilities responding to the issue
operated any system in this voltage range. (See, for example, Exs.
0545.1, 0548.1, 0551.1; Tr2. 93, 159.) Dr. Randy Horton, testifying on
behalf of EEI, stated:
OSHA should include these voltage ranges in the final [r]ule in
order to provide complete guidance to the industry. However, there
are not many lines that operate at these voltages within the
American electric utility industry. [Tr2. 93]
Although it appears that there are few, if any, electric power
transmission systems in the United States operating at 362.1 to 420
kilovolts, OSHA is including this voltage range in the final standard.
Otherwise, an employer with a system operating in this voltage range
would have to set minimum approach distances based on a maximum system
voltage of 550 kilovolts, the highest voltage in the next higher
voltage range listed in Table V-6. Even if systems operating in the
362.1- to 420-kilovolt range are extremely rare, OSHA is not requiring
employers to adhere to minimum approach distances that are
substantially higher than necessary to protect employees doing work at
those voltages. Therefore, OSHA decided to include the 362.1- to 420-
kilovolt range in Table V-6 in the final rule, which specifies
alternative minimum approach distances for worksites at an elevation of
900 meters or less. Employers not using that table can establish
minimum approach distances for any particular voltage, including
voltages in the 362.1- to 420-kilovolt range, using the equations in
Table V-2 for the maximum voltage on the particular circuit involved.
The electrical component of MAD--DC exposures. OSHA proposed
minimum approach distances for dc circuits in Table V-5. OSHA received
no comments on these minimum approach distances and, therefore, is
adopting them in Table V-7 of the final rule as proposed.
OSHA's requirements on minimum approach distances better effectuate
the purpose of the OSH Act than the national consensus standard.
Whenever a final rule differs substantially from an existing national
consensus standard, Section 6(b)(8) of the OSH Act requires OSHA to
publish a statement of reasons in the Federal Register explaining why
the final rule will better effectuate the purposes of the Act than the
national consensus standard. This final rule contains requirements for
minimum approach distances that differ substantially from those in the
2012 NESC, which the Agency determined is the current, relevant
national consensus standard.
Paragraph (g) of Sec. 1910.2 defines "national consensus
standard". There are currently two existing consensus standards
addressing minimum approach distances for electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work: ANSI/IEEE C2-2012 and IEEE Std
516-2009. The 2012 NESC, which also is an IEEE standard, was approved
as an ANSI standard on June 3, 2011.\244\ IEEE Std 516-2009 is not
currently an ANSI standard, although the 2003 edition was an ANSI
standard.\245\ Many States adopt the NESC (Tr2. 151).\246\ Mr. Charles
Kelly of EEI called the NESC "the preeminent National Consensus
Standard on clearance distances for electric utility work on high
voltage lines and equipment" (Tr2. 73). Mr. James Tomaseski,
testifying on behalf of the NESC, called that document "the authority
on safety requirements for power . . . systems" (Tr2. 35). In
contrast, rulemaking participants characterized IEEE Std 516 as "an
engineering document" containing engineering principles and guidelines
(Tr2. 56; see also, for example, Tr2. 59, 74, 129-130, 174). However,
the NESC takes those engineering principles and produces work rules,
taking into account the practical effects of the requirements. (See,
for example, Tr2. 57, 73, 175-176.) OSHA, therefore, concludes that the
2012 NESC is the existing national consensus standard for the purposes
of Section 6(b)(8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\244\ IEEE is the secretariat of the National Electrical Safety
Code, which IEEE adopted and which ANSI approved subsequently as a
standard. The official designation of the current version of the
National Electrical Safety Code is ANSI/IEEE C2-2012. Standards
approved as ANSI standards are American National Standards. In
addition, the ANSI approval process ensures that procedures used to
adopt standards conform to the procedures described in the
definition of "national consensus standard" in 29 CFR 1910.2(g).
See, for example, OSHA's adoption of national consensus standards
and established Federal standards under Section 6(a) of the OSH Act
(36 FR 10466, May 29, 1971).
\245\ IEEE standards frequently undergo the ANSI approval
process. After becoming an approved American National Standard, an
IEEE standard shares a joint ANSI/IEEE designation.
\246\ According to a survey conducted by IEEE, over 20 States
adopted the 2007 edition of the NESC, and several other States
adopted other editions of the NESC
(http://standards.ieee.org/about/nesc/pucsurvey2007.pdf*).
The States generally enforce public safety
provisions of the NESC through public utility commissions. OSHA is
not aware of any States that adopted the updated consensus standard
since its most recent publication. OSHA anticipates that States will
adopt this edition of the NESC when they update their regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2012 NESC sets its basic ac minimum approach distances in Table
441-1. This table divides minimum approach distances into two sets of
distances: one for voltages up to 72.5 kilovolts and the other for
voltages of 72.6 to 800 kilovolts. The minimum approach distances
applying to voltages of 72.5 kilovolts and less are the same for work
with and without tools between the employee and the energized part. The
minimum approach distances applying to voltages of 72.6 to 800
kilovolts vary depending on whether a tool spans the distance between
the employee and the energized part. The distances in Table 441-1 are
identical to the minimum approach distances in IEEE Std 516-2009 for
industry-accepted values of maximum transient overvoltage, and the NESC
limits the application of Table 441-1 to situations in which IEEE Std
516-2009 declares that industry-accepted values of maximum transient
overvoltage are valid, as described earlier in this section of the
preamble.
Table 441-1 in the 2012 NESC does not specify distances for phase-
to-phase exposures with tools or large conductive objects between the
employee and the energized part. In addition, the table applies only to
worksites at an elevation below 900 meters (3,000 feet). For higher
elevations, the 2012 NESC requires the employer to calculate minimum
approach distances using a formula equivalent to that in IEEE Std 516-
2009.
The 2012 NESC requires the employer to make an engineering analysis
to determine the minimum approach distance in two situations: (1) If
the employer uses phase-to-phase live line tools between the employee
and the energized part (Table 441-1, Note 8), and (2) if the employer
chooses to use an engineering analysis in lieu of using Table 441-1
(Rule 441A1). A note in the 2012 NESC reads: "IEEE Std 516-2009
contains information that may be used to perform an engineering
analysis to determine minimum approach distances."
The 2012 NESC bases its minimum approach distances on IEEE Std 516-
2009; and, as explained previously, the Agency concluded that the
minimum approach distances in IEEE Std 516-2009 expose employees to
additional risk of injury for various exposures. The IEEE standard sets
minimum approach distances for exposures at voltages of 72.5 kilovolts
and less that do not take account of tools or conductive objects in the
air gap. Consequently, OSHA determined that, for these voltages, the
IEEE method for calculating minimum approach distances, on which the
2012 NESC bases its minimum approach distances, does not protect
employees as well as the method for calculating minimum approach
distances specified in the final rule. The final rule ensures adequate
employee protection, even when tools or conductive objects are present
in the air gap. In addition, for phase-to-phase exposures at voltages
of more than 72.5 kilovolts, the Agency found that the method for
calculating minimum approach distances in IEEE Std 516-2009, on which
the 2012 NESC bases its minimum approach distances, does not use gap
factors that adequately represent the full range of employee exposures.
Furthermore, the 2012 NESC permits employers to use the industry-
accepted values for the maximum per-unit transient overvoltage without
ensuring that the maximum transient overvoltages at the worksite cannot
exceed those values. Although the 2012 NESC limits the use of the
industry-accepted values in some situations, the limitation does not
appear to apply to circuits such as the BPA circuit that exhibited
higher maximum per-unit transient overvoltages. Thus, OSHA concludes
that the 2012 NESC is not as effective as the final rule in protecting
employees against high maximum transient overvoltages. Because the
minimum approach distances contained in the final rule will better
protect employees than the distances specified in the NESC, the Agency
also concludes that the final rule will better effectuate the purposes
of the OSH Act than the NESC. Therefore, the Agency concludes that the
minimum approach distances required by the final rule, which account
for actual workplace conditions, will better protect employees than the
IEEE distances for these exposures.
Impacts of changes in minimum approach distances. The final rule
at Sec. 1926.950(d)(2), as well as Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(ii) and
Table V-2, requires employers to determine the maximum per-unit
transient overvoltage for the systems on which employees will be
working. Existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(3) already contains a comparable
provision, requiring employers to determine existing conditions
related to the safety of the work to be performed, including maximum
switching transient voltages.
The maximum per-unit transient overvoltages addressed by the
existing standard are the industry-accepted values of 3.0 for voltages
up to 362 kilovolts, 2.4 for 552 kilovolts, and 2.0 for 800 kilovolts.
OSHA believes that, under the existing rule, most employers simply
assume these maximum per-unit transient overvoltages and set minimum
approach distances accordingly. As explained earlier, this final rule
raises the highest maximum transient overvoltages to 3.5 for up to 420
kilovolts, 3.0 for 550 kilovolts, and 2.5 for 800 kilovolts. OSHA
believes that some systems will accommodate the larger minimum approach
distances that will result from using these new, default values. Not
all systems will accommodate such changes, however. (See, for example,
Exs. 0573.1, 0575.1, 0577.1.) For phase-to-ground exposures, the
minimum approach distance could be as much as 2.35 meters (7.67 feet)
greater under the final rule than under Table R-6 in existing Sec.
1910.269. The existing minimum approach distance is 4.53 meters (14.9
feet) for phase-to-ground exposures on an 800-kilovolt system. The
final rule sets 6.88 meters (22.57 feet) as the largest minimum
approach distance for this voltage. (This increase is due to the use of
minimum tool distances, as well as the higher default maximum per-unit
transient overvoltage.) Consequently, OSHA believes that employers with
installations that will not accommodate these larger minimum approach
distances will either determine through engineering analysis or
establish through the use of portable protective gaps \247\ precise
maximum per-unit transient overvoltages on these installations so that
the installations will accommodate the required minimum approach
distances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\247\ A portable protective gap is a device installed on a phase
conductor to provide a known withstand voltage. The gap is designed
to spark over at a low enough transient overvoltage to prevent
sparkover at the (reduced) electrical component of the minimum
approach distance at the work location (Ex. 0532).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the systems that exhibit transient overvoltages that will not
accommodate the resultant minimum approach distances, OSHA concludes
that it is feasible for employers to either control the maximum
transient overvoltages, through the implementation of such measures as
portable protective gaps, circuit alterations, or operational controls
(including blocking reclosing and restricting circuit switching), or
deenergize the circuit to perform the work. (See, for example, Exs.
0532, 0548.1; Tr2. 114-115.)
The final economic analysis, in Section VI, Final Economic Analysis
and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in this preamble, assumes
that electric utilities with circuits operating at 230 kilovolts or
more (including all circuits in the 169.1- to 242.0-kilovolt voltage
range \248\) will be affected by increases in minimum approach
distances at those voltages. Therefore, the Agency estimates that 10
percent of the circuits operating at 230 kilovolts or more will require
additional measures, such as installing portable protective gaps, that
permit employers to adopt minimum approach distances that their
circuits can accommodate.\249\ However, OSHA is not including any costs
for retrofitting or redesigning circuits or equipment for this purpose.
The Agency believes that such measures will be rare and undertaken only
when they are less costly than the alternatives or when necessitated
for reasons unrelated to requirements in the final rule. OSHA did not
include cost estimates for taking outages because the Agency concludes
that only rarely will other, less costly, measures be impractical.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\248\ As seen from Table R-6 in existing Sec. 1910.269 and
Table V-1 in existing Sec. 1926.950, existing electric power
circuits operate at 161 to 169 kilovolts and at 230 to 242
kilovolts. OSHA broadened the ranges in the corresponding tables in
the final rule in the unlikely event that electric utilities design
and install circuits operating at voltage between the listed voltage
ranges.
\249\ The final economic analysis estimates that 10 percent of
the "projects" (as that term is used in Section VI, Final Economic
Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in this
preamble) performed by employers with circuits operating at 230
kilovolts or more will involve installing portable protective gaps
based on the assumption that projects are distributed
proportionately across affected and unaffected circuits.
Consequently, if 10 percent of the circuits operating at voltages of
230 kilovolts or more require "additional measures, such as
installing portable protective gaps," then 10 percent of the
projects on those circuits will require such measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several rulemaking participants maintained that adopting minimum
approach distances greater than the distances in existing Sec.
1910.269 would have a substantial effect on how employees perform
energized line work and possibly on whether they could perform it at
all. (See, for example, Exs. 0545.1, 0549.1, 0550.1, 0573.1, 0575.1;
Tr2. 53-55, 96-98.) Some of these comments related to climbing
structures, with the commenters claiming that employees would be
precluded from climbing some structures if the final rule substantially
increased minimum approach distances. (See, for example, Exs. 0549.1,
0573.1; Tr2. 54-55, 166.) For instance, Consolidated Edison reported
that larger minimum approach distances could prevent workers from
climbing towers on several of its lines and noted that clearances vary
from tower to tower (Ex. 0549.1). Consolidated Edison also maintained
that larger minimum approach distances might prohibit it from
positioning an employee on the tower with a live-line tool to perform
tasks such as installing cotter keys or removing debris (id.). EEI
argued that, if minimum approach distances exceeded the length of line
insulators, employees would not be permitted to use existing live-line
maintenance equipment without changing their work methods (Ex. 0545.1;
Tr2. 114-115). EEI and Consolidated Edison, among others, maintained
that larger minimum approach distances could increase the number of
outages. (See, for example, Exs. 0545.1, 0549.1.)
For each of the examples the commenters provided of situations in
which higher minimum approach distances might be problematic, the
worker would be at ground potential while located on a tower or other
structure. Thus, these comments relate solely to phase-to-ground
exposures. For these exposures, the final rule increases minimum
approach distances substantially under two conditions: (1) When the
maximum per-unit transient overvoltage exceeds the default maximums
under the existing standards,\250\ or (2) when insulating tools or
conductive objects are present in the air gap. In each case, the
employer can implement measures, such as using a portable protective
gap, to reduce the maximum per-unit transient overvoltage and,
consequently, the minimum approach distance. (See Appendix B to final
Subpart V for a discussion of the use of a portable protective gap to
reduce the required minimum approach distance. Appendix B to existing
Sec. 1910.269 recognizes this method of reducing the required minimum
approach distance.) In addition, when the employer can demonstrate that
there will be only air between the employee and the energized part,
which should normally be the case during climbing or inspection
procedures, Table V-2 permits the employer to determine minimum
approach distances using the equation based on minimum air-insulation
distances, which will produce smaller minimum approach distances than
the equation based on minimum tool-insulation distance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\250\ The maximum per-unit transient overvoltages under existing
Sec. 1910.269 are 3.0 for voltages up to 362 kilovolts, 2.4 for 552
kilovolts, and 2.0 for 800 kilovolts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some rulemaking participants maintained that revised minimum
approach distances would result in costs related to the purchase of new
tools, revision of training programs, and retraining of employees.
(See, for example, Exs. 0545.1, 0548.1, 0550.1, 0551.1; Tr2. 94-95.)
For instance, American Electric Power commented:
The potential [cost impact] could be significant, especially
when considering the proposed changes and resulting implications on
the design standards. It is sufficient to state that changes in
minimum approach distances, that exceed the length of standard line
insulation, could require the re-tooling of live line maintenance
equipment (placing some live line maintenance currently done on hold
until new tooling is available); the development of new work methods
and the training/re-education that could be required; and could
impact current design standards (that are relatively common across
the industry). In some cases, on [extra-high-voltage] lines, it is
not possible to state that new tooling and procedures can be
established until maintenance experts have had adequate time to
fully evaluate the situation. [Ex. 0550.1]
OSHA included the costs of training employees in the requirements
of the standard, including the minimum approach-distance requirements,
in the economic analysis conducted for the proposed rule. (See 70 FR
34905-34910.) The proposal included revised minimum approach distances
that were in some cases greater than the distances specified in
existing Sec. 1910.269. OSHA's estimates for the proposed rule already
accounted for the costs associated with training employees in the
revised minimum approach distances, including any necessary changes in
procedures. Therefore, the Agency concludes that it is not necessary to
increase those cost estimates as a result of the changes made to the
minimum approach-distance provisions between the proposed and final
rules.\251\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\251\ OSHA addressed the cost of retrofitting or redesigning
circuits or equipment earlier in this discussion. OSHA's conclusion
regarding these costs apply equally to American Electric Power's
comment regarding the need to purchase new live-line maintenance
equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 9 shows the differences between the default minimum approach
distances in existing Sec. 1910.269 and the final rule for phase-to-
ground and phase-to-phase exposures on circuits operating between 72.6
kilovolts and 169.0 kilovolts. This table compares the minimum approach
distances in Table R-6 in existing Sec. 1910.269 with the largest
minimum approach distances in Table 7 through Table 9 in Appendix B to
final Subpart V. The distances in the tables in the appendix assume
that an insulated tool spans the gap (or that a
large conductive object is in the gap) for phase-to-ground exposures.
Table 9--Increases in Minimum Approach Distances for Phase-to-Ground
Exposures From Existing Sec. 1910.269 to Final Subpart V
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground Phase-to-phase
Voltage kV increase m (ft) increase m (ft)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
72.6 to 121.0................... 0.18 (0.59) 0.13 (0.43)
121.1 to 145.0.................. 0.21 (0.69) 0.14 (0.46)
145.1 to 169.0.................. 0.24 (0.79) 0.23 (0.75)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
For these voltage ranges, the maximum difference is no more than
0.24 meters (9 inches). As photographs of live-line tool work in the
record show, at these voltages, employers can comply with the minimum
approach distances specified in the final rule by having employees make
small adjustments in their working positions (269-Ex. 8-5). For
example, employees using live-line tools can take a position slightly
lower on the pole or structure and maintain the revised minimum
approach distances. (As noted previously, when employees work where the
employer can demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap and that
no large conductive object is in the gap, such as during climbing or
inspection activities, the final rule sets minimum approach distances
for phase-to-ground exposures that are substantially smaller than the
minimum approach distances for working with tools; and the maximum
difference between the existing and the new minimum approach distance
is no more than 0.14 meters (5.5 inches). Information in the record
indicates that, as long as OSHA does not apply minimum approach
distances to climbing and similar activities based on tools in the gap,
employers should be able to comply with the minimum approach distances
required by the final rule for those activities without adopting
additional measures (Ex. 0575.1\252\).) Because employers generally
should be able to demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap and
that no large conductive object is in the gap during climbing and
inspection activities and because the increases in minimum approach
distances for voltages of 72.6 to 169.0 kilovolts are small, OSHA
believes that, with regard to circuits operating at those voltages,
employers will not incur significant costs beyond costs associated with
retraining employees, which OSHA included in its economic analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\252\ In this exhibit, EEI described how applying "MAD for
tools" to climbing and inspection activities would make some of
this work infeasible. According to EEI, up to 23 percent of line
insulators at transmission voltages are shorter than minimum
approach distances based on tools in the gap. As explained
previously in this section of the preamble, when the employer can
demonstrate that there will be only air between the employee and the
energized part, which normally should be the case during climbing or
inspection procedures, Table V-2 permits the employer to determine
minimum approach distances using the equation based on minimum air-
insulation distances, which will produce smaller minimum approach
distances than the equation based on minimum tool-insulation
distance. Therefore, OSHA concludes, the percentage of structures
that workers could not climb or inspect without violating the
default minimum approach distances in the final rule is
significantly smaller than 23 percent for voltages up to 169.0
kilovolts and that, up to this voltage level, any costs related to
complying with the final rule's minimum approach distances
applicable to climbing or inspecting a structure (such as performing
an engineering analysis) are negligible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explanation of the final minimum approach-distance requirements. As
noted earlier in this section of the preamble, final Sec.
1926.960(c)(1) specifies minimum approach distances. The proposed rule
would have required the employer to ensure that no employee approached
or took any conductive object closer to exposed energized parts than
the minimum approach distances in proposed Tables V-2 through V-6. The
final rule splits this requirement into two provisions. First, as noted
previously, paragraph (c)(1)(i) requires employers to establish minimum
approach distances no less than the distances computed by Table V-2 for
ac systems or Table V-7 for dc systems; OSHA described and explained
earlier in this section of the preamble the equations in Table V-2 of
the final rule. Second, paragraph (c)(1)(iii) of the final rule
requires the employer to ensure that no employee approaches, or takes
any conductive object, closer to exposed energized parts than the
employer's established minimum approach distances, unless the employee
works in accordance with paragraphs (c)(1)(iii)(A), (c)(1)(iii)(B), or
(c)(1)(iii)(C). (See the discussion of these alternative methods later
in this section of the preamble.)
Paragraph (c)(1)(iii) in the final rule is equivalent to proposed
paragraph (c)(1), except that it is the employer that is establishing
the specific minimum approach distances for the workplace, based on
equations in the standard, rather than the standard setting those
distances explicitly.
The proposed rule would have allowed employees to approach
energized parts closer than the minimum approach distance under certain
conditions (see proposed Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(i) through (c)(1)(iii)).
Existing Sec. 1926.950(c)(1)(i), which is similar to proposed Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)(i), permits the employee to be insulated or guarded from
the live parts. OSHA omitted from the proposal language in the existing
standard specifically recognizing guarding. However, the language
proposed in paragraph (c)(1) required employees to maintain minimum
approach distances from "exposed" energized parts. OSHA defines
"exposed" in final Sec. 1926.968 as "[n]ot isolated or guarded";
therefore, the minimum approach-distance requirement does not cover
guarded live parts, whether guarded by enclosures or barriers or
guarded by position (isolated), because they are not "exposed." OSHA
removed similar redundancies throughout proposed paragraphs (c)(1)(i)
through (c)(1)(iii).
Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation (FRECC) urged OSHA
to retain the language that explicitly recognizes that employees do not
have to maintain minimum approach distances from guarded or isolated
energized parts (Ex. 0173).
Including language exempting guarded or isolated live parts would
be redundant and could lead to misinterpretation of the rule by
implying that "exposed energized parts" has a meaning other than not
guarded or isolated. Consequently, OSHA did not change the relevant
language in this final rule in response to FRECC's comment, and the
final rule removes the redundancies as proposed.
OSHA proposed a note to paragraph (c)(1) reading as follows:
Paragraph (f)(1) of Sec. 1926.966 contains requirements for the
guarding and isolation of live parts. Parts of electric circuits
that meet these two provisions are not considered as "exposed"
unless a guard is removed or an employee enters the space intended
to provide isolation from the live parts.
Final Sec. 1926.966(f)(1) requires the employer to provide guards
around all live parts operating at more than 150 volts to ground
without an insulating covering unless the location of the live parts
gives sufficient clearance (horizontal, vertical, or both) to minimize
the possibility of accidental employee contact. This provision, which
applies to substations, requires guards or isolation for all live parts
operating at more than 150 volts to ground unless the live parts have
an insulating covering. As explained previously, "exposed" means
"[n]ot isolated or guarded," and live parts that are insulated, but
not guarded or isolated, are exposed. Thus, live parts operating at
more than 150 volts with an insulating covering meet final Sec.
1926.966(f)(1), but are still exposed. Therefore, the proposed note to
Sec. 1926.960(c)(1) inaccurately portrays insulated parts as not
exposed, and OSHA did not include the note in the final rule.
Proposed paragraph (c)(1)(i) contained the first exception to
maintaining the minimum approach distances--insulating the employee
from the energized part. This insulation, for example, can take the
form of rubber insulating gloves and rubber insulating sleeves. This
equipment protects employees from electric shock while they work on
energized lines or equipment. Even though uninsulated parts of an
employee's body may come closer to the live part being worked on than
the minimum approach distance, the requisite rubber insulating gloves
and sleeves would insulate the employee's hand and arm from the live
part, and the working distances involved would be sufficient protection
against arc-over. As noted earlier, the minimum approach distances
include a component for inadvertent movement, which is unnecessary for
employees using rubber insulating equipment. Such inadvertent movement
most often involved the employee's hands and arms, and the insulating
equipment will protect them. In addition, the employee has control over
the energized part. The accident data in the record show that the
overriding hazard to employees involves other energized conductors in
the work area, to which the minimum approach distances still apply.
Final paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(A) provides that employees may use
insulating gloves and sleeves to insulate themselves from the energized
parts upon which they are working; rubber insulating gloves and sleeves
provide protection only for the line on which the employee is
performing work. Employers must ensure that employees maintain the
required minimum approach distances from other exposed energized parts.
In addition, the insulation used must be designed for the voltage.
(Final Sec. 1926.97 gives use voltages for electrical protective
equipment.)
IBEW recommended that OSHA clarify the final rule to indicate that
rubber insulating gloves or rubber insulating gloves with sleeves
provide adequate protection "only from the energized part upon which
the employee is working, not to other energized parts in the work
area" (Ex. 0230; emphasis included in original). OSHA is not adopting
IBEW's suggestion. Although this language correctly represents the
meaning of the provision, the Agency believes that this meaning is
clear without the suggested changes.
It is important to ensure that conductors on which the employee is
working cannot move unexpectedly while only rubber insulating gloves
and sleeves are protecting the employee against contact with the
conductors. It is a violation of the minimum approach-distance
requirement contained in existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(2)(i) for an
employee to be insulated from an energized part only by rubber
insulating gloves and sleeves if the part is not under the full control
of the employee at all times. For example, if an employee is cutting a
conductor, the employee must restrain the conductor from moving toward
the employee after being cut, or the employee must use additional
insulation to prevent the conductor from striking uninsulated parts of
his or her body. OSHA proposed to make this requirement explicit in
parenthetical text in the proposed rule, including in the proposed
revision of Sec. 1910.269.
Two commenters objected to the proposed language requiring the
employee to have control of the energized part sufficient to prevent
exposure to uninsulated parts of the employee's body (Exs. 0201, 0209).
They claimed that it is not always possible for the employer to ensure
that an employee has adequate control over a part. For example, Mr.
James Gartland with Duke Energy commented:
OSHA should require employees to maintain control of energized
parts only when it is reasonably achievable. It is not always
possible. . . . The revised text . . . should be: ". . .provided
that the employee has control of the part insofar as possible to
prevent exposure to uninsulated parts of the body." [Ex. 0201;
emphasis in original.]
The Agency is not adopting this recommendation. The language does
not require employees to maintain control of energized parts under all
conditions. The provision requires additional insulation on the
energized part when the employee does not have sufficient control to
prevent contact with uninsulated parts of his or her body. When it is
not possible for the employee to maintain sufficient control, the final
rule provides several options: (1) Maintain the minimum approach
distance (per the introductory text to final paragraph (c)(1)(iii));
(2) insulate the employee by installing an insulating barrier, such as
a rubber insulating blanket, between the employee and the energized
part (per final paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(A)); or (3) install a rubber
insulating line hose or a rubber insulating blanket on the energized
part (per final paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(B)). Allowing the employee to
work on an energized part that is not under the employee's full
control, with rubber insulating gloves and sleeves as the only
insulating barrier from the energized part, would not protect employees
sufficiently.
The Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives requested clarification of
what the Agency would consider to be adequate control, suggesting that
several types of measures might be adequate, including tying a
conductor to an insulator, clipping a conductor into the holder on the
jib arm of an aerial lift, and holding the conductor by hand at the
edge of the bucket of an aerial lift (Ex. 0186).
OSHA would generally consider any of these measures to constitute
adequate control. Using a mechanical device, such as a tie wire or
live-line tool clamps, would adequately control the end of an energized
conductor as long as it is of adequate strength for the application.
However, the employer also must consider portions of the conductor not
under the control of a mechanical device. For example, when the
employee takes the slack from a conductor under tension and must cut
the conductor to remove any excess, the employer must consider whether
the conductor, now held in place by the tensioning equipment, will
break from the employee's control after it is cut. OSHA would consider
a conductor held by an employee to generally be under adequate control.
However, if the conductor is hanging down and is not under the
employee's full control, the employer must ensure that the employee is
protected from exposure to
the lower portion of the conductor that could come too close to his or
her leg.
Mr. Leo Muckerheide with Safety Consulting Services objected to the
description of the application of minimum approach distances to
employees wearing rubber insulating gloves provided in the preamble to
the proposal (Ex. 0180). He assumed that existing Subpart V and the
proposal, which use similar language, did not permit uninsulated
portions of the employee's body to come closer to energized parts than
the minimum approach distance, even when the employee was wearing
rubber insulating gloves. In one particular example, he commented:
[T]he minimum distance listed in existing table V-1 for 2100
volts is 24 inches and the maximum length of an insulated glove is
18 inches. Therefore, it would be impossible to work on energized
circuits with only insulating gloves and be in compliance with the
existing table V-1. [id.]
Mr. Muckerheide misinterpreted this provision. The final standard
clearly considers the whole employee insulated as long as rated rubber
insulating gloves or gloves with sleeves insulate his or her hands and
arms.
The Agency determined that the language explaining when rubber
insulating gloves or rubber insulating gloves with sleeves are adequate
protection is necessary and appropriate and has adopted it without
substantial change in the final rule. (The final rule adds the word
"rubber" to the term "insulating gloves or insulating gloves and
sleeves." "Rubber insulating gloves" and "rubber insulating
sleeves" are the precise terms used to describe this equipment, and
this revision clarifies that final Sec. Sec. 1910.137 and 1926.97
cover this equipment.)
As a second exception to maintaining the minimum approach
distances, paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(B), which OSHA adopted without change
from proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii), allows the energized part to be
insulated from the employee and any other conductive object at a
different potential. Such insulation can be in the form of rubber
insulating blankets or line hose or other suitable insulating
equipment. Again, the insulation must be adequate for the voltage.
Paragraphs (c)(1)(iii)(A) and (c)(1)(iii)(B) in the final rule
recognize the protection afforded to the employee by an insulating
barrier between the employee and the energized part. As long as the
insulation is appropriate and is in good condition, current will not
flow through the worker, thereby protecting the worker.
The third exception to the requirement to maintain minimum approach
distances (final paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(C)) is for live-line barehand
work. (For specific practices for this type of work, see the discussion
of final Sec. 1926.964(c) later in this preamble.) In this type of
work, the employee is in contact with the energized line, but is not
contacting another conductive object at a different potential. This is
the "bird-on-a-wire" scenario. Because there is no complete circuit,
current cannot flow through the worker, thereby protecting the worker.
In the proposed rule, the exception for live-line barehand work was
broad enough to cover any work in which the employee is insulated from
any other exposed conductive objects. However, OSHA knows of several
accidents that occurred when employees working from aerial lifts,
either insulated or uninsulated, grabbed energized conductors (Ex. 0004
\253\). OSHA believes that some employers assume that this practice is
safe and, therefore, do not follow the live-line barehand procedures
specified in final Sec. 1926.964(c) for live-line barehand work. In
the preamble to the proposed rule, OSHA requested comments on whether
the proposal would adequately protect employees from this type of
accident and on what additional requirements, if any, would prevent
this type of accident.
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\253\ See, for example, the four accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=200550457&id=171055783&id=200780294&id=301171807.
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Two commenters responded to this issue; they both believed that the
proposed rule would adequately protect employees (Exs. 0126, 0213).
Another commenter stated that proper training is necessary to prevent
these types of actions (Ex. 0219).
OSHA determined that the requirements for live-line barehand work
are necessary whenever employees are working closer than the minimum
approach distance in accordance with final paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(C).
The accidents in the record make it clear that simply using an
insulated aerial lift to isolate employees from energized parts is not
sufficient protection (Exs. 0002, 0003, 0004). In Ex. 0004 alone, 69
accidents involved employees in aerial lifts who were working inside
the minimum approach distance without sufficient electrical protective
equipment. The accident summaries for these accidents indicated that 11
of the accidents involved insulated aerial lifts and that 2 of the
accidents involved uninsulated aerial lifts. Because power line work
predominantly makes use of insulated aerial devices, the Agency
believes that most of the other 56 accidents also involved insulated
aerial lifts. Employers may argue that the language in proposed
paragraph (c)(1)(iii) permits employees working from insulated aerial
lifts to position themselves inside the minimum approach distance
without following Sec. 1926.964(c). The sheer number of accidents
involving this practice clearly demonstrates that this practice is
unsafe. In addition, the 2002 NESC, in Rule 441A1d,\254\ contains a
similar restriction on its equivalent exception to its minimum
approach-distance requirement. Therefore, OSHA concludes that it is
necessary to restrict the exception proposed in paragraph (c)(1)(iii)
to live-line barehand work performed in accordance with final Sec.
1926.964(c) and modified the language of this exception, which is
contained in Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(iii)(C), accordingly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\254\ The 2012 NESC contains a similar provision in Rule 441A1d.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to testimony in the Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking, between
five and six percent of accidents experienced by power line workers
resulted when the upper arm of an employee wearing rubber insulating
gloves without sleeves contacted an energized part (269-DC Tr. 558-
561). This is a significant portion of the total number of serious
accidents occurring among electric line workers. The Agency believes
that most of these injuries and fatalities were preventable had the
employees used rubber insulating sleeves. However, as demonstrated by
the safety record of some electric utility companies, the extensive use
of insulating equipment to cover energized parts in the employee's work
area also would appear to prevent employees' upper arms and shoulders
from contacting live parts (269-Ex. 46). OSHA believes that insulating
every energized part within reach of an employee also would avert
electrical contacts involving other parts of the body, such as an
employee's head or back.
Existing Subpart V does not require any protection for employees
working on or near exposed live parts beyond the use of rubber
insulating gloves. To prevent the types of accidents described
previously from occurring in the future, the Agency decided to require
protection in addition to that required by existing Subpart V.
OSHA adopted paragraph (c)(2)(i) in the final rule substantially as
proposed; this provision generally requires employees to use rubber
insulating
sleeves whenever they are using rubber insulating gloves under final
paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(A). However, insulating exposed live parts on
which the employee is not working makes the sleeves unnecessary as long
as the insulation is placed from a position that would not expose the
employee's upper arm to contact with those parts (see final paragraph
(c)(2)). Therefore, employees can work without sleeves by installing
rubber line hose, rubber blankets, or plastic guard equipment on
exposed, energized parts on which the employees are not performing
work. OSHA reworded this provision in the final rule for purposes of
clarity.
NIOSH recommended that the standard require rubber insulating
sleeves whenever employees use rubber insulating gloves (Ex. 0130).
NIOSH explained: "[G]loves can be easily caught and pulled down by any
object protruding from the pole or powerline, exposing the body to
electrical current. . . [S]leeves add extra protection" (id.). NIOSH
pointed to one accident in support of its position (Ex. 0137).
OSHA reviewed the accident and found that it involved a situation
in which a splice on a conductor pulled down the cuff of the employee's
rubber insulating glove, with the conductor then contacting his forearm
near the wrist (id.). OSHA acknowledges that such accidents occur. For
example, there is a description of an additional similar accident in
the rulemaking record (Ex. 0002 \255\). Rubber insulating sleeves
protect an employee's arm from a point above the cuff of the rubber
insulating glove to the shoulder. In the accident cited by NIOSH, as
well as the other accident in the record, the conductor contacted the
employee at or near the wrist, where rubber insulating sleeves probably
would not have protected the employee. OSHA believes that the work
practices in which an employer trains qualified employees must include
practices designed to protect workers from the possibility that an
energized conductor will either pull a cuff down or penetrate the
opening at the end of the glove. (Paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of final Sec.
1926.950 requires employers to train each employee in "safety
practices . . . that are not specifically addressed by this subpart but
that are related to his or her work and are necessary for his or her
safety.") The Agency concludes that such work practices, rather than
the use of sleeves, will protect employees from being injured or killed
in the circumstances described by NIOSH. Therefore, OSHA is not
adopting NIOSH's recommendation in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\255\ A report of this accident is available at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=573717.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA knows of several accidents that occurred while employees were
performing work (generally on deenergized lines) near energized parts
without using rubber insulating equipment (Ex. 0004 \256\). In these
accidents, the employees were working near energized parts and
inadvertently entered the minimum approach distance. Employers
successfully challenged citations issued in a similar context by
arguing that the standard permits employees to work near energized
parts without the use of electrical protective equipment, as long as
they maintain the minimum approach distance involved and that, because
they trained their employees to maintain those distances, the accidents
were the result of unpreventable employee misconduct. (See, for
example, Central Kansas Power Co., 6 BNA OSHC 2118 (No. 77-3127,
1978).)
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\256\ See, for example, the six accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170074801&id=200010163&id=201750080&id=14242036&id=982082&id=170189849.
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OSHA does not believe that working close to energized parts (that
is, near the minimum approach distance boundary) without the use of
electrical protective equipment is a safe practice. The Agency further
believes that existing Sec. 1910.269, which appears to allow this
practice, is not effective in preventing these accidents. Therefore,
OSHA concludes that further regulation is necessary. Toward this end,
OSHA proposed two new requirements:
(1) If an employee is performing work near exposed parts energized
at more than 600 volts but not more than 72.5 kilovolts and is not
insulated from the energized parts or performing live-line bare-hand
work, the employee would have to work from a position where he or she
could not reach into the minimum approach distance (proposed Sec.
1926.960(d)(2)), and
(2) If an employee uses insulating gloves or insulating gloves with
sleeves to insulate himself or herself from energized parts, the
insulating gloves and sleeves would have to be put on and removed in a
position where the employee could not reach into the minimum approach
distance (proposed Sec. 1926.960(c)(2)(ii)).
The Agency proposed Sec. 1926.960(c)(2)(ii) to ensure that
employees don rubber insulating gloves and sleeves from a safe
position. OSHA is aware that some employers have a ground-to-ground
rule requiring their employees to wear rubber insulating gloves before
leaving the ground to perform work and to leave the gloves on until the
employees return to the ground. This practice ensures that employees
wear the rubber gloves and sleeves before they reach the energized area
and eliminates the chance that an employee will forget to don the
protective equipment once he or she reaches the work position. Other
employers simply require their employees to put on their gloves and
sleeves before they enter the energized area. This practice normally
requires the employee to use his or her judgment in determining where
to begin wearing the protective equipment. The proposal recognized both
methods of protecting employees, but still ensured that employees wear
rubber insulating gloves and sleeves once they reach positions from
which they can reach into the minimum approach distance. In the
preamble to the proposal, the Agency requested comments on the need for
this requirement and on whether the provision as proposed would protect
employees from the relevant hazards.
Many commenters expressed support for this proposed requirement or
urged the Agency to make the rule even more protective. (See, for
example, Exs. 0099, 0126, 0130, 0155, 0175, 0186, 0219, 0230, 0505; Tr.
891-894.) In supporting the proposed requirement, Mr. Anthony Ahern
with Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives explained:
Judging actual distance when in close proximity to a conductor
can be tricky. Great care needs to be used when putting on or taking
off sleeves when in close proximity to lines. This usually requires
the arms to be extended more than the employee might normally do
during regular work practices. Quite often too you will see a worker
waving his arms about as they try to settle the sleeve harness into
position behind their head. These inadvertent movements could bring
the workers arms inside of MAD. Also, while sleeves are being put on
or taken off the employee is not wearing rubber gloves. So if he
should reach inside of MAD his hands will have no protection. [Ex.
0186]
EEI and Ameren Corporation objected to proposed paragraph
(c)(2)(ii) because, they argued, it would effectively increase the
minimum approach distance (Exs. 0209, 0227, 0501). Ameren argued that
"[e]nsuring compliance with this proposal would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible," and that there was additional risk for
employees climbing with rubber insulating gloves (Ex. 0209). EEI echoed
Ameren's objections and maintained that this provision was effectively
increasing the ergonomic movement
factor of the minimum approach distance (Ex. 0227). EEI maintained that
this provision would have a significant adverse impact on industry
practices (id.). In its posthearing submission after the 2006 hearing,
EEI presented additional arguments against the proposed requirement:
There are several important difficulties with the proposed rules
that are self-evident. First, they do not establish an objective
standard, and therefore would be unenforceable. The rules would be
different for each employee, depending for example on personal
height, reach, working position, and the particular configuration of
the energized equipment in the vicinity. This will make it difficult
to train employees in compliance, and could make supervisory
enforcement of the rule a nightmare. Indeed, whether an employee is
[in] compliance could change literally from second to second, for
example, as the employee shift[s] weight on a pole, or turns around
to speak with a co-worker. As a litigation matter, proving the
violation element of employer knowledge will be problematic at best.
Second, the rules will effectively limit or inhibit the nature
of work that can be performed outside, but within reaching distance,
of the MAD. In planning a job, it would be necessary to consider
what work is to be performed outside the MAD distance, and to
consider the individual physical characteristics of the employee(s)
who would perform it. Conceivably, short employees, with short arms,
would be favored over tall, lanky employees, with long arms. This
makes no sense, and it does not appear that OSHA has considered or
analyzed the potential practical implications of these requirements.
. . .
Finally, there is no evidence in the record to show why OSHA is
proposing to implement these requirements. There is no evidence that
in the absence of these particular requirements, employees have been
injured or suffered near misses with energized electrical equipment.
In sum, these proposals are without any basis, and cannot be
sustained. [Ex. 0501]
OSHA does not agree that proposed paragraph (c)(2)(ii) increased
the minimum approach distance. Proposed paragraphs (c)(2)(ii) and
(d)(2) did not address the question of the employee's location once he
or she is wearing rubber insulating gloves and sleeves. Final paragraph
(c)(2)(ii) simply ensures that the employee is already wearing the
gloves and sleeves before he or she gets into position to perform work.
This paragraph has no effect on the minimum approach distances, which
provide protection against both energized parts on which the employee
will be working and other energized parts in the area. Under final
paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(A), once the gloves and sleeves are on, workers
may get within the minimum approach distance for the part on which they
are performing work. In addition, employees need to maintain the
minimum approach distances (not distances greater than the minimum
approach distances) for parts on which they are not working.
EEI and Ameren's argument that the provision would be difficult to
enforce is specious. The record contains several examples of methods of
compliance that would be reasonably easy to enforce, as well as easy
for employees to understand and follow. For example, employers can
institute ground-to-ground, cradle-to-cradle, or lock-to-lock rules.
(See, for example, Exs. 0099, 0130, 0201.) Mr. Kenneth Brubaker
described these rules as "the wearing of rubber [insulating] gloves
and sleeves from ground to ground while climbing energized structures,
from cradle to cradle while working from aerial baskets, and lock to
lock when working on underground cabinets and vaults for qualified line
personnel" (Exs. 0099, 0100). Commenters also suggested a "10-foot
rule" in which employees must wear electrical protective equipment
whenever they are within 3.05 meters (10 feet) of an exposed energized
part (Exs. 0099, 0186). OSHA expects that employers generally will
elect to use bright-line rules (for example, cradle-to-cradle or 3.05-
meter rules) such that an individual employee's height and reach will
not be an issue. Instituting such rules will ensure that all employees
put on and take off rubber insulating gloves and sleeves as specified
by the final rule. If an employer elects to use an alternative in which
an employee will be putting on and taking off rubber gloves and sleeves
in an unspecified location (for example if the employer simply
instructs the employee to put on and take off gloves and sleeves at any
location outside the reach of the minimum approach distance), the
employer will need to account for the employee's individual
characteristics.
EEI's argument that planning jobs would be difficult under proposed
paragraph (c)(2)(ii) is not relevant. This paragraph only applies when
workers use rubber insulating gloves or rubber insulating gloves with
sleeves, which the employees have to don and remove. This rule simply
addresses donning and removal of this equipment in relation to the
energized parts. OSHA addresses EEI's comments further in its
discussion of proposed paragraph (d)(2), which addresses selecting work
positions.
OSHA concludes that there is clear evidence in the record of
fatalities and injuries caused when employees approach too close to
energized parts without adequate protection (Exs. 0002, 0003,
0004).\257\ Evidence in the record indicates that industry and employee
representatives recognize that failure to wear electrical protective
equipment when necessary is a leading cause of accidents and that
additional measures to ensure the use of this equipment in appropriate
circumstances addresses this problem. For example, Mr. James Tomaseski
with IBEW testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\257\ See, for example, the 15 accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=526236&id=564971&id=566257&id=565051&id=512269&id=525675&id=609404&id=573832
&id=743310&id=755231&id=738989&id=755199&id=800508&id=784397&id=812479.
In a study on recent fatalities and serious accidents in the
industry by the OSHA Strategic Partnership of Major Electric Line
Contractor Employees, NECA, the IBEW, and EEI, by far the majority
of the accidents were from contact with energized parts. A solution
was easy in some folks' minds, and that was to come up with a
practice to get employees in rubber gloves and/or, again, rubber
sleeves, where required.
The Partnership, as part of their agreed-upon path, will develop
best practices. Their first target for these best practices was in
general to address electrical contacts. It was no surprise to many
of the partners that ground-to-ground and cradle-to-cradle practices
were first on the list. [Tr. 892]
IBEW also pointed to action taken by NESC Subcommittee 8 as evidence of
the need to don and remove rubber insulating gloves and sleeves outside
locations in which employees can reach into minimum approach distances
(Ex. 0505). According to IBEW's comments, the NESC subcommittee adopted
a requirement for the 2007 NESC specifying that rubber insulating
gloves be "worn whenever employees are within the reach or extended
reach of the minimum approach distances" (id.).\258\
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\258\ The NESC adopted this requirement, which, in the 2012
edition, appears in Rule 441A3b.
In addition, Mr. Ahern's description of the types of movements
employees make when donning rubber insulating sleeves makes it clear
that the final rule needs measures to ensure that workers do not
encroach on the minimum approach distance during such activities.
Encroaching on the minimum approach distance to energized parts
presents hazards to employees, particularly when involved in tasks not
related directly to work on those live parts.\259\ Thus, the Agency
believes that paragraph (c)(2)(ii), which OSHA is
adopting in the final rule with only editorial changes from the
proposal, is reasonably necessary and appropriate.\260\
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\259\ The ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance
only protects against errors in judging and maintaining the minimum
approach distance. It does not account for errors that might result
when employees become inattentive to the approach distance because
of work-related distractions or other factors.
\260\ One commenter noted that OSHA proposed the same
requirement in Sec. 1910.269(l)(3)(ii) using slightly different
language (Ex. 0186). The final rule uses the same language in both
Sec. Sec. 1910.269(l)(3)(ii) and 1926.960(c)(2)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some rulemaking participants recommended that the final rule
include a requirement that employers availing themselves of the
exception to the minimum approach-distance requirements for work
performed with rubber insulating gloves (or rubber insulating gloves
and sleeves) adopt ground-to-ground, cradle-to-cradle, or lock-to-lock
rules, or set a specific distance from energized parts at which
employees must wear electrical protective equipment.\261\ (See, for
example, Exs. 0099, 0130, 0186, 0230; Tr. 893-894.) IBEW recommended a
cradle-to-cradle requirement (Ex. 0230; Tr. 893-894). Two comments
suggested that the rule specify the distance from energized parts at
which employees must wear rubber insulating gloves or rubber insulating
gloves and sleeves (Exs. 0099, 0186). One of these commenters suggested
requiring that employees wear rubber insulating gloves and sleeves
within 3.05 meters (10 feet) of circuits energized at 500 volts to 500
kilovolts and within 6.1 meters (20 feet) of circuits energized at 500
to 800 kilovolts (Ex. 0099).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\261\ A ground-to-ground rule requires employees climbing a pole
to put on rubber insulating gloves or rubber insulating gloves with
sleeves while still on the ground and to remove them only after
returning to the ground. A cradle-to-cradle rule requires employees
working from an aerial lift to wear gloves or gloves with sleeves
whenever the aerial lift platform leaves its cradle. A lock-to-lock
rule requires employees working on transformers to wear gloves or
gloves with sleeves from the time they unlock the lock on the
transformer until they close the transformer case and reinstall the
lock.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NIOSH recommended adopting a ground-to-ground rule, stating:
Ground to ground use of personal protective equipment (PPE)
eliminates the hazard of reaching the energized area before donning
PPE. It also eliminates the reliance on employee judgment in
determining a safe distance to don PPE, and requires the worker to
don PPE before entering an aerial bucket . . . [Ex. 0130]
Other rulemaking participants opposed ground-to-ground and
similarly specific rules (Exs. 0163, 0212, 0225). For example, Ms.
Susan O'Connor with Siemens argued that "[f]orcing the use of one type
of enforcement strategy, especially one that questions the employee's
competency, can undermine a strong safety culture" (Ex. 0163). Mr.
James Gartland with Duke Energy did not oppose ground-to-ground and
similar rules, but recommended that any such rule include an exception
to permit employees, during short breaks, to move 3.05 meters (10 feet)
away and to remove their electrical protective equipment (Ex. 0201). He
commented that his company "has found the occurrence of heat-related
illnesses has been reduced by allowing employees to move the bucket
away from the conductors and remove rubber gloves and sleeves for a
brief rest period" (id.). Although IBEW did not oppose a ground-to-
ground rule, the union recognized that there may be valid arguments
against such a requirement. Mr. Tomaseski testified:
There are a few factors that mitigate against requiring [rubber
insulating gloves] ground-to-ground in all circumstances. First,
some linemen are concerned that they would have difficulty feeling
the pole while they are climbing if they had to wear rubber gloves
and they, therefore, would be at a greater risk of falling.
Second, if a splinter on the pole [punctures] the glove . . .
while [the employee is] climbing, it may compromise the protective
value of the glove and, therefore, create a hazard for the lineman
who subsequently touches an energized object. [Tr. 893]
In recommending a cradle-to-cradle rule, the union argued that
these factors were not present when an employee is working from an
aerial lift (Tr. 893-894).
OSHA concludes that there is likely to be little risk associated
with wearing rubber insulating gloves while climbing. The practices
required by final Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii) should mitigate any fall
hazards posed by climbing with rubber insulating gloves; this provision
specifies fall protection for employees climbing poles and other
structures. The Agency also believes it is unlikely that splinters will
puncture rubber insulating gloves during climbing. In this regard,
final Sec. 1926.97(c)(2)(vii) requires employees to wear protector
gloves over rubber insulating gloves; protector gloves should eliminate
any risk from small splinters. The Agency believes that employees would
feel any splinter large enough to penetrate the protector gloves and
also would notice any resulting damage to a rubber insulating glove. In
any event, there is little, if any, evidence that accidents occurred as
a result of fall or splinter hazards posed by climbing with rubber
insulating gloves.\262\ On the other hand, evidence of accidents caused
by employees not wearing rubber insulating gloves is pervasive (Exs.
0002, 0003, 0004). As Mr. Tomaseski noted, the electric power
partnership found that "by far the majority of the accidents were from
contact with energized parts" (Tr. 892).
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\262\ The record contains descriptions of several accidents
involving falls by employees during climbing, but none of the
descriptions indicates that the use of rubber insulating gloves
caused the fall.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is, however, significant evidence, as noted in the summary
and explanation for Sec. 1926.960(g) of the final rule later in this
section of the preamble, that electric power workers encounter heat-
stress hazards and that providing cooling breaks is a recognized method
of reducing such hazards. Adopting a ground-to-ground or cradle-to-
cradle rule would force employees wearing rubber insulating gloves to
either descend and reclimb poles or lower and reraise their aerial lift
platforms to take breaks from wearing the protective equipment. The
Agency suspects that such a requirement could discourage employees from
taking these breaks. Consequently, OSHA is not adopting a ground-to-
ground or cradle-to-cradle rule. Although the Agency is not adopting
ground-to-ground or cradle-to-cradle provisions in the final rule, OSHA
encourages employers to adopt such provisions when appropriate and to
remind employees of the importance of taking cooling breaks when
necessary.
The Agency also decided not to include in the final rule a specific
distance beyond which employees must put on and take off their rubber
insulating gloves. Any such distance would be arbitrary, and OSHA
believes that allowing employers to design work rules appropriate for
their workforces and workplaces is a more reasonable approach.
Consequently, OSHA is adopting paragraph (c)(2)(ii) in the final rule
substantially as proposed. As explained previously under the summary
and explanation for paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(A), the final rule uses the
term "rubber insulating gloves" in place of the term "insulating
gloves" included in the proposed rule.
Paragraph (d) of the final rule addresses the employee's working
position. The requirements in this paragraph protect employees against
slipping, falling, or accidentally reaching into energized parts. Mr.
Stephen Frost with the Mid-Columbia Utilities Safety Alliance supported
proposed paragraph (d), commenting:
Industry practice and OSHA guidance has always stated that the
worker shall not be within reaching or falling distance when working
near energized lines or equipment. We appreciate OSHA revising the
language to more clearly state what is reaching or falling distance.
[Ex. 0184]
Paragraph (d)(1), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires the employer to ensure that each employee,
to the extent permitted by other safety-related conditions at the
worksite, works in a position from which a shock or slip would not
cause the employee to contact exposed, uninsulated parts energized at a
potential different from the employee's. Since slips, and even electric
shocks, are not entirely preventable, it is important for the employee
to take a working position so that such an event will not increase the
severity of any incurred injury. OSHA adopted this requirement from
existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(4). There is no counterpart to this
requirement in existing subpart V.
The Agency believes that it is important for employees to work from
positions where a slip or a shock will not bring them into contact with
exposed, uninsulated energized parts unless other conditions, such as
the configuration of the lines involved, would make another working
position safer. The position taken must be the most protective
available to accomplish the task. In certain situations, this work
position may not be the most efficient one. OSHA notes that the
language in paragraph (d)(1) allows for guarding or insulating the live
part as an alternative means of compliance.
Proposed paragraph (d)(2) generally would have required an employee
working near exposed parts energized at 601 volts to 72.5 kilovolts to
be in a position such that he or she could not reach into the
applicable minimum approach distance. In the preamble to the proposed
rule, OSHA requested comments on the need for proposed paragraph (d)(2)
and on whether there are other effective means of protecting employees
from the relevant hazard.
The Southern Company argued that "[t]he minimum approach distance
contains an ergonomic component that should provide adequate protection
from inadvertent movement" (Ex. 0212).
OSHA does not agree with Southern Company that the ergonomic
component of the minimum approach distance provides adequate protection
for employees who are working close to, but not on, exposed,
uninsulated energized parts. As explained earlier in the preamble, OSHA
concluded that working extremely close to (that is, near the minimum
approach distance boundary to) energized parts without the use of
electrical protective equipment is not a safe practice and that
existing Sec. 1910.269, which may allow this practice, is not
effective in preventing accidents involving contact with energized
parts by employees who are not using electrical protective equipment.
(See the summary and explanation for final Sec. 1926.960(c)(2)(ii) for
a description of the purpose behind paragraphs (c)(2)(ii) and (d)(2)
and a discussion of the relevant accidents.)
When employees are not working directly on live parts, then nearby
exposed, uninsulated live parts are typically not in their view. Those
parts can be above them,\263\ below them,\264\ behind them,\265\ or to
the side \266\ (Exs 0002, 0003, 0004). As noted previously, OSHA
designed the ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance on
the premise that the employee will detect an error in judging and
maintaining the minimum approach distance and then have time to correct
that error before encroaching on the electrical component of the
minimum approach distance. When exposed, uninsulated live parts are not
in an employee's line of sight, such errors are difficult to detect. In
addition, the Agency believes that, when employees are not performing
work on energized parts, the employees are not paying as much attention
to those parts as to the equipment the employees are servicing and may,
inadvertently, become complacent about the hazards posed by those
parts. In any event, the accident record makes it clear that employees
working without electrical protective equipment near exposed,
uninsulated parts energized at 601 volts to 72.5 kilovolts face an
unacceptable risk of electric shock.
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\263\ See, for example, the three accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=201520301&id=573832&id=14333439.
\264\ See, for example, the three accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=927830&id=839480&id=14373955.
\265\ See, for example, the three accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=14403315&id=200350395&id=14346514.
\266\ See, for example, the three accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170672547&id=512269&id=569988.
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An alternative approach would be for OSHA to adopt a more limited
requirement prohibiting employees without electrical protective
equipment from working where they could reach into the electrical
component of the minimum approach distance. The basis of such a
requirement would be that the probability that current could arc to the
employee is not significant at a distance that is farther than the
electrical component of the minimum approach distance from exposed,
uninsulated live parts. However, as the accident data show, employees
often are moving up, back, down, or in other directions away from their
working positions when they contact live parts (id.).\267\ The Agency,
therefore, concludes that requiring employees to work in positions from
which they cannot reach into the electrical component (rather than the
full minimum approach distance) would not protect employees adequately.
Existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(ii)(C) already requires employers to
train their employees in minimum approach distances. In addition, final
Sec. 1926.960(c)(2)(ii) requires employers to ensure that employees
using rubber insulating gloves or rubber insulating gloves and sleeves
don the gloves and sleeves before they get into a position from which
they can reach into the minimum approach distance. OSHA believes that
using the same distance for paragraph (d)(2) will simplify training and
make it easier for employers to establish work rules governing the use
of electrical protective equipment.
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\267\ See, for example, the four accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=573832&id=14373955&id=200350395&id=569988.
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In the preamble to the proposed rule, the Agency discussed how to
comply with OSHA's minimum approach-distance requirements in the
summary and explanation for the proposal's minimum approach distances
specified in Sec. 1926.960(c)(1) (70 FR 34862). Although this
discussion applies equally to Sec. 1926.960(c)(1) in the final rule,
the Agency is moving the discussion to the summary and explanation for
final Sec. 1926.960(d)(2) because it relates to both provisions and to
comments received on both provisions, which OSHA discusses here. The
ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance accounts for
errors in maintaining the minimum approach distance (which might occur
if an employee misjudges the length of a conductive object he or she is
holding), and for errors in judging the minimum approach distance. The
ergonomic component also accounts for inadvertent movements by the
employee, such as slipping. In contrast, the working position selected
to comply with final paragraph (c)(1)(iii) (and paragraphs (c)(2)(ii)
and (d)(2)) must account for all of an employee's reasonably likely
movements and still permit the employee to adhere to the applicable
minimum approach distance. As noted in the preamble to the proposal
(id.), and in final Appendix B, to ensure compliance with minimum
approach distances (the electrical and ergonomic components combined),
the work position selected must account for such reasonably likely
movements as:
adjusting an employee's hardhat,
maneuvering a tool onto an energized part with a
reasonable amount of over- or under-reaching,
reaching for, and handling, tools, material, and equipment
passed to him or her, and
adjusting tools and replacing components on them, when
necessary during the work procedure.
Figure 1 in final Appendix B depicts an example of the range of
reasonably likely movements by an employee.
OSHA believes that it is important for employers to train employees
not only in the applicable minimum approach distances, but also in how
to maintain those distances. Proposed Appendix B explained this
approach, stating: "The training of qualified employees required under
Sec. 1926.950 and the job planning and briefing required under Sec.
1926.952 must address selection of the proper working position." To
clarify this point, final Sec. 1926.950(b)(2)(iii) requires employers
to train qualified employees in the "minimum approach distances
specified in this subpart corresponding to the voltages to which the
qualified employee will be exposed and the skills and techniques
necessary to maintain those distances" (emphasis added to show the new
language). (See the discussion of this provision earlier in this
section of the preamble.) Final Sec. 1926.952(b) requires the job
briefing to cover personal protective equipment requirements and the
procedures employees are to use in performing the work. OSHA interprets
this provision as requiring the job briefing to address the selection
of the proper working position under final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(iii)
and (d)(2).
EEI counsel Mr. Stephen Yohay and Mr. Clayton Abernathy with OG&E
Energy Corporation indicated that information in Appendix B to proposed
Subpart V, and the requirements in proposed paragraphs (c)(2)(ii)(a)
and (d), led EEI to believe that OSHA was increasing the ergonomic
component of the minimum approach distance by 0.61 meters, for a total
ergonomic component of 1.22 meters (Tr. 1079-1082). EEI commented:
In the proposed preamble, OSHA states it is necessary to add the
reach component since many injuries resulted from violation of MAD.
EEI requests that OSHA place in the record the evidence on which it
relies to substantiate this change. EEI also suggests that if, in
fact, OSHA's reasoning is correct and employees did cross the
imaginary 24 inch line in the past, why and how does OSHA believe
that employees will not cross a 50 inch line in the future? [Ex.
0227]
Testifying on behalf of EEI, Mr. Abernathy described how increasing
the minimum approach distance by 0.61 meters would restrict some of the
work his company's employees do (Tr. 1055-1078). He described two
scenarios that he claimed would be affected by this increase--an
apprentice line worker working on the secondary conductors on a
distribution transformer and a line worker installing insulating
protective equipment on overhead conductors. The apprentice in Mr.
Abernathy's first example was wearing rubber insulating gloves rated
for the secondary voltage, but not for the 15-kilovolt primary voltage
(Tr. 1058-1059).
As explained previously in this preamble, the ergonomic component
for voltages addressed by EEI's comments is 0.61 meters; it is not 1.22
meters as Messrs. Abernathy and Yohay claimed. The Agency believes that
EEI's confusion stemmed from a common misperception of how minimum
approach distances work in practice. Some employers mistakenly believe
that the ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance accounts
for all movement on the part of the employee. As described previously,
this is not the case. The minimum approach distance sets a boundary
that the employee may not penetrate as he or she is working. To ensure
that employees do not penetrate this boundary as they are working, the
employer must instruct workers how to position themselves so that
reasonably likely movements do not bring the employees inside that
boundary. Paragraph (d)(2) of the final rule ensures that employees who
are not protected against exposure to energized parts are working at a
safe distance from the parts. The final standard generally provides
that an employee performing work near exposed parts energized between
601 volts and 72.5 kilovolts must work from a position where he or she
cannot reach into the minimum approach distance. This positioning
requirement does not apply if the employee is wearing rubber insulating
gloves, being protected by insulating equipment covering the energized
parts, performing work using live-line tools, or performing live-line
barehand work.\268\
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\268\ The proposal provided that paragraph (d)(2) did not apply
to employees "insulated from the energized parts." The language in
the final rule clarifies that the provision does not apply to
employees wearing rubber insulating gloves or protected by
insulating equipment covering the energized parts. Note that
employers must still ensure that employees wearing rubber insulating
gloves maintain the minimum approach distance from energized parts
on which they are not working unless those parts are insulated from
the employee. (See final paragraph (c)(1)(iii).)
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As noted previously, OSHA concluded that there is clear evidence in
the record that approaching too close to energized parts kills and
injures employees (Exs. 0002, 0003, 0004). In Ex. 0004 alone, there
were at least 27 accidents involving employees coming too close to
energized parts without using electrical protective equipment.\269\
There are at least six accidents in the record involving apprentices
coming too close to energized parts without using electrical protective
equipment (Exs. 0002, 0003).\270\
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\269\ There were 27 accidents in which the investigation summary
indicated that an employee who was not using electrical protective
equipment contacted energized parts. There were many other accidents
involving employee contact with energized parts in which the summary
did not indicate whether the employee was using electrical
protective equipment. The 27 accidents can be found at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=512269&id=525675&id=573832&id=755199&id=768101&id=819805&id=894196&id=927830
&id=982082&id=14238117&id=14242036&id=14333439&id=14367023&id=14392393&id=14402788
and
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=14403315&id=14482723&id=170074801&id=170118475&id=170189849&id=170672547
&id=170891014&id=171054430&id=200010163&id=200010338&id=201520301&id=201750080.
\270\ See the six accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=200010163&id=201440013&id=14345318&id=170170179&id=789354&id=711960.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted by an OSHA witness at the hearing, employers can protect
the apprentice in Mr. Abernathy's example by ensuring that the
apprentice is working from a position where he or she cannot reach into
the minimum approach distance or, if that is not possible, by
installing electrical protective equipment on the primary conductors to
enable the employee to work within the minimum approach distance of
those conductors (Tr. 1087-1088). According to Mr. Abernathy, the
primary conductor is 1.0 meter (40 inches) from the secondary conductor
on which the apprentice would be working (Tr. 1069, 1071). The minimum
approach distance for a 15-kilovolt primary generally is 0.65 meters
(26 inches).\271\ Thus, the worker could position himself or herself so
that he or she could reach 0.34 meters (14 inches) beyond the secondary
conductor and still be in compliance with final paragraph (d)(2). In
addition, as long as the secondary conductor is below the primary by a
distance that is greater than the minimum approach distance, it should
be possible under the final rule for the apprentice to work on the
secondary without rubber insulating gloves rated for the primary
voltage. If the secondary conductor is closer to the
primary conductor than the minimum approach distance, the existing
standards (Sec. Sec. 1926.950(c)(1) and 1910.269(l)(2)) already
prohibit employees from working on the secondary conductor without
using electrical protective equipment rated for the primary voltage on
either the primary conductor or the employee.
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\271\ The minimum approach distance for 15 kilovolts is 0.65
meters at elevations of 900 meters or less, but increases at higher
elevations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final paragraph (d)(2) does not apply to voltages of 600 volts and
less. Much of the work performed at these lower voltages involves the
use of insulating hand tools in a panelboard or cabinet. The chance of
contacting a live part during this work is low because of the layout of
live parts within the enclosure and the use of the insulated tool to
maintain a safe distance from the live parts. The electrical clearances
between energized parts for voltages in this range are small enough
that all energized circuit parts normally will be in front of the
employee, enabling the employee to maintain the required minimum
approach distance easily. This paragraph also does not apply when the
voltage exceeds 72.5 kilovolts, because the minimum approach distances
generally become greater beyond this voltage and because employees
cannot use rubber insulating equipment for protection at these higher
voltages.
Mr. Lee Marchessault of Workplace Safety Solutions recommended that
paragraph (d)(2) apply to exposed parts energized at more than 300
volts rather than 600 volts, noting that this application would expand
the scope of the requirement to "underground, power plant and meter
work on exposed 480 volt secondary systems" (Ex. 0196).
As explained previously, and in the preamble to the proposed rule
(70 FR 34865), employees typically use insulated tools to work on this
equipment. In addition, a working position requirement is inappropriate
for this equipment because much of this equipment is at ground level,
where employees easily and frequently adjust their working positions
while they work. (In contrast, when employees are working at elevated
locations, where employees perform most of the energized work on higher
voltages, employees work from a fixed position determined by the
location of an aerial lift platform or their positioning straps.
Therefore, the Agency did not adopt Mr. Marchessault's recommendation
to expand the scope of final paragraph (d)(2).
Proposed paragraph (d)(2) did not apply to situations involving
employees insulated from the energized parts or performing live-line
barehand work. However, many rulemaking participants expressed concern
that proposed paragraph (d)(2) did not fully account for work practices
involving the use of live-line tools. (See, for example, Exs. 0125,
0127, 0149, 0151, 0155, 0159, 0164, 0172, 0179, 0188, 0226, 0471; Tr.
1237, 1245-1246.) The comments of Ms. Tracy Harness with the Northwest
Line Constructors Chapter of NECA typified these concerns:
This requirement proposes to add a greater working distance for
an employee working near energized exposed parts at more than 600
volts, but not more than 72.5 kilovolts if the employee is not
insulated from the energized exposed part or performing live-line
bare-hand work. This additional distance is proposed to prevent an
employee from accidentally reaching into the minimum approach
distance from their working position without protection . . . In
many states employees use insulated sticks to perform work on
energized parts above 600 volts. On page 34862 of the Federal
Register it appears that OSHA recognizes the difference when using
an insulated stick by not requiring this additional distance for
work above 72.5 kilovolts. A number of states do not allow the use
of protective gloves to work on energized parts above 5,000 volts.
There are no requirements for employees to wear insulated gloves
when using an insulated stick.
Will OSHA consider an employee using an insulated stick exempt
from having to maintain the added positioning distance for all
voltages above 600 volts?
If not, we request that OSHA reconsider this issue due to the
increased ergonomic risk it will place on employees. Requiring
employees to hold the stick at a greater distance from the object
they are handling or working on can put more stress on wrists,
elbows and shoulders by changing the leverage point. We do not
believe that the industry fatalities that support the proposed
change occurred while employees were using insulated sticks. [Ex.
0188]
A live-line tool used by an employee to work on an energized part
insulates the employee from that part. As noted earlier and in the
preamble to the proposed rule (70 FR 34862), a live-line tool holds the
energized part at a distance. Using a live-line tool, an employee can
easily maintain minimum approach distances, at least once the tool is
engaged with the energized part. The working position requirement in
proposed paragraph (d)(2) did not apply to employees insulated from the
energized parts, including employees working on live parts with live-
line tools. However, there may be energized parts in the work area
other than the one the worker is handling with the tool, and he or she
would not be insulated from those parts by the live-line tool. Thus, it
was less clear from the language in the proposed rule whether a worker
using a live-line tool on one part would be required to position
himself or herself out of reach of the minimum approach distances from
other energized parts.
OSHA examined the accident reports in Ex. 0004 and found that only
five of the 800 accidents in that database involved employees using the
live-line tool work method approaching too close to an energized part
operating between 600 volts and 72.5 kilovolts (Ex. 0004).\272\ This
compares to the 27 other accidents involving uninsulated employees
coming too close to energized parts noted previously. In addition,
employees using live-line tools generally are looking in the direction
of the live parts, are constantly aware of the presence of energized
parts, and position themselves by means of the live-line tool at a
fixed distance from the energized part on which they are working. Thus,
it is much less likely that these employees (compared to employees not
working on energized parts) will inadvertently encroach on the minimum
approach distances for parts not being worked on. The Agency concludes
that, although there is still some risk for employees using live-line
tools, that risk is much lower than for employees not insulated at all
from energized parts. Consequently, OSHA is adopting the commenters'
suggestion and is exempting work performed with live-line tools from
final paragraph (d)(2). This exemption only applies to work performed
using live-line tools. Thus, an employee who is hanging hardware on a
pole without the use of a tool or electrical protective equipment must
be in a position where he or she cannot reach into the minimum approach
distance of any part energized at 601 volts to 72.5 kilovolts, even if
the employee performs other work on that pole using live-line tools.
OSHA revised the language in Appendix B addressing the issue of proper
work positioning to explain clearly how to comply with the minimum
approach-distance requirements adopted in the final rule.
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\272\ See the five accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170378616&id=170577688&id=170336325&id=170089197&id=792739.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (e) of Sec. 1926.960 in the final rule, which is being
adopted without substantive change from the proposal, addresses the
practices of connecting and disconnecting lines and equipment. Common
industry practice, as specified in the 2002 NESC, Rule 443F,\273\ is
for employees to make connections by connecting the source as the last
item in the sequence and to break connections by removing the source as
the first item in the sequence (Ex. 0077). These practices, specified
by
paragraphs (e)(1) and (e)(2) in the final rule, will ensure that the
wire or device handled by an employee remains deenergized as long as
possible, thereby minimizing the chance that an electrical accident
will occur. Also, to prevent energizing any disconnected conductors,
employers must ensure that employees keep loose ends of conductors away
from exposed, energized parts, as required by final paragraph (e)(3).
These three provisions, which have no counterparts in existing Subpart
V, duplicate the requirements of existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\273\ The 2012 NESC contains the same requirement in Rule 443F.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (f) of final Sec. 1926.960, which OSHA adopted from
existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(6)(i), provides that, when employees perform
work within reach of exposed, energized parts, the employer must ensure
that each employee removes, or renders nonconductive, all exposed
conductive articles, such as keys or watches, if those articles would
increase the hazards associated with contact with the energized parts.
If an employee wears metal jewelry, he or she could cover the jewelry
so as to eliminate the contact hazard. This requirement does not
preclude workers from wearing metal rings or watch bands if the work
already exposes them to electric-shock hazards and if the metal would
not increase those hazards. (For example, for work performed on an
overhead line, the wearing of a ring would not increase the likelihood
that an employee would contact the line, nor would it increase the
severity of the injury should contact occur.) This requirement protects
employees working on energized circuits with small clearances and high
current capacities (such as some battery-supplied circuits) from severe
burn hazards. The rule also protects workers minimally exposed to shock
hazards from injuries resulting from a dangling chain's making contact
with an energized part. This provision has no counterpart in existing
subpart V.
The North Carolina Department of Labor recommended expanding the
list of prohibited articles or discussing other conductive articles in
the preamble to the final rule (Ex. 0098). The State agency pointed to
an OSHA interpretation related to a comparable provision in existing
Sec. 1910.333(c)(8).
The interpretation to which the North Carolina Department of Labor
referred was an intraagency memorandum dated December 30, 1993, and it
related to whether Sec. 1910.333(c)(8), which is similar to proposed
Sec. 1926.960(f), prohibits metal eyeglasses.\274\ This interpretation
reads as follows:
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\274\ This memorandum is available at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21350.
Eyeglasses with exposed metal parts are considered "Conductive
apparel". As noted in the middle of column 2 of page 32007 of the
preamble published in Volume 55, Number 151 of the Federal Register
on Monday, August 6, 1990, the Electrical Safety Related Work
Practice standard at 1910.333(c)(8) prohibits employees from wearing
conductive objects in a manner presenting an electrical contact
hazard. Normally, the wearing of eyeglasses containing exposed metal
frames (or metal parts of frames) is not considered to present an
electrical contact hazard. However, when the glasses have a metal
type frame and the employee is working with his or her face
extremely close to energized parts or when a metallic chain strap is
attached to the frame for wearing around the neck, an electrical
contact hazard can be present. In such cases, the standard permits
the hazard to be removed by eliminating the chain and wearing either
a protective face shield or appropriate safety glasses over the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
metal frame optical glasses.
OSHA confirms that this interpretation also applies to paragraph
(f) of the final rule. However, because eyeglasses would rarely pose
the hazards addressed by this provision, the Agency concludes that it
is not necessary to mention eyeglasses as an example of the type of
conductive article prohibited by paragraph (f). Therefore, OSHA is
adopting paragraph (f) in the final rule without substantive change
from the proposal.
Protection From Flames and Electric Arcs
Paragraph (g) of the final rule addresses protective clothing and
other personal protective equipment worn by employees exposed to
hazards posed by flames and electric arcs. OSHA revised the title of
paragraph (g) in the final rule to "Protection from flames and
electric arcs" to reflect more accurately that this paragraph
addresses forms of protection other than protective clothing. (For the
same reason, OSHA included language in final paragraph (g)(5) to be
clear that that provision requires both protective clothing and other
protective equipment.) In the 1994 rulemaking on Sec. 1910.269, OSHA
determined that electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution workers face a significant risk of injury from burns due
to electric arcs (59 FR 4388). In that rulemaking, OSHA also concluded
that certain fabrics increase the extent of injuries to employees
caught in an electric arc or otherwise exposed to flames (59 FR 4389).
Therefore, the Agency adopted two rules: (1) Existing Sec.
1910.269(l)(6)(ii), which requires that employers train employees
exposed to flames and electric arcs in the hazards related to the
clothing that they wear, and (2) existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(6)(iii),
which requires employers to ensure that employees exposed to flames or
electric arcs do not wear clothing that, when exposed to flames or
arcs, could increase the extent of injuries sustained by the workers. A
note following existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(6)(iii) indicates the types
of clothing fabrics that the Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking record
demonstrated were hazardous when worn by employees exposed to electric
arcs, namely, acetate, nylon, polyester, and rayon. The note explains
that the standard prohibits the use of clothing made from these types
of fabric unless the employer can demonstrate that the fabric was
treated to withstand any relevant conditions or the employee wears it
in a manner that eliminates the hazard.
Need for protection from electric arcs and hazard assessment. Even
after existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(6) became effective,\275\ employees
continue to sustain burn injuries when working on energized lines and
equipment. In the preamble to the 2005 Subpart V proposal, OSHA noted
that, from January 1, 1990, to October 30, 1994, there were 46
accidents investigated by Federal OSHA or State-plan occupational
safety and health agencies involving burns addressed later by Sec.
1910.269(l)(6)(iii) (70 FR 34866). These 46 accidents resulted in 71
total injuries (id.). Averaged over this period, there were 9.5
accidents and 14.7 injuries per year. Also in the preamble to the 2005
proposal, OSHA noted that, from November 1, 1994 (when Sec.
1910.269(l)(6)(iii) became effective), to December 31, 1998, there were
17 relevant accidents resulting in 26 injuries (id.). Averaged over
this period, there were 4.0 accidents and 6.2 injuries per year. Thus,
while the clothing rule in Sec. 1910.269 appeared to reduce the number
of relevant accidents and injuries by more than 50 percent, OSHA
believed that the remaining risk of burn injury was still serious and
significant when it published the proposal in 2005.
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\275\ The original Federal Register notice promulgating Sec.
1910.269 set an effective date for Sec. 1910.269(l)(6) of May 31,
1994 (59 FR 4320). However, OSHA subsequently stayed the enforcement
of Sec. 1910.269(l)(6)(iii) until November 1, 1994 (59 FR 33658;
June 30, 1994).
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OSHA based its belief that the risk of burn injury was serious and
significant on two assumptions. First, the accidents identified in the
2005 preamble
represented only a small fraction of the accidents that occurred during
this period because employers must report to the Agency only accidents
involving a fatality or three or more hospitalized injuries (29 CFR
1904.39(a)). In this regard, OSHA generally does not investigate
accidents that are not reported by employers (see OSHA directives CPL
02-00-150 and CPL 02-00-094). Therefore, OSHA does not investigate, or
have documentation of, most injury-producing accidents, even serious
ones, so data on these accidents are not included in the information
that OSHA reviewed. Second, the reported burn injuries identified in
the 2005 preamble were extremely serious and costly. Eighty-four
percent of the burn injuries were fatalities or required
hospitalization (70 FR 34866). Eighty-seven percent of the accidents
for which the report lists the severity of the injury involved third-
degree burns (id.). Such burns are extremely painful and costly,
typically requiring skin grafts and leaving permanent scars.
Dr. Mary Capelli-Schellpfeffer testified as OSHA's expert witness
on the subject of protecting workers from the hazards posed by electric
arcs. Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer received her medical degree from the
University of Florida in 1982. She also holds a master's degree in
public administration. Following her postgraduate medical training and
several years in private practice, Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer served as
the medical director of Wisconsin Energy Company, which included an
electric utility and a nuclear power generating plant. She joined the
University of Chicago, Department of Surgery Faculty, in 1993, where
she served as the director of the hyperbaric unit of the University of
Chicago Burn Center. Since 1999, she has worked as a consultant,
researcher, and teacher, and has treated employees in outpatient
clinical settings. She is licensed as a physician in Wisconsin,
Illinois, and Maryland, and she is board certified by the American
College of Preventive Medicine. Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer is also a
member of the American College of Occupational and Environmental
Medicine and a fellow of IEEE (Tr. 175-177).
In her prepared testimony for the 2006 public hearing, Dr. Capelli-
Schellpfeffer described the physical properties of an electric arc and
possible injury following exposure to an arc as follows:
[A]n electric arc exposure in a 480 V installation with 22.6 kA
available current is . . . captured on video from a high voltage
test laboratory. . . . In the . . . test, data results showed peak
monitored temperature exceeded 225 degrees C in 10 ms at the
mannequin's hand, and at the mannequin's neck at 120 ms. Cooling of
the hand to 70 degrees C required more than 2500 ms.
The injuries that accompany high temperature exposures at the
body surface are commonly referred to as skin burns. High
temperature exposures that occur volumetrically, or that distribute
within the body's tissues, are also called burns. The term burn
generally refers to a physico-chemical change in the human tissue.
For example, most people are familiar with the appearance of a
superficial sunburn, and how painful this can be. As the skin's
appearance changes more severely, the burn trauma is more profound,
and can affect other organ systems. When skin changes are
irreversible and irreparable, the trauma is severe.
Other organs beside the skin can be burned. The mechanism or way
organ injury unfolds in response to temperature is again sensitive
to the temperature peak, duration, and biophysical processes.
Additionally, the form of energy which creates the temperature
rise can influence the injury, once more because of biophysical
processes. For example, temperature change in the eye and
recognition of the resulting injury from conductive heat exposure
(like a piece of molten metal on the cornea) will be different than
the injury from a radiation exposure (like UV light).
The latent heat of melting subsequent to an electric arc can
also serve as an ignition hazard for clothing. This means that along
with the hazard from an arc's heat burning the skin, there is
additional possibility of severe harm from the arc burning up
clothing which lies against the skin. Burning clothing against the
skin creates damage to the skin through conductive heating for the
extended time which might be necessary to extinguish the clothing
and start cooling.
* * * * *
[T]est results illustrated the high degree of variability in
electric arc faults and led to excerpts of video images into time-
lapsed photographs. The test results also provided exposure data.
Finally, the stop action frames of video recordings permitted
visualization of the dynamic changes in the tests involving the
mannequin worker.
Of particular note in the stop action frames of video recordings
is the explosive speed and "blast" character of electric arcs.
These images allow for the viewing of a destructive plasma ball,
flames, and waves of air, smoke, and other gases.
The heating from the sub-second thermal expansion of air and
vaporization by sublimation of metallic conductors leads to pressure
waves, referred to as the "thermo acoustic effect" of an electric
arc.
* * * * *
[A picture] illustrates the extent of injury that can follow an
electric arc exposure. Eyes, ears, face, skin, limbs, and organs are
affected. Basic bodily function, including the ability to breath[e],
eat, urinate, and sleep are completely changed. For this patient,
initial medical treatment cost more than $650,000, including five
surgeries; $250,000 for reconstructive surgeries for five subsequent
admissions; and $250,000 for [5] years of rehabilitation including
over 100 physician visits and numerous therapy sessions. These costs
represent only direct medical expenditures, without inclusion of
indirect employer and family costs . . . . [Ex. 0373; emphasis
included in original]
Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer's testimony reveals the power and injury-
producing effects of electric arcs. She also highlights the potential
extent and costs of these injuries.
OSHA's existing clothing requirement in Sec. 1910.269 does not
require employers to protect employees from electric arcs through the
use of flame-resistant (FR) clothing. It simply requires that an
employee's clothing do no greater harm. Because the remaining risk to
power workers from electric arcs is serious, the Agency proposed to
revise the standard to require the use of flame-resistant clothing,
under certain circumstances, to protect employees from severe burns. As
OSHA noted in the preamble to the proposal (70 FR 34866), the electric
power industry is beginning to recognize this need, as evidenced by the
many employers that provide flame-resistant clothing to employees (see,
for example, Ex. 0080), in ASTM standards that provide for arc ratings
of protective clothing \276\ (see, for example, Exs. 0061, 0065, 0131,
0326), and by the adoption of protective-clothing requirements in the
2007 NESC \277\ (Ex. 0533). The National Fire Protection Association
also recognizes the need to protect employees working on energized
equipment from the hazards posed by electric arcs (see, for example,
Ex. 0134).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\276\ ASTM also has standards for other arc-protective
equipment, including ASTM F2178-08, Standard Test Method for
Determining the Arc Rating and Standard Specification for Face
Protective Products.
\277\ The 2012 NESC also contains protective-clothing
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When OSHA promulgated Sec. 1910.269, there were no standards for
clothing to protect employees from the thermal hazards resulting from
electric arcs. Since then, ASTM adopted such standards (see, for
example, Exs. 0061, 0065, 0131, 0326). These standards ensure that
clothing does not ignite and that it is rated to provide protection
against a specific level of heat energy. Manufacturers label apparel
meeting the ASTM standards with the amount of heat energy that the
clothing can absorb under laboratory test conditions without letting
through sufficient heat to cause a second-degree burn.\278\ Such
clothing
currently is widely available in ratings from about 4 cal/cm \2\ to
over 50 cal/cm \2\ (Tr. 412). In general, the higher the rating, the
heavier the clothing; however, lighter fabrics now provide a level of
protection equivalent to heavier fabrics used in the past (Tr. 440).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\278\ OSHA explains the arc rating for clothing in the summary
and explanation for final paragraph (g)(5), under the heading
Selecting arc-rated protective clothing and other protective
equipment, later in this section of the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some rulemaking participants generally supported OSHA's proposal to
require the use of FR clothing \279\ in certain circumstances. (See,
for example, Exs. 0155, 0230, 0235, 0241, 0505; Tr. 895-897.) IBEW,
ESCI, and the Independent Electrical Contractors, among others,
supported FR clothing requirements (Exs. 0155, 0230, 0241, 0505; Tr.
895-897). ORC voiced general support for the proposal's approach to
arc-flash protection, commenting:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\279\ The final rule requires arc-rated clothing (which also is
flame-resistant) in some circumstances and FR clothing in others.
When the distinction is unimportant, as when discussing general
comments on the need for protective clothing, OSHA uses the term
"FR clothing," even though the final rule may require that
clothing also be arc rated. For a detailed explanation of the
difference between FR clothing and arc-rated clothing, see the
summary and explanation for final paragraph (g)(5), under the
heading Selecting arc-rated protective clothing and other protective
equipment, later in this section of the preamble.
ORC generally supports the proposed requirements to protect
employees from the thermal hazards of electric arcs. Assessing the
potential for employee exposure to hazards from flames or electric
arcs is appropriate for employees working with or near energized
equipment and where their work clothing could be ignited directly by
molten metals or electric arcs or by flammable materials ignited by
an electric arc. Prohibiting the wearing of clothing that could melt
or ignite and requiring the wearing of flame-resistant and
appropriate arc-rated clothing based on the extent of the hazards
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
present are also appropriate. [Ex. 0235]
Many electric utility representatives generally opposed the
proposed requirements for protection from electric arcs. (See, for
example, Exs. 0177, 0183, 0202, 0220, 0227, 0233, 0238, 0401; Tr. 371-
374, 1093-1104, 1184-1185.) Some of these rulemaking participants
suggested that the requirements in existing Sec. 1910.269 were
sufficiently protective and that there was insufficient evidence of a
need to adopt more protective requirements. (See, for example, Exs.
0177, 0181, 0227.) For instance, Consumers Energy stated that, in its
experience, existing Sec. 1910.269(1)(6)(iii) "has been largely
effective" (Ex. 0177). Some commenters argued that the accidents that
occurred were the result of employees violating safety-related work
rules. (See, for example, Exs. 0152, 0238.) For instance, Mr. Frank
Owen Brockman with Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation
commented: "Most people are . . . injured not by arcs and their heat,
but by not following the simple, most basic rules" (Ex. 0401).
OSHA acknowledges that the adoption of existing Sec. 1910.269 in
1994 led to a reduction in the number (and potentially the severity) of
burn and other injuries incurred by power line workers exposed to
electric arcs. However, the Agency concludes that existing Sec.
1910.269 has not been sufficiently protective in preventing these
injuries.
As noted earlier, the 6.2 injuries per year that OSHA identified as
being caused by electric arcs represent only a small fraction of such
injuries experienced by electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution workers. Moreover, the vast majority of the injuries OSHA
identified are extremely serious, such as the accident described in Dr.
Capelli-Schellpfeffer's testimony.
OSHA's final regulatory analysis estimates that there are 444
serious injuries occurring each year during work addressed by the final
rule. This estimate was derived by multiplying the 25 serious injuries
actually reported annually over the period examined by a specified
correction factor to account for undercounting. (See Section VI, Final
Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in the
preamble to the final rule.) Multiplying the 6.2 reported serious arc-
related injuries by the ratio of 444 estimated injuries to 25 reported
injuries yields an estimate of 110 serious arc-related injuries still
occurring each year. As noted earlier, the vast majority of these
injuries involve third-degree burns.
Existing Sec. 1910.269 requires extensive training in electrical
safety-related work practices, and evidence in the record indicates
that workers covered by this final rule receive extensive training in
these practices and are highly qualified to perform electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution work. Mr. Albert Smoak with
Southwestern Electric Power Company stated, "We have a very extensive
apprentice program. And so we spend lots of money doing that. Our
apprentices are very well trained" (Tr. 1229). Mr. William Mattiford
of Henkels & McCoy testified, "Employees are trained either by Henkels
and McCoy or other construction companies or have undergone extensive
training in a certified apprenticeship program" (Tr. 1318-1319).
Similar statements appear elsewhere in the rulemaking record. (See, for
example, Tr. 1238-1239.) As the data show, however, serious arc-related
incidents continue to occur during work covered by this final rule.
Even Mr. Brockman recognized that "in the majority of [accidents], the
fatality involved [a] worker who had been appropriately trained for the
exposure" (Tr. 1278).
It would be contrary to the purposes of the OSH Act for the Agency
to set standards based on an expectation that there will be perfect
compliance with work-rule requirements. To be effective, such work-rule
provisions rely, in part, on employee compliance with employer work
practices. Because there will always be occasional instances of
noncompliance with work rules, OSHA standards incorporate secondary
protective measures. Moreover, arcs can occur as a result of
circumstances that work rules cannot control. For example, electric
arcs can result from accidents, such as an employee's dropping a tool
onto energized parts (Ex. 0004 \280\). According to Dr. Capelli-
Schellpfeffer, other causes of electric arcs on electric utility
systems include transient overvoltage disturbances (such as lightning,
switching surges, arcing ground fault in ungrounded systems),
mechanical breaking, cracking, loosening, abrading or deforming of
static or structural parts, and shorting by animals (Ex. 0373). These
types of electric arcs generally do not result from poor work
practices. Exhibit 0004 describes 100 accidents involving electric
arcs. More than 10 percent of those accidents involved equipment
failure or internal faults.\281\ Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer testified
about one of the reasons for this type of event:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\280\ See, for example, the accident described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=201841061.
\281\ See the 12 accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=201340395&id=170749873&id=170632699&id=170762769&id=14343594&id=170238109
&id=170891899&id=170358428&id=170888259&id=170727697&id=14241863&id=170193353.
There is more available power in the electric system, and the
higher availables put more stress, electromechanical stress, on the
infrastructure, at the same time that the infrastructure that we
have installed is mature. It is aging. And so there is a transition
in the experience of the power systems from fairly low levels of
available power and a relatively young infrastructure from the time
of the 1950s and `60s, to where we are today at the beginning of the
21st century where the availables are orders of magnitude higher,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and the infrastructure is far more mature. [Tr. 205-206]
IBEW explained:
Arcs can occur for reasons totally independent of the conduct of
employees or the utilities or contractors. Thus, arcs can result
from the presence of rodents, changes in mechanical properties,
environmental
conditions or the amount of stress that increasing amounts of
available power are putting on the aging infrastructure. [Tr.] 205,
207. Arc events are complicated and variable, and no one strategy
for preventing or protecting against them will be "maximally
protective." Moreover, whatever the reason for an arc flash, the
fact is that they occur in the electrical transmission and
distribution industry, and there are measures that can be taken to
minimize the hazard they pose to employees. As Dr. Capelli-
Schellpfeffer noted, employee protection requires a "multifactorial
approach," [Tr.] 210, which includes the use of FR clothing so that
if all else fails, employees will remain protected. [Ex. 0505]
The Agency, thus, continues to believe that further reductions in
the number and severity of arc-flash-related injuries will result from
adopting requirements that provide protection from electric arcs in a
way that supplements the existing requirements in Sec. 1910.269
designed to prevent electric arcs and the ignition of clothing when
arcs do occur. OSHA concludes that, under existing Sec. 1910.269 and
subpart V, the risks associated with electric arcs warrant additional
protection for employees.
The Agency does agree with APPA, however, that protective clothing
"is not a comprehensive solution to eliminating fire related injuries
in [the electric utility] industry" (Ex. 0504). Paragraph (g) of the
final rule protects employees in case an electric arc occurs in spite
of other provisions in the final rule designed to prevent them from
happening in the first place.
The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) recommended that,
even if the Agency found that there is a significant risk of arc-flash
burns for activities covered by this final rule, it should state
clearly that no findings indicate whether there is significant risk for
activities outside the scope of the final rule (Ex. 0222). The
association maintained that Sec. Sec. 1910.132 and 1926.95 do not
presently require arc-flash hazard assessments or arc-rated clothing
and that there is no justification for citations under those standards
or the general duty clause. NAM also recommended that the Agency
instruct its enforcement personnel not to issue such citations.
The risk findings OSHA makes in this preamble regarding hazards
posed by electric arcs address only the types of work covered by this
final rule. However, some existing general industry and construction
standards already address these hazards. For example, Sec.
1910.335(a)(2)(ii) requires the use of protective shields, barriers, or
insulating materials "to protect each employee from shock, burns, or
other electrically related injuries while that employee is working . .
. where dangerous electric heating or arcing might occur" (emphasis
added). Furthermore, Sec. 1926.95(a) requires personal protective
equipment "wherever it is necessary by reason of hazards of processes
or environment, chemical hazards, radiological hazards, or mechanical
irritants encountered in a manner capable of causing injury or
impairment in the function of any part of the body through absorption,
inhalation, or physical contact." Also, the generally applicable PPE
provisions for both general industry and construction--Sec. Sec.
1910.132(a) and 1926.95(a)--specifically mention "protective
clothing" as one form of required protection. The Agency described its
enforcement policy relating to the protection of employees from
electric-arc hazards in certain situations not covered by this final
rule in several letters of interpretation. (See, for example, the
November 14, 2006, letter to Ms. Joanne Linhard and the February 29,
2008, letter to Mr. Brian Dolin.\282\)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\282\ The Dolin letter is available at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=25973.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several commenters argued against the proposed requirements for
arc-protective clothing on the grounds that it is expensive and
uncomfortable. (See, for example, Exs. 0158, 0183, 0202, 0229, 0233,
0239.) For instance, NRECA commented:
Data so far suggest that arc protective clothing is expensive
and is uncomfortable to wear, especially in hot and humid climates.
Of course, the discomfort in wearing arc protective clothing is
largely because it must act as a heat shield and, therefore, it is
inherently bulky. [Ex. 0233]
OSHA finds that the costs associated with the requirements of
paragraph (g) of the final rule are commensurate with the benefits
resulting from those requirements. (For a detailed response to this
issue, see the discussion of comments on balance of risk and costs in
employing protective equipment to prevent arc-related burns in Section
VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later
in the preamble to the final rule.)
As explained later in this section of the preamble, OSHA determined
that the PPE required by paragraph (g) of the final rule is not likely
to be unduly uncomfortable for employees to wear. In any event, the
Agency does not believe that discomfort alone would justify deleting
Sec. 1926.960(g) from the final rule. Complaints that PPE is
uncomfortable have been common throughout the Agency's history. For
example, employees have complained that hard hats and eye protection
are too uncomfortable to wear. (See, for example, I.T.O. Corp. of New
England v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976), noting "employee
complaints that the [hard] hats created minor inconveniences e.g.,
because they were too heavy, too light, too hot, or too cold"; and
Lewis County Dairy Corp., 2006 WL 3247249, at *10 (03-1533, 2006)
(ALJ), noting that "[the plant manager] knew that employees did not
always wear eye protection and that it was difficult to get them to do
so as they found it uncomfortable.") In this rulemaking, the tree
trimming industry complained that employees find body harnesses
uncomfortable. (See, for example, Exs. 0174, 0200, 0219.) Although OSHA
generally advises employers to take the comfort of protective equipment
into consideration when selecting appropriate protective items for
their employees, the Agency concludes that the potential for complaints
about comfort does not outweigh the strong evidence that there is a
safety need for employees covered by this final rule to use PPE when
exposed to electric-arc hazards.
Paragraph (g)(1) of the final rule, which is being adopted without
substantive change from the proposal, requires the employer to assess
the workplace to identify employees exposed to hazards from flames or
electric arcs.\283\ This provision ensures that the employer evaluates
employee exposure to flames and electric arcs so that employees who
face such exposures receive the required protection. Because final
Sec. 1926.960 applies to work performed on or near exposed, energized
parts of electric circuits, employers do not need to conduct
assessments under paragraph (g)(1) for employees who do not perform
such work. However, until the employer ensures the complete
deenergization of a line or part of an electric circuit following the
procedures required by final Sec. 1926.961, including any required
testing and grounding, the line or part must be considered and treated
as energized as required by final Sec. 1926.960(b)(2). Also, final
paragraphs (g)(2) through (g)(5) protect employees only from the
thermal hazards posed by flames and electric arcs. Therefore, if
the hazard assessment required by paragraph (g)(1) shows employee
exposure to other hazards, then other standards, such as Sec. Sec.
1910.132(a) and 1926.95(a), may require the employer to provide PPE for
those hazards. (See the discussion under the heading Protecting
employees from flying debris from electric arcs, later in this section
of the preamble.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\283\ Under paragraph (g)(1), employers need not identify
employees by name. The required identification can also be
occupation based, task based, or location based provided that each
employee exposed to hazards from flames or from electric arcs
receives the protection that paragraph (g) requires.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final paragraph (g)(1) requires the employer to assess the
workplace to identify employees "exposed to hazards from flames or
from electric arcs." A few commenters requested that OSHA define this
phrase in the final rule (Exs. 0170, 0222, 0237). These commenters
argued that simply operating electric equipment, such as a disconnect
switch in an electrical box, does not pose a significant risk of injury
from an electric arc. For example, the American Forest & Paper
Association stated these concerns as follows:
[W]e are concerned that the language of proposed Sections
1910.269(l)(11) and 1926.960(g) could have unintended consequences
if interpreted to apply to employees not exposed to a significant
risk * * *
* * * * *
[W]e do not believe the individual who opens or closes the
electrical disconnect on an enclosed electrical box or panel with
the cover on/closed would be exposed to a significant risk of harm
from arc flash hazards, but that is not clear from the proposed
regulatory text or the preamble. A contrary interpretation would
involve a huge increase in the cost of both the proposed standards
and their potential extension outside the Electric Power Sector.
[Ex. 0237; emphasis in original; footnote omitted.]
If the employer properly installs and maintains enclosed equipment
and if there is no evidence of impending failure, the risk that an
electric arc will occur is low enough that the Agency would not deem
there to be exposure to electric-arc hazards.\284\ For the purposes of
final paragraph (g), OSHA will consider an employee "exposed" to
electric-arc hazards whenever there is a reasonable likelihood that an
electric arc will occur in the employee's work area. The Agency
considers there to be a reasonable likelihood that an electric arc will
occur whenever the probability of such an event is higher than it is
for the normal operation of enclosed equipment.\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\284\ There is still a low risk that the equipment will fail
(with or without an employee operating it); however, that risk is
low enough that no arc-flash protection is necessary. This risk is
equivalent to the risk encountered by employees every day when they
turn on the lights.
\285\ Basically, OSHA considers there to be a reasonable
likelihood that an electric arc will occur when an employee operates
enclosed electric equipment in a manner that is not in accordance
with the manufacturer's recommendations (that is, normal operation)
or when an employee operates enclosed electric equipment that the
employer has not maintained properly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In contrast, whenever the risk that an arc will occur is higher
than the risk of such an occurrence posed by the normal operation of
enclosed equipment, the Agency considers electric-arc hazards to be
present. For example, operating equipment that is not enclosed (for
example, racking in a circuit breaker) poses such a risk (Ex. 0004
\286\). Conductive objects can fall onto exposed live parts and cause
an arc. Evidence that the equipment may be defective, for example,
arcing noises or unusual behavior or heating, indicates that there is
employee exposure to the hazards of electric arcs (id. \287\). Also,
working near energized parts exposes employees to electric-arc hazards
whenever the employee or another conductive object can contact those
energized parts and other parts at a different potential (id. \288\).
(See the definition of "exposed" and the summary and explanation for
final Sec. 1926.960(b)(3), earlier in this section of the preamble.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\286\ See, for example, the three accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=14328736&id=200962322&id=170197156.
\287\ See, for example, the two accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170762769&id=170204622.
\288\ See, for example, the three accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170054258&id=170614002&id=170611057.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the American Forest & Paper Association's comment
about opening and closing disconnects in an enclosed electrical box,
evidence in the record indicates that equipment enclosures do not
always provide adequate protection against electrical faults (Ex.
0373). A paper by Jones et al. \289\ described the results of one
arcing-fault test as follows: "the fault blew the door open and
progressed up the vertical bus, completely destroying the vertical
section of the [motor control center]" (id.). A paper by Land \290\
described problems the Navy had in 1979 with arcing faults in
switchboards: "These arcs could completely destroy a switchboard
within a matter of seconds" (id.). Although these events may be
uncommon, OSHA believes that it is appropriate for the standard to
require the employer to assess the hazards posed by different
operations and distinguish conditions that expose employees to
electric-arc hazards from conditions that do not. For example,
employers may consider a properly maintained switch as posing no
electric-arc hazards when an employee is opening it under normal
conditions. On the other hand, if there is evidence that the switch may
be faulty or if the employee is opening the switch to troubleshoot the
circuit, OSHA would expect the employer to assume that the switch does
pose electric-arc hazards. Evidence that a switch may be faulty can
include the presence of arcing or unusual noise from the switch,
abnormally high temperatures around the switch, and safety bulletins
from the switch manufacturer indicating that the device might fail
under certain operating conditions. Thus, OSHA concludes that it is not
always safe to operate an enclosed switch and, therefore, is not
generally exempting such activities from the hazard-assessment
requirement in final paragraph (g)(1) or any of the other provisions in
final paragraph (g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\289\ Jones, R. A., Liggett, D. P., Capelli-Schellpfeffer, M.,
Macalady, T., Saunders, L. F., Downey, R. E., McClung, L. B., Smith,
A., Jamil, S., Saporita, V. J., "Staged Tests Increase Awareness of
Arc-Flash Hazards in Electrical Equipment," IEEE Transactions on
Industry Applications Society, 36(2): 659-667, March-April 2000.
\290\ Land III, H. B., "The Behavior of Arcing Faults in Low
Voltage Switchboards," 2005 IEEE ESTS, Philadelphia, pp. 133-140,
2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA does not believe that applying paragraph (g)(1) of the final
rule in this manner will impose substantial extra costs on employers.
The Agency anticipates that, in the vast majority of cases, the
employer will determine that employees operating enclosed switches will
have no exposure to hazards from electric arcs. On the basis of the
foregoing discussion, it should be clear that the only occasions that
an employee performing a switching operation would have exposure to
electric-arc hazards under paragraph (g)(1), and, thus, be required to
use arc-rated protection, would be if: a switch or other disconnect may
be faulty (which should be rare); an employee operates a switch outside
its rating \291\ (which also should be rare), or an employee is
performing troubleshooting or repair on the switch or a circuit
controlled by the switch. In the latter case, the employee will be
exposed to those same hazards during the troubleshooting or repair
activities, when appropriate arc-flash protection would be required
anyway. For the rare cases in which the employer has reason to believe
that the switch might fail and expose an employee to an electric-arc
hazard, the protection afforded by arc-flash protection would be
necessary.
However, the need to outfit the employee in arc-flash protection in
such cases will serve as an incentive to effect repair of the switch
and remove the hazard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\291\ Operating a switch or other disconnect outside its rating
is prohibited by Sec. 1926.960(k) of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some commenters argued that some utilities perform work with live-
line tools, which limits employee exposure to hazards posed by electric
arcs and makes FR clothing unnecessary. (See, for example, Exs. 0125,
0171, 0179, 0188, 0226.) NECA also argued that 40-cal/cm\2\ arc-flash
suits with hoods would reduce manual dexterity to the point that they
would interfere with the employee's ability to use live-line tools (Ex.
0171).
OSHA agrees that work with live-line tools exposes employees to a
lower incident-energy level than work directly on energized parts with
rubber insulating gloves because employees working with live-line tools
are normally farther from an electric arc than employees using gloves.
(The tables in Appendix E use a method of estimating heat energy that
assumes that employees using live-line tools will be substantially
further away from the arc than employees using rubber insulating
gloves.) All of the incident-energy calculation methods (described
later in this section of the preamble) result in energy estimates that
are approximately inversely proportional to the square of the distance.
This proportion means that, when the employee is twice as far from the
electric arc, he or she has exposure to no more than a quarter of the
energy. OSHA does not believe that there are many, if any, working
conditions that would expose an employee using a live-line tool to an
incident energy of 40-cal/cm\2\. NECA's example using clothing
appropriate for such high exposure contradicts its claim that employees
using live-line tools face reduced exposures.
As discussed later in this section of the preamble, final paragraph
(g)(4)(iv) requires FR clothing when the estimated incident-energy
levels are more than 2.0 cal/cm\2\. If live-line tool work practices
limit incident-energy levels to that value or less, then paragraph
(g)(4) may not require flame-resistant clothing. However, clothing can
ignite even at low incident-energy levels. For example, an arc can
ignite insulating fluid in transformers and other equipment, which
could ultimately ignite clothing (Ex. 0004 \292\). Current passing
through grounding conductors can melt those conductors and ignite
clothing (id. \293\). Hot debris from faulted equipment can spew out
and ignite clothing (Exs. 0342, 0373). Final paragraph (g)(4), as
described more fully later in this section of the preamble, requires
flame-resistant clothing in those scenarios. OSHA is not exempting
live-line tool work from the hazard assessment or other requirements in
paragraph (g) of the final rule. Employers must account for the
possibility of clothing ignition from sources other than incident heat
energy in the hazard assessment required by paragraph (g)(1) of the
final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\292\ See the seven accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=200671253&id=201340395&id=170762769&id=170632699&id=14504773&id=14343594&id=837815.
\293\ See the accident described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=596304.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The American Forest & Paper Association commented that the proposed
definition of "exposed" in Sec. 1926.968 does not seem applicable to
the use of the word "exposed" in proposed Sec. 1926.960(g) because
the definition refers to a conductor or part rather than a person (Ex.
0237).
OSHA agrees that the definition in final Sec. 1926.968 relates
only to parts of electric circuits; it does not address employee
exposure to hazards other than exposure to live parts.\294\ To clarify
the application of the definition of "exposed" in Sec. 1926.968 of
the final rule, OSHA is adding the parenthetical phrase "(as applied
to energized parts)" to the defined term "exposed."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\294\ Several provisions in subpart V in addition to final Sec.
1926.960(g) refer to employee exposure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimating incident heat energy.\295\ Once an employer determines
the employees exposed to hazards from flames or electric arcs, the next
step in protecting these employees is to determine the extent of the
hazard. Paragraph (g)(2) of the final rule, which OSHA revised from the
proposal as described later in this section of the preamble, requires
the employer to make a reasonable estimate of the incident heat energy
to which each employee exposed to electric-arc hazards would be
exposed. Under final paragraph (g)(5), employers must use this estimate
to select appropriate PPE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\295\ This preamble uses the term "incident energy" as a
synonym for "incident heat energy."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted in the preamble to the proposal, OSHA is aware of various
methods of calculating values of available heat energy from an electric
circuit (70 FR 34866-34867). Table 10, later in this section of the
preamble, lists methods that were available when OSHA proposed
paragraph (g)(2). Each method requires the input of various parameters,
such as fault current, the expected length of the electric arc, the
distance from the arc to the employee, and the clearing time for the
fault (that is, the time the circuit protective devices take to open
the circuit and clear the fault). Some of these parameters, such as the
fault current and the clearing time, are known quantities for a given
system. Other parameters, such as the length of the arc and the
distance between the arc and the employee, vary depending on what
happens to initiate the electric arc and are estimated parameters. It
should be noted that NFPA 70E-2004 Annex D contains three different
methods of estimating incident heat energy: (1) a method based on a
paper by Lee entitled "The Other Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc Blast
Burns," \296\ also known as the "Lee equation"; (2) a method based
on the Doughty, Neal, and Floyd paper, which Table 10 lists separately;
and (3) the IEEE 1584 method, which Table 10 also lists
separately.\297\ The following discussion refers to the method based on
the Lee equation as the NFPA 70E Annex D method.\298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\296\ Lee, R. H., "The Other Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc
Blast Burns, " IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, 1A-
18(3):246--251, May/June 1982 (Ex. 0433).
\297\ NFPA 70E-2012, Annex D, contains the same three methods
plus an additional method for calculating incident heat energy for
dc systems. Although OSHA has not evaluated this new method,
employers may use it to calculate incident heat energy if it
reasonably predicts the incident energy for the system involved.
\298\ NFPA 70E-2012, Annex D, also contains the Lee equation.
Consequently, OSHA's conclusions regarding the NFPA 70E-2004 Annex D
method also apply to NFPA 70E-2012, and Appendix E to final Subpart
V references NFPA 70E-2012. Unless otherwise noted, the preamble
references to the content of NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, apply equally
to NFPA 70E-2012.
Table 10--Methods of Calculating Incident Heat Energy From an Electric
Arc
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Standard for Electrical Safety Requirements for Employee Workplaces,
NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, "Sample Calculation of Flash Protection
Boundary."
2. Doughty, T. E., Neal, T. E., and Floyd II, H. L., "Predicting
Incident Energy to Better Manage the Electric Arc Hazard on 600 V Power
Distribution Systems," Record of Conference Papers IEEE IAS 45th
Annual Petroleum and Chemical Industry Conference, September 28-30,
1998.
3. Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations, IEEE Std 1584-
2002.
4. Heat Flux Calculator, a free software program created by Alan
Privette (widely available on the Internet).
5. ARCPRO, a commercially available software program developed by
Kinectrics, Toronto, ON, CA.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Employee arc exposures. One of the following three separate types
of electric arcs typically serves as the basis for the methods used to
estimate incident energy: single-phase arc in open air, three-phase arc
in open air, and three-phase arc in an enclosure (arc in a box) (Exs.
0425, 0430, 0433, 0463, 0468, 0469). A single-phase arc occurs when
electric current arcs from a circuit part for one phase to ground or to
a circuit part for another phase. A three-phase arc involves arcing
between all three phases of a three-phase circuit. A single-phase arc
can escalate into a three-phase arc as the air around the arc ionizes
and becomes more conductive (Ex. 0425). Both kinds of arcs can occur in
open air or inside an enclosure. The incident-energy levels vary
between the types of arcs, with energy levels progressively increasing
from single-phase arcs in open air, to three-phase arcs in open air, to
three-phase arcs in a box (Exs. 0425, 0430, 0468). OSHA finds that, for
an estimate of heat energy to be reasonable, it must account for the
type of exposure the employee likely will encounter.
Varying results using different calculation methods. Many
rulemaking participants objected to the proposed requirement that
employers make a reasonable estimate of the incident heat energy
associated with an employee's exposure to an electric-arc hazard. (See,
for example, Exs. 0152, 0173, 0178, 0201, 0209, 0227, 0233, 0501; Tr.
374-376, 547-548, 1094-1098, 1100-1102.) Some of these rulemaking
participants focused on purported problems with methods of calculating
incident heat energy. (See, for example, Exs. 0152, 0173, 0201, 0209,
0227, 0233, 0501; Tr. 547, 1094-1098, 1100-1102.) These commenters
maintained that the results of calculations from the different methods
varied widely or are subject to manipulation that would make the
calculation methods unreliable or unscientific (id.). For example, Ms.
Kathy Wilmer, testifying on behalf of EEI, spoke to the wide variations
she found in calculating incident heat energy using the methods listed
in the proposed rule:
OSHA does not endorse any of the methods listed in the table.
OSHA further acknowledges that the method of calculation can affect
the results inasmuch as each method yields somewhat different values
using the same input parameters.
* * * * *
[F]our methods, including two tables and two formulas, were
compared for the conditions of 15,000 volts, 5,000 amps, and 34.5
cycles. The heat energies determined were, No. 1, from Appendix F,
Table 8,\[\\299\\]\ of the proposal, 5 calories per square
centimeter; No. 2, from the HeatFlux Calculator, 2.9 calories per
square centimeter; No. 3, from NFPA 70E, Table
130.7(c)(9)(a),\[\\300\\]\ 40 calories per square centimeter, as it
is listed as risk category 4 \[\\301\\]\ for work on energized parts
in the other equipment over 1,000-fold category; No. 4, from NFPA
70E, Annex D, D7, formula, 153 calories per square centimeter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\299\ Table 8 in proposed Appendix F listed estimates of
incident energy for different parts of an electrical system
operating at 4 to 46 kilovolts. OSHA based these estimates on the
ARCPRO method.
\300\ NFPA 70E-2004 Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) is a method for
selecting PPE based on hazard/risk categories. Proposed Appendix F
did not list NFPA 70E-2004, Table 130.7(C)(9)(a), as an acceptable
method of estimating incident-energy level.
\301\ NFPA 70E-2004, Table 130.7(C)(11) lists the following
hazard-risk categories (HRC) with the corresponding minimum required
arc ratings: 0-none, 1-4 cal/cm\2\, 2-8 cal/cm\2\, 3-25 cal/cm\2\,
4-40 cal/cm\2\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In summary, the results were 2.9, 5, 40, and 153 calories per
square centimeter for the same conditions: 15,000 volts, 5,000 amps,
34.5 cycles. Again, this example illustrates serious concerns about
the reliability of methods offered to determine heat energy on
transmission and distribution systems. [Tr. 1096, 1101-1102]
OSHA applied the same methods Ms. Wilmer described in this comment
and arrived at values similar to the values provided in her testimony,
as shown in Table 11.
Table 11--Sample Incident-Energy Calculations Using Different Methods
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Method Incident energy (cal/cm\2\)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Heat flux calculator...................... 3.0 (results must be rounded up to ensure that the protective
equipment rating equals or exceeds this value).
Table 8 from proposed Appendix F.......... 5.0.
NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, section D.7....... 152.
NFPA 70E-2004, Table 130.7(C)(9)(a)....... Not applicable. Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) lists a Hazard-Risk Category of
2 (8 cal/cm\2\) for insulated cable examination in open areas,
which is an exposure comparable to that of a single-phase arc in
open air represented by the Heat Flux calculator and Table 8 from
proposed Appendix F. Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) lists a Hazard-Risk
Category of 4 (40 cal/cm\2\) for work on energized parts, which is
an exposure comparable to the three-phase arc in an enclosure
represented by the method in NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, section D.7.
However, as explained later in this section of the preamble, Table
130.7(C)(9)(a) combines a risk assessment with incident-energy
calculation and does not represent incident energy alone.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A closer look at these results shows that the two software
programs, heat flux calculator and ARCPRO (upon which OSHA based Table
8 of proposed Appendix F), produce similar results: 3.0 cal/cm\2\ for
the heat flux calculator and 5.0 cal/cm\2\ for ARCPRO. Because the arc
rating for the lightest weight arc-rated clothing ranges from 4.0 to
5.0 cal/
cm\2\, both programs would lead generally to the use of the same
minimum level of protection for the system parameters at issue.\302\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\302\ As explained later in this section of the preamble, Table
6 and Table 7 in Appendix E in the final rule set a minimum level of
4.0 cal/cm\2\, which is the minimum level of arc-rated clothing
currently available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The heat flux calculator and ARCPRO both calculate incident energy
produced by single-phase arcs in air, which is clear in the ARCPRO
documentation (Ex. 0468). Also, the preamble to the proposal clearly
stated that the results from the heat flux calculator require
adjustment for application to exposures involving three-phase arcs or
arcs in enclosures (70 FR 34867), and other evidence in the record
indicates that the calculator is designed for application to single-
phase arc exposures (Exs. 0430, 0463).
The incident-energy estimate resulting from application of the
formula in NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, is significantly higher than the
results obtained using either of the software programs. There are two
reasons for this difference. First, the formula that appears in section
D.7 of NFPA 70E, Annex D, is designed to calculate the incident energy
produced by a three-phase arc in open air. The corresponding single-
phase exposure, based on an ARCPRO conversion factor (multiplying
single-phase values by 2.2 to convert them to three-phase values or,
conversely, dividing three-phase values by 2.2 to convert them to
single-phase values), would be 70 cal/cm\2\ (Ex. 0468). Second,
although NFPA 70E states that the formula in section D.7 of Annex D can
be used to predict the incident energy produced by arcs on systems
operating at more than 600 volts, it also explicitly warns about doing
so, noting:
The following example is conservative at voltage levels above
600 volts. Experience suggests that the example is conservative at
voltage levels above 600 volts and becomes more conservative as the
voltage increases. [Ex. 0134; annex section D.1\303\]
\303\ NFPA 70E-2012, Annex D, contains the same equation in
Section D.6. Similar language warning about conservative results
from using the Lee paper for voltages over 600 volts appears in
Table D.1, Limitation of Calculation Methods.
Consequently, it is not surprising that the incident-energy
estimate calculated using Annex D of NFPA 70E-2004 for a scenario
involving a single-phase arc on a 15-kilovolt system \304\ is
substantially higher than the values derived using the two software
programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\304\ Although Ms. Wilmer did not state that her scenario
involved a single-phase exposure, her use of Table 8 in proposed
Appendix F, the use of which is limited to such exposures, implies
that the scenario is for a single-phase arc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Wilmer also mentioned Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) of NFPA 70E-2004.
The closest hazard-risk category from Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) is 2
(requiring clothing rated at 8 cal/cm\2\), which is for the task of
"[i]nsulated cable examination in open air" (Ex. 0134). The other
tasks in the category entitled "Other Equipment 1 kV and Above"
appear to represent exposures from arcs in enclosures, and all of those
tasks, including the one for cable examination, represent three-phase
exposures. Moreover, OSHA examined this table more closely and found
that it does not represent incident-energy calculations alone. The
hazard-risk categories listed in NFPA 70E-2004, Table
130.7(C)(9)(a),\305\ include a risk component, as well as an incident-
energy component, as can be seen from the entries for the various tasks
on 600-volt class motor control centers. The hazard-risk categories for
this equipment vary from 1 to 3 (which require clothing rated from 4 to
25 cal/cm\2\) depending on the task, even though, according to the
notes to the table, the system parameters are the same for all the
tasks; thus, the calculated incident energy for all the tasks for this
equipment should be the same. While not clear from NFPA 70E-2004, it
appears that the NFPA 70E Committee chose to reduce the amount of
protection for a task based on the likelihood that an electric arc
would occur.\306\ The level of protection needed for a particular
incident heat energy is the same regardless of the probability that an
electric arc will occur. In other words, whether there is a 5-percent
risk or a 10-percent risk is not relevant to whether the employee's PPE
is adequate. As will be explained later in this section of the
preamble, OSHA based the determination of the level of PPE required
under the final rule solely on incident heat energy. OSHA's final rule
separates the determination of risk (that is, whether an employee is
exposed to hazards posed by electric arcs), as required by final
paragraph (g)(1), from the calculation of incident energy, as required
by final paragraph (g)(2). Therefore, the Agency concludes that NFPA
70E-2004, Table 130.7(C)(9)(a), is not a reasonable method of
estimating incident energy under final paragraph (g)(2) and, therefore,
is not referencing that table in Appendix E in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\305\ NFPA 70E-2012 contains an equivalent table in Table
130.7(C)(15)(a). As noted earlier, NFPA 70E-2004, Table 130.7(C)(11)
lists the minimum arc rating for each hazard-risk category. NFPA
70E-2012 lists minimum arc ratings for each hazard-risk category in
Table 130.7(C)(16). OSHA's conclusions regarding NFPA 70E-2004 Table
130.7(C)(9)(a) apply equally to NFPA 70E-2012 Table 130.7(C)(15)(a).
\306\ Earlier editions of NFPA 70E, such as the 2000 edition,
and NFPA documentation on the adoption of the task table show that
the hazard/risk category is reduced by 1 if the probability of an
arc is low and reduced by 2 if the probability is very low.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the following discussion, the Agency evaluates the various
methods listed in Table 10 across three distinct voltage categories
(600 volts and less, 601 to 1,000 volts, and more than 1,000 volts),
and for each type of electric arc (single-phase arc in open air, three-
phase arc in open air, and three-phase arc in an enclosure).
Voltages of 600 volts and less. As can be seen from the tasks
listed in Table 130.7(C)(9)(a), much of the work addressed by NFPA 70E-
2004 involves voltages of 600 volts or less (Ex. 0134). This category
represents the dominant voltage class for utilization equipment
installed in buildings, including electric power generation stations.
It also includes service-class equipment, such as meters, installed on
distribution circuits. There is wide experience using the incident-
energy calculation methods included in Annex D of NFPA 70E-2004 and in
IEEE Std 1584a-2004,\307\ and there is evidence that some electric
utilities use these methods successfully (Exs. 0216 (showing TVA's use
of IEEE Std 1584 to calculate incident-energy levels), 0444 ("INPO
(Institute for Nuclear Power Operations) was and is a huge factor in
driving the use of NFPA 70E as a recognized `best practice' for
electrical safety programs in the nuclear power industry")). A
national consensus standard recognizes these methods
(NFPA 70E),\308\ and there is considerable test data validating them
(Exs. 0425 ("[the IEEE 1584 committee] has overseen a significant
amount of testing and has developed new models of incident energy" and
"[IEEE Std 1584a-2004 provides calculations based on] new, empirically
derived models based on statistical analysis and curve fitting of the
overall test data available"), 0430 (this paper, which the IEEE 1584
committee referenced, reported on the results of 25 tests that
supplemented "previously completed extensive arc testing").)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\307\ IEEE adopted two amendments after it published IEEE Std
1584-2002: IEEE Std 1584a-2004 (Amendment 1 to IEEE Std 1584-2002),
and IEEE Std 1584b-2011 (Amendment 2: Changes to Clause 4 of IEEE
Std 1584-2002). (Ex. 0425 contains both the IEEE Std 1584-2002
standard and the 1584a-2004 amendment.) This preamble refers to
specific versions of IEEE Std 1584 as follows:
IEEE Std 1584-2002: the base IEEE Std 1584 standard
IEEE Std 1584a-2004: IEEE Std 1584-2002 as amended by IEEE Std
1584a-2004
IEEE Std 1584b-2011: IEEE Std 1584-2002 as amended by IEEE Std
1584a-2004 and IEEE Std 1584b-2011.
IEEE Std 1584a-2004 and IEEE Std 1584b-2011 use the same basic
methodology to calculate incident-energy levels as IEEE Std 1584-
2002. In this section of the preamble, OSHA analyzed IEEE Std 1584a-
2004 (Ex. 0425) to determine whether employers can use that standard
to make reasonable estimates of incident energy. The Agency also
examined the latest version of IEEE Std 1584 and found that, because
the calculation method did not change from IEEE Std 1584a-2004 to
IEEE Std 1584b-2011, OSHA's conclusions regarding IEEE Std 1584a-
2004 also apply to IEEE Std 1584b-2011, and Appendix E to final
Subpart V references IEEE Std 1584b-2011. Unless otherwise noted,
the preamble references to the content of IEEE Std 1584a-2004 apply
equally to IEEE Std 1584b-2011.
\308\ As previously mentioned, NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D,
recognizes IEEE Std 1584-2002 as a valid method of calculating
incident heat energy (Ex. 0134).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA concludes that the methods of calculating incident heat energy
in NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, and IEEE Std 1584a-2004 are reasonable at
voltages of 600 volts and less for the exposures these methods address,
as explained more fully later in this section of the preamble. No
evidence in the record persuades OSHA otherwise. A paper by Stokes and
Sweeting entitled "Electric Arcing Burn Hazards" criticized both the
NFPA 70E Annex D and IEEE 1584 methods (Ex. 0452).\309\ That paper
notes that the NFPA and IEEE methods use a predominantly radiant model
of incident heat energy from an electric arc, in which 90 percent of
the heat is radiant heat and in which the entire exposure will be
outside the electric arc plasma. The Stokes and Sweeting paper
disagrees that radiant heat is the predominant hazard and shows that
orienting the test electrodes in a horizontal configuration can result
in the transference of a greater degree of convective heat and that the
amount of heat within the electric arc plasma \310\ is more than three
times higher than predicted by the NFPA and IEEE models. The Stokes and
Sweeting paper also noted that the Lee paper, which is the basis of the
NFPA method, predicts a smaller plasma diameter than the plasma
diameter found during testing. The Stokes and Sweeting paper explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\309\ Stokes, A. D., Sweeting, D. K., "Electric Arcing Burn
Hazards," IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications. Vol. 42. No.
1, January/February 2006, pp. 134-141.
\310\ Plasma is the high-temperature ionized gas cloud that
results from the electric arc.
As an example, for a three-phase arcing exposure of 5000 V and
20000 A, the Lee prediction forecasts a plasma diameter of 170 mm [7
inches]. . . . The authors' test results for this condition, for an
arc duration of 0.5 s, show a brilliant plasma cloud some 3000 mm
[118 inches] long and around 1500 mm [59 inches] tall in the plane
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
of the camera. [Id.]
OSHA recognizes that exposures within the plasma field of an
electric arc will produce heat that is several times the incident
energy predicted by any of the methods used to calculate heat energy
recognized by the final rule. However, the Agency believes that the
predominant exposure for employees covered by this final rule will be
outside the plasma field. Although, in the Stokes and Sweeting paper,
the plasma field extended beyond the distance provided for in the NFPA
and IEEE methods, the paper did not indicate how to estimate the
field's reach. Furthermore, all of the calculation methods require an
estimate of the distance from the electric arc to the employee. The
IEEE 1584 method uses 455 to 610 millimeters (18 to 24 inches) for low-
voltage (600 volts and less) equipment such as switchboards,
panelboards, and motor control centers. As explained later in this
section of the preamble, those distances are reasonable estimates of
the distance from the employee to the arc. In addition, the testing
supporting the IEEE 1584 method, which is representative of typical
exposures, confirms the incident-energy results derived using that
method (Ex. 0425). There is no evidence in the record that indicates
that employees will typically be closer than these distances for this
type of work or will be in the plasma field at these working distances.
Therefore, OSHA concludes that, in general, the incident-energy
calculation methods in NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, and IEEE Std 1584a-2004
reasonably represent employee exposure for voltages of 600 volts and
less.
The IEEE 1584 method accounts for differences between single-phase
and three-phase arcs and between arcs in open air and arcs in an
enclosure (id. ("The arc-flash hazard calculations included in this
guide will enable quick and comprehensive solutions for arcs in single-
or three-phase electrical systems either of which may be in open air or
in a box, regardless of the low or medium voltage available")). In
addition, as noted earlier, this method is based on extensive testing,
and a consensus standard recognizes this method. Therefore, OSHA
concludes that this method reasonably represents employee exposures for
single-phase and multiphase arcs in enclosures and open air.
Proposed Appendix F also listed a paper by Doughty, Neal, and Floyd
as a method of estimating incident energy from an electric arc. (See
Table 10 earlier in this section of the preamble.) This paper describes
the results of tests performed on a 600-volt power system with a 36.25-
kiloampere prospective fault current and contains algorithms to
estimate incident energy at a specified distance from an arc as a
function of the available bolted-fault current on a 600-volt system
(Ex. 0430). The tests included three-phase arcs in enclosures and in
open air (id.). Because this paper was peer reviewed and the methods it
uses are based on testing electric arcs, OSHA finds that the method in
this paper reliably estimates incident energy for the 600-volt systems
it represents.\311\ The Agency also finds that it reasonably represents
incident energy for systems of lower voltages and for single-phase
systems because the power produced by these systems should be
comparable to, and not exceed, the power from a three-phase 600-volt
system with an equivalent supply. The Doughty, Neal, and Floyd method
will produce conservative results for lower-voltage and single-phase
systems. On the other hand, this method does not estimate incident
energy for systems of higher voltages. Therefore, OSHA finds that it is
not reasonable to use this method to estimate incident energy for
systems of voltages of more than 600 volts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\311\ The equations given in this paper are for an arc lasting 6
cycles. An employer using the Doughty, Neal, and Floyd method will
need to adjust the results to account for any clearing times
different from 6 cycles by multiplying the incident energy
calculated using these equations by the ratio of the actual clearing
time to 6 cycles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Doughty, Neal, Floyd paper compared the results of its authors'
testing with other methods of estimating incident-energy levels,
including the NFPA Annex D method, the heat flux calculator, and a
commercial software program (apparently ARCPRO), which OSHA listed in
the proposal (id.). The paper compared the incident energy it found for
three-phase electric arcs with the incident energy calculated by the
Lee equation used in NFPA 70E, Annex D, by examining the distance
required to achieve an incident-energy level of 1.2 cal/cm\2\. This
distance is the "curable burn distance," which is the distance at
which an employee will begin to sustain a second-degree, or curable,
burn. The paper explained the results of this comparison as follows:
The Lee "curable burn" distances coincide almost exactly with
the second-degree burn distances for the open three-phase arc. The
second-degree burn distances for the arc in the cubic box, however,
are significantly higher. The difference is more pronounced at
higher bolted fault levels. [id.]
Figure 8 depicts these functions.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.012
Based on this analysis, the Agency finds that the Lee equation from
NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, is a reasonable method of estimating the
incident energy of a three-phase electric arc in open air for systems
of 600 volts or less. However, because the Lee equation significantly
underestimates incident energy from three-phase arcs in an enclosure,
OSHA finds that this is not a reasonable method to estimate incident
energy from such exposures. The Agency also finds that the NFPA 70E-
2004, Annex D, method reasonably represents incident energy for single-
phase systems because the power produced by these systems should be
comparable to, and not exceed, the power from a three-phase system with
an equivalent supply. Thus, this method will produce conservative
results for single-phase systems.
The Doughty, Neal, and Floyd paper also compared the results of its
authors' testing with the heat flux calculator and "a commercially
available computer program" (id.).\312\ The paper found that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\312\ Although the paper did not identify the "commercially
available computer program" by name, OSHA closely examined the
results from ARCPRO and compared them with the commercial software
program incident-energy estimates reported by the paper and found
them to be equivalent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The three-phase test values of maximum incident energy for
open arcs were 2.5 to 3.0 times the amounts calculated for single-phase
arcs in air by the two programs; and
The three-phase test values of maximum incident energy for
arcs in a box were 5.2 to 12.2 times the amounts calculated for single-
phase arcs in air by the two programs (id.).
This comparison clearly shows that neither program reasonably
estimates incident heat energy from three-phase electric arcs or
electric arcs in an enclosure. Although there are conversion factors
recommended for these programs, these conversion factors do not account
for the wide variation between the incident energies the programs
calculate and the actual incident energy found during testing. Thus,
OSHA finds that the heat flux calculator and ARCPRO do not reasonably
estimate incident heat energy for three-phase arcs or arcs in a box for
systems of 600 volts or less.
On systems of 600 volts or less, the phase conductors are typically
relatively close together, approximately 30 millimeters (1.25 inches),
as noted in the Doughty, Neal, and Floyd paper (id.). When an arc
occurs between one phase and ground, or between two phases, the
surrounding air becomes ionized (and, thus, conductive), and it can
relatively easily escalate to a three-phase arc (Ex. 0425). In
addition, as seen from NFPA 70E-2004, Table 130.7(C)(9)(a), most of the
exposures at this voltage level, with the exception of work on service
drops, involve equipment in enclosures (Ex. 0134).\313\ Consequently,
OSHA concludes that it normally would be unreasonable to estimate
incident-energy levels for systems of 600 volts using methods based on
single-phase open air arcs. However, the employer may use such methods
when it can demonstrate that there is only one phase present or that
the spacing of the phases is sufficient to prevent the formation of a
three-phase arc. The incident energy results from the electric-arc
model used by ARCPRO "have shown good agreement with measured values
from a series of tests covering the following ranges of parameters:
Currents from 3.5 kA to 21.5 kA, arc durations from 4 cycles to 30
cycles, arc lengths from 1 inches to 12 inches, and distances of 8
inches to 24 inches from the arc" (Ex. 0469). The ARCPRO documentation
does not indicate the voltage range verified by the test results;
however, the model used by this program uses voltage only to ensure
that an arc can be sustained over the distance between electrodes.
Consequently, OSHA finds that this program can reasonably estimate
incident energy from a single-phase arc in open air for systems of 600
volts or less, and the employer may use the program as long as the
employer can demonstrate that there is only one phase present or that
the spacing of the phases is sufficient to prevent the formation of a
three-phase arc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\313\ OSHA acknowledges that NFPA 70E exempts work on electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution installations.
However, the electric equipment installed in generating plants is of
the same type as that covered by NFPA 70E (Ex. 0077), and OSHA
concludes that the tasks performed on this equipment would be of a
similar nature.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For reasons explained later in this section of the preamble, OSHA
finds that the heat flux calculator is not a reasonable method for
estimating incident energy for any type of exposures, irrespective of
voltage.
Table 12 summarizes OSHA's findings regarding the reasonableness of
using the various methods of estimating incident heat energy for
exposures involving single-phase and three-phase arcs in open air and
in an enclosure for voltages of 600 volts and less.
Voltages of 601 volts to 15 kilovolts. Work at voltages from 601
volts to 15 kilovolts is common to both electric power distribution
work and to work in industrial and electric utility substations and
plants. Industrial installations use equipment similar to that used by
electric utilities (see, for example, 59 FR 4333-4334). Therefore, any
method that is appropriate for use with industrial systems operating at
these voltages should be appropriate for use with electric power
generation and distribution installations.
Again, there is wide experience using the incident-energy methods
included in Annex D of NFPA 70E-2004 and in IEEE Std 1584, and there is
evidence that some electric utilities use these methods successfully
(Exs. 0216, 0444). A national consensus standard (NFPA 70E) recognizes
these methods, and there is considerable test data validating them
(Exs. 0425, 0430). OSHA, therefore, finds that the IEEE 1584 method
reasonably estimates incident-energy levels for systems operating at
voltages of 601 volts to 15 kilovolts for exposures involving single-
phase and three-phase arcs in open air or in enclosures. As explained
previously in the discussion of Ms. Wilmer's comments, the method in
NFPA 70E, Annex D (the Lee method), is conservative at more than 600
volts. In addition, this method estimates incident-energy levels for
three-phase arcs and, thus, is even more conservative for exposures
involving single-phase arcs. Because the NFPA 70E Annex D method is
conservative, OSHA finds that it reasonably estimates incident-energy
levels for systems operating at voltages of 601 volts to 15 kilovolts,
that is, it will provide employees with adequate protection.\314\
However, clothing appropriate for the levels of incident energy
calculated by the NFPA 70E Annex D method will be heavier and bulkier,
as well as more expensive, than clothing appropriate for incident
energy calculated using other acceptable methods. (See, for example,
Ex. 0213, "[The NFPA 70E Annex D method] could be used to calculate
incident energies for transmission system voltages, but [it] will
produce very conservative (high heat energy) results. This will result
in employees wearing unnecessarily heavy arc flash protection when
working on lines.") Consequently, the Agency anticipates that
employers will only use this method to estimate incident-energy levels
at voltages of 601 volts to 15 kilovolts when it would result in the
use of clothing with a relatively low arc rating.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\314\ For reasons already explained, the NFPA 70E Annex D method
is not reasonable for estimating incident energy exposures from
three-phase arcs in an enclosure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The method in the Doughty, Neal, and Floyd paper described earlier
in this section of the preamble is based on testing performed
exclusively with an electrode spacing of 32 millimeters (1.25 inches)
at 600 volts (Ex. 0430). There is no evidence in the record that
suggests that this method is suitable at higher voltages, at which
electrode gaps likely are significantly longer. Therefore, OSHA finds
that this method does not reasonably estimate incident-energy levels
for systems operating at voltages above 600 volts.
The Agency closely examined the two software calculation methods,
ARCPRO and the heat flux calculator, over the voltage range 601 volts
to 15 kilovolts. OSHA performed this examination in part by looking at
the estimates of heat flux for different system parameters. Heat flux
is a measure of the flow of heat energy per unit area per second. The
incident energy from an electric arc can be computed by multiplying the
heat flux, which has the units cal/cm\2\-sec, by the number of seconds
the arc lasts (that is, the clearing time or the amount of time the
devices protecting a circuit take to open the circuit). The clearing
time for circuit protective devices typically is given in cycles, which
then is converted to seconds by dividing the number of cycles by the
number of cycles per second, usually 60. The two software programs,
ARCPRO and the heat flux calculator, can be used to calculate the heat
flux at a given distance from an electric arc with varying parameters
(for example, arc length, system voltage, and current). Figure 9
compares the heat flux calculated by these two programs at 380
millimeters (15 inches) from an arc with an electrode spacing of 51
millimeters (2 inches).\315\ Note that, although 15 kilovolts is the
voltage input to these programs, the incident energy calculated by both
programs would be the same at 601 volts. The two programs only use the
voltage to verify that an arc can be sustained across the given
electrode gap. Figure 9 shows that the heat flux calculator produces
results that can be more than 50 percent less than the results produced
by ARCPRO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\315\ In preparing Figure 9, OSHA used the values from Table 6
in Appendix E for the distance to the arc and the electrode spacing
corresponding to 15 kilovolts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After calculating the incident heat energy using ARCPRO or the heat
flux calculator, an employer can select arc-rated protective equipment.
NFPA 70E-2004 contains a widely used, five-level system for selecting
protective clothing based on different incident-energy levels (Ex.
0134). Figure 10 shows the protective-clothing arc rating, based on the
NFPA 70E levels, that employers would select based on the heat-flux
results shown in Figure 9 for each software program using clearing
times of 6, 12, and 36 cycles. The figures clearly show that incident-
energy calculations from the heat flux calculator can be more than 50
percent lower than the calculations from ARCPRO. This difference
generally increases with increasing fault current.
The documentation for ARCPRO describes the formulas for calculating
energy and heat estimates and the basis for that program's formulas, as
follows:
The ARCPRO computer program is based on a state-of-the-art
electrical arc model . . . Temperature-dependent gas properties, the
electrode materials and configuration are taken into account in the
model . . .
Energy and heat values computed by ARCPRO have been verified by
comparison with measured results from high current laboratory tests
involving controlled vertical arcs in air. ARCPRO results have shown
good agreement with measured values from a series of tests covering
the following ranges of parameters: Currents from 3.5 kA to 21.5 kA,
arc durations from 4 cycles to 30 cycles, arc lengths from 1 inches
to 12 inches, and distances of 8 inches to 24 inches from the arc.
[Ex. 0469]
Ontario Hydro Technologies (now known as Kinectrics), the same
company that performs high-voltage and high-current electrical testing,
including arc testing, developed this program for numerous purposes.
(See, for example, Exs. 0469, 0501; Tr. 283.\316\) Consequently, OSHA
concludes that the incident-energy values calculated by this program
relate reasonably to the heat energy faced by employees facing
exposures involving single-phase electric arcs in open air. (As
explained previously, ARCPRO's conversion factors for exposures
involving three-phase arcs and arcs in enclosures do not reasonably
estimate employee exposures and would result in significant
underprotection for workers.) The Agency believes that this program is
highly accurate over the range of input parameters for which testing
validated the results, that is, single-phase arcs in
open air only. Therefore, OSHA finds that ARCPRO reasonably estimates
incident-energy levels for single-phase arcs in open air for systems
operating at 601 volts to 15 kilovolts.
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\316\ See also http://www.kinectrics.com/en/serviceline/ElectricalTesting.html.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.014
BILLING CODE 4510-26-C
On the other hand, there is little documentation supporting use of
the heat flux calculator beyond the documentation provided by the NASCO
Electric Arc Hazard Support Page, which describes the program (Ex.
0467).\317\ OSHA is aware that some employers, electric utilities and
others, use this program to estimate incident-energy levels and select
appropriate PPE (Ex. 0430). However, there is little information in the
record on which to judge the heat flux calculator on its own merits or
the results it produces. In fact, TVA commented that it is "not aware
of any test verification of the results derived from the Heat Flux
Calculator" (Ex. 0213). Because the heat flux calculator provides
incident-energy levels that are substantially below the levels
resulting from the testing that supports ARCPRO and because there is no
other means of validating the incident energy results from this
program, OSHA cannot find that the heat flux calculator reasonably
estimates incident heat energy levels for any exposures covered by this
final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\317\ The updated online version of this page contains a link to
download the free program (http://www.nascoinc.com/quick_links/heatflux.htm).
The program is also available on other Internet Web sites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 12 summarizes OSHA's findings regarding the reasonableness of
using the various methods of estimating incident heat energy for
exposures involving single-phase and three-phase arcs in open air and
in an enclosure for voltages of 601 volts to 15 kilovolts.
OSHA expects employers to determine the type of exposure employees
will face. If the energized parts are not in an enclosure, the employer
may use a method appropriate for single-phase arcs in open air as long
as the employer can demonstrate that there is only one phase present or
if the spacings of the phases is sufficient to prevent the formation of
a three-phase arc. Otherwise, employers must use a method suitable for
three-phase arcs in open air or in an enclosure, as appropriate.
Voltages of more than 15 kilovolts. Systems that operate at more
than 15 kilovolts generally are electric power distribution or
transmission systems covered by existing Sec. 1910.269 and subpart V.
Although some industrial plants operate systems at these voltages,
these existing OSHA standards typically cover systems operating at more
than 15 kilovolts regardless of whether an electric utility or an
industrial operation operates the system. (See, for example, the
preamble to the 1994 final rule adopting existing Sec. 1910.269 (59 FR
4333-4335).)
IEEE Std 1584a-2004 describes the limits of its application as
follows:
This model is designed for systems having:
--Voltages in the range of 208 V-15 000 V, three-phase.
* * * * *
Use of this model is recommended for applications within the
parameters stated in this subclause. [Ex. 0425]
Systems operating at voltages above 15 kilovolts are, thus,
outside the recommended range of applications for the IEEE standard.
Consequently, OSHA finds that the IEEE 1584 method does not
reasonably estimate incident-energy levels for systems operating at
voltages of more than 15 kilovolts.
As noted earlier, the NFPA 70E Annex D method gives conservative
results for voltages over 600 volts. For example, as explained in
the discussion of Ms. Wilmer's comment earlier in this section of
the preamble, that method produces an incident heat energy level of
152 cal/cm\2\ for an exposure involving a three-phase arc in open
air for a system of 15 kilovolts with a fault current of 5,000
amperes, a clearing time of 34.5 cycles, and a distance from the
employee to the arc of 381 millimeters (15 inches). In addition, the
NFPA 70E Annex D method produces an incident-energy level of 1254
cal/cm\2\ for an exposure involving a three-phase arc in open air
for a system of 800 kilovolts with a fault current of 20,000
amperes, a clearing time of 54.5 cycles, and a distance from the
employee to the arc of 2,200 meters (86.6 inches).\318\ These values
are too high to be meaningful, particularly at the higher end of the
voltage range. Employers using the NFPA 70E Annex D method to select
arc-rated clothing would outfit employees in clothing that exposes
employees to severe heat-stress hazards even though the incident
energy is not high enough to warrant such protection. Thus, OSHA
finds that it is not reasonable to use this method to estimate
incident energy for systems of voltages of more than 15 kilovolts.
However, in some cases, employees may be far enough away from any
potential arc that even the NFPA 70E Annex D method does not result
in an estimated incident energy that is sufficient to ignite
flammable clothing (2.0 cal/cm\2\ or less, as explained later in
this section of the preamble). Because that method is conservative,
employers may use it to determine that employee exposure to
estimated incident-heat energy is not more than 2.0 cal/cm\2\ and,
thus, that employees need not wear FR clothing under final paragraph
(g)(4)(iv).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\318\ Table 9 in proposed Appendix F listed incident heat
energies for various voltage ranges of more than 46 kilovolts and
fault currents. These are the values for the distance to the arc and
the electrode spacing used in that table for 765 to 800 kilovolts.
The corresponding table in the final rule (Table 7 of Appendix E)
has been revised, as explained later in this section of the
preamble, but those parameters are the same for that voltage range.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For reasons explained previously, OSHA finds the Doughty, Neal,
and Floyd method does not reasonably estimate incident energy for
systems at voltages of more than 600 volts.
OSHA compared incident-energy values evaluated by the heat flux
calculator to the values computed by ARCPRO at voltages higher than
15 kilovolts using parameters from Table 8 and Table 9 of proposed
Appendix F. The results of this comparison were similar to the
results of the comparison using voltages of 601 volts to 15
kilovolts described earlier. The incident energies computed by the
heat flux calculator were substantially lower than the results
computed by ARCPRO using the same parameters for systems of more
than 15 kilovolts. In addition, as noted earlier, there is no
information in the record validating the incident-energy results
obtained using the heat flux calculator. Therefore, OSHA concludes
that the heat flux calculator does not reasonably estimate incident
energy from systems of more than 15 kilovolts.
As noted earlier, verification of the ARCPRO incident-energy
calculation model occurred by testing a wide range of input
parameters (Ex. 0469). This model is mostly independent of voltage
(in other words, the results do not vary with voltage); the program
only checks that the voltage will sustain an arc across the
electrode gap (id.). The program accepts parameters outside the
range verified by testing,\319\ and there is no evidence in the
record to indicate that results using parameters outside that range
would be invalid (id.). As noted earlier, this program calculates
incident energy from a single-phase arc in open air. OSHA concludes
that this program accurately calculates incident heat energy from
such arcs. Therefore, the Agency finds that ARCPRO reasonably
estimates incident energy from single-phase arcs in open air on
systems of more than 15 kilovolts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\319\ "ARCPRO results have shown good agreement with measured
values from a series of tests covering the following ranges of
parameters: currents from 3.5 kA to 21.5 kA, arc durations from 4
cycles to 30 cycles, arc lengths from 1 [inch] to 12 inches, and
distances of 8 inches to 24 inches from the arc" (Ex. 0469).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As mentioned previously, the incident energy calculated by
ARCPRO was significantly less than the actual heat energy found when
testing 600-volt, three-phase arcs in open air and in an enclosure
(Ex. 0430). Regardless of voltage, three-phase arcs consume more
power and, therefore, produce more energy, and three-phase arcs in
an enclosure produce even more heat energy because the heat energy
radiating away from the worker reflects back towards the worker and
because all of the convective heat energy is directed toward the
worker (Exs. 0430, 0433).\320\ Therefore, OSHA concludes that using
unmodified ARCPRO results would significantly underestimate the
amount of incident heat energy from these exposures. ARCPRO provides
multiplication factors for adjusting the results to estimate
incident energy from three-phase arcs in open air and
in enclosures.\321\ However, the Agency found that those adjustments
were not reasonable for systems up to 15 kilovolts. In those cases,
there are alternative calculation methods, identified in Table 12,
that more accurately estimate incident energy for those exposures.
In contrast, there is no reasonable alternative for voltages of more
than 15 kilovolts. Therefore, because ARCPRO is the best available
technology for estimating incident energy for three-phase arcs in
open air and in an enclosure for systems operating at more than 15
kilovolts, OSHA will treat this program as reasonably estimating
incident energy for these exposures provided the employer adjusts
the results using the conversion factors in the instructions
included with the program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\320\ Convection occurs in fluids (liquids and gases) through
the mixing of hot and cold fluid regions driven by pressure,
gravity, or mechanical agitation. This is the type of heating that
occurs as a pot of water is heated to boiling on a stove. Thermal
radiation occurs when radiation (such as infrared radiation) is
emitted from an object and is absorbed by another object. This is
the type of heating provided by the sun.
\321\ Here are the conversion factors listed in ARCPRO's help
system:
Energy for: Multiply by:
1-phase in a box.... 1.5
3-phase.................. 1.2 to 2.2
3-phase in a box.... 3.7 to 6.5
(Ex. 0468).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Tommy Lucas with TVA maintained that there are no nationally
recognized methods of reasonably estimating incident energy over 60
kilovolts (Ex. 0213).
As noted previously, however, OSHA evaluated the ARCPRO computer-
software method and found that it provides a reasonable estimate of
incident energy for voltages above 15 kilovolts, including voltages of
more than 60 kilovolts.
Table 12 summarizes OSHA's findings regarding the reasonableness of
using the various methods of estimating incident heat energy for
exposures involving single-phase and three-phase arcs in open air and
in an enclosure for voltages higher than 15 kilovolts.
Underground exposures, internal transformer faults, and other
potentially high exposures. Consolidated Edison Company of New York
(Con Edison), commented that the methodologies included in the proposal
would not be useful for exposures faced by its employees, explaining:
Con Edison has spent millions of dollars to recreate real life
fault situations on our system at a high power testing laboratory.
In these recreation scenarios we deliberately caused cable faults
both in open air and in manholes and had mannequins wired with heat
sensors to measure the incident energies our employees could
potentially be exposed to. Based on the experience gained through
thousands of these faults, both open air and in manholes, we
realized that none of the methodologies OSHA now proposes would be
useful in conducting an analysis to arrive at a protective scheme
for our employees. [Ex. 0157]
Although Con Edison did not provide the results of its tests, Dr.
Mary Capelli-Schellpfeffer submitted a presentation that Con Edison
prepared describing the company's tests (Ex. 0371). This presentation
did not include any quantitative comparisons with OSHA's proposed
methods of estimating incident energy. However, it did indicate that
Con Edison was able to select appropriate protective garments that
"have proven to be effective in the protection of [its employees]"
(id.).
The company's tests included tests of faulted transformers and
cable faults in manholes, and OSHA acknowledges that it is possible for
the incident energy for these exposures to exceed results obtained
using the IEEE 1584 method, which addresses exposures involving three-
phase arcs in both open air and enclosures.\322\ If a transformer
experiences an internal fault, the transformer oil can ignite, and the
burning oil will contribute additional heat energy not accounted for by
that method (Ex. 0004).\323\ For underground exposures in manholes and
vaults, it is possible not only for the wall of the enclosure close to
the arc to reflect the heat energy, but for the far walls to do so as
well. The IEEE 1584 method accounts for the former but not the latter
reflections (Ex. 0425). Because the IEEE 1584 method, if the voltage is
15 kilovolts or less, and ARCPRO, if the voltage exceeds 15 kilovolts,
are the best available methods for estimating incident energy for
three-phase arcs in open air or in enclosures, OSHA will treat those
two methods as reasonably estimating incident energy for the exposures
cited by Con Edison. However, these estimates may not fully protect
employees from electric-arc exposures resulting from internal faults in
transformers or similar equipment or from arcs in underground manholes
or vaults. Despite this shortcoming, the Agency believes that using
these methods to estimate incident energy and to select appropriate
protective equipment in accordance with the other provisions of final
paragraph (g) will better protect employees than if employers permitted
employees to work without arc-rated protective equipment. (See, also,
the summary and explanation of paragraph (g)(5), later in this section
of the preamble.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\322\ Because Con Edison did not provide the parameters involved
in its tests, OSHA cannot determine for certain what the exposure
was. However, the Agency assumes that the manhole and cable testing
was performed with three-phase voltages between 601 volts and 15
kilovolts. From Table 12, the IEEE 1584 method is the only method
that provides a reasonable estimate for three-phase arcs in an
enclosure, which is the exposure most common in manholes; and the
IEEE 1584 and NFPA 70E Annex D methods are the only methods that
provide a reasonable estimate for three-phase arcs in open air,
which is the exposure associated with three-phase cables.
\323\ See, for example, the two accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170632699&id=14343594.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manipulation of results. Some rulemaking participants maintained
that employers could manipulate the estimate of incident energy by
selecting an inappropriate calculation method or by varying the
parameters, such as arc length or distance from the arc, to achieve
desired results. (See, for example, Exs. 0156, 0161, 0183.) Others
commented more generally that the results of incident-energy
calculations will vary depending on the parameters selected. (See, for
example, Exs. 0163, 0173, 0181.) For instance, Mr. Alan Blackmon with
Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative commented:
Estimates of maximum amounts of heat energy to which an employee
would be exposed require making so many subjective assumptions as to
render the calculations useless. OSHA therefore should drop this
requirement. There is no value in an estimation that so easily can
be manipulated through choosing of, for example, duration of arc and
distance from arc to employee. [Ex. 0183]
The parameters used by the calculation methods discussed earlier
include: the fault current (usually the maximum available fault
current), the system voltage, the arc length, the arc duration, and the
distance from the arc to the employee.\324\ The system fixes most of
these parameters. Each system has a fixed system voltage, fault
current, and fault clearing time.\325\ The system voltage is a known
"quantity." IEEE Std 1584a-2004, Section 4.4, explains the
calculation of the maximum fault current based on known characteristics
about the circuit involved (Ex. 0425). IEEE Std 1584a-2004 describes
how to determine the corresponding fault-clearing time by checking the
maximum fault current against the time characteristics provided by the
protective device manufacturer as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\324\ IEEE Std 1584a-2004 also expects the user to select the
overcurrent device protecting the circuit (Ex. 0425). However, that
method makes certain assumptions about some of the other parameters,
in particular, arc duration, that avoid the need to enter those
parameters. The consensus standard also provides a generic case in
which all of the typical parameters are input. IEEE Std 1584b-2011
provides additional guidance on selecting arc-duration times for
different types of overcurrent protective devices (that is, fuses,
integral-trip circuit breakers, and relay-operated circuit breakers)
for the generic case.
\325\ The arc will last until the protective device opens the
circuit. Thus, the fault clearing time equals the duration of the
arc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An arc-flash hazard analysis should be performed in association
with or as a continuation of the short-circuit study and protective-
device coordination study. The process and methodology of
calculating
short-circuit currents and performing protective-device coordination
is covered in IEEE Std 141-1993 (IEEE Red Book TM) and
IEEE Std 242-2001 (IEEE Buff Book TM), respectively.
Results of the short-circuit study are used to determine the fault
current momentary duty, interrupting rating, and short-circuit
(withstand) rating of electrical equipment. Results of the
protective-device coordination study are used to determine the time
required for electrical circuit protective devices to isolate
overload or short-circuit conditions. Results of both short-circuit
and protective-device coordination studies provide information
needed to perform an arc-flash hazard analysis. [id. \326\]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\326\ IEEE Std 1584b-2011 revises this paragraph and separates
it into five paragraphs. The revisions are editorial, except for
updated references to relevant IEEE standards, including the
substitution of IEEE Std 551 TM-2006 (IEEE Violet Book
TM) for IEEE Std 141-1993 (IEEE Red Book TM),
and additional language explaining that "electrical system analysis
software may be used to simplify the calculations for complex
distribution systems . . ." and explaining the limitations and
advantages of such software.
Engineers typically perform system coordination studies during the
design of the system and again periodically and after any significant
change to the system (Tr. 1030-1031). If no initial or periodic studies
take place, the system owner risks having a fault on one part of the
system cause an outage over an extended portion of the system instead
of having the fault confined to the affected circuit. (See, for
example, 269-Exs. 8-15, 8-16, 8-17, 8-20, 8-21, 8-22.) As required by
existing Sec. 1910.269(n)(4)(i), employers must ensure that a similar
engineering analysis is performed to determine the appropriate ampacity
for protective grounding equipment; this provision specifies that
protective grounding equipment must be "capable of conducting the
maximum fault current that could flow at the point of grounding for the
time necessary to clear the fault." As noted by Mr. James Tomaseski of
IBEW: "For . . . employees to install personal protective grounds on a
circuit, they need to establish what level of . . . fault currents are
available, and that will decide what size grounds they will install"
(Tr. 960). Consequently, OSHA concludes that employers are likely to
have information that the Agency can verify about the system voltage,
fault current, and clearing times. OSHA will deem any manipulation of
these parameters for purposes of estimating heat energy under final
paragraph (g)(2) to result in an unreasonable estimate of incident
energy in violation of the standard.
Table 8 in proposed Appendix F presented estimates of available
energy for different parts of an electrical system operating at 4 to 46
kilovolts. Table 9 of proposed Appendix F presented similar estimates
for systems operating at voltages of 46.1 to 800 kilovolts. These
tables were for open-air, phase-to-ground (that is, single-phase)
electric-arc exposures typical for overhead systems operating at these
voltages. Table 8 and Table 9 of proposed Appendix F provided
information on what OSHA would consider as reasonable estimates of arc
length and the distance from the arc to the employee, as described
later in this section of the preamble. OSHA revised these tables as
described later in this section of the preamble and included them in
the final rule as Table 6 and Table 7 of Appendix E. OSHA will consider
it reasonable for an employer to use the Table 6 and Table 7 estimates
of arc length and the distance from the arc to the employee--for
single-phase arcs in open air--for purposes of the calculations
required by final paragraph (g)(2). IEEE Std 1584a-2004 also provides
guidance on these parameters (Ex. 0425).
Reasonable estimates of the arc gap (arc length). As noted earlier,
the exposures covered by Table 6 and Table 7 of Appendix E of final
subpart V, that is single-phase arcs in open air, typically occur
during overhead line work. In this case, the arc will almost always
occur when an energized conductor approaches too close to ground. Thus,
employers can determine the arc gap, or arc length, for these exposures
by the dielectric strength of air and the voltage on the line (Exs.
0041, 0533).\327\ The dielectric strength of air is approximately 10
kilovolts for every 25 millimeters (1 inch) (Ex. 0041), with a minimum
arc gap of 51 millimeters (1 inch). For example, at 50 kilovolts, the
arc gap would be 50 / 10 x 25, or 125 millimeters (5 inches). Although
OSHA is providing this guidance in the final rule, as discussed later
in this section of the preamble, employers may use other estimates of
the arc gap for single-phase arcs in open air if the estimates
reasonably resemble the actual exposures faced by employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\327\ Table 6 of Appendix E of final subpart V uses a more
conservative arc gap that equals the electrical component of the
minimum approach distance rather than a value corresponding to the
dielectric strength of air for the system voltage. (See the summary
and explanation for final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1), earlier in this
section of the preamble, and Appendix B to final Subpart V for
additional information on determining the electrical component of
the minimum approach distance based on the maximum transient
overvoltage for a system and determining the dielectric strength of
air for the maximum phase-to-ground system voltage.) OSHA used the
electrical component of the MAD to create Table 6 in final Appendix
E for consistency with the approach used in similar tables in the
2007 NESC (Ex. 0533) and the 2012 NESC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For three-phase arcs in open air and in enclosures, the IEEE 1584
method provides guidance (Ex. 0425). That method does not require the
user to input an arc gap (id.). Instead, it incorporates the arc gap
into its calculations based on the class of equipment involved. The
user selects the type of equipment involved (for example, 600-volt
switchgear). It then uses the appropriate bus or conductor spacings in
that equipment as the arc gap in the calculation of incident energy.
For a three-phase arc to occur, current must arc between all of the
phases. Such arcs typically occur when a conductive object drops across
the phases or when there is an internal fault in the equipment;
therefore, OSHA concludes that it is reasonable to use the bus or
conductor spacing as the arc gap. Notably, neither the NFPA 70E Annex D
nor the Doughty, Neal, and Floyd method require users to input an arc
gap.
Reasonable estimates of the distance from the employee to the arc.
All of the acceptable methods of estimating incident energy require the
user to input the distance from the arc to the employee. This approach
requires some judgment by the employer. However, the hazard assessment
required by final paragraph (g)(1) will provide information that the
employer can use to assess where arcs are reasonably likely to occur in
relation to the employee. To determine employee exposure to hazards
from electric arcs as required by final paragraph (g)(1), the employer
must determine where an employee is reasonably likely to be when an arc
occurs (in addition to whether there is a reasonable likelihood that an
arc could occur in the first place).
In Appendix E to final subpart V, OSHA provides guidance on
distance assumptions it will consider reasonable for estimating
incident energy for exposures involving single-phase arcs in open air.
As noted earlier, work on overhead power lines typically exposes
employees to single-phase arcs in open air. Employees performing this
type of work handle conductors; and these conductors can contact a
grounded object, or a grounded conductor (such as a guy or grounding
jumper) can contact a phase conductor (Ex. 0004 \328\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\328\ See, for example, the six accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170805238&id=200021004&id=170070981&id=201791803&id=14291868&id=170178370.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted under the summary and explanation for final paragraph
(c)(1), earlier in this section of the preamble, much of the work
performed on energized parts operating at 46 kilovolts and less is done
by employees using rubber insulating gloves.\329\ Working in a
comfortable position with elbows bent, an employee would be
approximately 380 millimeters (15 inches) from the energized conductor
on which he or she is working, measured from the employee's chest.\330\
Thus, OSHA used a distance of 380 millimeters (15 inches) to calculate
the incident-energy values in Table 8 in proposed Appendix F (Table 6
in final Appendix E) and will deem that a reasonable estimate for
employers to use when performing incident-energy calculations for
single-phase open-air exposures on voltages of 46 kilovolts and less.
Employers may use other distances if those distances reasonably
resemble the actual exposures faced by employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\329\ Work is not performed on energized parts in the 46.1- to
72.5-kilovolt range using rubber insulating gloves. The maximum
voltage rating for rubber insulating gloves is 36 kilovolts. (See
Table E-4 to final Sec. 1926.97.) The phase-to-ground voltage on a
72.5-kilovolt circuit is 41.8 kilovolts, which is above the maximum
use voltage for rubber gloves. Minimum approach distances are set
for the 46.1- to 72.5-kilovolt range based on the rubber insulating
glove work technique because rubber insulating glove work is
performed close to energized parts in this voltage range. For the
purposes of estimating incident-energy levels, the Agency believes
that the most likely electric arc will generally involve live parts
the employee will be handling, which will be energized at 46
kilovolts or less.
\330\ Rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors and
rubber insulating sleeves normally cover the employee's arms. This
equipment provides protection against incident heat energy (Exs.
0373, 0466; Tr. 434).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TVA maintained that the 380-millimeter (15-inch) distance
assumption for these exposures was too small, commenting:
OSHA states that an employee's chest will be about 380
millimeters (15 in.) from an energized conductor during rubber glove
work on that conductor. A review of anthropometric estimates
("Anthropometry, Ergonomics, and the Design of Work" by S.
Pheasant) for British adults (19 to 65 years old) shows that the
elbow to finger tip length for the 5th percentile is 440 mm (17.3
inches) for men and 400 mm (15.75 inches) for women. After adding a
distance of 51 mm (2 inches) for the arms to move toward the front
of the body and into a working position, the distance from the chest
to the potential arc point will be 451 mm (17.76 inches) for women
and 491 mm (19.33 inches) for men. Based [on] this data, the default
distance from the worker to the arc point should be 451 mm (17.76
inches) or about 18 inches. The 15-inch distance proposed by [OSHA]
will increase the calculated arc flash incident energy, which means
that employees will have to wear heavier protection within the area
of the arc flash boundary. This heavier protection is not warranted
based on anthropometric data. IEEE 1584 states that a typical
distance is 455 mm (17.91 inches) to the arc for cable work and low
voltage panelboards and motor control centers. It is recommended
that the final rule adopt 457 mm (18 inches) as the default distance
to the arcing point. [Ex. 0213]
OSHA does not dispute the anthropometric data described by TVA.
However, the Agency does not agree with TVA's application of this data
to rubber glove work. An employee working in a comfortable position on
a conductor will have his or her upper and lower arms at an angle of
about 60 degrees (269-Ex. 8-5). This position forms an equilateral
triangle with the sides produced by the upper arm, the lower arm, and
the distance between the employee's chest and the conductor. Therefore,
the distance from the energized part to the worker's chest is the same
as the distance between the energized part and the worker's elbow.
Although the 95th percentile distance between the elbow and the
fingertip may be 440 millimeters (17.3 inches), the conductor will be
closer than that distance because it will originate at the crotch
between the thumb and the palm rather than at the fingertip (id.).
Subtracting 60 millimeters (2.4 inches) from the length of the lower
arm, which is a conservative approximation of the distance between the
middle fingertip and the crotch between the thumb and the palm, yields
a distance of 380 millimeters (15 inches). This is the approximate
distance between an employee using rubber gloves on an energized
conductor and the live part, which also is the same distance as the
estimated distance TVA was challenging.\331\ OSHA does not dispute the
IEEE Std 1584 distance mentioned by TVA; however, the IEEE distances
are for cables and enclosed equipment, not for open conductors in air
(which involve the use of rubber insulating gloves). The Agency
concludes that the distance from the arc to the employee should be
different for these exposures, as explained later. Consequently, OSHA
concludes that 380 millimeters (15 inches) is a reasonable distance to
assume between the employee and the arc for work by employees using
rubber gloves involving exposures to single-phase arcs of up to 46
kilovolts in open air.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\331\ OSHA's approach is identical to the approach taken by the
2007 NESC in Table 410-1 (Ex. 0533). (The 2012 NESC retains this
approach in Table 410-2.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At voltages higher than 46 kilovolts, employees must use live-line
tools or the live-line barehand technique to handle energized
parts.\332\ For this work, OSHA considers it reasonable to calculate
incident-energy exposures for single-phase open-air arcs using a
distance from the employee to the arc that is equal to the applicable
minimum approach distance minus twice the arc length. In this case, the
employee would be at the minimum approach distance from the energized
part,\333\ where OSHA assumes the arc occurs, and subtracting twice the
arc length from that distance accounts for movement of the arc \334\
and for small errors in judging and maintaining the minimum approach
distance. There is no evidence on the record that this distance is
unreasonable, and the Agency received no adverse comments on that
assumption. Therefore, OSHA concludes that, for exposures involving
single-phase arcs in open air when employees perform work using live-
line tools, a reasonable estimate of the distance from the arc to the
employee is the minimum approach distance minus twice the arc length.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\332\ Although the rest of this discussion relates to work
performed using live-line tools, an employer can use the same
technique to reasonably estimate the distance from the employee to
the electric arc when the employee is performing live-line barehand
work. An employee performing live-line barehand work is at the
potential of the conductor and is maintaining the applicable minimum
approach distance from ground. From the worker's perspective, the
dangerous potential is ground, not the conductor to which he or she
is bonded. In that case, the employer can reasonably assume that the
arc, if one occurs, will be close to objects at ground potential as,
for example, if an energized conductor drops onto a grounded tower
leg, or at the potential of other phase conductors as, for example,
if a phase conductor drops on another phase conductor below.
\333\ The design of the live-line tool keeps the employee at a
distance from the energized part equal to, or greater than, the
applicable minimum approach distance.
\334\ When the arc initiates, the worker is likely to react by
pulling the live-line tool away from the energized part and toward
himself or herself. This action would pull the arc toward the
worker. If the worker reacts in the opposite direction, then he or
she would get closer to the arc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 9 in proposed Appendix F only covered work on systems
operating at more than 46 kilovolts. The Agency recognizes that some
employers require their employees to use live-line tools on voltages of
46.0 kilovolts and less. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0127, 0159.)
Therefore, the Agency is extending Table 7 in final Appendix E to cover
these lower voltages as well. Table 7 applies whenever employees use
live-line tools, irrespective of voltage, because OSHA based the table
on the work method, not on the voltage. OSHA also revised the titles of
Table 6 and Table 7 in final Appendix E to indicate that they are
applicable to work using
rubber insulating gloves and live-line tools, respectively, rather than
work on systems based on voltage as proposed.
One mechanism for reducing estimated incident energy is to move the
employee farther away from the electric arc. One way to accomplish this
objective is to use live-line tool work methods with a larger minimum
approach distance than the minimum distance required by paragraph
(c)(1) of final Sec. 1926.960. OSHA encourages employers to use such
methods to reduce incident-energy levels. If an employer requires an
employee to maintain a minimum approach distance greater than the
minimum distance required by paragraph (c)(1), OSHA would deem it
reasonable for the employer to use an estimate of the distance from the
employee to the arc that reflects the employer-imposed minimum approach
distance rather than the minimum approach distance required by the
standard.
Work that exposes employees to three-phase arcs in open air, or
single-phase or three-phase arcs in enclosures, typically involves the
employee working at a greater distance from energized parts than is the
case when an employee is working on a single phase conductor of an
overhead line. For example, employees typically perform work on
energized equipment using insulating tools or test equipment on the
energized parts or by operating the equipment or removing covers. In
the first two cases, that is, using insulated tools or test equipment
on energized parts, the employee will be working with arms extended. In
the latter two cases, that is, operating the equipment or removing
covers, employees would be working with their hands near the outside of
equipment. OSHA believes that, in all four cases, it is reasonable to
assume that the employee is working at a greater distance from the
energized parts than an employee working with rubber insulating gloves
on energized overhead line conductors. IEEE Std 1584a-2004 uses
distances based, at least in part, on the dimensions of the equipment
enclosure (Ex. 0425). Because IEEE designed that standard to address a
wide range of equipment, OSHA believes that the IEEE approach is
broadly applicable to work on energized equipment. The IEEE approach is
explained in Section 4.8 of that standard as follows:
Arc-flash protection is always based on the incident energy
level on the person's face and body at the working distance, not the
incident energy on the hands or arms. The degree of injury in a burn
depends on the percentage of a person's skin that is burned. The
head and body are a large percentage of total skin surface area and
injury to these areas is much more life threatening than burns on
the extremities. Typical working distances are shown in [the
following table:]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Typical working
Classes of equipment distance \a\ (mm)
[inches]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
15 kV switchgear.................................... 910 [36]
5 kV switchgear..................................... 910 [36]
Low-voltage switchgear.............................. 610 [24]
Low-voltage MCCs \[\\335\\]\ and panelboards........ 455 [18]
Cable............................................... 455 [18]
* * * * * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Typical working distance is the sum of the distance between the
worker standing in front of the equipment, and from the front of the
equipment to the potential arc source inside the equipment. [id.\336\]
IEEE Std 1584a-2004--IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard
Calculations--Amendment 1--Reprinted with permission from IEEE--
Copyright 2004, by IEEE. (Table revised from original).
There is no evidence on the record that the distances in IEEE Std
1584-2004 for three-phase arcs in open air or single-phase or three-
phase arcs in enclosures are unreasonable. Therefore, OSHA concludes
that the distances in IEEE Std 1584-2004 described earlier are
reasonable estimates for the distance from the employee to the electric
arc for three-phase arcs in open air, and single-phase and three-phase
arcs in enclosures, for voltages up to 15 kilovolts. Above that
voltage, employers must consider equipment enclosure size and the
working distance to the employee in selecting a distance from the
employee to the arc. The Agency will consider a distance reasonable
when the employer bases it on equipment size and working distance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\335\ Motor control center.
\336\ IEEE Std 1584b-2011 makes editorial changes to the quoted
paragraph and adds a column with English units to the table. The
metric distances in the table remain unchanged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary and discussion of general issues related to incident-energy
calculation methods. Table 12, Table 13, and Table 14 in this preamble
summarize OSHA's findings related to methods employers can use to
estimate incident heat energy as required by final paragraph (g)(2).
OSHA included these tables in Appendix E to Subpart V in the final rule
to enable employers to readily select incident-energy calculation
methods and input parameters that OSHA will consider reasonable and
acceptable for compliance with paragraph (g)(2) of final Sec.
1926.960.
Table 12--Selecting a Reasonable Incident-Energy Calculation Method\1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
600 V and less \2\ 601 V to 15 kV \2\ More than 15 kV
Incident-energy calculation method -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1[Phi] 3[Phi]a 3[Phi]b 1[Phi] 3[Phi]a 3[Phi]b 1[Phi] 3[Phi]a 3[Phi]b
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NFPA 70E-2004 Annex D (Lee equation) \3\...................... Y-C Y N Y-C Y-C N N\4\ N\4\ N\4\
Doughty, Neal, and Floyd...................................... Y-C Y Y N N N N N N
IEEE Std 1584-2004 \5\........................................ Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N
ARCPRO........................................................ Y N N Y N N Y Y\6\ Y\6\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key:
1[Phi]: Single-phase arc in open air
3[Phi]a: Three-phase arc in open air
3[Phi]b: Three-phase arc in an enclosure (box)
Y: Acceptable; produces a reasonable estimate of incident heat energy from this type of electric arc
N: Not acceptable; does not produce a reasonable estimate of incident heat energy from this type of electric arc
Y-C: Acceptable; produces a reasonable, but conservative, estimate of incident heat energy from this type of electric arc.
Notes:
\1\ Although OSHA will consider these methods reasonable for enforcement purposes when employers use the methods in
accordance with this table, employers should be aware that the listed methods do not necessarily result in estimates
that will provide full protection from internal faults in transformers and similar equipment or from arcs in
underground manholes or vaults.
\2\ At these voltages, the arc is presumed to be three-phase unless the employer can demonstrate that only one phase is
present or that the spacing of the phases is sufficient to prevent a multiphase arc from occurring.
\3\ The entries for NFPA 70E-2004 Annex D (Lee equation) apply equally to NFPA 70E-2012, and the comparable table in
Appendix E refers to NFPA 70E-2012 Annex D (Lee equation).
\4\ Although OSHA will consider this method acceptable for purposes of assessing whether incident energy exceeds
2.0 cal/cm\2\, the results at voltages of more than 15 kilovolts are extremely conservative and unrealistic.
\5\ The entries for IEEE Std 1584-2004 apply equally to IEEE 1584-2011, and the comparable table in Appendix E refers to
IEEE Std 1584 with this latest amendment.
\6\ OSHA will deem the results of this method reasonable when the employer adjusts them using the conversion factors for
three-phase arcs in open air or in an enclosure, as indicated in the program's instructions.
Table 13--Selecting a Reasonable Arc Gap
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Single-phase arc mm
Class of equipment (inches) Three-phase arc mm \1\ (inches)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cable............................... NA \2\...................... 13 (0.5)
Low voltage MCCs and panelboards.... NA.......................... 25 (1.0)
Low-voltage switchgear.............. NA.......................... 32 (1.25)
5-kV switchgear..................... NA.......................... 104 (4.0)
15-kV switchgear.................... NA.......................... 152 (6.0)
Single conductors in air, 15 kV and 51 (2.0) \3\................ Phase conductor spacing.
less.
Single conductor in air, more than Voltage in kV times 2.54 Phase conductor spacing.
15 kV. (0.1), but no less than 51
mm (2 inches) \3\.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Source: IEEE Std 1584a-2004.
\2\ "NA" = not applicable.
\3\ Table 6 of Appendix E of final Subpart V uses a more conservative arc gap that equals the electrical
component of the minimum approach distance rather than a value corresponding to the dielectric strength of air
for the system voltage, which forms the basis for the values in this table.
Table 14--Selecting a Reasonable Distance From the Employee to the Arc
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Single-phase arc mm Three-phase arc mm
Class of equipment (inches) (inches)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cable........................ NA\*\................ 455 (18)
Low voltage MCCs and NA................... 455 (18)
panelboards.
Low-voltage switchgear....... NA................... 610 (24)
5-kV switchgear.............. NA................... 910 (36)
15-kV switchgear............. NA................... 910 (36)
Single conductors in air (up 380 (15)............. NA
to 46 kilovolts), work with
rubber insulating gloves.
Single conductors in air, MAD - (2 x kV x 2.54) NA
work with live-line tools (MAD - (2 x kV /
and live-line barehand work. 10))[dagger].
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* "NA" = not applicable.
[dagger] The terms in this equation are:
MAD = The applicable minimum approach distance, and
kV = The system voltage in kilovolts.
With the guidance provided here and in Appendix E to final subpart
V, OSHA believes that employers will be able to reasonably estimate
incident-energy levels as required by final paragraph (g)(2). The
Agency expects that, upon inspection, it will be able to detect any
manipulation of input parameters designed to undermine the purpose and
requirements of this final rule.
In enforcing paragraph (g)(2) of the final rule, the Agency will
accept as reasonable any estimates made following the guidance in the
preamble and in Appendix E. Employers may depart from this guidance as
long as the methods and variables used to calculate incident heat
energy relate reasonably to the electric-arc exposures actually faced
by employees. Duke Energy pointed out that "standard writing
committees . . . are continuing to address the electric-arc hazards,
specifically NFPA 70E, IEEE Std 1584-2002, and technical papers written
by the IEEE/ESMOL[337] committee" (Ex. 0201). These efforts
may result in additional sources of information for employers to use in
estimating incident heat energy for purposes of final paragraph (g)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\337\ Electrical Safety and Maintenance of Lines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several rulemaking participants noted that IEEE and NFPA are
undertaking a joint research effort to address issues related to
methods of calculating incident heat energy from electric arcs. (See,
for example, Exs. 0177, 0201, 0227; Tr. 1095, 1128-1129.) These
rulemaking participants recommended that OSHA delay the rulemaking
pending the results of this research. For example, Ms. Kathy Wilmer,
testifying on behalf of EEI, stated:
In 2005, IEEE and NFPA sponsored a joint task force whose charge
was to develop a research and test plan intended to address
technical issues, including those raised by the calculation methods.
It will be several years, however, before the results of the IEEE/
NFPA Research and Test Plan Committee are available to employers.
[Tr. 1095]
EEI recommended that "OSHA wait for NFPA and IEEE to answer some
of [the] questions" related to the calculation methods (Tr. 1129).
As noted by Ms. Wilmer, the results of any research conducted as a
result of the IEEE-NFPA joint effort may be years away. Today, the
final results of this research are not available. OSHA concludes that
there is sufficient information in the rulemaking record to determine
that existing calculation methods can reasonably estimate incident heat
energy from electric arcs. Therefore, the Agency does not believe that
it is necessary to wait for IEEE and NFPA to complete the research. In
the future, this research may result in additional sources of
information for employers estimating incident heat energy for the
purposes of final paragraph (g)(2).
Note 2 to paragraph (g)(2), which is being adopted without
substantive change from the proposal, explains that paragraph (g)(2)
does not require the employer to estimate the heat-energy exposure for
every job task performed by each employee. The note indicates that the
employer may make broad estimates that cover multiple system areas
provided that: (1) The employer uses reasonable assumptions about the
energy-exposure distribution throughout the system, and (2) the
estimates represent the maximum exposure for those areas.
Proposed Appendix F explained that the employer could use the
maximum fault current and clearing time to cover several system areas
at once.
NIOSH expressed concern that, following this guidance, an employer
could estimate incident energy based on the maximum available fault
current, even though a higher incident-energy level is possible with a
lower fault current (Ex. 0130). NIOSH explained:
[Proposed Note 2 to paragraph (g)(2) and proposed Appendix F]
suggest that the point in a power system that has the highest
available fault current will also have the maximum heat energy
hazard in the event of an arcing-fault. [T]he heat energy released
during an arcing-fault is a function of both current and duration
(clearing time). The maximum heat energy hazard may be at a point in
the system where available fault current is less than the system
maximum and may consequently have a longer clearing time. This
longer clearing time is due to the inverse-time characteristic of
many circuit protection components such as fuses and relays (the
higher the fault current, the more quickly the circuit protection
components will clear the fault). [Id.]
NIOSH recommended "providing a more detailed explanation of the
interdependence of current and clearing time with respect to arcing-
fault hazards," and indicated that "NFPA 70E-2004 provides an example
of such an explanation" (id.).
OSHA recognizes that fault current lower than the maximum available
fault current can produce a higher incident energy. The maximum fault
current, also known as the bolted-fault current, occurs when the fault
has no impedance,\338\ as if the two conductors were bolted together.
The current in an electric arc is never as high as the maximum
available fault current because the arc itself has some impedance, and
this lowers the fault current. All of the incident-energy calculation
methods, except ARCPRO, account for this reduction (Exs. 0134, 0425,
0430, 0469).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\338\ Impedance is the effective resistance of an electric
circuit to alternating current. It includes the combined effects of
ohmic resistance and reactance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As NIOSH notes, when the current is less than the maximum available
fault current, the protective devices for the circuit may take longer
to clear the fault, resulting in longer clearing times. IEEE Std 1584a-
2004 accounts for this difference in clearing times and for variations
in arc current with arc voltage in the formulas it uses to calculate
incident energy (Ex. 0425). The other methods use the clearing time
corresponding to the fault current used to calculate the incident
energy.
However, the fault current and the clearing times used to calculate
incident energy in these calculations are only approximations of the
values that might occur in an actual fault. Like the distance from the
employee to the arc and, in some cases, the arc length, the fault
current and clearing time in an actual fault likely will be different
from the fault current and clearing time used to calculate incident
energy. The final rule requires that the employer's estimate of
incident energy be reasonable, not that it be a precise estimate of the
maximum possible incident energy. Lower fault current may produce a
higher incident energy, but so would exposures with the employee closer
to the arc. Other variations, such as short clearing times (which can
occur if the arc self-extinguishes) or longer distances between the
employee and the arc, could lead to lower incident energy. Considering
the evidence in the record as a whole, the Agency believes that using
maximum fault current in estimating incident energy will produce
reasonable estimates of the exposures faced by employees.
Mr. John Vocke with Pacific Gas and Electric Company stated that
his company conducted testing to verify the values in Table 8 and Table
9 in proposed Appendix F (Ex. 0185). He maintained that the incident-
energy values provided in those tables may be inaccurate.
As noted earlier, the Agency concluded that the ARCPRO method, on
which OSHA based the incident-energy values in proposed Table 8 and
Table 9, reasonably estimates incident energy from single-phase arcs in
open air on systems of more than 600 volts. Mr. Vocke did not provide
the parameters used in, or the results of, Pacific Gas and Electric
Company's testing. For example, it is not clear from Mr. Vocke's
comment whether the testing was with single-phase arcs in open air. If
not, then the Agency would expect their results to differ from the
values in proposed Table 8 and Table 9.
As described earlier, OSHA based Table 8 and Table 9 in proposed
Appendix F on calculations using ARCPRO and designed those tables to
cover a wide range of exposures faced by employees performing overhead
line work. TVA noted that these tables had little application and
expressed concern that employers would misuse the tables, commenting:
We believe the use of tables, e.g., * * * proposed Tables 8 & 9,
have limited application for estimating heat energy for electrical
circuits common to the electric utility industry. The footnotes to
these tables instruct users to use other methods if the circuit
assumptions in the tables are not applicable to the circuit being
analyzed. Our concern is that many companies will not understand the
limitations of these tables or choose to ignore the instruction to
use other methods. Either of these actions could result in under
estimating the arc flash hazard.
* * * * *
[W]e do not agree with the "table" method approach. We believe
that for many exposures in generating and transmission facilities
OSHA's proposed Tables 8 and 9 will not be useful to employers for
selecting arc flash protection. The tables are misleading because in
reality there are too many circuits with parameters that do not meet
the table use criteria. OSHA states in [proposed Appendix F] that
employers will need to use other methods in situations not addressed
by Table 8 or Table 9. We believe that an accepted method should be
used to calculate arc flash incident energies and recommend that the
final rule not include tables like proposed Table 8 and Table 9 for
selecting arc flash protection. [Ex. 0213]
OSHA believes that Table 8 and Table 9 from proposed Appendix F
(Table 6 and Table 7 in final Appendix E, which OSHA revised as
described elsewhere in this section of the preamble) serve as
relatively simple ways for employers to estimate incident energy. The
SBREFA Panel Report specifically recommended that OSHA consider
including such tables in the standard (Ex. 0019). The National
Electrical Safety Code committee adopted provisions on protection from
electric arcs that included tables similar to the ones in the proposal
(Ex. 0480). Mr. James Tomaseski of IBEW supported the proposed tables
and stated that the values in those tables represent "common exposures
out on distribution lines" (Tr. 939--940). Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI
also supported proposed Table 8 and Table 9, testifying:
ESCI fully supports the table 8 and table 9 in the appendix of
this proposal as a way of providing a method of choosing some FR
clothing for workers or small companies.
It will allow a company to figure out, take their fault current,
their clearing time, go into a table, and find . . . some clothing
that might be appropriate, buy that for them, and feel . . . assured
that they were doing what they could do and . . . what OSHA would
require. [Tr. 1246-1247]
The Agency concludes that Table 8 and Table 9 in proposed Appendix F
will assist employers in complying with the requirement in final
paragraph (g)(2) to estimate incident heat energy and that the tables
reasonably represent exposures in electric distribution systems, as
noted by Mr. Tomaseski, if not transmission systems.\339\ (See, also,
Mr. Erga's testimony at Tr. 1247: "I passed table 8 and table 9 around
to my customers. All of them feel it looks very good and looks very
straightforward for them to follow. And they feel pretty comfortable
that they would be willing to get into an FR program using [those]
table[s] . . . .") Consequently, OSHA is including the tables in final
Appendix E, with revisions as described elsewhere in this section of
the preamble. OSHA agrees with TVA that it is important for employers
to heed the notes to these tables, which limit their application to
rubber insulating glove work (Table 6) and live-line tool work (Table
7) involving exposure to single-phase arcs in open air. OSHA further
agrees that these tables are of little, if any, use in electric power
generating plants, where most of the exposures come from three-phase
arcs. Nevertheless, the Agency believes that many employers, especially
small ones, will find these tables useful.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\339\ Although there is nothing in the record that states
explicitly that Table 9 represents actual exposures for employees
working on transmission systems, the existence of similar tables in
the 2007 NESC (Ex. 0533) and the 2012 NESC strongly suggests that
Table 9 does reasonably represent transmission exposures. (Table 8
of proposed Appendix F covers only distribution voltages.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Tom Chappell of Southern Company suggested that the final rule
not require incident-energy estimates for voltages of 600 volts and
less, arguing that these systems do not pose the same risk as higher
voltage systems:
This proposed language would require that the employer make
estimates of the maximum available heat energy to which employees
are exposed to at 600 volts and below as well as those above 600
volts. We do not believe this to be reasonable. Even OSHA recognizes
that the risks of exposures at 600 volts and below do not carry the
same risk as those above 600 volts since the proposed regulations do
not require flame resistant clothing at voltages 600 volts and
below. Additionally, Note 2 suggests making broad estimates that
cover multiple system areas, and further gives an example of how
that may be done for distribution circuits. Both of these suggest
that the OSHA's intent was not to cover systems operating at 600
volts or less where such broad estimates are meaningless and not
possible. We recommend that estimates of heat energy not be required
for systems operating at 600 volts and below and that engineering
controls and work practices be used for these systems so that
contact is avoided. This recommendation would be consistent with
NESC proposed language. [Ex. 0212]
Mr. Chappell misunderstood the rationale behind OSHA's final rule.
First, Note 2 to proposed paragraph (g)(2), which OSHA is adopting
without substantive change, contained an example, clearly identified as
such, of how to estimate incident heat energy over a wide area. There
are other possible circuits that might be suitable for wide estimates.
In addition, the note only addresses circuits that are far-ranging,
such as transmission and distribution circuits. Circuits that operate
at 600 volts and less are found normally as services or as feeder or
branch circuits inside electric power generation plants. (See, for
example, 269-Exs. 8-5, 8-17, 8-20, 8-21, 8-22.) These circuits do not
normally extend for miles; each of them usually serves a single
facility. Second, OSHA does not agree that 600-volt systems produce
lower amounts of incident energy or pose a lower risk of burn injury to
employees than higher voltage systems. The rationale behind the
requirement in final Sec. 1926.960(g)(4)(i) that employees exposed to
contact with circuit parts operating at more than 600 volts wear flame-
resistant clothing relates to the reduced likelihood that contact with
a circuit part energized at lower voltages would produce an electric
arc through, and ignite, the clothing. As noted under the summary and
explanation for final paragraph (g)(4)(i), many commenters noted that
systems operating at 600 volts and less are capable of producing
extremely high levels of incident energy, sometimes even higher than
systems operating at higher voltages. For example, Mr. Paul Hamer
stated, "Many systems and equipment operating at 600 volts and below
have severe arc-flash hazards . . ." (Ex. 0166). In addition, TVA
noted:
The magnitude of the heat energy in 480 V arc flash accidents is
greater [than at voltages higher than 600 volts] because of the
following: 1. The single phase fault typically propagates to three
phase fault. 2. The clearing times in generating plants are
typically longer. 3. The arc flash energy is typically forced into
one direction (arc in a box). [Ex. 0213]
Therefore, while there may not be an ignition hazard from contact at
the lower voltages, burn hazards at these voltages may still be serious
and require arc-rated protective equipment.
For these reasons, OSHA is not adopting Mr. Chappell's
recommendation. The Agency believes that it is just as important to
estimate incident-energy levels for systems operating at 600 volts and
less as it is for systems of higher voltages. Without an estimate of
incident energy, an employer would not be able to select appropriate
arc-rated protective equipment for employees exposed to these voltages
in accordance with final Sec. 1926.960(g)(5).
Some rulemaking participants maintained that incident-heat-energy
exposures change over time. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0163; Tr.
404-405.) For instance, Ms. Susan O'Connor with Siemens Power
Generation commented that "if new equipment is added or the available
fault current to the plant from the utility changes, the entire
calculations change. The arc faults become a moving target" (Ex.
0163). Noting that fault current can change hourly, Mr. James Shill
with ElectriCities of North Carolina testified:
[I]n one of my first assignments in the power company I was in
charge of coordinating the equipment, and fault currents change
hourly. [I]t depends on where your source of energy comes from. [Tr.
404]
The final rule does not require employers to estimate incident-
energy levels on a moment-by-moment basis. As indicated by Note 2 to
paragraph (g)(2), the final rule permits employers to make broad
estimates of incident-energy exposure, provided those
estimates represent the reasonably expected maximum exposures. There
would be no need to perform additional calculations when changes to the
system would lower incident energy. In addition, as long as the
protective clothing and other protective equipment selected by the
employer will protect against the incident energy, including any
increase caused by changes to the system, the final rule does not
require the employer to reconduct the incident-energy estimates
required by paragraph (g)(2).
The Agency believes that employers will select arc-rated protective
equipment, not on the basis of estimates for individual circuits, but
on the basis of what levels will provide protection for broad areas of
the employers' systems. For instance, an employer could select a base
clothing outfit rated at 8 cal/cm.\2\ This clothing would be acceptable
as long as the estimated energy levels are less than that value.
Accordingly, OSHA believes that an employer can take measures to
minimize the number of times it must perform additional calculations.
For example, an employer using Table 6 or Table 7 in final Appendix E,
can select an incident-energy estimate for a maximum number of cycles
at a given level of fault current on a particular circuit. As long as
any change to the circuit does not increase the fault current or
clearing time beyond the fault current and clearing time used in
selecting a value from the table, the employer would not have to make
additional estimates. The employer then would know that as long as
relay settings (which affect clearing time) and transformer kilovolt-
ampere ratings (which affect maximum fault current) stay below the
values on which the employer bases the selection of incident-energy
level, then employees would remain safe, and the employer would remain
in compliance. Thus, the employer could avoid having to reestimate
incident-energy levels simply by limiting the types of changes that
could be made to a circuit or by selecting protective clothing and
other protective equipment that accommodates any changes that will be
made. As Mr. Donald Hartley of IBEW testified: "[If] you don't find
that [the fault current and clearing times] are substantially different
[then] you may not have to change what it is you were doing" (Tr.
1031-1032). On the other hand, it is possible that employers that do
not adequately plan changes to their systems will need to reestimate
incident heat energy for some of their circuits.
OSHA does not expect employers to account for unanticipated changes
to their systems in estimating incident-energy levels. As Mr. Shill
noted, it is possible that an unanticipated system change could
increase incident energy. For example, an unidentified faulty relay
could substantially increase the clearing time and, thus, an employee's
potential incident-energy exposure. However, final paragraph (g)(2)
does not require employers to anticipate such events. The estimates
required by this paragraph are for normal operating conditions.
For these reasons, OSHA concludes that concerns that employers
would need to constantly update their incident-energy estimates are
largely baseless. To the extent that employers must update these
estimates, the Agency's regulatory analysis fully accounts for periodic
updates. (See Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis, later in the preamble.)
Some commenters maintained that employers would need to hire
consultants to perform the incident-energy calculations required by
final paragraph (g)(2). (See, for example, Exs. 0163, 0178; Tr. 375-
376, 563.) Mr. James Shill of ElectriCities of North Carolina
testified: "Even if professional engineers know the method to use in
calculating maximum available heat energy, small electric utilities
often do not have such qualified personnel on staff. Instead, small
utility businesses will be faced with hiring outside consultants to
perform this work for each job at each workplace, and for each
employee" (Tr. 375-376).
OSHA agrees with these commenters that small employers may need to
hire consultants to perform or assist in the preparation of incident-
energy calculations. Even some larger utilities hire consultants to
help perform incident-energy calculations (Tr. 1197). The Agency
understands that estimating incident heat energy demands some
electrical engineering expertise. OSHA believes that most employers
that work on electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
systems have such engineering expertise available. As noted by some
witnesses, these estimates require much of the same knowledge and skill
as other assessments needed to operate, maintain, and work on electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution systems (Tr. 1030-
1032). In any event, OSHA's estimate of the costs associated with
complying with paragraph (g)(2) in the final rule accounts for the
possibility that, in some instances, consultants will perform the
required estimates. (See Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in this preamble.)
Some rulemaking participants suggested that contractors would have
difficulty estimating incident energy or would not be able to perform
the estimates at all. (See, for example, Exs. 0162, 0169, 0234, 0501;
Tr. 1326-1327, 1335-1336.) For instance, Quanta Services noted that
utility operators frequently do not know the maximum fault current on
their systems, making it "difficult [for contractors] to determine the
maximum fault current" (Ex. 0234). The Davis H. Elliot Construction
Company suggested that utilities might provide worst-case estimates to
their contractors because of potential liability concerns (Exs. 0156,
0206, 0231).
OSHA understands that contractors may face challenges in estimating
incident heat energy as required by paragraph (g)(2) in the final rule.
The requirements in final Sec. 1926.950(c)(1), which specifies that
host employers provide information about their systems to contract
employers, should ensure that contractors have the information they
need to estimate incident energy. Paragraph (c)(1)(iii) of final Sec.
1926.950 specifically requires host employers to provide information to
enable contract employers to perform the assessments required by the
final rule. This would include information contractors need to estimate
incident heat energy as required in final Sec. 1926.960(g)(2).\340\ In
any case in which the host employer does not provide the contractor
with necessary information and, therefore, violates this final rule,
contractors can use other (albeit less certain) means of estimating the
system parameters needed to perform incident-energy calculations.
Contractors can estimate fault currents through the ratings of the
transformers supplying the circuit \341\ and clearing times from the
type of overcurrent devices protecting the circuit \342\ (Ex. 0425;
269-Ex. 8-15). The Agency assumes that, when utilities are
not providing this information, contractors already are using these
methods when determining the size of grounds necessary under existing
Sec. 1910.269(n)(4)(i) ("Protective grounding equipment shall be
capable of conducting the maximum fault current that could flow at the
point of grounding for the time necessary to clear the fault.") There
is no evidence in the record that utilities are currently providing
unduly conservative estimates of fault current or clearing times to
contractors for the purposes of existing Sec. 1910.269(n)(4)(i), and
it seems unlikely that they would provide different estimates after
this final rule becomes effective. Consequently, the Agency concludes
that the concerns specific to contractors are baseless.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\340\ In the economic analysis, OSHA assumes that costs related
to estimating incident energy will be borne only by host employers.
The Agency anticipates that, for economic reasons, host employers
will provide the results of their estimates to contract employers
even though the final rule does not require them to do so. See
Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis, later in the preamble.
\341\ For example, a contractor can estimate the fault current
on the secondary side of a transformer on a radial system by
calculating the fault current at the transformer, which is equal to
the transformer rating divided by the product of the per-unit
impedance and the voltage (Ex. 0134).
\342\ IEEE Std 1584a-2004 gives the clearing times for a wide
range of circuit protective devices (Ex. 0425). Contractors also can
try to obtain clearing times from a number of other sources,
including the manufacturer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several commenters suggested that proposed paragraph (g)(2) was too
vague. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0152, 0227; Tr. 1095-1097.) For
instance, Ms. Jean Thrasher with Community Electric Cooperative
commented: "With undefined terms in the equation and no firm
guidelines from OSHA the employer has the potential to be cited even
though they performed a good faith appraisal but the inspector
disagreed with the values chosen" (Ex. 0152).
OSHA made it clear in this preamble and in Appendix E to final
Subpart V that the employer is free to choose any method for estimating
incident energy that results in a reasonable estimate of incident heat
energy to which the employee would be exposed. Appendix E provides
guidance on how to estimate incident heat energy and information on
approaches that OSHA will recognize as reasonable for performing these
estimates. In the final rule, OSHA revised Note 1 to paragraph (g)(2)
to further clarify what constitutes compliance with that paragraph. The
revised note provides that: (1) OSHA will deem employers that follow
the guidance in Appendix E to be in compliance with paragraph (g)(2),
and (2) employers can choose another method of estimating incident heat
energy if the chosen method reasonably predicts the incident energy to
which the employee would be exposed. (Note 1 in the proposal simply
referred to the appendix for guidance.) Employers can rely on the
guidance in this preamble and final Appendix E to select methods and
input parameters accepted by OSHA for compliance with final paragraph
(g)(2). Accordingly, the Agency concludes that paragraph (g)(2) in the
final rule is not unenforceably vague.
Proposed paragraph (g)(2) would have required employers to make "a
reasonable estimate of the maximum available heat energy to which the
employee would be exposed." OSHA concludes that this language might
not accurately convey the purpose of the proposed rule and, therefore,
could confuse the regulated community. For example, as should be clear
from the foregoing explanation of what OSHA will consider a
"reasonable estimate," the Agency believes that it is reasonable to
estimate incident-energy exposures based on the location where an
employee is reasonably expected to be working when an arc occurs.
However, as explained earlier, the maximum heat energy will occur
within the arc plasma, and the Agency concludes that it is not
necessary to estimate heat energy assuming that the employee is close
enough to the arc to be within the plasma field. In addition, as
explained previously, the choice of methods and other input parameters
also can affect the calculated incident energy. To clarify that the
Agency is expecting a reasonable estimate, and not an estimate of the
maximum heat energy, OSHA replaced the phrase "a reasonable estimate
of the maximum available heat energy" in paragraph (g)(2) in the
proposed rule with "a reasonable estimate of the incident heat
energy" in the corresponding provision in the final rule. The Agency
believes that the final rule more accurately reflects the purpose of
this provision and will clarify some of the confusion related to the
requirement to estimate incident-energy levels.
NIOSH stated that arc warning labels would be valuable for new or
upgraded installations (Ex. 0130). NIOSH explained its position as
follows:
Arc warning labels that explain the voltage, available fault
current, Arc Hazard Category, the ATPV of the required protective
clothing, and the approach distances would be a valuable addition to
all new or upgraded installations. Such information, as calculated
by the systems' designers, would then be readily available to the
workers who need to maintain such systems. Many commercial power
systems analysis packages can automatically generate these labels as
part of the systems design and analysis procedure. Having labels on
new equipment would eliminate the need for the employer to estimate
arc hazards by providing calculated engineering data. [id.]
OSHA decided against requiring arc-hazard warning labels such as
those recommended by NIOSH. OSHA believes that the employer can
effectively provide information on arc hazards and the required
protective measures in other ways. Employers must train their employees
in the recognition of electrical hazards, including hazards from
electric arcs, and the proper use of PPE, including FR and arc-rated
clothing, as required by final Sec. 1926.950(b)(2)(v) and (b)(2)(iv),
respectively. The employer can use several methods other than labels to
ensure that employees wear appropriately rated protective equipment,
including requiring a minimum level of protection that will cover most
exposures and including the arc rating on work orders. OSHA believes
that these other measures are likely to be more effective than warning
labels since they inform the employee of the appropriate rating before
the employee arrives at the jobsite. If the employer relies on labels,
employees may arrive at the jobsite without properly rated protective
equipment. In addition, OSHA does not believe that providing labels on
transmission and distribution installations is feasible or effective.
It is not possible to label the entire length of a transmission or
distribution line, and installing labels at switching points would not
prove effective or useful to employees whose work is remote from those
switching points. Therefore, OSHA is not adopting the requirement for
arc-hazard warning labels recommended by NIOSH.
Prohibited clothing. Paragraph (g)(3), which is being adopted with
only minor changes from the proposal, requires the employer to ensure
that employees exposed to hazards from flames or electric arcs do not
wear clothing that could either melt onto their skin or ignite and
continue to burn when exposed to flames or the heat energy estimated
under final paragraph (g)(2). This rule is equivalent to existing Sec.
1910.269(l)(6)(iii), although OSHA revised the language to explicitly
prohibit clothing that could melt onto an employee's skin or ignite and
continue to burn.\343\ Final paragraph (g)(3) ensures that employees
exposed to electric arcs do not wear clothing presenting the most
severe burn hazards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\343\ The existing rule prohibits clothing that could increase
the extent of injuries to an employee. The Agency interprets this
rule as prohibiting clothing that could melt or that could ignite
and continue to burn in the presence of an electric arc faced by an
employee. (See, for example, Memorandum to the Field dated August
10, 1995, from James W. Stanley, "Guidelines for the Enforcement of
the Apparel Standard, 29 CFR 1910.269(l)(6), of the Electric Power
Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Standard." This
memorandum is available at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21878.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A note following this provision lists fabrics, including acetate,
nylon, polyester, and rayon, that the final rule specifically prohibits
unless the
employer demonstrates that the clothing is treated or worn in such a
manner as to eliminate the hazard. In the proposed rule, this note was
the same as the note following existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(6)(iii). In
the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested comments on whether it
should add any other fabrics posing similar hazards to the note.
Many commenters recommended adding polypropylene to the list of
prohibited fabrics. (See, for example, Exs. 0148, 0183, 0233, 0239; Tr.
563-564.) Mr. Mark Zavislan, representing NRECA, testified:
Polypropylene is a synthetic fabric under heat conditions. It
melts. It's terrible. I have not witnessed it in an arc type of
exposure, but I was an EMT for several years, and one of the worst
injuries I have ever seen, vehicle accident involving a fire, an
individual wearing long underwear made out of this material, and it
was pretty ugly.
So I think, if you are looking at the heat exposures from an
arc, you've got the potential for the same type of damage. [Tr. 564]
OSHA finds that this evidence indicates that polypropylene can
melt. Although Mr. Zavislan's testimony did not indicate that this
fabric is likely to melt in an arc exposure, it does indicate that, if
polypropylene is exposed to sufficient heat, it will melt. In this
regard, OSHA believes that the heat generated by a arc flash is at
least as severe as the heat generated by a vehicle fire. Consequently,
OSHA is adding polypropylene to the list of prohibited fabrics
contained in the note following paragraph (g)(3) in the final rule.
Two commenters suggested adding acrylic fibers to the list in the
note, although they did not provide any evidence that this fabric melts
or ignites and continues to burn when exposed to electric arcs (Exs.
0148, 0213). While OSHA decided against adding acrylic fibers to the
list of prohibited fabrics contained in the note, the Agency observes
that the note's list of the types of fabric prohibited by final Sec.
1926.960(g)(3) is not exhaustive. Employers must ensure that employees
do not wear clothing made from an acrylic fiber if such clothing could
melt onto the skin or ignite and continue to burn when exposed to the
heat energy estimated under final paragraph (g)(2), regardless of
whether the note lists the fabric. One of the two commenters that
advocated adding acrylic fibers to the note was ASTM. ASTM has
extensive experience with testing materials. The Agency suspects that
acrylic fibers will melt onto the skin or easily ignite and continue to
burn in the presence of an electric arc, although it did not arrive at
this conclusion in this rulemaking.
Two commenters recommended removing rayon from the list of
prohibited fabrics contained in the proposed note (Exs. 0166, 0228,
0235). These commenters pointed out that rayon is a cellulose-based
synthetic fiber that burns but does not melt.
OSHA included rayon as one of the prohibited fabrics on the basis
of evidence in the record for the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking (59 FR
4389; 59 FR 33658-33659, 33661). In that rulemaking, the Agency
described the evidence and rationale for prohibiting certain fabrics as
follows:
The IBEW introduced a videotape, produced by the Duke Power
Company, demonstrating the effects of different types of clothing
upon exposure to electric arcs (Ex. 12-12). This tape provides clear
evidence of the hazards of wearing clothing made from certain
untreated synthetic fabrics, such as polyester, acetate, nylon, and
rayon.
* * * * *
Therefore, for exposed employees, . . . final Sec. 1910.269
adopts a requirement that these employees be trained in the hazards
related to the clothing that they wear [and prohibits] apparel that
could increase the extent of injuries received by a worker who is
exposed to an electric arc. OSHA has also included a note . . . to
indicate the types of clothing fabrics that the record demonstrates
are hazardous to wear by employees exposed to electric arcs.
The requirement is intended to prohibit the types of fabrics
shown in the Duke Power Company videotape to be expected to cause
more severe injuries than would otherwise be anticipated. These
include such untreated materials as polyester and rayon, unless the
employee is otherwise protected from the effects of their burning.
[59 FR 4389, as corrected at 59 FR 33658]
The Duke video indicated that rayon ignites easily in the presence
of electric arcs (269-Ex. 12-12). Existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(6)(iii)
and final paragraph (g)(3) prohibit clothing that can ignite and
continue to burn, in addition to fabrics that can melt onto the skin in
the presence of electric arcs. The evidence in the record indicates
that rayon meets this criterion. Therefore, OSHA is not removing rayon
from the list of prohibited fabrics.
When flame-resistant clothing is required. Proposed paragraph
(g)(4) would have required employees to wear flame-resistant clothing
whenever: (1) The employee was subject to contact with energized
circuit parts operating at more than 600 volts (proposed paragraph
(g)(4)(i)); (2) an electric arc could ignite flammable material in the
work area that, in turn, could ignite the clothing of an employee
nearby (proposed paragraph (g)(4)(ii)); or (3) molten metal or electric
arcs from faulted conductors in the work area could ignite the
employee's clothing (proposed paragraph (g)(4)(iii)). A note to
proposed paragraph (g)(4)(iii) indicated that this provision would not
apply to conductors capable of carrying, without failure, the maximum
available fault current for the time the circuit protective devices
take to intercept the fault. In such instances, conductors would not
melt from the fault current and, therefore, could not ignite the
employee's clothing. The conditions listed in proposed paragraph (g)(4)
address several burn accidents examined by OSHA involving ignition of
an employee's clothing (Exs. 0002, 0003, 0004).\344\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\344\ See, for example, the four accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=596304&id=14418776&id=170238109&id=202043758.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA reworded the introductory text to paragraph (g)(4) in the
final rule to clarify what clothing must be flame-resistant and to make
it consistent with provisions in final paragraphs (g)(5)(i) through
(g)(5)(v) that permit some types of non-flame-resistant clothing in
lieu of arc-rated clothing in certain conditions. (See the discussion
of the difference between flame-resistant and arc-rated clothing under
the summary and explanation for final paragraph (g)(5), later in this
section of the preamble.) The language in final paragraph (g)(4) makes
it clear that only the outer layer of clothing must be flame-resistant.
This requirement recognizes that some companies successfully use 100-
percent cotton T-shirts under FR shirts. (See, for example, Tr. 1345-
1346.) NFPA 70E-2004 also recognizes the use of non-flame-resistant
clothing under flame-resistant clothing as providing adequate
protection against electric-arc hazards in certain situations (Ex.
0134). In any event, final paragraph (g)(3) prohibits the use of
flammable layers of clothing beneath flame-resistant outer clothing
whenever doing so poses a burn hazard.
For reasons explained later, OSHA is adopting in the final rule
paragraphs (g)(4)(i) through (g)(4)(iii) (including the note) largely
as proposed. The Agency is adding a new paragraph (g)(4)(iv) that
requires employees to wear flame-resistant clothing whenever the
incident heat energy estimated under paragraph (g)(2) exceeds 2.0 cal/
cm\2\. See the explanation of this new paragraph later in this section
of the preamble.
Several rulemaking participants argued that some employers are
providing adequate protection for their employees by requiring them to
wear 100-percent cotton (that is, that flame-resistant clothing is
unnecessary). (See, for example, Exs. 0187, 0238, 0506; Tr.
543-544.) For instance, Mr. Jonathan Glazier with NRECA stated:
Many utilities now allow their employees to wear 100 percent
natural fiber clothing. This means cotton and, in colder climates,
wool or cotton/wool blends. One hundred percent natural fiber
clothing complies with OSHA's current 1910.269, if it is thick
enough not to ignite and to continue burning, but this will change
if the new proposal becomes final.
Proposed Sections 1910.269(l)(11)(4)(a) and 1926.960(g)(4)(i)
would require wearing FR clothing--that's FR clothing, not merely
clothing that will not melt or ignite and continue to burn, but FR
clothing--when an employee is "subject to contact with energized
circuit parts operating at more than 600 volts."
Arguably, this means that 100 percent natural fiber clothing
cannot be worn by employees doing rubber glove work on parts
energized above 600 volts. This will require many utilities that
have been successfully allowing 100 percent natural fiber clothing
to move to the more expensive and, let's face it, more [problematic]
FR clothing. [Tr. 543-544]
The evidence in the rulemaking record clearly shows that flame-
resistant clothing is necessary for the protection of employees when
the conditions addressed by final paragraph (g)(4) are present. (See,
for example, Exs. 0002, 0003, 0004.\345\) Sixteen of the 100 arc-
related burn accidents in Ex. 0004, covering the period from 1991 to
1998, involved the ignition of an employee's clothing. Two additional
burn accidents involved hydraulic fluid that ignited when an aerial
lift approached too close to an energized line (Ex. 0004 \346\). The
burning fluid can ignite flammable clothing. Five of these 18 accidents
occurred when an employee contacted or came too close to an energized
part; 3 accidents involved conductors or equipment that could not carry
fault current; and 3 accidents involved flammable materials ignited by
an electric arc. OSHA acknowledges that some, or potentially all, of
these injuries could occur even if the employees had been wearing
flame-resistant clothing. However, flame-resistant clothing can
minimize the extent of the injury.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\345\ See the 16 accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=14418776&id=170611057&id=170191050&id=170203871&id=14241863&id=14277487
&id=170193353&id=170061972&id=880658&id=170238109&id=170053128&id=170720957&id=880112&id=202043758&id=14373245&id=596304.
\346\ See the two accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=200671253&id=201340395.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted by Dr. Thomas Neal, much of the energy in a typical
electric arc is concentrated over one part of the body, and other parts
of the body receive less energy (Tr. 496-497).\347\ When an employee's
clothing ignites, the employee receives burns from the burning
clothing, as well as from any other heat sources in the area, such as
an electric arc or fire. In such cases, the ignition of clothing
exacerbates the extent of any burn injury that may occur. (See, for
example, Tr. 188-189, 215, 228.) For this reason, OSHA concludes that
preventing clothing ignition in the scenarios in which it is most
likely to occur will significantly enhance employee protection. In only
one of the 18 incidents mentioned previously was there an indication
that the clothing melted, indicating that the clothing probably
consisted of one of the fabrics explicitly prohibited by the note to
final paragraph (g)(3). Although it is not clear whether the remaining
injured employees were wearing 100-percent cotton clothing, it is
likely that they were. The record indicates that use of 100-precent
cotton clothing is standard practice for electric utilities that do not
require their employees to use flame-resistant clothing. (See, for
example, Exs. 0173 ("Much of the workforce across the nation uses 100%
cotton for their uniforms"), 0187 ("A large number of electric
utilities already are providing or requiring their employees to wear
flame-resistant clothing or 100 percent cotton clothing").) Because
some 100-percent cotton clothing poses an ignition hazard, which final
paragraph (g)(4) would likely prevent, OSHA concludes that use of 100-
percent cotton in lieu of FR clothing would not adequately protect
employees in the situations addressed by paragraph (g)(4).
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\347\ Thomas Neal has a Ph.D. in analytical chemistry. He worked
for E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company for 30 years, primarily in
the field of protective clothing. He has worked with ASTM to develop
standards for arc testing and has substantial experience with
protective garments used for arc-flash protection (Tr. 491-492).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pacific Gas and Electric Company requested an exemption from the FR
clothing requirements for live-line barehand work (Ex. 0185). The
company argued that the conductive suits used for this work provide
primary protection for employees and that the electrocution hazard (not
the burn hazard) is the primary concern in this type of work (id.).
Employers use the conductive clothing described by Pacific Gas as a
form of shielding to minimize potential differences and body current
for employees performing live-line barehand work (Ex. 0041). The
clothing assists in bonding the worker to the energized part and keeps
the worker from experiencing minor electric shocks as he or she moves
along a conductor. Where the conductive fibers that make the suit
conductive break, hot spots can develop (id.). It is important for this
clothing to be flame-resistant material, or these hot spots could
ignite the clothing. Consensus standards require that conductive
clothing used in live-line barehand work be flame-resistant; therefore,
conductive clothing manufactured with FR fabric with interwoven
conductive fibers is readily available (269-Ex. 60 \348\; Ex. 0041).
Accordingly, OSHA has decided against exempting live-line barehand work
from final paragraph (g)(4).\349\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\348\ IEC 60895-2002, Live working--Conductive clothing for use
at nominal voltage up to 800 kV a.c. and 600
kV d.c., is the international standard for conductive clothing. IEEE
Std 516-2009 references this standard (Ex. 0532). Since 1987 when
IEC first adopted its standard, IEC 895-1987, Conductive clothing
for live working at a nominal voltage up to 800 kV a.c., the
consensus standard required conductive clothing to be flame-
resistant (269-Ex. 60).
\349\ Note that estimates of incident energy for live-line
barehand work may assume that the arc is most likely to form at
objects at potentials different from the worker, such as grounded
objects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EEI argued that proposed paragraph (g)(4) was too vague,
commenting:
[The requirements in this paragraph] call for determinations for
which objective criteria are absent. . . . For example, on what
basis is an employer to determine that an electric arc could ignite
a flammable material that could in turn ignite the clothing of an
employee? What kind of calculations does this require, especially
considering that it is virtually impossible to predict the movement
of an electric arc? Likewise, how is an employer to determine that
an employee's clothing could be ignited by molten metal? In sum, the
standard calls for speculation, not an objective determination, and
therefore does not satisfy due process requirements. [Ex. 0227]
OSHA disagrees with EEI's comment that the requirement for flame-
resistant clothing is vague. The Agency believes that employers can
determine the presence of each of the conditions listed in final
paragraph (g)(4) through a reasonable assessment of what conditions
they can expect when an electric arc occurs. This assessment should be
part of the hazard assessment required by final paragraph (g)(1). For
purposes of final paragraph (g)(4)(i), if the employee is using the
rubber glove work method within reaching distance of circuit parts
energized at more than 600 volts or if the employee is using the live-
line tool work method underneath parts energized at more than 600
volts, OSHA will consider the employee to be "exposed to contact"
with those parts. The proposed rule used the phrase "subject to
contact," which the Agency has changed in the final rule to the
phrase "exposed to contact." (See the discussion of that phrase under
the summary and explanation of final Sec. 1926.960(b)(3) earlier in
this section of the preamble.) That change should clarify the meaning
of this paragraph.
For purposes of final paragraph (g)(4)(ii), OSHA will be looking
for flammable material, such as insulating hydraulic fluid, in the work
area close to where an arc may occur. In such situations, the arc can
be expected to ignite the fluid, with the burning fluid then igniting
an employee's flammable clothing.
For purposes of final paragraph (g)(4)(iii), if there are
conductors, such as pole grounds, that energized parts may contact
during the course of work and if these conductors cannot carry the
fault current, then OSHA expects the employer to assume that molten
metal or arcing from the faulted conductor could ignite the flammable
clothing of a nearby employee. As explained in the note to final
paragraph (g)(4)(iii), the employer can presume that conductors do not
pose ignition hazards related to molten metal or arcing if they are
capable of carrying, without failure, the maximum available fault
current for the time the circuit protective devices take to interrupt
the fault.
Paragraph (g)(4)(iii) of the final rule, which is being adopted
without substantive change from the proposal, requires flame-resistant
clothing where "[m]olten metal or electric arcs from faulted
conductors in the work area could ignite the employee's clothing." The
Southern Company objected to the requirement in proposed paragraph
(g)(4)(iii) that employees wear flame-resistant clothing if molten
metal could ignite their clothing (Ex. 0212). The company maintained
that "it is difficult to determine where molten metal may pose a
risk" (id.).
OSHA notes that the prepositional phrase "from faulted conductors
in the work area" modifies "molten metal" as well as "electric
arcs." Thus, employers must provide flame-resistant clothing where
employees are working close to equipment, such as pole grounds, that
cannot carry fault current. The test is not whether employees are
working in areas where an electric arc could eject molten metal onto
them; it is whether the employee is working near a conductor that
cannot carry fault current. Consequently, OSHA is not adopting the
recommendation of Southern Company to eliminate this requirement from
paragraph (g)(4)(iii).
Final paragraph (g)(4)(iv) provides that, if the incident heat
energy estimated under paragraph (g)(2) exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\, then the
employer must ensure that employees wear flame-resistant clothing.
The foregoing explanation is not an exhaustive discussion of all of
the scenarios that would require flame-resistant clothing under final
paragraph (g)(4). The Agency expects employers to use the hazard
assessment required by final paragraph (g)(1) to determine if any of
the conditions listed in final paragraphs (g)(4)(i) through (g)(4)(iv)
are present.
Many commenters opposed the 600-volt threshold in the requirement
for flame-resistant clothing in proposed paragraph (g)(4)(i). (See, for
example, Exs. 0128, 0166, 0186; Tr. 537-538.) These commenters argued
that severe arc-flash hazards occur at voltages lower than 600 volts.
For example, Mr. Paul Hamer commented:
Many systems and equipment operating at 600 volts and below have
severe arc-flash hazards and [require] the use of flame-resistant
clothing for personnel protection. Low-voltage motor control
centers, panelboards, switchboards, and switchgear are commonly used
in electrical power generation, transmission, and distribution
systems. See the requirements of NFPA 70E-2004, which include
systems operating at 600 volts and below. [Ex. 0228]
TVA recommended lowering the threshold to 480 volts, explaining:
Our conclusion is that FR clothing must be worn to protect
employees from arc flash hazards on circuits operating at 480 V or
more. We have experienced serious injuries in accidents involving
480 V circuits. In 23 arc flash accidents recorded between 1981 and
2003 in our company, 52 percent (23 cases) [were] on 480 V circuits.
The 1584 IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations
lists in its Annex C, 49 arc flash cases. Of these cases, 46 percent
of the accidents involved either 480 V or 600 V systems. These
statistics show that employees working on circuits operating at 480
V or 600 V are at a significant risk of arc flash injury.
We believe the 480 V arc flash hazard is as great as or greater
than the higher voltage arc flash hazard. At transmission voltages,
the arcs generally present a lower risk of injury because of the
distance the employee is to the arc (MAD), the arc being phase-to-
ground, the arc being in open air, and the other reasons stated in
our comments to other sections of this rule. The magnitude of the
heat energy in 480 V arc flash accidents is greater because of the
following:
1. The single phase fault typically propagates to three phase
fault.
2. The clearing times in generating plants are typically longer.
3. The arc flash energy is typically forced into one direction
(arc in a box).
It is recommended that the final rule require the employee to
wear flame resistant clothing any time he or she is subject to
contact with live parts energized at 480 V or more. [Ex. 0213]
These commenters misunderstood the proposed rule. Paragraph (g)(3)
of the final rule contains a prohibition against wearing clothing that
could melt onto an employee's skin or that could ignite and continue to
burn when exposed to flames or the incident heat energy estimated under
final paragraph (g)(2). Thus, final paragraph (g)(3) indirectly
requires flame-resistant clothing when the incident heat energy could
melt clothing onto an employee's skin or ignite an employee's clothing.
Paragraph (g)(4) of the final rule supplements paragraph (g)(3) and
requires flame-resistant clothing under other conditions likely to
ignite flammable clothing. Thus, final paragraph (g)(4)(i) requires
flame-resistant clothing when an employee is exposed to contact with
energized parts operating at more than 600 volts, regardless of the
estimated incident heat energy.
NFPA 70E-2004 Section 130.3 requires employers to conduct an arc-
flash hazard analysis and determine the arc-flash protection boundary
to protect employees from being injured by electric arcs (Ex.
0134).\350\ That section defines the arc-flash protection boundary as
the distance at which the incident energy equals 1.2 cal/cm\2\ or, if
the clearing time is 0.1 seconds (6 cycles) or less, 1.5 cal/cm\2\
(id.). A few commenters urged the Agency to consider an arc-flash
boundary requirement similar to the one in NFPA 70E. (See, for example,
Exs. 0128, 0130, 0235.) For instance, the Dow Chemical Company
commented:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\350\ Section 130.5 of NFPA 70E-2012 contains an equivalent
requirement.
Dow recommends that OSHA change the trigger for wearing FRC from
"contact with energized circuit parts operating at more than 600
volts" to "work within the electric arc flash hazard distance when
there is a substantial potential for an arc flash" . . . . NFPA 70E
uses the electric arc flash hazard distance as the trigger for
wearing FRC, and it provides guidance in how to determine the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
electric arc flash hazard distance. [Ex. 0128]
In response to these comments, OSHA is adding a requirement, in
final paragraph (g)(4)(iv), that employees wear clothing that is flame-
resistant where the incident heat energy estimated under final
paragraph (g)(2) exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\. Although NFPA 70E-2004 sets the
arc-flash protection boundary at lower levels, Section 130.7(C)(14)(b)
of that standard \351\
permits employees to wear "nonmelting flammable natural materials"
(in lieu of flame-resistant clothing) where the incident-energy level
is 2.0 cal/cm\2\ or less.\352\ New paragraph (g)(4)(iv) should make it
clear that employees must wear flame-resistant clothing whenever the
incident heat energy would be sufficient to ignite flammable clothing,
regardless of voltage. For consistency, OSHA is making a corresponding
change in final paragraph (g)(5), which requires employers to ensure
that each employee exposed to hazards from electric arcs wears
protective clothing and other protective equipment with an arc rating
greater than or equal to the heat energy estimated under final
paragraph (g)(2) whenever that estimate exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\. The
Agency believes that final paragraphs (g)(4)(iv) and (g)(5) must have
the same incident-energy threshold; otherwise, the final rule would
require clothing to be arc rated, but not flame resistant, when the
estimated incident energy was 2.0 cal/cm\2\ or less. (As noted under
the summary and explanation for final paragraph (g)(5), later in this
section of the preamble, all arc-rated clothing is flame resistant.
Thus, if the final rule required arc-rated clothing when the estimated
incident energy was 2.0 cal/cm\2\ or less, it also would effectively
require flame-resistant clothing at these exposures.) Therefore, under
the final rule, whenever paragraph (g)(4)(iv) requires clothing to be
flame resistant, that clothing must also have an arc rating under
paragraph (g)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\351\ NFPA 70E-2012 no longer explicitly permits "nonmelting
flammable materials" for exposures from 1.2 to 2.0 cal/cm\2\;
however, NFPA 70E-2012 Table 130.7(C)(15)(b) apparently permits such
fabrics for certain exposures above 1.2 cal/cm\2\. Consequently, the
latest edition of NFPA 70E does not conflict with OSHA's decision to
require flame-resistant clothing for estimated incident heat energy
exposures exceeding 2.0 cal/cm\2\.
\352\ Although OSHA has not stated the requirement in final
paragraph (g)(4)(iv) in terms of a boundary, the area inside which
flame-resistant clothing is required extends to the boundary where
the estimated incident energy equals 2.0 cal/cm\2\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Selecting arc-rated protective clothing and other protective
equipment. Paragraphs (g)(3) and (g)(4) of final Sec. 1926.960 will
protect workers against burns from the ignition or melting of clothing.
These provisions do not address the protection of workers from the
incident heat energy in an electric arc, which is the purpose of
paragraph (g)(5).
Much of the flame-resistant clothing available today comes with an
arc rating.\353\ In basic terms, an arc rating indicates that a fabric
should not transfer sufficient thermal energy to cause a second-degree
burn when tested under standard laboratory conditions that expose the
fabric to an electric arc that radiates an energy at or below the
rating.\354\ Proposed paragraph (g)(5) would have required that
employees exposed to hazards from electric arcs wear clothing with an
arc rating greater than or equal to the heat energy estimated under
paragraph (g)(2). This clothing will protect employees exposed to heat
energy from sustaining severe burn injuries in areas covered by the
clothing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\353\ The ASTM standards governing arc rating require the tested
fabric to be flame resistant. Thus, no non-flame-resistant clothing
has an arc rating.
\354\ ASTM F1506-02a\e1\, Standard Performance Specification for
Flame Resistant Textile Materials for Wearing Apparel for Use by
Electrical Workers Exposed to Momentary Electric Arc and Related
Thermal Hazards: defines "arc rating" as "the maximum incident
energy (E 1) resistance demonstrated by a material prior to
breakopen or at the onset of a second-degree burn" (Ex. 0061). The
latest version of that consensus standard, ASTM F1506-10a, contains
a differently worded, but equivalent definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several rulemaking participants argued that OSHA should not require
protection based on unreliable estimates of incident energy. (See, for
example, Exs. 0183, 0229, 0233.) For instance, Mr. Jonathan Glazier
with NRECA commented:
[E]stimates of maximum amounts of heat energy are inherently
unreliable. Accordingly, such estimates do not provide an adequate
foundation for a protective clothing requirement. In other words, it
makes no sense to require clothing to protect against second degree
burns from an amount of energy that cannot be calculated reliably.
For that reason, OSHA should drop the protective clothing
requirement of 1910.269(l)(11)(v) and 1926.960(g)(5). [Ex. 0233]
As explained under the discussion of final paragraph (g)(2) earlier
in this section of the preamble, OSHA concludes that there are incident
heat energy calculation methods that can provide reasonable estimates
of incident energy for all types of arc exposures employees experience.
Therefore, the Agency concludes that it is reasonable to select arc-
rated clothing and other protective equipment on the basis of those
estimates.
EEI argued that "OSHA has not shown that the risk of harm would be
materially reduced by using the methods specified in the proposal" and
that "there simply is not substantial evidence that wearing clothing
with an appropriate arc rating . . . would eliminate or substantially
reduce employee exposure to a burn injury from a flame or electric
arc" (Ex. 0227).
OSHA disagrees with EEI. There is substantial evidence in the
record that selecting protective clothing and other protective
equipment with an arc rating based on a reasonable estimate of incident
energy will substantially reduce injury from electric arcs. To
understand how arc-rated clothing and other protective equipment
substantially reduces injury, one must first examine how burn injuries
occur. The skin absorbs heat energy; and, after absorbing a certain
amount of energy, the skin sustains burn injury. According to Dr.
Thomas Neal, the human body begins to get a burn at 1 to 2 cal/cm\2\
(Tr. 433). At low levels of heat, the body sustains a first-degree
burn, like a sunburn, with redness and minor pain, but no blistering.
An incident heat energy level of 1.2 cal/cm\2\ is the threshold at
which the burn injury becomes a second-degree burn (Exs. 0134, 0425).
Second-degree burns involve swelling and blisters, along with greater
pain and redness. As the skin absorbs more energy, the burn gets worse,
involving more layers of skin, until it reaches a full-thickness, or
third-degree, burn. The most serious burns require prolonged
hospitalization and skin grafts and result in permanent scarring (Ex.
0373; Tr. 219).
Figure 11 shows a simplified diagram of a worker exposed to an
electric arc.\355\ This diagram shows the boundary (depicted by a
broken circle) where the estimated incident energy equals a clothing
rating that meets, but does not exceed, the rating required by final
paragraph (g)(5). Inside the broken circle, the incident energy is
greater than the estimate; outside the circle, the incident energy is
less than the estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\355\ In all likelihood, an electric arc would be larger than
the small-diameter sphere depicted in Figure 11. However, the
estimated energy is the same at all points that are the same
distance from the arc, and the diagram is valid for any spherical
arc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.015
The arc rating of protective clothing and other protective
equipment is an indication of the relative protection it provides from
incident energy. Dr. Thomas Neal explained that "the arc rating . . .
is defined as the level of . . . exposure at which you would expect 50
percent probability of a burn injury" (Tr. 444). The ASTM standard
clarifies that the rating is at "the onset of a second-degree bum"
(Ex. 0061). Thus, in Figure 11, the employee has a 50-percent chance of
barely receiving a second-degree burn at the point where the broken
circle touches the employee. (That is, the probability that the
incident energy will be equal to or greater than 1.2 cal/cm\2\ is 50
percent.) As Dr. Neal explained, the chance of barely sustaining a
second-degree burn drops quickly with a reduction in incident energy
(Tr. 443-445). The probability of receiving a second-degree burn while
wearing a particular arc-rated garment typically drops to 1 percent
with a reduction in incident energy of a few calories below the arc
rating of the clothing (id.). For example, with the NFPA 70E Annex D
method, the incident energy is inversely proportional to the square of
the distance from the arc to the employee. If the distance from the arc
to the employee is 455 millimeters (18 inches), the incident energy
drops nearly 10 percent at a distance of 150 millimeters (6 inches)
from the point where the circle touches the employee.
From this, OSHA concludes that an employee wearing arc-rated
protection in accordance with the final rule should receive, at worst,
a second-degree burn over a relatively small portion of his or her body
at the estimated incident-energy level. In addition, because arc-rated
clothing and other protective equipment that complies with final
paragraph (g)(5) will block a substantial portion of the heat energy,
any injury that occurs will be substantially less severe than would
occur without arc-rated protection at all or with arc-rated protection
with a rating lower than the estimated heat energy. Consequently, the
Agency concludes that the severity of injury will be reduced when an
employee is wearing protective clothing and other protective equipment
with an arc rating greater than or equal to the actual incident-energy
level experienced by the employee. Although an employee will receive a
more severe burn injury if the incident energy exceeds the arc rating
of the protection than if it does not, OSHA concludes that estimates of
incident heat energy prepared in compliance with final paragraph (g)(2)
will relate reasonably well to the incident energy actually experienced
by employees in the event of an arc. Also, even if the incident energy
actually exceeds those estimates, arc-rated protection will still
reduce the extent and degree of injury (see Tr. 535: "MR. WALLIS
[asking question]: `Would arc [rated] clothing reduce the extent and
degree of injury, even if the arc energy is higher than the employer's
estimate?' DR. NEAL [responding]: `Yes, it would."'). The reduction in
these effects occurs because arc-rated protective clothing and other
protective equipment blocks the amount of heat that gets through to the
employee's skin (Tr. 471-472).
Protecting the entire body. OSHA did not propose to require a
specific level of protection for skin not covered by clothing. However,
in the preamble to the proposal, the Agency requested comments on
whether the standard should require protection for an employee's entire
body.
TVA recommended that the rule address unprotected skin as follows:
Due to our experience with arc flash accidents, we believe that
the employee's hands and arms require some level [of] protection.
Our procedure requires the employee to wear the long sleeved FR
shirt with the sleeve down and buttoned. [W]e do not consider a
short sleeve FR shirt to provide adequate arc flash protection to
the employee's arms. We also require employees to wear leather
gloves or voltage rated gloves with leather protectors when in arc
flash
exposure situations. The electric utility industry has arc flash
exposures that could result in 3rd degree burns to unprotected parts
of the body that could cause serious injury. It is recommend[ed]
that the final rule require employees to wear a long-sleeved FR
shirt with its sleeve[s] down and buttoned in potential arc flash
situations. The rule should also require leather gloves, if voltage
rated gloves are not being worn. [Ex. 0213]
Forty-six of the 100 arc-related burn accidents in Exhibit 0004
involved burn injuries to an employee's arms.\356\ Five of those 100
accidents involved burns to an employee's leg.\357\ Forty of those 100
accidents involved burns to an employee's head.\358\ The accidents in
the rulemaking record and TVA's experience clearly indicate a need to
protect all parts of the employee's body. Employees with uncovered skin
are at risk of severe injury or death. Requiring protection only for
areas covered by clothing would lead to the absurd possibility that an
employer would be in compliance if an employee worked without clothing.
Therefore, OSHA concludes that the standard should address not only the
rating of the clothing, but the extent of protection needed for the
employee's body. Accordingly, paragraph (g)(5) in the final rule
requires that, when employers must provide arc-rated protection to
employees, the protection must cover the employee's entire body, with a
few exceptions described later.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\356\ See, for example, the nine accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170097497&id=170054258&id=170614002&id=14225569&id=201140522&id=170152540
&id=170071138&id=170738165&id=170250062.
\357\ See the five accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170361026&id=170389811&id=201791803&id=14490114&id=596304.
\358\ See, for example, the nine accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170097497&id=170054258&id=14225569&id=170631469&id=170071138&id=170738165
&id=170611057&id=200962322&id=170764021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is evidence in the record that some types of nonarc-rated
clothing and protective equipment provide suitable protection from arc-
related burn injuries on areas not typically covered by clothing, for
instance, the hands and feet. (See, for example, Exs. 0186, 0212, 0213;
Tr. 433-435.) As noted in the preamble to the proposal, although
neither rubber insulating gloves nor leather protectors have arc
ratings, their weight and thickness typically provide greater
protection from electric arcs than light-weight flame-resistant
clothing (70 FR 34868). The accident data support this conclusion--none
of the burn injuries to employees' hands described in the record
involved an employee wearing rubber insulating gloves. In addition,
NFPA 70E-2004 recognizes the protection afforded by rubber insulating
gloves (Ex. 0134). Heavy-duty leather work gloves with a weight of 407
gm/m\2\ (12 oz/yd\2\) provide protection up to about 14 cal/cm\2\ (Ex.
0134; Tr. 434).\359\ Therefore, the final rule recognizes the
protection afforded by rubber insulating gloves with protectors, as
well as heavy-duty leather work gloves. Under final paragraph
(g)(5)(i), the employer need not ensure the use of arc-rated protective
gear over the employee's hands when the employee wears rubber
insulating gloves with protectors or, if the estimated incident-energy
exposure is 14 cal/cm\2\ or lower, if the employee wears heavy-duty
leather work gloves with a weight of at least 407 gm/m\2\ (12 oz/
yd\2\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\359\ In a note to Section 130.7(C)(13)(c), NFPA 70E-2004 states
that "[i]nsulating rubber gloves . . . provide hand protection
against the arc flash hazard" (Ex. 0134). OSHA anticipates that
there is a limit to the amount of protection afforded by rubber
insulating gloves, but there is no information in the record to
indicate what that limit might be. However, that section in the NFPA
standard requires leather protectors to be worn over rubber
insulating gloves for purposes of arc-flash protection. (NFPA 70E-
2012 contains an equivalent requirement and note.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NFPA 70E recognizes "[h]eavy-duty work shoes" as providing "some
arc flash protection to the feet" and generally requires this type of
shoe when the exposure is above 4 cal/cm\2\ (Ex. 0134).\360\ As OSHA
found no evidence in the record of an employee sustaining burn injuries
to the feet in an arc-related accident, the final rule recognizes the
protection afforded by heavy-duty work shoes. Final paragraph
(g)(5)(ii) provides that employees wearing heavy-duty work shoes or
boots do not need to use arc-rated protection on their feet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\360\ NFPA 70E-2004 requires heavy-duty work shoes for tasks in
hazard-risk category 2 and higher (Ex. 0134). Table 130.7(C)(9)(a)
generally requires hazard-risk category 2 protection when the
incident energy is more than 4 cal./cm\2\, but less than 8 cal./
cm\2\ (id.). NFPA 70E-2012 additionally requires heavy-duty work
shoes for "all exposures greater than 4 cal/cm\2\."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many rulemaking participants opposed requiring arc-rated protection
for the head,\361\ arguing that faceshields could interfere with vision
and make the work more dangerous. (See, for example, Exs. 0167, 0175,
0186, 0233.) For instance, Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, Maryland
& Delaware Association of Electric Cooperatives commented, "Employing
the use of a faceshield may cause more of [a] hazard than benefit by
reducing peripheral vision and nuisance distraction to the employee
while work is being performed on energized facilities" (Ex. 0175).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\361\ In the preamble and regulatory text, the term "protection
for the head" means protection for the entire head, from the neck
up. It includes protection for the neck, face, and ears. In
contrast, the term "head protection" as used in Sec. Sec.
1910.135 and 1926.100 and in final Sec. 1910.269 and subpart V,
means protection provided for the head by a hardhat, which generally
does not protect the face or neck.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other rulemaking participants supported a requirement for
faceshields or other forms of arc-rated head and face protection. (See,
for example, Exs. 0130, 0241; Tr. 461-463.) NIOSH explained their
position as follows:
NIOSH recommends that the use of arc-rated face protection be
included in sections 1910.269(l)(11) and 1926.960(g)(5). An arcing-
fault can injure an employee's face and eyes, and typical non-arc-
rated safety eyewear is inadequate. Arc-rated face shields and hoods
are available that offer protection levels that can be matched to
the rating of any arc-rated fire resistant clothing. NFPA 70E-2004
requires a wraparound face shield of appropriate arc-rating that
protects forehead, ears, and neck . . . for heat energy exposure
levels above 4 calories/cm\2\, and a flash suit hood of appropriate
arc-rating . . . for levels above 8 calories/cm\2\ (see NFPA 70E-
2004, page 33, table 130.7(C)(10)). [Ex. 0130]
IBEW supported a requirement for arc-rated head and face
protection, but only in certain circumstances (Exs. 0230, 0505). The
union explained its position and rationale as follows:
IBEW submits that while face shields may provide effective
protection in some work environments, they are not appropriate means
of protection for all aspects of transmission and distribution work.
[F]ace shields are designed to be attached to the employee's
hard hat. . . . They provide a complete shield from above the
employee's forehead to below his or her chin. Because they only
protect the front of the employee's head, however, Dr. [Thomas] Neal
recommends that they be worn in combination either with a "bee
keeper's hood," of the type used by firefighters, or with a
lighter-weight and cooler advancement, a balaclava, or ski-type
mask. . . .
Dr. Neal testified that although he knows utilities have
purchased face shields, he does not know how they have been used. In
particular, he could not say whether they are being used by anyone
doing line work. Nor did he have any familiarity with what it would
be like to perform line work while wearing the face shield, either
alone or in combination with a balaclava. . . .
A face shield is appropriate PPE for an electrician in a power
plant racking a breaker in or out of its enclosure. In that
situation, it usually takes only minutes to accomplish the task.
Further, the electrician would generally be on solid footing--either
on the plant floor or a platform--when wearing the shield to perform
the energized work. The shield is also practical PPE when setting or
removing a meter, where, again, the
employee would be donning the face shield for a short period of
time.
These two work situations sharply contrast with that of climbing
a pole, working up a pole surrounded by wires, braces, brackets, and
transformers, and descending the pole. In these types of work
situations, wearing the face shield for lengthy periods would create
additional safety problems, including issues with mobility, heat,
and vision, that could more than offset the shield's arc protection
factor.
To summarize, although face shields are designed to provide
important protection against arc flash hazards, the record fails to
demonstrate the feasibility of requiring them in every instance of
energized work. Indeed, simply examining the conditions under which
employees work on electrical lines shows that it would be
impractical to require their use as PPE in all situations. [Ex.
0505]
OSHA agrees with IBEW that wearing arc-rated head and face
protection is likely to cause more problems for overhead power line
work than for in-plant work. For instance, faceshields and other forms
of arc-rated head and face protection potentially can interfere with
climbing and descending a pole (Ex. 0505). However, the Agency does not
believe that this interference necessarily creates a greater hazard.
Power line workers generally must wear hardhats under existing
Sec. Sec. 1910.135 and 1926.100. Because it is suspended below the
employee's hardhat, a faceshield does not extend significantly beyond
the edge of the hardhat. Consequently, a faceshield worn alone with a
hardhat should not be substantially more of an impediment to climbing
than the hardhat alone. Perhaps a beekeeper-type hood, which extends on
all sides beyond a hardhat, would interfere more substantially with
climbing and descending poles; however, Dr. Neal noted that newer forms
of arc-rated protection, such as a balaclava (a garment that looks like
a ski mask and that an employee wears beneath a hardhat), can provide
nearly the same protection as a hood without the hood's bulk (Tr. 438-
440). In addition, as discussed in the summary and explanation for
final Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii), the final rule generally requires
employers to protect employees against falling while climbing or
descending poles. Therefore, OSHA concludes that suitable head
protection should not interfere with climbing or descending poles
enough to pose a significant hazard.
If an employee is working so close to "wires, braces, brackets,
and transformers" that a faceshield would interfere with his or her
performance, as IBEW argues, the objects would also be close enough to
endanger the employee's face as the employee is working. In any event,
it is unclear how a faceshield, or even a faceshield with a balaclava,
would interfere significantly with the mobility of an employee
performing overhead line work. Thus, OSHA concludes that employers can
find suitable head and face protection that will interfere minimally
with a worker's mobility and allow the worker to perform his or her job
safely and efficiently, without posing a significant hazard to the
worker.
As discussed later in this section of the preamble, OSHA examined
the heat stress issue raised by some commenters and concludes that,
although heat stress can be a significant hazard, there are feasible
means of abating the hazard for employees wearing arc-rated protective
garments and head and face protection. In fact, Dr. Neal testified that
faceshields would not contribute significantly to heat-stress hazards
because "air is going to be moving inside the shield" (Tr. 478). As
explained later, employers need not use arc-rated head protection or a
faceshield until the estimated incident-energy level is greater than or
equal to 9 cal/cm\2\ for most forms of overhead line work. At higher
levels, employers must take heat-stress abatement measures when
warranted by environmental conditions.
A beekeeper-type hood likely would interfere with peripheral
vision. However, as noted earlier, employers can achieve similar
protection with a faceshield and balaclava combination, which should
not interfere with an employee's peripheral vision.
Dr. Neal noted that clear faceshields do not provide much
protection from arc-related burn injuries, however (Tr. 433-434). In
response to questions about whether arc-rated faceshields could reduce
visibility, especially at night, Dr. Neal testified:
MR. BYRD: Does that shield--Is that designed primarily for
daylight work?
DR. NEAL: Well, it's designed for work where you have light,
yes. Could be daylight; it could be artificial light.
MR. BYRD: I guess what I'm asking: If I had a car break a pole
off at two o'clock in the morning and I'm having to wear some kind
of shield, do I have to have a tinted shield and also a clear
shield? Do you make the clear shields as well?
DR. NEAL: Yes, I think there are companies that make both types
of shields. But, no, the clear shield is--The tinted shield takes
care of the function of the clear shield, which is actually to
protect you from projectiles.
MR. BYRD: Well, I guess what I'm looking at is visibility in
repairing that pole and the lines that are energized. If I have a
shield on that is designed for daylight and I put that in, it's kind
of like sunglasses or your safety glasses that are tinted. If I put
those on at night, I'm totally blind now. So I would have to have a
shield for nighttime use as well.
DR. NEAL: Well, those sunglasses actually are much darker than
the shield that I had here. It's not really designed for day work,
but you may find that--You know, I think when you are doing work at
night, you have to add light in most cases.
MR. BYRD: We do.
DR. NEAL: Yes. So I think whatever you add for doing the work
normally would suffice for most of the shields. It's something you
would have to try, and you would say, well, no, I'm not getting
enough light. So you may have to do something different there. [Tr.
511-513]
Based on this evidence, OSHA concludes that employers can find suitable
arc-rated head and face protection that does not significantly
interfere with an employee's vision and that normally does not require
supplemental lighting beyond what they would otherwise supply.
For the foregoing reasons, OSHA concludes that suitable arc-rated
head and face protection does not necessarily pose greater hazards than
working without it and that a requirement for employees to wear such
protection when warranted by arc hazards generally will be
technologically feasible and reasonable for overhead line work. Because
the evidence, including IBEW's comments, suggests that overhead line
work is the most problematic type of work for purposes of wearing arc-
rated head and face protection, the Agency comes to the same conclusion
for the other types of work addressed by Sec. 1910.269 and Subpart V.
Dr. Neal testified that he believed that employees should wear head
and face protection "[a]nytime there is a risk of a heat exposure over
[1.5 to] 2 calories, . . . where you are just on the edge of getting a
second degree burn" (Tr. 462). He also noted, however, that his
opinion is at odds with "some of the standards that exist today, [in
which] this is not required until you get to about 8 calories" (id.).
For instance, Table 130.7(C)(10), Protective Clothing and Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE) Matrix, in NFPA 70E-2004, requires
faceshields for hazard-risk category 2, which generally corresponds to
an incident-energy level of 5 to 8 cal/cm\2\, and flash-suit hoods for
hazard-risk category 3 and higher, which generally corresponds to an
incident-energy level of 9 cal/cm\2\ and higher (Ex. 0134).\362\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\362\ NFPA 70E-2012, in Table 130.7(C)(16), requires an arc-
rated faceshield for hazard-risk category 1, which generally
corresponds to an incident-energy level of 1.2 to 4 cal/cm\2\, and
an arc-rated flash suit hood or arc-rated faceshield and arc-rated
balaclava for hazard-risk category 2 and higher, which generally
corresponds to an incident-energy level of 5 to 8 cal/cm\2\.
However, as explained later in this section of the preamble, this
edition of NFPA 70E does not account for any reduction in incident
heat energy at the employee's face in comparison to the level of
incident heat energy at the working distance (generally the
employee's chest). OSHA concludes that not accounting for this
reduction would require more protection against incident heat energy
than necessary. As explained under the heading Heat stress, later in
this section of the preamble, heat stress is a genuine concern of
many rulemaking participants. Requiring a level of head and face
protection higher than the likely incident energy at employees'
heads would unnecessarily increase heat stress for employees. As
further explained in that section of the preamble, OSHA also
concluded that: Heat stress is a widely recognized hazard; employers
covered by the final rule already have an obligation under the
general duty clause of the OSH Act to abate these hazards; and
employers covered by the final rule already are addressing heat-
stress issues in their workplaces. Despite these conclusions, the
Agency believes that, for work covered by the final rule, paragraphs
(g)(5)(iii) through (g)(5)(v) strike a more reasonable balance
between the need for protection against incident energy from
electric arcs and the need to protect employees against heat stress.
The final rule achieves this balance by requiring a level of
protection commensurate with the incident energy likely at the
employee's head.
Note that OSHA's finding regarding the need for faceshields
applies only with respect to their use as protection from incident
energy. As noted under the heading Protecting employees from flying
debris from electric arcs, OSHA's existing general PPE requirements
in Sec. Sec. 1910.132 and 1926.95 require employers to address
nonthermal hazards, including physical trauma hazards posed by
flying debris, associated with employee exposure to electric arcs.
Note also that OSHA's findings regarding head and face
protection apply only to electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution work covered by the final rule. NPPA 70E-2012, like
subpart S of OSHA's general industry standards, requires employers
to deenergize electric circuits before employees work on them except
under limited circumstances. Thus, heat stress hazards for work
performed under NFPA 70E-2012 and Subpart S should not be as
pervasive as under this final rule, which generally permits
employees to work on energized circuits without restriction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the three-phase exposures addressed by the incident-energy
calculation methods given in NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, the Agency
concludes that these are reasonable thresholds for requiring head and
face protection (id.).\363\ It is apparent that NFPA 70E-2004 Table
130.7(C)(10) sets protective equipment requirements for the worst-case
exposures for the methods in Annex D of that standard, that is,
exposures involving three-phase arcs in enclosures. The Agency believes
that such exposures are more likely to involve convective heat energy,
which can transfer to the area behind a faceshield, and to involve the
back of the head due to reflected heat energy. In addition, Annex D
presumes a distance from the employee to the arc of 455 millimeters (18
inches).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\363\ NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D describes the Doughty, Neal, and
Floyd and IEEE 1584 methods in addition to the Lee method. See the
summary and explanation for final paragraph (g)(2), earlier in this
section of the preamble, for a discussion of these methods (Ex.
0134). Annex D in NFPA 70E-2012 adds a method, from the NESC, for
single-phase arcs in open air.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As explained previously in this section of the preamble, much
overhead line work poses hazards involving exposure to single-phase
arcs in open air. In such exposures, there is little or no reflected or
convective heat energy. In addition, as also noted earlier, OSHA
concluded that a reasonable distance from the employee to the arc for
these exposures is 380 millimeters (15 inches), measured from the
crotch of the employee's hand to the chest.\364\ (See Table 14, earlier
in this section of the preamble.) OSHA estimates that the employee's
face will likely be at least 455 millimeters (18 inches) from the
arc.\365\ Because the heat energy from a single-phase arc in air drops
in inverse proportion to the square of the distance, the roughly 20-
percent increase in distance (from 380 to 455 millimeters) results in a
drop in incident energy of nearly 30 percent (Ex. 0430). Therefore,
because the incident energy at the employee's head will be more than 30
percent lower than the estimated incident energy, which OSHA based on
the exposure at the employee's chest, OSHA concludes that the
thresholds for requiring head and face protection for exposures
involving a single-phase arc in air can be higher than the threshold
for requiring head and face protection for three-phase exposures. The
final rule adopts the following ranges for head and face protection:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\364\ OSHA concluded that 380 millimeters (15 inches) is a
reasonable distance for rubber insulating glove work. For work with
live-line tools, OSHA concluded that the distance is greater than
380 millimeters. (See the summary and explanation for final Sec.
1926.960(g)(2) earlier in this section of the preamble.)
\365\ With the employee's hands out directly opposite the chest,
the distance from the chest to the arc is 380 millimeters (15
inches), and the distance vertically from that point on the chest to
the employee's chin is about 255 millimeters (10 inches). The
distance from the chin to the arc is the hypotenuse of the right
triangle with those two sides, or about 455 millimeters (18 inches).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minimum head and face protection
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arc-rated
Exposure faceshield with a Arc-rated hood or faceshield with
None * minimum rating of 8 balaclava
cal/cm\2\ *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Single-phase, open air.......... 2-8 cal/cm\2\...... 9-12 cal/cm\2\..... 13 cal/cm\2\ or higher [dagger].
Three-phase..................... 2-4 cal/cm\2\...... 5-8 cal/cm\2\...... 9 cal/cm\2\ or higher [Dagger].
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* These ranges assume that employees are wearing hardhats meeting the specifications in Sec. 1910.135 or Sec.
1926.100(b)(2), as applicable.
[dagger] The arc rating must be a minimum of 4 cal/cm\2\ less than the estimated incident energy. Note that Sec.
1926.960(g)(5)(v) permits this type of head and face protection, with a minimum arc rating of 4 cal/cm\2\
less than the estimated incident energy, at any incident energy level.
[Dagger] Note that Sec. 1926.960(g)(5) permits this type of head and face protection at any incident energy
level.
OSHA chose the 5- and 9-cal/cm\2\ thresholds for three-phase arcs
to match the thresholds in NFPA 70E-2004, as recommended by NIOSH (Ex.
0134). The 9- and 13-cal/cm\2\ thresholds for exposures involving
single-phase arcs in open air account for the lack of reflected and
convective heat on the employee's head, as well as the 30-percent
reduction in incident energy expected at the employee's head.
Final paragraph (g)(5)(iii) does not require arc-rated protection
for the employee's head when the employee is wearing head protection
meeting Sec. 1926.100(b)(2) and the estimated incident energy is less
than 9 cal/cm\2\ for exposures involving single-phase arcs in open air
or 5 cal/cm\2\ for other exposures. Final paragraph (g)(5)(iv) permits
the employer to protect the employee's head using a faceshield with a
minimum arc rating of 8 cal/cm\2\ if the employee is wearing head
protection meeting Sec. 1926.100(b)(2) and the estimated incident-
energy exposure is less than 13 cal/cm\2\ for exposures involving
single-phase arcs in open air or 9 cal/cm\2\ for other exposures.
Paragraph (g)(5)(v) permits a reduction of 4 cal/cm\2\ in the arc
rating of head and face protection for single-phase arcs in open air
(the difference between the two sets of thresholds). For example, if
the estimated incident energy for an exposure involving a single-phase
arc in open air is 13 cal/cm\2\, the head protection provided to the
employee must have an arc rating of at least 9 cal/cm\2\.
Other issues relating to the selection of protective clothing and
other
protective equipment. Ms. Susan O'Connor with Siemens Power Generation
contended that there were factors to consider other than incident heat
energy in the selection of arc-rated protection, commenting:
We do not believe that protective clothing decisions should be
made solely based on a numerical calculation--especially when such
calculation methods are suspect as to their range of error. There
are certainly hazards that would be created by utilizing this
equipment. This clothing is heavy, hot, and bulky. It is not
unreasonable to foresee that heat stress, and injuries related to
lack of mobility or visibility would increase when using this
equipment. Likewise, the heat calculations make no allowances for
the inherent risk of a task. Opening a bolted panel on a piece of
equipment is riskier than opening a hinged panel. (A bolted panel
could be fumbled into live bus causing a fault, while this is nearly
impossible with a hinged panel). Racking a breaker out with the
enclosure door open is riskier than with the door closed. (The
closed door will contain much of the fault energy should it occur
thereby protecting the employee) However, if we rely solely on the
heat calculation these two sets of scenarios would require identical
PPE. [Ex. 0163]
As explained earlier, OSHA already considered issues related to the
mobility and vision of workers using arc-rated head and face protection
and concluded that such items generally will not create more hazardous
conditions for employees. For similar reasons, the Agency also
concludes that mobility is not generally a concern for arc-rated
protection. Even the highest-rated clothing is not significantly
heavier than winter weather clothing (see, for example, Tr. 440 \366\),
and line workers are currently performing tasks in winter clothing in
cold weather. In addition, evidence in the record indicates that at
least one utility requires its employees to use some of the heaviest
weights of arc-rated clothing, and this utility did not report any
problems with worker mobility (Exs. 0213, 0215). As explained later in
this section of the preamble, the Agency also concludes that heat
stress should not affect the selection of arc-rated protection under
final paragraph (g)(5) as there are other ways of mitigating that
hazard when necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\366\ According to Dr. Thomas Neal, manufacturers make suits
rated at 100-cal/cm\2\ from material weighing 610 gm/m\2\ (18
ounces/yd\2\) (Tr. 440). That weight is less than twice the weight
of denim material, which is about 375 gm/m\2\ (11 ounces/yd\2\)
(269-Ex. 12-12. See, also, 59 FR 33659).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed under the summary and explanation for final paragraph
(g)(2), earlier in this section of the preamble, OSHA concluded that it
is unreasonable to reduce estimated incident-energy levels simply
because an employee is working in a situation in which there is a low
risk that an electric arc will occur. The Agency similarly concludes
that it unreasonable to select arc-rated protection based on how likely
an arc is to occur. OSHA does not dispute that there is a higher risk
of an arc occurring when an employee is racking a circuit breaker than
when an employee is opening a hinged panel.\367\ Three of the arc-
related burn accidents in Ex. 0004 occurred as employees were racking
breakers.\368\ None of the burn accidents involved an employee opening
or closing a hinged cover on enclosed equipment. As explained in the
summary and explanation for final paragraph (g)(2), if there is no
reasonable likelihood that an electric arc will occur, OSHA will
consider the employee to have no electric-arc exposure, and the
employer need not provide the protection required under final paragraph
(g)(4)(ii), (g)(4)(iv), or (g)(5).\369\ OSHA believes that opening a
hinged cover on a dead-front panelboard generally would not result in
employee exposure to electric-arc hazards under final paragraph (g)(2).
However, if there is a reasonable likelihood that an electric arc will
occur in the employee's work area, then protection against the full
incident heat energy of the arc is necessary. Otherwise, when an arc
does occur, the employee could receive severe burn injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\367\ Racking a circuit breaker is the process by which a
circuit breaker is inserted and removed from the circuit breaker
cubicle.
\368\ See the three accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=14328736&id=200962322&id=170197156.
\369\ Paragraphs (g)(4)(i) and (g)(4)(iii) involve exposures
that OSHA has determined expose employees to electric arcs or
flames, namely, contact with energized circuit parts operating at
more than 600 volts and molten metal or electric arcs from faulted
conductors in the work area that could ignite the employee's
clothing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Three commenters wanted OSHA to clarify that paragraph (g)(5) only
requires protection to the extent that compliant clothing is reasonably
available (Exs. 0170, 0222, 0237). These commenters expressed concern
that the standard would require employers to implement potentially
costly abatement measures to reduce incident energy to levels for which
clothing is available (id.). For example, Mr. Chris Tampio with the
National Association of Manufacturers commented:
The proposal does not explain how the rule would be interpreted
in situations where compliance with the proposed arc-rated clothing
requirements is infeasible because there is no clothing available to
protect against that level of heat energy (and still permit the
employee to perform the required work). We believe it is critical
that OSHA clarify that compliance with the proposed rule would be
considered infeasible under those circumstances, and that the agency
would not require the employer to exhaust other feasible measures.
Otherwise, we are concerned that employers could be required to
engage in very expensive retrofitting of electrical installations so
as to reduce the maximum heat energy that might be released by an
arc flash to a level where suitable [flame-resistant or arc-rated]
clothing would be reasonably available.
The extremely costly measure of retrofitting equipment is not
accounted for in the agency's economic analysis for this rulemaking,
would substantially raise the costs of compliance with the proposed
standard, and might invalidate the agency's entire economic analysis
for this proposal. OSHA has a duty to promulgate rules that are both
technically and economically feasible, and a duty to base its
decisions on the best available information relating to the economic
consequences of the intended regulation. Executive Order . . . No.
12866, titled "Regulatory Planning and Review", . . . include[s] a
requirement that each agency assess both the costs and the benefits
of the intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs and
benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation
only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended
regulation justify its costs. Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court
and various Courts of Appeals have held that OSHA regulations must
be technically and economically feasible. . . .
In order to meet these legal requirements, OSHA must either
clarify that no retrofitting is required or adequately address the
economic impact of retrofitting electrical equipment due to the
infeasibility of providing protective equipment and clothing that
can withstand arc-flash hazards. [Ex. 0222; footnotes omitted;
emphasis included in original.]
The final rule generally requires that employers provide protection
with an arc rating at least as high as the incident energy estimated
under final paragraph (g)(2). When the initial estimated incident
energy is extremely high, employers can either provide protection with
an arc rating that is at least as high as the estimate or take measures
to reduce the estimated incident energy. Those measures include changes
to the installation and changes to work procedures. For example,
installing current-limiting fuses is one way that will reduce incident
energy by changing the installation (Tr. 498), and performing the work
from a remote position (Tr. 499) and installing heat-shielding barriers
(Tr. 210, 266) are ways that will reduce incident energy by changing
work procedures.
The Agency examined the rulemaking record and concluded that
retrofitting would rarely be necessary to permit compliance with this
final rule. Employees perform much of the work covered by the final
rule on overhead
transmission and distribution lines. Several rulemaking participants
noted that work on the vast majority of overhead line installations
will not require the highest-rated protection available. Mr. James
Tomaseski, representing IBEW testified:
From the tables that are proposed in Appendix F, . . . we looked
at those as common exposures out on distribution lines. [I]n
discussions that I have had with utility employers and engineers,
and so forth, about these values, I have not heard anybody yet say
that they would have to be in hoods working on their distribution
circuits" (Tr. 939-940).
There is no evidence in the record that estimated incident-energy
values for overhead power line installations are likely to exceed the
values in Table 6 and Table 7 in final Appendix E. The highest
estimated incident-energy level listed in those tables is 12 cal/cm\2\,
and protection with this rating is readily available (see, for example,
Tr. 412-414).
Underground distribution systems potentially expose employees to
higher incident-energy levels. IBEW noted, for example, that
"replacing fuses in underground distribution systems" is one type
"of short duration [job] with a possible high hazard arc energy
level" (Ex. 0230). However, although the three-phase arc-in-a-box
exposures faced by employees working on underground installations may
be high, much of the work performed in these locations is on
deenergized circuits (269-Ex. 8-5).\370\ For the remaining work, which
potentially exposes employees to relatively high incident-energy
levels, employers will have to choose between providing arc-rated
protection appropriate for those levels and reducing the incident-
energy level through the installation or work methods changes noted
previously. The Agency estimates that, for underground exposures,
employers will be able to institute measures, such as increasing
working distances, that do not involve substantial expense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\370\ Existing Sec. 1910.269(t)(7) already requires protection
from hazards posed by energized cables in a manhole. This
requirement provides that, where a cable in a manhole has one or
more abnormalities that could lead to or be an indication of an
impending fault, the defective cable must be deenergized before any
employee may work in the manhole, except when service load
conditions and a lack of feasible alternatives require that the
cable remain energized. In that case, employees may enter the
manhole provided they are protected from the possible effects of a
failure by shields or other devices that are capable of containing
the adverse effects of a fault in the joint.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Potential incident-energy exposures for electric power generation
installations also can be quite high, but the record shows that
employers can implement relatively simple controls to reduce those
exposures to levels for which adequately rated protection is readily
available. Table 15 summarizes incident-energy estimates for a TVA
nuclear generation plant (Ex. 0215).
Table 15--Distribution of Incident Energy at TVA Generation Plant
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incident Energy (E) at 455 mm (18 inches), cal/ Number of Percent
cm\2\ buses of buses
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.0 < E <= 4.0.................................... 26 15
4.0 < E <= 8.0.................................... 48 29
8.0 < E <= 30.0................................... 22 13
30.0 < E <= 50.0.................................. 32 19
50.0 < E <= 75.0.................................. 7 4
75.0 < E <= 100.0................................. 15 9
100.0 < E <= 162.4................................ 18 11
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TVA instituted engineering or administrative controls to reduce all
incident-energy levels to 100 cal/cm\2\ or less.\371\ These controls
included:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\371\ The highest arc rating for clothing is 100 cal/cm\2\ (Tr.
440).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using remote-control voltage test equipment,
Resetting circuit breaker trip devices,
Installing current limiting devices,
Using robotics,
Employing remote control devices to operate equipment, and
Developing procedures that increase the working distance
between the worker and the arc (id.).
Two of these methods, resetting circuit-breaker trip devices and
increasing the working distance, do not involve heavy capital outlays.
The record identifies other simple methods for reducing incident-energy
levels, such as setting up a circuit for work by temporarily adjusting
relays (Tr. 940), changing operating procedures to eliminate or
minimize the time two sources of power remain tied together (Ex.
0425),\372\ and using shields or barriers to block incident energy
before it reaches the employee (Ex. 0445). Because they do not make
permanent changes to the installation, these methods also do not
involve capital expenditures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\372\ In a network setting, more than one source can supply a
circuit. Diverting one or more of those sources, by switching them
so that they do not supply power to that circuit, can reduce the
incident-energy level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency decided to adjust its regulatory analysis to accommodate
the extra measures that employers likely will take to reduce incident-
energy levels below 100 cal/cm\2\. To account for the costs of adopting
incident-energy-control measures for electric power generation
installations, OSHA included costs for reducing incident-energy
exposures that, when combined with OSHA's estimated costs for
calculating incident energy, correspond to TVA's estimate of $300 per
employee for firms in industries with generation installations. Because
TVA included incident-energy reduction costs in its estimate, OSHA's
cost estimates also account for additional engineering controls that
employers with power generation installations might need to implement
to reduce the incident energy of particular circuits to no more than
100 cal/cm\2\ (the maximum level for which protective clothing and
equipment are generally available). In addition, in some cases,
employers will be able to institute measures, such as resetting
breakers or increasing working distances, that do not involve
substantial expense. (See Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in this preamble.)
A note following final paragraph (g) explains that Appendix E to
final Subpart V contains information on the selection of appropriate
protection. This appendix contains information on the ignition
threshold of various fabrics, techniques for estimating available heat
energy, and means of selecting protective clothing and other protective
equipment to protect employees from burn injuries resulting from
electric arcs. OSHA adopted this note substantially as proposed, except
as necessary to reference the appropriate appendix (Appendix E).
Heat stress. Many commenters argued that arc-rated protection would
subject employees to heat-stress hazards. (See, for example, Exs. 0099,
0152, 0169, 0238; Tr. 406, 1105.) Mr. Jean Thrasher with Community
Electric Cooperative, for instance, commented:
An already existing hazard in the utility industry is heat
stroke and heat exhaustion. If the calculated arc thermal value
results in a requirement for multiple layers of FR clothing, there
WILL BE hospitalizations from heat stroke and heat exhaustion. Many
manufacturers gloss over or try to hide this concern by claiming
they have engineered "cool and comfortable" FR clothing. The
simple fact is that in summer, in 90[deg]+ heat with 80% or higher
humidity multiple layers of any type clothing are too much,
especially considering the linemen already are wearing solid rubber
from shoulder to fingers on both arms. [Ex. 0152; emphasis included
in original]
EEI expressed concern that, in proposing the arc-protection
requirements in Subpart V, OSHA did not consider "the impact that
excessive clothing could have on employees
working in high temperatures" (Ex. 0227).
There is considerable evidence in the record related to heat-stress
hazards. (See, for example, Exs. 0227, 0268, 0363, 0364; Tr. 431-461,
1106-1110.) Record evidence suggests that heat stress can result in:
Heat cramps (Ex. 0268; Tr. 1106),
Heat exhaustion (id.),
Heat rash (id.),
Heat stroke (id.),
Fainting (Ex. 0268),
Loss of concentration (id.), and
Unsafe behaviors (Tr. 1109-1110).
EEI submitted a State of California Finding of Emergency that reported
on occupational heat-related illnesses in that State (Ex. 0268). That
document reported that "[s]tatistical information from the California
Division of Workers Compensation's report on occupational injuries in
heat-related illness from 2000-2004 [found] that at least 300 . . .
cases of heat-related illness annually [were] recorded by employers or
are the subject of claims for Workers Compensation Insurance" (id.).
EEI noted that heat stress would cause unsafe behaviors, which could
lead to accidents involving contact with energized parts, an outcome
these commenters contended presents a serious hazard that OSHA should
address in the final rule in the context of arc-rated protection (Ex.
0227; Tr. 1109-1110).
OSHA acknowledges that heat stress can pose serious hazards to
employees. As EEI noted, OSHA has several documents available that
discuss heat-stress hazards and mitigation measures (Ex. 0478). In
fact, the Agency has a Web page devoted to this topic
(http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/heatstress/index.html).
Dr. Thomas Neal explained that "heat stress is an occurrence when
the human body core temperature goes over its normal temperature, which
we normally state [is] 98.6 degrees F" (Tr. 446). He further described
the hazard of heat stress as follows:
When the work you are doing generates more heat than can escape
through your clothing, that heat can only go to your body. So what
happens is your body, a fairly sizeable mass that it is, begins to
heat up, and if you continue that process for a period of time, your
body will basically heat up to a point where you are into a heat
stress condition that can be dangerous.
Heat builds up, and the core temperature of your organs and your
brain heat up, and just a few degrees above 98.6, and it's been
shown that your judgment can be impaired, and the core temperature,
if it reaches up to . . . 105, it can actually become a life
threatening situation. [Tr. 447]
Dr. James Lancour, testifying for EEI, addressed the factors that
can contribute to heat stress:
Information gleaned from the literature clearly demonstrates the
following:
One, heat stress job-risk factors include: hot work
environments, the metabolic rate required by the worker to perform
the task, the type of protective clothing that is worn by a worker,
exposure time, and the age and physical condition of the worker.
Two, as metabolic requirements necessary to perform a given task
increase, the exposure time at a given temperature necessary to
minimize heat stress decreases.
Three, the amount of clothing worn by a worker tends to increase
the risk of heat stress.
Four, as the temperature of the work environment increases above
about 30 degrees Centigrade, or 88 degrees Fahrenheit, there is a
sharp increase in heat-related illnesses. [Tr. 1108-1109]
The record also clearly shows that electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution workers perform tasks outdoors in hot
and humid environments. (See, for example, Exs. 0169, 0183, 0220, 0233;
Tr. 406, 1003.)
In view of this evidence, OSHA agrees that heat stress poses a
significant hazard to employees covered by this final rule. The Agency
does not dispute that electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work can be physically demanding and that employees
perform this work in hot and humid weather. OSHA also agrees with the
testimony of its expert witness, Dr. Mary Capelli-Schellpfeffer, that
heat stress "is not a new topic" for employers with employees who
perform this type of work and that "strategies to manage thermal
hazards, and . . . heat thermal stress, are well appreciated across
geographic domains," north and south (Tr. 234-235). Drs. Neal,
Lancour, and Capelli-Schellpfeffer noted that employers in this
industry must deal with heat-stress hazards even if employees are not
wearing arc-rated protection (Tr. 198, 478-479, 1129).
Evidence in the record also indicates that there is a range of
measures that employers can take to mitigate heat-stress hazards,
including:
Rest breaks (Ex. 0268; Tr. 198-199),
Supplying sufficient amounts of water (Ex. 0268; Tr. 199),
Using cooling vests (Tr. 199),
Supplying ambient cooling (Tr. 198),
Providing shade (Ex. 0268), and
Acclimatizing employees to the heat (Ex. 0268).
Evidence in the record indicates that employers already are using some
of these measures (Tr. 1129-1130).
Dr. Neal described the body's metabolic process, which controls how
the body responds to heat, as follows:
If the heat generation from metabolic activity is greater than
the heat loss through clothing or through parts of the body,
obviously, also that are not clothed, then you have heat stress.
Conversely, if the opposite happens, if your heat generation by
metabolic activity is less than the heat loss through your clothing
and uncovered parts of your body, then you have hypothermia.
So your body operates in a narrow zone, and needs to do that to
function effectively. Obviously, both heat stress and hypothermia
are dangerous when you move away from that normal zone. . . .
[There are] two main ways the body loses heat, and this comes
from a North Carolina State University study of several years ago.
One is what we call dry heat transfer, just air moving through my
clothing, my body basically giving up heat as that happens. If I am
cold, that is what is happening or, if I am in a comfort zone,
that's pretty much what is happening.
If I get hotter, then I begin to perspire and go into the
evaporative heat transfer process, which is a very effective way of
losing heat. . . . So then I am in a discomfort zone . . . .
Finally, if I get to the point where I can't los[e] enough heat by
sweating and by dry heat transfer to maintain my body temperature, I
go into a heat stress situation where my core temperature begins to
rise. [Tr. 448--449]
Dr. Neal then described how arc-rated clothing affects this process:
Flame resistant shirts, pants, coveralls that you wear are
basically like any other clothing article. They are breathable. We
actually measure that in terms of air permeability, and they are
typically lighter weight or similar weight than conventional cotton
work apparel like jeans or cotton shirts that would be worn as
nonmeltable work clothing.
So they don't really function any different when you are wearing
them. You may feel different. Again, somebody tells me it's not as
comfortable as his cotton shirt, I'm not going to argue that,
because he has to be the judge of what is comfortable. But it is not
anymore prone to heat stress is my point on that.
. . . The heat stress potential for the wearer [of] FR clothing
would be typically less than or equivalent [to] typical conventional
work clothing. . . . I'm talking about regular shirts, pants, and
coveralls that you would wear for protection, and it would give you
something up to maybe 8 calories or so of protection, single layer-
wise.
* * * * *
When arc flash suits basically have higher ratings like 25 or 40
calories, 100 calories, 60 calories--there are many different levels
that are fairly high--well, there are multiple layers that are used
to create those levels of protection. So heat, obviously--and there
are hoods involved in those. So in those cases, obviously, the heat
stress potential does go up. [Tr. 449-451]
Dr. Neal presented two tables, one showing metabolic rates for
different
tasks and the other showing heat-loss values for various types of
protection (Ex. 0363). OSHA is reproducing these tables here as Table
16 and Table 17, respectively.
Table 16--Metabolic Rates for Various Tasks
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Metabolic
Task rate (W/
m\2\)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Standing..................................................... 70
Walking at 1.3 m/s (4.4 ft/s)................................ 180
Tennis....................................................... 260
Heavy labor.................................................. 320-440
Wrestling.................................................... 500
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 17--Typical Heat Loss Values Through Clothing
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clothing material Total heat loss (W/m\2\)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
205-gm/m\2\ (6-oz/yd) Meta-aramid FR Woven 747.
Fabric (for example, NOMEX).
205-gm/m\2\ (6-oz/yd) Cotton T-shirt Knit.... 688.
Lightest 8-cal/cm\2\ FR Shirt-Pants Fabric... 500 to 600.
40-cal/cm\2\ systems......................... 300 to 400.
Firefighter turnout, breathable.............. 150 to 250.
100-cal/cm\2\ arc-flash suits................ 150 to 250.
Firefighter turnout, nonbreathable........... 80 to 120.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA presumes that electric power work is equivalent to heavy
labor, with a metabolic rate of 320 to 440 watts/meter \2\. As
demonstrated in Table 17, even 8-cal/cm\2\ clothing does not interfere
with heat loss significantly more than normal (non-flame-resistant)
work clothing. Thus, the Agency concludes that employers can treat
clothing with an arc rating of 8 cal/cm\2\ or less the same as normal
work clothing with respect to its contribution to heat stress and that
clothing with an arc rating of 8 cal/cm\2\ or less should not require
any significant changes to measures employers already are taking to
protect electric power workers from heat stress generally (Tr. 503--
504).
Employers with employees who are in protection with arc ratings
between 8 and 25 cal/cm\2\ will need to start planning for, and
implement, heat-stress mitigation strategies beyond the strategies used
for employees wearing normal work clothing (id.). These employers may
need to choose among such mitigation strategies as: Providing the
lightest-weight arc-rated clothing for the estimated incident-energy
level, ensuring that employees take extra rest breaks, and reducing the
incident energy using the methods described previously. However,
employers will need to take these measures only when the ambient
temperature warrants such actions.
As shown in Table 16 and Table 17, when the estimated energy level
rises above 25 cal/cm\2\, employers likely will need to implement a
variety of heat-stress reduction measures, except for short-duration
tasks. An employee who is performing heavy labor has a metabolic rate
of 320 to 440 watts/m \2\ (Table 16). Protection rated at 40 cal/cm\2\
provides for a heat loss of 300 to 400 watts/m \2\ (Table 17). However,
tasks requiring this level of protection \373\ are normally of short
duration (Tr. 202). Such tasks include racking circuit breakers (Tr.
381), replacing fuses in an underground installation (Ex. 0230), and
removing or installing socket-type meters (id.). Dr. Capelli-
Schellpfeffer also testified that, even when employees are wearing this
level of protection, "at one to two minutes, three minutes, four
minutes, in that ballpark, [it] is very, very uncommon to appreciate
that there would be any thermal challenge significant enough to take .
. . an employee to a heat stress condition" (Tr. 202--203). Dow
Chemical Company similarly commented that arc-rated clothing "is only
needed when an employee is working where there is a substantial
potential for an arc flash, which typically should be for very short
periods of time" (Ex. 0128).\374\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\373\ Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer described this level of
protection as "fully enclosing FR protective clothing," which
includes a protective hood (Tr. 202). Dr. Neal testified that a
faceshield attached to a hard hat and a balaclava could be used in
lieu of a hood for exposures up to about 40 cal/cm\2\ (Tr. 439).
\374\ OSHA interprets this comment as applying to tasks
performed in a generation plant or substation, as the Agency does
not believe that Dow Chemical performs maintenance on utility-type
transmission or distribution installations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Wilson Yancey with Quanta Services maintained that "[o]n
transmission work, employees often experience potential fault currents
that would require multiple layers of FR clothing, plus a 40 calorie
space suit with hood and shield, to provide the necessary protection"
(Ex. 0169). In addition, EEI presented information contending that
clothing rated for more than 100 cal/cm\2\ might be necessary when
employees work on 15-kilovolt distribution circuits with varying fault
current levels (Ex. 0227). However, OSHA concludes that neither of
these cases represents typical exposures for distribution or
transmission systems. As explained earlier, under the summary and
explanation for paragraph (g)(2) of the final rule, the NFPA 70E Annex
D calculation method EEI used to arrive at its 97- to 153-cal/cm\2\
estimates is extremely conservative and likely would produce extremely
elevated estimates at voltages of more than 15 kilovolts. EEI's
corresponding estimate, based on Table 8 in proposed Appendix F, was
only 5 cal/cm\2\ (id.), which, as explained earlier, would not require
employers to put employees in protection that would cause concerns
about heat stress. There is no evidence in the record that fault
currents on transmission circuits typically are higher than the fault
currents listed in Table 7 of final Appendix E or that incident-energy
estimates likely would be higher than the values in that table.
As explained under the heading Other issues relating to the
selection of protective clothing and other protective equipment,
earlier in this section of the preamble, the Agency concluded that most
exposures on overhead transmission and distribution systems, where
employees perform much of the work covered by the final rule, are no
higher than 12 cal/cm\2\. Furthermore, as noted by Dr. Capelli-
Schellpfeffer, the types of tasks that require protection rated at more
than 25 cal/cm\2\ are typically of short duration and will not require
measures to reduce heat stress (Tr. 202-203). Thus, the final rule will
not result in employers having to take
additional measures to protect workers from heat stress in most cases.
When incident energy requires protection rated at more than 8 cal/
cm\2\, but no more than 12 cal/cm\2\ (the highest level in Table 6 and
Table 7 in final Appendix E), employers might have to take some
additional measures to protect employees in elevated ambient
temperatures from heat stress. (See, for example, Tr. 503-504.) Even
under these conditions, the Agency concludes that these measures should
not be extreme because the clothing weight should be only slightly
higher than 8-cal/cm\2\ clothing,\375\ and because affected employers
already institute measures under these conditions to mitigate heat-
stress hazards (Tr. 197-198, 1129-1130).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\375\ Clothing rated 15 to 20 cal/cm\2\ is available in weights
of 300 gm/m\2\ (8.8 oz/yd\2\), less than typical jeans-weight
material (370 gm/m\2\, or 11 oz/yd\2\) (Ex. 0363).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Heat stress is a widely recognized hazard, and employers covered by
the final rule already have an obligation under the general duty clause
of the OSH Act to abate these hazards.\376\ As noted earlier, the
record indicates that employers covered by the final rule already are
addressing heat-stress issues in their workplaces. Depending on the
level of protection afforded to comply with final paragraph (g)(5),
employers may have to adjust their heat-stress programs, but the Agency
believes that employers will be able to provide compliant protection
under paragraph (g)(5) without necessarily exposing employees to
dangerous heat-stress conditions. Moreover, OSHA believes that EEI's
concerns about heat stress from arc-rated protection causing unsafe
acts are groundless even if the protection could increase heat stress
experienced by employees, because employers can take measures to abate
the heat-stress hazard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\376\ See, for example,
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In summary, the Agency agrees with IBEW's posthearing brief on the
subject of heat stress:
Another issue raised during the hearing was the specter that
wearing FR clothing increases the risk of heat stress for employees
working in hot climates. While the record is replete with reference
to heat stress, material about its attendant hazards, and advice
about how to avoid it, see, e.g., Ex. [0478] (EEI Post-Hearing
Comments; references to materials on OSHA's Web site), there is
absolutely no evidence in the record that employees wearing FR
clothing are necessarily at greater risk of suffering heat stress
than employees working in similar conditions but wearing regular
work clothes.
Heat stress is a function of a number of different factors,
including not only the kind of clothing the employee is wearing, but
the heat load of the particular operation in which the employee is
involved, the level of exertion associated with the employee's
tasks, his or her physical condition and diet, and such
environmental conditions as temperature and humidity. [Tr.] 198,
234[,] 1349-51; Ex. [0363]. Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer explained that
the extent to which clothing poses a heat stress problem is less a
function of the FR rating than the degree to which it encloses the
body and prevents it from cooling. Thus, for most FR clothing worn
during routine operations, if the clothing is not "enclosing" and
the body has the ability to cool naturally, its FR nature will not
pose any more of a heat stress threat than any other clothing. [Tr.]
200-01, 249. Thomas Neal, of Neal Associates, added that although
heavier clothing may contribute to heat stress, the availability of
lighter weight FR clothing is minimizing that issue. Ex. [0363]. And
representatives of both the utility industry ([Tr.] 388
(ElectriCities)) and electrical contractors ([Tr.] 1349, 1350, 1351)
concurred that although they certainly have had experience with heat
stress, they were unaware of any situation that would not have
occurred if the employee had not been wearing FR clothing. In fact,
Quanta's Wilson Yancey noted that of the 6000 company employees who
worked during last summer's extreme hurricane season, there was not
one case of heat stress that he would attribute to FR clothing.
[Tr.] 1350.
This is not to disregard the fact that heat stress is an issue
for electrical transmission and distribution workers--whether or not
they are wearing FR clothing. The record shows, however, that there
are industrial hygiene strategies for minimizing the possibility
that employees working in hot, humid conditions experience heat
stress, which utility and contractor employers either do or should
utilize. These strategies include controlling the amount of time a
particular employee performs a particular task, rotating employees,
permitting cooling rests, ensuring adequate fluid intake, and
utilizing light-weight, layered systems of arc-rated clothing. [Tr.]
198-99[,] 460; Ex. [0363].
Where the arc hazard analysis dictates putting employees in such
highly rated FR clothing that heat stress or other performance
impediments become a real problem, the answer may be to employ other
strategies for protecting the employee from the threat. For example,
an arc hazard analysis showed Gallatin Steel that it needed to
develop alternative switching procedures to minimize employee
exposure to arc flashes. Ex. [0460]. NIOSH recommends establishing
"flash protection boundaries" from which employees can maintain a
sufficient distance from the exposure that they will not require
protective clothing. Ex. [0130]. See also [Tr.] 498-99 (examples
from other industries that have employed methods to lower heat
energy estimates). [Ex. 0505]
Are FR and arc-rated clothing personal protective equipment? As
described earlier, OSHA is requiring employers, in certain situations,
to ensure that their employees (1) wear flame-resistant clothing and
(2) wear protective clothing and other protective equipment with an arc
rating greater than or equal to the heat energy estimated under
paragraph (g)(2) of the final rule. In the preamble to the proposal,
OSHA stated that it considered the protective clothing required by
proposed paragraph (g) to be PPE (70 FR 34868). As the preamble noted,
the protective clothing would reduce the degree of injury sustained by
an employee when an electric arc occurs and, in some cases, would
prevent injury altogether (id.).
Many rulemaking participants objected to OSHA's classification of
arc-rated clothing as PPE. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0157, 0170,
0172, 0185, 0207, 0209, 0504, 0506; Tr. 544-547, 1123-1124.) For
instance, Mr. Jonathan Glazier with NRECA commented:
To avoid any confusion, NRECA requests that OSHA reiterate its
longstanding position that FR clothing is not PPE. That is, FR
clothing, when it is not used as protective clothing, is not PPE
even though it also has a protective value. For an example of OSHA's
longstanding position on FR clothing as not being PPE, see the
statement in the July 31, 1995 letter from John B. Miles, Jr.,
Director, Directorate of Compliance Programs, to Mr. Jack Callaway,
Director of Environment Affairs, Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative,
that the Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution standard
section "1910.269 (l)(6)(iii) is not a personal protective
(clothing) equipment requirement." [Ex. 0233]
The letter of interpretation referred to by Mr. Glazier simply
states that existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(6)(iii), which prohibits the use
of clothing that could increase the extent of an injury in the event of
an arc exposure, is not a requirement for PPE. The letter does not
state that FR clothing itself is not PPE. An OSHA memorandum to the
field describes this Agency policy more explicitly:
The Apparel Standard is intended to provide worker protection
from exposure to the secondary hazard of the employee's clothing
burning or melting and making even worse any injuries caused by
primary exposure to the electric arc or flame. While OSHA requires,
with exceptions, that employers provide and pay for PPE, paragraph
1910.269(l)(6)(iii) is silent on these points. Note that this
Apparel Standard is not considered a personal protective equipment
(PPE) standard; however, it may apply to personal protective
equipment. [Emphasis added.] For example, paragraph
1910.269(l)(6)(iii) applies to an employer who provides personal
protective clothing worn by an employee, who is exposed to the
hazards of electric arcs or flames, for protection against cold or
rain.
Because it is not a PPE requirement, the Apparel Standard does
not address whether
or not an employee's clothing must cover all exposed parts of the
employee's body. The Apparel Standard, by itself, does not prohibit
employers from purchasing flame-retardant-treated short sleeve
shirts or from altering flame-retardant-treated long sleeve shirts
to shorten the sleeves. However, such practices are discouraged.
Flame-retardant-treated clothing provides a measure of protection to
an employee exposed to an electric arc.
From this standpoint, flame-retardant-treated clothing which
covers not only the body and legs, but also the arms provides better
protection to the employee.
Note: An employer would be in a citable posture for violation of
[Sec. 1910.132] of the Subpart I Personal protective equipment
standard when it is a generally accepted safe work practice of the
industry to wear clothing which covers the arms, legs or other
exposed surfaces of the body to protect an employee in a particular
workplace application and the employee does not do so. [Memorandum
for: Regional Administrators, From: James W. Stanley, dated August
10, 1995, Subject: Guidelines for the Enforcement of the Apparel
Standard, 29 CFR 1910.269(l)(6), of the Electric Power Generation,
Transmission, and Distribution Standard; \377\ emphasis included in
original]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\377\ The full text of this memorandum is available at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21878.
This memorandum makes it clear that, while OSHA does not treat existing
Sec. 1910.269(l)(6)(iii) as a PPE requirement, some FR clothing may be
PPE for purposes of other OSHA standards.
Some rulemaking participants maintained that OSHA did not define
PPE or argued that the Agency was defining PPE to include FR clothing
for the first time in this rulemaking. (See, for example, Exs. 0207,
0222, 0233; Tr. 568.) For instance, the Small Business Administration's
Office of Advocacy commented: "OSHA declares in a single sentence in
the preamble that it now views protective clothing as PPE, a position
that OSHA has previously not asserted" (Ex. 0207; footnote omitted).
Mr. Chris Tampio with NAM argued:
The basic Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) standards for
general industry and construction are found in Sections 1910.132 and
1926.95, respectively, and have been in existence for over 30 years.
To the best of our knowledge, these provisions have not been
interpreted to require fire-resistant or arc-rated clothing to
address arc flash hazards. If OSHA already interpreted Section
1910.132 or 1926.95 to require fire-resistant or arc-rated clothing
to address arc flash hazards, there would have been no reason to
propose the clothing requirements in the current rulemaking.
Accordingly, should the final rule contain provisions requiring arc
flash hazard assessments and FR/AR clothing, it is essential for
OSHA to insert language into the final rule and the preamble to the
final rule clarifying that the agency's interpretations of Sections
1910.132 and 1926.95 remains unchanged--that they do not require
flame-resistant and arc-rated clothing in connection with any arc
flash hazards that may exist outside the activities covered by
Section 1910.269 and Subpart V.
* * * * *
OSHA's discussion of the clothing requirements in the preamble
to this rulemaking demonstrate that fire-resistant clothing is . . .
not considered PPE under Section 1910.132:
OSHA's existing clothing requirement in Sec. 1910.269 [which
incorporates the personal protective equipment requirements of
Subpart I of Part 1910 by reference into Section 1910.269(g)(1)]
does not require employers to protect employees from electric arcs
through the use of flame-resistant clothing. It simply requires that
an employee's clothing do no greater harm. Because of the serious
nature of the still remaining risk to power workers from electric
arcs, the Agency believes that the standard should be revised to
require the use of flame-resistant clothing, under certain
circumstances, to protect employees from the most severe burns.
Section 1910.132, "General Requirements [for PPE]", is OSHA's
general PPE standard which requires that PPE shall be used wherever
necessary by reason of workplace hazards. Because 1910.269 already
incorporates Sec. 1910.132, there would be no reason to revise
Sec. 1910.269 (or Subpart V) to require the use of FR/AR clothing,
or to perform an economic impact analysis of the additional burden
of that requirement, if FR/AR clothing was already required by Sec.
1910.132 (or Sec. [1926].95) to address the arc flash hazard.
. . . In [a] 1999 rulemaking, OSHA issued [a notice of proposed
rulemaking] to address the issue of whether an employer would be
required to pay for the PPE required by Sec. 1910.132. The scope of
that preamble and the technical and economic feasibility analysis
for that proposal were limited to head, eye, hand, face and foot
protection, and some forms of protective clothing (other than arc-
rated or fire-resistant clothing). There was no mention of its
application to fire-resistant or arc-rated clothing for electrical
workers. The NAM respectfully submits that, to this day, as the
subject rulemaking acknowledges, OSHA has never interpreted Sec.
1910.132 or 1926.95 to require fire-resistant clothing or arc-rated
clothing to address arc flash hazards.
In light of this well-established interpretation of Sec. Sec.
1910.132 and 1926.95, we respectfully submit it may not be
materially changed except through notice and comment rulemaking that
clearly announces to all interested parties that such an enormous
change is under consideration. It is well-established that agency
interpretations, even when reasonable constructions of its rules,
trigger notice and comment requirements under the APA when the
interpretation represents a significant change from a previous,
definitive interpretation. See Alaska Professional Hunters
Association, Inc. v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999). [Ex.
0222; footnotes omitted; emphasis included in original.]
First, the Agency considers irrelevant the argument that, if
Sec. Sec. 1910.132 and 1926.95 already cover arc-rated clothing, OSHA
does not need separate requirements for such clothing in Subpart V and
Sec. 1910.269. The regulated community could construe existing Sec.
1910.269(l)(6)(iii), because it explicitly covers electric-arc hazards
for work performed under Sec. 1910.269, to preempt application of
Sec. 1910.132(a) to electric-arc hazards in electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work. Consequently, OSHA needed to
revise Sec. 1910.269, as it proposed to do, to clarify that employees
must use arc-rated clothing for work covered by that standard.
Second, the commenters' statements about current OSHA policy are
wrong. The Agency currently considers FR clothing to be PPE; OSHA is
not establishing new policy on that issue in this final rule. The
Agency has issued, and the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission has upheld, citations against employers for violating Sec.
1910.132(a) by not providing flame-resistant clothing to employees.
(See, for example, Lukens Steel Co., 10 BNA OSHC 1115 (No. 76-1053,
1981) (Section 1910.132 required the use of "protective equipment,
including . . . flame retardant clothing" for employees exposed to
burn hazards at a steel-producing facility).) In addition, the Agency
has issued several letters of interpretation stating that, under
certain circumstances, Sec. 1910.132(a) or Sec. 1926.95(a) require FR
clothing. (See, for example, letters of interpretation dated March 7,
2006, to Mr. Joseph P. Zemen \378\ (FR clothing in plants processing
flammable materials) and February 29, 2008, to Mr. Brian Dolin \379\
(protection against arc-flash hazards for work covered by 29 CFR Part
1926, Subpart K).)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\378\ This letter is available at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=25366.
\379\ This letter is available at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=25973.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the recently completed rulemaking on employer payment for
personal protective equipment (72 FR 64342), some commenters suggested
"that FR clothing is not PPE." (72 FR 64353). OSHA rejected that
argument, noting:
If OSHA determines in [the Subpart V] rulemaking that FR
clothing is required, it will then become subject to the PPE payment
provisions of this rule . . . [Id.]
Thus, it is clear that the Agency considers flame-resistant clothing to
be PPE. In this regard, this rulemaking does not establish new policy
or revise
longstanding policy, as the commenters suggested.\380\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\380\ Mr. Tampio also argued that FR clothing is not considered
electrical protective equipment under Sec. 1910.335 (Ex. 0222).
This argument is not relevant to this discussion. However, note that
OSHA agrees with Mr. Tampio that FR clothing is not electrical
protective equipment. This equipment, covered by Sec. Sec. 1910.137
and 1926.97 in this final rule, protects employees from electric
shock. FR clothing, whether arc-rated or not, does not provide
protection against electric shock.
In addition, Mr. Tampio argued that the hazard assessment and
training requirements in Sec. 1910.132 apply only to head, eye,
hand, face, and foot protection. OSHA also agrees with this
statement, but again finds it irrelevant. The limitation of the PPE
hazard assessment and training provisions, contained in Sec.
1910.132(g), has no bearing or effect on the types of PPE covered by
the general requirement to provide PPE in Sec. 1910.132(a). The
preamble to the Subpart V proposal requested comment on whether to
extend the hazard assessment and training requirements of Sec.
1910.132 to electrical protective equipment, which is another form
of PPE covered by Sec. 1910.132(a) (70 FR 34893).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consistent with past policy, OSHA believes that it is reasonable
and appropriate to treat FR and arc-rated clothing required under final
paragraph (g) as PPE. FR clothing required by paragraph (g)(4) of the
final rule will protect against the ignition of clothing, and arc-rated
clothing, as required by paragraph (g)(5) of the final rule, will
protect against heat-related hazards caused by electric arcs. Dr. Mary
Capelli-Schellpfeffer explained that electric arcs can "occur
unintentionally in man-made systems" and represent "a common
electrical fault condition which may lead to a failure in the power
system" (Ex. 0373). She explained that, when an employee is repairing
an electrical installation, "[i]f the installation remains energized,
or is not in an electrically safe working condition, the risk of
electric arc persists, and may be increased as a result of the post-
fault status" (id.). As Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer noted, the causes of
electric arcs include: transient overvoltage disturbances, such as
lightning and switching surges; mechanical damage from foreign sources,
such as digging or vehicles; shorting by tools or metal objects;
mechanical failure of static or structural parts; and insulation
breakdown (id.). Thus, electric arcs commonly result from the breakdown
of equipment in the process of generating, transporting, or using
electricity or from the process of repairing an electrical
installation.
Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer also described the thermal hazards posed
by electric arcs, explaining:
With temperatures rising in and around an arc, burn hazard is
present from ohmic heating due to electrical power flow; ignition
and combustion of nearby materials, notably including worn clothing
and adjacent equipment; and sprayed or blown hot or melting
installation elements moved by the mechanical forces in the electric
arc event. Additionally, radiation is another major source of heat.
[Ex. 0373; see, also, Tr. 178-188.]
Thus, thermal hazards posed by electric arcs arise not only from the
processes but are a direct result of the rapidly changing environment
that results from a fault in an electrical system.
Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer also described the injuries that can
result from electric arcs:
The injuries that accompany high temperature exposures at the
body surfaces are commonly referred to as skin burns. When these
injuries are distributed within the body we still call them skin
burns, and the burn generally refers to a physical chemical change.
As many appreciate from the experience of sunburn, this kind of
condition is painful, and when the trauma is more severe, the pain
is extraordinary, and of course the medical treatment is extensive.
[Tr. 188]
As noted earlier, she graphically depicted these injuries with a
photograph of the victim of an electric arc, which she explained as
follows:
[T]he extent of the injury that can follow an arc exposure is
readily appreciated. Eyes, ears, faces, skin, limbs, and organs are
affected. Basic bodily function, including the ability to breathe,
eat, urinate, and sleep are completely changed. [Tr. 186]
Thus, thermal injuries from an electric arc occur when an employee's
body absorbs the heat from the arc.
In light of the foregoing discussion, OSHA concludes that FR
clothing and arc-rated clothing will protect against "hazards of
processes or environment" and are designed to protect against hazards
"encountered in a manner capable of causing injury or impairment in
the function of any part of the body through absorption, inhalation or
physical contact." Thus, OSHA is reiterating that FR clothing and arc-
rated clothing are PPE as Sec. Sec. 1910.132(a) and 1926.95(a)
generally describe that term.
Mr. Jonathan Glazier with NRECA argued that FR clothing is not
protective (Ex. 0506; Tr. 544-545). At the hearing, Mr. Glazier
testified:
The FR nature of clothing offers no protective value. It refers
merely to the clothing's inability to melt or ignite and remain
ignited. We should be aware of the difference between the attribute
of FR and the attribute of protection.
It gets confusing, because arc protective clothing, which sounds
like it may be personal protective equipment, and OSHA says it is
personal protective equipment in the preamble . . .
It gets confusing, because arc protective clothing is first FR.
That is, all arc protective clothing is also FR, and I am told that
all FR clothing sold nowadays has an arc protective rating.\[381]\
But still, there is a difference between the FR attribute and the
arc protective attribute. [Tr. 544-545]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\381\ OSHA is aware that some FR clothing, such as children's FR
sleepwear and certain types of FR clothing made specifically for
protection from contact with molten metal, are not arc rated.
OSHA disagrees with Mr. Glazier. FR clothing, even without an arc
rating, protects employees against burns caused by radiant and
convective heat as well as burns caused by potential ignition of
clothing that is not flame resistant. Dr. Thomas Neal testified that FR
clothing "not only [does not] ignite and, basically, eliminate[s] the
burning clothing on the body syndrome, but [it] also provide[s] a level
of protection by blocking heat from reaching the body" (Tr. 472). Dr.
Capelli-Schellpfeffer similarly testified that "FR clothing . . . is
protective and designed to resist ignition and block heat transfer"
(Tr. 189). An arc-rating on FR clothing is a measure of how much
incident energy can be present before the wearer will just barely
sustain a second-degree burn (Ex. 0061). Clearly, arc-rated clothing
and FR clothing (even without an arc rating) protect employees from
being burned by electric arcs and are, therefore, protective.
Mr. Frank White with ORC Worldwide expressed concern that OSHA
would consider untreated cotton clothing to be PPE (Ex. 0235). He noted
that Table 10 in proposed Appendix F listed untreated cotton clothing
as "protective" for incident energy up to 2 cal/cm\2\ and that "at
higher incident energy exposures a [T]-shirt is listed as the first
layer of protective clothing, followed by other layers of FR clothing"
(id.). Mr. White also interpreted Table 11 from proposed Appendix F,
which listed ignition thresholds for various weights of cotton fabrics,
as indicating that these fabrics provide "protection from heat energy
below the ignition threshold" (id.).
Untreated cotton can ignite and continue to burn when subjected to
incident heat energy above its ignition threshold (Tr. 467-469, 472).
OSHA does not consider cotton clothing, which can ignite and pose a
hazard itself, as constituting protective clothing with respect to
electric arcs common to work covered by the final rule. Therefore, OSHA
did not include Table 10 or Table 11 from proposed Appendix F in final
Appendix E. (See also the summary and explanation for the appendices to
Subpart V, later in this section of the preamble.) Finally, even though
wearing cotton clothing as one
layer in a clothing system can effectively increase the arc-rating of
the system, OSHA does not consider cotton clothing to be
protective.\382\
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\382\ Note that, even if cotton clothing in these circumstances
were PPE, Sec. Sec. 1910.132(h)(4)(ii) and 1926.95(d)(4)(i) exempt
"everyday clothing" from the employer-payment requirements in
Sec. Sec. 1910.132(h) and 1926.95(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some commenters maintained that OSHA needed to conduct a separate
rulemaking to determine whether FR clothing is PPE. (See, for example,
Exs. 0170, 0183, 0202, 0207, 0222, 0229, 0233, 0239, 0240.) For
instance, Mr. Alan Blackmon with Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative
commented that, if "OSHA institutes an arc protective clothing
requirement, its nature as PPE or non-PPE should be the subject of
public notice and comment. It is not enough for OSHA merely to issue a
pronouncement in the Preamble of this rulemaking" (Ex. 0183).
The U.S. SBA's Office of Advocacy suggested that "the issue of
protective clothing as PPE [was] not . . . fully vetted in the
rulemaking process" and recommended that "OSHA address the issues of
protective clothing, PPE, and employer payment for PPE in the PPE
rulemaking process and not finalize these provisions prior to that
rulemaking's conclusion" (Ex. 0207).
As noted earlier, existing OSHA policy treats FR clothing (whether
or not it is arc rated) as PPE. OSHA's statement in the preamble to the
proposed rule simply reaffirmed that position. Although the Agency does
not believe notice and comment is necessary on this issue (see, for
example, 5 U.S.C. 553(b) (APA notice and comment requirements do not
apply "to interpretative rules")), affected parties had clear notice
in the preamble to this rulemaking that the Agency was considering
whether employers would have to pay for the arc-rated clothing required
by the final rule (an issue discussed later in this section of the
preamble). OSHA believes that the public also had clear notice that the
Agency considered FR clothing to be PPE and had ample opportunity to
challenge the Agency on that point as it relates to this rulemaking.
Consequently, OSHA concludes that there is no need to conduct further
rulemaking related to the issue of whether FR clothing is PPE.
Who should pay for the PPE required by paragraph (g) of the final
rule? As explained earlier, OSHA considers FR clothing and arc-rated
clothing required by the final rule to be PPE. The proposed rule did
not specify whether employers would have to provide protective clothing
at no cost to employees. However, OSHA noted in the preamble to the
proposal that it was considering including an employer-payment
requirement in the final rule and sought comments on the issue.
The preamble to the proposal also noted that OSHA had proposed
regulatory language for the general PPE standards to clarify that
employers generally are responsible for the cost of PPE (70 FR 34869,
citing 64 FR 15402, Mar. 31, 1999). OSHA published the final rule on
employer payment for PPE on November 15, 2007 (72 FR 64342). The final
rule on employer payment for PPE requires employers to pay for the PPE
used to comply with OSHA standards, with a few exceptions, including
(1) everyday clothing, such as longsleeve shirts, long pants, street
shoes, and normal work boots; and (2) ordinary clothing, skin creams,
or other items, used solely for protection from weather, such as winter
coats, jackets, gloves, parkas, rubber boots, hats, raincoats, ordinary
sunglasses, and sunscreen. (See 29 CFR 1910.132(h); 29 CFR 1926.95(d).)
In the PPE-payment rulemaking, OSHA explained the rationale behind
its decision to require employers generally to pay for PPE, as follows:
1. The OSH Act Requires Employer Payment for PPE
OSHA is requiring employers to pay for PPE used to comply with
OSHA standards in order to effectuate the underlying cost allocation
scheme in the OSH Act. The OSH Act requires employers to pay for the
means necessary to create a safe and healthful work environment.
Congress placed this obligation squarely on employers, believing
such costs to be appropriate in order to protect the health and
safety of employees. This final rule does no more than clarify that
under the OSH Act employers are responsible for providing at no cost
to their employees the PPE required by OSHA standards to protect
employees from workplace injury and death.
* * * * *
2. The Rule Will Result in Safety Benefits
Separate from effectuating the statutory cost allocation scheme,
this rule will also help prevent injuries and illnesses. OSHA has
carefully reviewed the rulemaking record and finds that requiring
employers to pay for PPE will result in significant safety benefits.
As such, it is a legitimate exercise of OSHA's statutory authority
to promulgate these ancillary provisions in its standards to reduce
the risk of injury and death.
There are three main reasons why the final rule will result in
safety benefits:
When employees are required to pay for their own PPE,
many are likely to avoid PPE costs and thus fail to provide
themselves with adequate protection. OSHA also believes that
employees will be more inclined to use PPE if it is provided to them
at no cost.
Employer payment for PPE will clearly shift overall
responsibility for PPE to employers. When employers take full
responsibility for providing PPE to their employees and paying for
it, they are more likely to make sure that the PPE is correct for
the job, that it is in good condition, and that the employee is
protected.
An employer payment rule will encourage employees to
participate wholeheartedly in an employer's safety and health
program and employer payment for PPE will improve the safety culture
at the worksite.
* * * * *
3. Clarity in PPE Payment Policy
Another benefit of the final PPE payment rule is clarity in
OSHA's policy. While it is true that most employers pay for most PPE
most of the time, the practices for providing PPE are quite diverse.
Many employers pay for some items and not for others, either as a
matter of collective bargaining or long standing tradition. In some
cases, costs are shared between employees and employers. In other
workplaces, the employer pays for more expensive or technologically
advanced PPE while requiring employees to pay for more common items.
However, in some workplaces exactly the opposite is true. [72 FR
64344]
OSHA concludes that there is no evidence in the Subpart V
rulemaking record to persuade the Agency that any of these reasons
are invalid with respect to FR and arc-rated clothing. As explained
later, OSHA considered and rejected nearly all of the arguments
against an employer-payment requirement for FR and arc-rated
clothing in the PPE-payment rulemaking. As noted previously, OSHA
specifically considered FR clothing in the PPE-payment rulemaking
and concluded in the preamble to the final PPE-payment rule that,
"[i]f OSHA determines in [the Subpart V] rulemaking that FR
clothing is required, it will then become subject to the PPE payment
provisions of this rule, unless the final Sec. 1910.269 and Part
1926 Subpart V standards specifically exempt FR clothing from
employer payment" (72 FR 64353). Therefore, the default position
for the Subpart V rulemaking is that employers must pay for the FR
and arc-rated clothing required by this final rule unless the Agency
adopts provisions specifically exempting this clothing from the
general PPE-payment rule. Also, for reasons described later, OSHA
concludes that such an exemption is neither necessary nor
appropriate for the FR or arc-rated clothing required under
paragraph (g) of this final rule. The general PPE-payment rule,
including all exceptions, applies to the FR and arc-rated clothing
used to comply with this final rule. (See 72 FR 64369.)
Several rulemaking participants supported requiring employers to
pay for the FR clothing and arc-rated clothing required by the final
rule. (See, for example, Exs. 0130, 0164, 0197, 0211, 0230, 0505;
Tr. 819-820, 834, 897-898.) These rulemaking participants gave
several reasons for supporting an employer-payment requirement:
Many employers already are providing this protective
clothing (Exs. 0230, 0505; Tr. 897-898),
Employers are more likely to properly train employees
in using PPE (Ex. 0211),
Employers are more likely to select, and ensure that
employees wear, proper protective clothing (Exs. 0197, 0211, 0230),
Employers are more likely to properly maintain the
protective clothing (Exs. 0130, 0211, 0230), and
The OSH Act requires employers to pay for this type of
protection (Tr. 848--849).
Other commenters opposed an employer-payment requirement. (See,
for example, Exs. 0099, 0125, 0146, 0169, 0173, 0186, 0201, 0209,
0222; Tr. 546--547.) These rulemaking participants presented the
following reasons for not imposing such a requirement:
The difficulty and expense contractors would have
buying protective clothing for employees who move from employer to
employer (Exs. 0169, 0186),
Employees take better care of clothing when they pay at
least a portion of the cost (Exs. 0099, 0186),
Employers consider protective clothing a "tool of the
trade" that employees must bring with them to the job (Ex. 0222;
Tr. 295-297),
FR and arc-rated clothing only provides secondary
protection (Exs. 0209, 0210), and
Protective clothing is personal because employees can
wear it off the job (Exs. 0125, 0146, 0173, 0209, 0222).
OSHA examined several of these arguments in the PPE-payment
rulemaking. For example, the Agency explained how employers could
handle the problems associated with transient workforces:
If the employer retains ownership of the PPE, then the employer
may require the employee to return the PPE upon termination of
employment. If the employee does not return the employer's
equipment, nothing in the final rule prevents the employer from
requiring the employee to pay for it or take reasonable steps to
retrieve the PPE, in a manner that does not conflict with federal,
state or local laws concerning such actions. In these situations,
OSHA notes that the employer is not allowed to charge the employee
for wear and tear to the equipment that is related to the work
performed or workplace conditions. As suggested by National Tank
Truck Carriers, Inc., a written agreement, for example, between the
employer and employee on the matter may be an effective method of
ensuring that the employer's expectations of the employee are clear
and unambiguous . . . . Another acceptable alternative is a deposit
system that provides an incentive for employees to return the
equipment. However, the Agency cautions that the deposit system must
not be administered in a fashion that circumvents the rule and
results in an employee involuntarily paying for his or her PPE.
In some situations, an employer may prohibit an employee from
using PPE that the employer has paid for while working for another
employer. . . . Conversely, an employer may allow an employee to use
employer-owned PPE while working for another employer. . . . Since
the employer has retained ownership of the PPE, he or she can
stipulate where it is used. OSHA does not object to either of the
aforementioned practices. [72 FR 64359]
The same solutions apply here. OSHA notes that the record in this
rulemaking describes another possible solution for contractors
employing unionized labor. Mr. Jules Weaver with Western Line
Constructors Chapter testified that "[t]here are certain parts of the
country in our industry, IBEW and [NECA], have a . . . safety fund, and
the contractors pay into it, and they provide FR clothing for
individuals" (Tr. 307). Thus, although providing employees with PPE,
including FR clothing and arc-rated clothing, might be challenging for
employers with transient workforces, the Agency believes that there are
reasonable compliance options available.
In the PPE-payment rulemaking, the Agency rejected an argument that
employees take better care of PPE than employers, explaining: "OSHA is
also not swayed by [the] arguments that employees are in a better
position to maintain, use, and store PPE. In fact, the existing PPE
standards place on employers the responsibility for ensuring proper
fit, use, and maintenance of PPE" (72 FR 64380). The same rationale
applies to the argument in this rulemaking that employees take better
care of protective clothing when they pay for all, or a portion, of it.
The OSH Act and the PPE standards at Sec. Sec. 1910.132 and 1926.95
make the employer, not the employee, responsible for the care and
maintenance of PPE.
In the PPE-payment rulemaking, the Agency decided not to exempt
"tools of the trade," stating:
As discussed previously and noted by many commenters, in some
trades, industries, and/or geographic locations, PPE for employees
who frequently change jobs can take on some of the qualities of a
"tool of the trade." In other words, the PPE is an item that the
employee traditionally keeps with his or her tool box. This may be
because the PPE is used while performing some type of specialized
work, such as welding or electrical work, or because it is a
tradition in the industry, such as in home building. OSHA has not
included an exception to the payment requirement for tools of the
trade because, among other things, of the difficulty of defining,
with adequate precision, when an item of PPE is or is not a tool of
the trade. However, because the rule does not require employers to
reimburse employees for PPE they already own, it recognizes that
some employees may wish to own their tools of the trade and bring
that equipment to the worksite.
OSHA has further emphasized in the regulatory text that
employees are under no obligation to provide their own PPE by
stating that the employer shall not require an employee to provide
or pay for his or her own PPE, unless the PPE is specifically
excepted in the final rule. These provisions address the concern
that employers not circumvent their obligations to pay for PPE by
making employee ownership of the equipment a condition of employment
or continuing employment or a condition for placement in a job. OSHA
recognizes that in certain emergency situations, such as response to
a natural disaster, where immediate action is required, it may be
necessary for employers to hire or select employees already in
possession of the appropriate PPE. As a general matter, however,
employers must not engage in this practice. Taking PPE-ownership
into consideration during hiring or selection circumvents the intent
of the PPE standard and constitutes a violation of the standard. [72
FR 64358-64359]
The same rationale applies here.
OSHA also rejects the argument that, because FR and arc-rated
clothing is secondary protection, the Agency should not require
employers to pay for it. As noted earlier, PPE is part of a hierarchy
of controls. OSHA standards typically require other forms of controls,
such as engineering and work-practice controls, in preference to PPE.
In many cases, PPE supplements engineering controls and forms a second
line of defense to protect employees in the event that other types of
controls do not provide complete abatement of the relevant hazard. For
example, existing Sec. Sec. 1910.67(c)(2)(v) and 1926.453(b)(2)(v)
require employees working from aerial lifts to wear personal fall
protection equipment because that PPE would protect the workers in case
the engineering controls (that is, the guardrails or bucket walls on
the aerial lift platforms or buckets) do not provide sufficient
protection. (See, also, the preamble to the final rule on respiratory
protection, 29 CFR 1910.134 and 29 CFR 1926.103, which notes:
"Respiratory protection is a backup method which is used to protect
employees from toxic materials in the workplace in those situations
where feasible engineering controls and work practices are . . . not in
themselves sufficient to protect employee health . . ." (63 FR 1156-
1157, Jan. 8, 1998).) Consequently, OSHA standards often consider PPE
"secondary" protection. FR and arc-rated clothing is not unique in
this regard. In any event, where this final rule requires FR or arc-
rated clothing, OSHA determined that it is necessary for employee
protection (as described previously) and, thus, the rationale for
requiring employers to pay for this type of PPE still applies.
In the PPE-payment rulemaking, OSHA also considered exempting types
of PPE that were "personal in nature." \383\ However, instead of
exempting all such personal PPE, the Agency chose to evaluate various
types of personal PPE individually. First, OSHA chose not to require
employer payment for everyday clothing or ordinary clothing used solely
for protection from weather. The Agency explained the reasoning for
this decision as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\383\ For the purposes of this discussion, OSHA considers PPE
that is "personal in nature" to be PPE fitted to an individual
employee and not shared by other employees and that the employee can
use off the job.
OSHA does not believe that Congress intended for employers to
have to pay for everyday clothing and ordinary clothing used solely
for protection from the weather. While serving a protective function
in certain circumstances, employees must wear such clothing to work
regardless of the hazards found. OSHA is exercising its discretion
through this rulemaking to exempt jeans, long sleeve shirts, winter
coats, etc., from the employer payment requirement. As stated, this
is consistent with OSHA's intent in the proposal and is also
supported by the rulemaking record. A number of commenters stated
that OSHA should exempt these items from the employer payment
requirement . . .
Thus, OSHA is not requiring employers to pay for everyday
clothing even though they may require their employees to use such
everyday clothing items such as long pants or long-sleeve shirts,
and even though they may have some protective value. Similarly,
employees who work outdoors (e.g., construction work) will normally
have weather-related gear to protect themselves from the elements.
This gear is also exempt from the employer payment requirement. [72
FR 64349]
The PPE-payment rule also exempts nonspecialty safety-toe
protective footwear, provided the employer permits employees to wear it
off the jobsite.\384\ OSHA explained this exemption as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\384\ The PPE-payment rule provides additional exemptions for
such items as nonspecialty prescription safety eyewear. However, the
rationale behind those exemptions sheds no additional light on
whether FR and arc-rated clothing should or should not be subject to
the general employer-payment requirement.
OSHA has historically taken the position that safety-toe
protective footwear has certain attributes that make it unreasonable
to require employers to pay for it in all circumstances . . . .
Safety footwear selection is governed by a proper and comfortable
fit. It cannot be easily transferred from one employee to the next.
Unlike other types of safety equipment, the range of sizes of
footwear needed to fit most employees would not normally be kept in
stock by an employer and it would not be reasonable to expect
employers to stock the array and variety of safety-toe footwear
necessary to properly and comfortably fit most individuals.
Furthermore, most employees wearing safety-toe protective
footwear spend the majority of their time working on their feet, and
thus such footwear is particularly difficult to sanitize and reissue
to another employee. Other factors indicate as well that employers
should not be required to pay for safety-toe protective footwear in
all circumstances. Employees who work in non-specialty safety-toe
protective footwear often wear it to and from work, just as
employees who wear dress shoes or other non-safety-toe shoes do. In
contrast, employees who wear specialized footwear such as boots
incorporating metatarsal protection are likely to store this type of
safety footwear at work, or carry it back and forth between work and
home instead of wearing it. . . . OSHA does not believe that
Congress intended for employers to have to pay for shoes of this
type.
For all of these reasons, OSHA has decided to continue to exempt
nonspecialty safety shoes from the employer payment requirement.
OSHA, however, also wants to make clear that this exemption applies
only to non-specialty safety-toe shoes and boots, and not other
types of specialty protective footwear. Any safety footwear that has
additional protection or is more specialized, such as shoes with
non-slip soles used when stripping floors, or steel-toe rubber
boots, is subject to the employer payment requirements of this
standard. Put simply, the exempted footwear provides the protection
of an ordinary safety-toe shoe or boot, while footwear with
additional safety attributes beyond this (e.g., shoes and boots with
special soles) fall under the employer payment requirement. [72 FR
64348]
FR and arc-rated clothing is not "everyday clothing" or
"ordinary clothing . . . used solely for protection from weather" as
OSHA used those terms in the exemptions from the PPE-payment rule. This
is not clothing that employees would purchase on their own to wear
every day or to wear for protection against the weather. Although
employees could wear it off the job, FR and arc-rated clothing command
a premium above the price of normal clothing. OSHA estimates that a
single set of flame-resistant apparel costs $191.75, on average. (See
Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis, later in the preamble.) OSHA estimates that normal work
clothing would cost half that amount. Winter-weather gear that is
flame-resistant or arc-rated commands a greater premium. Evidence in
the record indicates that non-FR winter wear may cost about $60 to
$120, whereas similar FR winter wear could cost as much as $300 (Tr.
1024-1026).
In addition, FR and arc-rated clothing provides more than
incidental protection. As explained earlier, manufacturers design these
garments specifically to protect against clothing ignition and incident
heat energy. Consequently, OSHA determined that the rationale for
exempting "everyday clothing" and "ordinary clothing . . . used
solely for protection from weather" from the final PPE-payment rule
does not apply to FR or arc-rated clothing, and OSHA is not
interpreting these exemptions specified in the PPE-payment rule as
covering the FR and arc-rated clothing required by final Sec.
1926.960(g).
FR and arc-rated clothing shares some attributes with nonspecialty
safety-toe protective footwear. Employers normally may not keep in
stock the range of sizes of pants, shirts, and other clothing needed to
fit most employees,\385\ and it would not be reasonable to expect
employers to stock the array and variety of clothing necessary to
properly and comfortably fit most individuals. In addition, employees
who work in FR or arc-rated clothing may sometimes wear it to and from
work, just like employees who wear ordinary clothing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\385\ There are ways to provide FR and arc-rated clothing to
employees that do not require the employer to maintain stocks of
clothing, including using a clothing rental or uniform service and
providing a clothing allowance so that employees can purchase their
own clothing (Tr. 1134).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the other hand, FR and arc-rated clothing does not have some of
the other characteristics that formed the basis of OSHA's decision to
exempt nonspecialty safety-toe protective footwear from PPE-payment
requirements. FR clothing is not exempt from requirements for employer
payment in other workplaces, such as steel plants, where an OSHA
standard, such as Sec. 1910.132(a), requires it. Furthermore,
employers can sanitize this clothing easily for use by other employees.
In fact, evidence in the record indicates that some employers currently
use uniform-supply companies to provide and launder FR and arc-rated
clothing (Ex. 0230). In addition, employers can purchase arc-rated
clothing in a wide variety of ratings and are in a better position to
make purchasing decisions with respect to arc rating than employees,
which is not true of nonspecialty safety-toe protective footwear. OSHA
concludes that FR and arc-rated clothing do not have all the attributes
on which the Agency based its rationale for exempting nonspecialty
safety-toe protective footwear; and, therefore, OSHA is not granting a
similar exemption from the employer payment requirements for this
clothing.
Moreover, OSHA believes that the record in this rulemaking
demonstrates that, similar to most OSHA requirements for PPE, employee
safety will significantly benefit from a requirement that employers
provide FR and arc-rated clothing at no cost to employees. Employers
generally need to ensure that the clothing worn by
employees has an arc rating at least as high as the employer's
incident-energy estimates. Selecting the proper clothing sometimes will
involve determining the rating of an entire clothing system; such a
determination is likely beyond the capability of individual employees,
but is within an employer's capability. For example, Dr. Thomas Neal
testified:
[T]he only sure way [to obtain a rating for a layered clothing
system] is to measure the arc rating for the system. [I]t's not [a]
situation where you could have an arc rating for three different
layers that you put those on top of each other, just add them
together. That doesn't work. [Tr. 500]
In addition, as discussed later in this section of the preamble,
clothing maintenance can substantially impact the ability of FR and
arc-rated clothing to protect employees. Employers are in a better
position to make purchasing decisions based on clothing maintenance
needs than employees.
While considerations regarding clothing selection and maintenance
address principally arc-rated clothing, the Agency believes that
requiring employers to purchase arc-rated but not FR clothing would cut
too fine a line through OSHA's rationale. It is OSHA's understanding
that most FR clothing, especially work clothing, has an arc rating (Tr.
545), and the Agency believes that employers will use arc-rated
clothing (which is always flame-resistant) to meet the requirement in
final paragraph (g)(4) for FR clothing. In this regard, it seems
unlikely that employers will purchase one set of clothing to meet final
paragraph (g)(4) and a different set of clothing to meet final
paragraph (g)(5).
Some employers recommended that OSHA exempt clothing of various
types, or having a specified minimum arc rating, from any requirement
that employers pay for FR or arc-rated clothing. (See, for example,
Exs. 0125, 0149, 0167; Tr. 295-297.) For instance, Mr. Ward Andrews
with Wilson Construction recommended that employees come to the job in
a minimum level of protective clothing and that employers pay for any
higher level of protection needed for a particular exposure (Tr. 295-
297). He justified his recommendation as follows:
[I]t is our belief that journeyman linemen should come to work
with basic tools. And we believe a Level one FR garment would be a
basic tool to do his everyday task.
[O]ur position is that they should come to work with those basic
tools. And that is the minimum level one protection for the average
distributional circuit here in America.
* * * * *
So we agree that at level one, basic [attire] should be
clothing, as part of their job requirement, to step on. And then as
they associate a job with hazards, and a higher level of protection
needs to be provided, then surely that contractor should provide
those additional levels.
[W]e look [at] a journeyman lineman today, and we realize that
he brings in his climbing belt, his positioning belt, his skid, his
line boots. I believe that his positioning belt falls under--his
line belt is a positioning belt, which is considered personal
protective equipment. They provide that as tool that they bring to
the job. So once again, I think that's evidence to--the same thing
as a shirt, a very basic component that they should wear as
journeyman lineman.
They provide their own raingear. They provide their own clothing
right now. Your rule as proposed would say the most outer garment
should be FR resistant. I believe that these basic tools that they
now require, they should still provide, and you should give them
time to buy FR raingear and clothes. [Tr. 295-297]
This argument is identical to the argument made for tools of the
trade. In the PPE-payment rulemaking, OSHA rejected that argument for
tools of the trade, as described earlier, and the Agency rejects this
argument as it applies to FR and arc-rated clothing for the same
reasons.
For the foregoing reasons, OSHA determined that employers must
provide FR and arc-rated clothing at no cost to employees, and OSHA is
not exempting this protective clothing from the PPE-payment rule. The
requirements in Sec. Sec. 1910.132(h) and 1926.95(d) apply to FR and
arc-rated clothing; and, therefore, OSHA is not adding PPE-payment
provisions to Sec. 1910.269 or Subpart V.\386\
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\386\ OSHA does not consider the FR and arc-rated clothing
required by this final rule to be the type of everyday or ordinary
clothing exempted from the PPE-payment rules in Sec. Sec. 1910.132
and 1926.95.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some employees performing work covered by this final rule may
already own FR or arc-rated clothing. The PPE-payment requirements in
Sec. Sec. 1910.132(h)(6) and 1926.95(d)(6) provide that, when an
employee provides adequate protective equipment that he or she owns,
the employer may allow the employee to use it and need not reimburse
the employee for the equipment. However, those provisions also prohibit
the employer from requiring an employee to provide or pay for his or
her own PPE, unless the PPE-payment requirement exempts the PPE.
Accordingly, paragraph (h)(6) of Sec. 1910.132 and paragraph (d)(6) of
Sec. 1926.95 apply to the FR and arc-rated clothing required by this
final rule.
Maintenance of FR and arc-rated clothing. Some rulemaking
participants stressed the importance of proper maintenance of the FR
and arc-rated clothing required by the standard (Exs. 0130, 0186, 0325;
Tr. 830-831, 834-839). For example, NIOSH stated that "[c]lothing
maintenance is required for arc-rated FR clothing to provide continued
protection at its rated arc thermal performance value" (Ex. 0130). Mr.
Eric Frumin with UNITE HERE testified:
Regarding the FR uniform programs in which the employees wash
the garments themselves, there are number of factors that make it
difficult or impossible for employees themselves to preserve the FR
characteristics of the garments, contamination of the garment,
inadequate training about the proper care of the garment, how do you
maintain the physical integrity of it, the proper materials to use
for repairing defects, proper laundering techniques, what kinds of
cleaning agents or bleaching agents to avoid and so forth.
And of course maintaining a proper number of garments to be
available so that workers always have them. . . .
A number of these problems are mentioned in the standard, [ASTM]
1449 and recommends the use of professional laundering services.
Likewise NIOSH in its comments for this hearing said, "The emphasis
that manufacturers place on proper laundering to maintain the FR
characteristics of their garment suggests the need for professional
laundering." So these are important things for OSHA to be mindful
of as far as possibly assur[ing] that quality of the FR garments is
maintained even when employees are washing the garments themselves.
Now I would like to address that question of maintenance of
consistent high quality laundering of FR clothing. Employers have a
critical role to play here and that's envisioned in the ASTM
standard. Likewise, NFPA 70E talks about the need specifically for
careful inspection of clothing and kinds of interferences,
contamination, damage and takes the position that defective clothing
shall not be used. Very important. [Tr. 835-836]
Mr. Frumin cited two examples of a contract uniform service that failed
to properly maintain the FR clothing they serviced (Tr. 836-838). Mr.
John Devlin with the Utility Workers Union of America also described
examples of inadequate maintenance of FR clothing:
This shirt was sent in several times and it continually came back
with a hole that was never repaired even though it was requested
twice. These pants were sent out twice with the repair tag for the
frayed bottoms of the trousers to be either shortened or repaired in
some manner. The answer that Cintas did was they sent back a pair of
new trousers. The only problem there was no belt loops. [Tr. 821]
Mr. Frumin urged OSHA to "require . . . employers to obtain with each
delivery a certification from their suppliers that the correct number
of garments has been provided, that they
are free of defects and contamination that could compromise the FR
protection" (Tr. 838).
The record indicates that there are a variety of methods currently
in use to maintain FR and arc-rated clothing. Some employers have their
employees launder and maintain this clothing. (See, for example, Tr.
305-306, 1192--1193.) Other employers hire laundering or uniform
services to perform those functions. (See, for example, Tr. 388, 821.)
OSHA stresses that Sec. Sec. 1910.132(a) and (b) and 1926.95(a) and
(b) require employers to properly maintain FR and arc-rated clothing
required by this final rule. These provisions make PPE maintenance the
responsibility of employers, not employees. The Agency is declining to
adopt Mr. Frumin's suggestion to require employers to have suppliers
certify that each delivery of FR clothing is free of defects and
contamination because OSHA believes that it is the employer's
responsibility to ensure proper maintenance of PPE. There are ways of
ensuring proper maintenance of FR and arc-rated clothing that do not
rely on the certification of a supplier. For example, employers can
inspect this clothing before accepting it, and they can return it to
the supplier if they find defects or contaminants on the clothing. In
any event, the responsibility for maintaining PPE rests squarely with
the employer under existing OSHA standards.
The Agency is not prohibiting home laundering of FR and arc-rated
clothing. However, to comply with Sec. 1910.132 or Sec. 1926.95,
employers cannot simply instruct employees to follow manufacturers'
instructions.\387\ If employers rely on home laundering of the
clothing, they must train their employees in proper laundering
procedures and techniques, and employers must inspect the clothing on a
regular basis to ensure that it is not in need of repair or
replacement. Evidence in the record indicates that some employers
already are performing these functions. (See, for example, Tr. 1193.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\387\ See also a memorandum from Richard E. Fairfax, Director,
Directorate of Enforcement Programs, and Steven Witt, Director,
Directorate of Cooperative and State Programs, dated March 19, 2010,
detailing OSHA's enforcement policy for flame-resistant clothing in
oil and gas drilling, well servicing, and production-related operations
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=27296.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protecting employees from flying debris from electric arcs. Two
rulemaking participants recommended that OSHA require protection from
flying debris that results from electric arcs (Exs. 0340, 0342, 0378;
Tr. 253-268, 274-283). Mr. Nestor Kolcio with 2K Consultants argued
that a substantial number of injuries result from the flying debris,
which he called "fragmentation" or "shrapnel," released in an
electric arc-flash incident (Ex. 0342). Using OSHA's preliminary
regulatory analysis as a baseline, he estimated that 17 injuries from
flying debris occur annually in work covered by the final rule (id.).
He stated that these injuries result from work activities such as
pulling fuses and end caps, working on dead-front transformers,
installing lightning arresters, and operating load-break switches
(id.). Mr. Jim Stillwagon with Gary Guard described injuries that
occurred from flying debris caused by electric arcs, including an eye
injury and a chest injury in which debris "settled in the [worker's]
aort[ic] valve" (Tr. 276-280). Mr. Kolcio and Mr. Stillwagon
recommended that OSHA require protection, in the form of shields on
live-line tools, from injuries caused by flying debris resulting from
electric arcs that occur when employees are using live-line tools (Tr.
268, 274-275). Mr. Kolcio also noted that the existence of IEEE and
ASTM standards covering these shields, as well as various scientific
papers, indicated the need for such protection (Tr. 265-267).
OSHA agrees with Messrs. Kolcio and Stillwagon that electric arcs
pose hazards in addition to the thermal hazards addressed by the final
rule. Dr. Mary Capelli-Schellpfeffer testified that electric arcs can
result in "sprayed or blown hot or melting installation elements,
moved by the mechanical forces in the electric arc event" (Tr. 187).
Also, NFPA 70E-2004 warned that "[d]ue to the explosive effect of some
arc events, physical trauma injuries could occur" (Ex. 0134; emphasis
added).\388\ OSHA expects that the hazard analysis required by
paragraph (g)(1) in the final rule will identify nonthermal hazards,
including physical trauma hazards posed by flying debris, associated
with employee exposure to electric arcs. Although the final rule does
not address these hazards, OSHA's existing general PPE requirements,
for example, Sec. Sec. 1910.132 and 1926.95, require employers to
address them. Those standards require employers to provide shields and
barriers necessary to protect employees from physical trauma hazards.
However, as noted by NFPA 70E, not all arc events pose physical trauma
hazards from flying debris; therefore, this protection will not always
be necessary, and the Agency concludes that this final rule does not
have to address these hazards further.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\388\ NFPA 70E-2012 contains the same warning in Informational
Note No. 1 to Section 130.7(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Compliance deadlines for certain provisions in paragraph (g). The
final rule includes a new paragraph (g)(6) setting a compliance
deadline of January 1, 2015, for the requirement in paragraph (g)(2)
that the employer make reasonable estimates of incident energy and a
compliance deadline of April 1, 2015, for: (1) the requirement in
paragraph (g)(4)(iv) that the employer ensure that the outer layer of
clothing worn by an employee is flame-resistant when the estimated
incident heat energy exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\ and (2) the requirement in
paragraph (g)(5) that the employer ensure that each employee exposed to
hazards from electric arcs wears the necessary arc-rated protection.
These deadlines are described more fully in Section XII, Dates, later
in this preamble.
Fuse handling, covered conductors, non-current-carrying metal
parts, and opening circuits under load. The remaining provisions in
final Sec. 1926.960 deal with handling fuses, covered (noninsulated)
conductors, non-current-carrying metal parts, and opening and closing
circuits under load. To protect employees from contacting energized
parts, paragraph (h) of final Sec. 1926.960 requires employers to
ensure that employees installing and removing fuses use tools or gloves
rated for the appropriate voltage if one or both terminals are
energized at over 300 volts or if exposed parts are energized at more
than 50 volts. When an expulsion fuse operates on a fault or overload,
the arc from the fault current reacts with an agent in the tube. This
reaction produces hot gas that blasts the arc through the fuse tube
vent or vents, and with it any loose material in its path. The arc
blast or particles blown by the blast could injure employees' eyes.
Employers must ensure that employees do not install or remove such
fuses using rubber insulating gloves alone. Therefore, final paragraph
(h) also requires employees installing or removing expulsion-type fuses
with one or both terminals energized at more than 300 volts to wear eye
protection, use a tool rated for the voltage, and be clear of the fuse
barrel's exhaust path. (See, also, the discussion of protection from
flying debris under the summary and explanation for paragraph (g) of
the final rule earlier in this section of the preamble.) OSHA adopted
this paragraph, which has no counterpart in existing Subpart V, from
existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(7).
Proposed paragraph (h) provided that employees use eye protection
only during expulsion fuse installation. Mr.
Nestor Kolcio presented data indicating that employees sustained
injuries associated with electric arcs when the employees were
removing, as well as installing, fuses or end caps (Ex. 0342). As noted
earlier, Mr. Kolcio recommended that the standard require employees to
be protected from flying debris associated with electric arcs.
Based on Mr. Kolcio's data, OSHA concludes that protection from the
material expelled from expulsion-type fuses is necessary for employees
removing, as well as installing, them. Therefore, final paragraph (h)
requires the same protection for employees removing expulsion-type
fuses as for employees installing such fuses.
The Virginia, Maryland and Delaware Association of Electric
Cooperatives recommended that this paragraph include the term "live-
line tool" to make it clear that the provision was not requiring a
special tool designed specifically for handling fuses (Ex. 0175).
A live-line tool is one type of insulated tool. Paragraph (h) of
the final rule permits fuse handling with any type of insulated tool,
including a live-line tool. This provision was clear in the proposed
rule. Therefore, OSHA is not adopting the recommendation from the
Virginia, Maryland and Delaware Association of Electric Cooperatives.
Final paragraph (i) explains that the requirements of Sec.
1926.960 that pertain to the hazards of exposed live parts also apply
when employees perform work in proximity to covered (noninsulated)
conductors. That is, the final standard treats covered conductors as
uninsulated. (See the definition of "covered conductor" in final
Sec. 1926.968.) The covering on this type of wire protects the
conductor from the weather, but does not provide adequate insulating
value. OSHA took this provision, which has no counterpart in existing
Subpart V, from existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(8). The Agency received no
comments on this provision and is adopting it with only editorial
changes from the proposal.
Final paragraph (j) requires that non-current-carrying metal parts
of equipment or devices be treated as energized at the highest voltage
to which those parts are exposed unless the employer inspects the
installation and determines that the parts are grounded. Grounding
these parts, whether by permanent grounds or by the installation of
temporary grounds, provides protection against ground faults and
minimizes the possibility that non-current-carrying metal parts of
equipment and devices will become energized. OSHA based this
requirement, which has no counterpart in existing Subpart V, on
existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(9). OSHA received no comments on this
provision and is adopting it in the final rule without substantive
change from the proposal.
Paragraph (k) in the proposed rule provided that employers ensure
the use of devices designed to interrupt the current involved to open
circuits under load conditions. This proposed requirement had no
counterpart in existing Subpart V; OSHA adopted it from existing Sec.
1910.269(l)(10).
The Ameren Corporation requested that OSHA clarify that this
provision only applies to switches and breakers (Ex. 0209). Ameren
believed that this interpretation was consistent with the 1994
rulemaking record for existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(10) (id.). In that
rulemaking, OSHA explained the rationale for this provision as follows:
The National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) urged
OSHA to add a requirement for opening circuits under load only with
devices intended to interrupt current (Ex. 3-81). Edison Electric
Institute recommended adoption of a similar requirement (Ex. 28).
The Agency agrees with EEI and NEMA that it is hazardous to open a
circuit with a device that is not designed to interrupt current if
that circuit is carrying current. Non-load-break switches used to
open a circuit while it is carrying load current could fail
catastrophically, severely injuring or killing any nearby employee.
Therefore, OSHA has adopted a requirement that devices used to open
circuits under load conditions be designed to interrupt the current
involved . . . . [59 FR 4390]
The Agency disagrees with Ameren that this provision applies only
to switches and circuit breakers. The preamble to the 1994 rulemaking
mentioned non-load-break switches as an example of a type of device
that could fail catastrophically. However, the rationale and the rule
apply similarly to any device that is not capable of interrupting load
current. In addition, a similar provision in the 2002 NESC, quoted in
the next paragraph, applies to "switches, circuit breakers, or other
devices." The OSHA provision applies to other devices in addition to
switches and circuit breakers. Therefore, OSHA is not adopting the
change requested by Ameren.
IBEW recommended that OSHA expand proposed paragraph (k) to cover
devices used to pick up load or close circuits (Ex. 0230). Rule 443E of
the 2002 NESC \389\ supports IBEW's position; the NESC provision
addresses the opening and closing of circuits under load as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\389\ The 2012 NESC contains the same requirement in Rule 443E.
When equipment or lines are to be disconnected from any source
of electric energy for the protection of employees, the switches,
circuit breakers, or other devices designated and designed for
operation under the load involved at sectionalizing points shall be
opened or disconnected first. When re-energizing, the procedure
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
shall be reversed. [Ex. 0077]
OSHA recognizes that closing a circuit onto a load poses the same
hazards as opening a circuit under load. In either case, heavy current
can cause a device to fail if the design of that device is not such
that it can safely interrupt or pick up load current. Therefore, OSHA
is adopting IBEW's recommendation by adding a new paragraph (k)(2),
that reads as follows: "The employer shall ensure that devices used by
employees to close circuits under load conditions are designed to
safely carry the current involved." OSHA is adopting proposed
paragraph (k) without substantive change as paragraph (k)(1) in the
final rule.
12. Section 1926.961, Deenergizing Lines and Equipment for Employee
Protection
Section 1926.961 of the final rule addresses the deenergizing of
electric transmission and distribution lines and equipment for the
protection of employees. Transmission and distribution systems are
different from other energy systems found in general industry or in the
electric utility industry. The hazardous energy control methods for
these systems are necessarily different from the methods covered under
the general industry standard on the control of hazardous energy
sources (Sec. 1910.147). As explained in the preamble to the 1994
final rule on existing Sec. 1910.269, electric utilities install
transmission and distribution lines and equipment outdoors;
consequently, these lines and equipment are subject to reenergization
by means other than normal energy sources (59 FR 4390). For example,
lightning can strike a line and energize a deenergized conductor, or
unknown cogeneration sources not under the control of the employer can
energize a line. Additionally, some deenergized transmission and
distribution lines are subject to reenergization by induced voltage
from nearby energized conductors or by contact with other energized
sources of electrical energy. Another difference is that energy control
devices often are remote from the worksite and are frequently under the
centralized control of a system operator.
For these reasons, OSHA is adopting requirements for the control of
hazardous energy sources related to transmission and distribution
systems. This is the same approach used in existing Sec. 1910.269. In
this regard, OSHA developed the requirements proposed in Sec. 1926.961
from existing Sec. 1910.269(m). Existing Subpart V also contains
procedures for deenergizing transmission and distribution
installations. OSHA discusses the differences between existing Sec.
1926.950(b)(2) and (d) and final Sec. 1926.961 later in this preamble.
OSHA is promulgating paragraph (a) of the final rule without change
from the proposal. Final paragraph (a) describes the application of
Sec. 1926.961 and explains that conductors and equipment that have not
been deenergized under the procedures specified by Sec. 1926.961 have
to be treated as energized.
Ms. Susan O'Connor with Siemens Power Generation recommended that
OSHA require that live parts be deenergized "unless the employer can
demonstrate that deenergizing introduces additional or increased
hazards or is infeasible due to equipment design or operational
limitations" (Ex. 0163).
It is true that other OSHA standards that protect employees from
hazardous energy (such as the general industry lockout-tagout standard
at Sec. 1910.147 and the electrical lockout and tagging requirements
at Sec. 1910.333(a)(1) and (b)(2)) generally require employers to
deenergize energy sources. OSHA nevertheless rejects Ms. O'Connor's
recommendation because there is insufficient information in the record
to determine whether the recommendation is economically or
technologically feasible. First, Ms. O'Conner did not include
information in her comment on whether deenergizing transmission and
distribution lines and equipment would be economically and
technologically feasible. Second, Federal and local government agencies
regulate the reliability of electric power systems, thereby limiting
electric utilities' ability to deenergize transmission and distribution
circuits.\390\ Finally, the record in this rulemaking demonstrates
that: (1) Electric utilities and their contractors routinely work on
energized lines and equipment and (2) deenergizing transmission and
distribution circuits can involve significant cost and practicability
issues. (See, for example, Exs. 0573.1, 0575.1.) For instance, EEI
stated that "[p]lanning and scheduling for an outage [on a
transmission circuit] can require as little as 1 month and 3 day
notification to as long as 6 months and 3 days depending on the outage
length" (Ex. 0575.1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\390\ For example, section 215 of the Federal Power Act, 16
U.S.C. 824o, requires a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission-
certified Electric Reliability Organization to develop mandatory and
enforceable reliability standards, which are subject to review and
approval by the Commission. Electric utilities ultimately must meet
those reliability standards. (See also 18 CFR Part 40; Ex. 0545.1.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some systems are under the direction of a central system operator
who controls all switching operations. Other systems (mostly
distribution installations) are not under any centralized control.
Electric utilities energize and deenergize these systems in the field
without the direct intervention of a system operator. Paragraph (b)(1)
of the final rule states that employers must designate one employee in
the crew as being in charge of the clearance and must comply with all
of the requirements of paragraph (c) if a system operator is in charge
of the lines and equipment and of their means of disconnection.
(Paragraph (c), which OSHA discusses in detail later, sets procedures
that employers must follow when deenergizing lines and equipment.) OSHA
is adopting final paragraph (b)(1) as proposed with one clarification.
This provision in the final rule makes clear that the employer must
designate the employee in charge of the clearance. Final paragraph
(c)(1) requires the "designated" employee in charge to request the
clearance, and final paragraph (b)(2) (described in the next paragraph
in this preamble) requires the employer to designate the employee in
charge when there is no system operator. OSHA included an explicit
requirement in final paragraph (b)(1) that the employer designate the
employee in charge when there is a system operator to clarify that
designating the employee in charge is the employer's responsibility
whether or not there is a system operator.
Final paragraph (b)(2), which is also being adopted without
substantive change from the proposal, sets requirements for crews
working on lines or equipment that are not under the control of a
system operator.\391\ When final paragraph (b)(2) applies, the employer
must designate one employee on the crew to be in charge of the
clearance. In this case, final paragraph (b)(2) provides that, except
as provided in final paragraph (b)(3), all of the requirements in final
paragraph (c) apply and provides that the employee in charge of the
clearance perform the functions that the system operator would
otherwise perform.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\391\ If there are multiple circuits involved with some lines or
equipment under the control of a system operator and the others not
under system-operator control, the lines or equipment that are under
the control of a system operator fall under paragraph (b)(1), and
the ones that are not under such control fall under paragraph
(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final paragraph (b)(3) exempts a portion of the requirements of
final paragraph (c) from applying to work performed by a single crew of
employees if the means of disconnection of the lines and equipment are
accessible and visible to, and under the sole control of, the employee
in charge of the clearance. The provisions of final paragraph (c) that
do not apply are those relating to: (1) Requesting the system operator
to deenergize the lines and equipment (final paragraph (c)(1)), (2)
automatic and remote control of the lines (final paragraph (c)(3)), and
(3) the wording on tags (final paragraph (c)(5)). Final paragraph
(b)(3) also provides that employers need not use the tags required by
the remaining provisions of final paragraph (c).\392\ It is not
necessary to request the system operator to deenergize the lines or
equipment because he or she would not be in control of the
disconnecting means for the lines or equipment. When paragraph (b)(3)
applies, employers do not need tags for the protection of the crew
because only one person would be in charge of the clearance for the
crew, and the means of disconnection for the lines or equipment would
be accessible and visible to, and under the control of, that person.
Finally, OSHA exempted the provision addressing remote and automatic
switching of lines and equipment because, again, the means of
disconnection must be accessible and visible to, and under the sole
control of, the employee in charge of the clearance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\392\ The proposed rule was similar, except that it exempted an
additional provision, proposed paragraph (c)(11), which addressed
the removal of tags. In the final rule, the corresponding provision,
in paragraph (c)(12), clarifies that "[n]o one may remove tags
without the release of the associated clearance as specified under
paragraphs (c)(10) and (c)(11) of this section." Even though final
paragraph (b)(3) does not require tags, when that paragraph applies,
final paragraph (c)(12) should not be exempted. It is important that
members of a crew not remove tags that are placed for the protection
of other crews.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final paragraph (b)(4) addresses work situations in which a group
of employees consists of several "crews" of employees working on the
same lines or equipment. Final paragraph (b)(4)(i) provides that
employers may treat these crews as a single crew when they are under
the direction of a single employee in charge of the clearance for all
of the crews and they are working in a coordinated manner to accomplish
a task on the same lines or equipment. In such cases, the employer must
ensure
that employees coordinate all operations that could energize or
deenergize a circuit through a single employee in charge, as required
in final paragraphs (b) and (c). OSHA notes that, if paragraph
(b)(4)(i) does not apply, employers must treat the crews as independent
crews (see the discussion of final paragraph (b)(4)(ii) in the
following paragraph), and each independent crew must have an employee
in charge, as required by final paragraphs (b) and (c).\393\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\393\ OSHA notes that this interpretation of the word "crew"
applies only to Sec. 1926.961(b)(3). The interpretation does not
apply to other provisions in the final rule addressing the work of
two or more crews.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final paragraph (b)(4)(ii) provides for the situation in which more
than one independent crew is working on the same line or equipment.
Under the final rule, in such circumstances: (1) Each crew must follow
separately the steps outlined in final paragraph (c); and, (2) if there
is no system operator in charge of the lines or equipment, each crew
must have separate tags and coordinate deenergizing and reenergizing
the lines and equipment with the other crews. The purpose of the
provision is to ensure that a group of workers does not make faulty
assumptions about what steps another group took or will take to
deenergize and reenergize lines or equipment.
OSHA adopted the provisions in final paragraph (b)(4)(ii), which
require each independent crew to comply independently with paragraph
(c) and each crew to coordinate deenergizing and reenergizing the lines
or equipment with the other crews if there is no system operator in
charge of the lines or equipment, from proposed paragraph (b)(3)(ii).
Final paragraph (b)(4)(i), and the provision in final paragraph
(b)(4)(ii) requiring a separate tag for each crew if there is no system
operator in charge of the lines or equipment, are new provisions that
were not in the proposal. OSHA is adopting the new provisions after
examining comments on whether the standard should require each crew to
have a separate tag.
Several commenters argued that separate tags for each crew are
unnecessary (Exs. 0126, 0175, 0177, 0201, 0209, 0220, 0227). These
commenters maintained that crews working on the same circuits typically
coordinate their activities and work under a single person with
authority over the clearance. For example, Duke Energy stated:
Multiple crew tagging could create confusion and will result in
insufficient coordination between the crews. If one person is in
charge of multiple crews in a work group, one tag is sufficient for
that group of crews. If each crew has a person placing tags, the
probability of error increases. If a single tag is applied, then the
employee in charge will be responsible to verify that it is placed
correctly. Considering multiple crews working in a coordinated
manner as one crew for the purpose of tagging ensures that the
employee in charge will maintain control over the entire situation.
Multiple tagging complicates coordination of the work effort. [Ex.
0201]
Other commenters stated that when multiple crews work
independently, without a single employee responsible for the clearance,
they should use separate tags for each crew (Exs. 0186, 0210, 0212,
0219, 0225, 0230). For example, Mr. Anthony Ahern with the Ohio Rural
Electric Cooperatives commented:
Every independent crew working on a line that is protected by
the same disconnect device should have their own tag in place. This
is particularly important in storm or emergency restoration work. It
is simply too easy to lose track of crews, even with a system
[operator]. If each crew tags the disconnect, then it simply is not
allowed to be operated until all crews remove their tags. This is
the only real way to ensure that everyone is accounted for and in
the clear. There could be a procedure where a crew could grant
someone else permission to remove their tag if they were a long
distance away and it would require an extended amount of time for
them to go back to the disconnect location. But because they did
have a tag at the disconnect they were still contacted and accounted
for. This should also be a requirement for line-clearance tree-
crews. Quite often they are working on clearing a section of line
and other line crews don't know they are there. [Ex. 0186]
Southern Company commented:
We agree that when two independent crews are working under a
system operator that each crew should have their own clearance but a
single tag issued by the system operator is sufficient. . . . There
may be situations where the "independent" crews do not want to
coordinate their activities. The standard should require in those
situations that each independent crew have their own tag on the
lines or equipment. [Ex. 0212]
After considering these comments, OSHA concludes that employers may
treat crews working in a coordinated manner under a single employee
holding the clearance as a single crew. Such crews act as a single
crew, and the Agency believes that requiring separate tags would not
increase worker safety. OSHA drafted final paragraph (b)(4)(i)
accordingly.
In the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking, the Agency explained its
decision regarding the issue of whether employers must use separate
tags for independent crews as follows:
Three commenters stated that some utilities use one tag for all
crews involved, maintaining a log to identify each crew separately .
. . . They recommended that the standard allow this practice to
continue.
Paragraph (m)(3) of final 1910.269 does not require a separate
tag for each crew (nor did paragraph (m)(3) in the proposal); it
does require, however, separate clearances for each crew. There must
be one employee in charge of the clearance for each crew, and the
clearance for a crew is held by this employee. In complying with
paragraph (m)(3)(viii), the employer must ensure that no tag is
removed unless its associated clearances are released (paragraph
(m)(3)(xii)) and that no action is taken at a given point of
disconnection until all protective grounds have been removed, until
all crews have released their clearances, until all employees are
clear of the lines or equipment, and until all tags have been
removed at that point of disconnection (paragraph (m)(3)(xiii)). [59
FR 4393]
If a system operator controls clearances, employers may use a log
or other system to identify each crew working under a single tag (269-
Exs. 3-20, 3-27, 3-112). When each crew releases its clearance to the
system operator, that signals to the system operator that each employee
in the crew received notification that release of the clearance is
pending, that all employees in the crew are in the clear, and that all
protective grounds for the crew have been removed. (See final paragraph
(c)(10).) The system operator cannot take action to restore power
without the release of all clearances on a line or equipment. (See
final paragraphs (c)(12) and (c)(13).)
However, without a system operator, each independent crew would
have no way of knowing the exposure status of other crews without
separate tags. When the crews are truly independent and there is no
system operator, there would be no way to determine that all crew
members are clear of energized parts or that all the crew's protective
grounds have been removed unless each crew uses a separate tag.
Consequently, OSHA decided to adopt a requirement in final paragraph
(b)(4)(ii) that, whenever there is no system operator, each crew must
(1) have separate tags (this is a new provision not in the proposal)
and (2) coordinate deenergizing and reenergizing the lines or equipment
with other crews (OSHA adopted this provision from proposed paragraph
(b)(3)(ii)). Final paragraph (b)(4)(ii) also carries forward the
requirement from proposed paragraph (b)(3)(ii) that independent crews
independently comply with Sec. 1926.961 whether or not there is a
system operator.
It is apparent that commenters did not completely understand the
discussion of how the proposal treated separate
crews. Even though the preamble to the proposal indicated that OSHA
would treat separate crews coordinating their activities and operating
under a single employee in charge of the clearance as a single crew (70
FR 34871), several commenters appeared to believe that the Agency was
considering separate tags for each crew in such circumstances. (See,
for example, Exs. 0175, 0201.) Therefore, the final rule provides
separate requirements for (1) single crews working with the means of
disconnection under the sole control of the employee in charge of the
clearance (final paragraph (b)(3)), (2) multiple crews coordinating
their activities with a single employee in charge of the clearance for
all of the crews (final paragraph (b)(4)(i)), and (3) multiple crews
operating independently (final paragraph (b)(4)(ii)). This approach
should clarify the application of the final rule to multiple crews.
OSHA is adding new titles to final paragraphs (b)(3) and (b)(4) to
clarify their content. The title of final paragraph (b)(3) is "Single
crews working with the means of disconnection under the control of the
employee in charge of the clearance." Although this provision applies
to a single crew, OSHA limited its application to circumstances in
which the means of disconnection is accessible and visible to, and
under the sole control of, the employee in charge of the clearance. The
revised title makes this limitation clear. Thus, this paragraph applies
to a special subset of instances in which employees are working as a
single crew; it is not generally applicable.\394\
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\394\ Existing Sec. 1926.950(d) also recognizes deenergizing
procedures that are not generally applicable. These alternative
procedures, which apply when "[w]hen a crew working on a line or
equipment can clearly see that the means of disconnecting from
electric energy are visibly open or visibly locked-out," require:
(1) Guards or barriers to be installed to protect against contact
with adjacent lines (existing paragraph (d)(2)(i)), and (2) the
designated employee in charge, upon completion of work, to determine
that all employees in the crew are clear and that protective grounds
installed by the crew have been removed, and to report to the
designated authority that all tags protecting the crew may be
removed (existing paragraph (d)(2)(ii)). Unlike final Sec.
1926.961, existing Sec. 1926.950(d)(2) specifies no procedures for
deenergizing, testing, or grounding lines and equipment. OSHA
concluded in the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking that requirements
for deenergizing, testing, and grounding are necessary for employee
protection (59 FR 4390-4391). Therefore, OSHA concludes that the
existing alternative procedures are inadequate to ensure worker
safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, final paragraph (b)(4), pertaining to multiple crews,
applies unconditionally, whenever more than one crew is working on the
same lines or equipment. OSHA believes that the purpose of this
paragraph will be clearer under its own title, "Multiple crews." With
these new titles, the final rule clearly states the purposes of the
paragraphs and closely follows the procedures described in the
rulemaking record.
Paragraph (b)(5) of the final rule requires the employer to render
inoperable any disconnecting means that are accessible to individuals
not under the employer's control.\395\ For example, the employer must
render inoperable a switch handle mounted at the bottom of a utility
pole that is not on the employer's premises to ensure that the overhead
line remains deenergized. This requirement prevents a member of the
general public or an employee who is not under the employer's control
(such as an employee of a contractor) from closing the switch and
energizing the line. OSHA adopted this requirement, which has no
counterpart in existing Subpart V, from existing Sec.
1910.269(m)(2)(iv). OSHA received no comments on this provision, which
was proposed as paragraph (b)(4), and is adopting it substantially as
proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\395\ Note that this provision, unlike paragraph (c)(2),
requires employers to render disconnecting means inoperable
regardless of whether the design of the disconnecting means permits
this capability. When the design of the disconnecting means does not
permit this capability, employers then must install some additional
means, such as a lockable cover, to render the disconnecting means
inoperable when required under paragraph (b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (c) of the final rule sets forth the exact procedure for
deenergizing transmission and distribution lines and equipment.
Employers must follow the procedure in the order specified in paragraph
(c), as provided in paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2). Except as noted, the
rules are consistent with existing Sec. 1926.950(d)(1), although OSHA
took the language from existing Sec. 1910.269(m)(3).
Paragraph (c)(1) of the final rule requires an employee to request
the system operator to deenergize a particular section of line or
equipment.\396\ So that control is vested in one authority, a single
designated employee is assigned this task. The employer must assign
this task to a single designated employee to ensure that only one
employee is in charge of, and responsible for, the clearance for work.
OSHA adopted this provision, which has no counterpart in existing
Subpart V, from existing Sec. 1910.269(m)(3)(i). The designated
employee who requests the clearance need not be in charge of other
parts of the work; in the final rule, this designated employee is in
charge of the clearance. He or she is responsible for requesting the
clearance, for informing the system operator of changes in the
clearance (such as transfer of responsibility), and for ensuring that,
before the clearance is released, it is safe to reenergize the circuit.
OSHA received no comments on this provision and is adopting it
substantially as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\396\ If there is no system operator in charge of the lines or
equipment or their means of disconnection, the employer must ensure,
pursuant to final paragraph (b)(2), that the designated employee
performs the functions that the system operator would otherwise
perform. This means, with respect to final paragraph (c)(1), that
the employer must ensure that the designated employee takes
appropriate action to deenergize the particular section of line or
equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When an employee requests a clearance in advance, the employees who
will be performing the actual work would not necessarily have notice of
this request and would not be in position to answer questions about the
clearance. Therefore, if someone other than an employee at the worksite
requests a clearance and if that clearance is in place before the
employee arrives at the site, then that employee will need to transfer
the clearance, pursuant to final paragraph (c)(9), to an on-site
employee responsible for the work (such as an employee on the crew or a
supervisor for the crew).\397\ This transfer must occur before the work
begins so that the system operator can inform the on-site employees of
any alterations in the clearance. The Agency believes that the employee
holding the clearance must, after the system operator deenergizes the
lines and equipment, serve as the point of contact in case alterations
in the clearance, such as restrictions in the length or extent of the
outage, are necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\397\ Although the language in paragraph (c) does not state
explicitly that the employee in charge must be at the worksite, the
employee in charge is responsible, under paragraph (c)(10), for (1)
notifying each employee under his or her direction of the pending
release of the clearance, (2) ensuring that all employees on the
crew are clear of the lines and equipment, (3) ensuring the removal
of all protective grounds installed by the crew, (4) reporting this
information to the system operator, and (5) releasing the clearance.
Only an employee at the worksite can perform these functions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (c)(2) of the final rule requires the employer to open
all disconnecting means, such as switches, disconnectors, jumpers, and
taps, through which electrical energy could flow to the section of line
or equipment. This provision also requires the employer to render the
disconnecting means inoperable if the design of the device permits. For
example, the employer could detach the removable handle of a switch.
The final rule also requires that the disconnecting means
be tagged to indicate that employees are at work.
This paragraph ensures the disconnection of lines and equipment
from their sources of supply and protects employees against the
accidental reclosing of the switches. This rule requires the
disconnection of known sources of electric energy only. Employers
control hazards related to the presence of unexpected energy sources by
testing for voltage and grounding the circuit, as required by
paragraphs (c)(6) and (c)(7), respectively (see the discussion of these
provisions later in this section of the preamble).
OSHA adopted paragraph (c)(2) of the final rule from existing Sec.
1910.269(m)(3)(ii). Existing Subpart V has comparable requirements in
Sec. 1926.950(d)(1)(i), (d)(1)(ii)(a), and (d)(1)(ii)(b). The existing
provisions require: (1) The employer to identify and isolate the line
or equipment from sources of energy (paragraph (d)(1)(i)), and (2) each
designated employee in charge to notify and assure the employees on the
crew that all disconnecting means have been opened and tagged
(paragraphs (d)(1)(ii)(a) and (d)(1)(ii)(b)). OSHA believes that the
language in the final rule accurately reflects the steps taken by
employers to deenergize lines and equipment. OSHA received no comments
on this provision and is adopting it substantially as proposed.
Paragraph (c)(3) of the final rule requires the tagging of
automatically and remotely controlled switches. Employers also must
render inoperable an automatically or remotely controlled switch if the
design of the switch allows for it to be made inoperable. This
provision, which OSHA adopted from existing Sec. 1910.269(m)(3)(iii),
protects employees from injuries resulting from the automatic operation
of such switches. Existing Subpart V contains an equivalent requirement
in Sec. Sec. 1926.950(d)(1)(ii)(b) and (d)(1)(ii)(c). OSHA received no
comments on this provision and is adopting it substantially as
proposed.
The final rule contains a new exemption from the tagging
requirements of final paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) that was not in the
proposal. OSHA included this exemption in the final rule as paragraph
(c)(4).
Consolidated Edison Company of New York and EEI noted that the
compliance directive for existing Sec. 1910.269, CPL 02-01-038,
"Enforcement of the Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and
Distribution Standard" (June 18, 2003, originally CPL 2-1.38D;
hereafter, "CPL 02-01-038") addressed specific conditions under which
OSHA considered it a de minimis condition to leave network protectors
used to isolate network distribution lines from voltage untagged (Exs.
0157, 0227; Tr. 1111-1118). The two organizations requested that the
Agency incorporate the directive's language on network protectors into
the final rule. Consolidated Edison expressed this view as follows:
Under normal conditions, switches at the substation are used to
deenergize the primary conductors to the distribution transformers.
When the primary conductors become deenergized, . . . network
protectors operate to disconnect the secondary side of the
transformers and to prevent back feed from energizing the primary
conductors. The network protectors are automatic devices and are not
normally opened or closed manually.
OSHA inserted language into the Compliance Directive and made
not tagging a network protector to its associated network
transformer for work on the primary feeder . . . a "de minimis"
violation if certain conditions were met. . . We are requesting that
[an exception for network protectors be included in the standard]
and that the "de minimis" violation be eliminated. We recommend
the following language be included in the 269 standard:
"Network feeders utilizing low voltage network protectors, or
similarly designed devices, are considered isolated from all network
sources of supply when the associated feeder is removed from service
at the source station and verified as being de-energized, and
provided that the design of the protectors prevent operation of the
device when the supply feeder is de-energized." [Ex. 0157]
OSHA did not incorporate the recommended exemption into the
proposal because the Agency believed that the conditions permitted by
the directive were applicable to a single company, Consolidated Edison.
OSHA continues to believe that the preferred approach to protect
employees is to tag network protectors. However, the Agency's rationale
for considering it a de minimis condition not to tag network protectors
in certain circumstances remains viable. The directive describes the
operation of network protectors, the circumstances necessary for a de
minimis condition, and the Agency's rationale as follows:
Paragraph (m)(3)(ii) of [existing] Sec. 1910.269 requires all
switches, disconnectors, jumpers, taps, and other means through
which known sources of electric energy may be supplied to the
particular lines and equipment to be deenergized to be opened and
tagged. Paragraph (m)(3)(iii) requires automatically and remotely
controlled switches to be tagged at the point of control.
An AC network system consists of feeders, step-down
transformers, automatic reverse-current trip breakers called network
protectors, and the network grid of street mains. The network grid
is made up of a number of single conductor cables tied together at
street intersections to form a solid grid over the area they serve.
This grid is typically energized at 120/208 volts from the secondary
windings of the distribution transformers serving a particular area.
A network protector, placed between the secondary side of the
transformer and the secondary mains, is provided for each
transformer. The primary windings of the transformer are connected
to a feeder cable that is energized from a substation at voltages
ranging from 13 to 33 kilovolts. Each feeder cable is connected to
the substation through an automatic circuit breaker. . .
Network protectors are placed between the network transformer
and the secondary network to protect against reverse power flow
through the network transformer into the supply feeders. Reverse
power protection is necessary because fault current would continue
to flow into a short circuit in a network transformer or primary
feeder. Backfeed from the network grid would continue to flow into
the fault even after the primary feeder circuit breaker trips. The
other primary feeders would continue to supply power to their
network transformers, which are interconnected with the faulted
circuit through the network grid.
Under normal conditions, switches at the substation are used to
deenergize the primary conductors to the distribution transformers.
When the primary conductors become deenergized, the network
protectors operate to disconnect the secondary side of the
transformers and to prevent backfeed from energizing the primary
conductors. The network protectors are automatic devices and are not
normally opened or closed manually.
Not tagging a network protector to its associated network
transformer for work on the primary feeder is considered a de
minimis violation of Sec. 1910.269(m)(3)(ii) under the following
conditions:
a. The line is deenergized as otherwise required by paragraph
(m)(3)(ii);
b. Any switches or disconnecting means (other than network
protectors) used to deenergize the line are tagged as required by
paragraph (m)(3)(ii);
c. The line is tested to ensure that it is deenergized as
required by paragraph (m)(3)(v);
d. Grounds are installed as required by paragraph (m)(3)(vi);
e. The network protectors are maintained so that they will
immediately trip open if closed when a primary conductor is
deenergized;
f. The network protector cannot be manually placed in a closed
position without the use of tools, and any manual override position
must be blocked, locked, or otherwise disabled; and
g. The employer has procedures for manually overriding the
network protector that incorporates provisions for ensuring that the
primary conductors are energized before the protector is placed in a
closed position and for determining if the line is deenergized for
the protection of employees working on the line. [CPL 02-01-038;
emphasis included in original]
Figure 12 is a one-line diagram from the directive showing network
protectors, the primary conductors (primary voltage feeder), and the
extent of the deenergized area for lines connected to the network
protectors.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.016
OSHA decided to include in the final rule a provision that
duplicates the exempted conditions specified in the directive. In
issuing the directive, OSHA determined that leaving network protectors
untagged under these conditions was a de minimis condition, or a
condition having "no direct or immediate relationship to safety or
health" (29 U.S.C. 658(a)). Moreover, even if Consolidated Edison is
the only affected company, it does have a considerable number of
circuits and network protectors covered by the conditions listed in the
directive: "At Con Edison in any given one-year period over 5,000
feeders involving approximately 123,000 network protectors are worked
on using the procedures described [in the directive]" (Ex. 0157).
Therefore, the Agency decided to exempt network protectors from the
requirements for tags in paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) when the employer
can demonstrate that the following conditions are present:
1. Every network protector is maintained so that it will
immediately trip open if closed when a primary conductor is
deenergized;
2. Employees cannot manually place any network protector in a
closed position without the use of tools, and any manual override
position is blocked, locked, or otherwise disabled; and
3. The employer has procedures for manually overriding any network
protector that incorporate provisions for determining, before anyone
places a network protector in a closed position, that: (a) The line
connected to the network protector is not deenergized for the
protection of any employee working on the line and (b) (if the line
connected to the network protector is not deenergized for the
protection of any employee working on the line) the primary conductors
for the network protector are energized. (See Figure 12 for a depiction
of network protectors, the primary conductors (primary voltage feeder),
and the extent of the deenergized area for lines connected to the
network protectors.)
These three conditions are identical to the last three conditions
listed in the Sec. 1910.269 directive. OSHA is not including the first
four conditions listed in the directive as provisions in the exemption
because other provisions in the final rule already require these
conditions. Note that the exemption applies only to the network
protectors themselves. As required by paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) in
the final rule, employers must still tag any switches or disconnecting
means, other than the network protectors, used to deenergize lines or
equipment and any other automatically and remotely controlled switches
that could cause the opened disconnecting means to close.
OSHA stresses that it is including the network protector exemption
in the final rule only for the reasons stated here, that is, because
OSHA already concluded that leaving network protectors untagged under
the conditions now required by the
exemption is a de minimis condition. OSHA does not agree with the other
reasons provided by Consolidated Edison and EEI for incorporating the
exemption. For example, the Agency does not agree that tagging network
protectors would be extremely difficult or complex, as claimed by EEI
and Consolidated Edison (Exs. 0157, 0227). The Agency also does not
agree with EEI and Consolidated Edison that backfeed from the network
grid prevented by network protectors is an unexpected source of
electric energy. By design, such backfeed is an expected source of
electric energy. If such backfeed were not an expected source, the
network protector would not be necessary. Contrary to the claims made
by EEI and Consolidated Edison, OSHA made no contradictory statement in
the preamble to the 1994 rulemaking on existing Sec. 1910.269
regarding the disconnection of distribution transformers supplying
customer loads. In that preamble, OSHA stated only that employers did
not have to disconnect transformers if doing so would remove unknown
sources of electric energy only (59 FR 4392). OSHA expressly required
in the 1994 rulemaking (as in this rulemaking) that employers had to
disconnect expected sources of electric energy (id.).
In addition, in adopting the network-protector exemption, OSHA
decided not to use the language recommended by Consolidated Edison and
EEI because their recommended language addresses only the design of
network protectors and not the additional procedures required to ensure
worker safety when employees perform work on network protectors. OSHA
previously concluded, in issuing the directive, that these additional
procedures were necessary steps in ensuring employee safety when
employers leave network protectors untagged; the Agency reaffirms that
conclusion here.
In the notice extending the comment period on the proposal and
setting dates for a public hearing, OSHA requested comment on the issue
of whether the standard should include tagging requirements for systems
using supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) equipment (70 FR
59291).\398\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\398\ SCADA is a computer system for monitoring and controlling
equipment (in this case, electric power transmission and
distribution lines and equipment).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency received only three comments on this issue. One
commenter stated, "If OSHA adopts SCADA tagging requirements, it
should be as written in the . . . NESC" (Ex. 0201). Two other
commenters recommended that OSHA adopt the SCADA requirements in the
NESC (Exs. 0212, 0230). One of the commenters, IBEW, voiced its support
as follows:
[The NESC discusses] specific tagging activities utilizing
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) equipment . . .
SCADA switching is common place in the electric utility industry for
both deenergizing circuits and defeating automatic recloser
operation. Both of these actions have a direct impact on employee
safety and OSHA should at a minimum reference this section of the
NESC [Ex. 0230]
Rule 442E of the 2002 NESC includes the following provision: "When
the automatic reclosing feature of a reclosing device is disabled
during the course of work on energized equipment or circuits, a tag
shall be placed at the reclosing device location" (Ex. 0077; emphasis
added).\399\ The SCADA provisions in that consensus standard are in the
form of an exception to this tagging requirement (id.). Final Sec.
1926.961 does not contain a similar requirement for tagging reclosing
devices, as Sec. 1926.961 applies to deenergizing lines and equipment,
and not to work on energized lines and equipment. However, final
Subpart V provides requirements for disabling reclosing in paragraphs
(b)(3) and (c)(4) of Sec. 1926.964. In addition, employers may need to
disable automatic circuit reclosing as one measure in ensuring that the
maximum transient overvoltage does not exceed a specific value, as
required by the minimum approach-distance provisions of Sec.
1926.960(c)(1) and Table V-2. To disable automatic reclosing devices,
the employer will need to adopt measures that prevent reenabling the
automatic feature of these devices in addition to turning the feature
off. When the employer uses SCADA on a reclosing device, the employer
may follow the SCADA provisions in the NESC to ensure that the
reclosing feature remains disabled. However, the Agency believes that
there are other methods, such as tagging those controls, that employers
can use for the same purpose. Therefore, OSHA is not adopting the SCADA
rules from the 2002 NESC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\399\ The relevant provisions in the 2012 edition of the NESC
are identical.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (c)(5) of the final rule, which OSHA is adopting without
change from proposed paragraph (c)(4), requires that tags attached to
disconnecting means prohibit operation of the disconnecting means and
state that employees are at work. OSHA adopted this requirement from
existing Sec. 1910.269(m)(3)(iv). Existing Sec. 1926.950(d)(1)(ii)(b)
specifies that tags indicate that employees are working; however, it
does not require that the tags prohibit operation of the disconnecting
means. The Agency believes that it is essential for the tags to contain
this prohibition so that the meaning of the tag is clear.
Proposed paragraph (c)(5) would have required employers to test the
lines or equipment. This test would ensure that the lines or equipment
are deenergized and prevent accidents resulting from someone's opening
the wrong disconnect. It also would protect employees from hazards
associated with unknown sources of electric energy.
OSHA based proposed paragraph (c)(5) on existing Sec.
1910.269(m)(3)(v). Existing Sec. 1926.950(d)(1)(iii) requires the
employer to perform a test or a visual inspection to ensure that the
lines or equipment are deenergized. Employers cannot determine that a
line or equipment is deenergized by visual inspections alone because
voltage backfeed, induced current, and leakage current can energize
electric lines and equipment without the employee "seeing" it (Ex.
0041). Additionally, OSHA determined in the 1994 Sec. 1910.269
rulemaking that visual inspection instead of testing was not sufficient
for this purpose because of evidence about lack of testing causing
accidents (59 FR 4393; 269-Exs. 3-107, 9-2, 12-12). Therefore, OSHA
proposed to require a test, rather than a visual inspection, to
determine whether the lines or equipment are energized. OSHA adopts
that requirement in the final rule as final paragraph (c)(6).
In the proposed rule, OSHA did not specify the type of test;
however, the preamble to the proposal stated that the Agency expects
employers to use testing procedures that will indicate reliably whether
the part in question is energized (70 FR 34872). OSHA stated in the
preamble to the proposal that using a voltage detector on the part
would be acceptable for this purpose (id.). OSHA requested comments on
when and if methods such as "fuzzing" a line are acceptable. The
preamble to the proposal explained that "fuzzing," or "buzzing," a
line involves using a live-line tool to hold a wrench or similar tool
near a line and listening for the buzzing sound emitted as the tool
approaches a circuit part energized at a high voltage (id.). OSHA
requested comments on this issue because two OSHA letters of
interpretation, which addressed a similar requirement in existing Sec.
1910.269(n)(5), recognized the fuzzing or buzzing method of checking
lines for voltage. (See the August 23, 1995, letter to Mr. Enoch F.
Nicewarner
and the October 18, 1995, letter to Mr. Lonnie Bell.\400\)
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\400\ The Nicewarner letter is available at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21897.
The Bell letter is available at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21981.
(After the effective date of the final rule, the Nicewarner letter
will not be available on the Internet, and OSHA will edit the Bell
letter to remove the response to the question on fuzzing.)
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OSHA decided that fuzzing, or buzzing, will not be an acceptable
testing method under the final rule. The preamble to the proposal noted
that this method has obvious disadvantages when ambient noise levels
are excessive and is only reliable above certain voltage levels (70 FR
34872; see also 269-Ex. 8-5). Moreover, rulemaking participants
universally opposed recognizing the fuzzing method of checking lines
for voltage. (See, for example, Exs. 0155, 0162, 0175, 0213, 0220,
0227, 0230; Tr. 882-884, 1238.) Several rulemaking participants
reported incidents involving failure to detect voltage using this
method (Exs. 0213, 0220; Tr. 947-948). Some commenters recommended
requiring devices specifically designed as voltage detectors (Exs.
0186, 0213, 0230; Tr. 1238).
To implement its decision, OSHA modified the language of the
requirement proposed in paragraph (c)(5) so that employers must perform
the test "with a device designed to detect voltage." Such devices
include voltage detectors meeting ASTM F1796-09 Standard Specification
for High Voltage Detectors--Part 1 Capacitive Type to be Used for
Voltages Exceeding 600 Volts AC (Ex. 0480).\401\ OSHA is adopting this
requirement in paragraph (c)(6) in the final rule. The final rule also
replaces the proposed term "employee in charge of the work" with
"employee in charge" for consistency with the rest of final paragraph
(c). The designated employee in charge of the clearance need not be a
supervisor or be responsible for the work. The employee in charge need
only be responsible for the clearance.
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\401\ ASTM F1796-09 is an updated version of ASTM F1796-97
(2002), which IBEW cited in Ex. 0480. OSHA reviewed both documents
and determined that devices meeting either ASTM standard are
acceptable for use in meeting paragraph (c)(6) of the final rule.
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Final paragraph (c)(7), which OSHA is adopting without substantive
change from proposed paragraph (c)(6), requires the installation of any
protective grounds required by Sec. 1926.962. Installation of
protective grounds must occur after employees deenergize and test the
lines or equipment in accordance with the previous provisions; at this
point, it is safe to install a protective ground. OSHA based this
requirement on existing Sec. 1910.269(m)(3)(vi). Paragraph (d)(1)(iv)
of existing Sec. 1926.950 contains an equivalent requirement.
Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI recommended that OSHA reword this
provision to refer to "temporary protective grounding equipment"
rather than "protective grounds" (Ex. 0155). He noted that his
recommendation is consistent with the terminology used in ASTM F855,
Standard Specifications for Temporary Protective Grounds to Be Used on
De-energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment. He made the same
recommendation with respect to other provisions of the proposal, such
as proposed Sec. 1926.962(c).
OSHA decided not to use the term recommended by Mr. Erga. ASTM
F855-04 covers "the equipment making up the temporary grounding system
used on de-energized electric power lines, electric supply stations,
and equipment" (Ex. 0054).\402\ The term "protective grounds," as
used in final Subpart V and Sec. 1910.269, encompasses more than just
the equipment covered by the ASTM standard. For instance, employers can
use permanent (that is, fixed) grounding equipment as part of a
protective grounding system. Moreover, the protective grounding system
also includes the "ground" itself, that is, the device to which
employees attach the grounding equipment to bring deenergized parts to
ground potential. Therefore, OSHA is adopting the language in the
proposal.
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\402\ The most recent edition of that consensus standard, ASTM
F855-09, uses identical language to describe its scope.
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After an employer follows the seven previous provisions of final
paragraph (c), final paragraph (c)(8) permits the lines or equipment to
be treated as deenergized. OSHA based this provision, which OSHA is
adopting without substantive change from proposed paragraph (c)(7) and
which has no counterpart in existing Subpart V, on existing Sec.
1910.269(m)(3)(vii).\403\
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\403\ As noted earlier in this preamble, under the summary and
explanation for final Sec. 1926.960(b)(2), existing Sec.
1926.950(b)(2) requires electric equipment and lines to be
considered as energized until determined to be deenergized by tests
or other appropriate means. The existing rule is insufficient to
protect employees because employers cannot rely on a simple test for
a deenergized condition to ensure that lines and equipment remain
deenergized. OSHA concludes that final Sec. 1926.961 contains the
appropriate procedures for treating lines and equipment as
deenergized.
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Mr. Erga also commented on this provision in the proposed rule,
recommending that the standard use the term "deenergized and
grounded" rather than just "deenergized" (Ex. 0155). He maintained
that "line[s] and equipment [are] not safe to work unless [they have]
been de-energized and grounded" (id.).
OSHA decided not to adopt Mr. Erga's recommendation. The final
rule, as with existing Sec. 1910.269, does not always require
grounding of deenergized equipment. Final paragraph (b) of Sec.
1926.962 permits deenergized lines and equipment to remain ungrounded
under limited circumstances. OSHA believes that it is safe to work on
deenergized lines and equipment under these limited circumstances, and
there is no evidence in this rulemaking record that indicates that it
would not be reasonably safe to do so. Therefore, OSHA is adopting the
language of this provision as proposed.
In some cases, as when an employee in charge has to leave the job
because of illness, it may be necessary to transfer a clearance. Under
such conditions, final paragraph (c)(9), which OSHA is adopting from
proposed paragraph (c)(8), requires the employee in charge to inform
the system operator and the employees in the crew of the transfer. If
the employee holding the clearance must leave the worksite due to
illness or other emergency, the employee's supervisor could inform the
system operator and crew members of the transfer in clearance. This
requirement, which OSHA based on existing Sec. 1910.269(m)(3)(ix), has
no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
The Agency received no comments on this provision in the proposal.
However, neither the existing standard at Sec. 1910.269(m)(3)(ix) nor
the proposal addresses who notifies crew members of the transfer in
clearance. Because the employee in charge of the clearance is
responsible for the clearance and communications regarding it, the
notification must come from that individual. Therefore, OSHA has
revised the language of paragraph (c)(9) in the final rule to clarify
that "the employee in charge (or the employee's supervisor if the
employee in charge must leave the worksite due to illness or other
emergency) shall inform . . . employees in the crew " of the transfer.
After transfer of the clearance, the new employee in charge is
responsible for the clearance. To avoid confusion that could endanger
the entire crew, employers must ensure that only one employee at a time
be responsible for any clearance.
Once the crew completes its work, the employee in charge must
release the clearance before the system operator can reenergize the
lines or equipment. Paragraph (c)(10) covers this procedure.
To ensure that it is safe to release the clearance, the employee in
charge must: (1) Notify workers in the crew \404\ of the release, (2)
ensure that they are clear of the lines and equipment, (3) ensure the
removal of all protective grounds, and (4) notify the system operator
of the release of the clearance. OSHA based this provision on existing
Sec. 1910.269(m)(3)(x). Paragraph (d)(1)(vii) of existing Sec.
1926.950 contains an equivalent requirement. OSHA received no comments
on this provision, proposed as paragraph (c)(9), and is adopting it
substantially as proposed. Paragraph (c)(7) requires the employer to
ensure the installation of protective grounds for the crew, but does
not require the crew to install them. To account for the possibility
that the crew does not install the grounds protecting them, paragraph
(c)(10)(iii) requires the employee in charge to ensure the removal of
"protective grounds protecting employees under [the] clearance"
rather than "protective grounds installed by the crew."
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\404\ The employees in the crew are working under the clearance
assigned to the employee in charge of the clearance. The proposed
rule required notification of "each employee under his or her
direction." The final rule, in paragraph (c)(10)(i), uses the
phrase "under that clearance" instead of "under his or her
direction" to make it clear that the employee in charge is
responsible for the clearance and, as noted earlier in this section
of the preamble, need not be a foreman or supervisor. In addition,
the final rule uses the term "employees under that clearance" in
place of the proposed terms "employees in the crew" and "the
crew" in paragraphs (c)(10)(ii) and (c)(10)(iii), respectively.
This revision makes it clear that, in cases in which a single
employee is in charge of the clearance for multiple crews under
paragraph (b)(4)(i), the employee in charge must ensure that
employees in all crews under his or her clearance are clear of lines
and equipment and that grounds protecting employees in all crews
under his or her clearance are removed.
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Final paragraph (c)(11), which OSHA is adopting without substantive
change from proposed paragraph (c)(10), requires the individual who is
releasing the clearance to be the one who requested it, unless the
employer transfers responsibility under final paragraph (c)(9). Final
paragraph (c)(11) ensures that the employee in charge of the clearance
authorizes release of the clearance. OSHA based this paragraph, which
has no counterpart in existing Subpart V, on existing Sec.
1910.269(m)(3)(xi). The Agency received no comments on this provision.
Paragraph (c)(12), proposed as paragraph (c)(11), prohibits the
removal of a tag without release of its associated clearance. Because
the persons who place and remove the tags may not be the same person,
the standard prohibits removing a tag unless the employee in charge of
the associated clearance first releases it. OSHA based this provision,
which has no counterpart in existing Subpart V, on existing Sec.
1910.269(m)(3)(xii). OSHA is adopting paragraph (c)(12) with one
clarification from proposed paragraph (c)(11). Final paragraph (c)(12)
clarifies that the release of the clearance must comply with final
paragraph (c)(11), in addition to final paragraph (c)(10) (which
corresponds to proposed paragraph (c)(9), the only provision referenced
in proposed paragraph (c)(11)). As noted in the preceding paragraph of
this preamble, paragraph (c)(11) of the final rule requires the
individual who is releasing the clearance to be the one who requested
it, unless the employer transfers responsibility. This provision
applies regardless of whether final paragraph (c)(12) references it,
and the final rule makes its application clear.
NIOSH recommended that the person removing the tag "be the person
who placed the tag on the line or the supervisor, unless they have been
replaced due to shift change" (Ex. 0130). NIOSH recommended that, if a
shift change occurred, the employer brief the replacement workers on
their responsibilities (id.).
OSHA agrees with NIOSH that employees placing and removing tags
need appropriate training. In this regard, Sec. 1926.950(b)(1)
requires that each employee receive training in, and be familiar with,
the safety-related work practices, safety procedures, and other safety
requirements in Subpart V that pertain to his or her job assignments.
However, OSHA does not believe that the employee who removes a tag
under paragraph (c)(12) needs to be the same one who placed it. Because
tags are often remote from the work location, the employee in charge of
the clearance does not typically place or remove them. The key to
employee safety in such cases is that no one may remove a tag until the
employee in charge of the associated clearance releases that clearance.
Accordingly, the key employee in this situation is the employee in
charge of the clearance (that is, the employee who requested the
clearance or the employee to whom the employer has transferred
responsibility under final paragraph (c)(9)). Therefore, OSHA is not
adopting NIOSH's recommendation.
According to final paragraph (c)(13), the employer shall ensure
that no one initiates action to reenergize the lines or equipment at a
point of disconnection until all protective grounds have been removed,
all crews working on the lines or equipment release their clearances,
all employees are clear of the lines and equipment, and all protective
tags are removed from that point of disconnection. This provision
protects employees from possible reenergization of the line or
equipment while employees are still at work. This provision does not
require the removal of all tags from all disconnecting means before any
of them may be reclosed. Instead, it requires that all tags for any
particular switch be removed before that switch is closed. It is
important in a tagging system not to return any energy isolating device
to a position that could allow energy flow if there are any tags on the
energy isolating device that are protecting employees. For example,
after the employee in charge releases the clearance for a 5-mile
section of line that the employer deenergized by opening switches at
both ends of the line, the employer can close any one switch only after
all the tags are removed from that switch. OSHA received no comments on
this provision (proposed as paragraph (c)(12)) and is adopting it
substantially as proposed. Final paragraph (c)(13), which has no
counterpart in Subpart V, has been taken from existing Sec.
1910.269(m)(3)(xiii).
13. Section 1926.962, Grounding for the Protection of Employees
Sometimes, deenergized lines and equipment become energized. Such
energization can happen in several ways, for example, by contact with
another energized circuit, voltage backfeed from a customer's
cogeneration installation, lightning contact, or failure of the
clearance system outlined in final Sec. 1926.961.
Electric utilities normally install transmission and distribution
lines and equipment outdoors, where the weather and actions taken by
members of the general public can damage the lines and equipment.
Electric utilities install many utility poles alongside roadways where
motor vehicles can strike the poles. Falling trees damage distribution
lines, and the public may use transmission-line insulators for target
practice. Additionally, customers fed by a utility company's
distribution line may have cogeneration or backup generation
capability, sometimes without the utility company's knowledge. All of
these factors can reenergize a deenergized transmission or distribution
line or equipment. When energized lines are knocked down, they can fall
onto deenergized lines. A backup generator or a cogenerator can cause
voltage backfeed on a deenergized power line. Lastly, lightning, even
miles from the worksite, can reenergize a line. All of these situations
pose hazards to
employees working on deenergized transmission and distribution lines
and equipment. These circumstances factored into 14 of the accidents
described in 269-Exhibit 9-2, as noted in the preamble to the 1994
final rule adopting Sec. 1910.269 (59 FR 4394).
Grounding the lines and equipment protects employees from injury
should such energizing occur. Grounding also protects against induced
current and static charges on a line.\405\ (These induced and static
voltages can be high enough to endanger employees, either directly from
electric shock or indirectly from involuntary reaction (Exs. 0041,
0046.)
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\405\ Induced current can flow in a deenergized conductor when a
nearby conductor is carrying alternating current. The varying
electromagnetic field that surrounds the current-carrying conductor
causes electrons to flow in any nearby electrical path, or loop,
formed by a nearby deenergized conductor. The amount of current in
the loop increases with an increase in the length of the loop that
intersects the electromagnetic field; that is, the current increases
as the length of the deenergized conductor running in parallel with
a current-carrying conductor increases.
Induced static electric charge can develop on a conductive
object in several ways. The capacitive coupling that occurs between
an energized conductor and a nearby deenergized conductive object
can induce a voltage on the conductive object. Similarly, the same
environmental conditions that can cause an electric charge to build
in clouds can cause a buildup of charge on a deenergized conductor.
A static discharge in the form of lightning can deposit an electric
charge directly on the conductive object.
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Grounding, as a temporary protective measure, involves connecting
the deenergized lines and equipment to earth through conductors. As
long as the conductors remain deenergized, this action maintains the
lines and equipment at the same potential as the earth. However, if a
source impresses voltage on a line, the voltage on the grounded line
rises to a value dependent upon the impressed voltage, the impedance
between its source and the grounding point, and the impedance of the
grounding conductor.
Employers use various techniques to limit the voltage across an
employee working on a grounded line should the line become energized.
Bonding is one of these techniques; it involves bonding conductive
objects within the reach of the employee to establish an equipotential
work area for the employee. Bonding limits voltage differences within
this area of equal potential to a safe value.
OSHA took the requirements proposed in Sec. 1926.962 from existing
Sec. 1910.269(n). Existing Sec. 1926.954 contains provisions related
to grounding for the protection of employees. In developing the
proposal for this rulemaking, OSHA reviewed existing Sec. 1926.954 and
found that it is not as protective as existing Sec. 1910.269(n) and
also contains redundant and unnecessary requirements. For example, as
noted under the summary and explanation of Sec. 1926.960(b)(2) of this
final rule, existing Sec. 1926.950(b)(2) requires "[e]lectric
equipment and lines [to] be considered energized until determined to be
deenergized by tests or other appropriate methods or means." Existing
Sec. 1926.954(a) similarly requires "[a]ll conductors and equipment
[to] be treated as energized until tested or otherwise determined to be
deenergized or until grounded." These provisions do not adequately
protect employees from inadvertently reenergized lines and equipment,
however. As noted in the earlier discussion, electric power
transmission and distribution lines and equipment can become
reenergized even after an employer deenergizes them. Therefore, OSHA
concluded in the Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking that grounding deenergized
lines and equipment is essential, except under limited circumstances
(59 FR 4394-4395). The Agency is adopting that approach here. In
developing Sec. 1926.962 of the final rule, OSHA eliminated redundant
requirements from existing Sec. 1926.954, consolidated related
requirements from that section, and strengthened the current Subpart V
requirements to protect employees better.
Section 1926.962 of the final rule addresses protective grounding
and bonding.\406\ Paragraph (a) provides that all of Sec. 1926.962
applies to the grounding of transmission and distribution lines and
equipment for the purpose of protecting employees. Paragraph (a) also
provides that paragraph (d) in final Sec. 1926.962 additionally
applies to the protective grounding of other equipment, such as aerial
lift trucks, as required elsewhere in Subpart V. Under normal
conditions, such mechanical equipment would not be connected to a
source of electric energy. However, to protect employees in case of
accidental contact of the equipment with live parts, OSHA requires
protective grounding elsewhere in the standard (in Sec.
1926.964(c)(11), for example); to ensure the adequacy of this
grounding, paragraph (d) of final Sec. 1926.962 addresses the ampacity
and impedance of protective grounding equipment. A note following
paragraph (a) indicates that Sec. 1926.962 covers grounding of
transmission and distribution lines and equipment when this subpart
requires protective grounding and whenever the employer chooses to
ground such lines and equipment for the protection of employees.
Although the Agency did not propose the note, OSHA included the note in
the final rule to clarify that Sec. 1926.962 applies both when Subpart
V requires grounding of transmission and distribution lines and
equipment \407\ and when the employer grounds such lines and equipment
for the protection of employees even though not required to do so.
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\406\ As used throughout the rest of this discussion and within
final Sec. 1926.962, the term "grounding" includes bonding.
Technically, grounding refers to the connection of a conductive part
to ground, whereas bonding refers to connecting conductive parts to
each other. However, for convenience, OSHA is using the term
"grounding" to refer to both techniques of minimizing voltages to
which an employee will be exposed.
\407\ For example, final Subpart V requires the employer to
ground transmission and distribution lines and equipment in
Sec. Sec. 1926.962(b) and 1926.964(b)(4).
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Mr. James Junga with Local 223 of the Utility Workers Union of
America suggested that any requirement in the rule "that an aerial
lift truck should be grounded should be worded exactly that way, not
implied" (Ex. 0197). He stated that this language would eliminate any
confusion between a worker and his or her supervisor regarding this
issue (id.).
The Agency notes that Sec. 1926.962 in the final rule does not
contain requirements for grounding aerial lifts or other types of
mechanical equipment. Final Sec. Sec. 1926.959(d)(3)(iii) and
1926.964(c)(11) contain requirements to ground this equipment. These
provisions, which do permit alternatives to grounding mechanical
equipment, specify precisely when employers must ensure proper
grounding of this equipment.
TVA recommended that Sec. 1926.962 also apply to medium-voltage
installations in generating plants, explaining:
The "application" sections of 1910.269(n) and 1926.961 are
limited to the grounding of transmission and distribution lines and
equipment for the purpose of protecting employees. Both 1910.269 and
Subpart V have no requirements on grounding of generating plant
conductors and equipment for the protection of employees. We believe
this exposes employees to shock and electrocution hazards in the
workplace. These conductors may become energized by dangerous
induced voltage and failure of the clearance system. For circuits
operating at 480 V and below, we recommend grounding for the
protection of employees from the hazard of induced voltage because
the ampacity of the grounding jumper necessary to conduct the
current for the time to clear the fault would make the jumper [too]
large to install in many cases. It is recommended that the final
rule incorporate requirements for grounding medium voltage (1 kV to
23 kV) conductors and equipment in generating plants. [Ex. 0213]
Subpart V does not apply to work on generation installations.
Therefore, it would be inappropriate to include grounding requirements
for generating plants in Subpart V. Although final Sec. 1910.269
applies to work in generation plants, the grounding requirements in
Sec. 1910.269(n) do not apply to electric power generation circuits.
Existing Sec. 1910.269(n)(1) provides that Sec. 1910.269(n) applies
to "the grounding of transmission and distribution lines and equipment
for the purpose of protecting employees." Existing Sec.
1910.269(n)(2) requires such lines and equipment to be grounded under
certain conditions. The remaining requirements in existing Sec.
1910.269(n) apply to grounding of transmission and distribution lines
and equipment without regard to whether Sec. 1910.269 requires them to
be grounded if the grounding is "for the purpose of protecting
employees."
To respond to TVA's comment, OSHA examined two issues: (1) Whether
final Sec. 1910.269(n)(2) should require grounding of electric power
generation circuits, and (2) whether the other requirements in final
Sec. 1910.269(n) should apply to the grounding of generation circuits
whenever an employer grounds them to protect employees (that is, even
when the standard does not require such grounding). With respect to the
first issue, OSHA does not believe that it is always necessary to
ground electric power generation circuits. These circuits are similar
in most respects to electric utilization circuits (circuits used to
supply equipment that uses electric energy for lighting, heating, or
other purposes) covered by Subpart S; Subpart S, which generally
applies to utilization circuits in generation plants, does not require
grounding of deenergized circuits. Subpart S rather than Sec. 1910.269
covers many of the circuits in generation plants.\408\ The voltages on
generation circuits are typically lower than distribution and
transmission voltages. In addition, the hazards of induced voltage, and
voltages impressed on the circuits from lightning or contact with other
energized lines, noted earlier as being common to transmission and
distribution lines, are rarely, if ever, present on generation
circuits. Therefore, OSHA concludes that it is unnecessary to require
grounding of electric power generation lines and equipment in final
Sec. 1910.269(n)(2).
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\408\ The safety-related work practices required by Sec. Sec.
1910.331 through 1910.335 in Subpart S apply to utilization circuits
in electric power generation plants that "are not an integral part
of a generating installation." (See Note 1 to Sec.
1910.331(c)(1).)
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Note, however, that electric power generation plants typically have
the electrical output of the generators feeding a substation. The
generating plant substation, in turn, steps up the voltage and supplies
a transmission line. Consequently, any lines and equipment in a
substation at a generation plant connected to a transmission line are
subject to the same induced and impressed voltage hazards as the
transmission line. OSHA expects employers to treat lines and equipment
connected to a transmission line as transmission lines and equipment
for purposes of final Sec. Sec. 1926.962 and 1910.269(n).\409\ This
requirement will protect employees from the hazards of induced and
impressed voltage that may be present at electric generation plants.
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\409\ The existing directive for Sec. 1910.269, CPL 02-01-038,
generally permits employers to designate where in a generation plant
substation the generation installation ends and the transmission
installation begins for the purpose of choosing to follow Sec.
1910.269(d) or (m) in deenergizing that portion of the substation.
Employers must deenergize circuits on the generation side of the
demarcation point in accordance with Sec. 1910.269(d) and the
remaining circuits in the substation in accordance with Sec.
1910.269(m). However, irrespective of any such demarcation, Sec.
1910.269(n) always applies to any lines or equipment still connected
to the transmission circuit after the employer deenergizes the
circuit.
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With respect to the second issue, OSHA agrees with TVA that
grounding of electric power generation circuits should comply with the
grounding requirements in final Sec. 1910.269(n) other than paragraph
(n)(2). These requirements serve two functions. First they protect
employees working on grounded circuits from electric shock should the
circuits become energized. Second, they protect employees from hazards
related to the installation and removal of protective grounds and to
the ability of the ground to carry current. For example, final
paragraphs (n)(6)(i) and (n)(6)(ii) ensure that employees are not
injured if the protective grounding equipment is installed on or
removed from an energized circuit. Also, paragraph (n)(4) ensures that
the protective grounding equipment can safely carry the current that
would flow if the circuit becomes energized. Applying these provisions
to electric power generation circuits will protect employees from these
hazards. Therefore, OSHA decided to apply the requirements of final
Sec. 1910.269(n), other than paragraph (n)(2), to electric generation
lines and equipment.
Paragraph (b) of final Sec. 1926.962 sets the conditions under
which employers must ensure that lines and equipment are grounded as a
prerequisite to employees' working the lines or equipment as
deenergized.\410\ Generally, for lines or equipment to be treated as
deenergized, employers must deenergize the lines and equipment as
specified under Sec. 1926.961 and then ground them as well. An
employer may omit grounds on lines and equipment by demonstrating that
either installation of a ground is impracticable (such as during the
initial stages of work on underground cables, when the conductor is not
bare for grounding) or the conditions resulting from the installation
of a ground would present greater hazards than work without grounds.
OSHA expects that conditions warranting the absence of protective
grounds will be rare.
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\410\ As previously noted, existing Sec. 1926.954(a) requires
conductors and equipment to be considered as energized until
determined to be deenergized or until grounded. Paragraph (c) of
existing Sec. 1926.954 requires bare communication conductors on
poles or structures to be treated as energized unless protected by
insulating materials. Paragraph (b)(2) of final Sec. 1926.960
covers the hazard addressed by these existing requirements, as
discussed earlier in this preamble.
Existing Sec. 1926.954(b) addresses when to ground new lines
and equipment. When an employee installs equipment, it poses the
same hazard to the employee as any other conductive object
manipulated near exposed energized parts. Requirements contained in
final Sec. 1926.960(c) and (d) adequately address this hazard. The
installation of lines, however, poses additional hazards. First, the
lines may be subject to hazardous induced voltage. Second, because
of their length, new overhead lines are much more likely than other
new equipment to contact existing energized lines. This contact can
happen, for example, through failure of the stringing and tensioning
equipment used to install the new lines or through failure of the
existing lines or support structures. Final Sec. 1926.964(b)
addresses these hazards by specifically covering the installation
and removal of overhead lines. Lastly, new underground lines, which
are run as insulated cable, do not pose these electrical hazards.
For these reasons, OSHA indicated in the preamble to the
proposal that the Agency would not include the provisions of
existing Sec. 1926.954(b) in the final rule (70 FR 34873). However,
OSHA requested comment on whether the proposal adequately protected
employees from hazards associated with the installation of new lines
and equipment. Only one commenter supported including the existing
requirements in the final rule, but that commenter did not provide
any rationale for its position (Ex. 0175). Therefore, OSHA is not
including the provisions of existing Sec. 1926.954(b) in the final
rule.
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When paragraph (b) does not require grounds, but the lines and
equipment are to be treated as deenergized, the employer must meet
certain conditions and ensure that employees use additional
precautions. The employer must still deenergize the lines and equipment
according to the procedures required by final Sec. 1926.961 (per final
paragraph (b)(1)). Also, there must be no possibility of contact with
another energized source (per final paragraph (b)(2)) and no hazard of
induced voltage
present (per final paragraph (b)(3)). Since these precautions and
conditions do not protect against the possible reenergizing of the
lines or equipment under all conditions, the standard requires
employers to ground lines and equipment in all but extremely limited
circumstances.
Paragraph (f) of existing Sec. 1926.954 allows employers to omit
grounds without the additional restrictions specified in final Sec.
1926.962(b)(1) through (b)(3). However, the existing standard requires
the lines or equipment to be treated as energized in such cases. While
the final rule does not specifically permit omitting grounds for
conductors that are treated as energized, it does not require grounding
unless the equipment is to be considered as deenergized. (See also the
discussion of final Sec. 1926.960(b)(2), earlier in this section of
the preamble.)
Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, Maryland & Delaware Association
of Electric Cooperatives opposed requiring the grounding of lines
operating at 600 volts and less:
We do not agree with [the requirement to ground lines operating
at 600 volts or less] and do not see how this is physically possible
in most cases. We typically open, isolate, [tagout], and test 600
volt lines deenergized prior to performing work. We do not see the
need for protective grounding in order to provide safety to
employees on these circuits. Further, operational methods do not
exist to ground 600 volt URD (underground residential distribution)
or insulated overhead circuits.
Commercial electricians commonly work on 600 volt or less lines
and there is no industry standard from electricians or utilities to
ever ground such lines. The industry standard is to isolate, test,
and tag. This should be sufficient for personnel safety. It should
be noted that most 600 volt or less equipment has no provisions or
space for attaching protective grounds. [Ex. 0175]
OSHA believes that the operating voltage on a distribution line is
immaterial. As explained earlier, these lines can not only become
energized by a failure of the clearance system, but also by a number of
external factors that the deenergizing procedures required by final
Sec. 1926.961 do not control. These factors include lightning, voltage
backfeed, and contact with other energized lines. Commercial
electricians working on systems operating at 600 volts or less do not
face these same hazards unless they are working on a distribution line;
in such cases, Sec. 1910.269 or Subpart V, which require grounding the
lines and equipment, would cover the electricians. Thus, OSHA concludes
that, regardless of voltage, it is necessary to ground transmission and
distribution lines and equipment that are to be treated as deenergized,
except when those external hazards are not present.
Ms. Layton did not convince the Agency that it is impossible to
ground lines operating at 600 volts or less. Ms. Layton did not state
why it is not possible to ground these lines. Protective grounding
equipment is available in sizes down to No. 2 AWG, and this size should
be suitable for typical line conductor sizes at the 600-volt class (269
Ex. 8-5; Ex. 0054). Moreover, even if grounding were not possible, it
would be possible, and acceptable under the final rule, to work the
lines as though energized.
Mr. Wilson Yancey with Quanta Services recommended that OSHA remove
the exceptions for installing grounds (Exs. 0169, 0234). He commented
that the exceptions are subject to possible abuse by workers,
explaining, "Since it is easier not to ground, crews might attempt to
claim that the specified criteria for not grounding applies in their
situation" (Ex. 0234). He suggested that employees should always work
lines and equipment as though energized if grounds cannot be provided
(id.).
As noted earlier, OSHA believes that the conditions in which the
final rule will not require grounding are extremely rare. OSHA also
believes that the restrictions imposed by final Sec. 1926.962(b)
reduce the risk of electric shock to employees to an acceptable level.
The alternative suggested by Mr. Yancey seems compelling; however, it
relies on the assumption that working lines and equipment energized is
as safe as, or safer than, working them deenergized without grounds in
the limited conditions permitted under this final rule. OSHA concludes
that when the risk of electric shock is low, as it is under conditions
that satisfy final Sec. 1926.962(b)(1) through (b)(3), working the
lines and equipment energized poses more risk than working them
deenergized without grounds. The choice suggested by Mr. Yancey would
provide an incentive to work with the lines and equipment energized
(rather than deenergized, but treated as energized), which the Agency
believes is less safe. Therefore, OSHA is adopting paragraph (b)
without substantive change from the proposal.
Paragraph (f) of existing Sec. 1926.954 addresses where employers
must place grounds. The existing standard requires employers to place
grounds between the work location and all sources of energy and as
close as practicable to the work location. Alternatively, employers can
place grounds at the work location. If employees are to perform work at
more than one location in a line section, the existing standard
requires them to ground and short circuit the line section at one
location and to ground the conductor they are working on at each work
location. Although these requirements are designed to protect employees
in case the line on which they are working becomes reenergized, OSHA
indicated in the preamble to the proposal that it did not believe that
these existing provisions ensure the use of grounding practices and
equipment that are adequate to provide this protection (70 FR 34874).
OSHA proposed requirements similar to the requirements in existing
Sec. 1926.954(f) when it initially proposed Sec. 1910.269(n). In
developing final Sec. 1910.269(n), OSHA reviewed the accidents in 269-
Ex. 9-2 and 269-Ex. 9-2A for situations involving improper protective
grounding. There were nine accidents in these two exhibits related to
protective grounding. In three cases, inadequately protective grounds,
which did not protect the employee against hazardous differences in
potential, were present. Because grounding is a backup measure that
provides protection only when all other safety-related work practices
fail, OSHA concluded that this incidence of faulty grounding was
significant.
In promulgating Sec. 1910.269 in 1994, OSHA concluded that
grounding practices that do not provide an equipotential zone (which
safeguards an employee from voltage differences) do not provide
complete protection (59 FR 4395-4396). In case the line becomes
energized inadvertently, the voltages could be lethal, as demonstrated
by some of the exhibits in the Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking record (269-
Exs. 6-27, 57). Absent equipotential grounding, the only protection an
employee will receive is if he or she does not contact the line until a
circuit protective device clears the energy source, thereby removing
the potentially lethal voltage on the line.
For these reasons, OSHA proposed in this rulemaking to require
grounds that would protect employees in the event that the line or
equipment on which they are working becomes reenergized. OSHA took
proposed Sec. 1926.962(c) directly from existing Sec. 1910.269(n)(3),
which provides that protective grounds must be so located and arranged
that employees are not exposed to hazardous differences in electric
potential. The Agency designed the proposal to allow employers and
employees to use any grounding method that protects employees in this
way. OSHA explained in the preamble to the proposal that, for employees
working at elevated positions
on poles and towers, single-point grounding may be necessary, together
with grounding straps, to provide an equipotential zone for the worker
(70 FR 34874). OSHA also noted in the proposal that grounding at
convenient points on both sides of the work area might protect
employees in insulated aerial lifts working midspan between two
conductor-supporting structures (id.). Bonding the aerial lift to the
grounded conductor would ensure that the employee remains at the
potential of the conductor in case of a fault. The Agency also
explained that other methods may be necessary to protect workers on the
ground, including grounding mats and insulating platforms (id.). In the
preamble to the proposal, the Agency stated that it believed that the
proposed performance-oriented approach to grounding would provide
flexibility for employers, while still affording adequate protection to
employees (id.).
Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, Maryland & Delaware Association
of Electric Cooperatives argued that the requirement to provide an
equipotential zone is unnecessary:
[W]e agree with the need to employ safe grounding practices.
However, we have concerns with the requirement for equipotential
grounding as the "safe" method for grounding when an employee is
working on the pole. Three incidents/injuries are referenced that
were a result of inadequate grounding. More information is needed to
determine the inadequacies with these grounds. That is, were there
high resistant ground connections, were the grounds placed as
described in 1926.954 (b), and were the grounds properly constructed
to provide maximum protection to the employee[.] [Ex. 0175]
Ms. Layton recognized the importance of "grounds properly
constructed to provide maximum protection to the employee" (id.). The
accidents described in the 1994 rulemaking clearly indicate that the
grounds involved did not provide a working zone free of hazardous
differences in electric potential. As noted earlier, evidence in that
record also indicated that lethal voltages can develop when employees
use such inadequate grounds.
In its posthearing brief, EEI maintained that existing Sec.
1910.269(n), and the identically worded proposed Sec. 1926.962(c), are
unenforceably vague (Ex. 0501). EEI argued as follows:
[T]he proposed standards would require employers to place
grounds in such a manner "as to prevent each employee from being
exposed to hazardous differences in electrical potential." See
proposed 1926.962(c). OSHA doubtless would characterize this as a
"performance" standard that allows the employer to cho[o]se a
means of compliance. But there is a point at which the total absence
of objective criteria for achieving compliance takes a standard
beyond the legally safe harbor of a "performance standard" to the
constitutionally infirm area of ambiguity and vagueness. That is
where a requirement for "equipotential grounding" stands as of
now.
First, the record allows no other conclusion. Mr. Tomaseski and
Mr. Brian Erga, who together are as knowledgeable as any in the
electric utility industry about transmission and distribution
grounding, agree that there are no guidelines, standards or other
sources to guide employers as to how to achieve equipotential
grounding (Tr. 1262-1266). Mr. Erga commented in particular that
IEEE 1048 is "quite outdated." (Tr. 1262).
Second, OSHA's enforcement experience under Section
1910.269(n)(3) confirms this conclusion. Several years ago, the
Department of Justice, on OSHA's recommendation, indicted an
electrical contractor for an alleged criminal violation of this
section. At trial, however, neither DOJ [nor] OSHA could produce
even a single expert witness to testify in support of the indictment
as to what constitutes equipotential grounding, and the contractor
was acquitted of this charge. There is no basis, therefore, now to
extend the "equipotential zone" requirement to Part 1926, and it
should be stricken from the final standards. Also, OSHA should issue
compliance advice to its field personnel that Section 1910.269(n)(3)
is unenforceable. [Ex. 0501]
With respect to the hearing testimony referenced by EEI, OSHA notes
that the cited exchange involved Mr. Tomaseski, representing IBEW,
questioning Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI (Tr. 1262-1263). Mr. Tomaseski did
not testify during that exchange; he only asked questions.\411\
Although OSHA does not dispute Mr. Erga's expertise in equipotential
grounding, the Agency disagrees with his description of IEEE Std 1048
as "outdated." IEEE Std 1048-2003, IEEE Guide for Protective
Grounding of Power Lines, was available at the time of the 2006 hearing
(Ex. 0046). At that point, it had been available for only 3 years, and
there is no evidence in the record that IEEE withdrew the consensus
standard or otherwise disavowed it. There also is no evidence that IEEE
Std 1048-2003 is inaccurate. On the basis of the rulemaking record
considered as a whole, that consensus standard represents the best
available guidance on what constitutes equipotential grounding.
Paragraph (c) of final Sec. 1926.962 requires employers to determine
the proper grounding method based on the system involved. An
engineering determination of the currents in the employee's body that
will occur if the lines or equipment become reenergized during work
generally is necessary for this purpose. IEEE Std 1048-2003 (previously
IEEE Std 1048-1990) provides detailed guidelines on how to determine
maximum body currents and how to calculate what those currents would be
for a particular protective grounding system on a particular circuit
(Ex. 0046). Consequently, OSHA concludes that there are guidelines
available that can assist employers in developing grounding methods
that will comply with final Sec. Sec. 1910.269(n)(3) and 1926.962(c).
However, as explained later, OSHA agrees that additional guidance from
the Agency on this issue will facilitate compliance, and Appendix C to
this final rule provides such guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\411\ Although Mr. Tomaseski did not testify about proposed
Sec. 1926.962(c), IBEW generally supported the proposed provision
in its posthearing comments (Ex. 0505).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EEI did not provide a citation for the case on which it relies to
support its assertion that existing Sec. 1910.269(n)(3) is
unenforceable. However, OSHA assumes that EEI is referring to United
States v. L.E. Myers Co., 2005 WL 3875213 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 2, 2005),
rev'd on other grounds, 562 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2009), as that case was
a criminal prosecution involving, among other issues, the equipotential
grounding provision in existing Sec. 1910.269. EEI's reliance on this
case is misplaced. First, EEI incorrectly asserts that the Government
elected not to call an expert witness on equipotential grounding in
that case because the Government could not produce such an expert. In
fact, before the trial in that case, the Government designated an
expert witness who was prepared to describe the proper way to establish
an equipotential zone consistent with the facts of the case. Second,
the unfavorable decision in the case may mean simply that the jury
decided that the defendant did not violate Sec. 1910.269(n)(3), not
that the standard is unenforceable.
The Agency concludes that the standard should explicitly state that
the employer has a duty to determine (and be able to demonstrate) that
the grounding practices in use provide an equipotential zone for the
worker. IBEW commented that "[p]ersonal protective grounding is either
entirely misunderstood or just not thought of as much as other issues
involved [in electric power transmission and distribution] work" (Ex.
0230). OSHA infers from this statement that employers are not fully
implementing the existing requirement for equipotential zones in Sec.
1910.269(n)(3). Mr. Wilson Yancey with Quanta
Services testified: "We believe that the [equipotential grounding]
standard should be entirely performance-based and put both the burden
and responsibility on the employer, putting in place procedures and
practices that protect employees from electrical hazards" (Tr. 1324-
1325). The Agency agrees with Mr. Yancey. Therefore, OSHA is revising
the proposed language to expressly require employers to demonstrate
that temporary protective grounds have been placed at such locations
and arranged in such a manner so as to prevent each employee from being
exposed to hazardous differences in electric potential.
Two commenters objected to use of the phrase "equipotential zone"
in the heading for proposed paragraph (c) and opposed a specific
requirement for the creation of an "equipotential zone" (Exs. 0201,
0212). Duke Energy commented:
The OSHA standard should not include specific requirements for
the creation of an equipotential zone. There is not adequate
information available to employers about how to effectively
establish equipotential zones on distribution structures. Without
this information, OSHA should not specify the technique of
"equipotential" on those structures. In addition, OSHA should
change the term "equipotential grounding" to "temporary
protective grounding" which will allow employers to determine
effective grounding techniques. [Ex. 0201]
Southern Company commented that the term "equipotential zone" is a
misnomer because it "implies that the voltage difference between two
points within the zone will be zero, therefore allowing no voltage to
develop across the worker. This misconception eliminates consideration
of the other critical parameters such as impedance of the temporary
ground, fault levels, etc." (Ex. 0212). Like Duke Energy, Southern
Company advocated use of the phrase "temporary protective grounding"
in lieu of "equipotential zone" (id.).
In contrast, several commenters supported the requirement for an
equipotential zone. (See, for example, Exs. 0155, 0162, 0186, 0230,
0505; Tr. 899-900, 1253-1254.) For example, Mr. Anthony Ahern of Ohio
Rural Electric Cooperatives commented, "These grounding requirement[s]
will be a major improvement. Equal-potential grounding/bonding should
be required where ever it is possible to do so" (Ex. 0186). However,
many of those who supported the proposed requirement recommended that
OSHA provide more guidance on acceptable methods that employers can use
to achieve the equipotential zone called for in the proposal. (See, for
example, Exs. 0162, 0230, 0505; Tr. 899-900, 1253-1254.) For example,
Mr. James Tomaseski with IBEW spoke to the need for guidance:
[Protective grounding] is an essential procedure to ensure
employee safety when performing work associated with transmission
and distribution voltages. As important as it is, it is also a
procedure that is commonly misunderstood and many times misapplied.
In particular, many people, for some reason, do not understand
the term "equipotential" and do not understand proper application
of grounds to create an equipotential zone. This needs to be
changed. Either in the rule itself or in existing Appendix C or a
new appendix devoted to equipotential zones, OSHA should better
describe what an equipotential zone actually is and how an
equipotential zone is created and offer examples for overhead
distribution, overhead transmission, and underground distribution of
how to accomplish that task of creating an equipotential zone. [Tr.
899-900]
Mr. Steven Theis with MYR Group "strongly recommended that OSHA
attempt to clarify acceptable grounding methods and/or configurations
that would be considered adequate or acceptable" (Ex. 0162). Mr. Erga
recommended that the Agency address grounding for underground systems
and provided information for that purpose (Exs. 0474, 0475; Tr. 1256-
1257).
OSHA disagrees with the commenters who objected to the term
"equipotential zone." As used in paragraph (c) of the final rule, the
word "equipotential" means that conductive objects within the
worker's reach do not differ in electric potential to the point that it
could endanger employees.\412\ This definition differs slightly from
the dictionary definition of "equipotential" (that is, having the
same electric potential at every point), but the difference is clear
from the regulatory text in paragraph (c). OSHA uses the term
"equipotential zone" only in the heading. The text of paragraph (c)
states the requirement precisely without using the term. In other
words, the standard does not require what Southern Company alleges,
that is, a zone of precisely equal electric potential.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\412\ See the summary and explanation for final Sec.
1926.964(b)(4)(i) for an explanation of what OSHA considers to be a
hazardous difference in electric potential.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA agrees, however, that some employers can use assistance
determining what an equipotential zone is. Appendix C to final Subpart
V contains information designed to help employers develop grounding
practices that will provide the equipotential zone required by the
final rule. OSHA culled this information from the record, primarily
IEEE Std 1048-2003 (Ex. 0046) and from determinations that the Agency
made in this rulemaking (see, for example, the summary and explanation
for final Sec. 1926.964(b)(4)) and other rulemakings on safe levels of
current in the body, including the 1994 preamble to final Sec.
1910.269 (59 FR 4406) and the preamble to the rule on ground-fault
protection (41 FR 55696-55704, Dec. 21, 1976). In addition, the Agency
decided to provide a safe harbor of the type requested by Mr. Theis, so
a new note in the final rule provides that grounding practices meeting
the guidelines in Appendix C will comply with Sec. 1926.962(c). This
note will enable employers to adopt safe grounding practices that
provide an equipotential zone without having to conduct a separate
engineering determination, which should be particularly useful to
contractors who perform work on many different systems. Following the
guidelines in Appendix C, employers will be able to adopt a uniform set
of grounding practices that will be acceptable for a wide range of
above-ground and underground transmission and distribution systems.
Employers may set their own grounding practices without following the
guidelines in Appendix C, but the Agency reminds employers that the
final rule requires them to be able to demonstrate that any practices
selected will prevent each employee from being exposed to hazardous
differences in electric potential.
Paragraph (d) of the final rule contains requirements that
protective grounding equipment must meet. For the grounding equipment
to protect employees completely, it must not fail while the line or
electric equipment is energized. Thus, paragraph (d)(1)(i) requires
protective grounding to have an ampacity high enough so that the
equipment is capable of conducting the maximum fault current that could
flow at the point of grounding during the period necessary to clear the
fault. In other words, the grounding equipment must be able to carry
the fault current for the amount of time necessary to allow protective
devices to interrupt the circuit. OSHA adopted this provision from the
first sentence of existing Sec. 1910.269(n)(4)(i). There was broad
support in the record for this requirement (see, for example, Exs.
0125, 0127, 0149, 0159, 0172, 0179). Consequently, OSHA is including it
in the final rule as proposed.
As noted in the preamble to the proposed rule, the design of
electric power distribution lines operating at 600 volts or less can
present a maximum fault current and fault interrupting time
that exceeds the current carrying capability of the circuit conductors
(70 FR 34874). In other words, the maximum fault current on
distribution secondaries of 600 volts or less can be high enough to
melt the phase conductors carrying the fault current. If OSHA required
protective grounding equipment to carry the maximum amount of fault
current without regard to whether the phase conductors would fail, the
size of the grounding equipment would be impractical. OSHA does not
interpret existing Sec. 1910.269(n)(4)(i) to require protective
grounding equipment to be capable of carrying more current than
necessary to allow the phase conductors to fail. (See OSHA Instruction
CPL 02-01-038.) A protective grounding jumper sized slightly larger
than a phase conductor would be sufficient to meet the existing
standard.
To clarify this requirement, OSHA proposed, in paragraph
(d)(1)(ii), to recognize certain conditions in which it would be
permissible to use protective grounding equipment that would not be
large enough to carry the maximum fault current indefinitely, but that
would be large enough to carry this current until the phase conductor
fails. First, the proposal would have required the grounding equipment
to be capable of carrying the maximum fault current until the conductor
protected by the grounding equipment failed. Second, the conductor
would have been considered grounded only where the grounding equipment
was protecting the employee after the conductor failed. In other words,
the portion of the phase conductor between the grounding equipment and
the employee protected by the grounding equipment would have had to
remain intact under fault conditions. Third, since the phase conductor
will likely fall once it fails, the proposal provided that "[n]o
employees . . . be endangered by the failed conductor." OSHA requested
comments on proposed paragraph (d)(1)(ii), including specifically
whether the Agency should restrict the provision to lines and equipment
operating at 600 volts or less.
Some commenters supported proposed paragraph (d)(1)(ii) (Exs. 0126,
0167, 0201, 0219, 0220). For example, Duke Energy supported this
change, contending that "it relaxes overly restrictive rules" (Ex.
0201). Mr. Allan Oracion with Energy United EMC commented that proposed
paragraph (d)(1)(ii) "is needed for fault current of lines at 600
volts or less because, if not, the ground wire would be too big to
handle and use" (Ex. 0219).
However, most of the comments received on the proposed provision
opposed it. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0127, 0149, 0159, 0172, 0179,
0227, 0230.) For instance, Ms. Wyla Wood with Mason County Public
Utility District Number 3 commented:
[T]he requirement to size a grounding jumper to be able to
withstand the maximum fault current for the time necessary to have
the grounded conductor fail to the point of separation and fall to
the ground is impracticable in most situations due (1) to the
required size of the grounding jumper and (2) the lack of adequate
connection points at which to attach the grounding jumper. In a
transmission system there usually is no neutral conductor so the
grounding jumper must be attached to the tower or structure ground
which at the most is only a 4/0 conductor or less. In the National
Electric Safety Code and the National Electric[al] Code (NFPA 70),
the connection to ground is only required to be sized to withstand
the available fault current for the time required to have the
electrical protective equipment operate. This would include relays
seeing the fault current and opening breakers, tripping generating
units off line, and/or allowing proper fusing to fail thereby
creating an electrical opening in the system stopping the flow of
current. The design requirements for electrical circuits as found in
the NESC Section 9, 093.C1-9 and the NEC Chapter 2 Article 250 would
need to be changed so that all new construction would have the
ability to do what we believe you are asking in this section.
Another consideration would be the physical size and weight of a
temporary grounding jumper. As loads are becoming greater, the size
of transmission and distribution conductors are becoming larger in
size. If, for instance, the conductor was 756 MCM,\[\\413\\]\ the
grounding jumper would be required to be equal in size or capable of
carrying the full fault current for the time necessary to have this
conductor fail to the point of separation. A temporary grounding
jumper of this size would be too heavy for a worker to lift and too
stiff to form into the proper configuration required by some
situations. OSHA should adhere to the requirements already in place
in the above referenced regulations. [Ex. 0125]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\413\ MCM is million circular mils.
EEI opposed the proposed requirement for similar reasons and argued
that crews "would have to carry ten different sets of ground chains"
(Ex. 0227).\414\ IBEW also opposed the proposed provision, stating that
the "requirement for properly sized grounds should not be [dependent]
on [the] size [of the] conductor [to which] the ground is attached"
(Ex. 0230). Noting that the size of grounds should not be a concern
with transmission circuits, the union recommended that, if the grounds
would be too large because of available fault current, employees should
work the circuit as energized (id.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\414\ OSHA believes that EEI intended to use the term
"grounding equipment" rather than "grounding chains." Grounding
chains are an outdated form of protective grounding equipment that
are unlikely to meet current design standards for protective
grounding equipment such as those in ASTM F855-09, Standard
Specifications for Temporary Protective Grounds to Be Used on De-
energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It appears to the Agency that commenters that opposed proposed
paragraph (d)(1)(ii) did not understand that this provision was
intended as an exception to the requirement in proposed paragraph
(d)(1)(i) that protective grounding equipment "be capable of
conducting the maximum fault current that could flow at the point of
grounding for the time necessary to clear the fault." However, based
on the comments received, OSHA reconsidered the need for the proposed
exception. Based on IBEW's comment, there appears to be no need for it
on transmission circuits, and possibly even for any circuit of more
than 600 volts (Ex. 0230). In addition, the hazards posed by faulted
conductors that cannot carry fault current appear to be greater than
those from working those conductors as energized because, when a
faulted overhead conductor fails, it will drop. The ungrounded side may
be energized (depending on where the failure occurred) and may contact
the worker, who will not be protected against such contact as he or she
would be if the work were performed energized. Therefore, OSHA is not
adopting proposed paragraph (d)(1)(ii) in the final rule. However, note
that, even though OSHA is not adopting proposed paragraph (d)(1)(ii),
the final standard does not require protective grounding equipment to
be capable of carrying more current than necessary to allow the phase
conductors to fail.
Paragraph (d)(1)(ii) of the final rule, which OSHA proposed as
paragraph (d)(1)(iii), requires protective grounding equipment to have
an ampacity of at least No. 2 AWG copper. This provision is equivalent
to language in existing Sec. 1910.269(n)(4) and ensures that
protective grounding equipment has a suitable minimum ampacity and
mechanical strength. This proposed requirement received broad support.
(See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0127, 0149, 0159, 0172, 0179.)
Consequently, OSHA is adopting the requirement in the final rule
without substantive change from the proposal.
Paragraph (d)(2) requires the impedance of the grounding equipment
to be low enough so as not to delay the operation of protective devices
in case of accidental energization. Existing Sec. 1910.269(n)(4)(ii)
requires protective grounding equipment to have "an
impedance low enough to cause immediate operation of protective devices
in case of accidental energizing of the lines or equipment." As noted
in OSHA Instruction CPL 02-01-038, this requirement ensures that the
protective grounding equipment does not contribute to any delay in the
operation of the devices protecting the circuit. For certain lines and
equipment, the design of the system allows some ground faults to occur
without the operation of the circuit protection devices, regardless of
the impedance of the grounding equipment. According to the OSHA
Instruction, if the impedance of the grounding equipment does not
contribute to delay in the operation of the circuit protection devices
and if the impedance of this equipment is low enough to provide a safe
work zone for employees (as required by existing Sec. 1910.269(n)(3)),
the employer is in compliance with existing Sec. 1910.269(n)(4)(ii).
The Agency proposed to include this interpretation in the
regulatory text of Sec. Sec. 1910.269(n)(4) and 1926.962(d) by
requiring the impedance of the grounding equipment to be low enough so
that it "do[es] not delay the operation of protective devices,"
rather than low enough "to cause immediate operation of protective
devices" in case of accidental energizing of the lines or equipment.
OSHA did not receive any objection to the change in language and is
adopting it without change in the final rule.
Paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2) help ensure the prompt clearing of the
circuit supplying voltage to the point where the employee is working.
Thus, the grounding equipment limits the duration and reduces the
severity of any electric shock, though it does not prevent shock from
occurring. (As discussed earlier, Sec. 1926.962(c) of the final rule
requires employers to protect employees from hazardous differences in
electric potential.) OSHA included a note to paragraph (d) of the final
rule referencing the ASTM and IEEE standards on protective grounding
equipment (ASTM F855-09 and IEEE Std 1048-2003, respectively) so that
employers can find additional information that may be helpful in their
efforts to comply with the standard. Mr. Tom Chappell with Southern
Company maintained that, because the ASTM standard does not require
asymmetrical test current,\415\ grounding equipment that satisfies that
standard still might not be able to withstand the peak current and
forces of a fully offset asymmetrical current (Ex. 0212.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\415\ In an alternating current system, current varies over time
in a symmetrical pattern--the current forms a sine wave as a
function of time, in which current above the zero axis is equal in
magnitude and duration to current below the zero axis. In a fault
condition, a direct current offset is added to the normal
symmetrical current (still in the form of a sine wave), which
results in current that is not symmetrical about the zero axis. The
instantaneous current is higher due to this asymmetry than it would
be when the current is symmetrical. The higher current also leads to
higher mechanical forces on the protective grounding equipment. The
degree of asymmetry depends on the ratio of the reactance of the
circuit to its resistance, which is called the X/R ratio.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA agrees that ASTM F855-09 does not require testing using
asymmetrical current. However, that consensus standard provides for
reduced maximum current-carrying ratings for temporary protective
grounding equipment used with systems that present asymmetrical fault
current (Ex. 0054).\416\ In addition, there are other factors to
consider in the selection and installation of appropriate protective
grounding equipment, such as maximum forces imposed on protective
grounding cables during a fault, circuit reclosing, inductive and
capacitive coupling with adjacent energized lines, and clamp connection
considerations (Ex. 0046). These factors are not adequately addressed
in ASTM F855 because it is a specification standard for the design of
protective grounding equipment, not a guide for selecting and using
that equipment. However, IEEE Std 1048-2003 includes substantial useful
information on these factors, including information on derating
protective grounding equipment for systems with worst-case asymmetry
(id.). The Agency added a reference to the IEEE standard in the note to
address Mr. Chappell's concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\416\ ASTM F855-09 contains the same reduction in ratings as the
2004 edition that is in the rulemaking record as Ex. 0054.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Chappell also asked whether "opening and locking a switch"
removes the possibility that the circuit would contribute to the fault
current and, thus, eliminates the need to account for that circuit in
calculating fault current (Ex. 0212). The procedures required by final
Sec. 1926.961 ensure that circuits are deenergized and that they
remain deenergized while employees are working on those circuits.
However, OSHA determined that these procedures do not eliminate the
risk that these circuits can become reenergized; in other words,
grounding is still necessary (Exs. 0002, 0004).\417\ The Agency does
not believe that installing a lock will substantially reduce the risk
of reenergization further. Tags required by final Sec. 1926.961(c)(2)
already would protect those switches, and a failure in the tagging
procedures would be nearly as likely to render a lock ineffective for a
person authorized to close the circuit.\418\ Therefore, lines and
equipment deenergized under the procedures required by final Sec.
1910.269(m) or final Sec. 1926.961 can still become reenergized
through a failure in those procedures, and protective grounding
equipment must be capable of withstanding the maximum current if the
circuits become reenergized. However, the employer generally may assume
that multiple (deenergized) sources of energy will not reenergize a
deenergized line simultaneously. This assumption would limit the
maximum current to the current from the highest capacity source.
Nevertheless, the employer must assume that additional sources can
contribute to the current through the protective grounding equipment
for any sources that automatic switches could reenergize
simultaneously.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\417\ See, for example, the eight accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=566034&id=170000459&id=14198543&id=783118&id=170228035&id=14342513
&id=14445399&id=768002.
\418\ For example, the system operator could remove a tag or a
lock from the wrong switch when energizing or deenergizing a
circuit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Existing Sec. 1926.954(h), (i), and (j) contain requirements
relating to the impedance and ampacity of personal protective grounds.
Paragraph (i) requires tower clamps to have adequate ampacity, and
paragraph (j) establishes the same requirement for ground leads, with
an additional restriction that they be no smaller than No. 2 AWG
copper. Paragraph (h) requires the impedance of a grounding electrode
(if used) to be low enough to remove the danger of harm to employees or
to permit prompt operation of protective devices.
OSHA believes that the entire grounding system should be capable of
carrying the maximum fault current and should have an impedance low
enough to protect employees. The existing standard does not specify the
impedance of grounding conductors or clamps, nor does it specify the
ampacity of grounding clamps other than tower clamps. By addressing
specific portions of the grounding systems but not addressing others,
the existing standard does not provide complete protection for
employees. Because the final rule's grounding requirements apply to the
entire grounding system, OSHA believes that the revised standard will
provide better protection for employees than the existing rule.
Paragraph (e), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires employers to ensure that employees test
lines and equipment
and verify that nominal voltage is absent before employees install any
ground on those lines or equipment. If a previously installed ground is
present, employees need not conduct a test. This provision prevents the
grounding of energized equipment, which could injure the employee
installing the ground. OSHA adopted this paragraph, which is equivalent
to existing Sec. 1926.954(d), from existing Sec. 1910.269(n)(5).
Paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2) of the final rule set procedures for
installing and removing grounds. To protect employees in the event that
the "deenergized" equipment employees will ground is, or becomes,
energized, these paragraphs require employees to attach the "equipment
end" of grounding devices last and remove them first. These paragraphs
also generally require employees to use a live-line tool for both
procedures.
These provisions are similar to existing Sec. 1926.954(e)(1) and
(e)(2), except that the existing standard recognizes the use of a
"suitable device" in addition to a live-line tool. As noted in the
preamble to the proposal, OSHA expressed concern that this language
implied that employees could use rubber insulating gloves to install
and remove grounds under any circumstance (70 FR 34875). The Agency
also noted that it is unsafe for an employee to be too close when
connecting or disconnecting a ground (id.). Under the final rule, OSHA
will consider any device insulated for the voltage, and that allows an
employee to apply or remove the ground from a safe position, to be a
live-line tool for the purposes of paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2).
OSHA based the corresponding paragraphs in the proposed rule on
existing Sec. 1910.269(n)(6) and (n)(7). Subsequent to the publication
of existing Sec. 1910.269 in 1994, some electric utilities complained
that lines and equipment operating at 600 volts or less cannot always
accommodate the placement and removal of a protective ground by a line-
line tool. OSHA, therefore, proposed alternatives to enable employees
to place protective grounds on this equipment in a manner that would
still provide adequate protection. The proposal would have permitted
the use of insulated equipment other than live-line tools for attaching
protective grounds to, and removing them from, lines and equipment
operating at 600 volts or less: (1) If the employer ensured that the
line or equipment was not energized at the time or (2) if the employer
could demonstrate that the employee would be protected from any hazard
that could develop if the line or equipment was energized. For example,
an employee could connect test equipment to a line to be grounded, and
than an employee wearing rubber insulating gloves could apply the
protective ground while the test equipment indicated that the line was
deenergized. After the ground was in place, an employee could remove
the test equipment.
Two commenters supported the proposal's approach to grounding lines
and equipment operating at 600 volts or less (Exs. 0201, 0227). One
additional commenter, who apparently supported the proposal,
recommended that OSHA recognize the use of devices other than live-line
tools for removing grounds at voltages less than 600 volts (Ex. 0212).
This commenter cited the difficulty in "situations such as a pad mount
transformer, [in which] the use of a live line tool is impractical due
[to] space constraints and equipment design" (id.). There was no
opposition to this part of proposed paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2), so
OSHA is adopting the proposed exception for lines or equipment operated
at 600 volts or less in this final rule.
Some rulemaking participants recommended that OSHA revise the
language in proposed paragraph (f)(2) to provide additional protection
for employees who are removing grounds from deenergized lines (Exs.
0162, 0230; Tr. 900-901). Mr. James Tomaseski with IBEW described the
problem and recommended a solution as follows:
The removal of protective grounds has caused many fatal
accidents over the years. As far back as the IBEW has maintained
accident records, removal of grounds in the wrong sequence has been
the principal factor in these grounding accidents.
One might assume that the same hazard exists during installation
of the grounds, but the situation is actually different. The
accident always occurs when an employee is in the process of
removing a ground potential clamp from one of the number of grounds
that are connected in the same location on the pole or structure.
Mistake is made when a ground end is removed and the other end
is connected to the phase conductor, and usually because of induced
voltage from a parallel or crossing energized circuit, the employee
ends up holding an energized ground clamp in his or her hand while
wearing only leather gloves.
This can be rectified by prescribing a work rule that, when more
than one ground end connection is assembled in the same general area
on the pole or the structure, all phase conductor ends must be
removed first before any ground ends are removed. This is consistent
with the new code language that Subcommittee 8 of the National
Electric Safety Code has adopted to address this problem. [Tr. 900-
901]
OSHA agrees that the process of removing grounds can be even more
dangerous than installing them. As noted earlier, if a worker removes
the grounded end of a grounding cable before the line end, the worker,
who typically will not be using a live-line tool or other form of
protective equipment, will be in contact with any residual voltage on
the "deenergized" line or equipment, which may be from induced
voltage or voltage backfeed. As Mr. Tomaseski notes, this situation has
resulted in fatal accidents (Ex. 0004 \419\). However, the final rule
prohibits the practice of removing the ground end after the line or
equipment end, including when the grounding cables are crossed or
parallel. Although the rule does not prescribe a particular method of
installing and removing parallel or crossed conductors, OSHA expects an
employer's work rules and training to adequately ensure the correct
order of removal of grounds however employees install them. Depending
on the circumstances, the employer may have to instruct employees to
remove all phase conductor ends first so as to avoid confusion between
multiple grounds. For the reasons explained by IBEW, the Agency does
not consider a work rule that simply repeats the OSHA standard to be
adequate to prevent employees from removing the grounded end of the
wrong cable in circumstances in which it is reasonably likely that
employees will mistake one ground for another during the removal
process. If the employer's work methods could cause confusion for
employees regarding the identity of a cable or cable end, then the
employer must design the work rules and training to prevent employees
from removing the ground ends of cables still attached at their line or
equipment ends.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\419\ See, for example, the two accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=200780245&id=922914.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, note that, during the periods before employees install
all of the grounds and after employees remove the first end of a
ground, the line or equipment involved must be considered as energized
(under final Sec. 1926.960(b)(2)). As a result, the live work
provisions in final Sec. 1926.960(c) apply during these periods. The
employer's work rules and training must also account for this
requirement. For example, when an employee cuts a deenergized and
grounded conductor, unless both sides of the cut are grounded or
connected by a bonding jumper, the employee must treat as energized the
end that is not connected to ground when he or she is making the cut.
In this case, the employer's work rules must either provide for
grounding
both sides of the cut or ensure that the employee complies with the
minimum approach-distance requirements with respect to the ungrounded
end of the conductor.
As the preamble to the proposal noted, with certain underground
cable installations, the current from a fault at one location along the
cable can create a substantial potential difference between the earth
at that location and the earth at other locations (70 FR 34875). Under
normal conditions, this is not a hazard. However, if an employee is in
contact with a remote ground (by being in contact with a conductor
grounded at a remote station), he or she can be exposed to the
difference in potential (because he or she also is in contact with the
local ground). To protect employees in such situations, final paragraph
(g) prohibits grounding cables at remote locations if a hazardous
potential transfer could occur under fault conditions. OSHA adopted
this provision from existing Sec. 1910.269(n)(8), which has no
counterpart in existing Subpart V. Mr. James Junga with Local 223 of
the Utility Workers Union of America expressed support for this
provision (Ex. 0197). OSHA is adopting paragraph (g) without
substantive change from the proposal.
Paragraph (h) addresses the removal of grounds for test purposes.
Employers may permit employees to remove grounds for test purposes
following the procedure specified by paragraph (h). Existing Subpart V
contains a comparable requirement in Sec. 1926.954(g). However, the
existing standard simply requires employees to take extreme caution
when removing grounds for testing. In the preamble to the proposed
rule, OSHA indicated that it did not believe that the existing language
contains sufficient safeguards for employees (70 FR 34875). Therefore,
the Agency is adopting performance criteria for testing procedures.
OSHA took the language in final paragraph (h) from existing Sec.
1910.269(n)(9). During the test procedure, the employer must: (1)
Ensure that each employee uses insulating equipment, (2) isolate each
employee from any hazards involved, and (3) implement any additional
measures necessary to protect each exposed employee in case the
previously grounded lines and equipment become energized. OSHA believes
that the final rule protects employees better than the existing rule.
The Agency received no comments on this provision in the proposal and
is adopting it without substantive change from the proposal.
14. Section 1926.963, Testing and Test Facilities
Section 1926.963 of the final rule contains safety work practices
covering electrical hazards arising from the special testing of lines
and equipment (namely, in-service and out-of-service, as well as new,
lines and equipment) to determine maintenance needs and fitness for
service. Generally, the NESC specifies the need to conduct tests on new
and idle lines and equipment as part of normal checkout procedures, in
addition to maintenance evaluations. As stated in paragraph (a), final
Sec. 1926.963 applies only to testing involving interim measurements
using high voltage, high power, or combinations of both high voltage
and high power, as opposed to testing involving continuous measurements
as in routine metering, relaying, and normal line work.
OSHA adopted this section from existing Sec. 1910.269(o). Existing
Subpart V has no counterpart to the requirements in this section. In
the preamble to the proposal, the Agency stated its belief that
employees perform these high-voltage and high-current tests during
construction work and that employees and employers would benefit from
the inclusion of these provisions in the construction standard instead
of a reference to Sec. 1910.269 (70 FR 34876). However, in the
proposal, OSHA requested comments on the need to include proposed Sec.
1926.963 in Subpart V.
The Agency received little response to this request for comments,
but commenters who did respond supported the inclusion of proposed
Sec. 1926.963 in the final rule. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0175,
0186, 0213.) TVA expressed its support as follows:
Our experience shows that the tests performed before new
equipment and conductors are energized for electrical service on the
system may be performed by either the construction contractor or the
owner's maintenance and operations employees. It is recommended that
the requirements in 1910.269(o) be repeated in proposed Sec.
1926.963. [Ex. 0213]
With the endorsement of these commenters, OSHA included Sec.
1926.963 on testing and test facilities in the final rule.
For the purposes of this section, OSHA assumes that high-voltage
testing involves voltage sources having sufficient energy to cause
injury and having magnitudes generally in excess of 1,000 volts,
nominal. High-power testing involves sources of fault current, load
current, magnetizing current, or line dropping current for testing,
either at the rated voltage of the equipment under test or at lower
voltages. Final Sec. 1926.963 covers such testing in laboratories, in
shops and substations, and in the field. However, the Agency believes
that testing in laboratories and shops will almost always fall under
final Sec. 1910.269(o), rather than final Sec. 1926.963.
Examples of typical special tests in which employees use either
high-voltage sources or high-power sources as part of operation,
maintenance, and construction of electric power transmission and
distribution systems include cable-fault locating, large capacitive
load tests, high current fault-closure tests, insulation-resistance and
leakage tests, direct-current proof tests, and other tests requiring
direct connection to power lines.
Excluded from the scope of final Sec. 1926.963 are routine
inspection- and maintenance-type measurements made by qualified
employees for which the hazards associated with the use of intrinsic
high-voltage or high-power sources require only the normal precautions
specified by Subpart V. The work practices for these routine tests
would have to comply with the rest of final Subpart V. Because this
type of testing poses hazards that are identical to other types of
routine electric power transmission and distribution work, OSHA
believes that the requirements of final Subpart V, other than Sec.
1926.963, adequately protect employees performing these tests. Two
typical examples of such excluded test work procedures would be
"phasing-out" testing and testing for a "no voltage" condition. To
clarify the scope of this section, OSHA included a note to this effect
after paragraph (a).
Paragraph (b)(1), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires employers to establish and enforce work
practices governing employees engaged in certain testing activities.
These work practices delineate precautions that employees must observe
for protection from the hazards of high-voltage or high-power testing.
For example, if an employer uses high-voltage sources in the testing,
the employer must institute safety practices under paragraph (b)(1) to
protect employees against such typical hazards as inadvertent arcing or
voltage overstress destruction, as well as accidental contact with
objects that have induced voltage from electric field exposure. If an
employer uses high-power sources in the testing, the employer must
establish safety practices to protect employees against such typical
hazards as ground voltage rise, as well as exposure to excessive
electromagnetic forces associated with the passage of heavy current.
These practices apply to work performed at both permanent and
temporary test areas (that is, areas permanently located in
laboratories or shops or in temporary areas located in the field). At a
minimum, the safety work practices include:
(1) Safeguards for the test area to prevent inadvertent contact
with energized parts,
(2) Safe grounding practices,
(3) Precautions for the use of control and measuring circuits, and
(4) Periodic checks of field test areas.
Final paragraph (b)(2) complements the general rule on the use of
safe work practices in test areas with a requirement that employers
ensure that each employee involved in these safety test practices
receives training in safe work practices upon his or her initial
assignment to the test area. This paragraph simply makes explicit one
type of training required in any event by the general training
provisions in final Sec. 1926.950(b). Paragraph (b)(2) of final Sec.
1926.963 also requires the employer to provide retraining as required
by final Sec. 1926.950(b). OSHA is adopting paragraph (b)(2) of final
Sec. 1926.963 without substantive change from the proposal.
Although specific work practices used in test areas generally are
unique to a particular test, three basic elements affecting safety are
commonly present to some degree at all test sites: Safeguarding,
grounding, and the safe use of control and measuring circuits. By
considering safe work practices in these three categories, OSHA
provided a performance-oriented standard applicable to high-voltage and
high-power testing and test facilities.
OSHA believes that employers can best achieve safeguarding when
they provide it both around and within test areas. By controlling
access to all parts that are likely to become energized by either
direct or inductive coupling, the standard will prevent accidental
contact by employees. Within test areas, whether temporary or
permanent, employers can achieve a degree of safety by ensuring that
employees observe safeguarding practices that control access to test
areas. Therefore, paragraph (c)(1), which is being adopted without
substantive change from the proposal, requires that employers provide
such safeguarding if the test equipment or apparatus under test could
become energized as part of the testing by either direct or inductive
coupling. A combination of guards \420\ and barriers \421\ or
barricades \422\ can provide protection to all employees in the
vicinity of the testing. In final paragraph (c)(1) and elsewhere in
paragraphs (b) and (c) of final Sec. 1926.963, OSHA changed the words
"guarding" and "guarded" to "safeguarding" and "safeguarded,"
respectively, to clarify when employers may use protective measures
other than guards, such as barricades.
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\420\ A guard is a physical barrier to an area or hazard. It is
usually an enclosure.
\421\ According to final Sec. 1926.968, a "barrier" is "[a]
physical obstruction that prevents contact with energized lines or
equipment or prevents unauthorized access to a work area." Fences
and walls are examples of barriers.
\422\ According to final Sec. 1926.968, "barricade" is "[a]
physical obstruction such as tapes, cones, or A-frame type wood or
metal structures that provides a warning about, and limits access
to, a hazardous area."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (c)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires employers to guard permanent test areas,
such as laboratories, by having them completely enclosed by walls or
some other type of physical barrier. In the case of field testing,
paragraph (c)(3) provides a level of safety for temporary test sites
comparable to that achieved in permanent test areas. For these areas,
if employers do not provide permanent fences or gates, employers must
either (1) use distinctively colored safety tape--approximately waist
high--with safety signs attached or (2) station one or more observers
to monitor the test area. Paragraph (c)(3), which is being adopted
without substantive change from the proposal, also accepts safeguarding
of test areas by any barriers or barricades that limit access to the
test area in a manner that is physically and visually equivalent to the
safety tape with signs that employers can use under paragraph
(c)(3)(i).
Since failing to remove a temporary safeguarding means when it is
not required can severely compromise its effectiveness, employers must
make frequent safety checks of the safeguarding means to monitor its
use. For example, leaving barriers in place for a week when the
employer performs testing only an hour or two per day is likely to
result in disregard for the barriers. Accordingly, final paragraph
(c)(4) requires employers to ensure the removal of temporary safeguards
when they are no longer needed for the protection of employees.\423\
OSHA changed the word "barrier" in this paragraph to "safeguards"
because "safeguards" more accurately describes the protective
measures required by paragraph (c)(3) than barriers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\423\ Employees who serve as test observers under final
paragraph (c)(3)(iii) need not leave the area. However, they no
longer function as test observers when the protection they provide
is no longer needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Suitable grounding is another important work practice that
employers can use to protect employees from the hazards of high-voltage
or high-power testing. If employers use high currents in the testing,
they can use an isolated ground-return conductor, adequate for the
service, so that heavy current, with its attendant voltage rise, will
not pass in the ground grid or the earth. Another safety consideration
involving grounding is that employers should maintain at ground
potential all conductive parts accessible to the test operator while
the equipment is operating at high voltage. Final paragraph (d)
contains requirements for proper grounding at test sites.
Final paragraph (d)(1) requires that employers establish and
implement safe grounding practices for test facilities that will ensure
proper grounding of conductive parts accessible to the test operator
and that will ensure that all ungrounded terminals of test equipment or
apparatus under test are treated as energized until determined to be
deenergized by tests. The final rule drops the exception for "portions
of the equipment that are isolated from the test operator by guarding"
specified in proposed paragraph (d)(1) because guarded parts of
equipment are not accessible to the operator.
Paragraph (d)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires employers to ensure either that visible
grounds are applied automatically, or that employees using properly
insulated tools manually apply visible grounds, to the high-voltage
circuits. The grounds must be applied after the circuits are
deenergized but before employees perform work on the circuit or on the
item or apparatus under test. This paragraph also requires common
ground connections to be solidly connected to the test equipment and
apparatus under test.
Paragraph (d)(3), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, addresses hazards resulting from the use of
inadequate ground returns. Inadequate ground returns can result in a
voltage rise in the ground grid or in the earth whenever high currents
occur during the testing.\424\ This paragraph requires the use of an
isolated ground return so that no intentional passage of current, with
its attendant voltage rise, can occur in the ground grid or in the
earth. However, under some conditions, it may be impractical to provide
an isolated ground return. In such cases, it would not be reasonable to
require an isolated ground-return conductor system. Therefore, final
paragraph (d)(3) provides an exception to the requirement for an
isolated ground return if the employer cannot use isolated ground
returns because of the distance between the test site and the electric
energy source and if the employer protects employees from hazardous
step and touch potentials that may develop.\425\ Employers must always
consider the possibility of voltage gradients developing in the earth
during impulse, short-circuit, inrush, or oscillatory conditions.
Examples of acceptable protection from step and touch potentials
include suitable electrical protective equipment and the removal of
employees from areas that may expose them to hazardous potentials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\424\ High current can occur during high-voltage testing, in
which case the testing would also be high-power testing.
\425\ The term "step and touch potentials" refers to voltages
that can appear between the feet of an observer or between his or
her body and a grounded object.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A note following final paragraph (d)(3)(ii) indicates that Appendix
C contains information on measures employers can take to protect
employees from hazardous step and touch potentials. Mr. Brad Davis with
BGE noted that IEEE Std 80, Guide for Safety in AC Substation
Grounding, is a good reference for guidance on protecting against
hazardous step and touch potentials (Ex. 0126). OSHA reviewed IEEE Std
80-2000 and agrees that it does provide useful guidance on measures to
protect employees from hazardous differences in electric potential,
even though it applies to substation grounding rather than to high-
voltage and high-power testing. Therefore, OSHA included references to
this standard in both Appendix C, Protection from Step and Touch
Potentials, and Appendix G, Reference Documents.
Final paragraph (d)(4) addresses situations in which grounding
through the power cord of test equipment would prevent employers from
taking satisfactory measurements or would result in greater hazards for
test operators. Normally, an equipment grounding conductor in the power
cord of test equipment connects it to a grounding connection in the
power receptacle. However, in some circumstances, this practice can
prevent satisfactory measurements, or current induced in the grounding
conductor can cause a hazard to employees. If these conditions exist,
the use of the equipment grounding conductor within the cord would not
be mandatory. In such situations, final paragraph (d)(4) requires the
employer to use a ground clearly indicated in the test set up (for
example, a ground with a distinctive appearance), and the employer must
demonstrate that the ground used affords safety equivalent to the
protection afforded by an equipment grounding conductor in the power
supply cord. OSHA reworded this paragraph in the final rule for
clarity.
Final paragraph (d)(5) addresses grounding after tests and requires
the employer to ensure that a ground is placed on the high-voltage
terminal and any other exposed terminals when any employee enters the
test area after equipment is deenergized. In the case of high
capacitance equipment or apparatus, before any employee applies the
direct ground, the employer must discharge the equipment or apparatus
through a resistor having an adequate rating for the available energy.
A direct ground must be applied to exposed terminals after the stored
energy drops to a level at which it is safe to do so. OSHA adopted this
paragraph substantially as proposed. The Agency reworded paragraph
(d)(5)(i) to explicitly require the employer to discharge equipment or
apparatus before a direct ground is applied. The proposed rule implied
this requirement by ordering paragraph (d)(5)(i), which required
employers to discharge the equipment or apparatus, before paragraph
(d)(5)(ii), which required the application of a direct ground.
Paragraph (d)(6), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, addresses the hazards associated with field testing
in which employers use test trailers or test vehicles. This paragraph
requires that the chassis of such vehicles be grounded and further
requires employers to protect employees, by bonding, insulation, or
isolation, against hazardous touch potentials with respect to the
vehicle, instrument panels, and other conductive parts accessible to
the employees. The following examples describe the protection provided
by each of these methods:
(1) Protection by bonding: Provide, around the vehicle, an area
covered by a metallic mat or mesh of substantial cross-section and low
impedance, with the mat or mesh bonded to the vehicle at several points
and to an adequate number of driven ground rods or, where available, to
an adequate number of accessible points on the station ground grid. All
bonding conductors must be of sufficient electrical size to keep the
voltage developed during maximum anticipated current tests at a safe
value. The mat must be of a size that precludes simultaneous contact
with the vehicle and with the earth or with metallic structures not
adequately bonded to the mat.
(2) Protection by insulation: Provide, around the vehicle, an area
of dry wooden planks covered with rubber insulating blankets. The
physical extent of the insulated area must be sufficient to prevent
simultaneous contact between the vehicle, or the ground lead of the
vehicle, and the earth or metallic structures in the vicinity.
(3) Protection by isolation: Provide an effective means to exclude
employees from any area where they could make simultaneous contact
between the vehicle (or conductive parts electrically connected to the
vehicle) and other conductive materials. Employers may use a
combination of barriers, together with effective, interlocked gates, to
ensure that the system is deenergized when an employee enters the test
area.
Finally, a third category of safe work practices applicable to
employers performing testing work, which complements the first two
safety work practices of safeguarding and grounding, involves work
practices associated with the installation of control and measurement
circuits used at test facilities. Employers must adopt the practices
necessary for the protection of personnel and equipment from the
hazards of high-voltage or high-power testing for every test using
special signal-gathering equipment (that is, meters, oscilloscopes, and
other special instruments). In addition, special settings on protective
relays and reexamination of backup schemes may be necessary to ensure
an adequate level of safety during the tests or to minimize the effects
of the testing on other parts of the system under test. Accordingly,
final paragraphs (e)(1) through (e)(4) address the principal safe work
practices associated with control and measuring circuits used in the
test area.
Generally, control wiring, meter connections, test leads, and
cables should remain within the test area. Paragraph (e)(1), which is
being adopted without substantive change from the proposal, contains
requirements to minimize hazards involving test wiring routed outside
the test area. The employer may not run control wiring, meter
connections, test leads, or cables from a test area unless contained in
a grounded metallic sheath and terminated in a grounded metallic
enclosure or unless the employer takes other precautions that it can
demonstrate will provide employees
with equivalent safety, such as guarding the area so that employees do
not have access to parts that could be hazardous.
Paragraph (e)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, prevents possible hazards that arise from
inadvertent contact with energized accessible terminals or parts of
meters and other test instruments. Employers must isolate meters and
instruments with such terminals or parts from employees performing
tests. If an employer provides isolation by locating test equipment in
metal compartments with viewing windows, the employer must also provide
interlocks that interrupt the power supply when someone opens the
compartment cover.
Paragraph (e)(3) of the final rule addresses protecting temporary
wiring and its connections from damage. This paragraph requires the
employer to protect temporary wiring and its connections against
damage, accidental interruptions, and other hazards. This paragraph
also requires employers to keep the functional wiring used for the test
set-up (that is, signal, control, ground, and power cables) separate
from each other to the maximum extent possible, thereby minimizing the
coupling of hazardous voltages into the control and measuring circuits.
Paragraph (e)(3) in the proposal would have required employers to
secure "[t]he routing and connections of temporary wiring" against
hazards. Paragraph (e)(3) of the final rule clarifies that the employer
has to protect the temporary wiring and its connections against
hazards.
Paragraph (e)(4) of the final rule identifies a final safety work
practice requirement related to control circuits. This paragraph, which
is being adopted without substantive change from the proposal, requires
the presence of a test observer in the test area during the entire test
period if employees will be in the area. The test observer must be
capable of immediately deenergizing all test circuits for safety
purposes.
Since the conditions for conducting field tests differ in important
respects from those for laboratory tests, employers must take extra
care to ensure appropriate levels of safety. Under field test
conditions, employers usually do not provide permanent fences and gates
for isolating the field test area, nor is there a permanent conduit for
the instrumentation and control wiring. Additional hazards include
sources of high-voltage electric energy in the vicinity, other than the
source of test voltage.
It is not always possible in the field for the employer to erect
fences and interlocked gates to prevent employee ingress into a test
area, as is possible during laboratory testing. Consequently, as
described earlier under the summary and explanation for final paragraph
(c)(3), employers must use readily recognizable means to discourage
such ingress during field testing. Accordingly, final paragraph (f)(1)
requires employers to adopt safety practices that provide for a safety
check of temporary and field test areas before employees begin each
group of continuous tests (that is, a series of tests conducted one
immediately after another). Final paragraph (f)(2) provides that the
test operator responsible for the testing verify, before the initiation
of a continuous period of testing, the status of several safety
conditions. These conditions include the state and placement of
barriers and safeguards, the condition of status signals, the marking
and availability of disconnects, the provision of clearly identifiable
ground connections, the provision and use of necessary personal
protective equipment, and the separation of signal, ground, and power
cables. OSHA adopted paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2) without substantive
change from the proposal.
Section 1926.964, Overhead Lines and Live-Line Barehand Work
As noted in paragraph (a)(1), Sec. 1926.964 of the final rule
applies to work performed on or near overhead lines and equipment. The
types of work performed on overhead lines and addressed by this section
include the installation and removal of overhead lines, live-line
barehand work, and work on towers and structures, which typically
expose employees to the hazards of falls and electric shock.
Section 1926.955 of existing Subpart V covers overhead lines. As
OSHA noted in the preamble to the proposal, several requirements in the
existing standard are redundant, and the Agency believes the existing
section needs better organization (70 FR 34878). For example, existing
paragraphs (c) and (d) both apply to the installation of lines parallel
to existing lines. Existing paragraph (c)(3) requires the employer to
ground lines being installed where there is a danger of hazardous
induced voltage, unless the employer makes provisions to isolate or
insulate employees. Paragraph (d)(1) of existing Sec. 1926.955
contains a similar requirement, and the rest of paragraph (d) specifies
exactly how employers are to install the grounding.
Paragraph (q) of existing Sec. 1910.269 also addresses work on
overhead lines. When OSHA proposed to revise Subpart V, the Agency
stated that it believed that "the newer standard is much better
organized, contains no redundancies, and better protects employees than
the older construction standard" (70 FR 34878). Therefore, the Agency
used existing Sec. 1910.269(q), rather than existing Sec. 1926.955,
as the base document in developing proposed Sec. 1926.964. However,
OSHA also proposed requirements for Sec. 1926.964 that the Agency took
from existing Sec. 1926.955 pertaining specifically to construction
work. (Paragraph (q) of existing Sec. 1910.269 does not contain these
requirements, because it does not apply to construction.) For example,
OSHA included the requirements of existing Sec. 1926.955(b), which
applies to metal-tower construction, in the proposed revision of
Subpart V.
Paragraph (a)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires the employer to determine that elevated
structures such as poles and towers are strong enough to withstand the
stresses imposed by the work employees will perform on them. For
example, if the work involves removing and reinstalling an existing
line on a utility pole, the pole must withstand the weight of the
employee (a vertical force) and the forces resulting from the release
and replacement of the overhead line (a vertical and possibly a
horizontal force). The additional stress involved may cause the pole to
break, particularly if the pole is rotted at its base. If the pole or
structure cannot withstand the imposed loads, the employer must
reinforce the pole or structure so that failure does not occur. This
rule protects employees from hazards posed by the failure of a pole or
other elevated structure. OSHA took this requirement, which is
equivalent to existing Sec. 1926.955(a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(4), from
existing Sec. 1910.269(q)(1)(i).
In ascertaining whether a wood pole is safe to climb, as required
under paragraph (a)(2), it is important to check the actual condition
of the pole for the presence of decay or other conditions adversely
affecting the strength of the pole.\426\ Appendix D to Subpart V
contains methods of inspecting and testing the condition of wood
structures before employees climb those structures. OSHA took these
methods,
which employers can use in ascertaining whether a wood structure is
capable of sustaining the forces imposed by an employee climbing it,
from Appendix D to existing Sec. 1910.269. Note that the employer also
must ascertain whether the pole is capable of sustaining any additional
forces imposed on it during the work, such as the weight of employees
working on it, the weight of any new or replaced equipment installed on
it, and forces resulting from putting tension on conductors and guys. A
note to this effect follows paragraph (a)(2). The note also references
Appendix D.
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\426\ In some cases, the host employer will know about the
condition of a pole, such as when the host employer has results from
a pole-inspection program. Host employers must pass any such
information to employees (as required by final Sec. 1926.952(a)(1))
and contractors (as required by final Sec. 1926.950(c)(1)(ii)).
However, in most cases, the employee at the worksite will still need
to inspect the structure for deterioration to determine whether it
is safe to climb.
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The employer can comply with final paragraph (a)(2) by ensuring
that the design of support structures can withstand the stresses
involved, training employees in proper inspection and evaluation
techniques, and enforcing company rules that adhere to the standard.
OSHA notes that employees in the field do not necessarily have
structural engineering skills, so in many situations--such as those
involving the installation of new, heavier, equipment in place of
older, lighter, equipment--the employer might need to have its
engineering staff conduct engineering analyses to ensure that the pole
can withstand the stresses involved. (Typically, utilities perform this
task in the initial design of the system or when they plan changes to
it.) In such situations, the Agency still expects the employer to have
the determination of the condition of the pole or structure made at the
worksite by an employee who is capable of making this determination.
When employees handle a pole near overhead lines, it is necessary
to prevent the pole from contacting exposed, energized lines. Paragraph
(a)(3)(i) of final Sec. 1926.964 prohibits letting the pole come into
direct contact with exposed, energized overhead conductors. One measure
commonly used to prevent such contact involves pulling conductors away
from the area where the pole will go. OSHA took final paragraph
(a)(3)(i), which is equivalent to existing Sec. 1926.955(a)(5)(i),
from existing Sec. 1910.269(q)(1)(ii).
Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI recommended that OSHA revise this section
to specify the measures that employers must take if employees bring
poles within the minimum approach distance, explaining:
Poles whether wood, steel or concrete are conductive, often very
conductive, and should never enter MAD without insulated cover-up.
However, the task of taking poles into MAD is conducted thousands of
times each day across the US. OSHA needs to insure that safe work
practices are used when working with poles. [Ex. 0155]
Paragraph (a)(3)(i) of the final rule protects employees against
injury from contact with conductors knocked down by poles being set,
moved, or removed. OSHA did not design this paragraph primarily to
protect against electric shock caused by approaching too closely to
energized parts. OSHA agrees with Mr. Erga that poles are conductive
and that employees must not take them within the minimum approach
distance of energized parts. However, final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(iii)
already prohibits employees from taking any conductive object closer to
exposed energized parts than the employer's established minimum
approach distance, unless employers take certain protective measures.
The Agency believes that it is unnecessary to repeat those requirements
or alter them here. However, it is possible that the preamble to the
proposal prompted Mr. Erga's comment; the preamble indicated that
"[m]easures commonly used to prevent . . . contact [between poles and
lines] include installation of insulating guards on the pole" (70 FR
34879). In light of Mr. Erga's apparent confusion, OSHA did not include
this example in the final explanation for paragraph (a)(3)(i). In any
event, Mr. Erga's recommendation does not protect employees from injury
by conductors knocked down by poles. Therefore, OSHA is adopting
paragraph (a)(3)(i) substantively as proposed.
Paragraph (a)(3)(ii) requires the employer to ensure that employees
who handle a pole while setting, moving, or removing it near an exposed
energized overhead conductor use electrical protective equipment or
insulated devices and do not contact the pole with uninsulated parts of
their bodies. OSHA took this provision from existing Sec.
1910.269(q)(1)(iii). NIOSH supported proposed paragraph (a)(3)(ii),
noting that "[e]lectrocutions have occurred when ground workers not
wearing PPE were guiding poles into holes and a powerline was
contacted" (Ex. 0130). OSHA is adopting paragraph (a)(3)(ii) without
change from the proposal.
Existing Sec. 1926.955(a)(6)(i), which OSHA did not adopt in final
Sec. 1926.964, requires employers to ensure that employees standing on
the ground do not contact equipment or machinery that is working
adjacent to energized lines or equipment, unless the employees are
using suitable electrical protective equipment. The final rule covers
the hazards of using mechanical equipment near energized parts in Sec.
1926.959, discussed earlier in this section of the preamble, and the
Agency does not believe that there is a need for redundancy in Sec.
1926.964. In fact, OSHA designed the final rule to eliminate the
redundant and conflicting requirements contained in existing Subpart V.
OSHA notes that it also left existing Sec. 1926.955(a)(5)(ii),
(a)(6)(ii), and (a)(8) out of final Sec. 1926.964 because final Sec.
1926.959 already adequately covers the hazards addressed by these
provisions (that is, hazards related to operation of mechanical
equipment near energized parts).
Paragraphs (a)(3)(i) and (a)(3)(ii) protect employees from hazards
caused by falling power lines and by the pole's contacting the line.
They apply in addition to other applicable provisions, including
requirements in final Sec. 1926.959(d) for operations involving
mechanical equipment and in final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(iii) for minimum
approach distances.
To protect employees from falling into holes dug for poles,
paragraph (a)(3)(iii), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, requires employers to physically guard the
holes, or ensure that employees attend the holes, whenever anyone is
working nearby.\427\ OSHA took this provision, which is equivalent to
existing Sec. 1926.955(a)(7), from existing Sec. 1910.269(q)(1)(iv).
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\427\ For the purpose of Sec. 1926.964(a)(3)(iii), "nearby"
means that an employee on the ground is near enough to the hole that
he or she could fall into it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (b) addresses the installation and removal of overhead
lines. OSHA took the provisions contained in this paragraph from
existing Sec. 1910.269(q)(2), which OSHA based in large part on
existing Sec. 1926.955(c) (stringing and removing deenergized
conductors) and Sec. 1926.955(d) (stringing adjacent to energized
lines). However, the final rule, as with existing Sec. 1910.269(q)(2),
combines these provisions into a single paragraph (b). OSHA believes
that these provisions, which combine and simplify the construction
requirements for stringing overhead lines, will be easier for employers
and employees to understand. OSHA added "(overhead lines)" after
"overhead conductors or cable" in the introductory text to paragraph
(b) in the final rule to clarify that paragraph (b) uses these terms
synonymously.
Paragraph (b)(1) requires employers to take precautions to minimize
the possibility that conductors and cables, during installation and
removal, will contact energized power lines or equipment. This
paragraph requires
employers to do so by stringing conductors using the tension-stringing
method (which keeps the conductors off the ground and clear of
energized circuits) or by using barriers, such as rope nets and guards
(which physically prevent one line from contacting another). Employers
also may use equivalent measures. This paragraph protects employees
against electric shock and against the effects of equipment damage
resulting from accidental contact between the line and energized parts
during line installation and removal.
Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, Maryland and Delaware
Association of Electric Cooperatives asked the Agency to "clarify that
this requirement is necessary to avoid hazards only when crossing or
paralleling existing energized cables and conductors" (Ex. 0175).
OSHA generally agrees with this comment, but notes that the
required precautions are necessary whenever the lines can contact any
energized parts, not just existing energized cables and conductors.
Therefore, to clarify the rule, the Agency added the clause "[w]hen
lines that employees are installing or removing can contact energized
parts" at the beginning of final paragraph (b)(1).
Even though the precautions taken under paragraph (b)(1) minimize
the possibility of accidental contact, there is still a significant
residual risk that the line could contact energized parts during
installation or removal of the line. In the 1994 rulemaking on Sec.
1910.269, OSHA concluded that the hazards posed during line
installation or removal were equivalent to the hazards posed during the
operations of mechanical equipment near energized parts (59 FR 4406).
Employee exposure to hazardous differences in potential occurs if,
during installation or removal of the line, the conductor or the
equipment installing or removing the conductor contacts an energized
part. The methods of protection employers can apply also are the same
in both cases. Therefore, the Agency concluded that the approach
applied to the hazard associated with contact between mechanical
equipment and overhead lines also should apply to the hazard associated
with contact between an existing energized conductor and a line during
installation and removal of the line. Accordingly, paragraph (b)(2) of
proposed Sec. 1926.964 adopted the requirements of proposed Sec.
1926.959(d)(3) by reference for conductors, cables, and pulling and
tensioning equipment in situations in which employees install or remove
conductors or cables close enough to energized conductors that certain
failures (in the pulling or tensioning equipment, the conductor or
cable being pulled, or the previously installed lines or equipment)
could energize the pulling or tensioning equipment, conductor, or
cable. Therefore, the proposal essentially provided that the employer
would have to institute measures to protect employees from hazardous
differences in potential at the work location. (See the discussion of
final Sec. 1926.959(d)(3) and Appendix C to Subpart V for acceptable
methods of compliance.)
Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI recommended that the heading to paragraph
(b)(2) be shortened from "Conductors, cables, and puling and
tensioning equipment" to "Pulling and Tensioning Equipment" (Ex.
0155). Mr. Erga also proposed extensive new language for this
provision, explaining:
[ESCI's] proposed changes to 1926.694(b)(2) [use] current
industry safe work practices accepted in the electrical industry and
supported by IEEE 516 Section 7.5 and IEEE 1048 Section 10. These
changes are the current thinking of the industry and should be
followed to protect workers near mechanical equipment. [Id.]
As discussed earlier in this section of the preamble, Mr. Erga made
a similar proposal with respect to proposed Sec. 1926.959(d)(3) (id.).
OSHA rejected that proposal. (See the summary and explanation for final
Sec. 1926.959(d)(3), earlier in this section of the preamble.) The
Agency is declining to adopt Mr. Erga's proposal here for the same
reasons. In addition, OSHA believes that it is important for the final
rule to allow employers to set the same procedures for protecting
pulling and tensioning equipment as they set for other types of
mechanical equipment; the hazards, and the methods of protecting
employees, are the same. The Agency declines to change the heading for
this paragraph, as suggested by Mr. Erga, because this paragraph
applies not only to pulling and tensioning equipment, but to conductors
and cables as well. Therefore, OSHA adopted paragraph (b)(2)
substantially as proposed. In the final rule, OSHA replaced the word
"wire" with "conductor" for consistency, as proposed Sec.
1926.964(b)(2) used these words interchangeably.
Mr. James Junga with Local 223 of the Utility Workers Union of
America requested clarification of proposed paragraph (b)(2) as it
applies to pulling underground cables up a pole (Ex. 0197). First, he
asked if this provision addressed the stress that the pulling operation
puts on the pole (id.). OSHA notes that it addressed these hazards in
final paragraph (a)(2), which requires the employer to determine that
elevated structures such as poles and towers are strong enough to
withstand the stresses imposed by the work employees will perform. In
making that determination, the employer must consider the stresses
imposed by pulling underground cables up a pole.
Second, Mr. Junga asked whether paragraph (b)(2) applies to pulling
operations when employees pull an underground cable up a pole between
energized conductors. OSHA considers an underground cable-pulling
operation to fall under the overhead line provisions whenever employees
pull the "underground" cable up a pole or other overhead structure
because the cable is an overhead line where the cable rises overhead.
Thus, the precautions in final paragraph (b)(2) apply when employees
pull an underground cable up a pole close enough to energized
conductors that the specified failures could energize the pulling or
tensioning equipment or the cable.
Paragraph (b)(3), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires the disabling of the automatic-reclosing
feature of the devices protecting any circuit for conductors energized
at more than 600 volts and that pass under conductors employees are
installing or removing. If the employer did not make the automatic-
reclosing feature inoperable, it would cause the circuit protective
devices to reenergize the circuit after they had tripped, exposing the
employees to additional or more severe injury.
Final paragraph (b)(1) requires the use of techniques that minimize
the possibility of contact between existing and new conductors. Final
paragraph (b)(2) requires the use of measures that protect employees
from hazardous differences in potential. These two paragraphs provide
the primary protection to employees installing conductors. Final
paragraph (b)(3) is a redundant form of protection; it provides an
additional measure of safety in case the employer violates the first
two provisions.\428\ Therefore, this paragraph applies only to circuit
reclosing devices designed to permit the disabling of the automatic-
reclosing feature. The Agency believes that the
combination of final paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) will provide
effective protection to employees against the electrical hazards
associated with installing or removing lines near energized parts.
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\428\ Disabling the reclosing feature of circuit protective
devices does not provide any protection against initial contact with
the energized circuit involved. It only prevents the devices from
reenergizing the circuit after they open it on a fault condition as
would occur, for example, when a line an employee is stringing drops
onto an energized conductor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA proposed paragraph (b)(4) to protect workers from the hazard
of induced voltage on lines they are installing near (and usually
parallel to) other energized lines. Proposed paragraph (b)(4) contained
supplemental provisions on grounding that would have applied, in
addition to grounding requirements elsewhere in Subpart V. The proposed
paragraph generally would have required employers to ground these lines
to minimize the voltage and protect employees handling the lines from
electric shock when there was a hazard from induced voltage.
Proposed paragraph (b)(4) provided that, before employees install
lines parallel to existing energized lines, the employer would have to
determine the approximate voltage to be induced in the new lines or
assume that the induced voltage would be hazardous. Additionally, the
proposal would have permitted employers to treat the line as energized
rather than comply with the grounding requirements contained in
proposed paragraph (b)(4). As proposed, paragraph (b)(4) contained five
requirements that would have applied unless: (a) The employer could
demonstrate that the lines being installed were not subject to the
induction of hazardous voltage or (b) the lines were treated as
energized. These provisions would have required employers to:
(1) Install grounds on each bare conductor in increments of no more
than 2 miles (proposed paragraph (b)(4)(i));
(2) Ensure that grounds remain in place until completion of the
installation between dead ends (proposed paragraph (b)(4)(ii));
(3) Remove grounds as the last phase of aerial cleanup (proposed
paragraph (b)(4)(iii));
(4) Install grounds at each work location and at all open dead-end
or catch-off points or the next adjacent structure when employees are
working on bare conductors (proposed paragraph (b)(4)(iv)); and
(5) Bond and ground bare conductors before splicing them (proposed
paragraph (b)(4)(v)).
Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI objected to the requirements in proposed
paragraph (b)(4), maintaining that the proposed provisions had serious
flaws that posed hazards to employees (Exs. 0155, 0471; Tr. 1254-1256).
He proposed alternative provisions to protect workers installing lines
from hazards associated with the lines becoming energized either
through contact with energized parts or by electromagnetic or
electrostatic induction (id.). He explained:
[S]everal paragraphs in the current section of OSHA 1910.269(q)
and the proposed section of OSHA 1926.964 are simply wrong and "old
school." Much of the current and proposed regulations rely on
theories and beliefs that have been found to be totally incorrect
and in some cases deadly wrong.
OSHA 1910.269(q)(2)(iv) and 1926.964(b)(4)(i) requires:
(i) Each bare conductor shall be grounded in increments so that
no point along the conductor is more than 3.22 km (2 miles) from a
ground.
(ii) If employees are working on bare conductors, grounds shall
also be installed at each work location where these employees are
working and grounds shall be installed at all open dead-ends or
catch-off points or the next adjacent structure.
OSHA 1926.964(b)(4)(i) through (b)(4)(iv) provides no protection
and cannot be justified with today's knowledge of equipotential
grounding procedures. These procedures are not supported in any
industry published documents and contradicts IEEE 1048.
. . . ESCI has yet to find an industry expert who can explain
the reason for OSHA 1910.269(q)(2)(iv) and 1926.964(b)(4)(i). In
fact these procedures create lethal hazards on de-energized lines
and equipment for workers. Again, these rules are from the days when
we believed in safety of "felt hats" and the "horse and buggy."
Documented fatal accidents prove multiple sets of grounds on the
same de-energized line can create electrostatic induction at lethal
levels. On December 18, 2000, Connecticut Light and Power sustained
a fatal accident when a qualified worker was electrocuted on a
grounded static wire, of a de-energized and grounded line that was
grounded in multiple locations along the lines route . . . .
IEEE 1048-2003, Section 4.4.2 "Magnetic coupling under normal
conditions" discusses the hazard developed by closing the station
ground switches and installing grounds at the worksite (use of
multiple grounds at multiple locations along the line). This hazard
can be easily eliminated by grounding at one location; the worksite
with [an equipotential zone].
Other industry studies have shown that more than one personal
protective ground, installed at the work location, does nothing but
create additional hazards. [Ex. 0471]
Mr. Erga's comment convinced the Agency that multiple unnecessary
grounds can lead to injury and that proposed paragraph (b)(4), which
provided for multiple redundant grounds, is therefore insufficiently
protective. Furthermore, OSHA notes that other provisions in the
standard that require protective grounding impose performance
requirements that protect employees from hazardous differences in
potential. For example, final Sec. 1926.962(c) requires temporary
protective grounds to be placed on deenergized conductors to prevent
employee exposure to hazardous differences in electric potential.
Paragraph (d)(3)(iii) of final Sec. 1926.959 requires employers to
protect each employee from hazards that might arise from mechanical
equipment's contacting energized lines, including protection from
hazardous differences in electric potential. OSHA decided to adopt a
similar provision here. First, the Agency divided paragraph (b)(4) of
proposed Sec. 1926.964 into two paragraphs. Final paragraph (b)(4)(i),
which is described further later in this section of the preamble,
contains the first sentence from the introductory text to proposed
paragraph (b)(4) without substantive change. Paragraph (b)(4)(ii),
which replaces the last sentence of the introductory text to proposed
paragraph (b)(4) and proposed paragraphs (b)(4)(i) through (b)(4)(v),
sets the employer's obligation to protect employees from hazardous
differences in potential unless the lines employees are installing are
not subject to the induction of a hazardous voltage or unless the lines
are treated as energized. Paragraph (b)(4)(ii) of the final rule reads
as follows:
Unless the employer can demonstrate that the lines that
employees are installing are not subject to the induction of a
hazardous voltage or unless the lines are treated as energized,
temporary protective grounds shall be placed at such locations and
arranged in such a manner that the employer can demonstrate will
prevent exposure of each employee to hazardous differences in
electric potential.
OSHA also added a note following this paragraph, similar to the notes
to final Sec. Sec. 1926.959(d)(3)(iii) and 1926.962(c), indicating
that Appendix C contains guidelines for protecting employees from
hazardous differences in electric potential.
OSHA decided against adopting Mr. Erga's suggested regulatory
language. The Agency believes that his proposed language is too
detailed and that the requirement adopted in the final rule
appropriately states the objective in performance terms. OSHA, however,
considered Mr. Erga's suggested requirements and adopted several of
them as guidelines in Appendix C to final Subpart V for installing
protective grounding equipment to protect employees from hazardous
differences in potential.
As noted earlier, paragraphs (b)(4)(i) and (b)(4)(ii) of the final
rule require the employer to determine whether existing energized lines
will induce hazardous voltage when lines are installed parallel
to the existing lines. OSHA notes that the final rule does not provide
specific guidance for determining whether a hazard exists due to
induced voltage. The hazard depends not only on the voltage of the
existing line, but also on the length of the line employees are
installing and the distance between the existing line and the new one.
Electric shock, whether caused by induced or other voltage, poses two
different hazards. First, the electric shock could cause an involuntary
reaction, which could cause a fall or other injury. Second, the
electric shock itself could cause respiratory or cardiac arrest. If the
employer takes no precautions to protect employees from hazards
associated with involuntary reactions from electric shock, a hazard
exists if the induced voltage is sufficient to pass a current of 1
milliampere through a 500-ohm resistor. (The 500-ohm resistor
represents the resistance of an employee. The 1 milliampere current is
the threshold of perception.) If the employer protects employees from
injury due to involuntary reactions from electric shock, a hazard
exists if the resultant current would be more than 6 milliamperes (the
let-go threshold for women \429\). OSHA included a note to this effect
following final paragraph (b)(4).
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\429\ Electric current passing through the body has varying
effects depending on the amount of the current. At the let-go
threshold, the current overrides a person's control over his or her
muscles. At that level, an employee grasping an object will not be
able to let go of the object. The let-go threshold varies from
person to person; however, there are accepted values for women, men,
and children. At 6 milliamperes, 5 percent of women will not be able
to let go. Thus, this is the accepted let-go threshold for women.
(See 41 FR 55698.)
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Paragraph (b)(5) of the final rule requires reel-handling
equipment, including pulling and tensioning equipment, to be in safe
operating condition, as well as leveled and aligned. Proper alignment
of the stringing machines will help prevent failure of the equipment,
conductors, and supporting structures, which could result in injury to
workers. OSHA is adopting this provision without change from the
proposal.
The purpose of final paragraphs (b)(6), (b)(7), and (b)(8) is to
prevent failure of the line-pulling equipment and accessories. These
provisions, respectively, require the employer to ensure that employees
do not exceed load ratings (limits) of the equipment, require the
repair or replacement of defective pulling lines and accessories, and
prohibit the use of conductor grips on wire rope unless the
manufacturer designed such grips specifically for use in pulling wire
rope. OSHA considers equipment damaged beyond manufacturing
specifications or damaged to an extent that would reduce its load
ratings to be "defective" for the purposes of final paragraph (b)(7).
Manufacturers normally provide load limits and design specifications,
but employers also can find load limits and specifications in
engineering and materials handbooks (see, for example, The Lineman's
and Cableman's Handbook, 269-Ex. 8-5). OSHA adopted paragraphs (b)(6),
(b)(7), and (b)(8) without substantive revision from the proposal.
When employers use the tension stringing method, the pulling rig
(which takes up the pulling rope and thereby pulls the conductors into
place) is separated from the reel stands and tensioner (which pay out
the conductors and apply tension to them) by one or more spans (the
distance between the structures supporting the conductors). In an
emergency, the pulling equipment operator may have to shut down the
operation. Paragraph (b)(9), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, requires the employer to ensure that
employees maintain reliable communication between the reel tender and
the pulling-rig operator through two-way radios or other equivalent
means. OSHA designed this provision to ensure that, in case of
emergency at the conductor supply end, the pulling rig operator can
shut the equipment down before injury-causing damage occurs.
Paragraph (b)(10), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, prohibits the operation of the pulling rig
under unsafe conditions. OSHA included an explanatory note following
final paragraph (b)(10) providing examples of unsafe conditions.
Paragraph (b)(11), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, generally prohibits employees from working
directly beneath overhead operations or on the crossarm while a power-
driven device is pulling the conductor or pulling line and the
conductor or pulling line is in motion. Employees may perform work in
such positions only as necessary to guide the stringing sock or board
over or through the stringing sheave. This provision minimizes employee
exposure to injury resulting from the failure of equipment, conductors,
or supporting structures during pulling operations.
Under certain conditions, employees must perform work on
transmission and distribution lines while they remain energized.
Sometimes, employees use rubber insulating equipment or live-line tools
to accomplish this work. However, this equipment has voltage and other
limitations which make it impossible to insulate the employee
performing work on energized lines under all conditions. In such cases,
usually on medium- and high-voltage transmission lines, employees use
the live-line barehand technique to perform the work. When they perform
work "bare handed," the employees work from an insulated aerial
platform and are electrically bonded to the energized line. In this
configuration, there is essentially no potential difference across the
worker's body, thereby protecting the employee from electric shock.
Final paragraph (c) addresses the live-line barehand technique.
OSHA took paragraph (c) from existing Sec. 1910.269(q)(3).
Existing Sec. 1926.955(e) contains similar requirements for live-line
bare hand work. The following summary and explanation of final Sec.
1926.964(c) outlines the substantive differences between this final
rule and the existing rules.
Because employees perform live-line barehand work on overhead
lines, OSHA proposed to place requirements for this type of work in the
section relating to work on overhead lines. This placement is
consistent with the placement of live-line barehand requirements in
existing Subpart V. However, it is technically possible to perform
live-line barehand work on other types of installations as well (in
substations, for example). In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA
requested comments on whether it should consolidate the live-line
barehand requirements with the other requirements relating to work on
energized lines contained in Sec. 1926.960.
OSHA received few comments on this issue. Most of the commenters
recommended leaving the live-line barehand requirements in the section
on overhead line work. (See, for example, Exs. 0162, 0186, 0227.) TVA
recommended moving the live-line bare hand requirements to Sec.
1926.960 to place all requirements related to work on energized lines
in one location (Ex. 0213). BGE recommended that the live-line barehand
requirements stand alone (Ex. 0126).
OSHA decided to keep the live-line barehand provisions with the
requirements for overhead line work. The Agency believes that nearly
all live-line barehand work is performed on overhead lines. In
addition, the inherent characteristics of the work and the required
minimum approach distances to grounded objects generally make it
difficult to use the live-line barehand technique on energized parts
not
installed overhead. However, OSHA is making changes to Sec. 1926.964
to clarify that paragraph (c) applies to all barehand work on energized
parts. The Agency is modifying the title of final Sec. 1926.964 and
the scope of this section, as set forth in paragraph (a)(1), to
indicate that this section applies to live-line barehand work, in
addition to overhead line work. Thus, final paragraph (c) applies to
live-line barehand work irrespective of whether employees perform this
work on overhead lines.
Final paragraph (c)(1) requires employers to train each employee
using, or supervising the use of, the live-line barehand method on
energized circuits in the technique and safety requirements of final
Sec. 1926.964(c). The training must conform to Sec. 1926.950(b).
Without this training, employees would not be able to perform this
highly specialized work safely. Proposed paragraph (c)(1) incorrectly
implied that only refresher training needed to meet proposed Sec.
1926.950(b). OSHA revised the language in this provision in the final
rule to make it clear that the employee must complete training
conforming to final Sec. 1926.950(b) and that all of the training
requirements in Sec. 1926.950(b) apply.
Before employees can start live-line barehand work, employers must
ascertain the voltage of the lines on which employees will be
performing work. This voltage determines the minimum approach distances
and the types of equipment that employees can use. If the voltage is
higher than expected, the minimum approach distance will be too small,
and the equipment may not be safe for use. Therefore, final paragraph
(c)(2) requires employers to make a determination, before any employee
uses the live-line barehand technique on energized high-voltage
conductors or parts, of the nominal voltage rating of the circuit, of
the clearances to ground of lines and other energized parts on which
employees will perform work, and of the voltage limitations of
equipment they will be using. OSHA is adopting this provision largely
as proposed. The Agency describes two key revisions in the following
paragraph.
First, the final rule clarifies that this information is in
addition to the information about existing conditions that is required
by final Sec. 1926.950(d). Second, final Sec. 1926.964(c)(2)(ii) uses
the term "clearances to ground" in place of the proposed term
"minimum approach distances to ground." OSHA took this provision from
existing Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(ii)(B). OSHA took existing Sec.
1910.269(q)(3)(ii)(B), in turn, from existing Sec. 1926.955(e)(2)(ii),
which uses the term "clearances to ground." \430\
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\430\ In fact, in 1989, OSHA used "clearances to ground" in
proposed Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(ii)(B). The Agency mistakenly changed
the language from "clearances to ground" to "minimum approach
distances to ground" in the 1994 final rule promulgating Sec.
1910.269 because OSHA decided to replace the term "clearance" with
"minimum approach distance" throughout Sec. 1910.269 where it
used the word "clearances" to refer to "[t]he closest distance an
employee is permitted to approach an energized or a grounded
object" (59 FR 4381).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The term "clearances to ground" in existing Sec.
1926.955(e)(2)(ii) refers to the clear distance between energized parts
and ground. That term, not "minimum approach distances to ground," is
appropriate here. Therefore, in final Sec. 1926.964(c)(2)(ii), OSHA is
adopting the term from existing Sec. 1926.955(e)(2)(ii) in place of
the proposed term.
Because an employee performing live-line barehand work is at the
same potential as the line on which he or she is working, the employee
has exposure to two different voltages. First, the employee is exposed
to the phase-to-ground voltage with respect to any grounded object,
such as a pole or tower. Second, the employee is exposed to the full
phase-to-phase voltage with respect to the other phases on the circuit.
Thus, there are two sets of minimum approach distances applicable to
live-line barehand work--one for the phase-to-ground exposure (the
distance from the employee to a grounded object) and one for the phase-
to-phase exposure (the distance from the employee to another phase).
The phase-to-phase voltage is higher than the phase-to-ground voltage.
Consequently, the phase-to-phase-based minimum approach distance is
greater than the phase-to-ground-based minimum approach distance. (See
the explanation of the basis for minimum approach distances in the
summary and explanation for final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1), earlier in this
section of the preamble.)
Paragraph (c)(3)(i), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, requires that the employer ensure that the
insulated tools (such as live-line tools), insulated equipment (such as
insulated ladders), and aerial devices and platforms used by employees
in live-line barehand work are designed, tested, and made for live-line
barehand work. The Agency considers insulated equipment (such as live-
line tools) designed for long-duration contact with parts energized at
the voltage on which employees will use the equipment to meet this
requirement. Insulating equipment designed for brush contact only is
not suitable for live-line barehand work. Paragraph (c)(3)(ii), which
is being adopted without substantive change from the proposal, requires
that employers ensure that employees keep tools and equipment clean and
dry while they are in use. These provisions are important to ensure
that equipment does not fail under constant contact with high-voltage
sources.
Paragraph (c)(4), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires employers to render inoperable the
automatic-reclosing feature of circuit-interrupting devices protecting
the lines if the design of those devices so permits. In case of a fault
at the worksite, it is important for the circuit to be deenergized as
quickly as possible and for it to remain deenergized once the
protective devices open the circuit.\431\ Preventing the reclosing of a
circuit will reduce the severity of any possible injuries.
Additionally, this measure helps limit possible switching-surge
voltage, thereby providing an extra measure of safety for employees.
This provision is comparable to existing Sec. 1926.955(e)(5), which
requires the employer to render the automatic-reclosing feature
inoperable "where practical." The proposal eliminates this phrase
because OSHA believes that it is essential that a line that becomes
deenergized on a fault not be reenergized if possible. During live-line
barehand work, employees have no other back-up system providing for
their safety as they would for work on deenergized lines.\432\ Thus, if
the employee causes a fault on the line, the line must not become
reenergized automatically.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\431\ If the circuit protective devices do not provide an
autoreclosing feature, the circuit will remain deenergized by
design. In addition, voltage surges caused by circuit reclosing
would not occur.
\432\ Protective grounding provides supplementary protection in
case the deenergized line is reenergized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sometimes the weather makes live-line barehand work unsafe. For
example, lightning strikes on lines can create severe transient
voltages against which the minimum approach distances required by final
paragraph (c)(13) (described later in this section of the preamble) may
not provide complete protection to employees working on the line.
Additionally, forces imposed by the wind can move line conductors and
reduce the clearance below the minimum approach distance. To provide
protection against environmental conditions that can increase the
hazards by an unacceptable degree, final paragraph (c)(5) prohibits
live-line barehand work under adverse weather conditions that make the
work
hazardous even after the employer implements the work practices
required by Subpart V. Also, employees may not work under any
conditions in which winds reduce phase-to-phase or phase-to-ground
clearances at the work location below the minimum approach distances
specified in final paragraph (c)(13), unless insulating guards cover
the grounded objects and other lines and equipment.
Existing Sec. 1926.955(e)(6) prohibits live-line barehand work
only during electrical storms. OSHA believes that expanding the
prohibition to include any weather condition making it unsafe to
perform this type of work will increase employee protection. OSHA took
the language for paragraph (c)(5) in the final rule from existing Sec.
1910.269(q)(3)(v), which prohibits live-line barehand work "when
adverse weather conditions would make the work hazardous even after the
work practices required by this section are employed." (Emphasis
added.) OSHA included this language in proposed Sec. 1926.964(c)(5).
The Agency corrected paragraph (c)(5) in the final rule by replacing
the word "section" with "subpart." In addition, the Agency revised
this provision in the final rule to clarify that employees may not
perform work when winds reduce the phase-to-ground or phase-to-phase
clearances (rather than "minimum approach distances") below the
required minimum approach distances.
A note to final paragraph (c)(5) provides that thunderstorms in the
vicinity, high winds, snow storms, and ice storms are examples of
adverse weather conditions that make live-line barehand work too
hazardous to perform safely, even after the employer implements the
work practices required by Subpart V. In the final rule, OSHA revised
the note from the proposal to more closely match the regulatory text in
paragraph (c)(5). In addition, the Agency changed "immediate
vicinity" to "vicinity" to clearly indicate that thunderstorms do
not need to be in the work area to pose hazards.\433\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\433\ Section 7.3.1.1 of IEEE Std 516-2009 states: "Energized-
line maintenance should not be started when lightning is visible or
thunder is audible at the worksite" (Ex. 0532).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (c)(6), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires the use of a conductive device, usually a
conductive bucket liner, for bonding the insulated aerial device to the
energized line or equipment. This bond creates an area of equipotential
in which the employee can work safely. The employee must be bonded to
this device by means of conductive shoes or leg clips or by another
effective method. Additionally, if necessary to protect employees
further (that is, if differences in electric potential at the worksite
pose a hazard to employees), the employer must provide electrostatic
shielding designed for the voltage. This paragraph, which OSHA took
from existing Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(vi), is essentially identical to
existing Sec. 1926.955(e)(7).
To avoid receiving a shock caused by charging current, the employee
must bond the conductive bucket liner or other conductive device to the
energized conductor before he or she touches the conductor. Typically,
employees use a live-line tool to bring a bonding jumper (already
connected to the conductive bucket liner) into contact with the
energized line. This connection brings the equipotential area
surrounding the employee to the same voltage as that of the line. Thus,
paragraph (c)(7), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires the employer to ensure that, before the
employee contacts the energized part, the employee bonds the conductive
bucket liner or other conductive device to the energized conductor by
means of a positive connection. Final paragraph (c)(7) also requires
this connection to remain attached to the energized conductor until
employees complete the work on the energized circuit. This paragraph,
which OSHA took from existing Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(vii), is essentially
identical to existing Sec. 1926.955(e)(14).
Paragraph (c)(8), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires aerial lifts used for live-line barehand
work to have upper controls that are within easy reach of the employee
in the bucket and lower controls near the base of the boom that can
override operation of the equipment. On two-bucket-type lifts, the
upper controls must be within easy reach of both buckets. Upper
controls are necessary so that employees in the bucket can precisely
control the lift's direction and speed of approach to the live line.
Control by workers on the ground responding to directions from a worker
in the bucket could lead to contact by an employee in the lift with the
energized conductor before the bonding jumper is in place. Controls are
necessary at ground level, however, so that employees on the ground can
promptly lower and assist employees in the lift who become disabled as
a result of an accident or illness. Therefore, paragraph (c)(9), which
is being adopted without substantive change from the proposal,
prohibits, except in an emergency, operation of the ground-level
controls when an employee is in the lift. Final paragraphs (c)(8) and
(c)(9), which OSHA took from existing Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(viii) and
(q)(3)(ix), respectively, are essentially identical to existing Sec.
1926.955(e)(12) and (e)(13).
Paragraph (c)(10), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, requires the employer to ensure that
employees check all aerial-lift controls to ensure that they are in
proper working order before employees elevate an aerial lift into the
work position. This paragraph, which OSHA took from existing Sec.
1910.269(q)(3)(x), is essentially identical to existing Sec.
1926.955(e)(10).
To protect employees on the ground from the electric shock they
would receive upon touching the truck supporting the aerial lift,
paragraph (c)(11), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires the body of the truck to be grounded, or
the body of the truck to be barricaded and treated as energized, before
employees elevate the boom. If the truck is grounded, the insulation of
the lift limits the voltage on the body of the truck to a safe level.
This paragraph, which OSHA took from existing Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(xi),
is similar to existing Sec. 1926.955(e)(9). The existing requirement
in Subpart V, however, also includes a provision for using the
outriggers on the aerial lift to stabilize the equipment. Final Sec.
1926.959(b), discussed earlier in this section of the preamble,
addresses the need to stabilize aerial lifts.
Aerial lifts that are used in live-line barehand work are exposed
to the full line-to-ground voltage of the circuit for the duration of
the job. To ensure that the insulating value of the lift being used is
high enough to protect employees, final paragraph (c)(12) requires the
employer to ensure that employees perform a boom-current test before
starting work each day. Employers also must ensure that employees
perform the test each time during the day when they encounter a higher
voltage and whenever changed conditions indicate a need for retesting.
According to final paragraph (c)(12)(i), the test consists of
placing the bucket in contact with a source of voltage equal to that
encountered during the job and keeping it there for at least 3 minutes.
Employees normally accomplish the test at the worksite by placing the
bucket in contact with the energized line on which they will be working
(without anybody in the bucket, of course).
To provide employees with a level of protection equivalent to that
provided by existing Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(xii) and
American National Standard for Vehicle-Mounted Elevating and Rotating
Aerial Devices (ANSI/SIA A92.2-2001 \434\), OSHA proposed, in the third
sentence of paragraph (c)(12), to permit a leakage current of up to 1
microampere per kilovolt of nominal phase-to-ground voltage. In
contrast, the corresponding provision in existing Sec. 1926.955(e)(11)
is less protective; it allows up to 1 microampere of current for every
kilovolt of phase-to-phase voltage.\435\ OSHA received no comments on
this issue and, therefore, adopted the proposed limit of 1 microampere
per kilovolt of nominal phase-to-ground voltage in paragraph
(c)(12)(ii) of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\434\ The 2009 edition of ANSI/SIA A92.2 contains an identical
requirement.
\435\ For a three-phase, Y-connected system, the phase-to-phase
voltage equals times the phase-to-ground voltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final paragraph (c)(12)(iii) requires the immediate suspension of
work from the aerial lift whenever there is an indication of a
malfunction of the equipment, not only during tests. This requirement
will prevent the failure of insulated aerial devices during use and
will only affect work from an aerial lift. Employers may continue work
not involving an aerial lift. Halting work from the lift will protect
employees in the lift, as well as employees on the ground, from the
electrical hazards involved.
OSHA took paragraph (c)(12) from existing Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(xii)
and adopted paragraph (c)(12) without substantive change from the
proposal; this provision in the final rule is similar to existing Sec.
1926.955(e)(11), except as previously noted.
Paragraphs (c)(13), (c)(14), and (c)(15) in the proposed rule would
have generally required employees to maintain the minimum approach
distances specified in Table V-2 through Table V-6 from grounded
objects and from objects at an electric potential different from the
potential of the bucket. Those proposed provisions, which OSHA based on
existing Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(xiii), (q)(3)(xiv), and (q)(3)(xv), were
essentially identical to existing Sec. 1926.955(e)(15), (e)(16), and
(e)(17). Proposed paragraph (c)(13) applied to minimum approach
distances in general; proposed paragraph (c)(14) covered minimum
approach distances for employees approaching or leaving the energized
conductor or bonding to an energized circuit; and proposed paragraph
(c)(15) applied to the distance between the bucket and the grounded end
of a bushing or insulator string and other grounded surfaces. The
latter two paragraphs in the proposal clarified that the employee and
the bucket are, in effect, at phase potential as the employee is
approaching the energized part and that employees would have to
maintain the phase-to-ground minimum approach distance from grounded
objects. The preamble to the proposal noted that the employee also
would have to maintain the phase-to-phase minimum approach distance
from the other phases on the system (70 FR 34882) and requested
comments on whether proposed paragraphs (c)(14) and (c)(15) should
address objects at different phase potentials, in addition to objects
at ground potential.
Only two commenters addressed this issue. BGE commented that it is
reasonable to address only phase-to-ground potential because the
proposed provisions implied phase-to-phase potential (Ex. 0126). IBEW
argued, in contrast, that OSHA also should address phase-to-phase
exposures in paragraphs (c)(14) and (c)(15), commenting:
Since this requirement is contained in the live-line bare-hand
work section of the proposal, the language should address objects at
different phase potential, not just ground potentials. When
performing live-line bare-hand work mid span, the phase-to-phase MAD
could be critical. The same would hold true anytime an aerial device
would be positioned between dead-ends on structures, or any other
configuration when multiphases are present on the structure. [Ex.
0230]
OSHA decided to take a middle course on this issue. When an
employee is working at phase potential, which final paragraph (c)(13)
covers, or moving into or away from the working position, which final
paragraph (c)(14) covers, both phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground
exposures may come into play. Proposed paragraph (c)(13) addressed both
exposures, but, as noted in the preamble to the proposal, proposed
paragraph (c)(14) did not (70 FR 34882). OSHA is correcting this
oversight in the final rule, so that final paragraph (c)(14) also
requires the employer to ensure that employees maintain the minimum
approach distances "between the employee and conductive objects
energized at different potentials."
Proposed paragraph (c)(15) supplemented proposed paragraphs (c)(13)
and (c)(14) and served as a reminder that the phase-to-ground minimum
approach distance applied to the grounded end of the insulator string.
Thus, there is no need to add phase-to-phase exposures to this
paragraph.
OSHA is making an additional change to paragraphs (c)(13) through
(c)(15) to account for changes in the minimum approach-distance
requirements adopted in final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1). The final rule does
not list specific minimum approach distances in tables as the proposal
did. Instead, final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(i) requires the employer to
establish minimum approach distances. (See the summary and explanation
for final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1), earlier in this section of the
preamble.) Consequently, paragraphs (c)(13) through (c)(15) of final
Sec. 1926.964 refer to "minimum approach distances, established by
the employer under Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(i)," in place of the
references to proposed Table V-2 through Table V-6.
Mr. Anthony Ahern with Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives noted that
clearances between phases in substations typically are closer than on
power lines (Ex. 0186). He asserted that if paragraph (c) "is also
going to cover bare hand work in substations then phase to phase
clearances also need to be addressed" (id.).
OSHA does not dispute Mr. Ahern's assertion that phase-to-phase
clearances in substations may be smaller than on overhead lines.
However, if the clearances are too small to permit employees to
maintain minimum approach distances for phase-to-phase exposures while
performing live-line barehand work, then the employer will have to
choose a different work method. The Agency notes that employers already
face this issue under existing Sec. 1910.269 and Subpart V, which both
set minimum approach distances for phase-to-phase exposures.
Paragraph (c)(16), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, prohibits the use of handlines between the
bucket and boom or between the bucket and ground. Such use of lines
could result in a potential difference between the employee in the
bucket and the power line when the employee contacts the handline. If
the handline is a nonconductive type not supported from the bucket,
employees may use it from the conductor to ground. (Unless the rope is
insulated for the voltage, employees on the ground must treat it as
energized.\436\) Lastly, the employer must ensure that no one uses
ropes used for live-line barehand work for other purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\436\ The definition of "insulated" in final Sec. 1926.968
reads: "Separated from other conducting surfaces by a dielectric
(including air space) offering a high resistance to the passage of
current." The note following this definition states: "When any
object is said to be insulated, it is understood to be insulated for
the conditions to which it normally is subjected. Otherwise, it is,
for the purpose of this subpart, uninsulated." Thus, employees must
treat any rope not insulated for the voltage as a conductive object
and, thus, as energized when it is in contact with an energized
part.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA took final paragraph (c)(16) from existing Sec.
1910.269(q)(3)(xvi); this provision is similar to existing Sec.
1926.955(e)(18). However, the existing standard, at Sec.
1926.955(e)(18)(ii), prohibits employees from placing conductive
materials over 36 inches long in the aerial lift bucket. Existing Sec.
1926.955(e)(18)(ii) makes exceptions for "appropriate length jumpers,
armor rods, and tools." OSHA is removing this requirement. Under the
final rule, employers must ensure that employees maintain minimum
approach distances regardless of the length of any conductive object.
Thus, existing Sec. 1926.955(e)(18)(ii) is unnecessary.
Paragraph (c)(17), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, prohibits passing uninsulated equipment or
materials between a pole or structure and an aerial lift while an
employee working from the bucket is bonded to an energized part.
Passing uninsulated objects in this way would bridge the insulation to
ground and endanger the employee. This provision, which OSHA based on
existing Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(xvii), has no counterpart in existing
Sec. 1926.955(e).
Proposed paragraph (c)(18) would have required the employer to
print, on a plate of durable nonconductive material, a table reflecting
the minimum approach distances listed in proposed Table V-2 through
Table V-6. That paragraph would also have required the employer to
mount the plate so as to be visible to the operator of the boom on
aerial devices used for live-line barehand work. This provision, which
OSHA took from existing Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(xviii), was equivalent to
existing Sec. 1926.955(e)(20)(i).
Although the Agency received no comments on this proposed
provision, OSHA is not including it in the final rule. First, the final
rule replaces the tables specifying minimum approach distances with a
requirement that the employer establish minimum approach distances
based on formulas. For voltages over 72.5 kilovolts, where employers
use the live-line barehand technique, those established minimum
approach distances could vary from site to site as the maximum
transient overvoltage varies.\437\ Employers would comply with proposed
paragraph (c)(18) with a table listing either a single minimum approach
distance for each voltage or listing a variety of minimum approach
distances for each voltage. A table listing a single value for each
voltage would list minimum approach distances that employees would not
be using at some sites, possibly leading to confusion. A table listing
a variety of minimum approach distances for each voltage would be more
difficult for employees to follow and might lead them to use
noncompliant minimum approach distances, thus exposing the employees to
sparkover hazards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\437\ The final rule does not require the employer to make site-
by-site engineering analyses. The employer could make an analysis
that applies to a single site, a range of sites, or all sites for a
given voltage, depending on the approach the employer takes in
performing the engineering analysis. See the summary and explanation
for final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(ii), earlier in this section of the
preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, with information provided by the employer under final
Sec. Sec. 1926.950(d) and 1926.952(a)(1), employees will know the
applicable minimum approach distance and will discuss it during the job
briefing required under final Sec. 1926.952(a)(2). Through the job
briefing, the aerial device operator, and, if needed, the observer
required under Sec. 1926.959(d)(2), will know the applicable minimum
approach distance without needing to reference a table mounted on the
boom of the aerial device.
For these reasons, OSHA is not adopting proposed Sec.
1926.964(c)(18) in the final rule.
Final paragraph (c)(18) requires a nonconductive measuring device
to be available and readily accessible to employees performing live-
line barehand work. OSHA took this provision from existing Sec.
1910.269(q)(3)(xix). Existing Sec. 1926.955(e)(20)(ii) recommends, but
does not require, an insulating measuring device. OSHA believes that
this should be a requirement, rather than a recommendation, so that
employees can accurately determine whether they are maintaining the
required minimum approach distances. Compliance with final paragraph
(c)(18) will help the employee accurately determine and maintain the
minimum approach distances required by the standard. OSHA revised
paragraph (c)(18) in the final rule to clarify that the measuring
device must be accessible to employees performing live-line barehand
work.
Existing Sec. 1926.955(e)(19) prohibits employees from
overstressing an aerial lift used in live-line barehand work while
lifting or supporting weights. OSHA did not include this requirement in
proposed or final Sec. 1926.964. The hazard addressed by the existing
requirement is a general hazard, which is present whenever an employee
uses an aerial lift, not just during live-line barehand work. Final
Sec. 1926.959(c), which requires employers to operate mechanical
equipment within its maximum load ratings and other design limitations,
is the appropriate provision addressing the relevant hazards.
Final paragraph (d) addresses hazards associated with towers and
other structures supporting overhead lines. OSHA took this paragraph
from existing Sec. 1910.269(q)(4).
Paragraph (b) of existing Sec. 1926.955 addresses metal tower
construction. Many of the requirements in the existing rules cover the
same hazards as other provisions in the construction standards. For
example, existing Sec. 1926.955(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) address
hazards associated with footing excavations. Subpart P of Part 1926
fully protects power transmission and distribution workers from these
hazards.\438\ Therefore, revised Subpart V contains no counterparts to
these existing requirements. Existing Sec. 1926.955(b)(5)(i) and
(b)(7) contain simple references to other Part 1926 requirements.
Existing Sec. 1926.955(b)(5)(iii), (b)(6)(i), (b)(6)(v), and (b)(8),
which address a few of the hazards associated with mechanical
equipment, contain requirements that are equivalent to provisions in
existing Subpart CC of Part 1926 or final Sec. 1926.959. Revised
Subpart V does not contain counterparts for these six paragraphs. OSHA
believes that eliminating these provisions will reduce redundancy and
will eliminate the potential for conflicts between different standards.
No rulemaking participants opposed the removal of these existing
requirements.
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\438\ Provisions outside Subpart P cover two of the requirements
in the existing paragraphs. Under the last sentence of existing
Sec. 1926.955(b)(1), employees must use ladders to access pad- or
pile-type footing excavations more than 4 feet deep. Paragraph (a)
of Sec. 1926.1051 already addresses this hazard; this provision
requires employers to provide a stairway or a ladder for access to
breaks in elevation of more than 48 cm, unless a ramp, runway,
sloped embankment, or personnel hoist is available. Existing Sec.
1926.955(b)(3)(iii) addresses the stability of equipment used near
excavations. Final Sec. 1926.959(b) and (c) cover hazards
associated with instability of mechanical equipment.
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To protect employees on the ground from hazards presented by
falling objects, paragraph (d)(1), which is being adopted without
substantive change from the proposal, prohibits workers from standing
under a tower or other structure while work is in progress, unless the
employer can demonstrate that their presence is necessary to assist
employees working above. This provision, which OSHA took from existing
Sec. 1910.269(q)(4)(i), is equivalent
to existing Sec. 1926.955(b)(4)(i) and (b)(5)(ii). However, final
paragraph (d)(1) eliminates the redundancy presented by the two
existing requirements in Sec. 1926.955.
Paragraph (d)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires the employer to ensure that employees use
tag lines or other similar devices to maintain control of tower
sections being raised or positioned, unless the employer can
demonstrate that the use of such devices would result in a greater
hazard to employees. The use of tag lines prevents moving tower
sections from striking employees. This provision, which OSHA took from
existing Sec. 1910.269(q)(4)(ii), is similar to existing Sec.
1926.955(b)(4)(ii) and (b)(6)(ii). However, final paragraph (d)(2)
eliminates the redundancy presented by the two existing requirements in
Sec. 1926.955.
Paragraph (d)(3), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires loadlines to remain in place until
employees safely secure the load so that it cannot topple and injure an
employee. This provision, which OSHA took from existing Sec.
1910.269(q)(4)(iii), is essentially identical to existing Sec.
1926.955(b)(4)(iii) and (b)(6)(iii). However, final paragraph (d)(3)
eliminates the redundancy presented by the two existing requirements in
Sec. 1926.955.
Some weather conditions can increase the hazard for employees
working from towers and other overhead structures. For example, icy
conditions may increase the likelihood of slips and falls, perhaps
making them unavoidable. Final paragraph (d)(4) generally provides that
work must stop when adverse weather conditions make the work hazardous
in spite of compliance with other applicable provision of Subpart V.
However, when the work involves emergency restoration of electric
power,\439\ the additional risk may be necessary for public safety, and
the standard permits employees to perform such work even in adverse
weather conditions. This provision, which OSHA took from existing Sec.
1910.269(q)(4)(iv), is essentially identical to existing Sec.
1926.955(b)(6)(iv). OSHA changed "this section" in proposed paragraph
(d)(4) to "this subpart" in final paragraph (d)(4) to accurately
identify the CFR unit involved.
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\439\ For purposes of final paragraph (d)(4), OSHA considers
emergency-restoration work to be work needed to restore an electric
power transmission or distribution installation to an operating
condition to the extent necessary to safeguard the general public.
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A note to paragraph (d)(4) provides that thunderstorms in the
vicinity, high winds, snow storms, and ice storms are examples of
adverse weather conditions that make work on towers or other structures
that support overhead lines too hazardous to perform, even after the
employee implements the work practices required by final Subpart V. In
the final rule, OSHA revised the note to closely match the regulatory
text in paragraph (d)(4). In addition, the Agency changed "immediate
vicinity" to "vicinity" to more clearly indicate that thunderstorms
do not need to be in the work area to pose a hazard.\440\
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\440\ Section 7.3.1.1 of IEEE Std 516-2009 states: "Energized-
line maintenance should not be started when lightning is visible or
thunder is audible at the worksite" (Ex. 0532).
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16. Section 1926.965, Underground Electrical Installations
In many electric distribution systems, utilities install electric
equipment in enclosures, such as manholes and vaults, set beneath the
earth. Section 1926.965 addresses safety for these underground
electrical installations. As noted in final paragraph (a), the
requirements in this section are in addition to requirements contained
elsewhere in Subpart V (and elsewhere in Part 1926) because Sec.
1926.965 only addresses conditions unique to underground facilities.
For example, final Sec. 1926.953, relating to enclosed spaces, also
applies to underground operations involving entry into an enclosed
space.
OSHA took Sec. 1926.965 from existing Sec. 1910.269(t). Existing
Subpart V contains requirements for work on underground lines in Sec.
1926.956. OSHA explains the differences between the existing rules and
the final rule in the following summary and explanation of final Sec.
1926.965.
Paragraph (b), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires the use of ladders or other climbing
devices for entrance into, and exit from, manholes and subsurface
vaults that are more than 1.22 meters (4 feet) deep. Because employees'
jumping into subsurface enclosures or climbing on the cables and
hangers installed in these enclosures can easily injure employees, the
standard requires the use of appropriate devices for employees entering
and exiting manholes and vaults. Paragraph (b) specifically prohibits
employees from climbing on cables and cable hangers to get into or out
of a manhole or vault. OSHA took this provision from existing Sec.
1910.269(t)(1). Existing Subpart V contains no counterpart to this
requirement.
Paragraph (c), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires equipment used to lower materials and tools
into manholes or vaults to be capable of supporting the weight of the
materials and tools and specifies that employers check this equipment
for defects before employees use it. Paragraph (c) also requires
employees to be clear of the area directly under the opening for the
manhole or vault before tools or materials are lowered into the
enclosure. These provisions, found in separate paragraphs in the final
rule, protect employees against injuries from falling tools and
material. Note that, because work addressed by this paragraph exposes
employees to the danger of head injury, Sec. 1926.100(a) requires
employees to wear head protection when they are working in underground
electrical installations. OSHA took paragraph (c) of the final rule
from existing Sec. 1910.269(t)(2). Existing Subpart V contains no
counterpart to this requirement.
Final paragraph (d) requires attendants for manholes and vaults.
Under final paragraph (d)(1), during the time employees are performing
work in a manhole or vault that contains energized electric equipment,
an employee with first-aid training must be available on the surface in
the immediate vicinity \441\ of the manhole or vault entrance (but not
normally in the manhole or vault) to render emergency assistance.
However, under paragraph (d)(2), the attendant may enter the manhole,
for brief periods, to provide nonemergency assistance to the employees
inside.
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\441\ For the purposes of final Sec. 1926.965(d)(1),
"immediate vicinity" means near enough to the manhole or vault
opening that the attendant can monitor employees in the space and
render any necessary assistance in an emergency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The provisions in final paragraph (d) ensure that employers can
provide emergency assistance to employees working in manholes and
vaults, where the employees work unobserved and where undetected injury
could occur. Taken from existing Sec. 1910.269(t)(3) and existing
Sec. 1926.956(b)(1), these requirements protect employees within the
manholes and vaults without exposing the attendants outside to a risk
of injury faced by employees inside these structures.
Because the hazards addressed by final paragraph (d) involve
primarily electric shock, allowing the attendant to
enter the manhole briefly \442\ would have no significant effect on the
safety of the employee he or she is protecting. In case of electric
shock, the attendant would still be able to provide assistance. OSHA is
adopting paragraph (d) without substantive change from the proposed
rule. As noted in the summary and explanation for final Sec. Sec.
1926.951(b) and 1926.953(h) earlier in this section of the preamble,
OSHA adopted a definition of "first-aid training" that provides that
first-aid training includes training in CPR. Therefore, OSHA replaced
the term "first aid and CPR training meeting Sec. 1926.951(b)(1)" in
proposed Sec. 1926.965(d)(1) with "first-aid training" in final
Sec. 1926.965(d)(1).
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\442\ The attendant may remain within the manhole only for the
short period necessary to assist the employee inside the manhole
with a task that one employee cannot perform alone. For example, if
a second employee is necessary to help lift a piece of equipment
into place, the attendant may enter only for the period needed to
accomplish this task. However, if significant portions of the job
require the assistance of a second worker in the manhole, the
attendant may not remain in the manhole for the necessary period,
and a third employee would have to provide the requisite assistance.
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Mr. Kevin Taylor with Lyondell Chemical Company requested that the
Agency clarify what this provision means by "immediate vicinity,"
asking: "Would this definition include someone in a nearby control
room that is readily available (via radio) to come and administer CPR
or first aid?" (Ex. 0218).
Final Sec. 1926.968 defines "attendant" as "[a]n employee
assigned to remain immediately outside the entrance to an enclosed or
other space to render assistance as needed to employees inside the
space." An employee in a control room is not close enough to the
manhole or vault to qualify as an attendant for the purposes of the
final rule.
As previously noted, final paragraph (d)(2) permits the attendant
to occasionally enter the manhole or vault for brief periods to provide
assistance for nonemergency purposes. Note that, if hazards other than
electric shock could endanger the employee in the manhole or vault,
final Sec. 1926.953(h) also may apply. Paragraph (h) in final Sec.
1926.953 requires attendants when employees are working in an enclosed
space (which includes, manholes and vaults) and traffic patterns
present a hazard in the area of the opening to the enclosed space. In
such situations, having an attendant enter the manhole or vault would
expose the attendant and the entrant to the traffic-pattern hazards.
Therefore, the final rule does not permit attendants required under
Sec. 1926.953(h) to enter a manhole or vault. To clarify the
application of the two different attendant requirements, OSHA included
a note following final Sec. 1926.965(d)(2). The note states that Sec.
1926.953(h) may also require an attendant and does not permit this
attendant to enter the manhole or vault.
OSHA included a second note following final paragraph (d)(2). The
second note serves as a reminder that Sec. 1926.960(b)(1)(ii)
prohibits unqualified employees from working in areas containing
unguarded, uninsulated energized lines or parts of equipment operating
at 50 volts or more.
Mr. Lee Marchessault with Workplace Safety Solutions maintained
that there was a conflict between proposed Sec. 1926.953 and Sec.
1926.965 with respect to the requirements for attendants (Ex. 0196; Tr.
580-581). He also recommended that OSHA revise Sec. 1926.965(d)(2) to
permit the attendant to enter a manhole or vault only when it is less
than 1.5 meters (5 feet) in depth (Ex. 0196).
OSHA does not believe that the depth of a manhole or vault is
generally relevant to determining whether an employer should permit an
attendant to enter one of these spaces. If the depth of the manhole or
vault presents a hazard, as it might if it were deep enough to pose
pressure or access and egress hazards, then those hazards would still
endanger the life of an entrant or interfere with escape from the space
even after the employer takes the precautions required by final
Sec. Sec. 1926.953 and 1926.965. In such cases, final Sec.
1926.953(a) would require entries to conform to paragraphs (d) through
(k) of Sec. 1910.146. Otherwise, the hazards for the entrant and
attendant should be independent of the depth of the manhole or vault.
Moreover, the Agency does not believe that there is a conflict
between the requirements for attendants in final Sec. Sec. 1926.953
and 1926.965. As noted earlier, final Sec. 1926.953(h) requires
attendants for work in an enclosed space (which includes, manholes and
vaults) if a hazard exists because of traffic patterns in the area of
the opening to the enclosed space. Thus, this attendant requirement
addresses hazards outside the space. On the other hand, the hazards
addressed by final Sec. 1926.965(d) primarily involve electric shock.
As noted earlier, allowing the attendant required by this paragraph to
enter the manhole or vault briefly has no significant effect on the
safety of the employee he or she is protecting.
Paragraph (d)(3), which is being adopted without change from the
proposal, permits an employee working alone to enter a manhole or
vault, where energized cables or equipment are in service, for brief
periods of time for the purpose of inspection, housekeeping, taking
readings, or similar work. In such situations, the employer must
demonstrate that the employee will be protected from all electrical
hazards.
Mr. Lee Marchessault of Workplace Safety Solutions recommended that
OSHA remove this paragraph from the standard (Ex. 0196; Tr. 581). He
testified that "[t]here is no way to ensure the safety of a worker in
a vault containing energized cables, and an attendant should always be
prepared for rescue in case of emergency" (Tr. 581).
As noted earlier, the purpose of requiring an attendant under final
paragraph (d) is to provide assistance in case the employee in the
manhole or vault receives an electric shock. In proposing paragraph
(d)(3), OSHA believed that, when an employee is performing the types of
work listed in this provision, there is very little chance that he or
she would suffer an electric shock. Mr. Marchessault did not provide
any evidence that the permitted types of work are unsafe or that they
expose employees to a risk of electric shock. In fact, final paragraph
(d)(3) requires the employer to demonstrate that the employee will be
protected from all electrical hazards. Thus, the Agency continues to
believe it is safe for an employee to perform duties such as
housekeeping and inspection without the presence of an attendant in the
circumstances described by final paragraph (d)(3).
NIOSH recommended that this provision require the employer to
demonstrate that employees will also be protected from "hazardous
atmospheres (as required in 1910.146)" (Ex. 0130).
OSHA agrees that employees entering manholes and vaults may be
exposed to hazardous atmospheres. However, these hazards are adequately
addressed by the requirements on enclosed spaces contained in final
Sec. 1926.953, which also apply to manholes and vaults. Consequently,
the Agency is not adopting the recommendation from NIOSH.
Paragraph (d)(4), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires reliable communications through two-way
radios or other equivalent means to be maintained among all employees
involved in the job, including any attendants, the employees in the
manhole or vault, and employees in separate manholes or vaults working
on the same job. This requirement, which OSHA took from existing Sec.
1910.269(t)(3)(iv), has no counterpart in Sec. 1926.956(b)(1).
To install cables into the underground ducts, or conduits, that
will contain them, employees use a series of short jointed rods, or a
long flexible rod, inserted into the ducts. The insertion of these rods
into the ducts is known as "rodding." Employees use the rods to
thread the cable-pulling rope through the conduit. After withdrawing
the rods and inserting the cable-pulling ropes, employees then can pull
the cables through the conduit by mechanical means.
Paragraph (e), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires the employer to ensure that employees
install the duct rods in the direction presenting the least hazard to
employees. To make sure that a rod does not contact live parts at the
far end of the duct line being rodded, which would be in a different
manhole or vault, this paragraph also requires the employer to station
an employee at the remote, or far, end of the rodding operation to
ensure that employees maintain the required minimum approach distances.
This provision, which OSHA took from existing Sec. 1910.269(t)(4), has
no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
To prevent accidents resulting from working on the wrong, and
possibly energized, cable, paragraph (f), which is being adopted
without substantive change from the proposal, requires the employer to
identify the proper cable when multiple cables are present in a work
area. The employer must make this identification by electrical means
(for example, a meter), unless the proper cable is obvious because of
distinctive appearance, location, or other readily apparent means of
identification. The employer must protect cables other than the one
being worked from damage. This paragraph, which OSHA took from existing
Sec. 1910.269(t)(5), is similar to existing Sec. 1926.956(c)(4),
(c)(5), and (c)(6); however, existing Sec. 1926.956(c)(4) and (c)(5)
apply only to excavations. Final paragraph (f) applies the requirements
to all underground installations.
If employees will be moving any energized cables during underground
operations, paragraph (g) requires the employer to ensure that
employees inspect these cables for abnormalities that could lead to a
fault, except as provided in paragraph (h)(2). If the employees find an
abnormality, final paragraph (h)(1) applies. These provisions protect
employees against possibly defective cables, which could fault when
moved, leading to serious injury. OSHA replaced "defects" in proposed
paragraph (g) with "abnormalities" in the final rule for consistency
with the language used in final paragraph (h). In addition, OSHA added
language exempting employers from the inspection requirement when final
paragraph (h)(2) permits employees to perform work that could cause a
fault in an energized cable in a manhole or vault. Under paragraph
(h)(2), employers may perform work that could cause a fault in a cable
when service-load conditions and a lack of feasible alternatives
require that the cable remain energized. In that case, employees may
enter the manhole or vault, and perform that work without the
inspection required by paragraph (g), provided the employer protects
them from the possible effects of a failure using shields or other
devices that are capable of containing the adverse effects of a fault.
Paragraph (g) in the final rule, which OSHA took from existing Sec.
1910.269(t)(6), has no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
Since an energized cable with an abnormality may fail with an
enormous release of energy, employers must take precautions to minimize
the possibility of such an occurrence while an employee is working in a
manhole or vault. Therefore, final paragraph (h) addresses conditions
that could lead to a failure of a cable and injure an employee working
in a manhole or vault.
Final paragraph (h)(1) provides that, if a cable in a manhole or
vault has one or more abnormalities that could lead to a fault or be an
indication of an impending fault, the employer must deenergize the
cable before an employee may work in the manhole or vault, except when
service-load conditions and a lack of feasible alternatives \443\
require that the cable remain energized. For example, under some
service-load conditions, it may not be feasible for the electric
utility to deenergize the cable with the abnormality because the
utility deenergized another line for maintenance work. In such cases,
employees may enter the manhole or vault only if protected from the
possible effects of a failure by shields or other devices capable of
containing the adverse effects of a fault. Final paragraph (h)(1)
provides that the employer must treat the following abnormalities as
indications of impending faults: oil or compound leaking from cable or
joints, broken cable sheaths or joint sleeves, hot localized surface
temperatures of cables or joints, or joints swollen beyond normal
tolerance. However, if the employer can demonstrate that the listed
conditions could not lead to a fault, final paragraph (h)(1) does not
require the employer to take protective measures. This provision, which
OSHA took from existing Sec. 1910.269(t)(7), has no counterpart in
existing Subpart V. OSHA revised the language in the final rule to
clarify that it applies to abnormalities that "could lead to a fault
or be an indication of an impending fault" (emphasis added). The
Agency also included the information in the note to proposed paragraph
(h)(1) in the regulatory text of this final paragraph to clarify that,
when any of the abnormalities specifically listed in paragraph (h)(1)
are present, the burden is on the employer to demonstrate that the
abnormality could not lead to a fault.
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\443\ Feasible alternatives could include the use of shunts or
other means of supplying areas with power.
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As noted earlier in the discussion of the definition for "entry"
under the summary and explanation for final Sec. 1926.953(g), ConEd
and EEI expressed concern that proposed Sec. 1910.269(t)(7)(i) (and by
implication its counterpart in proposed Sec. 1926.965(h)(1)) would
preclude the ability of an employer to enter a manhole or vault and
hang a tag to indicate the presence of a defective cable.
Final Sec. 1910.269(t)(7)(i) and its counterpart in final Sec.
1926.965(h)(1) are substantially the same as existing Sec.
1910.269(t)(7). These provisions generally prohibit employees from
entering a manhole or vault containing a cable that has one or more
abnormalities that could lead to a fault, or be an indication of an
impending fault. Employers are unlikely to know about the abnormalities
addressed by these provisions before employees enter the manholes or
vaults in which they are present. The rule does not prohibit an initial
entry into a manhole or vault, so long as the employer does not have
actual or constructive knowledge of the abnormalities before the
initial entry. If an employer uses the described tagging system to
identify cables with these abnormalities, OSHA expects that the tags
will be hung during the initial entry into the manhole or vault when
employees first identify the abnormalities. Once the employer acquires
knowledge of cables with abnormalities that could lead to a fault, or
be an indication of an impending fault, the final rule prohibits
additional entries unless the employer takes the precautions required
by final paragraph (h)(1).
Paragraph (h)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, addresses work that could cause a fault in a cable,
such as removing asbestos covering on a cable
or using a power tool to break concrete encasing a cable. This type of
work can damage the cable and create an internal fault. The energy
released by the fault could injure not only the employee performing the
work, but any other employees nearby. Final paragraph (h)(2) requires
the same protective measures in those situations as paragraph (h)(1),
that is, deenergizing the cable or, under certain conditions, using
shields or other protective devices capable of containing the effects
of a fault.
Two commenters requested that OSHA clarify the meaning of the
phrase "shields or other devices that are capable of containing the
adverse effects of a fault" in proposed paragraph (h) (Exs. 0209,
0227). Both paragraphs (h)(1) and (h)(2) use this phrase. OSHA notes
that the preamble to the proposal described the types of devices that
employers could use to satisfy these requirements:
For example, a ballistic blanket wrapped around a defective
splice can protect against injury from the effects of a fault in the
splice. The energy that could be released in case of a fault is
known, and the energy absorbing capability of a shield or other
device can be obtained from the manufacturer or can be calculated.
As long as the energy absorbing capability of the shield or other
device exceeds the available fault energy, employees will be
protected. The proposal would require employees to be protected,
regardless of the type of device used and of how it is applied. [70
FR 34884-34885]
This clarification applies equally to the final rule.
Mr. Lee Marchessault with Workplace Safety Solutions suggested that
paragraph (h) also require consideration of FR clothing as outlined in
proposed Appendix F (Ex. 0196).
Employers may use arc-rated clothing, which employers must use
under final Sec. 1926.960(g)(5), in combination with the shields or
other devices specified by final paragraph (h), to achieve the
protection from heat energy required by both of these provisions.
However, paragraph (h) of the final rule requires a broader form of
protection, including protection from flying objects and other hazards
from the fault. Therefore, OSHA does not recognize FR or arc-rated
clothing as a device that is capable, by itself, of containing the
adverse effects of a fault as required by that paragraph.
Consolidated Edison objected to the wording of proposed paragraph
(h)(2) and the explanation of proposed paragraph (h)(2) in the preamble
to the proposal (70 FR 34885), commenting:
While Consolidated Edison does not object to the concept that
OSHA is trying to convey in this new provision, we find the wording
to be unnecessarily vague. In the preamble to the proposed rule,
OSHA uses the example of removing asbestos covering from a cable as
a type of work that could cause a fault. In a given year, Con Edison
conducts almost one hundred (100) projects in which we remove
twenty-five (25) linear feet of asbestos covering from energized
cable. This is the regulatory limit at which we must file for the
project; it does not include projects where we remove less than the
regulatory filing limit. Con Edison has a set procedure by which
this work is conducted. This does not represent work that could be
expected to cause a fault in a cable since we routinely conduct this
work without cable faulting. In addition, we routinely remove arc-
proof tape of non-asbestos type from cables that are energized
without incident.
In another example, you indicate that using a power tool to
break concrete encasing a cable could cause a fault. Con Edison uses
power tools to break concrete duct encasing energized cable as part
of our normal operations. We took the time to analyze the operation
and develop a procedure by which this can be done safely. By
following this procedure, we successfully remove concrete (and other
material) duct from energized cable.
There are recognized work practices that could be expected to
cause a fault in a cable but the two examples OSHA provides in the
preamble to the proposed rule are not these type of operation. As
currently written, the rule could preclude a great deal of work in a
subsurface structure with energized cable even though there is no
danger to employee safety. Therefore, we are suggesting that OSHA
change the proposed language to the following:
If the work being performed in a manhole or vault could be
expected to cause a fault in a cable, that cable shall be
deenergized before any employee may work in the manhole or vault,
except when service load conditions and a lack of feasible
alternatives require that the cable remain energized. In that case,
employees may enter the manhole or vault provided they are protected
from the possible effects of a failure by shields or other devices
that are capable of containing the adverse effects of a fault. [Ex.
0157; emphasis included in original]
EEI similarly objected to the language in proposed paragraph (h),
arguing that "the wording as . . . proposed would eliminate any work
in a structure with live equipment" (Ex. 0227). EEI recommended the
following language to address its concerns: \444\
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\444\ Paraphrasing language from proposed paragraph (h)(1), EEI
indicated that it was commenting on that provision of the proposal
(Ex. 0227). However, EEI recommended revised language that would
replace proposed paragraph (h)(2). In this discussion, OSHA responds
to EEI's comment as it applies to proposed paragraph (h) generally
and to the recommended language as a suggested replacement for
proposed paragraph (h)(2).
If the work being performed in a manhole or vault could be
expected to lead to a fault in a cable, that cable shall be
deenergized before an employee may work on that cable. [Id.;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
emphasis included in original]
First, OSHA disagrees with Consolidated Edison with regard to the
two examples of work that could cause a fault in a cable. In both
cases, the cable is hidden from view--in one case, by an asbestos
covering, and in the other case, by concrete. Employees cannot inspect
the condition of the cable jacket and insulation, which may be decades
old, until after removing the covering.\445\ It is reasonable to expect
that vibrations from the removal of an asbestos or concrete covering
would move the encased cables, and any movement of a cable with an
abnormality, even movement from vibrations, can lead to the failure of
the cable (that is, a fault). In addition, there is at least one
accident in the record involving the use of tools to remove concrete
from underground cables, and others involving tools penetrating
concrete-encased underground cables (Ex. 0004 \446\). Consequently,
OSHA continues to believe that these are two good examples of work that
could cause a fault in a cable.
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\445\ As noted earlier, final paragraph (g) requires employees
to inspect energized cables before moving them, except as provided
in paragraph (h)(2). OSHA added the exception, which the proposal
did not make explicit, to clarify that paragraph (g) does not
require an inspection when paragraph (h)(2) permits employees to
perform work that could cause a fault in an energized cable in a
manhole or vault.
\446\ See, for example, the three accidents described at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170063499&id=14485585&id=170191100.
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Second, the Agency does not agree with EEI that the final rule will
"eliminate any work in a structure with live equipment" (Ex. 0227).
Final paragraph (h) requires employers to deenergize cables only under
limited conditions. Paragraph (h)(1) requires the employer to
deenergize a cable only when the cable has one or more abnormalities
that could lead to a fault or be an indication of an impending fault.
Paragraph (h)(2) requires the employer to deenergize a cable only when
employees will perform work that could cause a fault in that cable. The
final rule permits employees to work in manholes and vaults containing
live equipment whenever the conditions specified in paragraphs (h)(1)
and (h)(2) are not present, as well as when service-load conditions and
a lack of feasible alternatives require that the cable remain
energized.
Finally, OSHA is not adopting Consolidated Edison's (or EEI's)
suggested language. The Agency does not believe that the recommended
change would clarify the rule and
believes that adopting the change would make the provision more
difficult to enforce. Final paragraph (h)(2) does not require
deenergizing cables when there is only a remote possibility that a
fault would occur. There must be a reasonable possibility that
performing the work could cause a fault. Such work would include: work
in which employees are using tools or equipment in a manner in which
they could foreseeably penetrate the cable jacket; work that would
disturb a cable that employees cannot visually inspect; and any other
work that could damage a cable. These are the types of activities that
caused accidents in the record (Exs. 0002, 0003 \447\). In addition,
EEI's recommendation would only protect employees working on a cable.
EEI's proposed language would not ensure the safety of employees
performing work in the vicinity of, but not on, the energized cable in
which a fault could occur. Such work would include work in which
employees are using tools or equipment in a manner in which they could
foreseeably penetrate the cable jacket, as noted previously. Therefore,
OSHA concludes that EEI's language would not provide adequate
protection to employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\447\ See, for example, the five accidents at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170065650&id=014485585&id=170191100&id=170153977&id=170247944.
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Paragraph (i), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires employers to maintain metallic-sheath
continuity while employees are working on buried cables or cables in
manholes and vaults. Bonding across an opening in a cable's sheath
protects employees against electric shock from a difference in electric
potential between the two sides of the opening. As an alternative to
bonding, the cable sheath can be treated as energized. (In this case,
the voltage at which the sheath is to be considered energized is equal
to the maximum voltage that could be seen across the sheath under fault
conditions.) This requirement, which OSHA took from existing Sec.
1910.269(t)(8), is essentially identical to existing Sec.
1926.956(c)(7), except that the final rule allows the cable sheath to
be treated as energized in lieu of bonding. This requirement is
consistent with other parts of the final rule, such as Sec.
1926.960(j), which recognize treating objects as energized as an
alternative to grounding.
Mr. John Vocke with Pacific Gas and Electric Company objected to
proposed paragraph (i) as follows:
Paragraph (i) of proposed Sec. 1926.965 would require metallic
sheath continuity to be maintained while work is performed on
underground cables. In its underground transmission system, PG&E has
deliberately engineered certain circuits with discontinuous shield
wires for system reliability. PG&E submits that as long as specific
safety procedures are in place, underground transmission cables need
not be equipped with metallic sheath continuity. [Ex. 0185]
Paragraph (i) of the final rule requires employers to maintain
metallic-sheath continuity. It does not require these sheaths to be
continuous across the system, nor does it require the employer to bond
across breaks already installed in the system. As noted in the earlier
explanation of this provision, it requires employers to place bonds
when employees interrupt the continuity of the sheath as part of the
work procedure (for example, when the employee strips the jacket,
sheath, and insulation from a cable to splice it). Thus, Mr. Vocke's
concern is unfounded. OSHA notes, however, that final Sec. 1926.962(c)
requires temporary protective grounds to be installed to prevent each
employee from being exposed to hazardous differences in electric
potential. Installing grounds in accordance with this provision will
protect employees from hazardous differences in potential where
designed breaks in metallic sheath continuity exist.
Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI recommended that OSHA add specific
procedures for grounding underground cables (Exs. 0155, 0471; Tr. 1256-
1257). He explained:
IEEE has recognized the problem after a number of accidents
involving de-energized cables. The industry has also recognized the
hazard and has conducted research justifying the need for new safe
work methods.
Again, there ha[ve] been a number of serious accidents and
fatalities when de-energized cable, thought to be . . . safely
grounded, has been energized due to voltage rise on the system
neutral. After an accident at San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E)
involving a grounded cable [that] became energized, SDG&E conducted
research in system neutral voltage rise. A paper was written and
published on the research . . . . Also, the IEEE/ESMOL Task Force
15.07.09.01 published a paper titled "Worker Protection While
Working De-energized Underground Distribution Systems". . . . [Ex.
0471]
Mr. Erga suggested provisions that included requiring the employer
to (1) insulate employees from system neutral voltage rise, (2) isolate
the cable and its associated neutral from system neutral voltage rise,
or (3) create an equipotential zone at the work location (id.).
The final rule already addresses the provisions recommended by Mr.
Erga. Final Sec. 1926.962 requires employers to install grounds and
provide an equipotential zone on lines treated as deenergized.
Alternatively, the employer can treat the lines as energized. Paragraph
(b) of final Sec. 1926.962 also permits lines and equipment to be
treated as deenergized without grounds under certain conditions;
however, Mr. Erga did not include all of these conditions in his
recommendations. Finally, final Sec. 1926.962(g) prohibits grounding
at a remote terminal if there is a possibility of hazardous transfer of
potential should a fault occur. Thus, OSHA believes that the final rule
adequately addresses the hazards covered by Mr. Erga's suggested
regulatory text and decided not to adopt it. The Agency is, however,
incorporating appropriate information from Mr. Erga's submission in
Appendix C to final Subpart V, Protection from Hazardous Differences in
Electric Potentials, to assist employers in complying with the
requirements on grounding as they apply to underground installations.
17. Section 1926.966, Substations
As explained in paragraph (a), final Sec. 1926.966 addresses work
performed in substations. The provisions of this paragraph supplement
(rather than modify) the general requirements contained in other
portions of Subpart V, such as final Sec. 1926.960, which regulates
working on or near live parts.
Final paragraph (b) requires the employer to provide and maintain
sufficient access and working space around electric equipment to permit
ready and safe operation and maintenance of the equipment by employees.
This rule prevents employees from contacting exposed live parts as a
result of insufficient maneuvering room. A note following this
paragraph recognizes, for compliance purposes, the provisions of ANSI/
IEEE C2-2012, which address the design of workspace for electric
equipment. Final Sec. 1926.966(b), which OSHA took from existing Sec.
1910.269(u)(1), has no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
OSHA realizes that older installations may not meet the dimensions
set forth in the latest version of the national consensus standard. The
Agency believes that the language of final paragraph (b) is
sufficiently performance-oriented that older installations, likely
built to specifications in the national consensus standards that were
in effect during construction of the installation, will meet the
requirement for sufficient workspace provided that the installation
and work practices used enable employees to perform work safely within
the space and to maintain the minimum approach distances established by
the employer under Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(i). The note to final Sec.
1926.966(b) states that the NESC specifications are guidelines. That
note indicates that OSHA will determine whether an installation that
does not conform to that consensus standard complies with final
paragraph (b) based on the following criteria:
(1) Whether the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI/IEEE
C2 that was in effect when the installation was made,
(2) Whether the configuration of the installation enables employees
to maintain the minimum approach distances, established by the employer
under Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(i), while the employees are working on
exposed, energized parts, and
(3) Whether the precautions taken when employees perform work on
the installation provide protection equivalent to the protection
provided by access and working space meeting ANSI/IEEE C2-2012.
The language in this note is equivalent to a note in existing Sec.
1910.269(u)(1) and accomplishes three goals. First, it explains that an
installation need not be in conformance with ANSI/IEEE C2-2012 to be in
compliance with final paragraph (b). Second, it informs employers with
installations that do not conform to the latest ANSI standard of how
they can comply with final paragraph (b). Third, it ensures that,
however old an installation is, it provides sufficient space to enable
employees to work within the space without significant risk of injury.
OSHA received no comments on either proposed paragraph (b) or the note
and is adopting them without substantive change from the proposal. OSHA
updated the version of ANSI/IEEE C2 listed in the note to the most
recent edition (2012). OSHA reviewed ANSI/IEEE C2-2012 and finds that
it provides protection equivalent to the 2002 edition referenced in the
note in the proposal.
Paragraph (c), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires the employer to ensure that, when employees
remove or insert draw-out-type circuit breakers,\448\ the breaker is in
the open position. Additionally, if the design of the control devices
permits, the employer must render the control circuit for the circuit
breaker inoperable. These provisions prevent arcing that could injure
employees. Final paragraph (c), which OSHA took from existing Sec.
1910.269(u)(2), has no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\448\ A draw-out-type circuit breaker is one in which the
removable portion may be withdrawn from the stationary portion
without unbolting connections or mounting supports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because voltages can be impressed or induced on large metal objects
near substation equipment, proposed paragraph (d) would have required
conductive fences around substations to be grounded. In addition, the
proposal specified that employers maintain grounding continuity and
provide bonding to prevent electrical discontinuity when the employer
expanded substation fences or removed sections of such fences.
OSHA took the proposed provision from existing Sec.
1910.269(u)(3). Existing Sec. 1926.957(g)(1) requires employers to
maintain "[a]dequate interconnection with ground" between temporary
and permanent fences, but does not require permanent substation fences
to be grounded. In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA indicated that it
believes that grounding metal fences, whether they are temporary or
permanent, is essential to the safety of employees working near the
fences (70 FR 34885).
OSHA received many comments on proposed paragraph (d). (See, for
example, Exs. 0125, 0126, 0151, 0159, 0172, 0188, 0212.) Most of these
commenters pointed out that the proposal was at odds with the methods
of protecting employees and the general public from hazardous
differences in electric potential described in IEEE Std 80-2000, IEEE
Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding. (See, for example, Exs.
0125, 0126, 0151, 0159, 0172, 0188.) For instance, Mr. Jules Weaver
with the Northwest Line Constructors Chapter of NECA commented:
As currently written, [paragraph (d)] creates a situation in
which death or serious injury to both employees and the public
exists. When a substation fence is expanded or a section removed for
working in an existing substation, the temporary fence installed to
keep the work area secured shall not be bonded or the fence
continuity maintained between the existing grounded fence enclosure
and the temporary fence, as explained in IEEE Standard 80-2000
"IEEE Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding" section 17.3.
When expanding a substation the practice is to remove the existing
section of fence between the energized portion of the substation and
the new section. The new section is fenced to protect the worksite
and the public from unauthorized access into the energized sub.
Temporary isolation fences are installed between the existing
substation fence and the temporary fence to prevent touch and step
potential hazards. As stated in the current regulations by
maintaining a bond and electrical continuity employees are exposed
to these differences of potential. As the new substation addition is
built the following basic sequence of events occur, excavation of
the existing soil is completed, foundations and footings are poured
for equipment placement, control wiring and ground grid installed,
and then final installation of rock placed creating the required
insulation for employee protection. It is not until the new ground
grid in the substation addition is installed and equipment in place
does the connection between the new addition and the existing
substation [begin]. As the new addition nears completion the fence
isolation fences are removed, permanent fencing is installed, and
the grid connected. It is at this critical time that the employees
can be exposed to critical potential differences and proper work
rules on bonding and grounding would be required. [Ex. 0188;
emphasis included in original]
He recommended that OSHA modify paragraph (d) to read:
Conductive fences around substations shall be grounded. When a
substation fence is expanded or a section is removed, they shall be
designed to limit touch, step, and transferred voltages in
accordance with industry practices.
Note to paragraph . . . (d) . . . of this section: Guidelines
for substation grounding as defined in IEEE Guide for Safety in AC
substation Grounding (Standard 80-2000) would he one source that may
be utilized to provide guidance in meeting these requirements. [Id.;
emphasis included in original]
OSHA agrees that this approach, which other commenters also
recommended, would better protect employees than the proposed
requirement. As demonstrated by the description quoted from Mr.
Weaver's comment, employers isolate temporary fences from existing
fences, in addition to bonding and grounding substation fence sections,
to protect employees from hazardous differences in potential. The
Agency also agrees that IEEE Std 80 provides useful guidance to protect
employees from hazardous differences in electric potential. Therefore,
OSHA adopted the following language in final paragraph (d):
Conductive fences around substations shall be grounded. When a
substation fence is expanded or a section is removed, fence sections
shall be isolated, grounded, or bonded as necessary to protect
employees from hazardous differences in electric potential.
Note to paragraph (d) of this section: IEEE Std 80-2000, IEEE
Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding, contains guidelines for
protection against hazardous differences in electric potential.
The Agency believes that the language in the final rule addresses
the commenters' concerns, as well as the concern of another commenter,
who questioned whether isolation joints would be acceptable under the
standard as proposed (Ex. 0212).
Final paragraph (e) addresses the guarding of rooms and other
spaces that contain electric supply equipment. OSHA took this paragraph
from existing Sec. 1910.269(u)(4). Paragraphs (c) and (g) of Sec.
1926.957 are the only provisions in existing Subpart V that address the
guarding of live parts in substations. These two provisions require
employers to install barricades or barriers (paragraph (c)) and to
install temporary fences if sections of permanent fencing are expanded
or removed (paragraph (g)). Existing Sec. 1926.957(g)(2) also
generally requires employers to lock gates to unattended substations.
The existing requirements only address temporary guarding measures.
Existing Sec. 1926.957 does not mention permanent guarding of live
parts, which generally is more substantial than the tape and cone
barricades permitted under the existing rule. OSHA's revision of the
substation rules addresses guarding of live parts in substations in a
more comprehensive manner and will provide better protection for
employees than existing Sec. 1926.957.
OSHA believes that it is important to prohibit unqualified persons
from entering areas containing energized electric supply equipment,
regardless of the work they are performing. Employees working in these
areas must be trained in the hazards involved and in the appropriate
work practices, as required by final Sec. 1926.950(b)(2). This
training will enable employees to distinguish hazardous circuit parts
from nonhazardous equipment and will ensure that they are familiar with
the appropriate work practices, regardless of the jobs they are
performing. Many accidents occur because unqualified persons contact
energized parts in such areas (Ex. 0004 \449\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\449\ See, for example, the eight accidents at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=800995&id=170571012&id=902650&id=170571632&id=14529085&id=170681456
&id=170681456&id=170108310.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subpart V applies to electrical installations for which OSHA has
few design requirements. The Subpart K electrical installation
standards typically do not apply to electric power transmission and
distribution installations, and such installations may pose hazards in
addition to the hazards associated with exposed live parts. For
example, ungrounded equipment enclosures pose such hazards. If
employers do not meet the requirements of Subpart K, then it is
important to prevent unqualified persons from gaining access to areas
containing electric power transmission and distribution equipment.
Paragraph (e) of final Sec. 1926.966 sets forth criteria for
access by unqualified persons to rooms and other spaces containing
electric supply lines or equipment. Final paragraph (e)(1) specifies
which areas containing electric supply lines or equipment must meet the
guarding requirements contained in final paragraphs (e)(2) through
(e)(5). These areas fall into three categories as follows:
(1) Rooms and other spaces where exposed live parts operating at 50
to 150 volts to ground are within 2.4 meters (8 feet) of the ground or
other working surface,
(2) Rooms and other spaces where live parts operating at 151 to 600
volts to ground are within 2.4 meters (8 feet) of the ground or other
working surface and are guarded only by location, as permitted under
final Sec. 1926.966(f)(1), and
(3) Rooms and other spaces where live parts operating at more than
600 volts to ground are located, unless:
(a) The live parts are enclosed within grounded, metal-enclosed
equipment whose only openings are designed so that foreign objects
inserted in these openings will be deflected from energized parts, or
(b) The live parts are installed at a height, above ground and any
other working surface, that provides protection at the voltage on the
live parts corresponding to the protection provided by a 2.4-meter (8-
foot) height at 50 volts.
Final paragraphs (e)(2) through (e)(5) contain requirements that
apply to these areas. Fences, screens, partitions, or walls must
enclose these rooms and other spaces so as to minimize the possibility
that unqualified persons will enter; the employer must display signs at
the entrances warning unqualified persons to keep out; and the employer
must keep the entrances locked unless the entrances are under the
observation of a person attending the room or other space for the
purpose of preventing unqualified employees from entering.
Additionally, unqualified persons may not enter these rooms or other
spaces while the electric supply lines or equipment are energized.
OSHA received no comments on proposed paragraph (e) and is adopting
it substantially as proposed. In the final rule, OSHA added metric
equivalents that were missing from proposed paragraphs (e)(1)(i) and
(e)(1)(ii). In addition, the Agency reworded paragraph (e)(5) in the
final rule as follows: "The employer shall keep each entrance to a
room or other space locked, unless the entrance is under the
observation of a person who is attending the room or other space for
the purpose of preventing unqualified employees from entering."
Proposed paragraph (e)(5) would have required the employer to lock
entrances to rooms and other spaces not under the observation of an
"attendant." OSHA defined the word "attendant" in final Sec.
1926.968 as "[a]n employee assigned to remain immediately outside the
entrance to an enclosed or other space to render assistance as needed
to employees inside the space." This term applies to provisions that
require an attendant whose purpose is to protect employees within an
enclosed or other space. In contrast, the purpose of the person
attending the room or other space under final paragraph (e)(5) is to
keep unqualified employees from entering the room or other space.
Therefore, the use of the term "attendant" in proposed paragraph
(e)(5) was inappropriate, and the revised language is more accurate.
Paragraph (f) also addresses guarding of live parts. This
paragraph, which OSHA took from existing Sec. 1910.269(u)(5), has no
counterpart in existing Subpart V.
Paragraph (f)(1), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires the employer to provide guards around all
live parts operating at more than 150 volts to ground without an
insulating covering unless the location of the live parts gives
sufficient clearance to minimize the possibility of accidental employee
contact. This provision protects qualified employees from accidentally
contacting energized parts. Guidance for clearance distances
appropriate for guarding by location is available in ANSI/IEEE C2. A
note following final paragraph (f)(1) provides that OSHA considers
installations meeting ANSI/IEEE C2-2002 to meet paragraph (f)(1), which
OSHA based on Rule 124A1 of that standard.\450\ The note further
provides that OSHA will determine whether an installation that does not
conform to this ANSI standard complies with paragraph (f)(1) based on
the following criteria:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\450\ The 2012 NESC contains a similar requirement in Rule
124A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Whether the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2
that was in effect when the installation was made,
(2) Whether each employee is isolated from energized parts at the
point of closest approach, and
(3) Whether the precautions taken when employees perform work on
the installation provide protection equivalent to the protection
provided by horizontal and vertical clearances meeting ANSI/IEEE C2-
2002.
This approach affords employers flexibility in complying with the
standard and affords employees protection from injury due to sparkover
from live circuit parts.
In developing the final rule, OSHA examined the 2012 version of
ANSI/IEEE C2 to determine if the guarding requirements of the newer
consensus standard protect employees to the extent required by final
paragraph (f)(1) and ANSI/IEEE C2-2002. Rule 124A1 of ANSI/IEEE C2-2012
requires guarding of "live parts operating above 300 V phase-to-
phase" rather than "live parts operating at more than 150 volts to
ground" as required by final paragraph (f)(1). Therefore, some live
parts that require guarding under the OSHA standard and ANSI/IEEE C2-
2002 do not require guarding under ANSI/IEEE C2-2012. For example, an
ungrounded, single-phase circuit operating at 240 volts between
conductors has a phase-to-ground voltage of 240 volts.\451\ The phase-
to-phase voltage of this circuit also is 240 volts. Consequently, final
paragraph (f)(1) and ANSI/IEEE C2-2002 require guarding of live parts
on this circuit, while ANSI/IEEE C2-2012 does not. Accordingly, the
Agency finds that ANSI/IEEE C2-2012 requires guarding of fewer live
parts and, therefore, provides less employee protection than the OSHA
standard and ANSI/IEEE C2-2002. The note to final paragraph (f)(1)
retains the reference to ANSI/IEEE C2-2002, as proposed, rather than
updating the reference to ANSI/IEEE C2-2012. However, with regard to
the dimensions of clearance distances about electric equipment,
employers can rely on ANSI/IEEE C2-2012 for providing sufficient
clearance to minimize the possibility of accidental employee contact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\451\ The 2002 and 2007 editions of ANSI/IEEE C2 define the
phase-to-ground voltage on an ungrounded circuit as "[t]he highest
nominal voltage available between any two conductors of the circuit
concerned" (Ex. 0077).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (f)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires that the employer maintain guarding of
energized parts within a compartment during operation and maintenance
functions. This guarding will prevent accidental contact with energized
parts and prevent tools or other equipment from contacting energized
parts if an employee drops the tools or equipment. However, since
qualified employees need access to energized equipment, an exception to
this requirement allows qualified employees to remove guards to replace
fuses and to perform other necessary work. In such cases, paragraph
(f)(3), which also is being adopted without substantive change from the
proposal, applies. When anyone removes guards from energized equipment,
final paragraph (f)(3) requires the employer to install barriers around
the work area to prevent employees who are not working on the
equipment, but who are in the area, from contacting the exposed live
parts.
Paragraph (g)(1), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires employees who do not work regularly at the
station to report their presence to the employee in charge of
substation activities so that they can receive information on special
system conditions affecting employee safety. Final paragraph (g)(2)
requires the job briefing under final Sec. 1926.952 to cover
information on special system conditions affecting employee safety,
including the location of energized equipment in, or adjacent to, the
work area and the limits of any deenergized work area. OSHA took
paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) from existing Sec. 1910.269(u)(6). The
Agency revised the language in paragraph (g)(2) in the final rule to
make it clear that the information covered in the job briefing must
include all information on special system conditions affecting employee
safety in the substation. Note that, unlike paragraph (g)(1), paragraph
(g)(2) applies equally to unattended and attended substations, and to
employees already working in a substation and employees who enter a
substation.
Existing Sec. 1926.957(a)(1) requires the employer to ensure that
employees obtain authorization from the person in charge of the
substation before performing work. Proposed paragraph (g) would not
have required authorization. In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA
stated that the Agency did not believe that such a requirement was
necessary (70 FR 34886). Proposed paragraph (g)(1) would have required
employees who do not work regularly in the substation to report their
presence to the employee in charge. OSHA explained in the preamble to
the proposal that the main purpose of this rule is to ensure a flow of
important safety-related information from the employee in charge to
employees about to work in the substation (70 FR 34887). The Agency
believed that, as long as the employee in charge imparted this
information to the employees performing the work and as long as
employers followed the requirements proposed in the revision of Subpart
V, employees could perform the work safely. Although OSHA did not
believe that it was necessary to require that the employee in charge
authorize the work, the Agency requested comments on whether the lack
of authorization to perform work could lead to accidents.
Four commenters argued that the final rule should require
authorization (Exs. 0167, 0209, 0219, 0227). Three of these commenters
stated that lack of authorization can lead to accidents, but did not
describe how or why such accidents could occur (Exs. 0209, 0219, 0227).
The other commenter maintained that the only way to assure that
employees receive the proper information is by requiring authorization
by the employee in charge (Ex. 0167).
Other commenters supported the proposal and agreed with OSHA's
preliminary conclusion that authorization is unnecessary. (See, for
example, Exs. 0186, 0201, 0212, 0213.) Mr. Anthony Ahern with the Ohio
Rural Electric Cooperatives succinctly described this reasoning as
follows:
[A]n employee is required to report to the person in charge. The
person in charge knows who is present and what they are doing. Newly
arrived employee[s] cannot start work until they receive their
safety briefing. If the person in charge doesn't want the employee
to start work on their particular task they will stop them at that
time. Otherwise the employee will start working on their task after
the safety briefing. [Ex. 0186]
The Agency agrees with Mr. Ahern that the act of reporting will
give the employee in charge an opportunity to deny access if necessary.
Therefore, the Agency is not including Subpart V's existing requirement
for authorization in the final rule.
One commenter questioned: "Should there be a provision that states
an unqualified person may enter a substation with a qualified employee,
and must not touch anything, even if they are just doing a visual
inspection?" (Ex. 0126).
OSHA notes that final Sec. 1926.966(e) generally prohibits
unqualified employees from entering rooms and other spaces containing
unguarded energized supply lines or equipment. If it is necessary for
such employees to enter these rooms and other spaces, employers must
train them as qualified employees. Note that OSHA considers employees
in training to be qualified employees under certain conditions, one of
which is when they are under the direct supervision of a qualified
employee. (For more detail, see CPL 02-01-038.)
Another commenter asked OSHA to clarify how proposed paragraph
(g)(1) would apply to vendors and engineers who may be present, but do
not directly work in substations (Ex. 0162).
Final paragraph (g)(1) does not require employees who are not
performing work covered by Subpart V to report their presence to the
employee in charge. In such cases, Subpart V would not be applicable.
Existing Sec. 1926.957(a)(2) is essentially identical to final
Sec. 1926.966(g)(2), except that the existing rule, in paragraph
(a)(2)(ii), also requires the determination of what protective
equipment and precautions are necessary. Since final Sec. 1926.952(b)
already requires the job briefing to cover these areas, existing Sec.
1926.957(a)(2)(ii), which applies only to work in energized
substations, is no longer necessary. The Agency received no objection
to this proposed change.
18. Section 1926.967, Special Conditions
Final Sec. 1926.967 sets requirements for special conditions
encountered during electric power transmission and distribution work.
Except as noted otherwise, OSHA received no comments on this section.
Since capacitors store electric charge and can release electrical
energy even when disconnected from their sources of supply, some
precautions may be necessary--in addition to the precautions contained
in final Sec. 1926.961 (deenergizing lines and equipment) and final
Sec. 1926.962 (grounding)--when employees perform work on capacitors
or on lines connected to capacitors. Paragraph (a), which is being
adopted without substantive change from the proposal, contains
precautions that will enable this equipment to be treated as
deenergized. This paragraph, which OSHA took from existing Sec.
1910.269(w)(1), has no counterpart in existing Subpart V. A note to
paragraph (a) serves as a reminder that final Sec. Sec. 1926.961 and
1926.962 apply to deenergizing and grounding capacitor installations.
Under final paragraph (a)(1), before employees work on capacitors,
the employer must disconnect the capacitors from energized sources and
short circuit the capacitors. In addition, the employer must ensure
that the employee short circuiting the capacitors waits at least 5
minutes from the time of disconnection before applying the short
circuit. This provision not only removes the sources of electric
current, but also relieves the capacitors of their charge. Note that
ANSI/IEEE Std 18-2012, IEEE Standard for Shunt Power Capacitors,
requires all capacitors to have an internal discharge device to reduce
the voltage to 50 volts or less within 5 minutes after the capacitor is
disconnected from an energized source.\452\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\452\ The time limit is 5 minutes for capacitors rated over 600
volts and 1 minute for capacitors rated 600 volts or less.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Before employees handle the units, the employer must short circuit
each unit in series-parallel capacitor banks between all terminals and
the capacitor case or its rack; and, if the cases of capacitors are on
ungrounded substation racks, the employer must bond the racks to
ground. Final paragraph (a)(2) requires these measures to ensure that
individual capacitors do not retain a charge. Final paragraph (a)(3)
requires the employer to short circuit any line connected to capacitors
before the line is treated as deenergized.
Although the magnetic flux density in the core of a current
transformer usually is low, resulting in a low secondary voltage, it
will rise to saturation if the secondary circuit opens while the
transformer primary is energized. When the secondary opens, the
magnetic flux will induce a voltage in the secondary winding high
enough to be hazardous to the insulation in the secondary circuit and
to workers. Because of this hazard to workers, paragraph (b), which is
being adopted without substantive change from the proposal, prohibits
the opening of the secondary circuit of a current transformer while the
transformer is energized. If the employer cannot deenergize the primary
of the current transformer before employees perform work on an
instrument, a relay, or other section of a current transformer
secondary circuit, the employer must bridge the circuit so that the
current transformer secondary does not experience an open-circuit
condition. This provision, which OSHA took from existing Sec.
1910.269(w)(2), has no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
In a series streetlighting circuit, the lamps are connected in
series, and the same current flows in each lamp. A constant-current
transformer, which provides a constant current at a variable voltage
from a source of constant voltage and variable current, supplies the
current in a series streetlighting circuit. As with the current
transformer, the constant current source attempts to supply current
even to an open secondary circuit. The resultant open-circuit voltage
can be extremely high and hazardous to employees. For this reason,
final paragraph (c)(2) contains a requirement similar to that in
paragraph (b). Under final paragraph (c)(2), before any employee opens
a series loop, the employer must deenergize the streetlighting
transformer and isolate it from the source of supply or must bridge the
loop to avoid an open-circuit condition. In addition, final paragraph
(c)(1) requires the employer to ensure that employees work on series
streetlighting circuits with an open-circuit voltage of more than 600
volts in accordance with the requirements for overhead lines in final
Sec. 1926.964 or for underground electrical installations in final
Sec. 1926.965, as appropriate. Final paragraph (c), which OSHA took
from existing Sec. 1910.269(w)(3), has no counterpart in existing
Subpart V, and the Agency is adopting it without substantive change
from the proposal.
Frequently, electric power transmission and distribution employees
must work at night, or in enclosed places, such as manholes, without
natural illumination. Since inadvertent contact with live parts can be
fatal, proper lighting is important to the safety of these workers.
Therefore, paragraph (d), which is being adopted without substantive
change from the proposal, requires the employer to provide sufficient
illumination to enable the employee to perform the work safely. This
provision, which OSHA took from existing Sec. 1910.269(w)(4), is
comparable to existing Sec. 1926.950(f). The existing requirement in
Sec. 1926.950(f), however, applies only at night. OSHA believes that
it is important for employees to have sufficient lighting to perform
the work safely regardless of the time of day. The note following
paragraph (d) refers to Sec. 1926.56 for specific levels of
illumination required under various conditions.
Paragraph (e) of the final rule sets requirements to protect
employees working in areas that expose them to drowning hazards.
Paragraph (e)(1), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, requires the provision and use of personal flotation
devices meeting Sec. 1926.106 whenever an employee may be pulled or
pushed, or might fall, into water where there is a danger of
drowning.\453\ Paragraph (e)(2), which is being adopted without
substantive change from the proposal, requires that the employer
maintain each personal flotation device in safe condition and
inspect each personal flotation device frequently enough to ensure that
it does not have rot, mildew, water saturation, or any other condition
that could render the device unsuitable for use. Lastly, paragraph
(e)(3) requires a safe means of passage, such as a bridge, for
employees crossing streams or other bodies of water. This provision,
which OSHA took from existing Sec. 1910.269(w)(5), replaces existing
Sec. 1926.950(g). The existing rule at Sec. 1926.950(g) simply
references other construction standards on body belts, safety straps,
and lanyards, on safety nets, and on protection for working over or
near water, namely Sec. Sec. 1926.104, 1926.105, and 1926.106. In
final Sec. 1926.967(e)(3), OSHA is adopting language nearly identical
to that contained in existing Sec. 1910.269 to ensure a safe means of
passage, which the existing Subpart V rule does not address. In
addition, existing Sec. 1926.950(g) is unnecessary because the
referenced construction standards apply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\453\ Paragraph (w)(5)(i) of Sec. 1910.269 explicitly requires
that the employer provide flotation devices approved by the U.S.
Coast Guard, rather than referring to Sec. 1926.106, which is a
construction standard. Section 1926.106 also requires that the
employer provide flotation devices approved by the U.S. Coast Guard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, Maryland & Delaware Association
of Electric Cooperatives objected to proposed paragraph (e)(3) because
she believed it to be too broad (Ex. 0175). She stated that the U.S.
Geological Survey designates "many intermitted streams on their
topographic map that may not have running waters many times during the
year" (id.). She also argued that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
prohibits building bridges in certain wetlands. Ms. Layton maintained
that workers wearing waders can cross safely some small streams.
OSHA notes that final paragraph (e)(3) does not require a bridge,
but only a safe means of passage. A bridge is only one form of safe
passage that employers can use to meet this requirement. A safe means
of passage would exist when the water is shallow enough that workers
wearing waders can cross it safely. Therefore, OSHA is adopting
paragraph (e)(3) without substantive change from the proposal.
Paragraph (f) references Subpart P of Part 1926 for requirements on
excavations. This provision is equivalent to existing Sec.
1926.956(c)(2), which references Sec. Sec. 1926.651 and 1926.652 of
that subpart. The final rule clearly indicates that all of the
requirements of Subpart P apply. OSHA is adopting paragraph (f) without
change from the proposal.
Working in areas with pedestrian or vehicular traffic exposes
employees to additional hazards compared to employees working on an
employer's premises, where the employer generally restricts public
access. One serious additional hazard faced by employees working in
public areas is traffic mishaps (for example, impact with a vehicle or
a pedestrian). Final paragraph (g) sets requirements to protect
employees against injuries resulting from traffic mishaps. If employees
work in the vicinity of vehicular or pedestrian traffic that may
endanger them, paragraph (g)(2), which is being adopted without
substantive change from the proposal, requires the employer to place
warning signs or flags and other traffic-control devices in conspicuous
locations to alert and channel approaching traffic. If the measures
required by paragraph (g)(2) do not provide sufficient employee
protection or if employees are working in an area in which there are
excavations, paragraphs (g)(3) and (g)(4), which are being adopted
without substantive change from the proposal, require the employer to
erect barricades. Paragraph (g)(5), which is being adopted without
substantive change from the proposal, requires the employer to display
warning lights prominently for night work. Paragraph (g)(1) requires
traffic-control signs and devices to meet Sec. 1926.200(g)(2), which
covers traffic-control devices. This provision in OSHA's construction
standards requires compliance with Part VI of the Manual of Uniform
Traffic Control Devices, 1988 Edition, Revision 3, September 3, 1993,
FHWA-SA-94-027, or Part VI of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control
Devices, Millennium Edition, December 2000, Federal Highway
Administration. OSHA is adopting paragraph (g)(1) without substantive
change from the proposal. Paragraph (g), which OSHA took from existing
Sec. 1910.269(w)(6), has no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
Paragraph (h), which is being adopted without substantive change
from the proposal, addresses the hazards of voltage backfeed due to
sources of cogeneration or from the secondary system. Under conditions
of voltage backfeed, the lines on which employees will perform work
remain energized after the employer disconnects the main source of
power. According to this provision, if there is a possibility of
voltage backfeed from sources of cogeneration or from the secondary
system, employers must have employees work the lines as energized under
final Sec. 1926.960 or work the lines deenergized following final
Sec. Sec. 1926.961 and 1926.962. The referenced requirements contain
the appropriate controls and work practices employers must implement in
case of voltage backfeed. Final paragraph (h), which OSHA took from
existing Sec. 1910.269(w)(7), has no counterpart in existing Subpart
V.
Sometimes, electric power transmission and distribution work
involves the use of lasers. Existing Sec. 1926.54 of the construction
standards contains appropriate requirements for the installation,
operation, and adjustment of lasers. Paragraph (i), which is being
adopted without substantive change from the proposal, requires the
employer to install, adjust, and operate laser equipment in accordance
with Sec. 1926.54. Paragraph (i), which OSHA took from existing Sec.
1910.269(w)(8), has no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
To ensure that hydraulic equipment retains its insulating value,
paragraph (j) requires the hydraulic fluid used in insulated sections
of hydraulic equipment to provide insulation for the voltage involved.
Proposed paragraph (j) also contained an exemption from the requirement
in Sec. 1926.302(d)(1) that hydraulic fluid used in hydraulic-powered
tools be fire-resistant. OSHA did not adopt the proposed exemption in
final Sec. 1926.967(j) because final Sec. 1926.956(d)(1) already
contains the relevant exemption.
Final paragraph (k) addresses communication facilities associated
with electric power transmission and distribution systems. Typical
communications installations include installations for microwave
signaling and power line carriers. This paragraph, which OSHA took from
existing Sec. 1910.269(s), has no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
Paragraph (k)(1) addresses microwave signaling systems. To protect
employees' eyes from injury caused by microwave radiation, paragraph
(k)(1)(i), which is being adopted without substantive change from the
proposal, requires employers to ensure that employees do not look into
an open waveguide or antenna connected to an energized source of
microwave radiation.
Existing Sec. 1910.97, which covers nonionizing radiation,
prescribes a warning sign with a special symbol to indicate nonionizing
radiation hazards. Paragraph (k)(1)(ii), which is being adopted without
substantive change from the proposal, provides that, if the
electromagnetic-radiation level in an accessible area exceeds the
radiation-protection guide set forth in Sec. 1910.97(a)(2), the
employer post the area with warning signs containing the warning symbol
described in Sec. 1910.97(a)(3). This paragraph also requires the
lower half of that symbol to include the following statements or
statements that the employer can demonstrate are equivalent:
Radiation in this area may exceed hazard limitations and special
precautions are required. Obtain specific instruction before
entering.
The sign will warn employees about the hazards present in the area
and inform them that special instructions are necessary to enter the
area.
In Sec. 1910.97, the radiation-protection guide is advisory only.
In final paragraph (k)(1)(iii), OSHA makes the guide mandatory for
electric power transmission and distribution work by requiring the
employer to institute measures that prevent any employee's exposure
from being greater than the exposure set forth in the guide. These
measures may be administrative measures (such as limitations on the
duration of exposure) or engineering measures (such as a design of the
system that limits the emitted radiation to that permitted by the
guide), or the measures may involve the use of personal protective
equipment. This provision does not require employers to follow the
hierarchy of controls normally required for the protection of employees
from occupational hazards. Employees exposed to radiation levels beyond
that permitted by the radiation-protection guide are typically
performing maintenance tasks, and OSHA typically permits the use of
personal protective equipment in lieu of engineering or administrative
controls during work operations, such as some maintenance and repair
activities, for which engineering and work-practice controls are not
feasible. (See, for example, Sec. Sec. 1910.1001(g)(1)(ii) (asbestos),
1910.1018(h)(1)(ii) (inorganic arsenic), and 1910.1028(g)(1)(ii)
(benzene).) The Agency indicated in the preamble to the proposal that
it did not believe any employees had radiation exposures exceeding the
radiation-protection guide on a routine basis (70 FR 34888). The Agency
requested comments on whether the proposal adequately protected
employees and whether the standard should require employers to follow
the hierarchy of controls.
No commenters suggested that OSHA apply the hierarchy of controls
to electromagnetic-radiation exposure. However, Mr. Anthony Ahern with
Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives commented that "[e]xposure to really
high power microwave radiation is diminishing as more and more of the
big telcos are dismantling their microwave facilities in favor of fiber
optic networks" (Ex. 0186). The record, therefore, does not contradict
OSHA's determination that it is unnecessary in final paragraph
(k)(1)(iii) to require that employers comply with the hierarchy of
controls.
Two commenters maintained that Sec. 1910.97 is out of date and
recommended other, more protective guidelines (Exs. 0163, 0212). Ms.
Susan O'Connor with Siemens Power Generation commented that ANSI, the
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, and the
International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection have
guidelines that are more current and more protective than the
requirements in Sec. 1910.97 (Ex. 0163). She recommended that OSHA
update Sec. 1910.97 if the Agency references Sec. 1910.97 in the
final rule. Mr. Tom Chappell with Southern Company stated that the
Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) OET Bulletin 65, Edition 97-
01, Evaluating Compliance with FCC Guidelines for Human Exposure to
Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields, has a two-tiered approach for
setting permissible exposure limits for nonionizing radiation that
"appears to provide a greater level of protection for employees" (Ex.
0212). He recommended that OSHA defer to the FCC in establishing
employee exposure limits.
The purpose of this rulemaking is to set safety standards for
employees working on electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution installations and to set safety standards for electrical
protective equipment. It is not the purpose of this rulemaking to set
permissible exposure limits for nonionizing radiation. Therefore, the
radiation-protection guide contained in Sec. 1910.97 is outside the
scope of this rulemaking, and OSHA is not revising Sec. 1910.97 in
this final rule.
The FCC authorizes and licenses devices, transmitters, and
facilities that generate radio-frequency radiation. It has jurisdiction
over all transmitting services in the United States, except services
operated by the Federal government.
(See http://www.fcc.gov/oet/rfsafety/rf-faqs.html#Q10.)
However, the FCC's primary jurisdiction
does not include the health and safety of employees, and the FCC relies
on other agencies and organizations for guidance in such matters (id.).
Therefore, OSHA decided that it would be inappropriate to defer
establishing employee exposure limits to the FCC as recommended by Mr.
Chappell. For these reasons, OSHA is adopting paragraph (k)(1)(iii) as
proposed.
Power-line carrier systems use power lines to carry signals between
equipment at different points on lines. Therefore, paragraph (k)(2),
which is being adopted without substantive change from the proposal,
requires the employer to ensure that employees perform work associated
with power-line carrier installations, including work on equipment used
for coupling carrier current to power line conductors, according to the
requirements for work on energized lines. As a correction, the final
rule replaces the term "this section," which was in the proposal,
with "this subpart."
Comments Regarding Heightened Sensitivity to Electromagnetic Radiation
Some rulemaking participants recommended that OSHA adopt protection
for workers who are sensitive to electromagnetic radiation. (See, for
example, Exs. 0106, 0482; Tr. 326-352.) These commenters maintained
that some individuals are especially sensitive to electromagnetic
radiation from sources such as computers, power lines, and other
electric equipment (id.) For example, Ms. M. Matich Hughes commented
that sensitive individuals react to this type of radiation with a wide
range of symptoms, including itching, redness, swelling, and stinging
(Ex. 0106). Some of these commenters also pointed to papers supporting
their claims (Exs. 0106, 0482). For instance, Drs. Diane and Bert
Schou, and Mr. Paul Schou, submitted several papers, and referenced
others, on the effects of electromagnetic radiation in humans and
animals (Ex. 0482).
OSHA declines to regulate exposure to electromagnetic radiation in
this rulemaking for several reasons. First, the relevant portion of
this rulemaking focuses on the safety hazards associated with the
maintenance and construction of electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution installations.\454\ The hazards that
these commenters address appear to be health hazards posed by
electromagnetic radiation. The commenters maintain that only certain
individuals are sensitive to electromagnetic radiation (see, for
example, Ex. 0106 ("a California Department of Health Services survey
has found that 3 percent of the people interviewed reported that they
are unusually sensitive to electric appliances or power lines"), Ex.
0124 ("It is most easily understood as a radiation type injury that
affects . . . a population estimated at 3 to 5 percent in the world"),
and Tr. 330 ("we're talking about three percent worldwide of the
people who are very, very
sensitive")) and that symptoms may develop or worsen after long-term
exposure (see, for example, Ex. 0482 ("High [electromagnetic
radiation] exposure for a short time is preferred to long time low
power [electromagnetic radiation]"). Second, these commenters are
requesting that OSHA address hazardous conditions that go far beyond
the work covered by the final rule. The commenters maintain that there
are many sources of electromagnetic radiation that can cause symptoms.
(See, for example, Ex. 0106 ("[Electromagnetic radiation] sensitivity
is . . . associated with exposure to electromagnetic fields created by
computers, power lines and other electronic equipment") and Tr. 334
("Sources that [can trigger electromagnetic radiation sensitivity]
include the fluorescent lights[,] remote meters[,] broadband on power
lines, [and] wireless Internet").) Thus, to the extent that
electromagnetic radiation poses "sensitivity hazards," those hazards
are not unique to work on electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution installations, but are present in nearly all workplaces.
OSHA, therefore, concludes that this rulemaking is not a proper vehicle
for regulating the hazards identified by these commenters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\454\ This rulemaking also addresses electrical protective
equipment, a subject unrelated to electromagnetic radiation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. Section 1926.968, Definitions
Final Sec. 1926.968 contains definitions of terms used in Subpart
V. Since OSHA based these definitions, in large part, on consensus
standards and existing OSHA rules, and since the definitions included
are generally self-explanatory, OSHA believes the regulated community
understands these terms well; therefore, with a few exceptions, this
discussion of final Sec. 1926.968 provides no explanation of the
terms' definitions. For terms having meanings that may not be readily
apparent, the Agency is providing an explanation of the definition of
each of these terms in the discussion of the provision in which the
term first appears. The following table shows where in this preamble
OSHA discusses some of the key definitions.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
See the summary and explanation
Term for:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contract employer...................... Sec. 1926.950(c), Information
transfer.
Enclosed space......................... Sec. 1926.953(a), Enclosed
spaces, General.
Entry.................................. Sec. 1926.953(g), Hazardous
atmosphere.
Exposed................................ Sec. 1926.960(b)(3), At least
two employees.
Sec. 1926.960(g)(1), Hazard
assessment.
Fall restraint system.................. Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii),
Care and use of personal fall
protection equipment.
Host employer.......................... Sec. 1926.950(c), Information
transfer.
Isolated............................... Sec. 1926.960(b)(3), At least
two employees.
Line-clearance tree trimming........... Sec. 1926.950(a)(3),
Applicable Part 1910
requirements.
Personal fall arrest system............ Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii),
Care and use of personal fall
protection equipment.
Work-positioning equipment............. Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii),
Care and use of personal fall
protection equipment.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA based the definition of "qualified employee" on the
definition of that term as set forth in existing Sec. 1910.269(x).
This definition states that a qualified employee is an employee
knowledgeable in the construction and operation of the electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution equipment involved, along
with the associated hazards.
As OSHA indicated in the preamble to the proposal, the Agency is
not requiring that a "qualified employee" be knowledgeable in all
aspects of electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
equipment (70 FR 34888--34889). OSHA believes that this definition will
convey the true meaning of this term. Note that the final rule uses the
term "qualified employee" to refer only to employees who have the
training to work on energized electric power transmission and
distribution installations. Paragraph (b)(2) of final Sec. 1926.950
sets out the training an employee must have to be a qualified employee.
OSHA included a note to this effect following the definition of the
term. OSHA received no comments on the definition of "qualified
employee" and is adopting it without substantive change from the
proposal.
One commenter requested that the standard define "fire-resistant
clothing" (Ex. 0237). This commenter noted that untreated cotton,
regardless of weight, is not considered "fire-resistant" and asked
that the final rule clarify this point.
As the commenter pointed out in its submission, a footnote in
proposed Appendix F described flame-resistant clothing as follows:
Flame-resistant clothing includes clothing that is inherently
flame resistant and clothing that has been chemically treated with a
flame retardant. (See ASTM F1506-02a, Standard Performance
Specification for Textile Materials for Wearing Apparel for Use by
Electrical Workers Exposed to Momentary Electric Arc and Related
Thermal Hazards.) [70 FR 34977]
OSHA decided not to include a definition of "flame-resistant
clothing" in the final rule. From the comments received on the record,
the Agency believes that affected employers and employees understand
that untreated cotton is not flame-resistant for the purposes of final
Sec. 1926.960(g)(4). Because final Sec. 1926.960(g)(5) requires arc-
rated protection, and because most FR clothing has an arc rating, OSHA
also believes that employers generally will use arc-rated clothing to
meet both requirements. (See, for example, Tr. 545.) In any event, the
Agency included a separate topic in Appendix E explaining what OSHA
means by FR and arc-rated clothing, so that employers will know what
clothing to purchase.
IBEW objected to the definition of "system operator" as it
applied to the control room operator in a generating station (Exs.
0230, 0480; Tr. 905). The union maintained that generating plants do
not have system operators, stating:
Most generating stations have a control room operator that is
responsible for all operations related to a specific generating
unit. System operators are usually located in some type of system
operations center and are responsible for operations of the
transmission system. There is available technology for computer
systems operated by system operators to have some form of automated
generation control . . . in a specific transmission system, but the
operations of the generating unit, specifically the installation of
lockout/tagout devices are the responsibility of station personnel,
probably the control room operator. OSHA should make the appropriate
changes. [Ex. 0230]
IBEW recommended that OSHA adopt a different term, "control room
operator,"
applicable to the lockout-tagout requirements in Sec. 1910.269(d) and
defined as follows:
Control room operator. A qualified employee who operates an
electric generating system or its parts from within a centralized
control room. [Ex. 0480]
In final Sec. 1926.968, "system operator" means a "qualified
person designated to operate the system or its parts." This is a
generic definition that OSHA believes applies equally to the employees
in the dispatch center operating a transmission or distribution system
and to the employees in the control room of a power generating plant
who control the generation system and apply lockout-tagout devices.
OSHA recognizes that the utility industry views these two groups of
employees as being distinct and may even frequently use the term
"system operator" exclusively for the transmission and distribution
operators (though some utilities call these employees "dispatchers"
(Exs. 0167, 0508)). However, from the description of the energy control
procedures in the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking record, and even from
IBEW's own recommended definition, it is clear that the control room
operator in a generation plant serves the same function as a system
operator for a transmission or distribution system (269-Ex. 12-6; Ex.
0480). Therefore, the Agency concludes that a control room operator in
a generation plant is "designated" by the employer to "operate" or
control "the [generation] system or its parts" and, thus, meets the
definition for "system operator" contained in the final rule. For
these reasons, OSHA is adopting the definition of "system operator"
as proposed.
20. Appendices
OSHA is including six appendices to final Subpart V. The first of
these appendices is Appendix A. Proposed Appendix A to Subpart V
referred to Appendix A to Sec. 1910.269. The general industry appendix
contains flow charts depicting the interface between Sec. 1910.269 and
the following standards: Sec. 1910.146, Permit-required confined
spaces; Sec. 1910.147, The control of hazardous energy (lockout/
tagout); and Part 1910, Subpart S, Electrical. Appendix A to Sec.
1910.269 has little relevance, if any, to work covered by Subpart V, as
that appendix only contains information relevant to the application of
general industry standards. Therefore, the Agency is not adopting
proposed Appendix A to Subpart V.
Lee Marchessault with Workplace Safety Solutions expressed concern
that Appendix A to Sec. 1910.269 granted electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work an exemption from Subpart S of the
general industry standards (Ex. 0196; Tr. 582-583). Based on his
experience as an electrician, he believed that there were some hazards
covered by Subpart S that Sec. 1910.269 does not address.
OSHA did not propose any changes to existing Appendix A to Sec.
1910.269 and is adopting it in Sec. 1910.269 of this final rule
without substantive change. This appendix does not grant an exemption
from Subpart S for electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work. It simply provides guidance, in the form of a
flowchart, on how Sec. 1910.269 and Subpart S apply to various
installations. OSHA is not altering the scope of Subpart S in any way.
In fact, final Sec. 1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B) explicitly states that Sec.
1910.269 does not apply to "electrical installations, electrical
safety-related work practices, or electrical maintenance considerations
covered by Subpart S of this part." Therefore, Mr. Marchessault's
concerns are groundless.
Appendix B provides information relating to the determination of
appropriate minimum approach distances under final Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)(i). In the proposed rule, OSHA based this appendix on
existing Appendix B to Sec. 1910.269, with revisions necessary to
reflect the changes to the minimum approach distances proposed for
Sec. 1910.269 and Subpart V. In this final rule, OSHA revised this
appendix as necessary to account for the calculation methods required
by final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(i) and Table V-2. OSHA based these
revisions on: (1) the findings made with regard to minimum approach
distances (see the summary and explanation for Sec. 1926.960(c)(1),
under the heading Minimum approach distances, earlier in this section
of the preamble); (2) IEEE Std 516-2009 (Ex. 0532); and (3) draft 9 of
IEEE Std 516 (Ex. 0524). The appendix includes a discussion, based on
IEEE Std 516-2009 (Ex. 0532), regarding how to determine the maximum
transient overvoltage for a system.
Proposed Appendix C provided information relating to the protection
of employees from hazardous step and touch potentials as addressed in
proposed Sec. Sec. 1926.959(d)(3)(iii)(D), 1926.963(d)(3)(ii), and
1926.964(b)(2). As discussed under the summary and explanation for
final Sec. 1926.962(c), earlier in this section of the preamble, the
Agency expanded this appendix to incorporate guidance on protecting
employees from hazardous differences in potential as required by that
provision in the final rule. OSHA renamed this appendix accordingly.
OSHA based the additional material in this appendix on IEEE Std 1048-
2003 (Ex. 0046). Appendix C in the final rule also includes examples of
how to achieve equipotential grounding as required by final Sec.
1926.962(c). The Agency based these examples on information in the IEEE
standard and on the principle from the consensus standard that
installing grounds of adequate ampacity (as required by Sec.
1926.962(d)(1)) and sufficiently low impedance (as required by Sec.
1926.962(d)(2)) and adequately bonding all conductive objects within
the work zone will minimize potential differences (Ex. 0046). As
discussed in the summary and explanation for Sec. 1926.962(c), earlier
in this preamble, OSHA will deem employers using the examples in
Appendix C to be in compliance with that final paragraph. Employers are
free to use other methods of grounding as long as they can demonstrate
that those other methods will prevent exposure of each employee to
hazardous differences in electric potential.
Appendix D contains information on the inspection and testing of
wood poles addressed in final Sec. 1926.964(a)(2). This appendix
describes ways to test wood poles to ensure that they are sound.
Proposed Appendix D described how to test a wood pole using a "hammer
weighing about 1.4 kg (3 pounds)." Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia,
Maryland & Delaware Association of Electric Cooperatives recommended
deleting the weight of the hammer from the appendix (Ex. 0175). She
maintained that lighter hammers are as effective in sounding a pole as
a 1.4-kilogram hammer.
OSHA notes that Appendix D is not mandatory. It contains guidelines
that employers may choose to follow in inspecting and testing wood
poles. Thus, employers may use lighter or heavier hammers if they find
them to be effective. However, Appendix D provides some guidance on
what weight hammer OSHA knows to be effective in testing wood poles.
The Agency took the weight given in Appendix D directly from Sec.
1910.268(n)(3)(i). Therefore, the Agency is not adopting Ms. Layton's
recommendation and is adopting Appendix D substantially as proposed.
Appendix E, which OSHA proposed as Appendix F, provides guidance on
the selection of protective clothing and other protective equipment for
employees exposed to flames or electric arcs as addressed in final
Sec. 1926.960(g). The Agency modified this appendix to reflect the
final rule as discussed in the
summary and explanation for Sec. 1926.960(g), earlier in this section
of the preamble. That preamble discussion also responds to some of the
comments OSHA received on proposed Appendix F. Several other comments
addressed the appendix; OSHA discusses these comments here.
Proposed Appendix F included tables for estimating incident-energy
levels based on voltage, fault current, and clearing times (proposed
Table 8 and Table 9, which OSHA adopted as Table 6 and Table 7 in
Appendix E of the final rule). Employers could use these tables to
estimate incident energy for exposures involving phase-to-ground arcs
in open air. The proposed appendix also included a table giving
protective clothing guidelines for electric-arc hazards (Table 10,
which OSHA did not adopt in the final rule). This table described
protective clothing that employers could use for different ranges of
estimated incident energy.
Noting that the energy is inversely proportional to the distance,
NIOSH pointed out that proposed Appendix F incorrectly stated that the
amount of heat energy is directly proportional to the distance between
the employee and the arc (Ex. 0130). OSHA corrected the appendix
accordingly.
Three commenters made recommendations for clarifying the
information presented in proposed Appendix F. First, NIOSH recommended:
Revising the headings in Table 8 and Table 9 (Table 6 and
Table 7 in Appendix E of the final rule) to reflect more clearly that
the values in the table represent maximum clearing times at specified
maximum incident-energy levels,
Making it clear that unqualified references to "cotton"
in the appendix meant "untreated cotton,"
Describing how to use the arc rating on the clothing label
to select clothing appropriate for a given estimate of incident energy,
Clarifying that the standard prohibits the use of meltable
undergarments, and
Clarifying that employer-added logos on arc-rated clothing
can adversely affect the arc rating and FR characteristics of the
clothing (id.).
Second, TVA recommended that OSHA clarify that workers can sustain
burns even when wearing appropriately selected protection because there
is a 50-percent chance that a worker will sustain a second-degree burn
at the arc rating of the protective equipment (Ex. 0213). Third, Mr.
Paul Hamer recommended that the Agency note the method used to
calculate the incident-energy values in proposed Table 8 and Table 9
(Table 6 and Table 7 in Appendix E of the final rule) (Ex. 0228).
OSHA believes that these recommendations will serve to provide
additional useful guidance to workers and employers. Therefore, OSHA is
adopting all of these suggestions in Appendix E of the final rule.
Mr. James Thomas, president of ASTM International, recommended
adding ASTM F1891-02b, Standard Specification for Arc and Flame
Resistant Rainwear, as a reference within proposed Appendix F (Ex.
0148).
OSHA agrees that ASTM F1891 contains recognized standards for
particular types of arc-rated protective equipment. Therefore, OSHA
added a reference to ASTM F1891-12, the latest edition of the consensus
standard, in Appendix E in the final rule.
Leo Muckerheide with Safety Consulting Services requested that OSHA
stress the limitations of the various methods of estimating incident
heat energy, in particular the limitations included in the notes to
proposed Table 8 and Table 9 (Table 6 and Table 7 in Appendix E of the
final rule) (Ex. 0180). He expressed concern that employers would use
the methods inappropriately and ignore notes and other information
limiting their use.
As noted in the summary and explanation for final Sec.
1926.960(g)(2), OSHA is including information on the acceptable use of
the various calculation methods in Appendix E of the final rule. The
Agency also made it clear in the captions to Table 6 and Table 7 in the
final appendix that those tables only apply to exposures involving
phase-to-ground arcs in open air.
Proposed Appendix F included the following statement, "Outer
flame-resistant layers may not have openings that expose flammable
inner layers that could be ignited." Mr. Anthony Ahern with Ohio Rural
Electric Cooperatives objected to this statement because it would
require buttoning the top button on a shirt worn over an untreated
cotton T-shirt, which could increase discomfort and heat stress (Ex.
0186).
The Agency dismissed objections to FR and arc-rated clothing based
on comfort and heat stress as noted under the summary and explanation
for final Sec. 1926.950(g)(5). In addition, the exposed portion of a
T-shirt poses an ignition hazard. Existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(6)(iii),
which proscribes the wearing of clothing that could increase the extent
of injury in the event of exposure to flames or electric arcs, already
prohibits exposing flammable garments, including T-shirts, to possible
ignition from an electric arc.\455\ Therefore, OSHA did not adopt Mr.
Ahern's recommendation to remove the quoted statement from the
appendix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\455\ See, for example, the August 10, 1995, memorandum to
regional administrators from James W. Stanley, "Guidelines for the
Enforcement of the Apparel Standard, 29 CFR 1910.269(l)(6), of the
Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Standard"
(http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21878).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lee Marchessault with Workplace Safety Solutions recommended that
OSHA replace references to ARCPRO in proposed Appendix F with
references to "commercially available software" (Ex. 0196; Tr. 582).
He noted that software other than that mentioned in the appendix was
available, such as EasyPower (Tr. 582, 598).
Today, there is a much wider array of software available for
calculating incident heat energy from an electric arc. However, the
basis of most of this software, including EasyPower, is the NFPA 70E
Annex D or IEEE 1584 methods. The Agency is not aware of any software
that uses a calculation method, other than the heat flux calculator,
that is not already listed in Table 2 of Appendix E in the final rule.
As discussed earlier under the summary and explanation for final Sec.
1926.960(g)(2), ARCPRO uses its own calculation method validated
through testing of electric arcs. As explained in that same portion of
the preamble, OSHA found the heat flux calculator to be an unacceptable
method of estimating incident heat energy. The Agency believes that it
is essential to inform employers of what methods OSHA will deem
acceptable, and not all available software for calculating incident
energy from an arc will provide reasonable estimates of incident heat
energy. Consequently, Table 2 of Appendix E in the final rule lists
ARCPRO as an acceptable method. However, the appendix notes that other
software that yields results based on any of the listed methods is also
acceptable. In addition, as noted earlier under the summary and
explanation for final Sec. 1926.960(g)(2), an employer is free to
choose a method that is not listed in the appendix if the chosen method
reasonably predicts the potential incident-heat-energy exposure of the
employee.
Some rulemaking participants recommended that OSHA revise Table 8
and Table 9 in proposed Appendix F (Table 6 and Table 7 in Appendix E
of the final rule) to reflect an incident-energy level of 4 cal/cm\2\
rather 5 cal/cm\2\ (Exs. 0228, 0230, 0383; Tr. 410-412, 490-491). Mr.
Norfleet Smith with
E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company described the reasons for this
change as follows:
[T]he 5 cal column in Tables 8 and 9 of Appendix F [should] be
changed to be 4 cals, and the respective clearing times in those
charts [should] be updated accordingly. That's what we propose. . .
.
[T]here are numerous U.S. based electric utility companies that
have adopted flame resistant protective clothing systems under
1910.269, and . . . many of those clothing systems today meet 4
calories per square centimeter arc thermal performance ratings but
may not meet 5 cal per centimeter square arc thermal performance
ratings.
These employers would be forced to modify their existing
clothing programs, should the new rule go into effect as it is
written today.
Further, NFPA 70E has already defined hazard risk categories of
4, 8, 25, and 40 cals per square centimeter, and flame resistant
protective clothing systems have already been developed to match
those levels. Having both a 4 calorie per square centimeter category
in NFPA 70E and a 5 calorie per square centimeter category in OSHA
29 CFR 1910.269 and 1926.960 may create confusion and inefficiency
in the garment supply system.
Since Tables 8 and 9 of Appendix F have maximum clearing times
listed which are generated using commercially available software
programs, the appropriate clearing times for 4 calories per square
centimeter can be modified to support that rating, and no loss of
protection would occur, as the new maximum clearing times would
match the new protection levels of 4 calories per square centimeter.
. . .
Lastly, as referenced on one of the pages in the proposed rule,
. . . "clothing is currently widely available in ratings from about
4 calories per square centimeter to over 50 calories per square
centimeter." [Tr. 410-412]
In addition, IBEW pointed out that the NESC subcommittee with
responsibility for work rules adopted a proposal with charts equivalent
to Table 8 and Table 9 in proposed Appendix F (Table 6 and Table 7 in
Appendix E of the final rule), except that the minimum incident heat
energy listed in the NESC proposal was 4 cal/cm\2\ rather than 5 cal/
cm\2\ (Ex. 0230). The union submitted the NESC proposal to the Subpart
V rulemaking record; the NESC proposal also contained corrections to
some of the values reflected in the proposed OSHA tables (id.).\456\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\456\ IEEE subsequently adopted the NESC proposal, which is
contained in Table 410-1 and 410-2 of the 2007 NESC. The 2012 NESC
contains equivalent tables in Table 410-2 and 410-3, though the
values in Table 410-3 are different from the values in 2007 NESC
Table 410-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA agrees with these rulemaking participants that some employers
already have programs using protective equipment with an arc rating of
4 cal/cm\2\. Although the Agency does not agree that keeping a 5-cal/
cm\2\ minimum incident-energy level in final Table 6 and Table 7, which
are not mandatory, would force employers to upgrade their existing
protection to match the higher level, OSHA does believe that a 4-cal/
cm\2\ minimum energy level would facilitate compliance for many of
these employers. Therefore, Table 6 and Table 7 in the final rule adopt
the lower minimum incident-energy level. In addition, OSHA is
correcting the clearing times in those tables.
Mr. Paul Hamer recommended that Table 8 and Table 9 in proposed
Appendix F (Table 6 and Table 7 in Appendix E of the final rule) list
clearing times for incident-energy levels corresponding to the NFPA 70E
hazard-risk categories (4, 8, 25, and 40 cal/cm\2\) because, in his
view, these are the levels that industry already is using (Ex. 0228).
Although industries other than the electric utility industry use
the hazard-risk categories in NFPA 70E, evidence in the record
indicates that electric utilities and their contractors for electric
power transmission and distribution work do not widely use this
consensus standard. (See, for example, Ex. 0212 ("[NFPA 70E] was
developed primarily for premise[s] wiring, not utility type electric
systems. The systems covered by the [hazard-risk category task table]
are not utility type distribution or transmission systems. The tables
are therefore not applicable for utility [transmission and
distribution] systems.") OSHA believes that the NESC proposal better
reflects incident-energy levels appropriate for the types of systems
addressed by final Table 6 and Table 7, that is, overhead transmission
and distribution lines.\457\ Table 6 and Table 7 apply only to
exposures involving phase-to-ground arcs in open air, which are the
types of exposures found predominantly in work on overhead transmission
and distribution lines. Consequently, OSHA is not adopting Mr. Hamer's
recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\457\ The corresponding tables in the 2007 and 2012 NESC provide
clearing times for incident-energy levels of 4-, 8-, and 12 cal/
cm\2\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some commenters urged OSHA to replace Table 10 in proposed Appendix
F with a similar table from NFPA 70E, Table 130.7(C)(11), protective
clothing characteristics (Exs. 0190, 0228, 0235). Mr. Frank White with
ORC Worldwide noted that OSHA appeared to have based Table 10 in the
proposal on a 1996 IEEE paper that was significantly older than NFPA
70E-2004 (Ex. 0235). He asked OSHA to explain why it is not basing the
table on the more recent consensus standard. Mr. Thomas Stephenson with
International Paper commented, "Based on my research, of the readily
available single layer shirts, the highest ATPV rating is 8.2 cal/sq
cm. Based on Table 10, this shirt would not be acceptable for a 5.1
cal/sq cm exposure" (Ex. 0190). He noted that many companies base
their electrical safety programs, including PPE, on NFPA 70E and
recommended that the rule match that consensus standard.
OSHA did not include proposed Table 10 in the final rule. The
Agency agrees with these commenters that Table 10 in proposed Appendix
F is out of date. There also is evidence in the record indicating that
arc-rated clothing is getting lighter and that even Table 130.7(C)(11)
in NFPA 70E-2004 might be out of date (Tr. 493). Appendix E in the
final rule explains that any protective clothing and other protective
equipment that meets the employer's reasonable estimate of incident
heat energy is acceptable. For example, employers may use protective
shirts and pants rated at 12 cal/cm\2\ for an estimated exposure of 12
cal/cm\2\.
Some rulemaking participants pointed out an error in the way the
proposed appendix described the energy level expected to produce a
second-degree burn injury (Exs. 0213, 0228; Tr. 540). These commenters
noted that the threshold of second-degree burn injury, as reflected in
NFPA 70E and IEEE Std 1584, is 1.2 cal/cm\2\, unless the fault-clearing
time is under about 0.1 second. For the faster clearing times, the
threshold is 1.5 cal/cm\2\ (id.).
OSHA agrees with these comments and revised the language in
Appendix E in the final rule to indicate that the threshold for second-
degree burn injury is 1.2 to 1.5 cal/cm\2\.
Appendix F in the final rule, which OSHA proposed as Appendix G,
contains guidelines for the inspection of work-positioning equipment to
assist employers in complying with final Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(i). OSHA
received no comments on this appendix and is adopting the appendix
substantially as proposed.
Appendix G in the final rule, which OSHA proposed as Appendix E,
contains references to additional sources of information that
supplement the requirements of Subpart V. The national consensus
standards referenced in this appendix contain detailed specifications
to which employers may refer in complying with the performance-oriented
requirements of OSHA's final rule. Except as specifically noted in
Subpart V, however, compliance with the national consensus standards is
not a substitute for
compliance with the provisions of the OSHA standards.
OSHA listed the most recent versions of the consensus standards in
final Appendix G. In some cases, the version of the consensus standard
in the record is older than the version listed in the appendix. In
other cases, the consensus standard is not contained in the record at
all. However, OSHA based the requirements in the final rule only on the
consensus documents and other data contained in the record. The Agency
evaluated any editions of the consensus standards listed in the
appendix that are not in the record for consistency with OSHA's final
rule. The Agency determined that these later consensus standards
conform to the requirements of final Subpart V, as specifically noted
in the final rule, and that these later consensus standards provide
information useful for employers and workers in complying with the
final rule.
C. Part 1910 Revisions
1. Sections 1910.137 and 1910.269
The construction of electric power transmission and distribution
lines and equipment nearly always exposes employees to the same hazards
as the maintenance of electric power lines and equipment. Power line
workers use the same protective equipment and safety techniques in both
types of work. During the course of a workday, these employees can
perform both types of work.
For example, an employer might assign a power line crew to replace
one failed transformer with an equivalent one and a second failed
transformer with a transformer with a different kilovolt-ampere rating.
When the employees perform the first job, they are performing
maintenance work covered by Part 1910. However, the second job would be
construction and covered by Part 1926. The employees would almost
certainly use identical work practices and protective equipment for
both jobs.
Because of this, OSHA believes that, in most cases, it is important
to have the same requirements apply regardless of the type of work
performed. If the corresponding Part 1910 and Part 1926 standards are
the same, employers can adopt one set of work rules covering both types
of work. Employers and employees will generally not have to decide
whether a particular job is construction or maintenance--a factor that,
in virtually every instance, has no bearing on the safety of employees.
(For a discussion of comments suggesting that OSHA combine Subpart V
and Sec. 1910.269 into one rule, refer to the introductory paragraphs
in the summary and explanation of final Sec. 1926.950.)
Therefore, OSHA is adopting revisions to Sec. Sec. 1910.137 and
1910.269 so that the construction and maintenance standards will be
substantially the same.\458\ The following cross-reference table shows
the major paragraphs in final Sec. 1910.269 and the corresponding
section in final Subpart V:\459\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\458\ Subpart V does not contain requirements for work involving
electric power generation installations or line-clearance tree-
trimming operations. See the summary and explanation for final Sec.
1926.950(a)(3), earlier in this section of the preamble.
\459\ Existing Sec. 1910.269 contains an introductory note
explaining that OSHA is staying the enforcement of certain
provisions of existing Sec. 1910.269 until November 1, 1994, and of
existing Sec. 1910.269(v)(11)(xii) until February 1, 1996. OSHA is
not including this note in final Sec. 1910.269 because it is no
longer applicable. OSHA is not including this note in final Sec.
1910.269 because it is no longer applicable.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Corresponding section in
Major paragraph in Sec. 1910.269 subpart V
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(a) General............................ Sec. 1926.950 General.
(b) Medical services and first aid..... Sec. 1926.951 Medical
services and first aid.
(c) Job briefing....................... Sec. 1926.952 Job briefing.
(d) Hazardous energy control (lockout/ Sec. 1926.950(a)(3)--Subpart
tagout) procedures [applies only to V applies Sec. 1910.269 to
work involving electric power work involving electric power
generation installations]. generation installations.
(e) Enclosed spaces.................... Sec. 1926.953 Enclosed
spaces.
(f) Excavations........................ Sec. 1926.967(f) Excavations.
(g) Personal protective equipment...... Sec. 1926.954 Personal
protective equipment.
(h) Portable ladders and platforms..... Sec. 1926.955 Portable
ladders and platforms.
(i) Hand and portable power equipment.. Sec. 1926.956 Hand and
portable power equipment.
(j) Live-line tools.................... Sec. 1926.957 Live-line
tools.
(k) Materials handling and storage..... Sec. 1926.958 Materials
handling and storage.
(l) Working on or near exposed Sec. 1926.960 Working on or
energized parts. near exposed energized parts.
(m) Deenergizing lines and equipment Sec. 1926.961 Deenergizing
for employee protection. lines and equipment for
employee protection.
(n) Grounding for the protection of Sec. 1926.962 Grounding for
employees. the protection of employees.
(o) Testing and test facilities........ Sec. 1926.963 Testing and
test facilities.
(p) Mechanical equipment............... Sec. 1926.959 Mechanical
equipment.
(q) Overhead lines and live-line Sec. 1926.964 Overhead lines
barehand work. and live-line barehand work.
(r) Line-clearance tree-trimming Sec. 1926.950(a)(3)--Subpart
operations. V applies Sec. 1910.269 to
line-clearance tree-trimming
operations.
(s) Communication facilities........... Sec. 1926.967(k)
Communication facilities.
(t) Underground electrical Sec. 1926.965 Underground
installations. electrical installations.
(u) Substations........................ Sec. 1926.966 Substations.
(v) Power generation................... Sec. 1926.950(a)(3)--Subpart
V applies Sec. 1910.269 to
work involving electric power
generation installations.
(w) Special conditions................. Sec. 1926.967 Special
conditions.
(x) Definitions........................ Sec. 1926.968 Definitions.
Appendices A through G................. Appendices A through G,
respectively.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following distribution table presents the major revisions and a
brief summary of OSHA's rationale for adopting them. The full
explanation of the changes and the rationale for adopting them is in
the summary and explanation for the corresponding provision in final
Sec. 1926.97 or Subpart V.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New part 1910
Existing part 1910 paragraph paragraph Part 1926 revision Rationale and comments
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 1910.137 Sec. 1926.97
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b)................................ (c)................... (c)................... Existing Sec. 1910.137(b)
redesignated as Sec.
1910.137(c) for
consistency with Sec.
1926.97.
(a)(1)(ii), (b)(2)(vii), and Table (a)(1)(ii), (a)(1)(ii), Section 1910.137 revised to
I-2, Table I-3, Table I-4, and (c)(2)(vii), and (c)(2)(vii), and include Class 00 rubber
Table I-5. Table I-1, Table I-2, Table E-1, Table E-2, insulating gloves.
Table I-3, and Table Table E-3, and Table
I-4. E-4.
The note following (a)(3)(ii)(B)... The note following The note following Note revised to include the
(a)(3)(ii)(B). (a)(3)(ii)(B). latest ASTM standards.
References to ASTM
definitions and to an ASTM
guide for visual
inspection of rubber
insulating equipment
included to provide
additional useful
information for complying
with the OSHA standard.
A new note following (b)(2)(ii).... A new note following The note following A reference to an ASTM
(c)(2)(ii). (c)(2)(ii). guide for visual
inspection of rubber
insulating equipment
included to provide
additional useful
information for complying
with the OSHA standard.
(b) [New]............. (b)................... A new paragraph added to
cover electrical
protective equipment not
made of rubber.
(b)(2)(vii)(B)..................... (c)(2)(vii)(C) and (c)(2)(vii)(C) and Existing Sec.
(c)(2)(vii)(D). (c)(2)(vii)(D). 1910.137(b)(2)(vii)(B)
divided into two separate
CFR units.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 1910.269 Subpart V
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(a)(2)(i).......................... (a)(2)(i)(A), Sec. Existing Sec.
(a)(2)(i)(B), and 1926.950(b)(1)(i), 1910.269(a)(2)(i) divided
(a)(2)(i)(C). (b)(1)(ii), and into three separate CFR
(b)(1)(iii). units. The last of those
units, paragraph
(a)(2)(i)(c), adopts a new
requirement that employers
determine the degree of
training by the risk to
the employee.
(a)(2)(ii)(E) [New]... Sec. A new paragraph added to
1926.950(b)(2)(v). require employers to train
qualified employees to
recognize electrical
hazards and to control or
avoid them.
(a)(2)(vii)........................ (a)(2)(viii).......... Sec. 1926.950(b)(7). The existing requirement
for employers to certify
that they trained
employees has been
replaced with a
requirement for employers
to determine that
employees demonstrated
proficiency in the work
practices involved. In
addition, a new note added
to clarify how training
received in a previous job
would satisfy the training
requirements.
(a)(2)(iii) [New]..... None.................. A new paragraph added to
require training for line-
clearance tree trimmers.
(See the summary and
explanation for Sec.
1926.950(b)(2).)
(a)(3) [New].......... Sec. 1926.950(c).... A new paragraph added to
require host employers and
contract employers to
share information on
safety-related matters.
(a)(3)............................. (a)(4)................ Sec. 1926.950(d).... Existing Sec.
1910.269(a)(3)
redesignated as Sec.
1910.269(a)(4) for
consistency with Subpart
V.
(c)................................ (c)................... Sec. 1926.952....... The existing provisions on
job briefing reorganized
and renumbered. A new
requirement added to
ensure that employers
provide the employee in
charge with information
that relates to the
determination of existing
characteristics and
conditions.
The note following existing (e)(6). None.................. None.................. This note removed. It
currently references Sec.
1910.146 for the
definition of "entry."
OSHA added a definition of
this term to Sec.
1910.269(x), so this note
is unnecessary.
(e)(7)............................. (e)(7)................ Sec. 1926.953(h).... OSHA removed the
requirement to provide an
attendant if there is
reason to believe a hazard
exists in the enclosed
space. The introductory
text to Sec. 1910.269(e)
requires the entry to
conform to Sec. 1910.146
if there are hazards for
which the requirements of
Sec. 1910.269(e) and (t)
do not provide adequate
protection. Thus, if an
employer has reason to
believe that a hazard
exists despite the
precautions taken under
Sec. 1910.269(e) and
(t), then Sec. 1910.146
applies and requires an
attendant.
(e)(8)............................. (e)(8)................ Sec. 1926.953(i).... The existing requirement
revised to clarify that
the test instrument must
have an accuracy of 10 percent.
(e)(12)............................ (e)(12)............... Sec. 1926.953(m).... The existing requirement
revised to require the
employer to be able to
demonstrate that it
maintained ventilation
long enough to ensure that
a safe atmosphere exists
before employees enter an
enclosed space.
(g)(2)............................. (g)(2)................ Sec. 1926.954(b).... The existing requirements
revised to maintain
consistency with the
construction provisions.
(i)(2)(i).......................... None.................. None.................. The existing requirement
was removed because it is
unnecessary. See the
summary and explanation
for final Sec.
1926.956(b).
(i)(2)(ii)(C)...................... (i)(2)(iii)........... Sec. 1926.956(b)(3). The final rule limits the
voltage on isolating
transformers used with
cord- and plug-connected
equipment to 50 volts.
(l)(1), introductory text.......... (l)(1)(i), (l)(1)(ii), Sec. The introductory text to
and (l)(1)(iii). 1926.960(b)(1)(i), existing Sec.
(b)(1)(ii), and 1910.269(l)(1) divided
(b)(2). into three separate CFR
units.
(l)(1)(i) and (l)(1)(ii)........... (l)(2)(i) and Sec. Existing Sec.
(l)(2)(ii). 1926.960(b)(3)(i) and 1910.269(l)(1)(i) and
(b)(3)(ii). (l)(1)(ii) redesignated as
Sec. 1910.269(l)(2)(i)
and (l)(2)(ii) for
consistency with Subpart
V.
(l)(2) and existing Table R-6 (l)(3) and Table R-3 Sec. 1926.960(c)(1) The final rule revises, and
through Table R-10. through Table R-9. and Table V-2 through requires the employer to
Table V-8. establish, minimum
approach distances that
employees must maintain
from exposed energized
parts. Note that, in other
provisions, the final rule
replaces references to
minimum approach-distance
tables with references to
the minimum approach-
distance requirements in
Sec. 1910.269(l)(3)(i)
or Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)(i), as
appropriate.
(l)(2)(i).......................... (l)(3)(iii)(A)........ Sec. 1926.960 The existing requirement
(c)(1)(iii)(A). clarified to indicate that
an energized part must be
under the full control of
the employee for rubber
insulating gloves or
rubber insulating gloves
and sleeves to be
sufficient insulation from
that part.
(l)(3) and (l)(4).................. (l)(4) and (l)(5)..... Sec. 1926.960(c)(2) OSHA revised the existing
and (d). requirements to ensure
that employees use
electrical protective
equipment whenever they
can reach within the
minimum approach distance
of an energized part.
(l)(5)............................. (l)(6)................ Sec. 1926.960(e).... Existing Sec.
1910.269(l)(5)
redesignated as Sec.
1910.269(l)(6) for
consistency with Subpart
V.
(l)(6)............................. (l)(7) [Revised] and Sec. 1926.960(f) and OSHA revised the
(l)(8) [New]. (g). requirements on clothing
in existing Sec.
1910.269(l)(6)(ii) and
(iii) to require the
employer to protect
employees from electric
arcs. Existing paragraph
(l)(6)(i) redesignated as
new paragraph (l)(7), and
the new protective
clothing and other
protective equipment
requirements added as
paragraph (l)(8).
(l)(7) through (l)(10)............. (l)(9) through (l)(12) Sec. 1926.960(h) Existing Sec.
through (k). 1910.269(l)(7), (l)(8),
(l)(9), and (l)(10)
redesignated as new Sec.
1910.269(l)(9), (l)(10),
(l)(11), and (l)(12),
respectively.
(m)(3)(viii)....................... (m)(2)(iv)(A) [New] Sec. 1926.961(b)(4). The existing provision
and (m)(2)(iv)(B). revised to require
independent crews to
coordinate energizing and
deenergizing lines and
equipment. A new paragraph
has been added requiring
multiple crews to
coordinate their
activities under a single
employee in charge and to
act as a single crew.
(n)(6) and (n)(7).................. (n)(6)(i) and Sec. 1926.962(f)(1) The existing requirement
(n)(6)(ii). and (f)(2). revised to allow, under
certain conditions,
insulating equipment,
other than a live-line
tool, to place grounds on,
or remove them from,
circuits of 600 volts or
less.
(p)(4)(i).......................... (p)(4)(i)............. Sec. 1926.959(d)(1). OSHA revised this provision
to clarify that, if an
insulated aerial lift
comes closer to an
energized part than the
minimum approach distance,
the aerial lift must
maintain the minimum
approach distance from
objects at a different
potential.
(t)(3), (t)(7), and (t)(8)......... (t)(3), (t)(7), and Sec. 1926.965(d), OSHA revised these
(t)(8). (h), and (i). requirements to apply to
vaults as well as
manholes. Additionally,
OSHA added a requirement
(paragraph (t)(7)(ii)) to
address work that could
cause a cable to fail.
The notes following (u)(1) and The notes following The note following OSHA updated the references
(v)(3). (u)(1) and (v)(3). Sec. 1926.966(b). in these notes from ANSI
C2-1987 to ANSI/IEEE C2-
2012.
The notes following (u)(5)(i) and The notes following The note following OSHA updated the references
(v)(5)(i). (u)(5)(i) and Sec. 1926.966(f)(1). in these notes from ANSI
(v)(5)(i). C2-1987 to ANSI/IEEE C2-
2002.
(x)................................ (x)................... Sec. 1926.968....... OSHA added definitions of
"contract employer,"
"first-aid training,"
"host employer," and
"entry." (See the
discussion of final Sec.
Sec. 1926.950(c),
1926.953(g), and
1926.953(h) in the
preamble discussion of
final Subpart V.)
Appendix E to Sec. 1910.269...... Appendix G to Sec. Appendix G to Subpart OSHA redesignated this
1910.269. V. appendix as Appendix G to
Sec. 1910.269. In
addition, the final rule
updates the references
contained in this
appendix.
Appendix E to Sec. Appendix E to Subpart OSHA added a new appendix
1910.269 [New]. V. containing information on
protecting employees from
electric arcs.
Appendix F to Sec. Appendix F to Subpart OSHA added a new appendix
1910.269 [New]. V. containing guidelines for
the inspection of work-
positioning equipment.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA received several comments on provisions in existing Sec.
1910.269 that the Agency did not propose for revision.\460\ Mr. Mark
Spence with Dow Chemical Company maintained that, in the years since
OSHA promulgated Sec. 1910.269, "industrial establishments have had
some difficulties in adapting to this utility-oriented rule" (Ex.
0128). He recommended that, in promulgating this final rule, OSHA
"take the differences between industrial establishments and electric
utilities into account and establish different provisions for each as
appropriate" (id.). He provided two examples. For the first, he noted
that electric utilities generally follow the NESC whereas industrial
establishments generally follow the NEC and NFPA 70E. For the second
example, he noted that electric utilities frequently use contractors to
perform work "off-site," but that industrial establishments typically
have contractors' employees working on-site, side-by-side with their
own employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\460\ OSHA stated in the proposal that it was seeking comment on
entire Sec. Sec. 1910.137 and 1910.269 (70 FR 34892). However, OSHA
also stated:
Comments received on the general industry standards will be
considered in adopting the final construction standards and vice
versa. In particular, the Agency has requested comments on several
issues in the proposed revision of Subpart V and in proposed new
Sec. 1926.97. Some of these issues are directed towards
requirements in those construction standard that are taken from
general industry provisions that OSHA is not proposing to revise.
For example, earlier in this section of the preamble, the Agency
requests comments on whether AEDs should be required as part of the
medical and first-aid requirements in proposed Sec. 1926.951. (See
the summary and explanation of proposed Sec. 1926.951(b)(1).)
Although OSHA has not proposed to revise the corresponding general
industry provision, existing Sec. 1910.269(b)(1), the Agency
intends to revise that general industry provision if the rulemaking
record supports a requirement for AEDs. Therefore, OSHA encourages
all rulemaking participants to respond to these issues regardless of
whether the participants are covered by the construction standards.
[Id.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA is not setting separate requirements for industrial
establishments in final Sec. 1910.269. First, OSHA rejected a similar
comment during the 1994 rulemaking. One of the commenters in that
rulemaking opposed the application of Sec. 1910.269 to industrial
establishments because "[t]raditionally, industrial electrical systems
have been based upon the [NEC] in their design and operation" and
"[u]tility electrical systems, on the other hand, have always been
based upon the [NESC] in their design and operation" (269-Ex. 3-45).
In rejecting this comment, OSHA reasoned in part that "there are
hazards related to electrical power generation, transmission, and
distribution work that are not adequately addressed elsewhere in the
General Industry Standards" (59 FR 4334). Mr. Spence provides no basis
to support a conclusion that OSHA's determination on this issue in the
1994 rulemaking was erroneous, and OSHA continues to find its earlier
determination to be valid.
Second, OSHA believes that whether contractors work off-site or on-
site is not relevant to the issue of whether Sec. 1910.269 should
apply to industrial establishments. The work practices required by the
final rule are necessary for employee safety without regard to whether
an industrial establishment's employees are working alone or alongside
contractor employees.\461\
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\461\ Comments, including comments from Mr. Spence, regarding
the requirement proposed in Sec. Sec. 1910.269(a)(4)(ii)(B) and
1926.950(c)(2)(ii) for contract employers to follow the host
employer's safety-related work rules are discussed in the summary
and explanation for final Sec. 1926.950(c)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, the Agency believes that, at least for electric power
generation facilities and plant distribution substations, there are
more similarities between electric utilities and industrial
establishments than portrayed by Mr. Spence. There is evidence that
some electric utilities with electric power generation plants refer to
NFPA 70E for electrical safety guidelines. (See, for example, Exs. 0214
and 0217, which both list NFPA 70E, but not the NESC, as references for
TVA's electrical safety practices in electric power generation plants.)
OSHA, therefore, finds that it is not necessary or appropriate to adopt
Mr. Spence's recommendation for promulgating separate requirements for
electric utilities and industrial establishments.
EEI petitioned OSHA to revise the group lockout-tagout and system-
operator provisions in existing Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(ii) and (d)(8)(v)
(Exs. 0227, 0501).
OSHA hereby denies EEI's petition. In doing so, OSHA reexamined the
evidence supporting the promulgation of the existing group lockout-
tagout provisions in 1994 and continues to find that evidence
persuasive. OSHA also finds that the evidence on which EEI relies in
support of its petition does not justify revising the standard, as
explained in the following paragraphs.
OSHA designed the requirements for hazardous energy control
(lockout-tagout) procedures in existing Sec. 1910.269(d) to protect
employees working on electric power generation installations from
injury while maintaining or servicing machinery or equipment that is
part of that installation. Paragraph (d) of existing Sec. 1910.269,
which is almost identical to OSHA's general industry standard for the
control of hazardous energy at Sec. 1910.147, requires the employer to
"establish a program consisting of
energy control procedures, employee training, and periodic inspections
to ensure that, before any employee performs any servicing or
maintenance on a machine or equipment where the unexpected energizing,
start up, or release of stored energy could occur and cause injury, the
machine or equipment is isolated from the energy source and rendered
inoperative" \462\ (existing Sec. 1910.269(d)(2)(i)). In part,
existing Sec. 1910.269(d) requires: the employer to isolate the
machine or equipment from hazardous energy sources before servicing
begins; authorized employees to affix lockout or tagout devices to the
switches, disconnects, and other means used to isolate the machine or
equipment after the employer isolates the machine or equipment but
before servicing or maintenance begins; and authorized employees to
remove their lockout or tagout devices before the machine or equipment
is reenergized (existing Sec. 1910.269(d)(6)(ii) and (d)(6)(iii),
(d)(6)(iv), and (d)(7)). The standard generally prohibits anyone from
removing a lockout or tagout device other than the employee who placed
it (existing Sec. 1910.269(d)(7)(iv)). This prohibition protects the
employee who is performing work on the machine or equipment from injury
resulting from the reenergization of hazardous energy by someone else.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\462\ Throughout the final rule, OSHA changed "inoperative"
wherever it appeared in the existing standard to "inoperable."
"Inoperable," which means "incapable of being operated," is the
more precise of the two terms. ("Inoperative" means "not
working.") Paragraph (c)(1) of Sec. 1910.147, which is identical
to existing Sec. 1910.269(d)(2)(i), continues to use
"inoperative." OSHA intends to publish a technical amendment
making a similar change to Sec. 1910.147(c)(1) in the near future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The existing Sec. 1910.269 group lockout-tagout provision, which
is identical to the analogous general industry provision (Sec.
1910.147(f)(3)), makes it clear that each individual authorized
employee must take an affirmative step to accept and release his or her
own protection under the lockout-tagout standard and that this
affirmative step must be traceable to the employee and under that
employee's control. The group lockout-tagout provision applies "[w]hen
servicing or maintenance is performed by a . . . group" of workers
(existing Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(ii)). Although this provision allows
certain variations from the individual servicing model, it requires a
lockout-tagout "procedure which affords the employees a level of
protection equivalent to that provided by the implementation of a
personal lockout or tagout device." In particular, "[e]ach authorized
employee shall affix a personal lockout or tagout device to the group
lockout device, group lockbox, or comparable mechanism when he or she
begins work and shall remove those devices when he or she stops working
on the machine or equipment being serviced or maintained" (existing
Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(ii)(D)).
The existing Sec. 1910.269 system-operator provision in paragraph
(d)(8)(v) is the only provision that has no analog in the general
industry standard. In the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking, OSHA found
that "the only concept employed by electric utilities that is unique
to their industry is the use of central control facilities" (59 FR
4364). To account for this unique aspect of power generation plants,
the standard provides that when "energy isolating devices are
installed in a central location and are under the exclusive control of
a system operator," so that the servicing employees cannot
individually affix and remove their personal lockout or tagout devices,
the system operator may "place and remove lockout and tagout devices
in place of the" servicing employees (existing Sec.
1910.269(d)(8)(v)). However, as with the existing group lockout-tagout
provision, the existing system-operator provision requires the employer
to "use a procedure that affords employees a level of protection
equivalent to that provided by the implementation of a personal lockout
or tagout device." In the preamble discussion, OSHA elaborated on this
language, stating that, under the system operator provision, procedures
must "ensure that no lock or tag protecting an employee is removed
without the knowledge and participation of the employee it is
protecting" (59 FR 4364). The preamble also stated that the procedures
must ensure that no one operates locked-out or tagged-out energy-
isolating devices without the employee's personal authorization (id.).
As such, the requirement for personal control and accountability in the
existing standard's group lockout-tagout and system-operator provisions
is clear.
EEI's petition for rulemaking marks the latest stage in a long-
running dispute between OSHA and EEI over appropriate lockout-tagout
procedures in the electric power generation industry. Even before OSHA
proposed the existing Power Generation Standard, and throughout that
rulemaking, EEI urged OSHA to adopt a standard that would allow
supervisors to maintain exclusive control of energy isolating devices
in group-servicing operations (59 FR 4322, 4350-4351, 4360, 4363-4364).
OSHA definitively rejected EEI's suggestions when it promulgated the
standard in 1994. Since OSHA promulgated the existing standard, EEI
sought repeatedly to have the standard's personal control and
accountability provisions nullified.\463\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\463\ In its latest effort, EEI challenged the validity of the
Sec. 1910.269 compliance directive on the basis that the standard
did not contain a requirement for personal control and
accountability (EEI v. OSHA, 411 F.3d 272 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
rejected that challenge, and in doing so, noted that EEI "should
have made [its] points in a challenge to the 1994 Standard-a
challenge that it began but later withdrew--not in a petition to
review a compliance directive issued nearly a decade later" (id. at
282).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its petition for rulemaking, EEI once again challenges the
validity of the existing Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(ii) requirements for
group lockout-tagout to provide "a level of protection equivalent to
that provided by the implementation of a personal lockout or tagout
device" and for each authorized employee to "affix a personal lockout
or tagout device to the group lockout device, group lockbox, or
comparable mechanism when he or she begins work and [to] remove those
devices when he or she stops working on the machine or equipment being
serviced or maintained" (the "personal control and accountability
requirements"). OSHA addresses EEI's assertions, and the Agency's
rationale for rejecting those assertions, in the following paragraphs.
1. EEI asserted that OSHA should revise the existing standard to
permit electric utilities to use procedures that were in place before
the promulgation of the 1994 standard; that is, OSHA should permit the
person who is responsible for servicing the equipment (referred to by
the electric utility industry as "the person who holds the
clearance") to communicate orally with the employees working on the
equipment instead of requiring measures equivalent to applying a
personal lockout-tagout device.
OSHA decided not to adopt EEI's suggestion to remove the existing
personal control and accountability requirements from the final
standard. The Agency found in the 1994 rulemaking on Sec. 1910.269
that application of personal lockout-tagout devices by each authorized
employee in a group was necessary and reasonable, stating, "OSHA is
convinced that the use of individual lockout or tagout devices as part
of the group lockout provides the greatest assurance of protection for
servicing employees" (59 FR 4361). There was clear evidence in the
1994 rulemaking that individual protection was necessary, including
evidence that "work authorizations under [electric utility generation
plant]
tagging systems had been released under pressure from supervisory
personnel or without the knowledge of the employee who held the
authorization" (59 FR 4351).
EEI's suggested change would have the principle authorized
employee, or, as the trade association put it, the "holder of the
clearance," be responsible for the safety of all authorized employees
working under the lockout-tagout for the group. Such a change would be
inconsistent with the fundamental principle adopted in the general
industry lockout-tagout rulemaking, and again in the 1994 Sec.
1910.269 rulemaking, that each individual authorized employee controls
his or her own lockout-tagout. As the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission held in rejecting a challenge to the personal control
and accountability requirements in existing Sec. 1910.269, "the core
concept of lockout/tagout is personal protection" (Exelon Generating
Corp., 21 BNA OSHC 1087, 1090 (No. 00-1198, 2005); emphasis included in
original). Vesting power over and responsibility for an employee's
protection from the release of hazardous energy in another employee
allows for the types of abuse reported in the 1994 rulemaking record.
As the primary rationale for its suggested revisions, EEI attacked
the validity of the existing rule resulting from the 1994 rulemaking
record. EEI maintained that "[t]here was no evidence when Section
1910.269 was adopted . . . that electric utility workers were at
significant risk of harm under the unique procedures that had been used
successfully in the industry for decades" (Ex. 0227). Second, EEI
contended that OSHA did not show that "sign-on, sign-off requirements
in utility power plants were reasonably necessary to eliminate or
reduce a significant [risk] of harm to affected employees" (id.).
Third, EEI asserted that OSHA did not show that the cost of compliance
bears any relationship to expected benefits or that OSHA considered
"the cost of compliance with the sign-on, sign-off principle" (id.).
EEI bases these arguments on the false premise that OSHA must make
hazard-by-hazard significant risk findings in vertical standards. As
explained in detail in Section II.D, Significant Risk and Reduction in
Risk, earlier in this preamble, there is no such legal requirement.
During the 1994 rulemaking, OSHA examined the injuries and fatalities
in the electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
industry, and concluded that "hazards of work on electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution installations pose a
significant risk to employees and that the standard is reasonably
necessary and appropriate to deal with that risk" (59 FR 4321). OSHA
also found that the existing standard's lockout-tagout and other
provisions would "significantly" reduce the number of injuries
associated with "uncontrolled exposure to occupational hazards" and
that the economic impacts on affected industry groups would be small
(59 FR 4431-4434). Finally, OSHA examined nonregulatory alternatives
and concluded that "the need for government regulation arises from the
significant risk of job-related injury or death caused by inadequate
safety practices for electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work" (59 FR 4432).
In any event, although OSHA does not agree that hazard-specific
significant risk findings are necessary, the record in the 1994
rulemaking supports such a finding with respect to the standard's
personal control and accountability requirements. EEI's first argument
on this issue was that "[t]here was no evidence when Section 1910.269
was adopted . . . that electric utility workers were at significant
risk of harm under the unique procedures that had been used
successfully in the industry for decades" (Ex. 0227). According to
EEI, OSHA applied the principles and assumptions about risk in general
industry in adopting lockout-tagout requirements taken from the general
industry lockout-tagout standard without accounting for the unique
methods proven to be safe in the electric power generation plants of
electric utilities (id.).
In the preamble to the 1994 final rule on Sec. 1910.269, OSHA
explicitly rejected EEI's argument that electric utility employees were
not at significant risk of injury under then-existing lockout-tagout
procedures:
In both the Subpart S work practices rulemaking and the [general
industry] hazardous energy control rulemaking, OSHA found existing
electric utility lockout and tagging procedures to expose employees
to a significant risk of injury (55 FR 32003, 54 FR 36651-36654,
36684). In a review of IBEW fatality reports, Eastern Research
Group, Ind., found 4 of 159 fatalities (2.5%) could have been
prevented by compliance with proposed Sec. 1910.269(d) (Ex. 6-24).
These fatalities occurred among approximately 50,000 electric
utility employees at high risk (Ex. 4: Table 3-22 with the
population limited to generating plant workers at high risk) at the
rate of nearly 2 per year (2.5% of the estimated 70 deaths per year;
Ex. 5). The Agency believes that these employees are exposed to a
significant risk of injury under existing industry practices.
Otherwise, no lockout and tagging standard would have been proposed.
OSHA evaluates significant risk based on the hazards that exist
under the current state of regulation. [59 FR 4363]
Second, during the rulemaking for the 1994 rule, OSHA also rejected
EEI's claim about the successful use of then-existing procedures by the
electric utility industry. For instance, the Agency found that
"although some electric utility companies have had excellent success
with their tagging systems, other companies have had problems" (59 FR
4351). The Agency also reported that "the electric utility industry
had [at least] 14 fatalities and 17 injuries recorded in OSHA files
that were directly caused by a failure of the lockout/tagout procedure
in use, during the period of July 1, 1972, to June 30, 1988" (id.;
internal citation omitted). OSHA found that "the evidence presented by
UWUA members demonstrated that not all electric utility tagging systems
work as well as those presented by the EEI witnesses" (59 FR 4354).
Finally, the Agency found that "the emergence of new types of
companies [footnote omitted] into the electric utility industry and
extending the scope of the standard to other industries will expand
coverage of Sec. 1910.269 to employers that might not have the tagging
systems that provide the level of safety EEI has testified is common
among their member companies" (id.).
Third, the current rulemaking record also provides evidence of risk
related to inadequate hazardous energy control procedures (Exs. 0002,
0004). Ex. 0002, which is a printout of accidents coded with the
keyword "elec utility work" or "e ptd" occurring in the years 1984
through 1997, includes 17 accidents at electric power generation plants
or substations coded as a failure of the lockout/tagout procedure in
use. The keywords "elec utility work" and "e ptd" capture work on
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution installations
covered by Sec. 1910.269 or Subpart V. OSHA included substations in
this analysis because Sec. 1910.269(d) covers substations at power
generation plants and because the procedures used at substations
typically follow the same lockout-tagout procedures, using a system
operator, used in generation plants. Ex. 0004, an accident database
that includes electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
accidents for the years 1991 through 1999, includes 53 accidents in
electric power generation plants or substations coded with the keyword
"lockout," which signifies either a failure to deenergize and lockout
or tagout a hazardous
energy source or a failure in lockout-tagout procedures.
Fourth, in the preamble to the 1994 rule, OSHA explicitly rejected
EEI's claim "that the elements of hazardous energy control in electric
utility operations are so unique that they warrant a completely
different set of lockout and tagging requirements" than the general
industry lockout-tagout requirements (59 FR 4350). In the rulemaking
for the 1994 rule, the Agency examined the six elements of electric
utility lockout-tagout procedures that EEI claimed made them unique.
The Agency found that those elements also were present in lockout-
tagout procedures used in other industries (59 FR 4350-4351), and it is
for this reason that the existing standards' lockout-tagout provisions
are nearly identical. As such, contrary to EEI's argument, evidence of
significant risk in the general industry rulemaking bolsters the
finding of significant risk in the 1994 rulemaking.
In making its significant risk argument, EEI relied on a statement
in the preamble to the 1994 rulemaking in which OSHA was discussing
existing Sec. 1910.269(d)'s system-operator provision. OSHA stated in
the preamble that the system-operator provision "recognize[s] lockout
and tagout practices that are common in the electric utility industry
and that have been successful in protecting employees" (59 FR 4364).
EEI asserted that this statement demonstrated that the Agency
recognized that electric utility lockout-tagout practices were safe.
This assertion is not correct. OSHA did not intend this statement to
negate the numerous statements in the preamble that existing industry
practices posed a significant risk to workers (59 FR 4349-4364). The
industry practice referred to in the preamble statement on which EEI
relies was the industry practice in which "the system operator has
complete control over hazardous energy sources," not the industry
practice of not requiring individual employee control and
accountability (59 FR 4364).
EEI also contended that OSHA did not show that "sign-on, sign-off
requirements in utility power plants were reasonably necessary to
eliminate or reduce a significant [risk] of harm to affected
employees" (Ex. 0227). In support of this contention, the association
pointed to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request it made asking
for documents that show that employees in electric power generation
plants are at risk from failure to use personal lockout or tagout
devices, or their equivalent. EEI stated that "OSHA admitted that it
had no documents that responded to [EEI's] requests" (id.). EEI also
pointed to the testimony of Mr. James Tomaseski before an
administrative law judge in the Exelon enforcement case. Mr. Tomaseski
testified that "signing on and off a piece of paper would not add to
employee safety, and could induce crew members to have a false sense of
security" (Ex. 0227; Tr. 906).
OSHA rejects EEI's contention. As explained earlier, OSHA described
in the preamble to the 1994 rule the basis for determining that the
personal control and accountability requirements were necessary (59 FR
4349-4364). OSHA concluded in that rulemaking, and in the earlier
rulemaking on the general industry lockout-tagout standard at Sec.
1910.147 (54 FR 36644, Sept. 1, 1989), that personal protection was
fundamental to ensuring employee safety in the control of hazardous
energy. Moreover, there was clear evidence in the 1994 rulemaking that
personal protection was necessary, including evidence that "work
authorizations under [electric utility generation plant] tagging
systems had been released under pressure from supervisory personnel or
without the knowledge of the employee who held the authorization" (59
FR 4351).
This evidence stands in stark contrast to Mr. Tomaseski's opinion
that signing on and off a piece of paper does not increase safety.\464\
Similarly, OSHA's response to EEI's FOIA request has no bearing on the
Agency's finding in the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking, or in this one.
The Agency responded as it did because, among other reasons: the FOIA
request did not seek documents associated with the Sec. 1910.147 and
existing Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking proceedings; during the rulemaking
process that preceded the adoption of both Sec. 1910.147 and existing
Sec. 1910.269, OSHA examined evidence and determined that individual
employee control of energy isolating devices, through the use of
personal lockout/tagout devices, was an essential element of an
effective energy control procedure; and OSHA limited its FOIA response
to certain, specified documents maintained in OSHA's National Office
because EEI's counsel declined to pay the statutorily defined costs
associated with locating and reproducing records from OSHA area
offices, as well as some records identified in the National
Office.\465\ OSHA, therefore, reaffirms its earlier conclusion that
personal protection, in the form of a personal lockout-tagout device or
comparable mechanism as required by existing Sec.
1910.269(d)(8)(ii)(D), is reasonably necessary for, and indeed is
fundamental to, the protection of employees from the release of
hazardous energy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\464\ EEI also fails to explain the basis of Mr. Tomaseski's
belief. At the 2005 public hearing on the Subpart V proposal, Mr.
Tomaseski testified that "[r]equiring a personal action such as
signing on and off a work permit does nothing to ensure the
equipment to be worked on is actually safe to work on. A walkdown of
the equipment and the principal isolation points will verify that
switching has been performed, the lockout/tagout devices are
installed, and the equipment is safe to work on. OSHA should
incorporate these changes into Paragraph (d)" (Tr. 906-907). OSHA
addresses Mr. Tomaseski's concern about verification later in this
section of the preamble.
\465\ The Agency's Docket Office contains the information on
which OSHA relied in adopting the lockout-tagout requirements in the
Sec. 1910.147 and 1994 Sec. 1910.269 rulemakings; the Docket
Office provides the public with access to the rulemaking record
during normal business hours. This docket is also available, on a
limited basis, at http://www.regulations.gov in Docket ID OSHA-S015-
2006-0645.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, EEI asserts that OSHA did not show that the cost of
compliance bears any relationship to expected benefits and that OSHA
did not consider "the cost of compliance with the sign-on, sign-off
principle" (Ex. 0227). OSHA rejects this assertion. As OSHA already
explained, the existing standard's lockout-tagout provisions were
reasonably necessary to eliminate or reduce a risk of significant harm
to affected employees. Moreover, the evidence is clear that there were
no substantial increased costs associated with the existing personal
control and accountability provisions. According to EEI, it was the
industry's practice prior to the promulgation of existing Sec.
1910.269 to "communicat[e] orally with each member of the maintenance
crew to advise when it is safe to begin work, and to assure that the
crewmembers have been notified and are clear of all equipment when the
job is complete" (id.). The time it currently takes the principle
authorized employee to communicate with each authorized employee should
be approximately equal to the time it would take the individual
authorized employee to sign in or sign out, or attach or remove a
tagout device, at the work location. Thus, the Agency did not account
for substantial increased costs for this provision because there was no
evidence in the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking record to indicate
otherwise.
EEI's contrary belief that requiring each authorized employee to
take an affirmative, physical action, such as attaching a tagout device
or signing on and off a work order, would result in a substantial
increase in cost is
unreasonable. Relying on a 2003 letter from Exelon to OSHA, EEI
asserted that "compliance with the tagging requirements specified in
[CPL 02-01-038] would cost more than $6 million annually in Exelon's
ten nuclear powered generation plants alone" and that, extrapolated to
the entire industry, the cost would be more than $100 million (Ex.
0227). Relying on the Exelon letter is problematic. As OSHA explained
in its response to this letter:
OSHA does not agree that compliance with the provisions in Sec.
1910.269(d) that require individual authorized employees to take an
affirmative and physical step prior to authorizing the re-
energization of machines or equipment is necessarily as costly as
you describe. While the computer terminal method that you describe
may permit the requisite degree of employee control, so too would
significantly simpler approaches, which would cost little, if
anything, to implement.
Indeed, in the Exelon litigation to which you refer, the
Secretary of Labor claimed that Exelon's energy control procedure,
as described, was deficient in only one respect. The deficiency was
that Exelon allowed a supervisor to authorize the re-energization of
equipment or machinery on behalf of individual authorized employees
after orally accounting for the employees and checking off the
employees' names on a Worker Tagout Tracking List (WTTL). During the
litigation, the Secretary clearly and repeatedly stated that the
same procedure would permit the requisite degree of employee
control, if amended slightly to require that each individual
employee sign the WTTL before beginning work and sign off the WTTL
to authorize re-energization of the machinery after completing work.
This minor modification would produce the individual employee
accountability and control mandated by the standard. [June 13, 2003,
letter of interpretation to Mr. Robert J. Fisher \466\]
\466\ This letter of interpretation is available at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24548.
As such, Exelon apparently overestimated the cost of compliance because
there are less expensive means of compliance available.\467\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\467\ EEI also did not adequately explain the basis for Exelon's
estimated costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, EEI's attacks on the 1994 rulemaking record are without
basis. EEI provided no new evidence to invalidate OSHA's conclusion
that the standard's personal control and accountability requirements
are necessary and appropriate. For these reasons, OSHA is denying EEI's
request to remove the personal control and accountability requirements
from Sec. 1910.269.
2. EEI asserted that the Agency should eliminate from the final
standard the concept that a system operator may place tags for
servicing and maintenance employees where energy controls are in a
central location under the exclusive control of the system operator
because those conditions are not present in electric generation plants.
Existing Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(v) applies where "energy isolating
devices are installed in a central location and are under the exclusive
control of a system operator." OSHA promulgated the existing system-
operator provision because OSHA found in the 1994 Sec. 1910.269
rulemaking that "the only concept employed by electric utilities that
is unique to their industry is the use of central control facilities"
(59 FR 4364). According to EEI, OSHA intended "to craft a provision
that endorsed longstanding utility power plant practices, [but] made a
fundamental error, apparently due to a lack of understanding of the
power plant environment" (Ex. 0227). EEI also describes OSHA's use of
the term "central control facilities" in the 1994 preamble as
"baffling." (id.).
OSHA denies EEI's petition to revise the existing system-operator
provision. First, the Agency's use of the term "central control
facilities" in the 1994 preamble was not "baffling." From the
language adopted in the introductory text to existing Sec.
1910.269(d)(8)(v), it is apparent that the Agency intended the term
"central control facilities" to mean facilities "where energy
isolating devices are installed in a central location and are under the
exclusive control of a system operator." As OSHA stated in the
preamble:
Under paragraph (d)(8)(v), the system operator has complete
control over hazardous energy sources that endanger employees
maintaining or servicing machinery or equipment associated with an
electric power generation installation. Other employees do not even
have access to the energy control devices and cannot operate them to
reenergize machinery or equipment being serviced. [59 FR 4364]
Second, OSHA based its decision to incorporate a system-operator
provision into the existing standard on the 1994 rulemaking record. An
EEI videotape showed a "control room operator" working in what
appears to be an isolated control room, with the ability to turn off
equipment at a master switch, although the employer also used
additional tags for local deenergization procedures (269-Ex. 12-6).
Furthermore, the 1987 NESC, in Rule 170, required that circuit
breakers, reclosers, switches, and fuses be accessible only to persons
qualified for operation and maintenance (269-Ex. 2-8).
If it was not widespread practice in the electric utility industry
to have energy controls in a central location under the exclusive
control of a system operator, then the existing provision would apply
to a narrower class of installations than the class of installations
OSHA believed existed during the 1994 rulemaking. There is evidence in
the record in this rulemaking that indicates that there are at least
some locations in electric power generation plants to which existing
Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(v) could apply. (See, for example, Ex. 0480,
"Switchboard operators (or individuals with similar job
classifications) control the flow of electricity from a central point
[emphasis omitted]," and the "control room operator may have
exclusive control of some energy isolating devices within the control
room.")
Note that, in adopting existing Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(v), OSHA
retained the fundamental precept that requires "a procedure that
affords employees a level of protection equivalent to that provided by
the implementation of a personal lockout or tagout device" (paragraph
(d)(8)(v)(A).) Consequently, even if OSHA were to accede to EEI's
request to broaden the scope of the system-operator provisions,
existing paragraph (d)(8)(v)(A) still requires the same measures to
which the association objects in existing paragraph (d)(8)(ii)(D).
For these reasons, OSHA is not adopting EEI's recommendation to
expand the scope of the existing system-operator provisions in final
Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(v).
3. EEI asserted that OSHA should remove the existing requirement
that group lockout-tagout procedures must afford a level of protection
equivalent to that provided by the implementation of a personal
lockout-tagout device because the Agency did not provide the basis for
this comparison.
The existing rule provides an interpretation of "protection
equivalent to a personal lockout or tagout device." Accordingly, to
provide equivalent protection, a group lockout-tagout program must
contain either the elements required by existing Sec. 1910.269(d) for
protection associated with the use of personal lockout or tagout
devices or elements that are equivalent to the elements required by
existing Sec. 1910.269(d) for protection associated with the use of
personal lockout or tagout devices. Thus, for instance, a group
lockout-tagout program must provide protection equivalent to the
personal control and accountability requirements of existing Sec.
1910.269(d)(6) and (d)(7). OSHA framed this requirement in performance
terms because the existing group lockout-tagout provisions offer a
compromise that balances the need for protection of each authorized
employee with the complexity and redundancy involved in many group
lockout-tagout situations. (In its response to IBEW's comment later in
this section of the preamble, OSHA further explains this compromise in
the context of the existing standard's verification requirement.)
Paragraphs (d)(8)(ii)(A) through (d)(8)(ii)(D) of existing Sec.
1910.269 further clarify the meaning of "protection equivalent to a
personal lockout or tagout device." Existing paragraph (d)(8)(ii)(A)
requires the employer to vest primary responsibility in an authorized
employee for a set number of employees (the group or crew) working
under the protection of a group lockout or tagout device. Existing
paragraph (d)(8)(ii)(B) requires that the group lockout-tagout
procedures provide for the authorized employee to ascertain the
exposure status of all individual group members with regard to the
lockout or tagout of the machine or equipment. Existing paragraph
(d)(8)(ii)(C) requires the employer to assign overall job-associated
lockout or tagout control responsibility to an authorized employee
designated to coordinate affected work forces and ensure continuity of
protection when the servicing or maintenance involves more than one
crew, craft, department, or other group. Existing paragraph
(d)(8)(ii)(D) requires each authorized employee to affix a personal
lockout or tagout device to the group lockout device, group lockbox, or
comparable mechanism when he or she begins work and to remove those
devices when he or she stops performing service or maintenance on the
machine or equipment.
Moreover, the preamble to the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 rule elaborated
on personal control and accountability requirements in the existing
standard by including the following guidelines:
(1) Group lockout/tagout procedures must be tailored to the
specific operation involved. Irrespective of the situation, the
requirements of the final rule specify that each employee performing
maintenance or servicing activities be in control of hazardous
energy during his or her period of exposure.
(2) The procedures must ensure that each authorized employee is
protected from the unexpected release of hazardous energy by
personal lockout or tagout devices. No employee may affix the
personal lockout or tagout device of another employee.
(3) The use of such devices as master locks and tags are
permitted and can serve to simplify group lockout/tagout procedures.
For example, a single lock may [be] used on each energy isolating
device, together with the use of a lockbox for retention of the keys
and to which each authorized employee affixes his or her lock or
tag. In a tagging system, a master tag may be used, as long as each
employee personally signs on and signs off on it and as long as the
tag clearly identifies each authorized employee who is being
protected by it.
(4) All other provisions of paragraph continue to apply. [59 FR
4362]
These guidelines make it clear that "each employee performing
maintenance or servicing activities be in control of hazardous energy
during his or her period of exposure." These guidelines, therefore,
provided the basis for determining whether group lockout-tagout
procedures afford a level of protection equivalent to that provided by
the implementation of a personal lockout-tagout device.
The pre-1994 procedures described by EEI in its comment to this
rulemaking, and in the videotape discussed earlier in this section of
the preamble, address many of the aspects of group lockout-tagout
required by existing Sec. 1910.269(d) (Ex. 0227; 269-Ex. 12-6). For
instance, the procedures described include a maintenance crew
supervisor or lead maintenance worker holding the "clearance" for the
group, which EEI calls a "crew" (Ex. 0227). This employee, who can
serve as the primary authorized employee called for in existing
paragraph (d)(8)(ii)(A), "assure[s] that the crewmembers have been
notified and are clear of all equipment when the job is complete and
the equipment is to be re-energized," as required by existing
paragraph (d)(8)(ii)(B) (id.). The system operator described by EEI and
seen in the videotape prepares "a list of energy control devices . . .
that must be operated to de-energize the equipment to be worked on"
and then gives the list to an operations employee, who, functioning as
a system operator, "performs the actions necessary to assure de-
energization, and applies the warning tags in the specified locations"
(id.). The system operator also coordinates with the principle
authorized employee, through mechanisms such as a master tag with the
principle authorized employee's signature or similar device, to help
prevent reenergization of hazardous energy while employees are working,
even under conditions involving multiple crews (Ex. 0227; 269-Ex. 12-
6). An employer can use these system-operator functions to comply with
existing paragraph (d)(8)(ii)(C). Apparently, the only facet of
"protection equivalent to a personal lockout or tagout device" that
EEI finds troubling is the personal control and accountability
requirements in the introductory text to existing paragraph (d)(8)(ii)
and in existing paragraph (d)(8)(ii)(D). Consequently, the Agency is
denying EEI's petition to the extent that EEI seeks removal of the
existing requirement that group lockout-tagout procedures afford a
level of protection equivalent to that provided by the implementation
of a personal lockout-tagout device.
4. EEI asserted that OSHA abused its discretion in elaborating on
the meaning of existing Sec. 1910.269 in its compliance directive (CPL
02-01-038). In this regard, EEI stated that "the requirements of the
standard should be clearly evident from its text" and that there
should be "no justification for continuing to rely on Appendix B to
[CPL 02-01-038] after this rulemaking is completed" (Ex. 0227). EEI
stated further that "any `clarifications' that are needed should be
accomplished in the text of the rule itself" (id.).
The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission in Exelon
Generating Corp., 21 BNA OSHC 1087 and the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in EEI v. OSHA, 411 F.3d
272 rejected EEI's assertions regarding the meaning of both existing
Sec. 1910.269 and the Sec. 1910.269 directive. In Exelon, the
Commission stated that "[t]he plain wording of . . . Sec.
1910.269(d)(8)(ii)(D) . . . clearly and explicitly mandates use of a
personal tagout device in a group tagging situation.. . . Accordingly,
we reject Exelon's contention that the group tagging requirements of
the standard are confusing or unclear" (21 BNA OSHC at 1090).
Moreover, in rejecting EEI's challenge to the Sec. 1910.269 directive,
the D.C. Circuit stated:
EEI's first contention is that the 2003 Directive constitutes a
change from the Power Generation Standard because neither the text
of the 1994 Standard, nor that of the preamble accompanying it,
requires that maintenance employees working in a group "exercise
personal accountability by affixing personal locks or tags or their
equivalent to energy control devices." Pet'r Br. at 33. But this
contention is simply incorrect. The 1994 Standard expressly states
that, "[w]hen servicing or maintenance is performed by" a group,
"[e]ach authorized employee shall affix a personal lockout or
tagout device . . ., or comparable mechanism, when he or she begins
work and shall remove those devices when he or she stops working."
29 C.F.R. Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(ii)(D) (emphasis added). That
provision reflects OSHA's view, as stated in the 1994 preamble, that
"the only way to ensure that the employee is aware of whether or
not the lockout or tagout device is in place is to permit only that
employee to remove the device himself or herself." 59 Fed.Reg. at
4360; see id. at 4361 ("[E]ach employee in the group needs to be
able to affix his/her personal lockout or tagout
system device as part of the group lockout." (quoting 54 Fed.Reg.
36,644, 36,681-82 (Sept. 1, 1989))). Indeed, in announcing the 1994
Standard, OSHA expressly rejected "EEI['s] argu[ment] that the
person removing a lockout or tagout device need not be the same as
the person who placed it," and instead adopted the position that
"each employee must have the assurance that the device is in his or
her control, and that it will not be removed by anyone else except
in an emergency situation." Id. at 4360; see also id. at 4361
("The authorized employee in charge of the group lockout or tagout
cannot reenergize the equipment until each employee in the group has
removed his/her personal device." (quoting 54 Fed.Reg. at 36,681-
82)). [footnote omitted]
EEI's second argument is that the 2003 Directive changes the
Power Generation Standard by adding, for the first time, a
definition of the term "central location under the exclusive
control of a system operator" that assertedly alters the term's
original meaning. The term plays a key role in the system operator
exception to the general requirements of the Power Generation
Standard. Under the 1994 Standard, the exception applies only when
"energy isolating devices are installed in a central location and
are under the exclusive control of a system operator." 29 C.F.R.
Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(v). In such circumstances, the "system
operator" may "place and remove lockout and tagout devices in
place of" the individual maintenance employee. Id. Sec.
1910.269(d)(8)(v)(B).
The 2003 Directive defines this key term as an "area to which
access by employees, other than the system operator, to energy
isolating devices is physically limited." 2003 Directive at A-2. It
further explains that the system operator exception applies only
when the "system operator has complete control over the hazardous
energy sources because no other employees have access to the area
and its energy control devices." Id. According to EEI, this
definition marks a dramatic change from the Power Generation
Standard, because it limits the system operator exception to cases
in which the operator is the only employee with physical access to
the equipment. By contrast, in EEI's view the 1994 Standard permits
a supervisor to place and remove locks and tags for other employees
whenever the supervisor has exclusive administrative control over
the machinery under repair--i.e., whenever the system operator is
the only person authorized to operate the equipment.
But what EEI calls a "new definition," Pet'r Br. at 21, is in
fact a near-verbatim recitation of the text of the 1994 preamble.
Compare 2003 Directive at A-2 ("The system operator has complete
control over the hazardous energy sources because no other employees
have access to the area and its energy control devices." (emphasis
added)), with 59 Fed.Reg. at 4364 ("Under [the system operator
exception], the system operator has complete control over hazardous
energy sources. . . . Other employees do not even have access to the
energy control devices and cannot operate them." (emphasis added)).
And the preamble's insistence that the system operator have
"complete control" because "[o]ther employees do not even have
access to the energy control devices," id. at 4364, strongly
supports the directive's focus on physical control. [411 F.3d 278-
80; emphasis included in original]
As such, the Sec. 1910.269 directive was not a "mandatory
regulatory" requirement, as EEI alleges (Ex. 0227). For all of the
foregoing reasons, OSHA is denying EEI's petition to revise the group
lockout-tagout and system-operator provisions in existing Sec.
1910.269(d).
IBEW also recommended changes to the lockout-tagout provisions in
Sec. 1910.269(d). First, as noted earlier, IBEW recommended that OSHA
replace the term "system operator" with "control room operator"
(Ex. 0230).
The Agency rejects IBEW's first recommendation for the reasons
given in the summary and explanation for final Sec. 1926.968, earlier
in this section of the preamble.
Second, IBEW recommended that OSHA require the "walk down of
principal isolating devices prior to any employee taking any action
other than application of a personal lockout/tagout device, including
beginning work under a group lockout/tagout application" (id.). IBEW
questioned why OSHA allows each authorized employee in a group lockout-
tagout situation the opportunity to verify the effective isolation of
hazardous energy sources, but does not make that action mandatory.\468\
The union asked, "If the agency allows another employee to verify this
action, how does this provide the same level of protection as the
application of a personal lockout/tagout device?" (id.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\468\ Paragraph (d)(6)(vii) of existing Sec. 1910.269 states:
"Before starting work on machines or equipment that have been
locked out or tagged out, the authorized employee shall verify that
isolation and deenergizing of the machine or equipment have been
accomplished."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA rejects IBEW's recommendation. As stated earlier, the
standard's group lockout-tagout provisions offer a compromise that
balances the need for protection of each authorized employee with the
complexity and redundancy involved in many group lockout-tagout
situations. Thus, for instance, the group lockout-tagout provisions
permit group lockout or tagout devices on energy isolating devices
instead of requiring each authorized employee to place individual
lockout-tagout devices on each isolating device. (final Sec.
1910.269(d)(8)(ii)(D)).
With respect to the verification issue, OSHA believes that IBEW was
addressing a letter of interpretation dated January 29, 2002, to Mr.
Jack Prestwood of Tampa Electric Company.\469\ This letter, in a
footnote, states, "While hazardous energy isolation may be
accomplished by a single authorized employee (a "primary authorized
employee") in a group lockout/tagout scenario, each authorized
employee has the right, and must be given the opportunity, to
participate in the verification process, regardless of whether the
verification ultimately is performed by each authorized employee or by
a primary authorized employee." OSHA based its response to Mr.
Prestwood on an earlier statement covering the general industry
lockout-tagout standard, Sec. 1910.147. OSHA restated the earlier
statement in the directive on that standard, CPL 02-00-147, "The
Control of Hazardous Energy--Enforcement Policy and Inspection
Procedures." That directive states, in part:
\469\ This letter is available at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA has recognized the need for an alternative to the
verification requirement where complex LOTO operations involve many
employees and numerous energy isolating devices. In such situations,
the employer may designate a primary authorized employee (PAE), with
the responsibility for a set number of employees working under the
group LOTO device(s). The primary authorized employee must implement
and coordinate the LOTO of hazardous energy sources and verify that
the steps taken, in accordance with the specific energy control
procedure, have in fact isolated the machine or equipment
effectively from the hazardous energy sources.
In addition to the primary authorized employee, each authorized
employee participating in the group LOTO must be informed of his
right to verify the effectiveness of the lockout measures, and each
authorized employee must be allowed to personally verify, if he so
chooses, that hazardous energy sources have been effectively
isolated. An authorized employee who opts to verify the
effectiveness of the isolation measures must perform this
verification simultaneously with or after the PAE verifies the
accomplishment of energy isolation and after the authorized employee
affixes her personal lockout or tagout device to the group LOTO
mechanism. These steps must be taken before authorized employees
perform servicing/maintenance activities. [CPL 02-00-147]
This alternative to the verification requirement, if properly
implemented, is consistent with the standard, but the procedure used
must afford employees "a level of protection equivalent to that
provided by the implementation of a personal lockout or tagout device"
as required by the introductory text to final Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(ii).
To that end, for an employer to properly implement this
alternative, that employer's group lockout-tagout procedures must
ensure that any energy verification performed by a primary authorized
employee affords a level of protection equivalent to the protection
provided had each authorized employee installed a personal lockout or
tagout device on each energy-isolating device. For example, the
procedures could provide that the primary authorized employee conducts
the appropriate verification for the machine or equipment they will be
servicing and effectively communicates the results of the verification
to each employee in the group. Thus, OSHA would not consider as
adequate, procedures under which the primary authorized employee merely
communicates with a group of authorized employees via radio, without
verifying that the machinery or equipment employees will be servicing
has, in fact, been deenergized and locked or tagged out.
Existing Sec. 1910.269(r)(1)(ii)(B), (r)(1)(iii), (r)(1)(iv), and
(r)(1)(v), which apply to line-clearance tree-trimming operations,
impose requirements that refer to existing Table R-6, Table R-9, and
Table R-10. Those tables in the existing standard set specific minimum
approach distances based on voltage. Existing Table R-6 sets minimum
approach distances for ac systems; existing Table R-9 sets minimum
approach distances for dc systems; and existing Table R-10 applies
altitude correction factors to the minimum approach distances in
existing Table R-6 and Table R-9.
Table R-6 and Table R-7 in the final rule correspond to existing
Table R-6. The two tables in the final rule set minimum approach
distances for ac systems based on the highest maximum per-unit
transient overvoltage, just as Table R-6 in existing Sec. 1910.269
does.\470\ Table R-8 in the final rule, which sets minimum approach
distances for dc systems, corresponds to Table R-9 in existing Sec.
1910.269.\471\ Table R-5 in the final rule, which sets altitude
correction factors, corresponds to Table R-10 in existing Sec.
1910.269.\472\ The final rule revises the relevant provisions in Sec.
1910.269(r)(1) by replacing the references to "Table R-6, Table R-9,
and Table R-10" with references to "Table R-5, Table R-6, Table R-7,
and Table R-8" wherever the former references appear in the existing
standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\470\ Existing Sec. 1910.269(r)(1)(ii)(B), (r)(1)(iii),
(r)(1)(iv), and (r)(1)(v) require line-clearance tree trimmers to
maintain minimum approach distances based on the highest maximum
transient overvoltage. Paragraph (l)(3)(i) of final Sec. 1910.269
requires employers to establish minimum approach distances based on
Table R-3 for ac systems. This table contains equations that
employers must use to calculate minimum approach distances. Table R-
6 and Table R-7 set minimum approach distances based on the highest
maximum transient overvoltage. Thus, Table R-6 and Table R-7 in the
final rule correspond to Table R-6 in existing Sec. 1910.269.
\471\ Table R-8 in the final rule is the same as existing Table
R-9 in existing Sec. 1910.269, except that the table in the final
rule lists distances in metric units.
\472\ Table R-5 in the final rule is the same as Table R-10 in
existing Sec. 1910.269, except that the table in the final rule
lists altitudes in metric units.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tree trimming industry practice, as reflected in the consensus
standard applicable to tree trimming work,\473\ is that "[a]ll
overhead and underground electrical conductors and all communication
wires and cables . . . be considered energized with potentially fatal
voltages" (Ex. 0037). However, testimony from tree trimming industry
witnesses described situations in which line-clearance tree trimmers
would treat power line conductors as deenergized. (See, for example,
Tr. 657-658, 665-667, 690-692.) In its posthearing comment, TCIA
indicated that a majority of its members would treat all conductors as
energized even if they were deenergized (Ex. 0503).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\473\ ANSI Z133.1-2000, "American National Standard for
Arboricultural Operations--Pruning, Repairing, Maintaining, and
Removing Trees, and Cutting Brush Safety Requirements." ANSI Z133-
2012 contains the same requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA has a concern that some tree trimming firms might consider
conductors deenergized simply because an electric utility told the
firms that the lines are deenergized. Paragraph (l)(1)(iii) of Sec.
1910.269 in the final rule provides that "[e]lectric lines and
equipment shall be considered and treated as energized unless they have
been deenergized in accordance with paragraph (d) or (m) of this
section." Tree-trimming firms typically perform line-clearance tree-
trimming operations around overhead power distribution or transmission
lines; final Sec. 1910.269(m) covers deenergizing these lines.
Paragraph (m)(3)(vii) of final Sec. 1910.269 requires that "[t]he
employer shall ensure the installation of protective grounds as
required by paragraph (n) of this section." However, paragraphs (d),
(l), (m), and (n) are not among the paragraphs listed in final Sec.
1910.269(a)(1)(i)(E)(2) as applying to line-clearance tree-trimming
operations performed by line-clearance tree trimmers who are not
qualified employees. On the other hand, according to final Sec.
1910.269(a)(1)(i)(D), these provisions do apply to work on, or directly
associated with, electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution installations (that is, installations covered by Sec.
1910.269(a)(1)(i)(A) through (a)(1)(i)(C)). OSHA considers Sec.
1910.269(a)(1)(i)(D) to regulate any work performed to deenergize lines
for the protection of employees. Thus, an electric utility or other
employer operating an electric power generation, transmission, or
distribution installation around which tree-trimming firms are
performing line-clearance tree-trimming operations must comply with
Sec. 1910.269(d) or (m),\474\ as applicable, before the line-clearance
tree-trimming firms may consider and treat the lines or equipment
involved as deenergized, in accordance with Sec. 1910.269(l)(1)(iii).
Note that each line-clearance tree trimming firm must coordinate its
work rules and procedures with the work rules and procedures of the
host employer as required by Sec. 1910.269(a)(3)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\474\ Paragraph (m) contains provisions that the "employee in
charge of the clearance" take certain actions. (See, for example,
paragraph (m)(2)(iv)(A), which requires, as one of two alternatives
for multiple crews working on the same lines, the crews to
coordinate their activities with a single employee in charge of the
clearance.) OSHA believes that this employee will be an employee of
the electric utility or other employer operating the electric power
transmission or distribution installation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA revised Sec. 1910.269(r)(5)(iv) to clarify that drop starting
of chain saws is prohibited by Sec. 1910.266(e)(2)(vi). Existing Sec.
1910.269(r)(5)(iv) requires employees to start gasoline-engine power
saws on the ground or where they are otherwise firmly supported. The
existing provision also permits drop starting of power saws weighing
more than 6.8 kilograms (15 pounds) outside of the bucket of an aerial
lift when the area below the lift is clear of personnel. While
paragraph (r)(5) of existing Sec. 1910.269 applies broadly to
gasoline-engine power saws, the introductory text to the paragraph
requires that power saws meet the requirements of Sec. 1910.266(e),
which applies to chain saws only. Paragraph (e)(2)(vi) of Sec.
1910.266, which OSHA promulgated after it promulgated existing Sec.
1910.269(r)(5)(iv), prohibits drop starting of chain saws. (See 59 FR
51672, 51712, Oct. 12, 1994.) Thus, existing Sec. Sec.
1910.266(e)(2)(vi) and 1910.269(r)(5)(iv) together operate to prohibit
drop starting of chain saws, but permit drop starting of other types of
gasoline-engine power saws weighing over 6.8 kilograms outside of the
bucket of an aerial lift when the area below the lift is clear of
personnel. OSHA clarified the language of Sec. 1910.269(r)(5)(iv) in
the final rule to this effect. In addition, the Agency added a note to
that paragraph stating that
Sec. 1910.266(e)(2)(vi) prohibits drop starting of chain saws.
EEI recommended that, except with respect to lockout-tagout
procedures in electric power generation installations, OSHA
"incorporate in the final standard the `[c]larifications' that are
contained in Appendix B of [CPL 02-01-038]" (Ex. 0227). (See also, Tr.
1171-1175.) Mr. Stephen Yohay, counsel for EEI, testified that doing so
would "provide notice of what the law requires, both to employers and
employees" and would prevent OSHA from "changing unilaterally" its
directive (Tr. 1174).
OSHA decided not to adopt EEI's recommendation (except with respect
to the issue of network protectors described in the summary and
explanation for final Sec. 1926.961(c)(4), earlier in this section of
the preamble). First, some of the statements in CPL 02-01-038 are moot
because of the changes made to Sec. 1910.269. For example, revisions
to the requirements on fall protection in the final rule, described in
the summary and explanation of Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii) earlier in
this section of the preamble, make some of the statements in the
directive inconsistent with the requirements in the final rule. When
OSHA issues a directive on the final rule, it will address the
requirements in the final rule.
Many of the remaining statements in Appendix B to CPL 02-01-038 are
in accord with final Sec. 1910.269. For example, a statement regarding
temporary protective grounds notes that the term "temporary protective
grounds" in existing Sec. 1910.269(n)(3) refers to grounds placed
temporarily and explains that employers can use fixed, as well as
portable, grounds to meet this provision. In any event, EEI's concern
that OSHA will make changes to such statements through future
directives is speculative, and EEI has no grounds to challenge the
directive, as it is not a standard.
2. Section 1910.132
Paragraph (d) of Sec. 1910.132 addresses hazard assessment and
selection of personal protective equipment. Paragraph (f) of Sec.
1910.132 addresses training in the use of personal protective
equipment. As noted in Sec. 1910.132(g), paragraphs (d) and (f) of
existing Sec. 1910.132 do not apply to electrical protective equipment
covered by Sec. 1910.137. While other electrical standards cover
training (for example, in Sec. 1910.268, Telecommunications, in Sec.
1910.269, Electric power generation, transmission, and distribution,
and in Sec. 1910.332, Training in electrical safety-related work
practices), other OSHA electrical standards do not address many of the
hazard-assessment requirements in Sec. 1910.132(d). In the preamble to
the proposed rule, OSHA requested comments on whether it should add
electrical protective equipment to the scope of Sec. 1910.132(d) or
Sec. 1910.132(f), or both.
One commenter supported adding electrical protective equipment to
the scope of the requirements for hazard assessment and selection of
PPE in Sec. 1910.132(d), and for training in Sec. 1910.132(f), if no
other standard addressed those issues (Ex. 0126).
Other commenters opposed expanding the scope of Sec. 1910.132(d)
and (f) to cover electrical protective equipment (Exs. 0177, 0186,
0201, 0209, 0212, 0227). Several of those comments argued that there is
no other "special industry equipment in Sec. 1910.132" (Exs. 0177,
0209, 0227).
Section 1910.132 covers all types of PPE regardless of their use
only in particular industries. The language of Sec. 1910.132(a) is
broad and inclusive of all types of PPE. That section clearly covers
electrical protective equipment under Sec. 1910.137 in Subpart I,
Personal Protective Equipment. Even assuming that these commenters
meant only that paragraphs (d) and (f) of Sec. 1910.132 do not cover
"special industry equipment," the commenters' rationale is not valid.
OSHA does not consider electrical protective equipment to be under the
exclusive domain of the electric power industry. OSHA standards having
general applicability to all of general industry require this type of
PPE (see Subpart S of Part 1910). Paragraph (a)(1)(i) of Sec. 1910.335
requires that "[e]mployees working in areas where there are potential
electrical hazards . . . be provided with, and shall use, electrical
protective equipment that is appropriate for the specific parts of the
body to be protected and for the work to be performed."
Southern Company argued that adding electrical protective equipment
to the scope of Sec. 1910.132(d) and (f) would appear to offer few
benefits (Ex. 0212). The company maintained that electrical protective
equipment has little in common with other types of PPE because the
selection of the type of rubber insulating equipment depends on many
factors, such as the work methods involved and the worksite
configuration.
OSHA disagrees that electrical protective equipment is unique with
respect to the number of factors involved with its selection. Whether
other types of PPE are necessary also depends on the work methods and
worksite configuration involved. For example, whether foot protection
is necessary depends on both the work methods in use and the worksite
configuration. Foot protection typically is necessary when employees
carry or handle materials such as packages, objects, parts, or heavy
tools that the employees could drop or when objects in the work area
could potentially roll over an employee's feet. (See Appendix B to
Subpart I of Part 1910.) Additionally, OSHA believes that the many
factors that go into the decision of whether to use electrical
protective equipment and what types of equipment to use argue for
adding this type of equipment to the scope of Sec. 1910.132(d) and
(f). The more difficult the decision-making process, the more important
it is for employers to train workers adequately and for employers to
adopt a more formal process for selecting PPE.
Two of the commenters opposing the addition of electrical
protective equipment to the scope of Sec. 1910.132(d) and (f) disputed
the need to do so (Exs. 0186, 0201). These two commenters maintained
that training and hazard assessment are addressed adequately in
existing standards. Duke Energy stated that Sec. 1910.269 addresses
training and assessment (Ex. 0201). Mr. Anthony Ahern with Ohio Rural
Electric Cooperatives commented that changing the scope of Sec.
1910.132 would be unnecessarily duplicative (Ex. 0186).
The Agency agrees with these commenters. The electrical standards
in Sec. Sec. 1910.268(c), 1910.269(a)(2) (which OSHA is revising in
this rulemaking), and 1910.332 require training that will ensure that
employees know how to properly use and care for electrical protective
equipment. These standards also contain several explicit requirements
mandating the use of electrical protective equipment. These training
and specific electrical protective equipment requirements clearly
reduce, if not eliminate, the need to cover hazard assessment and
training in Sec. 1910.132. Thus, the Agency agrees with Mr. Ahern that
adding electrical protective equipment to the scope of Sec.
1910.132(d) and (f) would be unnecessarily duplicative. Consequently,
OSHA decided against doing so.
NAM objected to adding arc-flash hazard assessment or protective
clothing to the scope of Sec. 1910.132(d) and (f) (Ex. 0222).
OSHA neither proposed adding, nor requested comments on whether it
should add, arc-flash hazard assessment or protective equipment needed
to protect against arc-flash hazards to the scope of Sec. 1910.132(d)
or (f). The preamble request for comments
addressed specifically electrical protective equipment covered by Sec.
1910.137. In this final rule, the Agency is explicitly requiring
employers to assess the hazards of flames and electric arcs only for
work covered by Sec. 1910.269(l) or Sec. 1926.960. Therefore, OSHA
finds no basis in NAM's concerns that the Agency is expanding the
hazard-assessment and training requirements related to electric-arc
hazards beyond the requirements contained in Sec. 1910.269 and Subpart
V. (See also the summary and explanation of final Sec. 1926.960(g),
earlier in this section of the preamble, for further discussion of
issues related to protection of workers from electric arcs.)
3. Section 1910.136
OSHA proposed to revise Sec. 1910.136(a), in addition to the
proposed new Sec. 1926.97 and the proposed revisions to Sec.
1910.137, Sec. 1910.269, and Subpart V. Existing Sec. 1910.136(a)
states that the employer must ensure that each affected employee uses
protective footwear when working in areas where there is a danger of
foot injuries due to falling or rolling objects, or objects piercing
the sole, and where such employee's feet are exposed to electrical
hazards.
In the preamble to the proposal, the Agency expressed concern that
the regulated community was interpreting this language to recognize the
use of electrical-hazard footwear as a primary form of electrical
protection (70 FR 34893).\475\ Manufacturers construct electrical-
hazard footwear to provide insulation of the wearer's feet from ground.
While this footwear can provide the wearer a small degree of protection
from electric shock at 600 volts or less under dry conditions, the
footwear is only a secondary form of electrical insulation. Conductive
footwear, which is not electrical-hazard footwear, prevents static
electricity buildup.\476\ This is one method of protecting against
static electrical discharges that can damage equipment or, in hazardous
locations, could possibly lead to fires or explosions.
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\475\ Primary insulation normally insulates an employee directly
from an energized part. Rubber insulating gloves and rubber
insulating blankets are examples of primary electrical protection.
Secondary insulation normally insulates an employee's feet from a
grounded surface. Electrical-hazard footwear and rubber insulating
matting are examples of secondary electrical protection.
\476\ ANSI Z41-1999, American National Standard for Personal
Protection--Protective Footwear, which is incorporated by reference
in existing Sec. Sec. 1910.6 and 1910.136, covers electrical-hazard
and conductive footwear.
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In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA explained that the use of
electrical-hazard footwear as a primary form of electrical protection
could expose workers to electric-shock hazards if they believe that the
primary forms of electrical protection (for example, rubber insulating
gloves or blankets) are no longer necessary (id.). First, electrical-
hazard footwear only insulates an employee's feet from ground. The
employee still might be grounded through other parts of his or her
body. Second, the insulation provided by electrical-hazard footwear is
effective only under dry conditions; this footwear provides little, if
any, protection once it becomes wet or damp. Lastly, the voltage rating
on electrical-hazard footwear is only 600 volts. Therefore, OSHA
proposed to delete language relating to electrical hazards from Sec.
1910.136(a). In the proposal, this paragraph read as follows:
(a) General requirements. The employer shall ensure that each
affected employee uses protective footwear when working in areas
where there is a danger of foot injuries due to falling or rolling
objects or due to objects piercing the sole.
OSHA decided not to incorporate the proposed language into the
final standard. Many commenters supported the proposed removal of the
language in Sec. 1910.136(a) relating to electrical hazards. (See, for
example, Exs. 0183, 0202, 0206, 0229, 0233.) These commenters agreed
with the rationale OSHA provided in the preamble to the proposed rule,
and some noted that this type of footwear is not designed for outdoor
environments or rated for the voltages encountered in electric power
distribution work.
Three commenters opposed the complete removal from existing Sec.
1910.136(a) of language addressing electrical hazards (Exs. 0105, 0123,
0148). These commenters mentioned ASTM F1116, Standard Test Method for
Determining Dielectric Strength of Dielectric Footwear, and F1117,
Standard Specification for Dielectric Footwear, as examples of
consensus standards for footwear that provides primary protection
against electric shock. Comments from Norcross Safety Products, LLC,
and LaCrosse Footwear noted that OSHA recognizes the need for electric
power workers to use dielectric footwear,\477\ but stated that the
proposed removal of protection against electrical hazards \478\ would
reduce protection for workers outside the electric power industry (Exs.
0105, 0123). These commenters indicated that an employer should base
the need for footwear to protect against electrical hazards on the
employer's job-safety assessment.
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\477\ ASTM F1117 describes dielectric footwear as "footwear
designed to provide additional isolation or insulation of workers if
in accidental contact with energized electrical conductors,
apparatus, or circuits." This ASTM standard covers three types of
footwear: rubbers, boots, and galoshes. Dielectric footwear, which
is proof tested at 15 or 20 kilovolts, ac, provides better electric
shock protection than electrical-hazard footwear, which is rated at
600 volts, maximum.
\478\ "Electrical hazards" as used in the discussion of
protective footwear in this preamble and in existing Sec.
1910.136(a) means electric shock hazards and hazards from the
discharge of static build up. There are three types of footwear that
protect against electrical hazards, that is, conductive, electrical-
hazard, and dielectric footwear.
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Paragraph (d) of Sec. 1910.132 requires employers to assess their
workplaces "to determine if hazards are present, or are likely to be
present, which necessitate the use of personal protective equipment,"
and to provide PPE in accordance with that assessment. As noted
previously, Sec. 1910.132(g) restricts the application of Sec.
1910.132(d) to PPE covered by Sec. Sec. 1910.133 (eye and face
protection), 1910.135 (head protection), 1910.136 (foot protection),
and 1910.138 (hand protection). Thus, OSHA's existing standards require
the hazard assessment recommended by Norcross and Lacrosse. However, if
the Agency adopted the proposed removal of electrical-safety footwear
(that is, electrical-hazard, dielectric, and conductive footwear) from
Sec. 1910.136(a), the requirement in Sec. 1910.132(d) for employers
to perform a hazard assessment would no longer apply to electrical-
safety footwear.
On the other hand, OSHA believes that, because of its limitations,
electrical-hazard and dielectric footwear should only be required by
Sec. 1910.136 as a supplementary form of electrical protection. The
Agency also believes that conductive footwear, whether or not it
provides protection for the foot, is supplementary protection to be
used when flammable gases or vapors or combustible dusts cannot be
adequately controlled. Consequently, OSHA is revising the language in
Sec. 1910.136(a) to require the employer to ensure that each affected
employee uses protective footwear (1) when working in areas where there
is a danger of foot injuries due to falling or rolling objects, or
objects piercing the sole, or (2) when the use of protective footwear
will protect the affected employee from an electrical hazard, such as a
static-discharge or electric-shock hazard, that remains after the
employer takes other necessary protective measures.
In addition, OSHA is revising nonmandatory Appendix B to Subpart I
to include a passage in section 10 of that appendix indicating that
electrically
conductive shoes would be required as a supplementary form of
protection for work activities in which there is a danger of fire or
explosion from the discharge of static electricity. The passage also
states that electrical-hazard or dielectric footwear would be required
as a supplementary form of protection when an employee standing on the
ground is exposed to hazardous step or touch potential (the difference
in electrical potential between the feet or between the hands and feet)
or when primary forms of electrical protective equipment, such as
rubber insulating gloves and blankets, do not provide complete
protection for an employee standing on the ground.
The same three commenters who opposed the complete removal from
existing Sec. 1910.136(a) of language addressing electrical hazards
also noted that existing Sec. 1910.137 did not specifically mention
dielectric footwear covered by ASTM F1116 and F1117 (Exs. 0105, 0123,
0148). These commenters maintained that this equipment does provide
primary protection from electric shock and recommended that OSHA
require such protection either in Sec. 1910.136, Sec. 1910.137, Sec.
1926.97, or Subpart V. Norcross submitted specific suggestions for
revising Sec. 1910.137 to address dielectric footwear (Ex. 0105).
OSHA considers dielectric footwear to be electrical protective
equipment, which is covered by Sec. Sec. 1910.137 and 1926.97 of the
final rule, in addition to being protective footwear covered by Sec.
1910.136.\479\ It is true that final Sec. Sec. 1910.137(a) and
1926.97(a) explicitly limit their coverage to rubber insulating
blankets, matting, covers, line hose, gloves, and sleeves and thus do
not cover dielectric footwear. However, final Sec. Sec. 1910.137(b)
and 1926.97(b) cover "the design and manufacture of electrical
protective equipment that is not covered by paragraph (a)," including
dielectric footwear. OSHA has examined the revisions to Sec. 1910.137
suggested by Norcross and concludes that the requirements adopted in
Sec. 1910.137(a) are not and should not be applicable to dielectric
footwear. The Agency has also concluded that it is more appropriate to
cover this equipment in Sec. 1910.137(b). In addition, OSHA does not
agree that dielectric footwear is primary electrical protection. ASTM
F1117-03 covers dielectric footwear "designed to provide additional
isolation or insulation of workers" from electric shock (Ex. 0105;
emphasis added). Thus, ASTM recognizes that dielectric footwear is
supplementary, not primary, protection. Consequently, OSHA is not
adopting the recommendation of these commenters to add specific
requirements for dielectric footwear in Sec. 1910.137.
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\479\ OSHA notes that Sec. 1926.96, which incorporates
requirements for occupational foot protection used in construction
work, applies to safety-toe footwear only. That section does not
apply to electrical-safety footwear except to the extent that it is
also safety-toe footwear.
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4. Part 1910, Subpart S Revisions
As noted earlier, OSHA revised the definition of "line-clearance
tree trimming" in Sec. 1910.269(x). Changing the definition broadens
the scope of Sec. 1910.269 with respect to tree-trimming operations
performed near electric supply lines and equipment energized at more
than 50 kilovolts. This change also impacts the scope of the
requirements for electrical safety-related work practices in Subpart S
of the general industry standards. Note 3 to Sec. 1910.331(c)(1)
indicates that Sec. Sec. 1910.332 through 1910.335 do not apply to
qualified employees performing line-clearance tree trimming operations.
Section 1910.399 defines "line-clearance tree trimming," using
language that is identical to the language in existing Sec.
1910.269(x), even though that term is used in Subpart S only in Note 3
to Sec. 1910.331(c)(1). OSHA determined that the meaning of "line-
clearance tree trimming" must be the same in Sec. 1910.269 and
Subpart S to ensure that there are no gaps or overlaps in coverage
between the two standards with respect to tree-trimming operations
performed by line-clearance tree trimmers (who are qualified employees
under Subpart S) near electric supply lines and equipment operating at
more than 50 kilovolts. Therefore, the Agency is removing the
definition of "line-clearance tree trimming" from Sec. 1910.399 and
is adding, to Note 3 of Sec. 1910.331(c)(1), a reference to the
definition of that term in Sec. 1910.269(x).
D. Part 1926, Removal of Incorporations by Reference
As explained earlier in this section of the preamble, the final
rule removes the incorporation by reference of several consensus
standards. OSHA is revising existing Sec. 1926.6, which provides
notification of approval of incorporations by reference by the Director
of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR
Part 51. In this regard, OSHA is removing and reserving paragraphs
(h)(17), (h)(18), (h)(19), (h)(20), (h)(21), (h)(22), and (j)(2), which
list the approval of the incorporation of ANSI standards that are no
longer incorporated in final Subpart V.
E. Part 1926, Subpart CC Revisions
OSHA's revised standard for cranes and derricks at Subpart CC of
Part 1926 contains provisions that reference existing Sec. 1910.269.
Paragraph (g) of existing Sec. 1926.1400 provides that, for work
covered by Subpart V of Part 1926, OSHA will deem employers complying
with existing Sec. 1910.269(p) as in compliance with Sec. Sec.
1926.1407 through 1926.1411 of Subpart CC. Because requirements for the
operation of mechanical equipment are the same in both final Sec.
1910.269 and final Subpart V, OSHA is revising these references in
Subpart CC of Part 1926 to refer to the corresponding provisions in
Subpart V of Part 1926.
In addition, Subpart CC contains provisions that apply when
employers perform Subpart V work with cranes or derricks closer to
overhead power lines than the minimum clearance distances in Table V-1
of existing Subpart V. First, existing Sec. 1926.1410(c)(2) permits an
employer engaged in Subpart V work to work closer than the distances in
existing Sec. 1926.950 Table V-1 where the employer meets both the
requirements of Sec. 1926.1410 and existing Sec. 1926.952(c)(3)(i) or
(c)(3)(ii). Second, existing Sec. 1926.1410(d)(4)(ii) provides that,
for work covered by Subpart V, existing Sec. 1926.1410(d)(4)(i), which
requires the use of an insulating link or device, applies only when
working inside the existing Subpart V, Table V-1 clearance distances.
Finally, existing Sec. 1926.1410(d)(4)(iii) provides that, for work
covered by Subpart V of Part 1926 involving operations for which use of
an insulating link/device is infeasible, employers may substitute the
requirements of existing Sec. 1910.269(p)(4)(iii)(B) or (p)(4)(iii)(C)
for the requirement in existing Sec. 1926.1410(d)(4)(i).
As noted in the summary and explanation for final Sec.
1926.959(d)(1) earlier in this section of the preamble, Subpart V
requires that employers ensure that employees do not take mechanical
equipment, except for the insulated portion of an aerial lift operated
by a qualified employee, inside the minimum approach distance,
established by the employer under Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(i).
Consequently, the requirements in existing Sec. 1926.1410(c)(2),
(d)(4)(ii), and (d)(4)(iii) that pertain to the operation of cranes and
derricks inside the minimum approach distance, are no longer
applicable. Therefore, OSHA is removing those requirements from Subpart
CC. However, OSHA is retaining the paragraph (d)(4)(ii) exemption from
Sec. 1926.1410(d)(4)(i) for
Subpart V work. Also, OSHA is replacing the phrase "the minimum
clearance distances specified in Sec. 1926.950 Table V-1" with "the
minimum approach distances established by the employer under Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)(i)" to reflect the changes made to the minimum approach
distances required by Sec. 1926.960(c)(1) in this final rule.
VI. Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
A. Introduction
The OSH Act requires OSHA to demonstrate that standards promulgated
under the Act are technologically and economically feasible. Executive
Order 12866 and 13563 and the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601
et seq., require Federal agencies to estimate the costs, assess the
benefits, and analyze the impacts, including small business impacts, of
their rules. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess
all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if
regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize
net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public
health and safety effects, distributive impacts, and equity). Executive
Order 13563 states that the Federal regulatory system "must take into
account benefits and costs" and "reduce burdens and maintain
flexibility and freedom of choice." OSHA determined that this action
is economically significant within the meaning of Section 3(f)(1) of
Executive Order 12866 because it is likely to have an effect on the
economy of $100 million or more in any 1 year. This final rule is also
a major rule under the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of
Management and Budget reviewed this final rule. As required by the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, OSHA assessed the impacts of this final
rule on small entities and prepared a Final Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis.
This is the Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis (FEA) for OSHA's update of the standards addressing electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution work, and the use of
electrical protective equipment. This analysis covers all elements of
this present rulemaking, including changes to 29 CFR Part 1910 and
changes to 29 CFR Part 1926. OSHA analyzed the consolidated set of
actions in its entirety; only portions of the standards identified as
involving nonnegligible costs are explicitly reflected in the analysis
of compliance costs and impacts. This FEA includes a discussion of all
the specific comments OSHA received on the PRIA in support of the
proposed rule, including comments received on OSHA's assumptions and
estimates. Where OSHA does not note comments or suggestions with
respect to an estimate, there were no comments or suggestions. OSHA is
including the complete FEA in this Federal Register notice.
B. Need for the Rule
Employees performing work involving electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution are exposed to a variety of significant
hazards, such as fall, electric-shock, and burn hazards, that can and
do cause serious injury and death. As detailed later in this section of
the preamble, OSHA estimates that, on average, 444 serious injuries and
74 fatalities occur annually among these workers. Although better
compliance with existing safety standards may prevent some of these
accidents, research and analyses conducted by OSHA found that many
preventable injuries and fatalities could continue to occur even if
employers fully complied with the existing standards. As the benefits
analysis shows, if the final rule can prevent even 10 percent of these
fatal and nonfatal accidents, then the benefits of the final rule will
exceed its costs. As the same analysis concludes, the final rule will
likely prevent far more than 10 percent of these fatal and nonfatal
accidents (assuming full compliance with the final rule). Accounting
for the probability that some accidents will be prevented by the
existing rule, OSHA estimates that the final rule will prevent 118.5
injuries and 19.75 fatalities per year (26.7 percent of all fatal and
nonfatal accidents).
Executive Order 12866 provides that "[e]ach agency shall identify
the problem that it intends to address [via regulation] including,
where applicable, the failures of private markets." OSHA believes it
can make a reasonable case that, in the absence of regulations, market
failures prevent free markets from providing the levels of occupational
safety, and particularly the levels of safety for electrical workers
affected by this standard, that would maximize net benefits to society.
Employees and supervisors affected by this rule are frequently
trained in, and knowledgeable about, the relevant hazards. Many are
also knowledgeable about existing OSHA standards. The primary problem
is that contractors, employees, and supervisors frequently lack the
information about the specific electrical system and worksite
conditions needed to determine what protective measures to take. The
most costly provisions of this standard address this problem. As
explained in the summary and explanation of the final rule's
requirements on information transfer and job briefing (Sec. Sec.
1926.950(c) and 1926.952(a)(1)), testimony and other information in the
record show that key information necessary for taking the appropriate
safety measures is sometimes lacking, often with fatal consequences. In
addition, as explained in the summary and explanation of the final
rule's requirements on minimum approach distances (Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)), employers frequently adopt minimum approach distances
that rely on industry-accepted values of maximum per-unit transient
overvoltage rather than the maximum value present at the worksite. The
benefits analysis presented under the heading "Benefits, Net Benefits,
and Cost Effectiveness," later in this section of the preamble, shows
that many accidents are potentially preventable with better information
on the electrical system and worksite conditions.
To determine possible market failures that could lead to employers
either not providing information to other employers or their own
employees, or to not providing other safety measures when the benefits
exceed the costs, it is necessary to examine the way employers make
decisions with respect to health and safety. When an employee accepts a
job with an employer, the employee will typically accept the risks
associated with the job in return for two forms of compensation--(1) a
wage premium for assuming the risk and (2) compensation for damages in
the event the risk actually leads to damages. The rational profit-
maximizing employer will make investments in workplace safety to reduce
the level of risk to employees to the extent that such expenditures
result at least in an offsetting reduction in the employer's payouts of
wage premiums for risk and compensation for damages. To the extent that
the sum of the costs of wage premiums and compensation for damages
accurately represent the total damages associated with workplace
accidents, the rational employer will conduct the appropriate economic
analysis and arrive at the level of accident prevention that is optimal
from a benefit-cost viewpoint. As a result, the possible origins of
market failure would be either: (1) There are costs of accidents that
are borne neither by the employee or the employer, or (2) the costs of
wage premiums or compensation for damages are not fully
responsive to changes in risk. Both cases apply here.
In the first case, there are some accident costs incurred by
neither the employer nor the employee. For instance, neither the
employer nor the employee will have a vested interest in Federal and
State taxes that go unpaid as a result of an employee injury. Such
taxes will typically be 15 (for Social Security alone) to 26 percent of
the total value of the income loss to the employee [17, 52].\480\ Tax
losses are likely to be significant because (1) workers' compensation
payments are not subject to Federal income or Social Security taxes
[16], and (2) many studies found that income losses not compensated by
workers' compensation are significant [23].
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\480\ The average federal tax rate for 2009 for the middle
quintile of household income was 11.1 percent [52].
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In the second case, the costs employers pay in compensation for
damages, or for wage premiums, are not completely responsive to changes
in risk, as discussed in the following paragraphs.
Workers' Compensation
Most employers cover, and are required to cover, compensation for
injured employees through workers' compensation insurance. (Some very
large employers may self-insure in some States.) States highly regulate
premiums for workers' compensation insurance and generally employ a
combination of a class rating and an experience rating in deriving
premiums [24, 3]. The class rating is the average risk for employees
with the same occupations as those employed by the employer. The basis
of the experience rating is the employer's actual workers' compensation
claims over the past several years. Very small firms are almost
entirely class rated; even medium-sized firms are partly class rated;
and firms that are fully experience rated will need several years
before their insurance premiums fully reflect any change in their
performance. As a result, many employers will find that changes in
their expenditures to avoid risk are only minimally reflected in
changes in their workers' compensation premiums, and all insured
employers will find that there is a considerable delay before changes
in risk are fully reflected in their workers' compensation insurance
premiums. As a result, many employers will not see improvements they
make in preventing injuries and illnesses reflected in the costs they
bear for compensating employee injuries and illnesses.\481\
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\481\ This outcome, of course, involves an accounting point.
Premiums due to class rating, by definition, do not change with an
individual employer's injury experience. There is some empirical
evidence, using a difference in differences methodology, that
(small) firms that move from class to experience rating decrease
their total claims by 8 to 12 percent [27].
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Wage Premiums
Wage premiums for risk are the remaining factor that could affect
employers' decisions about risk levels. The effects of wage premiums
are particularly important for risks that lead to fatalities because
workers' compensation covers only a small fraction of most estimates of
willingness to pay to prevent a fatality.\482\ Additionally, workers'
compensation payments do not fully compensate injuries in that workers'
compensation provides no payments for pain and suffering or losses
other than lost wages or medical expenses associated with injuries;
there is extensive evidence that workers' compensation does not fully
restore wages lost as result of long-term disability [3]. As a result,
wage premiums that accurately reflect the risks of a specific employer
are necessary, in addition to workers' compensation, for employers to
make valid risk-reduction decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\482\ While workers' compensation varies by State, Leigh and
Marcin estimate that the average indemnity benefits for a fatality
are $225,919, far less than willingness-to-pay estimates [21]. For
example, as explained in the benefits section of this analysis, OSHA
uses a willingness-to-pay measure of $8.9 million per life saved.
Other agencies use different estimates, but all of the values are in
the millions of dollars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For an employer to have an adequate incentive to implement measures
that will prevent workplace accidents, it is not sufficient that
employees simply know that their work is dangerous, or even know
quantitatively that their occupation has a given risk. Employees must:
know the exact quantitative effect of a specific employer's safety
measures and systems; have a reasonable expectation that the employer
will continue to provide existing safety measures in the future; and be
able to act on their knowledge of risk by readily changing workplaces
or changing wage demands in response to differences in levels of risk.
OSHA believes that even skilled electrical workers (and not all persons
injured in accidents preventable by the final rule are skilled
electrical workers) lack this detailed employer-specific quantitative
knowledge or the ability to act on it. Further, construction employees,
who typically work at a variety of different sites, including sites
controlled by multiple employers, will find it particularly challenging
to determine future risk levels, as these levels will vary from site to
site.
In summary, OSHA believes that: (1) The most costly portions of the
rule are necessary to assure that supervisors and employees have the
information they need to protect themselves; (2) the benefits of this
standard exceed the costs; (3) neither employers nor employees incur
some key costs of injuries and fatalities; and (4) neither wage
premiums nor workers' compensation insurance are sufficiently
responsive to changes in risk to assure that employers will reduce risk
to the optimal extent. The rule is, therefore, necessary to address
market failures that result in the provision of insufficient safety
measures in the workplace.
The OSH Act provides a Congressional finding as to the compelling
social need for assuring occupational safety. Congress declared that
the purpose of the OSH Act is "to assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working
conditions" (29 U.S.C. 651(b)). Thus, it is reasonable to argue that
there is a social purpose for this final rule independent of whether or
not it addresses a market failure.\483\ Further, by emphasizing "every
working man and woman," Congress expressed an interest in preventing
unsafe workplaces, not simply in assuring that, on average, workplaces
are safe. Thus, while some employers are excessively cautious about
risk while others are insufficiently cautious, OSHA's concern needs to
be with the insufficiently cautious.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\483\ See Section IV, Legal Authority, earlier in this preamble,
for a detailed discussion of the legal authority for this standard
and how the final standard meets the various requirements of the OSH
Act as interpreted by the courts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Examination of Alternative Regulatory Approaches
Under Section 3(8) of the OSH Act, the requirements of an OSHA
standard must be "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe
or healthful employment and places of employment." To be reasonably
necessary or appropriate, a safety standard must be technologically and
economically feasible, better able to effectuate the purposes of the
OSH Act than any relevant national consensus standards, and use the
most cost-effective protective measures.
To determine the appropriate regulatory requirements to address
occupational risks for employees working on electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution systems, OSHA considered many different
factors and potential alternatives. The Agency examined the incidence
of injuries and fatalities and their direct and underlying
causes to ascertain where existing standards needed strengthening. OSHA
reviewed these standards, assessed current practices in affected
industries, collected information and comments from experts, and
scrutinized the available data and research. A full discussion of the
Agency's rationale for adopting each of the regulatory requirements in
the final rule is available in Section V, Summary and Explanation of
the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble.
The most costly provisions in the final rule are those requiring
employers to conduct arc-flash hazard assessments and provide arc-flash
protective equipment appropriate for the identified arc hazards (as
required by Sec. 1926.960(g)). OSHA calculated the costs of two
alternative regulatory approaches to arc-flash protective equipment. As
a less stringent alternative to the final rule, OSHA considered a
general requirement for arc-flash protective clothing with an arc
rating of 4 cal/cm\2\. This alternative would eliminate the costs
associated with performing arc-hazard assessments, as well as the costs
of providing some types of protective gear, such as switching coats or
flash suits, faceshields, and head protection. Under this less
stringent alternative, the total annual costs for arc-flash protective
clothing would be approximately $15.6 million (instead of $19.4 million
for the arc-hazard assessment and arc-flash protective equipment
combined), and the total annual cost of the rule would be approximately
$45.7 million (instead of $49.5 million).
OSHA also considered the more stringent alternative of requiring
affected industries to follow Table 130.7(C)(9) in NFPA 70E-2009,
Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace. This approach would
obviate the need for employers to do arc-hazard assessments, but would
result in affected workers needing protective clothing with a higher
arc rating, and a higher percentage of power workers \484\ needing to
use arc-rated faceshields and head protection (80 percent of power
workers at small establishments and 90 percent of power workers at
large establishments, as opposed to 13 percent under the rule as
adopted). The cost for switching coats or flash suits would remain
unchanged under the more stringent alternative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\484\ The term "power worker" describes workers affected by
the rule by virtue of their performing electric power generation,
transmission or distribution work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To analyze the costs of requiring clothing with a higher arc rating
under the NFPA approach, OSHA estimated that a coverall with an arc
rating of 8 cal/cm\2\ costs $191.75 [13],\485\ while the equivalent
piece of clothing with an arc rating of 12 cal/cm\2\ costs $290.50
[14], for an incremental cost of $98.75 per item.\486\ With eight sets
of flame-resistant clothing \487\ per affected worker, this results in
incremental annualized costs of approximately $8.0 million. Adding
these costs to the $15.6 million in annualized costs for flame-
resistant clothing under the provisions of the final rule results in
total annualized costs for flame-resistant clothing of approximately
$23.7 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\485\ References are available at the end of this section of the
preamble.
\486\ Clothing rated at 8 cal/cm\2\ would, in turn, offer more
than adequate protection for incident heat energy of 8 cal/cm\2\ or
less.
\487\ This FEA uses the term "flame-resistant clothing" to
refer generally to the flame-resistant and arc-rated clothing, and
the term "arc-flash protective equipment" to refer to the flame-
resistant and arc-rated clothing and equipment, required by Sec.
1926.960(g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA calculated the costs for arc-rated faceshields and head
protection as described under the heading "Costs of Compliance,"
later in this section of the preamble, using estimated costs of $86.50
per arc-rated faceshield [11] and $29.75 per arc-rated balaclava [12].
OSHA assumes that 80 percent of affected workers at small
establishments and 90 percent of power workers at large establishments
would need to wear this equipment under the NFPA approach, for total
annualized costs of $8.3 million, or an additional annualized cost of
approximately $7.1 million.
Under this more stringent alternative, the estimated total
annualized cost of arc-hazard assessment and arc-flash protective
equipment would be approximately $32.4 million, and the estimated total
annualized cost of the rule would be approximately $62.5 million. Under
the final rule, OSHA estimated the total annualized costs of arc-hazard
assessment and arc-flash protective equipment to be approximately $19.4
million and estimated the total annualized cost of the rule to be
approximately $49.5 million. As outlined in Table 18, the NFPA
alternative would result in approximately $12.9 million in additional
costs relative to the final rule.
Table 18--Alternative Regulatory Approaches
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized
costs for Less stringent More stringent
Provision provisions in alternative alternative
final rule
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calculating Incident Energy and Arc-Hazard Assessment (Arc- $2,186,883 $0 $0
Hazard Assessment).............................................
Flame-Resistant Apparel......................................... 15,620,365 15,620,365 23,664,751
Switching Coats or Flash Suits.................................. 366,245 0 366,245
Faceshields..................................................... 946,964 0 6,212,770
Head Protection................................................. 325,690 0 2,136,762
-----------------------------------------------
Total Arc-Hazard Assessment and Arc-Flash Protective Equipment 19,446,147 15,620,365 32,380,528
Costs..........................................................
Total Cost of Rule.............................................. 49,516,264 45,690,483 62,450,646
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incremental Annualized Cost of Alternative...................... .............. -3,825,782 12,934,381
Incremental Lives Saved Annually of Alternative................. .............. -0.52 0
Incremental Injuries Prevented Annually of Alternative.......... .............. -3 0
Incremental Monetized Benefits.................................. .............. -4,710,000 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incremental Net Benefits ($).................................... .............. -884,218 -12,934,381
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
Source: Office of Regulatory Analysis, OSHA.
To assess the benefits associated with the alternative versions of
the arc-flash protective equipment requirements, OSHA considered the
fatalities prevented under the various approaches. A review of the same
set of IMIS reports used in the benefits analysis described later (see
the discussion under the heading "Benefits, Net Benefits, and Cost
Effectiveness") indicates that the more stringent requirement would
prevent an estimated 1.92 fatalities, while the less stringent option
would prevent an estimated 1.40 fatalities per year. These options
compare to an estimated 1.92 preventable fatalities under the provision
in the final rule. Consistent with the benefits methodology described
elsewhere in this section, the Agency estimates the final rule will
prevent approximately an additional 0.52 fatalities and 3 injuries
annually beyond the less stringent alternative, but would be as
effective as the more stringent alternative, as the arc-hazard
assessment allows employers to better target their need for protective
clothing and equipment. Monetizing these prevented fatalities using the
methodology described in the benefits analysis, and values of $8.7
million per prevented fatality and $62,000 per prevented injury,
results in an estimated incremental monetized benefit of about $0.9
million per year for the final rule over the less stringent option and
about $12.9 million a year over the more stringent option.
Profile of Affected Industries
The final rule affects establishments in a variety of different
industries involving electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution. The rule primarily affects firms that construct, operate,
maintain, or repair electric power generation, transmission, or
distribution systems. These firms include electric utilities, as well
as contractors hired by utilities and primarily classified in the
construction industry. In addition, affected firms appear in a variety
of manufacturing and other industries that own or operate their own
electric power generation, transmission, or distribution systems as a
secondary part of their business operations. The rule also affects
establishments performing line-clearance tree-trimming operations.
Some other industries will occasionally enter electric power
facilities (for example, insurance inspectors (Ex. 0198)). OSHA expects
that this rule will have no significant economic impact on industries
such as the insurance industry that occasionally have employees enter
electric power facilities for purposes other than construction or
maintenance. Further, to the extent such visitors to electric power
facilities are within the scope of the rule, the more costly provisions
of the rule are unlikely to have a substantial effect on those
visitors. (For a discussion of the application of the final rule to
insurance inspections and the implications for costs for the insurance
industry, see the summary and explanation for final Sec.
1926.950(a)(1), in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final
Rule, earlier in this preamble.) Finally, while final Sec. Sec.
1910.137 and 1926.97 apply to all general industry work and all
construction work, respectively, OSHA anticipates that these final
rules will primarily impact industries involved in electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution, and industries in the
nonutility sector involved with the cogeneration of electric power.
OSHA, therefore, concludes that these final rules will have a de
minimis effect on other industries.
OSHA based the PRIA in part on a report prepared by CONSAD [5],
which used 1997 NAICS and SIC code classifications of industries. OSHA
updated the information in the FEA with the assistance of ERG, using
the data sources described in the following paragraphs. CONSAD based
the estimates it developed for small, large, and total establishments
on the 1997 U.S. Economic Census, which used some NAICS classifications
that are now obsolete. To be analytically consistent, however, OSHA is
maintaining the older NAICS categories.
To update industry profile information for the construction
industry (NAICS 23), OSHA used the U.S. Census' County Business
Patterns data [47] on the growth of the construction contracting
industry between 1997 and 2007. These data suggest that the number of
establishments and firms grew 20.6 percent, and employment grew 32.7
percent, from 1997 to 2007. OSHA, thus, multiplied CONSAD's estimate of
the number of establishments and affected establishments by 1.206, and
CONSAD's estimate of total employment and affected power workers by
1.327, to obtain updated industry profile information. In the case of
firms, CONSAD listed total affected firms for each NAICS, but did not
delineate between small and large firms. To update the number of
affected firms in the construction industry, OSHA multiplied CONSAD's
estimate of total affected firms by 1.206, and assumed that, because
very small firms (that is, those with fewer than 20 employees) are
unlikely to have more than one establishment, the number of small firms
is equal to the number of small establishments and that the remainder
of affected firms are large. OSHA assumed that very small
establishments and firms grew in proportion to the rest of the
construction industry.
In the case of the privately owned utilities in the 1997 NAICS
Electric Power Generation (NAICS 221110) and Electric Power
Transmission, Control, and Distribution (NAICS 221120) categories, OSHA
updated industry profile information using the U.S. Census Bureau's
1997 NAICS and 1987 SIC Correspondence Tables [44], 1997 NAICS to 2002
NAICS Correspondence Tables [45], and 2002 NAICS to 2007 NAICS
Correspondence Tables [46] to match CONSAD's NAICS and SIC categories
to the 2007 NAICS categories. The 1997 category Electric Power
Generation (NAICS 221110) is the sum of the 2007 NAICS categories:
Hydroelectric Power Generation; Fossil Fuel Electric Power Generation;
Nuclear Electric Power Generation; and Other Electric Power Generation.
Similarly, the 1997 NAICS category Electric Power Transmission,
Control, and Distribution (NAICS 221120) is the sum of the 2007 NAICS
categories: Electric Bulk Power Transmission and Control; and Electric
Power Distribution.
To calculate the number of establishments among Industrial Power
Generators, OSHA used data from the Energy Information Administration
(EIA)'s Form EIA-860 Database Annual Electric Generator Report [49],
removed plants primarily engaged in the utility, mining, or agriculture
industries, and counted the remaining plants as establishments among
industrial power generators.
To estimate the number of major publicly owned utilities for the
analysis prepared for the proposed rule, CONSAD used EIA's Form-412
Annual Electricity Financial Report, which contained data on "each
municipality, political subdivision, State, and Federal entity engaged
in the generation, transmission, or distribution of electricity, which
had at least 150,000 megawatt hours of sales to ultimate consumers and/
or at least 150,000 megawatt hours of sales for resale for each of the
2 previous years" [48]. EIA terminated this survey, and there are no
data more recent than 2003.
To update CONSAD's estimate of publicly owned utility
establishments and firms, OSHA used data from EIA's Form-861 Annual
Electric Power Industry Report [50] for utilities with municipal,
state, or political subdivision ownership located in State-plan States
with sales of at least 150,000 megawatt-hours. These data indicate that
there are now 277 firms that are major publicly owned utilities.
Establishment data are not available for these utilities. In the
analysis prepared for the proposed rule, OSHA estimated that there were
923 establishments and 276 firms, and OSHA used the same ratio of
establishments to firms to estimate that there are now 927
establishments among firms that are Major Publicly Owned Utilities.
Similarly, there are no Census or EIA data on employees in Major
Publicly Owned Utilities.\488\ Applying the ratio of power workers to
utilities in CONSAD's report [5], OSHA estimated employment in Major
Publicly Owned Utilities (NAICS 2211) by taking the EIA Form-861 [50]
establishment data and extrapolating from those data an estimate of
8,582 employees at Major Publicly Owned Utilities affected by the final
rule.\489\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\488\ The category "Major Publicly Owned Utilities" does not
have its own NAICS code. In this analysis, OSHA used the NAICS code
2211, which encompasses both privately and publicly owned utilities,
to refer to "Major Publicly Owned Utilities" only, as OSHA found
it necessary to account for the costs to Major Publicly Owned
Utilities separately from the costs to private utilities. Similarly,
OSHA used NAICS 221110 and NAICS 221120 to refer to privately owned
utilities only, even though those NAICS codes include privately and
publicly owned utilities.
\489\ The rule will affect Major Publicly Owned Utilities that
operate in OSHA State-plan States. (State-plan States cover about
half of total U.S. employment. They operate their own OSHA-approved
occupational safety and health programs and must, under formal
agreements with OSHA, impose OSHA-equivalent State regulatory
requirements on public employers operating major publicly owned
utilities within their jurisdictions.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA used several data sources to estimate the number of line-
clearance tree trimmers (SOC 37-3013) affected by the rule within
Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) (now included in NAICS
561730, Landscaping Services). To estimate the number of establishments
performing line-clearance tree-trimming operations in NAICS 561730,
Landscaping Services, OSHA used 2007 BLS Occupational Employment
Statistics data [34] combined with establishment data from the 2007 BLS
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages [35]. These data suggest that
there are 4,803 establishments in NAICS 561730 Landscaping Services
that employ tree trimmers and pruners (SOC 37-3013). Based on
statistics on the distribution of establishments by employment size for
NAICS 561730 reported in the 2007 U.S. Census' Statistics of U.S.
Businesses, OSHA estimated that 4,479 of these establishments have
fewer than 20 employees or fewer and that 324 of these establishments
have 20 employees or more [43].\490\ In the analysis prepared for the
proposed rule, CONSAD used data from the National Arborist Association
\491\ to estimate the number of establishments in SIC 0783 involved in
line-clearance tree-trimming operations, with approximately 90 percent
of large establishments (291 establishments) and 2 percent of small
establishments (90 establishments) performing line-clearance tree-
trimming operations. OSHA applies these same percentages of affected
large and small establishments to the BLS data, which suggests that
there are 381 affected establishments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\490\ BLS Occupational Employment Statistics data [34] indicated
that 5 percent of establishments in NAICS 561730 employ Tree
Trimmers, and BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages [35] data
indicated that there were 96,605 establishments in NAICS 561730,
suggesting that 4,803 establishments in NAICS 561730 employ tree
trimmers. The portion of establishments with fewer than 20 employees
was estimated based on the distribution of establishment sizes in
NAICS 561730 as a whole, as reported in the 2007 U.S. Census's
Statistics of U.S. Businesses [43].
\491\ The National Arborist Association subsequently changed its
name to the National Tree Care Industry Association.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Census data [43] suggest that total employment in Landscaping
Services (NAICS 561730) is 572,520, with 260,815 of these employees (46
percent) \492\ working at establishments that employ fewer than 20
employees and 311,705 (54 percent) working at establishments that
employ 20 employees or more. To estimate the proportion of employees in
NAICS 561730 potentially affected by the proposed rule, OSHA used BLS
data [38] suggesting that there are a total of 32,600 tree trimmers and
pruners (SOC 37-3013) working in Landscaping Services (NAICS 561730).
OSHA extrapolated the percentage of employees working at small and
large establishments in all establishments in NAICS 561730 to
establishments that employ tree trimmers and pruners, suggesting that
there are 14,851 (46 percent of 32,600) employees at small
establishments and 17,749 (54 percent of 32,600) at large
establishments potentially affected by the final rule. OSHA then used
CONSAD's determination of the proportion of these workers who are doing
line-clearance tree-trimming work, suggesting that 5 percent of workers
at small establishments (768 workers) and 81 percent of workers at
large establishments (14,318 workers) perform line-clearance tree-
trimming operations, for a total of 15,086 employees doing line-
clearance tree-trimming work covered by the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\492\ In this paragraph, as elsewhere in this section of the
preamble, OSHA is presenting ratios in a concise, but rounded,
format. For instance, the 46 percent cited is more precise in
CONSAD's analysis, in this case 45.5556138 percent. This latter
ratio is the precise ratio of numbers in the CONSAD analysis. OSHA
used the more precise numbers in the calculations presented in this
FEA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 19 presents data on the numbers of affected establishments
and employees for each affected industry. Across all industries, an
estimated 24,407 establishments and 211,452 employees will be affected
by the final rule.
Table 19--Profile of Affected Establishments and Employees
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Affected Affected Affected
Industry code Industry name firms establishments employees
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910..................... Water, Sewer, and Pipeline 106 1,021 1,262
Construction.
NAICS 234920..................... Power and Communication 2,870 3,412 34,740
Transmission Line Construction.
NAICS 234930..................... Industrial Nonbuilding Structure 158 321 1,846
Construction.
NAICS 234990..................... All Other Heavy Construction....... 28 791 7,395
NAICS 235310..................... Electrical Contractors............. 51 1,945 21,686
NAICS 235910..................... Structural Steel Erection 120 786 398
Contractors.
NAICS 235950..................... Building Equipment and Other 202 1,148 373
Machine Installation Contractors.
NAICS 235990..................... All Other Special Trade Contractors 313 3,150 974
NAICS 221110..................... Electric Power Generation.......... 626 2,171 37,560
NAICS 221120..................... Electric Power Transmission, 1,232 7,440 64,179
Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211....................... Major Publicly Owned Utilities..... 277 927 8,582
Various.......................... Industrial Power Generators........ 197 913 17,372
SIC 0783......................... Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services. 309 381 15,086
-----------------------------------------
Total........................ ................................... 6,488 24,407 211,452
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
Sources: CONSAD [5], EIA [49, 50], U.S. Census [43].
As shown in Table 19, the construction industries with the largest
numbers of affected employees are the Power and Communication
Transmission Line Construction and Electrical Contractors industries,
which together account for 56,426 employees of the affected workforce.
Other affected construction industries include All Other Heavy
Construction, Building Equipment and Other Machine Installation
Contractors, Industrial Nonbuilding Structure Construction, Structural
Steel Erection Contractors, Water, Sewer, and Pipeline Construction,
and All Other Special Trade Contractors.
Table 19 also shows that establishments classified as utilities
(namely establishments in the Electric Power Generation industry (NAICS
221110) and the Electric Power Transmission, Control, and Distribution
industry (NAICS 221120)) account for 9,611 of the potentially affected
establishments and for 101,739 of the potentially affected employees.
One commenter questioned whether OSHA distinguished between electric
power generation and electric power transmission and distribution (Ex.
0227). OSHA included establishments classified in the Electric Power
Generation industry (NAICS 221110) and in the Electric Power
Transmission, Control, and Distribution industry (NAICS 221120), and
the Agency distinguished between them in the industrial profile and in
the costs and economic analysis.
Table 19 also shows OSHA's estimates of two special categories of
electric generators not covered in the data sources used for Census on
electric utilities: Major Publicly Owned Utilities and Industrial Power
Generators. Table 19 shows that that there are 927 establishments with
8,582 employees for Major Publicly Owned Utilities. Firms in the
Industrial Power Generator category include manufacturing and other
industries that own or operate their own electric power generation,
transmission, or distribution systems as a secondary part of their
business operations. These firms account for 913 establishments and
17,372 employees. Based on their primary business activity, OSHA
classified these establishments in the following industry sectors: Oil
and Gas Extraction; Mining; Water, Sewer, and Other Systems; Food
Manufacturing; Wood Product Manufacturing; Paper Manufacturing;
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing; Chemical Manufacturing;
Primary Metal Manufacturing; Wholesale Trade, Durable Goods;
Educational Services; and Hospitals.
Finally, Table 19 presents figures for the numbers of affected
establishments and employees in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services
industry. As noted previously, OSHA estimates that the final rule
potentially affects 381 establishments and 15,086 employees in this
industry. (Note that Table 19 does not present Census data for all
employees and establishments in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services
industry, but rather only employees and establishments estimated to
perform line-clearance tree-trimming operations. For more detail, see
the explanation of OSHA's estimates of employees and establishments in
that industry earlier in this section of the preamble.)
E. Benefits, Net Benefits, and Cost Effectiveness
OSHA expects the final rule addressing electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work to result in an increased degree of
safety for affected employees and to reduce the numbers of accidents,
fatalities, and injuries associated with the relevant tasks. The
accidents, fatalities, and injuries that the final rule will prevent
include falls, some burns, and many electric-shock incidents. OSHA also
expects the final rule to reduce the severity of certain injuries that
the final rule will not prevent, but that could still occur during the
performance of some of the affected work procedures. These injuries
include, among others, injuries that could occur as a result of an
arrested fall and some burns (for example, burns that result from
employee exposure to incident energy from an electric arc greater than
the employer's estimate).
To develop estimates of the benefits associated with the proposed
rule, CONSAD researched and reviewed potential sources of useful data.
CONSAD, in consultation with the Agency, determined that the most
reliable data sources for this purpose were reports from OSHA fatality-
catastrophe accident inspections contained in OSHA's IMIS, and the
Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) developed by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
From the IMIS and CFOI data, CONSAD identified and analyzed
injuries and fatalities for the proposed rule. CONSAD based this
analysis on over 9 years of data contained in these databases. CONSAD
identified relevant cases in the databases by determining the criteria
provided in the databases that would apply to such cases, such as the
type of the injury, the occupation of the employee, the source of the
injury, and the industry classification of the employer. CONSAD then
reviewed individual accident abstracts to make a final determination
whether to include the accident as one addressed by the proposed rule.
The final report CONSAD submitted to OSHA includes a complete
description of the methodological approach CONSAD used for analyzing
the data [5].
CONSAD's analysis found that, on average, the IMIS and CFOI
databases recorded 74 fatalities and 25 injuries annually involving
circumstances directly addressed by the existing or proposed standards
[5]. These figures likely represent underestimates of the injuries
addressed by this rulemaking since the figures are cases documented by
IMIS and CFOI only. As explained later under this heading of the FEA,
OSHA adjusted the approach used in CONSAD's analysis to reflect a more
accurate estimate of the number of total injuries affected by this
rulemaking.\493\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\493\ The number of fatalities addressed by this rulemaking also
may be somewhat higher, but OSHA does not currently have a basis for
estimating possible fatalities not included in the relevant data
sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The number of injuries addressed by this rulemaking is almost
certainly much greater than the number included
in CONSAD's analysis. Generally, the IMIS database includes injuries
only when the incident in question involves at least one fatality or
three or more hospitalizations. However, some individual States having
OSHA-approved safety and health plans (for example, California) have
more stringent reporting requirements than Federal OSHA, thereby
assuring that the IMIS database included at least some single-injury
cases (76 FR 36419). For this reason, CONSAD performed an analysis of
the IMIS fatality and injury data from California, which requires
employers to report all injuries involving hospitalization [6]. This
analysis, which includes only injuries that involve hospitalization,
found that the ratio of injuries to fatalities was over six to
one.\494\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\494\ OSHA relied on the IMIS data for California, and not the
IMIS data for any other State, because, for the period covered by
the IMIS data on which OSHA based its benefits determination, those
data included reasonably complete hospitalization information only
from California.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Applying this ratio to the number of known fatalities addressed by
this rulemaking, OSHA estimated that 444 relevant serious injuries
occur annually. Note that even this figure is probably low given that
the applied ratio, which OSHA based on California data, did not account
for injuries that did not involve hospitalization of a worker. Thus,
OSHA estimates that 74 fatalities and 444 serious injuries occur
annually among employees involved in electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution work addressed by the provisions of this
rulemaking.
To determine whether there were any significant declines in
fatalities since the time period of the CONSAD analysis, OSHA examined
available BLS CFOI data for the years 1992 to 2011 involving the
electric power, transmission, and distribution industry, which includes
all private-sector electric utilities. OSHA found that the number of
fatalities per year on average was 10 percent lower than for the time
period covered by the original CONSAD analysis. Most of the difference
between the two time periods was due to a single anomalous year (2009)
that had 55 percent fewer fatalities than any other year on record [8].
Based on these data, OSHA believes its earlier estimate of the numbers
of fatalities and injuries associated with work addressed by this
rulemaking continues to be accurate for purposes of estimating the
magnitude of benefits expected as a result of the final rule.\495\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\495\ The Agency also emphasizes that, except for firms coming
into compliance with provisions of the final standard in advance of
its promulgation, the passage of time should not affect
significantly the relevant pattern of fatalities and injuries
underlying the data. To the extent that higher rates of
prepromulgation compliance than estimated in the FEA occurred, the
expected benefits of the standard may be lower, but so would the
costs of compliance and economic impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To determine how many of the 74 fatalities and 444 serious injuries
the final rule would prevent, OSHA relied on CONSAD's probability
estimates, based on expert judgment, that the existing rule or the
proposed rule would prevent a given accident and the new rule would
prevent that same accident. CONSAD estimated the probability of
prevention on a case-by-case basis, and, therefore, did not find that
the final rule would prevent all 74 fatalities and 444 serious
injuries. To the contrary, CONSAD's estimate of the probability of
prevention for individual accidents ranged from 5 percent to 95 percent
[5]. Based on its review of CONSAD's analysis, OSHA estimates that full
compliance with the existing standards would prevent 52.9 percent of
the relevant injuries and fatalities. In comparison, full compliance
with the final rule is estimated to prevent 79 percent of the relevant
injuries and fatalities. Thus, the increase in safety provided by the
final rule would prevent an additional 19.75 fatalities and 118.5
serious injuries annually. Applying an average monetary value of
$62,000 per prevented injury and a value of $8.7 million per prevented
fatality (as explained later under the "Benefits" heading of the
FEA), OSHA estimates a monetized benefit of $179.2 million per year.
A number of commenters addressed these estimates. For example, EEI
submitted a posthearing brief suggesting that the IMIS descriptions on
which OSHA relied were not sufficiently reliable or detailed (Ex.
0501). EEI suggested as an alternative using the citations and
investigative files generated by compliance officers in OSHA's field
offices.
As EEI notes, reports generated by compliance officers serve as the
basis of the IMIS data. Other advantages of the IMIS data are that OSHA
reviews the data to ensure employee privacy, and the data are readily
available to the public. As stated earlier, OSHA also accounted for
uncertainties in the IMIS data by estimating the probability of
prevention for each accident and did not assume that the existing or
final rule was certain to prevent any accident. While the IMIS reports
may be incomplete in that OSHA compliance officers investigate only
accidents resulting in fatalities or multiple hospitalizations, OSHA
believes IMIS reports are one of the best available sources for
assessing the types and causes of serious accidents. OSHA used IMIS
data for benefit assessments in a number of previous economic analyses,
including the original benefits analysis for the existing general
industry standard for Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and
Distribution (Sec. 1910.269), which OSHA promulgated in 1994.\496\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\496\ To further support its argument that reliance on the IMIS
data was improper, EEI questioned whether CONSAD "appreciate[d] and
consider[ed] the distinction between the power generation, and power
transmission and distribution, industries" (Ex. 0227). Thus, EEI
criticized CONSAD's "review [of] the IMIS accident database for the
time period January 1994 through April 2000, to ascertain the extent
to which these power generation, transmission, and distribution
accidents would have been preventable under the existing power
generation, transmission, and distribution standards, and if the
proposed revisions to these standards were implemented" (id.,
internal citation omitted). EEI's assertion is baseless. In the
final rule, OSHA properly relied on the IMIS data, which reveals
that the injuries and fatalities suffered by workers performing
power generation, transmission, and distribution work result from
electric shocks, burns from electric arcs, and falls, as well as
other types of harmful accidents, including accidents involving
employees struck by, struck against, and caught between objects.
OSHA also properly relied on the IMIS data to form its conclusion
regarding the net benefits of complying with the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EEI also suggested that OSHA should separately determine benefits
for each individual hazard affected by this rulemaking (Ex. 0227).
In response, OSHA added for this FEA some analysis of the benefits
associated with reducing burn injuries under the final rule (see the
discussion under this heading of the FEA). However, OSHA did not rely
on a further hazard-by-hazard analysis in computing benefits for its
main analysis. Fundamentally, most of the fatalities and injuries
prevented by the final rule relate to the single hazard of electric
shock, and the final rule uses a variety of provisions, some redundant,
to prevent those fatalities and injuries. Redundancy is a fundamental
principle of safety systems--safety professionals do not rely on a
single mechanism to prevent fatalities, but instead use more than one
method to assure that the failure of a single mechanism does not lead
to harm. As a result, OSHA cannot separately estimate the number of
injuries or fatalities prevented by each of the specific provisions
that, taken together, address the same basic hazard. A hypothetical
example may clarify this point. Suppose we know with certainty that the
addition of a training provision alone will reduce fatalities by 20
percent. Suppose that we also know that the addition of a host-
contractor provision alone will reduce fatalities by
20 percent. It is perfectly possible that the addition of both
provisions will reduce fatalities by 30 percent (rather than 40
percent) because host-contractor communications, in part, reduce the
need for training and, likewise, training somewhat reduces the need for
host-contractor communications. However, in this situation, there is no
correct answer as to the extent to which each provision independently
reduces fatalities because the two provisions are partially redundant
and overlapping. In any event, this kind of hypothetical knowledge
about the separate effects of each provision in a rule is rarely, if
ever, available. In light of these limitations, OSHA typically
estimates the joint effects of all of the provisions (that is, the
benefits of the final rule in its entirety). See Section II.D,
Significant Risk and Reduction in Risk, earlier in this preamble, for
additional discussion.
Despite these impediments to a provision-by-provision benefits
analysis, in an effort to ensure the transparency of its analysis, OSHA
reviewed and reanalyzed each IMIS accident from 1995 and later from the
CONSAD report [5] and, based on those results, provided a supplemental
"Break-Even Sensitivity Analysis, Including Provision-by-Provision
Analysis of Benefits," in an appendix under this heading of the FEA.
OSHA undertook this additional analysis for two reasons: (1) It adds a
provision-by-provision analysis to the calculation of the rule's
aggregate probability of accident prevention, enabling OSHA to tie
analysis of the accidents more closely to individual provisions or
groups of provisions; and (2) it enables OSHA to calculate the
percentages of accidents that need to be prevented to assure that a
given provision, or combination of provisions, will pay for itself, or
themselves, and to then discuss the likelihood of achieving that level
of prevention.
OSHA presents the results of the supplemental analysis in detail in
the appendix. In short, the break-even level of accident prevention
needed for the benefits to exceed costs for various provisions ranged
between 0.8 percent for minimum approach distances and 18.5 percent for
arc-flash protection. With an accounting for joint prevention by
multiple provisions, the break-even analysis results ranged between 2.3
percent for aerial lift fall protection and 23.8 percent for arc-flash
protection. OSHA concludes in the appendix that the benefits of this
rule's provisions will exceed these break-even levels. For instance, if
there is full compliance with the combination of provisions intended to
protect against arc-flash related accidents, then there should be no
fatalities and very few or no serious injuries involving arc flash.
However, OSHA did not rely on the supplemental analysis to meet any
OSH Act legal test for the final rule or to determine costs and
benefits of the final rule. As discussed in Section IV, Legal
Authority, earlier in this preamble, OSHA must demonstrate that a
safety or health standard substantially reduces a significant risk of
material harm in the workplace (see Lockout/Tagout II, 37 F.3d 665,
668-69 (D.C. Cir. 1994)), and the supplemental analysis cannot serve
this purpose. As explained earlier in this preamble (Section II.D,
Significant Risk and Reduction in Risk), OSHA concluded that the final
rule will substantially reduce significant risk based on the 19.75
fatalities and 118.5 serious injuries that this FEA demonstrates the
final rule will prevent each year, a conclusion OSHA cannot draw from
the supplemental analysis. Accordingly, the supplemental analysis
focuses on the percentage of potential benefits individual provisions
must achieve for the benefits of those provisions to break even with
the costs of those provisions.
EEI also asserted that an individual accident case CONSAD reviewed
did not clearly establish the benefits of the final standard (Exs.
0227, 0501). EEI maintained that CONSAD's judgment in the review of
this case was unreliable (id.).
Reviewing cases will inevitably involve professional judgment based
on limited information, with the results described reasonably only in
probabilistic terms. The Agency stands by that professional judgment
with respect to this accident. Moreover, EEI's narrow focus on an
individual accident is misplaced. OSHA's professional judgment, as a
whole, provides a substantial body of evidence to support the standard.
The Agency's analysis recognizes that full compliance with the existing
standard would prevent a number of fatalities and injuries.
Nonetheless, the Agency believes that a close reading of the accident
abstracts, as embodied in its final analysis, indicates that the final
standard will prevent about half of the remaining cases. Therefore, the
Agency believes its approach represents the use of the best available
techniques applied to the best available data. (See Tr. 83-84.)
OSHA also believes, based on its supplemental analysis of benefits
(see the appendix under this heading of the FEA), that its main
analysis represents a low estimate of benefits. In this regard, the
supplemental analysis found that fatalities and serious injuries from
climbing-fall-protection, minimum approach-distance, and arc-flash-
related accidents are virtually impossible if there is full compliance
with the final rule, and that, if there is full compliance, the final
rule will prevent 40.8 of the 74 annual fatalities, and 245.1 of the
444 annual serious injuries, addressed by the final rule (see Table 7
in supplemental analysis). As such, OSHA interprets the supplemental
analysis as indicating that OSHA's estimate is conservative, based on
the CONSAD analysis, that this final rule will prevent 19.75 of the 74
annual fatalities, and 118.5 of the 444 annual serious injuries,
addressed by the final rule.
One commenter stated that, in the proposal, OSHA relied on data
from 1991 to 1998, and that this data was inadequate to show the
benefits associated with the promulgation of Sec. 1910.269 in 1994
(Ex. 0180).
The premise of the comment is incorrect. The underlying CONSAD
analysis of data covers the period from 1984 to 2001, and, therefore,
provides nearly 7 years of post-1994 experience (not 3 years, as
asserted by the commenter).
One commenter, Frank Brockman of the Farmers Rural Electric
Cooperative Corporation, asserted that, from experience, only a small
number of fatalities arose from situations that did not represent
violations of existing rules (Ex. 0173).
In response to Mr. Brockman's comments, OSHA first notes that its
analysis draws from a nationwide pool of data that will likely exceed
any individual's personal experience. Second, although most of the
existing cases are preventable by full compliance with existing
standards, as explained more fully in the supplemental analysis, there
remain a number of accidents unaffected by existing standards that the
final rule will affect; and, even though full compliance with existing
standards might prevent an accident, new requirements in the final
rule, like the information-transfer and job-briefing provisions, will
make it easier to assure full compliance with existing standards.
Another commenter suggested that OSHA's estimate in the PRIA was
likely an overestimate of the benefits because the Agency assumes full
compliance:
The estimated prevention of 19 fatalities and 116 injuries is a
likely overstatement of benefits of this rulemaking because it based
on an estimate of full compliance with the new regulation. 70 Fed.
Reg. 34894. Clearly from the description provided of the actual
record of fatalities and injuries, failure of compliance with the
current rule is the primary reason lives were endangered. A
more candid analysis would estimate the compliance rate as a part of
the calculation, which is likely 50 percent to 95 percent if OSHA's
analysis of training compliance was used. [Ex. 0240]
In response to this comment OSHA concludes, based on its analysis,
that compliance with the final standard, as a whole, will reduce
fatalities and injuries to a greater extent than compliance with the
existing standard, as a whole. Moreover, when performing an analysis of
the economic feasibility of a standard, it is necessary to assume full
compliance with the standard. Otherwise, the Agency could always find a
standard economically feasible by assuming that employers for whom it
was not feasible would not comply with the standard.
To estimate the monetary value of preventing a fatality, OSHA
followed the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) recommendation
(OMB Circular A-4, [30]) to rely on estimates developed using a
methodology based on the willingness of affected individuals to pay to
avoid a marginal increase in the risk of a fatality.
To develop an estimate using the willingness-to-pay approach, OSHA
relied on existing studies of the imputed value of fatalities avoided
based on the theory of compensating wage differentials in the labor
market. These studies rely on certain critical assumptions for their
accuracy, particularly that workers understand the risks to which they
are exposed, and that workers have legitimate choices between high-risk
and low-risk jobs. These assumptions are rarely accurate in actual
labor markets. A number of academic studies, summarized in Viscusi and
Aldy [53], show a correlation between job risk and wages, suggesting
that employees demand monetary compensation in return for a greater
risk of injury or fatality. The estimated tradeoff between lower wages
and marginal reductions in fatal occupational risk--that is, workers'
willingness to pay for marginal reductions in such risk--yields an
imputed value of an avoided fatality: the willingness-to-pay amount for
a reduction in risk divided by the reduction in risk. OSHA used this
approach in many recent proposed and final rules. (See, for example, 69
FR 59306 (Oct. 4, 2004) and 71 FR 10100 (Feb. 28, 2006), the preambles
for the proposed and final Hexavalent Chromium rules.) \497\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\497\ The Agency used the willingness-to-pay approach in the
PRIA for this rule as well. In estimating the value of preventing a
fatality in the PRIA, OSHA relied on an estimate by EPA, which made
an earlier attempt to summarize the willingness-to-pay literature
(70 FR 34901). For the FEA, the Agency went directly to the
underlying literature, a recent summary by Viscusi and Aldy [53], to
update its valuation. The estimate in the PRIA equaled $6.8 million
per fatality prevented in 2003 dollars; this amount would, in turn,
equal $7.9 million in 2009 dollars. The difference between the
underlying valuation used in the PRIA and the underlying valuation
used in this FEA is not significant for the purposes of OSHA's
analysis of the final rule. In the PRIA, OSHA used Viscusi and Aldy
[53] for valuing injuries, but not for valuing fatalities. For this
FEA, OSHA used recent Viscusi and Aldy [53] for valuing both
injuries and fatalities because Viscusi and Aldy is more recent than
the EPA estimated used in the PRIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA reviewed the available research literature on willingness to
pay. Viscusi and Aldy conducted a metaanalysis of studies in the
economics literature that used a willingness-to-pay methodology to
estimate the imputed value of life-saving programs, and concluded that
each fatality avoided should have a value of approximately $7 million
in 2000 dollars [53]. Using the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis' Gross
Domestic Product Deflator [31], this $7 million base number in 2000
dollars yields an estimate of $8.7 million in 2009 dollars for each
fatality avoided. This Value of a Statistical Life estimate also is
within the range of the substantial majority of such estimates in the
literature ($1 million to $10 million per statistical life, as
discussed in OMB Circular A-4 [30]).
Workers also place an implicit value on nonfatal occupational
injuries or illnesses avoided. This value reflects a worker's
willingness to pay to avoid monetary costs (for medical expenses and
lost wages) and quality-of-life losses. Viscusi and Aldy found that
most studies had estimates in the range of $20,000 to $70,000 per
injury, and several studies had even higher values [53]. The measure of
nonfatal job risks used partly explains the range of values: some
studies use an overall injury rate, and other studies use only injuries
resulting in lost workdays. The injuries prevented by this final rule
generally will be hospitalized injuries, which are likely to be more
severe, on average, than other lost-workday injuries. In addition, this
final rule will reduce the incidence of burn injuries, which tend to be
severe injuries, involving more pain and suffering, more expensive
treatments, and generally longer recovery periods than other lost-
workday injuries. Thus, for this rulemaking, OSHA believes it is
reasonable to select an estimated value of a statistical injury in the
upper part of the reported range of estimates. OSHA, accordingly, uses
a base number of $50,000 in 2000 dollars. Updating this estimate using
the Gross Domestic Product deflator [31], OSHA estimates a value of
$62,000 per prevented injury.
Frank Brockman of the Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative
Corporation commented that OSHA has "vastly overestimated" the
valuation of fatalities, citing the National Safety Council's (NSC)
valuation of $1 million per fatality [26], which he claimed was a more
"realistic" estimate of the "cost" of a fatality (Ex. 0173). The
commenter did, however, suggest a substantially larger estimate of the
cost of injury, $250,000, as perhaps being more typical of the electric
power industry.
The Agency notes that the concept of valuation of benefits in
question is fundamentally different than a simple loss of wages and
medical costs, or what is sometimes referred to as the "direct cost"
approach. As stated on the NSC Web site after introducing their $1
million (updated to $1.29 million for 2009 dollars) figure:
[This estimate] should not be used, however, in computing the
dollar value of future benefits due to traffic safety measures
because they do not include the value of a person's natural desire
to live longer or to protect the quality of one's life. That is, the
economic loss estimates do not include what people are willing to
pay for improved safety. Work has been done to create the necessary
theoretical groundwork and empirical valuation of injury costs under
the "willingness to pay" or comprehensive cost concept. [26]
The NSC's statement validates the Agency's decision to use the
willingness-to-pay approach in valuing benefits.
Finally, OSHA notes that although the Agency lacks a complete body
of data specific to the electric power industry that reflects the
economic loss involved in the types of injuries these workers will
frequently encounter, its estimate of the value of preventing an injury
may well be understated. As Dr. Mary Capelli-Schellpfeffer testified at
the hearings:
Then this figure, Figure 4, takes us to an illustration of a
real patient case, where the worker was in a 600 volt scenario, in a
power generation facility, and this is the human consequence--not
the staged consequence, but the human consequence--of being in an
electric shock and electric arc event, where the injuries are
severe.
* * * * *
So in Figure 4 the extent of the injury that can follow an arc
exposure is readily appreciated. Eyes, ears, faces, skin, limbs, and
organs are affected. Basic bodily function, including the ability to
breathe, eat, urinate, and sleep are completely changed.
For this patient initial medical treatment costs more than
$650,000 including five surgeries; $250,000 for reconstructive
surgeries as an outpatient; and subsequent
admissions and $250,000 for five years of rehabilitation, including
over 100 physician visits and numerous therapy sessions.
These costs represent only direct medical expenditures, without
inclusion of indirect employer and family costs. [Tr. 185-186 \498\]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\498\ OSHA concludes that it conservatively underestimated
benefits using its willingness-to-pay valuation of $62,000 per
injury. First, a study of burn injuries (Ex. 0424) indicated that,
between 1991 and 1993, the average medical cost for burns was
$39,533. Adjusting for inflation (to 2009 dollars) using the Medical
Services Consumer Price Index raises this cost to $76,694. Second,
OSHA calculated an alternative willingness-to-pay valuation using a
sensitivity analysis that assumed that 25 percent of burn injuries
were sufficiently severe as to equal 58.3 percent of a statistical
value of a life for a severe nonfatal medical event [22]. If OSHA
used this alternative formulation, the total benefits of the rule
would increase from $179 million to $328 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA estimates the net monetized benefits of the final rule at
$129.7 million annually ($179.2 million in benefits minus $49.5 million
in costs). These net benefits exclude any unquantified benefits
associated with revising existing standards to provide updated, clear,
and consistent regulatory requirements. Given that monetized benefits
are nearly four times larger than the estimated costs of the standard,
the total estimated benefits of the standard could be approximately
four times smaller than OSHA's estimate, and the rule would still
retain positive net monetized benefits. Thus, benefits would exceed
costs even if the new rule prevented no more than 5.5 fatalities and
29.6 serious injuries per year. This number is significantly less than
the 19.75 fatalities and 118.5 serious injuries that OSHA estimates the
final rule will prevent. Further, as explained earlier, the
supplemental analysis suggests that there are far more than 19.75
fatalities and 118.5 serious injuries that this final rule will
prevent. Finally, for reasons discussed in the supplemental analysis,
full compliance with the existing rule will not prevent certain
accidents the final rule will prevent, and although compliance with the
existing rule might prevent some accidents, full compliance with the
final rule will make it more likely that employers will comply with the
existing rule. As a result, OSHA is confident that benefits of the
final rule exceed the costs.
Table 20 and Table 21 provide an overview of the estimated benefits
associated with this final rule. Table 22 shows costs and benefits of
the final rule, in 2009 dollars, for the first 10 years after the rule
becomes effective.
Table 20--Net Benefits and Cost Effectiveness
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized costs: 7 Percent 3 Percent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calculating Incident Energy $2.2 million...... $1.8 million.
and Arc-Hazard Assessment
(Arc-Hazard Assessment).
Provision of Arc-Flash 17.3 million...... 15.7 million.
Protective Equipment.
Fall Protection............. 0.6 million....... 0.4 million.
Host-Contractor 17.8 million...... 17.8 million.
Communications.
Expanded Job Briefings...... 6.7 million....... 6.7 million.
Additional Training......... 3.0 million....... 2.7 million.
Other Costs for Employees 0.2 million....... 0.2 million.
not Already Covered by Sec.
1910.269.
MAD Costs................... 1.8 million....... 1.8 million.
---------------------------------------
Total Annual Costs...... 49.5 million...... 47.1 million.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual Benefits:
Number of Injuries Prevented 118.5............. 118.5.
Number of Fatalities 19.75............. 19.75.
Prevented.
Monetized Benefits (Assuming 179.2 million..... 179.2 million.
$62,000 per Injury and $8.7
Million per Fatality
Prevented.
OSHA Standards that Are Unquantified...... Unquantified.
Updated and Consistent.
Total Annual Benefits... 118.5 injuries and 118.5 injuries and
19.75 fatalities 19.75 fatalities
prevented. prevented.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Net Benefits (Benefits 129.7 million..... 132.0 million.
minus Costs):.
Compliance with
the final rule
will result in
the prevention of
one fatality and
6 injuries per
$2.5 million in
costs, or,
alternatively,
$3.62 of benefits
per dollar of
costs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
Sources: Provided in text.
Table 21--Overview of Annual Benefits
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Injuries Fatalities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Addressed by the Final 444................ 74.
Rule.
Preventable through Full 235................ 39.
Compliance with Existing
Standards (52.9 percent).
Additional Preventable with 118.5.............. 19.75.
Full Compliance with Final
Rule (26.1 percent).
Monetized Benefits (Assuming $7.3 million....... $171.8 million.
$62,000 per Injury and $8.7
million per Fatality
Prevented).
-----------------------------------------
Total Monetized Benefits.. $179.2 million.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to
rounding.
(2) Additional benefits associated with this rulemaking involve
providing OSHA standards that are updated, clear, and consistent.
Source: CONSAD [5].
Table 22--Costs and Benefits Over Time
[Millions of 2009$]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Costs*........................................ $107.9 $20.3 $22.6 $20.3 $75.5 $22.6 $22.6 $20.3 $75.5 $20.3
Monetized Benefits[dagger].......................... 179.2 179.2 179.2 179.2 179.2 179.2 179.2 179.2 179.2 179.2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Costs after the first year will vary as a result of the estimated cycle of protective equipment replacement:
2 years for faceshields and balaclavas, 4 years for flame resistant apparel, and 5 years for body harnesses
and positioning straps.
[dagger] Assuming $62,000 per injury and $8.7 million per fatality prevented.
Additional benefits associated with this rule involve providing
updated, clear, and consistent safety standards regarding electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution work to relevant
employers, employees, and interested members of the public. The
existing OSHA standards for the construction of electric power
transmission and distribution systems (Subpart V) are over 30 years old
and inconsistent with the more recently promulgated standard addressing
repair and maintenance work in Sec. 1910.269. OSHA believes that the
updated standards are easier to understand and to apply than the
existing standards and will improve employee safety by facilitating
compliance.
As explained earlier, inconsistencies between Subpart V and Sec.
1910.269 can create numerous difficulties for employers and employees.
The benefits associated with providing updated, clear, and consistent
safety standards are likely substantial, but OSHA did not monetize or
quantify them.
The Small Business Advocacy Review Panel (which OSHA convened for
this rulemaking in accordance with the provisions of the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), as
codified at 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) (Ex. 0019 [29]) and others (see, for
example, Ex. 0227) expressed concern about the balance of risk and
costs in employing protective equipment to prevent arc-related burns.
In response to this concern, the Agency performed an analysis of
burn injuries in the electric power and distribution industry to
specifically estimate the effect of the final rule on preventing burns
from electric arcs or on reducing the severity of any arc-related
injuries sustained by workers. To assess the effectiveness of the final
rule in preventing fatalities associated with burns from exposure to
electric arc-related accidents, OSHA reviewed IMIS accident reports
already in the record for the period January 1991 through December 1998
(Ex. 0004).\499\ OSHA identified 99 accidents that involved burns from
arcs from energized equipment faults or failures, resulting in 21
fatalities and 94 hospitalized injuries [8]. Based on this data, OSHA
estimates that an average of at least 8 burn accidents occur each year
involving employees doing work covered by this final rule, leading to
12 nonfatal injuries and 2 fatalities per year (id.). Of the reports
indicating the extent of the burn injury, 75 percent reported third-
degree burns (id.). Proper protective equipment and clothing would
reduce the number of fatalities and the severity of these injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\499\ As previously indicated, the Agency reviewed more recent
BLS CFOI data to verify the continued relevance of the IMIS data on
which OSHA relied in the proposed and final rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on the description of the accidents contained in the IMIS
reports, OSHA determined that the IMIS reports indicate that compliance
with the final rule would prevent 11 of the 21 fatalities either by
averting the injury altogether (2 cases) or by reducing the severity of
nonfatal injuries (9 cases). The IMIS accident reports, therefore,
indicate that the final rule will prevent 1.14 burn-related fatalities
a year.\500\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\500\ OSHA made an error in calculating the number of prevented
fatalities per year. The actual number of fatalities prevented each
year is 1.38, or the number of prevented fatalities (11) divided by
the number of years covered by the data (8). A similar error affects
the estimated number of injuries prevented annually described later
in this section of the FEA. Because the annual estimate of 1.14
prevented fatalities, and the corresponding estimate of prevented
burn injuries, are conservative, OSHA elected to base its benefits,
in part, on those values rather than the actual values.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A comparison of the total number of IMIS fatal accidents covered by
the final rule and the number of comparable fatalities reported in the
BLS CFOI data suggests that IMIS undercounts fatality numbers related
to electric power generation by about 41 percent [5, 8]. Increasing the
number of preventable fatalities by this factor (1.00/(1.00-0.41) =
1.69) results in an estimate of 1.92 burn fatalities per year averted
under the final rule (1.14 IMIS burn fatalities x 1.69) [8]. This
estimate is somewhat higher than the estimate of 1.57 burn fatalities
estimated for the proposal.\501\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\501\ Based on the increase in the estimated number of burn
fatalities prevented, the Agency determined that, on an average
annual basis, the final rule will prevent an additional 0.35 fatal
cases beyond the fatal cases OSHA estimated in the proposal. The
CONSAD analysis previously estimated 19.4 cases prevented annually
[5]. Hence, the Agency's estimate for the final rule is 19.75
fatalities prevented annually. By extension, the Agency estimates
that the final rule will prevent 118.5 injuries annually, or 2.5
more injuries annually than OSHA estimated in the proposal. OSHA
notes, however, that its revised estimate for the final rule does
not account for other types of fatalities and injuries (that is,
electric shock or falls) prevented by the new requirements of the
final rule not contained in the proposal (that is, new minimum
approach-distance and fall protection requirements). For this reason
(as well as for other reasons contained in this FEA), OSHA's
estimate is likely to be conservative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA determined that the final rule would prevent 36.2 percent of
nonfatal burn injuries such as the nonfatal burn injuries identified in
the IMIS data, compared to 17.0 percent prevented under the proposed
rule. OSHA's review of the IMIS data also found that 75 percent of burn
accidents resulted in third-degree burns to one or more of the victims
[8]. The Agency believes that the societal costs, including substantial
treatment costs and significantly reduced quality of life, for severe
burns is closer to the value of a prevented fatality than to the value
generally assigned to prevented injuries (Tr. 185-186).
Requiring the use of body harnesses instead of body belts as fall
arrest equipment for employees working from aerial lifts, in
conjunction with other provisions of the final rule, such as the
information-transfer, job-briefing, and training provisions, would
likely reduce fatalities and injuries among affected workers. There are
several problems with body belts. First, they are more likely than
harnesses to result in serious injury during a fall because body belts
place greater stress on the workers' body. Second, body belts virtually
eliminate the possibility of self rescue after the fall, and increase
the probability of serious internal injuries as the worker hangs
suspended after the arrested fall. Studies performed in Europe and by
the U.S. Air Force indicate high risks associated with the body belt as
used both in fall-arrest and suspension modes. Third, it is difficult
for supervisors to determine visually if workers are using body belts
as fall arrest equipment. By contrast,
supervisors can easily see from a distance whether a worker is wearing
a harness. Finally, there is a greater risk that a worker could slip
out of a body belt than a harness. As a result of these considerations,
many employers already switched to requiring harnesses rather than body
belts. Studies documenting the inappropriateness of, and the safety
risks associated with the use of, body belts as part of a fall arrest
system include Document IDs OSHA-S206-2006-0699-0039, OSHA-S206-2006-
0699-0171, OSHA-S206-2006-0699-0173, OSHA-S206-2006-0699-0174, and
OSHA-S206-2006-0699-0177 in Docket OSHA-S206-2006-0699 \502\ and
Document IDs OSHA-S700A-2006-0723-0044, OSHA-S700A-2006-0723-0065,
OSHA-S700A-2006-0723-0066, OSHA-S700A-2006-0723-0067, and OSHA-S700A-
2006-0723-0068 in Docket OSHA-S700A-2006-0723.\503\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\502\ These documents are legacy exhibits 2-36, 3-7, 3-9, 3-10,
and 3-13 in OSHA Docket S-206 (Fall Protection).
\503\ These documents are legacy exhibits 9-33, 11-3, 11-4, 11-
5, and 11-6 in OSHA Docket S-700A (Powered Platforms).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An average of about 15 fatalities annually involve falls from
aerial lifts; in these cases, the employees typically were not wearing
a belt or a harness. Since most employees wear a belt or a harness
(according to the CONSAD report, the current compliance rate is over 80
percent), there are likely to be at least 60 falls annually in which an
employee uses a belt or harness to arrest a potentially fatal
fall.\504\ Therefore, employees who rely only on a belt to arrest a
potentially fatal fall are still at significant risk of serious injury
or death. The use of a body belt as part of a fall arrest system is
generally inappropriate as OSHA already established with an extensive
record on the subject in the final rule for fall arrest equipment in
construction. (For a complete discussion of this issue, see the Summary
and Explanation section of the preamble to the final OSHA rule on fall
arrest equipment in construction (59 FR 40672, Aug. 9, 1994).)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\504\ OSHA calculated the annual number of nonfatal falls as
follows: X (total number of falls) multiplied by 1/5 (that is, a 20-
percent noncompliance rate) = 15 fatal falls; solving for X (that
is, 5 x 15), the total number of falls is 75, of which 60 (80
percent) are nonfatal and 15 (20 percent) are fatal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix to Section VI.E, Benefits, Net Benefits, and Cost
Effectiveness-- Break-Even Sensitivity Analysis, Including Provision-
by-Provision Analysis
1. Introduction
This supplemental analysis provides additional insight into the
effect of possible uncertainties on the benefits and costs of the
final rule and contains a break-even sensitivity analysis of the
possible benefits and costs of the final rule on a provision-by-
provision basis. As noted earlier in this section of the preamble,
the OSH Act does not require that OSHA standards meet an overall
benefit-cost test or that individual provisions have incremental
benefits that exceed costs. Thus, OSHA is providing this
supplemental analysis purely for the purpose of aiding public
understanding of the benefits and costs of the final rule, and this
analysis is not necessary, or used, to meet the requirements of the
OSH Act with respect to the final rule.
Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in
this preamble, provides a justification for each provision of the
final rule. However, OSHA provides this supplemental analysis to
assess provisions with substantial costs, including two types of
training; information transfer; job briefing; aerial-lift fall
protection; climbing fall protection; minimum approach distance and
working position; and arc-flash protection.\505\ Accordingly, we
will not be analyzing provisions in the final rule contained in
existing Sec. 1910.269.
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\505\ The chief costs that we are not analyzing are training and
other costs for employers not covered by existing Sec. 1910.269.
OSHA covered the justification for those costs in a previous
rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because the final rule contains jointly interacting and
overlapping provisions, there are two logistical issues with
performing a provision-by-provision sensitivity analysis of whether
benefits exceed costs in this case: (1) The available data do not
permit OSHA to determine the numbers of accidents that every
combination of provisions could prevent; and (2) a simple marginal
analysis will not fully address the question of whether benefits
exceed costs for the rule as a whole. It might, for example, take
two or more provisions to prevent a class of accident: A requirement
to do x if y would need, not only a requirement to do x if y, but
also a requirement to train workers to do x, as well as a
requirement to inform workers of when y is the case. In such
circumstances, while each provision alone might pass a marginal
benefit-cost test, all of the provisions together might not pass a
benefit-cost test because the provisions would prevent the same
accidents. The three provisions, each costing $5 million (for a
total cost of $15 million), might prevent only $12 million worth of
accidents because the three provisions would prevent the exact same
accidents. Thus, even if a provision-by-provision sensitivity
analysis were possible for this rule, that analysis would still not
justify the overall combination of provisions. Moreover, for the
purpose of determining whether benefits of a rule exceed the costs,
one cannot simply test each provision individually, but must find
ways to examine situations involving likely joint effects of the
provisions of the rule.
This two-part supplemental analysis addresses both of these
problems and takes the form of a break-even sensitivity analysis
that compares the potential benefits of a given individual provision
against the costs of both that provision and, separately, all
provisions that, when combined, achieve those particular benefits.
Thus, a break-even sensitivity analysis in this case represents an
estimate of the percentage of potentially preventable accidents that
an individual provision, or a combination of provisions, must
prevent for the benefits to equal the costs. Any percentage greater
than this percentage would result in benefits exceeding costs.
OSHA began this analysis by conducting a new analysis of the
existing accident record, rather than trying to build off of the
existing analysis. This supplemental analysis reviewed each accident
and indicated each provision that could have had an effect in
preventing the accident. Unlike the analysis performed by CONSAD for
the proposal, the new approach simply determined that a provision
might have prevented an accident, but did not attempt to assign an
accident-by-accident probability of prevention. OSHA took this new
approach for two reasons: (1) The new approach enabled OSHA to
conduct a more reproducible analysis of the accidents than did the
analysis CONSAD conducted for the proposal because there were no
expert judgments on probability of prevention; and (2) the new
approach enabled OSHA to calculate the percentage of accidents that
a given provision or combination of provisions needs to prevent to
assure that the provision or combination of provisions passes the
aforementioned test for cost-effectiveness, and then discuss the
reasonableness of that percentage.
OSHA used the results of the new analysis of the accident record
in three ways. First, OSHA determined the frequency with which each
single provision would have to prevent potentially preventable
accidents for benefits to exceed costs for that provision. Second,
to further address the issue of joint prevention effects, OSHA
conducted an analysis that: Noted the combinations of provisions
that were necessary to prevent different kinds of accidents;
allocated the costs of each provision according to the percentage of
each type of accident that provision likely would prevent; and
analyzed the break-even conditions needed for the combined costs of
the relevant provisions to be less than, or equal to, the benefits
of the accidents those provisions likely would prevent. Finally,
OSHA used the two sensitivity analyses it conducted (that is, the
analysis showing the break-even point for each single provision and
the alternative analysis showing the break-even point for combined
provisions) to further bolster the conclusion OSHA drew, in its main
analysis, that the benefits of the final rule as a whole exceed the
costs of the final rule as a whole.
2. Accident Analysis
The first step in each of these analyses was to examine accident
records to determine how many fatalities and nonfatal injuries the
relevant provisions of the final rule could potentially prevent. In
its accident analysis for the proposed rule, CONSAD examined
relevant accident data from OSHA's Integrated Management Information
System (IMIS) for the period of January 1, 1994, to March 31, 2000
(Ex. 0031). OSHA reviewed accidents in CONSAD's analysis that
occurred on or after January 1, 1995--a total of 268 accidents.\506\
For each accident, OSHA identified the provisions with costs in the
final rule that could help prevent the accident. Table 23 lists the
general criteria OSHA used to evaluate each accident, and the
discussion that follows explains in greater detail how the Agency
applied these criteria and how complying with the respective
provisions in the final rule would contribute to the prevention of
accidents in each category. The full details of this accident
analysis are in a printout [1] and a spreadsheet [2] showing the
analysis of each accident, including both the original accident
description and any comments on why OSHA classified the accident the
way it did.\507\
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\506\ OSHA began its analysis with the 1995 accidents because
some major provisions of the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 final rule,
including the training requirements, did not go into effect until
1995. The 268 accidents included all accidents of a type that the
proposed rule was trying to prevent. However, as shown in this
analysis, OSHA ultimately determined that not all of those accidents
were potentially preventable by provisions in the final rule.
\507\ For each accident, the printout displays: Information
about the accident, including the accident abstract and information
on the injuries resulting from the accident; inspection information,
including the industry classification for the employer and citations
issued to the employer; and the results of the analysis, including
comments. In some cases, the printout truncated the accident
abstract, citation data, or injury lines because of limitations on
the length of the related field. However, the complete record is
available on OSHA's Web site through the hyperlink for the
inspection record.
The spreadsheet contains the following information about each
accident: The accident form number; a hyperlink to the accident on
OSHA's Web page; the date of the accident; a one-line description of
the accident; the applicable categories of regulatory provisions (a
value of 1 indicates that the category is applicable to the
accident); and the comments from the analysis of the accident. On a
separate worksheet, the spreadsheet calculates the percentage of the
total number of accidents that are potentially preventable by each
category of provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note that the individual accident abstracts do not typically
indicate whether: A host employer provided a contract employer with
available information about the installation involved in the
accident; the employer provided the employee in charge with such
information; or employees received training on the work practices
required by the final rule and involved in the accident. Thus, OSHA
can only state that the accidents were of a kind that information-
transfer, job-briefing, or training would prevent, but not whether
there actually was adequate information transfer, job briefings, or
training. OSHA considers the information-transfer, job-briefing, and
training requirements to be prerequisites for compliance with the
work practices in the final rule. Without sufficient information
about the characteristics and conditions of the work and the
training on work-practices that the final rule requires, employees
are not likely to be capable of safely completing the work or
following those work practices. For example, if employees do not
know the voltage of exposed live parts, they will not be able to
determine the appropriate minimum approach distance or select a safe
work position with respect to those live parts. As noted under the
summary and explanation for final Sec. Sec. 1926.950(c) and
1926.952(a)(1), host employers do not always provide adequate
information to contract employers (see, for example, Tr. 877-878,
1240, 1333), and employers do not always provide adequate
information to employees in charge (see, for example, Ex. 0002
\508\). In addition, as explained in the summary and explanation for
final Sec. 1926.950(b), rulemaking participants broadly recognized
the importance of training to ensure that employees use the safety-
related work practices required by the final rule (see, for example,
Ex. 0219; Tr. 876). OSHA, therefore, considers the information-
transfer, job-briefing, and training requirements to be necessary
complements to the work-practice requirements in the final rule,
including the fall-protection, approach-distance, and arc-flash-
protection provisions. Consequently, the Agency attributed some
accidents, in part, to the employer's failure to provide contract
employers with the needed information to comply with the final rule
or employees with the needed information or training to comply with
the work practices the final rule requires, even if the accident
abstracts did not clearly indicate that contract employers or
employees lacked such information or training.\509\ However, in
cases in which the accident description indicated that appropriate
information transfers (between host employers and contract employers
or from the employer to the employee in charge) or training took
place, OSHA did not deem the accident potentially preventable by the
information-transfer, job-briefing, or training provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\508\ See, for example, the three accidents at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=14418941&id=200960060&id=642975,
in which employers did not provide sufficient information to employees
about the extent of a deenergized area, the location of circuits, and the
location of disconnects, respectively.
\509\ OSHA performs its accident investigations as part of the
Agency's inspection activities and focuses those investigations on
determinations of compliance with existing standards. Because
existing Sec. 1910.269 and Subpart V do not require the exchange of
information between host and contract employers, or between
employers and employees in charge, required by this new final rule,
OSHA compliance staff generally do not determine whether such an
information exchange takes place or, if they do make such a
determination, they do not include the results of the determination
in the accident abstracts.
Table 23--General Criteria for Determining Whether Cost-Related
Provisions Might Have Prevented Accidents
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Categories of requirements Criteria
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information-transfer requirements The accident occurred to an
(final Sec. Sec. 1910.269(a)(3) and employee working for an
1926.950(c)). employer classified under a
construction SIC (primarily,
1623 and 1731), or the
abstract otherwise indicated
that the employer was
performing work under contract
to a utility, and information
required by the final rule was
necessary for compliance with
provisions related to the
accident.
Job-briefing requirements (final Sec. Information required by the
Sec. 1910.269(c)(1)(i) and final rule was necessary for
1926.952(a)(1)). compliance with provisions
related to the accident.
Fall protection for employees in aerial The accident involved a fall
lifts (final Sec. from an aerial lift by an
1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(1)). employee working for a line-
clearance tree-trimming firm
(SIC 0783) or for an employer
that was not a utility or a
contractor.
Fall protection for employees on poles, The accident involved a fall by
towers, or similar structures (final an employee climbing or
Sec. Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(3) changing location on a pole,
and 1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(C)). tower, or similar structure.
Minimum approach distances and working The accident involved an
position (final Sec. 1910.269(l)(3), employee who approached too
(l)(4)(ii), and (l)(5)(ii), and final close to an energized part,
Sec. 1926.960(c)(1), (c)(2)(ii), and including employees who were
(d)(2)). not using electrical
protective equipment for
voltages of 301 V to 72.5 kV.
Note that this category does
not include accidents
involving contact through
mechanical equipment.
Arc-flash protection (final Sec. Sec. The accident involved an
1910.269(l)(8) and 1926.960(g)). employee burned by an electric
arc, injured by flying debris
from an electric arc, or
burned by clothing ignited by
an electric arc (including
electric arcs from direct
contact) or by burning
material ignited by an
electric arc.
Training (final Sec. Sec. Any accident included under any
1910.269(a)(2)(i) and 1926.950(b)(1)). category other than
information transfer and job
briefing, and any other
accident involving work
practices that would change as
a result of revisions to
existing Sec. 1910.269 made
in the final rule. (Note that
employees must be trained in
the work practice changes
included in the final rule to
achieve the benefits from the
changes in those work
practices.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: This table summarizes the general criteria for a category of
requirements, but does not include all refinements on these criteria.
The full text provides additional qualifying criteria not included in
the table.
Information-Transfer Requirements
The information-transfer requirements in final Sec. Sec.
1910.269(a)(3) and 1926.950(c) require host employers (generally
electric utilities) to exchange specified information with contract
employers (generally construction firms) so that each employer can
comply with the final rule to protect its employees. OSHA identified
accidents in which an employer that appeared to be a contract
employer (that is, employers in construction SICs, except as
otherwise noted in the comments to individual accidents) needed
specific information to comply with the final rule. The comments
note the type of information, such as voltage or incident energy,
that the contract employer would need to comply with requirements in
the final rule.
For example, in many instances, a contractor employee approached
too closely to an energized part.\510\ In these cases, the contract
employer needed, but might not have had, information on the voltage
of energized parts involved in the accident. With that information,
employees would be more likely to use the appropriate minimum
approach distance and less likely to experience the accident.
However, OSHA did not include in this category accidents in which
there was an explicit notation or clear implication in the abstract
that the employer knew the voltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\510\ See, for example, the five accidents at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=121317119&id=106549090&id=108964321&id=126680362&id=301305058.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In other instances, a contractor employee was exposed to an
electric arc.\511\ In these cases, the contract employer needed, and
might not have had,\512\ information on incident heat energy to
provide employees with appropriate protection against electric arcs
and to prevent or reduce the severity of injuries resulting from the
accident. OSHA did not include in this category accidents in which
employees received burns from hydraulic fluid ignited by electric
arcs because the required information has no bearing on these
accidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\511\ See, for example, the five accidents at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=122248933&id=123255036&id=119572378&id=125310748&id=113324040.
\512\ Because existing Sec. 1910.269 and Subpart V do not
require employers to protect employees from arc-flash hazards, OSHA
assumes that contract employers generally do not already have
information on incident heat energy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Job-Briefing Requirements
The job-briefing requirements in final Sec. Sec.
1910.269(c)(1)(i) and 1926.952(a)(1) specify that employers provide
employees in charge with certain information. OSHA identified
accidents in which employees needed the required information to
adhere to the work practices required by the final rule.\513\ For
example, in many instances, an employee approached too closely to an
energized part.\514\ In such cases, employees needed, but might not
have had, information on the voltage on energized parts so that they
could maintain the appropriate minimum approach distances from those
energized parts and, based on that information, select appropriate
electrical protective equipment rated for the voltage. However, OSHA
did not include in this category accidents in which there was
explicit notation or clear implication in the abstract that the
employees knew the voltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\513\ Such cases include all cases captured by the information-
transfer category. These cases also include similar cases involving
employees of host employers.
\514\ See, for example, the five accidents involving employees
of a host employer at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=125850560&id=107095234&id=126603075&id=126480821&id=114145840.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In other instances, employees needed, and might not have had,
information on incident heat energy so that they could wear
appropriate protection against electric arcs to prevent or reduce
the severity of injuries resulting from the accident.\515\ However,
OSHA did not include in this category accidents involving employees
burned by direct contact with energized parts unless the employees'
clothing ignited.\516\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\515\ See, for example, the five accidents involving employees
of a host employer at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=119617454&id=125958280&id=112130158&id=106447691&id=119541977.
\516\ The arc-flash protection requirements in the final rule
protect employees against burns resulting from incident heat energy
from an electric arc or resulting from clothing or other material
ignited by the incident heat energy from the electric arc. When the
employee's clothing ignited in a direct-contact incident, OSHA
assumed that the ignition resulted from the electric arc that
occurred during contact. Otherwise, OSHA assumed that the burns
resulted from current passing through the employee's body. The arc-
flash protection requirements will not prevent the latter type of
burn.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a few instances, employees needed other required information,
such as information on the condition of poles, to select appropriate
work practices, such as installing bracing to those poles to prevent
them from failing or falling over.\517\ The Agency did not include
in this category one instance in which an on-site supervisor was
aware of the conditions causing a pole to collapse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\517\ See, for example, the two accidents at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=125773978&id=302868344.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA recognizes that, in some of the accidents counted in this
category, the relevant information might not have been available to
the employer at the time of the accident; and, therefore, the
employer could not provide that information to the employee in
charge. However, if the information was available, the employer,
under the final rule, would have to provide it to the employee in
charge, making it more likely that employees would select compliant
work practices and, consequently, lessen the likelihood of the
accident.
Fall Protection for Employees in Aerial Lifts
The requirement for fall protection for employees in aerial
lifts in final Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(1) ensures that employees
working from aerial lifts use body harnesses to protect against
injuries resulting from falls. OSHA identified accidents involving
employees falling from aerial lifts.\518\ The Agency did not include
accidents involving aerial lifts overturning or aerial-lift failure
unless the accident abstract indicated that such an event ejected
the employee from the aerial lift platform and that the employee
might have suffered less severe injuries in the fall had the
employee been wearing a body harness. The comments included in the
analysis of these accidents explain OSHA's reasoning in such cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\518\ See the three accidents at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=127350080&id=301827531&id=301994091.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note that, unless the abstract indicated that body harnesses
were the employer's required form of fall protection, the Agency
included in this category accidents involving employees not wearing
any fall protection because the final rule makes it more likely that
employees will use fall protection.\519\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\519\ See the summary and explanation of final Sec.
1926.954(b)(1)(i), which explains that requirements associated with
using body harnesses are easier for employers to enforce than
requirements associated with using body belts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fall Protection for Employees on Poles, Towers, or Similar
Structures
The final rule, at Sec. Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(3) and
1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(C), requires qualified employees climbing and
changing location on poles, towers, or similar structures to use
fall protection. OSHA identified accidents involving employees
falling while climbing or changing location on poles, towers, and
similar structures.\520\ The Agency did not include in this category
accidents involving employees falling while at the work location (as
opposed to during climbing or while changing location) because the
existing standards require the use of fall protection in such
circumstances. Nor did the Agency include accidents involving
employees falling from ladders or structures that do not support
overhead power lines because the relevant fall protection
requirements in the final rule do not apply to ladders or structures
that do not support overhead power lines. Finally, OSHA did not
include in this category accidents involving falls resulting from
the failure of a pole, tower, or structure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\520\ See, for example, the five accidents at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=123997892&id=120080296&id=125864686&id=126603075&id=126053644.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA recognizes that the final rule does not require an employee
to use fall protection while the employee is climbing or changing
location on poles, towers, or similar structures when the employer
can demonstrate that climbing or changing location with fall
protection is infeasible or creates a greater hazard than climbing
or changing location without fall protection. Although OSHA was
unable to determine whether any of the accidents involved situations
in which this exception would apply, the Agency anticipates that the
exceptions would apply only in unusual, and relatively rare,
instances. Consequently, the Agency did not exclude any of the
accidents on this basis and determined that the final rule could
prevent nearly all accidents of this type.
Minimum Approach Distances and Working Position
The approach-distance requirements in final Sec.
1910.269(l)(3), (l)(4)(ii), and (l)(5)(ii), and final Sec.
1926.960(c)(1), (c)(2)(ii), and (d)(2), require that employees
maintain the employer's established minimum approach distances and
ensure that employees within reach of those minimum approach
distances are using electrical protective equipment or are otherwise
protected against electric shock.\521\ OSHA identified accidents in
which the final rule would make it more likely that employees would
use electrical protective equipment or in which substantially larger
minimum approach distances would make it less likely that an
unprotected employee would come too close to an energized part.
Although other provisions in the standard require that employers
ensure that employees maintain the employers' established minimum
approach distances in specific circumstances, for example, during
the operation of mechanical equipment, this analysis does not
account for benefits resulting from increases in minimum approach
distances in those other circumstances.\522\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\521\ The benefits of these provisions relate to the final
rule's costs, either directly (see discussion of costs of minimum
approach distance provisions in the FEA) or indirectly (because
employees will need training in the revised work practices contained
in the provisions).
\522\ These additional approach-distance requirements are in
final Sec. Sec. 1910.269(p)(4) and 1926.959(d) (for the operation
of mechanical equipment), final Sec. Sec. 1910.269(q)(3)(vi),
(q)(3)(xiv), (q)(3)(xv), and (q)(3)(xvi) and 1926.964(c)(5),
(c)(13), (c)(14), and (c)(15) (for live-line barehand work), and
final Sec. 1910.269(r)(1)(iii), (r)(1)(iv), and (r)(1)(v) (for
line-clearance tree-trimming work).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule generally prohibits employees who are not using
some form of electrical protective equipment or live-line tools from
being within reach of the minimum approach distance of exposed parts
energized at more than 600 volts, but not more than 72.5 kilovolts
(final Sec. 1910.269(l)(4)(ii) and (l)(5)(ii), and final Sec.
1926.960(c)(2)(ii) and (d)(2)). Existing Sec. 1910.269 contains no
such provisions; therefore, the final rule provides increased
protection in these circumstances and makes accidents less likely.
In addition, the final rule adopts minimum approach distances that
are substantially greater than the corresponding minimum approach
distances in existing Sec. 1910.269 for voltages between 301 and
1,000 volts and over 72.5 kilovolts.\523\ If employers follow the
final rule and ensure that employees use substantially greater
minimum approach distances at these voltages, then it is less likely
that an unprotected employee will approach too close to an exposed
energized part.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\523\ Under existing Sec. 1910.269, the minimum approach
distance for voltages of 50 to 1,000 volts is the statement, "avoid
contact." The final rule requires the employer to establish a
minimum approach distance of not less than 0.33 meters (1.09 feet)
for voltages of 301 to 750 volts and not less than 0.63 meters (2.07
feet) for voltages of 751 to 5,000 volts.
The default minimum approach distances in Table R-7 and Table V-
6 in the final rule provide substantially larger minimum approach
distances than the minimum approach distances in Table R-6 in
existing Sec. 1910.269 for voltages above 72.5 kilovolts. Under the
final rule, employers may establish their own minimum approach
distances, which may be the same as the minimum approach distances
in existing Table R-6, in lieu of using the default distances; but,
for the purposes of this analysis, OSHA assumed that employers would
use the default minimum approach distances. Even if employers
establish smaller minimum approach distances than the default
distances, the final rule requires that such distances ensure that
the probability of sparkover at the electrical component of the
minimum approach distance is no greater than 1 in 1,000, which makes
the probability of an accident less likely than under the existing
standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA identified accidents in which employees who were not using
electrical protective equipment or live-line tools contacted, or
approached too close to, exposed circuit parts energized at 301
volts or more.\524\ Although the accident abstracts typically state
that the employee "contacted" an energized part, at the voltages
commonly encountered in transmission and distribution work, the air
between the worker and the energized part will break down
dielectrically before the employee can contact the part. Whether the
employee pulls away or subsequently touches the energized part will
not affect the outcome--that is, electric shock, and potentially
electrocution, and burns from current passing through the skin and
from exposure to the electric arc carrying current to the energized
part. Consequently, OSHA concludes that all "contact" accidents
involve a sparkover across an air gap and not actual contact with
the energized part.\525\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\524\ See, for example, the five accidents at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=122193329&id=109573204&id=122194707&id=109298216&id=125652016.
\525\ As detailed in the summary and explanation of final Sec.
1926.960(c), in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final
Rule, earlier in this preamble, the sparkover distance at the
worksite depends on several factors, including, in particular, the
nominal voltage on the system and any transient overvoltage that
occurs while the employee is working.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, for several reasons, increasing the minimum
approach distance will decrease the likelihood that an employee will
approach closely enough for sparkover. First, the increases in
minimum approach distance, though slight in most cases, reduce the
probability of sparkover to 3[sigma] (approximately 1 in 1,000) from
sometimes substantially higher probabilities. (For example, the
probability of sparkover at the electrical component of the existing
phase-to-phase minimum approach distance for an 800-kilovolt system
with a 2.5-per unit maximum transient overvoltage is approximately 6
in 10.) Second, the increased distance will provide the employee
with additional distance, and thus time, to detect and withdraw from
an approach that is too close to energized parts. (See the summary
and explanation of final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1) under the heading
"The ergonomic component of MAD" in Section V, Summary and
Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble, for further
information.) Third, the increased distance provides a greater
margin of error for the employee in the absence of a known maximum
transient overvoltage.
The Agency did not, however, include certain types of accidents
under this category. First, the Agency did not include accidents
involving mechanical equipment, loose conductors, or guys \526\ that
contacted overhead power lines energized at less than 72.6
kilovolts. The revised requirements in the final rule do not
increase the likelihood of preventing such accidents because the
minimum approach distances at those voltages are substantially the
same as the distances in existing Sec. 1910.269, and the revised
work-positioning requirements in the final rule generally do not
address hazards associated with these accidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\526\ A guy is a tensioned cable, or wire rope, that adds
stability and support to structures carrying overhead power lines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, OSHA did not include accidents in which the abstract
indicated that an employee contacted an energized part that the
employee incorrectly believed to be deenergized, except when
information on the location of circuits and their voltages would
have informed the employees that lines or equipment were
energized.\527\ Provisions for deenergizing and grounding lines and
equipment in the existing standard address these hazards, and the
final rule does not revise those provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\527\ An example of the exception is an accident in which an
employer assigns a crew to work on one line the crew correctly
believes is deenergized, but a crew member accidentally works on a
wrong line, which is energized. Information on the correct location
of lines and which lines are energized would help prevent such
accidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, OSHA did not include accidents in which the abstract
indicated that the employee was using, or likely was using,
appropriate electrical protective equipment or live-line tools. The
revised work-positioning requirements would not apply in such cases.
Arc-Flash Protection
Final Sec. Sec. 1910.269(l)(8) and 1926.960(g) require the
employer to provide, and ensure the use of, appropriate protective
clothing and equipment to either prevent or reduce the severity of
injuries to employees exposed to electric arcs. OSHA identified
accidents in which employees sustained burns and other injuries from
electric arcs.\528\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\528\ See, for example, the five accidents at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=119617454&id=125958280&id=112130158&id=106447691&id=119541977.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency did not include accidents in which employees directly
contacted energized parts unless: (1) The employee survived the
electric shock and (2) the employee sustained burns or other arc-
flash injuries to parts of the body other than the hands and feet.
In the analysis, OSHA assumes that rubber insulating gloves with
leather protectors worn in compliance with the approach-distance
requirements will protect against burns to the hands. OSHA also
assumes that the injured employee was wearing heavy-duty work shoes
or boots that comply with the arc-flash protection requirements in
the final rule. Based on the analysis of the accident data, such
footwear will protect against exposure to electric arcs, but will
not protect against burns resulting from dielectric failure of the
footwear, which can occur in cases of direct contact with high-
voltage energized parts.
In addition, OSHA did not include accidents in which employees
received burns from hydraulic fluid ignited by an electric arc,
unless the burning hydraulic fluid ignited the employee's clothing.
The Agency assumes that the arc-flash provisions in the final rule
will not prevent, or substantially reduce, injuries caused by the
heat from burning hydraulic fluid.
Training
OSHA did not substantially revise the training requirements in
existing Sec. 1910.269. However, employers will incur costs for
training employees. Even though employees already are trained in the
work practices required by existing Sec. 1910.269, additional
training costs will result because employers must train workers in
the revised work practices required by the final rule. The
additional training requirements provide benefits because trained
employees are more likely to follow the work practices specified by
the standard than untrained employees.
The Agency identified accidents involving incorrect work
practices that the final rule will prevent.\529\ Specifically, OSHA
included in this category any accident included in the fall-
protection, approach-distance, or arc-flash categories described
earlier. The work-practice changes required in those areas in the
final rule will result in new training, which, in turn, will make
accidents included in the training category less likely.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\529\ See, for example, the five accidents at:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=123997892&id=119617454&id=125958280&id=123383382&id=124822347.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Results of Accident Analysis
Table 24 presents the results of OSHA's analysis of the CONSAD
accident data. The first column in that table lists the categories
of provisions in the final rule included in this analysis, while the
second column presents the number of accidents that the requirements
in each of these categories likely will prevent. For example, the
information-transfer requirements in the final rule make 77 of the
accidents less likely to occur in comparison with the existing
standards. The third column of Table 24 shows the corresponding
percentage of accidents that the requirements in each of these
categories likely will prevent. For example, the approach-distance
requirements in the final rule make 35.8 percent of the accidents
less likely to occur in comparison with the existing standards.
Table 24--Percentage of Accidents Addressed by Each Category of Provision
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage of 268
Number of accidents total accidents
Category of provision addressed by the addressed by the
provision provision
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information Transfer.......................................... 77 28.7
Job Briefing.................................................. 153 57.1
Training...................................................... 144 53.7
Aerial Lift Fall Protection................................... 3 1.1
Climbing Fall Protection...................................... 10 3.7
Approach Distance............................................. 96 35.8
Arc Flash..................................................... 42 15.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Provision-by-Provision Sensitivity Analysis
To conduct its provision-by-provision sensitivity analysis, OSHA
first compared the percentage of accidents in each category (from
Table 24) against the estimated total number of fatalities involving
circumstances directly addressed by the final rule, 74 annually, and
the corresponding number of serious injuries, 444 annually. OSHA
next estimated the economic value of those prevented fatalities and
injuries.\530\ Finally, OSHA estimated the percentage of provision-
relevant benefits that would be necessary to establish that a
particular provision produces zero net benefit (that is, the
estimated value of the prevented accidents equals the estimated cost
of the related provision). Any percentage greater than this will
produce positive net benefits. Table 25 shows the results of this
analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\530\ Note that, due to data limitations discussed in the body
of the FEA, OSHA could not identify or evaluate injuries with the
same degree of accuracy as fatalities. For that reason, throughout
this analysis, estimated injuries are in fixed proportion to
estimated fatalities. Note, also, that prevented injuries comprise
only a minor percentage of the total benefits of the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted earlier in the accident analysis, the Agency sometimes
attributed an accident to a provision even though it was unclear
from the accident abstract whether the employer followed that
provision on a voluntary basis. Therefore, although Table 25
accounts for baseline compliance in terms of costs, Table 25 does
not account for baseline compliance in terms of potential monetized
benefits. Table 26, on the other hand, accounts for baseline
compliance in terms of both costs and benefits.
OSHA notes that accounting for baseline compliance is difficult
because effectiveness and baseline compliance interact for purposes
of estimating the number of accidents where there is no baseline
compliance. For example, if a provision is so effective that there
would be no accidents so long as employers follow the regulation,
then all accidents attributed to that provision would necessarily
occur when employers did not follow the provision; and OSHA,
therefore, could state with 100 percent certainty that employers did
not follow the provision voluntarily. Conversely, if the provision
is completely ineffective, the associated injury and fatality rate
for employers in voluntary compliance will be
the same as for employers not in voluntary compliance. As a result,
the expected percentage of associated injuries and fatalities for
firms in voluntary compliance will equal the percentage of employees
in firms in voluntary compliance (as a percentage of all employees
with associated injuries and fatalities). Thus, if 20 percent of
employees work in firms in voluntary compliance with a completely
ineffective provision, then 20 percent of all associated injuries
and fatalities will occur among these employees, assuming an equal
distribution of affected work. OSHA examines intermediate cases,
which are more complex to calculate, in a spreadsheet showing the
calculation of breakeven rates taking account of baseline compliance
[9].
Table 26 shows estimated rates of baseline compliance for each
provision and the resulting percentage of potential benefits needed
for benefits to equal costs, adjusted for the compliance rate using
the methodology. The compliance rates show that, for all provisions,
with the exception of new requirements for calculating minimum
approach distances, industry already bears most of the costs
voluntarily. As expected, the break-even rates in Table 26 usually
are higher than the rates shown in Table 25. In some cases, as
discussed later, OSHA believes that accidents addressed by
individual provisions could not occur in the event of full
compliance with the final rule. In these cases, the last column of
Table 26 shows a range of potential benefits needed to break even
with costs, with the percentage in that column, adjusted for
baseline compliance, representing the top end of the range, and the
percentage from the last column of Table 25 representing the bottom
end of the range. OSHA believes the percentage at the top end of the
range is premised on an incorrect assumption--that relevant
accidents can occur even with full compliance with the final rule.
Table 25--Sensitivity Analysis of Potential Benefits From Different Provisions of the Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Standard
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage of Monetized Percentage of
accidents benefits of Injuries Monetized Total potential
Annualized addressed by Fatalities fatalities potentially benefits of potential benefits needed
Category of provision cost of the provision prevented potentially prevented Sec. injuries monetized to break even
compliance (from Table [dagger] prevented potentially benefits with costs
24) * [Dagger] prevented ** [dagger][dagger]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information Transfer.......................................... $17,820,841 28.7 21.5 $184,770,600 127.4 $7,900,536 $192,671,136 9.2
Job Briefing.................................................. 6,697,557 57.1 42.3 367,609,800 253.5 15,718,488 383,328,288 1.7
Training...................................................... 2,950,935 53.7 39.7 345,720,600 238.4 14,782,536 360,503,136 0.8
Aerial Lift Fall Protection................................... 113,222 1.1 0.8 7,081,800 4.9 302,808 7,384,608 1.5
Climbing Fall Protection...................................... 451,768 3.7 2.7 23,820,600 16.4 1,018,536 24,839,136 1.8
Approach Distances............................................ 1,807,505 35.8 26.5 230,480,400 159.0 9,855,024 240,335,424 0.8
Arc Flash..................................................... 19,446,147 15.7 11.6 101,076,600 69.7 4,321,896 105,398,496 18.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Total exceeds 100 percent because more than one provision may prevent a given accident.
[dagger] Percentage of accidents addressed multiplied by 74 (the number of fatalities of the type addressed by
the final rule).
[Dagger]thnsp;Valued at $8.7 million per fatality.
Sec. Percentage of accidents addressed multiplied by 444 (the number of injuries of the type addressed by the final rule).
** Valued at $62,000 per injury.
[dagger][dagger] The Percentage of Potential Benefits Needed to Break Even with Costs derived by dividing the monetized
benefits in column 8 by the costs in column 2.
Note: Totals may not equal the sum or product of the components due to rounding.
Table 26--Baseline Compliance Rates and Percentage of Potential Benefits Needed To Break Even With Costs, Given
Baseline Compliance
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage of potential
benefits that need to
Baseline compliance * be realized to break
Category of provision (percent) even with costs,
adjusted for baseline
compliance [dagger]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information Transfer.......................................... 77 31.6
Job Briefing.................................................. 96 31.7
Training...................................................... 95 14.7
Aerial Lift Fall Protection [Dagger].......................... 65 1.5-4.4
Climbing Fall Protection [Dagger]............................. 50 1.8-3.7
Approach Distances [Dagger]................................... 0 0.8
Arc Flash [Dagger]............................................ 81 18.5-55.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Calculated as the percentage of costs for projects already in compliance as a percentage of costs if no firms
were in compliance.
[dagger] See reference [9] for method of calculation.
[Dagger] It is possible that baseline compliance may be irrelevant because no accidents could occur (or, in the
case of the arc-flash provisions, no fatalities could occur, and the final rule would significantly reduce the
incidence of serious burns) in the event of 100-percent compliance, in which case the break-even percentage is
the same as in Table 25.
Before discussing the results of Table 25 and Table 26, OSHA
will address the potential preventability of the types of accidents
the final rule likely will prevent. Generally, no set of controls
can prevent all accidents associated with a particular activity and
still allow workers to engage in the activity at reasonable cost.
For example, controls cannot prevent fully many kinds of accidents,
such as transportation accidents or slips and trips. However, this
is not the case for many of the hazards addressed by this final
rule. The fall, burn, and electric-shock accidents that this
standard addresses are almost completely preventable with
appropriate, affordable precautions. The final rule addresses the
problem that, in many cases, employers do not apply known, effective
controls, either because no rule requires such controls or because
individual employers may lack the information to apply required
controls properly.
Because the benefits of information transfer, job briefings, and
training depend in part on the effectiveness of other provisions,
OSHA will first consider the effectiveness of provisions involving
aerial lift and climbing fall protection, approach distances, and
arc-flash protection. In evaluating the likelihood of meeting any of
the calculated break-even effectiveness rates, there are several key
factors to consider: The potential that a provision could prevent an
accident; the extent to which full compliance with existing rules
could prevent the accident; and, even if full compliance with
existing rules could prevent an accident, the extent to which the
provision makes it easier or more likely that there will be greater
compliance with existing rules.
Aerial Lift Fall Protection
Under the final rule, employees in aerial lifts performing
covered work will not be able to use body belts as part of fall-
arrest systems and, instead, must use body harnesses. While perfect
compliance with the existing fall-protection provision could prevent
most fatalities and some nonfatal injuries, as OSHA stated in
Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in
this preamble, using body harnesses instead of body belts will not
only reduce the number of fatalities and the severity of some
injuries, but also increase the probability that employees use fall
protection because it is not always possible for an employer to
detect from the ground whether an employee is wearing a body belt,
but it is relatively easy to determine whether an employee is
wearing a body harness.
Table 25 shows that the aerial-lift fall-protection provision
addresses 1.1 percent of all accidents OSHA reviewed for this
supplemental analysis. Moreover, Table 25 shows that, if compliance
with the final rule's aerial-lift fall-protection provision prevents
only 1.5 percent of these accidents, then the benefits will meet or
exceed the costs. Table 26 shows that, after adjusting for baseline
compliance, benefits will meet or exceed the costs if the provision,
including the correct use of body harnesses, prevents 4.4 percent or
more of these accidents.\531\
Ignoring the benefits resulting from the decrease in the number and
severity of injuries from falls into body harnesses in comparison to
falls into body belts, OSHA concludes that the increased probability
that workers subject to the final rule will use fall protection is
sufficient reason alone to assure a 4.4 percent decrease in
accidents involving falls from aerial lifts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\531\ OSHA uses the term "these accidents" in this and similar
portions of the text to refer to the percentage of the percentage of
total accidents that a particular provision needs to prevent for the
benefits of that provision to meet or exceed the costs of that
provision. For example, OSHA says in the text that "Table 25 shows
that the aerial-lift fall-protection provision addresses 1.1 percent
of all accidents OSHA reviewed for this analysis," and that "if
compliance with the final rule's aerial-lift fall-protection
provision prevents only 1.5 percent of these accidents, then the
benefits will meet or exceed the costs." This statement means that
Table 25 shows that benefits will meet or exceed costs if compliance
with the final rule's aerial-lift fall-protection provision prevents
1.5 percent of the 1.1 percent of total accidents that compliance
with the final rule's aerial-lift fall-protection provision would
potentially prevent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Climbing Fall Protection
The final rule requires that qualified employees use fall
protection when climbing or changing location on poles, towers, or
similar structures. Existing fall protection standards do not
require the use of fall protection in these circumstances.
Therefore, full compliance with existing rules would not prevent any
of the falls OSHA attributed to this provision.
Moreover, proper use of fall protection will prevent almost all
fatalities or serious injuries resulting from falls by employees
when climbing or changing location on such structures. Table 25
shows that the final rule's climbing fall protection provision
addresses 3.7 percent of all accidents and that benefits will meet
or exceed the costs if use of fall protection prevents 1.8 percent
or more of these accidents. Since it is nearly impossible for an
accident to occur if employers comply fully with these provisions,
it is reasonable to conclude that baseline compliance is irrelevant
and that 1.8 percent remains the relevant break-even percentage even
when considering existing compliance. OSHA believes that, given that
full compliance with this requirement will prevent almost all
fatalities and serious injuries from falls under these
circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that this provision will
have benefits that exceed costs.
Approach Distances
The approach-distance provisions require employers to ensure
that employees who do not use electrical protective equipment or
have other protection against electric shock not reach into the
employer's established minimum approach distances. The existing rule
does not contain similar requirements. Even though full compliance
with existing rules may have prevented some of the accidents OSHA
attributed to the final rule's provisions, the final rule's
provisions will make the maintenance of the minimum approach
distance easier or more likely than under the existing rule. Under
the final rule's approach, the type of contact accidents OSHA
attributed to the final rule's provisions are less likely because an
employee following the revised approach-distance requirements would
not need to divide his or her attention between performing a job
task and maintaining the minimum approach distance. Simply put, the
final rule's provisions will minimize the risk that errors in
judgment about the minimum approach distance will lead to
electrocution.
These provisions also require minimum approach distances that
are substantially greater than the corresponding minimum approach
distances in existing Sec. 1910.269 for voltages between 301 and
1,000 volts and over 72.5 kilovolts. For reasons stated earlier in
this analysis, increasing the minimum approach distance will
decrease the likelihood that an employee will approach closely
enough to an exposed energized part for sparkover. Therefore, if
employers follow the final rule and use substantially greater
minimum approach distances at these voltages, then it is
substantially less likely that an unprotected employee (that is, an
employee not using electrical protective equipment) will approach
too close to an exposed energized part.
It is almost certain that full compliance with the final rule
would prevent all accidents attributed to these provisions. Table 25
shows that the final rule's minimum approach distance provisions
address 35.8 percent of all accidents and that benefits will meet or
exceed the costs if the new provisions prevent 0.8 percent or more
of these accidents. Moreover, baseline compliance is zero percent in
this case; therefore, even if baseline compliance was above zero,
since it is nearly impossible for an accident to occur if employers
comply with these provisions, it is reasonable to conclude that
baseline compliance would be irrelevant, and that 0.8 percent would
remain the relevant break-even percentage even when considering
existing compliance. Given that full compliance with this
requirement will prevent almost all applicable fatalities and
serious injuries, OSHA believes that it is reasonable to conclude
that this provision will have benefits that exceed costs.
Arc Flash
The final rule contains new provisions addressing arc-flash
protection. These new provisions, if followed, will prevent
virtually all fatalities, and significantly reduce the incidence of
serious burns from arc-flash accidents. The existing rule does not
contain such protections. OSHA's existing rule simply requires that
an employee's clothing do no greater harm than the harm that the
employee would experience without the clothing. As such, it is
highly likely that full compliance with existing rules would prevent
none of the burn accidents OSHA analyzed.
Moreover, it is almost certain that full compliance with the
final rule would prevent the fatalities and reduce the serious
injuries resulting from electric arcs. Table 25 shows that the final
rule's arc-flash provisions address 15.7 percent of all accidents
and that benefits will meet or exceed the costs if the new
provisions prevent 18.5 percent or more of these accidents.
Compliance with these provisions will almost certainly reduce the
severity of burns and will make it is nearly impossible for a
fatality to occur.\532\ Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that
baseline compliance is irrelevant and that 18.5 percent remains the
relevant break-even percentage even when considering existing
compliance. OSHA believes that, given that full compliance with
these provisions will prevent almost all applicable fatalities and
significantly reduce the severity of burn injuries, it is reasonable
to conclude that this provision will have benefits that exceed
costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\532\ See the summary and explanation of final Sec.
1926.960(g), in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final
Rule, earlier in this preamble, for an explanation of how the final
rule protects employees from fatal and nonfatal burn injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information Transfer
The information-transfer provisions require host employers to
exchange specified information with contract employers so that each
employer can comply with the final rule to protect its employees.
The existing rule does not contain such provisions. However,
accidents among employers are far more likely to occur when those
employers do not have adequate information to comply with
requirements that depend on the employer having that information.
For example, an employer cannot not select protective grounding
equipment meeting existing Sec. 1910.269(n)(4)(i), which requires
that protective grounding equipment be capable of conducting the
maximum fault current that could flow at the point of grounding for
the time necessary to clear the fault, if the employer does not know
the fault current or clearing time for a circuit. As such, it is
highly likely that the existing rule could not prevent at least some
of the accidents OSHA attributed to these provisions because many
employers did not have adequate information to achieve full
compliance with the existing rule's work practice requirements and,
but for the new information-transfer provisions, would not have
adequate information to achieve full compliance with the final
rule's work-practice requirements.
OSHA also believes that it is likely that the benefits of this
provision will exceed the costs. In its analysis, OSHA identified
accidents in which an employer that appeared to be a contract
employer needed specific information to comply with the final rule.
It is necessary that the host employer transfer certain key
information about the electric power generation, transmission, or
distribution installation to the contract employer, as such
information is almost never readily available to the contract
employer from any source other than the host employer. Table 25
shows that the final rule's information-transfer provisions address
28.7 percent of all accidents and that benefits will meet or exceed
the costs if the new provisions prevent 9.2 percent or more of these
accidents. Table 26 shows that, after adjusting for baseline
compliance, benefits will meet or exceed the costs if the provisions
prevent 31.6 percent or more of these accidents. The transfer of
required information is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition
for preventing accidents; therefore, OSHA considers it likely that
the final rule will achieve this level of preventability given that
the record for this rulemaking clearly shows that contract employers
have difficulty meeting the provisions of the existing standard due
to a lack of information. In particular, the record shows that
contract employers experience a recurring inability to get needed
information from utilities. (See, for example, Tr. 877, 1240, 1333.)
Job Briefing
The job-briefing provision requires employers to provide certain
necessary safety information to the employee in charge. It is
important that the employer provide the employee in charge with this
information to aid employees' assessment of worksite conditions and,
as a secondary precaution, in case employees at the site fail to
observe a particular condition related to their safety. The existing
standards do not contain such a provision. Moreover, the record
makes clear that, under the existing rule, employees do not always
have, nor can they always obtain, the necessary information they
need to perform their jobs safely because employers are placing the
entire burden of compliance with the job-briefing requirement on the
employee in charge (see discussion of Sec. 1926.952 in Section V,
Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this
preamble). As such, it is highly likely that the existing rule could
not prevent at least some of the accidents OSHA attributed to this
provision because many employees did not have adequate information
for employers to achieve full compliance with the existing rule's
work practice requirements and, but for the new job-briefing
provision, would not have adequate information for employers to
achieve full compliance with the final rule's work-practice
requirements.
However, under existing Sec. 1910.269(c), employees become
aware of at least some of this necessary safety information because,
although the existing rule does not require employers to provide
this information to the employee in charge, the existing rule
requires job briefings that cover hazards associated with the job,
work procedures involved, special precautions, energy-source
controls, and personal protective equipment requirements. Consistent
with this conclusion, Table 25 shows that benefits will meet or
exceed the costs if the new provision prevents 1.7 percent or more
of the accidents addressed by this provision; Table 26 shows that,
after adjusting for baseline compliance, benefits will meet or
exceed the costs if the new provision prevents 31.7 percent or more
of these accidents.
Table 25 shows that compliance with the final rule's job-
briefing provision potentially would prevent a large portion (57.1
percent) of all accidents. As such, it is likely that the benefits
of this provision will exceed the costs because of the large
percentage of total accidents potentially prevented by this
provision (57.1 percent) and the percentage of prevention (31.7
percent) needed for the benefits of these accidents to equal costs.
Again, the record evidence supports the conclusion that at least
some employees do not have adequate information to perform their
jobs safely and, further, that the overwhelming majority of
employers do find such job briefings desirable.
Training
The training requirements in the final rule are substantially
the same as those in existing Sec. 1910.269. Training costs arise,
not from new training requirements, but from the need to provide
employees with new training in work practices conforming to new and
revised work-practice requirements in the final rule. Consequently,
the training required under the existing rule will prevent accidents
that only the existing rule's work-practice requirements might
prevent, and not accidents that only the final rule's work-practice
requirements might prevent.
For example, full compliance with the existing rule's training
requirements would not prevent the falls that OSHA attributed to the
final rule's climbing fall-protection provision because the existing
rule does not require qualified employees to use fall protection
when climbing or changing location on poles, towers, or similar
structures. However, full compliance with the existing rule's
training requirements might prevent some of the falls that OSHA
attributed to the final rule's aerial-lift fall-protection provision
because full compliance with the existing rule's aerial-lift fall-
protection provision would likely prevent some of those accidents.
As such, the training required under the existing rule would prevent
some, but not all, of the accidents attributed to the training
required under the final rule.
In its analysis, OSHA attributed to the training required under
the final rule any accident that the Agency attributed to provisions
requiring compliance with the final rule's new and revised work-
practice requirements (that is, provisions on aerial-lift fall
protection, climbing fall protection, information transfer, approach
distances, and arc flash). Consequently, the revised training
employers will provide under the final rule will prevent some, but
not all, of the accidents attributed to training required under the
final rule to the same extent as the new and revised work-practice
requirements. As such, full compliance with the new training
required under the final rule would help prevent the accidents OSHA
attributed to the new training precisely because OSHA also
attributed those accidents to the new and revised work-practice
provisions.
As noted earlier, the training provisions act jointly with the
new and revised work-practice requirements in the final rule to
prevent accidents. The new and revised work-practice provisions
necessitate new training, which, in turn, will make accidents
included in the training category less likely. Trained employees are
much more likely to follow the work practices required under the
final rule than untrained employees. As discussed earlier, it is
almost certain that full compliance with the final rule's climbing
fall-protection, approach-distance, and arc-flash provisions would
prevent all accidents attributed to these provisions. As also
discussed earlier, using body harnesses instead of body belts in
aerial lifts also will reduce the number of fatalities and the
severity of some nonfatal injuries. The training requirements will
contribute to this reduction in accidents because those requirements
will help ensure full compliance with the final rule's work-practice
provisions.
Table 25 shows that compliance with the final rule's training
provisions potentially would prevent 53.7 percent of all accidents
and that benefits will meet or exceed the costs if the provisions
prevent 0.8 percent or more of these accidents. Table 26 shows that,
after adjusting for baseline compliance, benefits will meet or
exceed the costs if the training provisions prevent 14.7 percent or
more of these accidents. OSHA believes that it is reasonably likely
the benefits will exceed the costs because training is essential to
assure that employees can follow the other provisions of the
standard and because of the relatively large portion of total
accidents related to this provision (53.7 percent) and the
relatively low percentage of these accidents (14.7 percent) that the
new provisions would need to prevent for benefits to equal costs.
5. Methodology for Comparing the Costs of Preventing Accidents, by
Accident Category, to the Associated Benefits
In the first sensitivity analysis, discussed previously, OSHA
determined the frequency with which each single provision would have
to prevent accidents addressed by that provision for benefits to
exceed costs for that provision; however, the analysis ignored the
possibility that it may take multiple provisions to prevent a given
accident and that not all provisions may be necessary to prevent
every accident. The second sensitivity analysis, described in this
section, addresses the joint effects arising from various
provisions.
The requirements in the final rule work in combination to
prevent accidents. For example, as noted previously, the minimum
approach-distance requirements work in combination with the training
requirements to prevent employees from coming too close to live
parts and receiving an electric shock. OSHA took steps to assure
that its provision-by-provision analysis accurately accounts for the
issue of joint costs, as described later.
As noted earlier, Table 24 shows, for different categories of
provisions, the number of accidents that the requirements in that
category are likely to prevent. Table 27 breaks down the data in
Table 24 further, and presents, for five different categories of
accidents (falls from aerial lifts; falls from structures; electric
shock, too close to live parts; burns from arc flash; and accidents
other than those listed above), the number and percentage of
accidents in each accident category that the different combinations
of provisions (that is, "provision categories") in Table 24 are
likely to prevent. An example illustrates how OSHA calculated the
percentages in Table 27. From Table 24, the Agency determined that
the information-transfer provisions in the final rule would address
77 accidents. Table 27 shows the number of those 77 accidents in
each accident category, and the corresponding percentage of those 77
accidents, that the information-transfer provisions will address:
Electric shock, too close to live parts--53 (69 percent); burns from
arc flash--13 (17 percent); and accidents other than those listed
above--11 (14 percent).
Table 28 presents the data in Table 24 differently.
Specifically, Table 28 presents, for each of the five provision
categories, the number and percentage of accidents (out of the total
accidents reviewed by OSHA for this supplemental analysis) that each
provision category of the final rule would address. Four of the
categories of accidents
in Table 28 (falls from aerial lifts; falls from structures;
electric shock, too close to live parts; burns from arc flash)
contain numbers of accidents that are identical to the numbers
contained in Table 24, as OSHA based both tables on its analysis of
the CONSAD accident data. For reasons explained later, OSHA derived
the number of accidents associated with the fifth category by
determining the number of accidents in Table 24 that the
information-transfer, job-briefing, and training provisions of the
final rule could prevent, not including accidents that the
provisions of the final rule that address the first four accident
categories in Table 27 also could prevent. Based on the analysis in
Table 27, OSHA determined that the final rule could potentially
prevent 165 (or 61.6 percent) of the 268 total accidents the Agency
analyzed.
Table 29 takes the analyses from Table 24, Table 27, and Table
28 and performs a sensitivity analysis that accounts for the
combinations of provisions that are necessary to prevent different
kinds of accidents. OSHA discusses this analysis in more detail
later. However, OSHA first describes the costs associated with each
accident category in detail.
For the purposes of Table 29, OSHA allocated to each hazard the
costs of a provision based on the percentage of accidents addressed
by the provision as a percentage of all accidents addressed by that
provision. That is, if a provision has costs of $10 million dollars
and 10 percent of all accidents addressed by the provision address
electric-shock hazards, then OSHA allocated $1 million dollars of
the costs of the provision to electric-shock hazards. OSHA believes
that allocating costs of provisions in proportion to the percentage
of accidents those provisions address allows for a reasonable
determination of the costs of provisions associated with individual
accidents. Indeed, this approach is entirely consistent with the
approach OSHA takes in the final rule: For example, final Sec. Sec.
1910.269(a)(2)(i)(C) and 1926.950(b)(1)(iii) specifically require
that employers determine the degree of employee training based on
the risk to the employees for the hazards they are likely to
encounter. Accordingly, allocating costs in proportion to the
percentage of accidents caused by each hazard is a reasonable
approach.
There are two possibilities with respect to the costs of the
provisions that address multiple kinds of hazards (like the job-
briefing and information-transfer provisions). First, there may be a
certain minimum time necessary for such activities as job briefings
or information transfer whenever the final rule requires those
activities. If so, the allocation of the minimum time for each
activity is a classic joint-cost allocation problem and allocating
cost as a percentage of expected benefits is one common solution.
Alternatively, the total time allotted may be a function of whether
or not hazards are present. If this is the case, then the percentage
of accidents associated with a given hazard is a reasonable proxy
for the percentage of time employees encounter the hazard and the
time required to transfer the associated information. OSHA believes
the data supports the conclusion that the time allotted is a
function of whether or not hazards are present. For example, OSHA
expects, and the data supports the conclusion, that the hazards from
falls from aerial lifts and from structures will seldom be part of
the information employers provide for job briefings and information
transfer because employees encounter the hazards from falls from
aerial lifts and from structures far less often than they do other
hazards addressed by the final rule, such as electric-shock and arc-
flash hazards.
Falls From Aerial Lifts
As explained later in the FEA, OSHA estimated the costs of
purchasing new fall protection equipment for employees working from
aerial lifts. However, this is not the only cost associated with
preventing these employees from falling. To ensure that employees
use this fall protection equipment properly, employers must train
workers in its use. Thus, training, and, consequently, a portion of
the training costs, contributes to the prevention of falls from
aerial lifts. OSHA assigned a percentage (2 percent) of the
annualized general training costs equal to the percentage of
accidents involving such falls taken from Table 27 and added that
cost to the annualized costs associated with providing fall
protection for employees working from aerial lifts. The Agency
estimates that the information-transfer and job-briefing
requirements do not contribute substantially to the prevention of
these accidents because there is little or no additional related
information provided to employees as a result of those new
provisions.
Falls From Structures
As explained later in the FEA, OSHA estimated the costs directly
associated with the new fall-protection requirements for employees
climbing or changing location on poles, towers, or similar
structures. The costs include the purchase of upgraded fall
protection equipment, training workers in its use, and, to a small
extent (1 percent, from Table 27), job briefing. As opposed to other
categories of training, the FEA includes a separate cost item for
training when the employer requires workers to use the upgraded fall
protection equipment. OSHA included this cost in its cost estimate
for this analysis. OSHA estimated that 1 percent of the annualized
job-briefing-related accidents \533\ involve the "Falls from
Structure" category.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\533\ The percentages listed in this portion of the analysis
come from Table 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electric Shock, Too Close to Live Parts
As explained later in the FEA, OSHA estimated the costs of the
revised minimum approach distances. However, the final rule further
prevents electric-shock accidents involving employees approaching
too close to energized parts through the revised work-positioning
requirements. Employers incur costs for these requirements through
training, including training in the revised minimum approach
distances. Consequently, the Agency assigned a percentage of the
annualized general-training costs (71 percent) to the prevention of
these electric-shock accidents and added these costs to its cost
estimate for the approach-distance requirements. In addition,
without knowledge of the voltages of exposed live parts in the work
area, employees would not be able to comply with the revised
approach-distance provisions. As a result, the information-transfer
(for contract employers) and job-briefing provisions also act to
prevent these electric-shock accidents, and OSHA added a percentage
of the annualized information-transfer and job-briefing costs (69
percent and 63 percent, respectively) to its estimated costs for the
approach-distance provisions.
Burns From Arc Flash
As explained later in the FEA, OSHA estimated costs associated
with the arc-flash requirements in the final rule. To follow the new
work practices involving arc-flash protection, employees must
receive training, and employers incur training costs associated with
these requirements, in addition to the direct costs associated with
these requirements. Finally, without knowledge of the estimated
incident energy (or, for contract employers, the system parameters
necessary to estimate incident energy), contract employers and
employees would not be able to select the appropriate protective
equipment. For these reasons, OSHA added a percentage of the
annualized costs associated with general training (27 percent),
information transfer (17 percent), and job briefing (27 percent) to
its estimate of costs for the arc-flash requirements.
Accidents Other Than Those Listed Above
As shown in Table 27, the new information-transfer requirements
and the new job-briefing requirements potentially could prevent 11
and 14 accidents, respectively (not including accidents in the other
four accident categories).\534\ The information provided to
employees through these requirements would facilitate employee
compliance with the work practices required by the existing
standard. Therefore, the only costs of the final rule directed
toward the prevention of these accidents are costs associated with
the information-transfer and job-briefing provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\534\ Because the final rule effectively requires a contract
employer to pass information from the host employer to the employee
in charge, the job-briefing requirements in the final rule also
could prevent all 11 accidents potentially prevented by the
information-transfer requirements. For example, in several cases,
the accidents involved employees who fell when a utility pole broke.
If the host employer had information about the condition of the
poles, the final rule requires the host employer to provide that
information to a contract employer and, through the employees'
employer, to the employee in charge. The employees then would use
that information in the evaluation of the need for bracing or
support as required by final Sec. Sec. 1910.269(q)(1)(i) and
1926.964(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Sensitivity of Net Benefits to Potential Preventability
Table 29 shows the break-even percentages by type of accident
and for the final rule as whole. In this analysis, OSHA first
addresses the reasonableness of concluding that the
benefits of the final rule's provisions addressing each individual
type of accident outweigh the costs of those provisions. OSHA then
explains how the two sensitivity analyses it conducted (that is, the
first analysis showing the break-even point for each provision
separately and the second analysis, discussed herein, showing the
break-even point for the combined provisions) further supports the
conclusion OSHA drew, in its main benefits analysis, that the total
benefits of the final rule exceed the total costs of the final rule.
Table 29 indicates that, for four categories of hazards, less
than 10 percent of potential benefits are necessary for benefits to
break even with the costs of the provisions addressing those
hazards. One category of hazard in Table 29, arc-flash-related
accidents, has a breakeven effectiveness of 23.8 percent. OSHA
concludes that the benefits of the final rule's provisions
addressing these five categories of hazards will outweigh the costs
of these provisions. First, as explained earlier, in discussing the
first sensitivity analysis, if there is full compliance with all
provisions necessary to protect against arc-flash, electric-shock,
and climbing fall protection-related accidents (including the
relevant work-practice and training, information-transfer, and job-
briefing provisions), then there will be no fatalities and few or no
serious injuries involving arc flash, electric shock, and climbing
fall protection. Second, the break-even percentage associated with
the aerial-lift fall-protection hazard is only 2.3 percent of
relevant benefits (or 2.3 percent of 0.8 fatalities and 4.9 serious
injuries). The new aerial-lift fall-protection provision should
prevent at least this small percentage of fatalities and serious
injuries. As discussed in the first sensitivity analysis, using body
harnesses instead of body belts will not only reduce the number of
fatalities and the severity of some injuries, but also increase the
probability that employees use fall protection because it is not
always possible for an employer to detect from the ground whether an
employee is wearing a body belt, but it is relatively easy to
determine whether an employee is wearing a body harness. Finally,
the relevant benefits of the job-briefing and information-transfer
provisions outweigh the costs assigned to the "other" category
(which has a break-even percentage of 8.9 percent of 3.8 fatalities
and 23.1 serious injuries). The relevant benefits should prevent at
least this small percentage of fatalities and serious injuries. The
accidents associated with the "other" category all involved
employer failure to comply with the work practices required by the
existing standard. As explained earlier, the information provided to
employees through the new job-briefing and information-transfer
requirements will facilitate employee compliance with these existing
work-practice requirements. OSHA concludes that the relevant
benefits will outweigh the relevant costs because of greater
compliance with existing rules that the costs will engender.
Finally, the two sensitivity analyses OSHA conducted support the
conclusion that, given full compliance with the final rule, the
total benefits of the final rule exceed the total costs of the rule.
The single-provision analysis, in Table 25 and Table 26, established
the break-even percentages that are necessary for the benefits of
single provisions to meet or exceed costs. In discussing that
analysis, OSHA explained that it was reasonable to conclude, for
each of the provisions, that benefits meet or exceed costs. Since it
is reasonable to conclude, with respect to individual provisions,
that benefits meet or exceed costs, it also is reasonable to
conclude, based on this analysis, that the total benefits of the
final rule meet or exceed total costs.
It is also reasonable to conclude, based on the second
sensitivity analysis, that the total benefits of the final rule meet
or exceed total costs. Table 29 provides that the final rule will
have total benefits at least equal to total costs if the rule
prevents 12.0 percent or more of potentially preventable accidents.
Thus, according to Table 29, the final rule will have benefits that
are equal to or exceed costs if the rule prevents at least 5.5
fatalities and 33 injuries per year (that is, 12.0 percent of the
45.5 total fatalities and 273.1 total injuries potentially prevented
annually by the final rule).\535\ Full compliance with the final
rule will almost certainly prevent 12.0 percent or more of
potentially preventable accidents because, as explained in the
discussion of the first sensitivity analysis, fatalities and serious
injuries from climbing fall protection, minimum approach-distance,
and arc-flash-related accidents are virtually impossible if there is
full compliance with the final rule. According to Table 29, these
hazards together account for 55.2 percent of all accidents OSHA
reviewed for this supplemental analysis, as well as 40.8 fatalities
and 245.1 injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\535\ The 45.5 total potentially prevented annual fatalities and
273.1 total potentially prevented annual injuries are the sums of
the fatalities and injuries potentially prevented annually for each
accident type, from columns 3 and 4 in Table 29.
Provision category
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information transfer Job briefing Training other than Training in fall
Accident category -------------------------------------------- fall protection for protection for
structures* structures*
Number Percent Number Percent -------------------------------------------
Number Percent Number Percent
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Falls from Aerial Lifts......................................... 0 0 0 0 3 2 N/A N/A
Falls from Structures........................................... 0 0 1 1 N/A N/A 10 100
Electric Shock, Too Close to Live Parts......................... 53 69 96 63 95 71 N/A N/A
Burns from Arc Flash............................................ 13 17 42 27 36 27 N/A N/A
Accidents Other than Those Listed Above......................... 11 14 14 9 0 0 N/A N/A
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total....................................................... 77 100 153 100 134 100 10 100
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Provision category
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aerial lift fall Climbing fall Approach distance Arc flash
Accident category protection protection -------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Falls from Aerial Lifts......................................... 3 100 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Falls from Structures........................................... ......... ......... 10 100 ......... ......... ......... .........
Electric Shock, Too Close to Live Parts......................... ......... ......... ......... ......... 96 100 ......... .........
Burns from Arc Flash............................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 42 100
Accidents Other than Those Listed Above......................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total....................................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The FEA separately estimates costs for training employees in upgraded fall protection for poles, towers, or similar
structures.
Table 28--Accident Categories and Total Number and Percent of Accidents Potentially Prevented by All Provisions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accident category Number * Percent [dagger]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Falls from Aerial Lifts....................................... 3 1.1
Falls from Structures......................................... 10 3.7
Electric Shock, Too Close to Live Parts....................... 96 35.8
Burns from Arc Flash.......................................... 42 15.7
Accidents Other than Those Listed Above....................... 14 5.2
-------------------------------------------------
Total....................................................... 165 61.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Number of accidents addressed by the final rule.
[dagger] Percent of 268 total accidents.
Table 29--The Benefits and Costs of Provisions of the Electric Power Generation
Standard Compared, by Type of Accident
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of
relevant Aggregate Portion of Annualized Percentage of
accidents Fatalities Injuries Total potential annualized relevant cost of potential
Type of accident/relevant provisions addressed by potentially potentially annual monetized cost of accidents preventing benefits
provisions prevented prevented benefits[Dagger] provisions related to particular needed to
(from Table annually* annually[dagger] (from FEA) particular hazard break even
28) provision with costs**
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aerial Lift Fall Protection:
Equipment............................................... .............. .............. ................ ................ $113,222 1 $113,222 ..............
Training................................................ .............. .............. ................ ................ 2,950,935 0.02 59,019 ..............
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBTOTAL............................................ 1.1 0.8 4.9 $7,384,608 .............. .............. 172,241 2.3
Climbing Fall Protection:
Equipment............................................... .............. .............. ................ ................ 451,768 1 451,768 ..............
Training[dagger][dagger]................................ .............. .............. ................ ................ 68,719 1 68,719 ..............
Job Briefing............................................ .............. .............. ................ ................ 6,697,557 0.01 66,976 ..............
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBTOTAL............................................ 3.7 2.7 16.4 24,839,136 .............. .............. 587,463 2.4
MAD:
Evaluation/Equipment.................................... .............. .............. ................ ................ 1,807,505 1 1,807,505 ..............
Training................................................ .............. .............. ................ ................ 2,950,935 0.71 2,095,164 ..............
Information Transfer.................................... .............. .............. ................ ................ 17,820,841 0.69 12,296,380 ..............
Job Briefing............................................ .............. .............. ................ ................ 6,697,557 0.63 4,219,461 ..............
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBTOTAL............................................ 35.8 26.5 159.0 240,335,424 .............. .............. 20,418,510 8.5
Arc-Flash Protection:
Evaluation/Equipment.................................... .............. .............. ................ ................ 19,446,147 1 19,446,147 ..............
Training................................................ .............. .............. ................ ................ 2,950,935 0.27 796,753 ..............
Information Transfer.................................... .............. .............. ................ ................ 17,820,841 0.17 3,029,543 ..............
Job Briefing............................................ .............. .............. ................ ................ 6,697,557 0.27 1,808,341 ..............
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBTOTAL............................................ 15.7 11.6 69.7 105,398,496 .............. .............. 25,080,783 23.8
Other:
Information Transfer.................................... .............. .............. ................ ................ 17,820,841 0.14 2,494,918 ..............
Job Briefing............................................ .............. .............. ................ ................ 6,697,557 0.09 602,780 ..............
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBTOTAL............................................ 5.2 3.8 23.1 34,909,056 .............. .............. 3,097,698 8.9
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL........................................... 61.5 45.5 273.1 412,866,720 .............. .............. 49,356,694 12.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Percentage of accidents potentially prevented (from Table 28) multiplied by 74 (the number of fatalities of the type
addressed by the final rule).
[dagger] Percentage of accidents potentially prevented (from Table 28) multiplied by 444 (the number of injuries of the type
addressed by the final rule).
[Dagger] Cases valued at $8.7 million per fatality, $62,000 per injury.
From Table 27.
** Percentage of Potential Benefits Needed to Break Even with Costs derived by dividing the costs in column 8 by the
benefits in column 5.
[dagger] In the FEA, OSHA separately estimated costs associated with training employees on the revised fall-protection
requirements for climbing and changing location on poles, towers, and similar structures.
Note: Totals may not equal the sum or product of the components due to rounding.
F. Technological Feasibility
In accordance with the OSH Act, OSHA must demonstrate that
occupational safety and health standards promulgated by the Agency are
technologically feasible. OSHA demonstrates that a standard is
technologically feasible "by pointing to technology that is either
already in use or has been conceived and is reasonably capable of
experimental refinement and distribution within the standard's
deadlines" (American Iron and Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 939 F.2d 975, 980
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted)). OSHA
reviewed each of the requirements imposed by the final rule and
determined that compliance with the requirements of the rule is
technologically feasible for all affected industries, that employers
can achieve compliance with all of the final requirements using readily
and widely available technologies, and that there are no technological
constraints associated with compliance with any of the final
requirements.
The final rule in Subpart V and Sec. 1910.269 includes several new
provisions or requirements that differ from the proposed rule. These
modifications primarily involve personnel time to develop programs and
procedures and to train employees. Any equipment required to comply is
either currently in use or readily available. OSHA determined, based on
its review, that all of the work practices and specifications required
by the final standard are consistent with equipment procurement,
installation, and work practices widely accepted in these industries.
Several factors support OSHA's determination regarding the
technological feasibility of the final rule. First, OSHA concluded that
compliance with existing Sec. 1910.137 and Sec. 1910.269 was
technologically feasible when it promulgated those standards in 1994
(59 FR 4431). OSHA carefully reviewed the application of these
provisions to construction operations and determined that the
provisions in the final rule that OSHA based on the existing standards
are technologically feasible in these operations. In fact, OSHA
estimated as part of its cost analysis that 95 percent of firms that
perform work for the construction of electric power transmission and
distribution lines and equipment are currently following these
standards because the firms also perform repair and maintenance work
subject to Sec. 1910.269.
Second, the provisions in the standard not based on existing
standards are also technologically feasible. As is evident from the
discussion of Sec. 1926.960(g)(2) in Section V, Summary and
Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble, any software
that employers might have to use to comply with the final arc-hazard
assessment provision is readily and widely available. Moreover, as is
evident from the compliance-rate data discussed in this section of the
preamble, the arc-flash protective equipment required by the final rule
is readily and widely available, and the harnesses and work-positioning
equipment required by the final rule are also readily and widely
available.\536\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\536\ For voltages of 50 to 300 volts, Table R-3 specifies a
minimum approach distance of "avoid contact." The minimum approach
distance for this voltage range contains neither an electrical
component nor an ergonomic component.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, OSHA based many of the provisions in the final rule on
national consensus standards, or indicated in the regulatory text of
the final rule that it would deem employers that comply with specific
provisions of certain national consensus standards to be in compliance
with specified provisions of the final rule. Reliance on a national
consensus standard provides assurance that a broad consensus of
industry representatives recognize that a means of compliance is an
appropriate way to comply and is, therefore, technologically feasible.
Fourth, in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule,
earlier in this preamble, OSHA adequately responded to issues
associated with the technological feasibility of specific provisions.
In that section of the preamble, OSHA discussed technological
feasibility concerns raised by rulemaking participants and also
discussed the technological feasibility of provisions that differ from
the proposed rule (such as the changes to the fall protection and
minimum approach-distance requirements). The legal test for proving
technological feasibility requires OSHA to establish a "reasonable
possibility that the typical firm will be able to . . . meet the
[standard's requirement] in most of its operations" (American Iron and
Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 939 F.2d 975, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam)
(internal citation omitted)). The following examples demonstrate how
OSHA satisfied this test with respect to the key minimum approach
distance and fall protection provisions.
In the section addressing OSHA's revision of the minimum approach-
distance requirements, OSHA addressed concerns that not all systems
have the space necessary to accommodate the larger minimum approach
distances that may result when an employer uses the final rule's new
default values for maximum per-unit transient overvoltages. (See the
discussion of Sec. 1926.960(c)(1).) Instead of using these default
values, employers may use an engineering analysis to determine the
actual values for maximum per-unit transient overvoltages and then
apply these values when calculating the required minimum approach
distances. However, even then it is possible for the transient
overvoltages to result in a minimum approach distance that exceeds the
available space. In such cases, employers have the option of reducing
the maximum transient overvoltages by implementing such measures as
portable protective gaps, portable lightning arresters, circuit
alterations, or operational controls (including disabling the automatic
reclosing feature on the circuit and restricting circuit switching).
Finally, if employers cannot use any of these measures to reduce the
maximum transient overvoltages and, thereby, lessen the minimum
approach distances, they have the option of deenergizing the circuit to
perform the work. Therefore, the final rule's minimum approach-distance
requirements will not prevent employers from completing their work.
With respect to the final rule's requirement that qualified
employees use fall protection when climbing and changing location on
poles, towers, or similar structures, OSHA concluded, based on the
record, that under these conditions it is generally feasible for
employees to climb and change location while using fall protection.
(See the discussion of Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii).) Substantial evidence
in the record supports OSHA's determination that the final rule is
technologically feasible, notwithstanding the Agency's acknowledgment
in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in
this preamble, that there may be limited circumstances that preclude
the use of fall protection while qualified employees are climbing, or
changing location on, a structure. OSHA addressed this issue by
incorporating into the final standard an exception to the requirement
for fall protection under these circumstances. Accordingly, the final
rule provides that qualified employees need not use fall protection
when climbing or changing location on poles, towers, or similar
structures if the employer can demonstrate that climbing or changing
location with fall protection is infeasible or creates a greater hazard
than climbing or changing location without it. (See Sec.
1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(C).)
G. Costs of Compliance
1. Introduction
This portion of the analysis presents the estimated costs of
compliance for the final rule. The estimated costs of compliance
represent the additional costs necessary for employers to achieve full
compliance. They do not include costs for employers that are already
complying with the new requirements, nor do they include costs
associated with achieving full compliance with existing applicable
requirements.
This analysis includes all elements of the final rulemaking,
including changes to 29 CFR Part 1910 and 29 CFR Part 1926. OSHA
analyzed this consolidated set of actions in its entirety and included
only parts of the final rule identified as imposing more than
negligible costs in the analysis of compliance costs and impacts. The
provisions of the rule with costs accounted for in this section
include:
Paragraph (b)(1) of Sec. 1926.950 and Sec.
1910.269(a)(2)(i) require each employee to receive training in, and to
be familiar with, the safety-related work practices, safety procedures,
and other safety requirements that pertain to his or her respective job
assignments, as well as applicable emergency procedures.
Table 30 refers to the nonnegligible costs of these provisions as
"Training."
Paragraph (c) of Sec. 1926.950 and Sec. 1910.269(a)(3)
require host employers to provide certain information to contract
employers, contract employers to provide certain information to host
employers, and some coordination between host employers and contract
employers. Table 30 refers to the nonnegligible costs of these
provisions as "Host-contractor communication."
Paragraph (a)(1) of Sec. 1926.952 and Sec.
1910.269(c)(1)(i) require the employer to provide the employee in
charge of the job with all available information that relates to the
determination of existing characteristics and conditions that the crew
must complete. Table 30 refers to the nonnegligible costs of these
provisions as "Job briefing."
Paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(A) of Sec. 1926.954 and Sec.
1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(1) require that employees working in aerial lifts
use appropriate fall protection. Table 30 refers to the nonnegligible
costs of these provisions as "Use of harnesses in aerial lifts."
Paragraphs (b)(3)(iii)(B) and (b)(3)(iii)(C) of Sec.
1926.954 and Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(2) and (g)(2)(iv)(C)(3)
require employees climbing or changing work locations at elevated
locations more than 1.2 meters (4 feet) above the ground on poles,
towers, or similar structures to use appropriate fall protection. Table
30 refers to the nonnegligible costs of these provisions as "Upgrading
fall protection equipment."
Paragraph (c)(1) of Sec. 1926.960 and Sec.
1910.269(l)(3) require the employer to establish minimum approach
distances and to ensure that no employee approaches or takes any
conductive object closer to exposed energized parts than the
established MAD, unless they use certain, specified safe work
practices. Table 30 refers to the nonnegligible costs of these
provisions as "MAD."
Paragraph (g)(1) of Sec. 1926.960 and Sec.
1910.269(l)(8)(i) require employers to perform a hazard assessment to
determine if each employee would be exposed to hazards from flames or
from electric arcs. For employees exposed to such hazards, Sec. Sec.
1926.960(g)(2) and 1910.269(l)(8)(ii) require the employer to make a
reasonable estimate of the incident heat energy of each such exposure.
Table 30 refers to the nonnegligible costs of these provisions as
"Arc-hazard assessment."
Paragraphs (g)(4) and (g)(5) of Sec. 1926.960 and Sec.
1910.269(l)(8)(iv) and (l)(8)(v) require the employer to select, and
ensure that employees use, appropriate flame-resistant and arc-rated
clothing and equipment (collectively referred to as arc-flash
protective equipment). Table 30 refers to the nonnegligible costs of
these provisions as "Provision of appropriate arc-flash protective
equipment."
Table 30 presents the total annualized estimated costs by provision
and by industry sector.
Table 30--Summary of Compliance Cost by Industry and Provision
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calculating
Other costs incident
Host- for employees energy and arc-
Industry code Industry name Training contractor Job briefing not already hazard
communication covered by assessment
Sec. (arc-hazard
1910.269 assessment)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910........................... Water, Sewer, and Pipeline $59,908 $150,214 $70,743 $4,427 NA
Construction.
NAICS 234920........................... Power and Communication 1,579,831 1,891,463 1,777,657 121,855 NA
Transmission Line Construction.
NAICS 234930........................... Industrial Nonbuilding 3,216 204,286 70,999 NA NA
Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990........................... All Other Heavy Construction... 317,634 894,356 424,921 25,941 NA
NAICS 235310........................... Electrical Contractors......... 840,667 2,702,235 1,545,162 76,067 NA
NAICS 235910........................... Structural Steel Erection 5,642 47,763 24,717 NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 235950........................... Building Equipment and Other 8,134 44,957 23,197 NA NA
Machine Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990........................... All Other Special Trade 23,289 124,535 71,957 NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 221110........................... Electric Power Generation...... 29,583 2,397,541 675,284 NA $628,793
NAICS 221120........................... Electric Power Transmission, 54,588 6,393,786 1,144,815 NA 1,012,130
Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211............................. Major Publicly Owned Utilities. 7,345 571,626 153,887 NA 261,913
Various................................ Industrial Power Generators.... 4,778 648,391 306,992 NA 284,046
SIC 0783............................... Ornamental Shrub and Tree 16,321 1,749,688 407,227 NA NA
Services.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.............................. ............................... 2,950,935 17,820,841 6,697,557 228,289 2,186,883
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Provision of
appropriate Use of Upgrading fall Total
Industry code Industry name arc-flash harnesses in protection MAD annualized
protective aerial lifts equipment compliance
equipment costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910........................... Water, Sewer, and Pipeline $180,982 NA NA NA $466,274
Construction.
NAICS 234920........................... Power and Communication 5,051,365 NA $108,190 NA 10,530,361
Transmission Line Construction.
NAICS 234930........................... Industrial Nonbuilding 216,963 NA NA NA 495,465
Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990........................... All Other Heavy Construction... 1,141,710 NA NA NA 2,804,561
NAICS 235310........................... Electrical Contractors......... 3,468,183 NA NA NA 8,632,314
NAICS 235910........................... Structural Steel Erection 58,585 NA NA NA 136,706
Contractors.
NAICS 235950........................... Building Equipment and Other 54,894 NA NA NA 131,182
Machine Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990........................... All Other Special Trade 174,370 NA NA NA 394,151
Contractors.
NAICS 221110........................... Electric Power Generation...... 2,084,506 NA 116,972 NA 5,932,679
NAICS 221120........................... Electric Power Transmission, 3,546,921 NA 199,879 $1,593,692 13,945,811
Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211............................. Major Publicly Owned Utilities. 475,610 NA 26,727 213,812 1,710,921
Various................................ Industrial Power Generators.... 805,175 $48,612 NA NA 2,097,993
SIC 0783............................... Ornamental Shrub and Tree 0 64,610 NA NA 2,237,846
Services.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.............................. ............................... 17,259,264 113,222 451,768 1,807,505 49,516,264
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
Sources: Office of Regulatory Analysis, OSHA. See text.
As shown in Table 30, OSHA estimated the total annualized cost of
compliance with the final rule to be about $49.5 million. The largest
component of the compliance costs, at approximately $17.3 million
annually, is the cost of providing arc-flash protective equipment. The
other provisions of the final rule resulting in nonnegligible
compliance costs include training ($3.0 million), host-contractor
communication ($17.8 million), job briefing ($6.7 million), calculating
incident energy and arc-hazard assessment (arc-hazard assessment) ($2.2
million), use of harnesses in aerial lifts ($0.1 million), upgrading
fall protection equipment ($0.5 million), and MAD ($1.8 million). In
addition, the Agency estimated other minor costs for employees
potentially not covered by existing Sec. 1910.269 ($0.2 million).
The remainder of this portion of the analysis explains the details
underlying the calculations of the compliance costs associated with the
final rule. OSHA estimated compliance costs for each provision of the
rule that involves nonnegligible costs and for each affected industry
sector. OSHA calculated total annualized costs by annualizing
nonrecurring one-time costs (at 7 percent over 10 years) and then
adding these costs to recurring annual costs.\536\ The calculations of
the estimated costs associated with compliance are representative of
the average resources necessary to achieve compliance with the final
rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\536\ OSHA annualized one-time costs using the formula Ct = C
i(1 + i) t/(1 + i) t -1, where C is the total one-time cost (also
referred to as the "Present Value"), i is the interest rate, and t
is the number of years over which the cost is annualized (for
example, the life of equipment). Loan-payment formulas, which can be
used to calculate annualized payments for one-time costs, are
standard items in spreadsheet software. To use these formulas to
calculate annualized costs, substitute the annualization interest
rate for the interest rate on the loan, the number of years of
annualization for the loan period, and the one-time cost for the
present value of the loan (the amount borrowed).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA based labor costs on industry-specific wage rates published by
BLS [37], then, using data from its National Compensation Survey, OSHA
adjusted those rates upwards by 43.5 percent to account for benefits
and other employee-related costs [36], as presented in Table 31.\537\
OSHA estimated supervisory wage rates, including benefits, to be $29.20
per hour in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry, with an
estimated range of $41.55 to $50.60 in all other affected industries.
The Agency estimated electric power worker wage rates, including
benefits, to be $21.26 per hour in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree
Services industry, with an estimated range of $29.99 to $40.77 in all
other affected industries. OSHA estimated wage rates for engineers in
the electric utility industry, including benefits, to be $51.94 per
hour. The Agency estimated clerical wage rates, including benefits, to
be $20.27 per hour in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry,
with an estimated range of $22.44 to $28.75 in all other affected
industries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\537\ The survey indicated the benefits component to be 30.3
percent of total compensation, the remainder being wages. The
adjustment represents wages x (30.3/69.7). As elsewhere in the
analysis, OSHA has performed its calculation on the precise
fraction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The appropriate sections of this analysis address the comments on
the costs of specific provisions of the final rule. For other
provisions, OSHA adhered to the general approach it adopted in the
PRIA. In most cases, commenters did not question the cost methodology
used in the PRIA; therefore, OSHA carried this methodology over to this
FEA. OSHA notes that, unless otherwise indicated, any increase in cost
in the FEA above the costs in the PRIA is due to market factors, such
as inflation and an increase in employment or number of projects in the
relevant industries.
Table 31--Summary of Wage Rates for Calculating Compliance Costs, by Industry
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electric Health and
Industry code Industry name Supervisor Clerical power Utility Utility safety Consultant
worker * supervisor engineer specialist
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910......................... Water, Sewer, and Pipeline $42.35 $23.76 $34.55 NA NA NA NA
Construction.
NAICS 234920......................... Power and Communication 42.35 23.76 34.55 NA NA NA NA
Transmission Line Construction.
NAICS 234930......................... Industrial Nonbuilding 42.30 24.46 34.55 NA NA NA NA
Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990......................... All Other Heavy Construction... 41.81 23.60 29.99 NA NA NA NA
NAICS 235310......................... Electrical Contractors......... 42.47 23.10 37.49 NA NA NA NA
NAICS 235910......................... Structural Steel Erection 42.27 22.44 37.49 NA NA NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 235950......................... Building Equipment and Other 42.47 23.10 37.49 NA NA NA NA
Machine Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990......................... All Other Special Trade 41.55 23.13 30.72 NA NA NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 221110......................... Electric Power Generation...... 50.60 28.75 40.77 $50.60 $51.94 $50.79 $250.00
NAICS 221120......................... Electric Power Transmission, 50.60 28.75 40.77 50.60 51.94 NA 250.00
Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211........................... Major Publicly Owned Utilities. 50.60 28.75 40.77 50.60 51.94 NA 250.00
Various.............................. Industrial Power Generators.... 50.60 28.75 40.77 50.60 51.94 NA 250.00
SIC 0783............................. Ornamental Shrub and Tree 29.20 20.27 21.26 NA NA NA NA
Services.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Depending upon the industry and the type of work performed (that is, power generation, power line, or both), these workers
include line workers, tree-trimming crew members, power plant workers, and substation workers.
Notes: (1) Wage rates include an additional 30.3 percent of base salary for fringe-benefit costs.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
Sources: BLS [36, 37].
For most provisions of the final rule, OSHA based the cost estimate
in part on the estimated percentage of workers or firms already in
compliance with the rule's requirements. OSHA originally drew the
compliance rates used to calculate costs from CONSAD's report in
support of the PRIA [5], which commenters on the proposal did not
question, except as noted. In most cases, CONSAD estimated different
compliance rates for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized
establishments, large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized
establishments.\538\ There are a few exceptions: Major Publicly Owned
Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC
0783) only have compliance-rate estimates for small and large
establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance-
rate estimate for large establishments. Generally, following the
findings of CONSAD's report [5], OSHA estimated that larger
establishments and unionized workforces have higher compliance rates
than smaller establishments and nonunionized establishments. The
compliance cost tables presented later in this section of the preamble
list these compliance rates as appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\538\ As with other assertions in this analysis not supported
directly by a citation, OSHA based its estimates on CONSAD's
analysis. CONSAD based its initial estimates on information gathered
from Agency stakeholder meetings held in 2000 and from site visits
conducted in 2001 and 2002. These initial estimates were reviewed by
small entity representatives during the SBREFA process, in
accordance with the SBREFA Panel findings, as summarized in the 2003
report of the Small Business Advocacy Review Panel [29]. CONSAD
subsequently modified its estimates to reflect the findings of the
Panel. CONSAD also incorporated information from the regulatory
analysis, and supporting research, for the 1994 Sec. 1910.269
rulemaking and from regulatory analyses for related rulemakings. The
CONSAD report was finalized in 2005 [5]. Unless otherwise specified,
OSHA received no objections to, or new evidence about, CONSAD's
estimates, and the estimates were not altered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One-Time Costs for Revising Training Programs
Establishments covered by this final rule may need to revise their
existing training programs to accommodate the amendments to existing
standards made in this final rule. For example, employers may need to
revise their training programs to address revisions in the employers'
minimum approach distances or arc-flash protection practices. However,
these costs are one-time costs only because employers will have to
revise these training programs once. These costs, therefore, merely
reflect the transitional costs of the new standard.
For all industries except for Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services,
OSHA estimated the costs associated with revising training programs
based on 8 hours of supervisory time plus an hour of clerical
time.\539\ Due to the limited and less complex training required for
employees in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry, OSHA
estimated the costs associated with revising a training program in this
industry based on 4 hours of supervisory time plus half an hour of
clerical time [5].\540\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\539\ One commenter suggested that it would take more than 8
hours to revise its training program (Ex. 0240). While it is
possible that some larger employers with complex operations may find
this to be the case, the Agency believes its estimate is a
reasonable average, in part because employers already are training
employees in need of training on existing Sec. 1910.269 and, in
many cases, already are operating under elements of the final
standard.
\540\ OSHA is retaining from the PRIA its estimate of 4 hours of
supervisory time, plus a half an hour of clerical time, for the
Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry (70 FR 34905). Although
no commenter objected to the estimate in the PRIA, OSHA now believes
the estimate is conservative given the limited obligations on this
industry specified by the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, OSHA estimates that the average cost of compliance per
affected establishment for revising existing training programs will be
$127 for establishments in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services
industry and $356 to $434 per establishment in all other affected
industries.
Most establishments in the affected industries either already have
training programs that meet the requirements of the final rule or
regularly revise their training programs to account for new information
or work practices. These establishments will not incur any additional
costs to achieve compliance with the final rule.
OSHA estimated rates of current compliance for each affected
industry. Within each industry, the Agency estimated rates of current
compliance separately for establishments based on
their size and on whether they had a unionized workforce. In the
Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry, estimated rates of current
compliance range from 50 to 75 percent. In all other affected
industries, OSHA estimated rates of current compliance to range from 75
to 98 percent [5].
The total estimated cost of compliance for revising training
programs is $0.7 million. Annualizing this nonrecurring one-time cost
at a rate of 7 percent over 10 years \541\ results in a total estimated
annualized cost of approximately $0.1 million for all affected
industries, as shown in Table 32. Table 32 also shows the costs of
compliance for each affected industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\541\ Unless otherwise discussed in this FEA, and as with most
other one-time costs under the final standard, OSHA annualized costs
assuming that initial costs will occur in the first year after
promulgation of the standard. OSHA notes that the PRIA referred to
one-time costs as first-year costs. The Agency did not annualize
these costs when initially presented in the PRIA, but did annualize
them in the FEA.
Table 32--Annualized One-Time Costs for Revising Training Programs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average cost per Annualized one-
Industry code Industry name Establishments affected Compliance rates time compliance
affected (%) establishment (%) costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910........... Water, Sewer, 95 $363 90/75/95/85 $6,426
and Pipeline
Construction.
NAICS 234920........... Power and 95 363 90/75/95/85 21,836
Communication
Transmission
Line
Construction.
NAICS 234930........... Industrial 100 363 90/75/95/85 1,804
Nonbuilding
Structure
Construction.
NAICS 234990........... All Other Heavy 95 358 90/75/95/85 5,233
Construction.
NAICS 235310........... Electrical 95 363 90/75/95/85 13,158
Contractors.
NAICS 235910........... Structural 100 361 90/75/95/85 5,258
Steel Erection
Contractors.
NAICS 235950........... Building 100 363 90/75/95/85 7,774
Equipment and
Other Machine
Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990........... All Other 100 356 90/75/95/85 22,351
Special Trade
Contractors.
NAICS 221110........... Electric Power 100 434 95/95/98/98 3,325
Generation.
NAICS 221120........... Electric Power 100 434 95/95/98/98 9,821
Transmission,
Control, and
Distribution.
NAICS 2211............. Major Publicly 100 434 95/98 1,350
Owned
Utilities.
Various................ Industrial 100 434 98 1,127
Power
Generators.
SIC 0783............... Ornamental 100 127 50/75 2,130
Shrub and Tree
Services.
Total.............. ............... ................ ................ ................ 101,592
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large
establishments.
Sources: CONSAD [5], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
One-Time Costs for Providing Additional Training for Employees Already
Receiving Training in Accordance With Existing Sec. 1910.269
The final rule will impose costs related to the additional training
required for employees currently receiving training that complies with
existing Sec. 1910.269. The costs in this section describe the cost of
performing the training once the employer redesigns the program. As
discussed in greater depth elsewhere, affected firms that perform
construction work typically will need to comply with requirements of
Sec. 1910.269 as their operations span both construction and general
industry operations. In this regard, Sec. 1910.269 already effectively
covers these firms. The discussion under the next heading provides
costs for the limited number of firms that perform only construction
operations.\542\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\542\ In the proposal, OSHA also accounted for on-going, annual
training costs. OSHA determined that this approach was an error.
Employers providing additional training for employees already
receiving training in accordance with existing Sec. 1910.269 will
not accrue new on-going training costs in conjunction with the
training requirements in revised Sec. 1910.269 because these
employers already must provide training under existing Sec.
1910.269; OSHA does not consider the modified requirements of the
revised standard to be more time-intensive than the existing
requirements. Any new training (including the training in the use of
fall protection for qualified climbers, discussed infra) replaces
training already required. In contrast, OSHA notes that any
employers providing additional training for employees not already
receiving training in accordance with existing Sec. 1910.269 will
accrue new on-going, annual training costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA estimates the costs associated with the additional training
required for these employees as involving resources (including labor
costs or other expenditures) equivalent to 1.5 hours of employee time
plus 12 minutes of supervisory time plus 3 minutes of clerical time per
employee for all affected industries, except Ornamental Shrub and Tree
Services [5].\543\ For establishments in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree
Services industry, OSHA estimates that providing additional training
involves resources (including labor costs or other expenditures)
equivalent to 0.75 hours of employee time plus 6 minutes of supervisory
time plus 3 minutes of clerical time per employee [id.].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\543\ Consistent with this estimate, one commenter, Siemens
Power Generation, Inc., noted that its employees already receive 4--
8 hours of electrical safety training per year (Ex. 0163). The
commenter indicated that the additional time OSHA allotted for
training was not sufficient for its workers. In response, the Agency
states that the assigned 1.5 hours additional training is an average
for most workers, including workers in the commenter's industry, and
that the allotted time should be sufficient to address the hazards
for workers in that industry. The Agency also emphasizes that this
estimate covers training on the new elements of the standard, not an
entire safety training course.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA estimates that the average cost of compliance for providing
the additional training will be 20 per employee for establishments in
the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry and will range from 55
to 73 per employee in all other affected industries.
OSHA accounted for new hires using a 3- to 53-percent turnover
rate, depending on the industry, and accounted for additional costs
associated with the transition to the final rule in the first-year by
halving the
applicable turnover rate for each industry. OSHA notes that it
increased the estimated turnover rate for Ornamental Shrub and Tree
Services from 31 percent to 53 percent based on comments received from
the Tree Care Industry Association (Exs. 0419, 0503). Table 33 shows
the estimated turnover rates for the various affected industry
segments.\544\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\544\ The FEA carries over the assumption, presented in the
original CONSAD analysis and carried through the PRIA, of additional
one-time training costs related to turnover. OSHA received no
comments on this approach. The consideration of turnover here is to
account for potential transitional costs related to the incremental
increase in the time it takes to train new employees. In any event,
inclusion of these costs results, at most, in a more conservative
(and perhaps overestimated) estimate of costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on research conducted by CONSAD, OSHA estimates that most
establishments in affected industries already are providing training
that fully complies with the requirements of the final rule [5]. These
establishments will not incur any costs for training under the final
rule.
OSHA estimated the rates of current compliance with the final
requirements for each affected industry. Within each industry, the
Agency estimated rates of current compliance separately for
establishments based on their size and whether they have a unionized
workforce. In the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry,
estimated rates of current compliance range from 50 to 75 percent. In
all other affected industries, the estimated rates of current
compliance range from 75 to 98 percent [5].
The total estimated one-time cost of compliance for providing
training that meets the requirements of the final rule is 0.6 million.
When OSHA annualized this nonrecurring one-time cost at a rate of 7
percent over 10 years, it results in total estimated annualized costs
of approximately 0.1 million, as shown in Table 33. Table 33 also shows
the costs of compliance for each affected industry.
Table 33--Annualized One-Time Costs for Providing Additional Training to Employees Already Receiving Training in
Accordance With Existing Sec.
1910.269
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% workers Average Annualized
Employees Turnover in first- cost per Compliance one-time
Industry code Industry name affected rate (%) year affected rate (%) compliance
(%) transition employee costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910........................... Water, Sewer, and Pipeline 95 16 8 $61 90/75/95/85 $1,082
Construction.
NAICS 234920........................... Power and Communication 95 16 8 61 90/75/95/85 28,521
Transmission Line Construction.
NAICS 234930........................... Industrial Nonbuilding 100 16 8 62 90/75/95/85 1,413
Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990........................... All Other Heavy Construction... 95 16 8 55 90/75/95/85 5,984
NAICS 235310........................... Electrical Contractors......... 95 11 6 66 90/75/95/85 21,348
NAICS 235910........................... Structural Steel Erection 100 11 6 66 90/75/95/85 384
Contractors.
NAICS 235950........................... Building Equipment and Other 100 11 6 66 90/75/95/85 360
Machine Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990........................... All Other Special Trade 100 11 6 56 90/75/95/85 938
Contractors.
NAICS 221110........................... Electric Power Generation...... 100 3 2 73 95/95/98/98 8,023
NAICS 221120........................... Electric Power Transmission, 100 3 2 73 95/95/98/98 13,608
Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211............................. Major Publicly Owned Utilities. 100 3 2 73 95/98 1,829
Various................................ Industrial Power Generators.... 100 3 2 73 98 3,651
SIC 0783............................... Ornamental Shrub and Tree 100 53 27 20 50/75 14,191
Services.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.............................. ............................... ........... ........... ........... ........... ............ 101,332
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large establishments.
Sources: CONSAD [5], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
One-Time Costs for Additional Training for Employees Not Already
Receiving Training in Accordance with Existing Sec. 1910.269
Companies that perform construction work associated with electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution systems generally are
also able and willing to perform (and do perform) similar work
involving the repair and maintenance of such systems. The distinction
between construction work and repair or maintenance work can be
difficult to make in some situations. For example, the distinction may
hinge on whether a particular piece of equipment is regarded as an
upgrade or a "replacement-in-kind."
Since the work is often almost identical, companies are not likely
to restrict themselves to only repair or maintenance work, or to only
construction work, with regard to potential jobs involving electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that any company involved in such work will have
their employees trained as required by the existing OSHA standard
addressing this type of work in general industry (Sec. 1910.269).
Small business representatives from the affected industries
providing
comments to OSHA on a draft of the proposed rule generally indicated
that construction contractors follow and comply with Sec. 1910.269 for
all of their work, including construction work. But some small business
representatives indicated that there are some companies that follow the
existing standards for construction work in Subpart V, rather than the
standards for general industry work in Sec. 1910.269 [29].
When performing construction jobs covered by existing Subpart V,
employers may be able to avoid costs associated with complying with
Sec. 1910.269 requirements unrelated to training. However, those
employers would still incur training costs if they perform maintenance
jobs, which are covered by existing Sec. 1910.269. Thus, before the
compliance deadlines for the final rule, compliance with the training
requirements of Sec. 1910.269 in particular is likely, even if a
specific job involves only construction work and the employer follows
the relevant provisions of Subpart V.
The number of firms, if any, that do only construction work as
defined by OSHA, and, therefore, avoid providing a basic training
regimen for employees under existing Sec. 1910.269, is difficult to
estimate. One Small Entity Representative (SER) estimated that about 10
to 30 percent of contractors involved in electric power transmission
and distribution work may exclusively do construction; another
representative stated that it did not know of any contractor firms that
do exclusively construction work [29].
It is unlikely that contractors performing electric power
generation, transmission, or distribution work meet both of the
following criteria: (1) know and expect that, for all projects
performed, only construction work will be done such that they do not
need to train employees as required by existing Sec. 1910.269 and (2)
have employees work without providing them with what many consider to
be minimum basic safety training applicable to this type of work, as
specified in the training requirements in existing Sec. 1910.269. Only
contractors meeting both of these criteria will incur costs under the
final rule for training employees who are not already receiving
training in accordance with existing Sec. 1910.269.
In the development of the final rule, OSHA was not able to identify
any employers that performed work covered by Subpart V and did not
perform work covered by Sec. 1910.269. However, carrying over
assumptions presented in the PRIA, OSHA calculated costs based on an
estimate that 5 percent of the affected construction employees performs
no work covered by existing Sec. 1910.269, primarily in response to
the recommendations of the SBREFA Panel, as discussed in the Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. Therefore, for purposes of estimating
the costs of compliance associated with this final rule, OSHA estimates
that 5 percent of the affected employees in several construction
industries will need to receive the training required by existing Sec.
1910.269 for their employers to achieve full compliance.
Specifically, OSHA estimates that 5 percent of the affected
employees in the following industries will require this training:
Water, Sewer, and Pipeline Construction; Power and Communication
Transmission Line Construction; All Other Heavy Construction; and
Electrical Contractors. OSHA also accounted for new hires using an 11-
to 16-percent turnover rate, depending on the industry, and accounted
for additional costs associated with the transition to the final rule
in the first-year by halving the applicable turnover rate for each
industry.\545\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\545\ For a discussion of why the FEA carried over the
assumption, presented in the original CONSAD analysis and through
the PRIA, of additional one-time training costs related to turnover,
see supra, footnote 545.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One commenter stated:
While many contractors may be doing work covered by Sec.
1910.269 a good many of them don't think they do or are not aware of
it. Many if not all of their employees have never received training
required by Sec. 1910.269. We believe that OSHA's estimate of 5% of
contractor employees will need this training is way off. [Ex. 0186]
The contractors to which the commenter is referring are already
legally obligated to comply with training under Sec. 1910.269. These
are costs the employers in question should already be bearing. The
costs in this section only capture employers not currently required to
comply with Sec. 1910.269.
OSHA estimates the costs associated with the additional training
necessary to achieve full compliance with the final rule for employees
not already trained in accordance with Sec. 1910.269 as involving
resources (including labor costs or other expenditures) equivalent to
24.75 hours of employee time plus 3 minutes of clerical time per
employee in the affected industries.\546\ The Agency also includes a
cost for supervisor training not accounted for in the PRIA, with one
supervisor trained for every five workers. The Agency updated the
assumptions contained in the PRIA to reflect current costs and assumes
that these employees will receive their training in a training course
at $1,149 per person [28]. OSHA also updated the travel allowance of
$90 included in the PRIA to $99 using the Bureau of Economic Analysis'
Implicit Price Deflator for Gross Domestic Product [32]. The Agency
estimates that the average cost of compliance per affected employee for
the required training will range from $2,198 to $2,387 in the affected
industries. OSHA estimates current compliance of zero for this part of
the analysis [5]. Commenters did not question this assumption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\546\ CONSAD estimated the additional training would be
equivalent to 24 hours, rather than 24.75 hours, of employee time
[5]. OSHA's estimate (which it developed in the PRIA) reflects
additional transitional elements associated with these one-time
costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, the Agency estimates the total one-time cost of compliance
for providing additional training for employees not already trained in
accordance with Sec. 1910.269 to be $9.2 million. When OSHA annualized
this nonrecurring one-time cost at a rate of 7 percent over 10 years,
it resulted in estimated total annualized costs of approximately $2.7
million, as shown in Table 34. Table 34 also shows the costs of
compliance for each affected industry.
Annual Costs for Additional Training for Employees Not Already Covered
by Sec. 1910.269
As noted earlier, OSHA included training costs based on an estimate
that 5 percent of the affected construction workforce performs no work
covered by Sec. 1910.269. Specifically, OSHA estimates that these
training costs would affect 5 percent of the relevant workforce in the
following industries: Water, Sewer, and Pipeline Construction; Power
and Communication Transmission Line Construction; All Other Heavy
Construction; and Electrical Contractors.
OSHA estimated the annual costs associated with this additional
training for new affected employees as involving resources (including
labor costs or other expenditures) equivalent to 24 hours of supervisor
and worker time plus 3 minutes of clerical time per employee. OSHA
estimates that the average cost of compliance per affected employee for
the required training would range from $2,198 to $741,783 in the
affected industries.
The Agency estimated the number of affected employees in each
establishment needing training each year by determining the
corresponding workforce turnover rate. OSHA estimated the workforce
turnover rate associated with the relevant occupational category for
each
potentially affected industry. The estimated turnover rates among
employees performing electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work ranged from 11 to 16 percent in the affected
construction industries [5].
For the establishments and employees affected by the expansion of
the scope of this training requirement, OSHA estimated current
compliance to be zero [5].
The total estimated annual cost of compliance for providing
additional training for employees not already covered by Sec. 1910.269
(and not already provided with such training) was about $0.0 million.
Summing the annualized one-time costs and annual costs results in total
costs of approximately $0.0 million, as shown in Table 34.
Table 34--Annualized One-Time Costs and Annual Costs for Additional Training for Employees Not Already Receiving Training
in Accordance With Existing
Sec. 1910.269
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% workers Annualized Total,
Employees Turnover in first- Average cost per Compliance one-time Annual annualized
Industry code Industry name affected rate (%) year affected rate (%) compliance costs and annual
(%) transition employee\*\ costs costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910................ Water, Sewer, and 5 16 8 $2,314/$26,730 25671 $52,400 $0 $0
Pipeline Construction.
NAICS 234920................ Power and 5 16 8 2,314/741,783 772533 1,514,316 0 0
Communication
Transmission Line
Construction.
NAICS 234930................ Industrial Nonbuilding 0 NA NA NA 0 0 0 0
Structure
Construction.
NAICS 234990................ All Other Heavy 5 16 8 2,198/150,006 156411 306,417 0 0
Construction.
NAICS 235310................ Electrical Contractors 5 11 6 2,387/466,573 339587 806,160 0 0
NAICS 235910................ Structural Steel 0 NA NA NA 0 0 0 0
Erection Contractors.
NAICS 235950................ Building Equipment and 0 NA NA NA 0 0 0 0
Other Machine
Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990................ All Other Special 0 NA NA NA 0 0 0 0
Trade Contractors.
NAICS 221110................ Electric Power 0 NA NA NA 0 0 0 0
Generation.
NAICS 221120................ Electric Power 0 NA NA NA 0 0 0 0
Transmission,
Control, and
Distribution.
NAICS 2211.................. Major Publicly Owned 0 NA NA NA 0 0 0 0
Utilities.
Various..................... Industrial Power 0 NA NA NA 0 0 0 0
Generators.
SIC 0783.................... Ornamental Shrub and 0 NA NA NA 0 0 0 0
Tree Services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................... ...................... ......... ......... .......... ................. 1294201 2,679,293 0 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*The first value is the one-time cost; the second value is the annual cost.
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large establishments.
Sources: CONSAD [5], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
6. One-Time Costs for Training Qualified Employees in the Use of Fall
Protection
The final rule requires qualified employees climbing or changing
location on poles, towers, or similar structures to use fall protection
equipment unless the employer can demonstrate that climbing or changing
location with fall protection is infeasible or creates a greater hazard
than climbing or changing location without it. This provision requires
the use of new types of fall protection equipment, such as positioning
straps with built-in anchorage straps by qualified workers who climb
poles to work on electric equipment. Qualified employees will need to
receive brief training--OSHA estimates an hour--in the use of the new
fall protection equipment. To estimate the ratio of workers who climb
or change location on poles, towers, or similar structures to all
workers in that industry, OSHA divided the number of line installers
and repairers (51,440) in NAICS 221100 (Electric Power Generation,
Transmission and Distribution) by the total employment in that NAICS
(395,570) [39, 40]. OSHA assumed that the resulting value of 0.13 was
similar across all affected NAICSs.\547\ In addition to the 13 percent
of existing workers affected by this requirement, OSHA accounted for
turnover and the first-year transition to the final rule, as previously
noted.\548\ The compliance rate for this training is necessarily the
same as the compliance rate estimated for upgrading fall protection
equipment, that is, 50 percent across all affected NAICS. This approach
results in estimated total one-time costs of $0.4 million and
annualized one-time compliance costs of $0.07 million, as shown in
Table 35. Table 35 also shows the costs of compliance for each affected
industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\547\ OSHA's estimates of the one-time costs for training
qualified employees in the use of fall protection and the costs for
upgrading positioning straps as part of work-positioning equipment
are conservative, as OSHA based these estimates on the total number
of line installers and repairers, including underground power-line
installers and repairers, who generally do not need to climb or
change location on poles, towers, or similar structures. Employers
will generally neither need to provide and ensure the use of, nor
provide training on, the newly required type of work-positioning
equipment for this subset of workers.
\548\ For a discussion of why the FEA carried over the
assumption, presented in the original CONSAD analysis and through
the PRIA, of additional one-time training costs related to turnover,
see supra, footnote 545.
Table 35--Annualized One-Time Costs for Training in Use of Fall Protection for Qualified Employees
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% workers Average Annualized
Employees Turnover in first- cost per Compliance one-time
Industry code Industry name affected rate (%) year affected rate (%) compliance
(%) transition employee costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910........................... Water, Sewer, and Pipeline 0 NA NA NA NA $0
Construction.
NAICS 234920........................... Power and Communication 13 16 8 $44 50/50/50/50 15,159
Transmission Line
Construction.
NAICS 234930........................... Industrial Nonbuilding 0 NA NA NA NA 0
Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990........................... All Other Heavy Construction.. 0 NA NA NA NA 0
NAICS 235310........................... Electrical Contractors........ 0 NA NA NA NA 0
NAICS 235910........................... Structural Steel Erection 0 NA NA NA NA 0
Contractors.
NAICS 235950........................... Building Equipment and Other 0 NA NA NA NA 0
Machine Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990........................... All Other Special Trade 0 NA NA NA NA 0
Contractors.
NAICS 221110........................... Electric Power Generation..... 13 3 2 52 50/50/50/50 18,235
NAICS 221120........................... Electric Power Transmission, 13 3 2 52 50/50/50/50 31,159
Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211............................. Major Publicly Owned Utilities 13 3 2 52 50/50 4,166
Various................................ Industrial Power Generators... 0 0 0 NA NA 0
SIC 0783............................... Ornamental Shrub and Tree 0 NA NA NA NA 0
Services.
Total.............................. .............................. ........... ........... ........... ........... .............. 68,719
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large establishments.
Sources: BLS [39, 40], CONSAD [5], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
7. Costs To Comply With Existing Sec. 1910.269 (Other Than Training)
for Employers Not Already Covered by Sec. 1910.269
As described earlier, OSHA believes that construction contractors
that perform work involving electric power generation, transmission, or
distribution generally comply with the requirements of Sec. 1910.269.
Nevertheless, for purposes of estimating the costs of compliance
associated with this final rule, OSHA estimated costs associated with
complying with existing requirements in Sec. 1910.269 for some
construction establishments. Specifically, OSHA estimates that the
compliance costs associated with achieving full compliance with the
requirements of existing Sec. 1910.269 for the construction industry
will be equivalent to that represented by 5 percent of the relevant
workforce not being in compliance with the requirements of existing
Sec. 1910.269, which OSHA introduced in the general industry standards
in 1994. In the PRIA, OSHA identified the affected employees as being
in the following industries: Water, Sewer, and Pipeline Construction;
Power and Communication Transmission Line Construction; All Other Heavy
Construction; and Electrical Contractors. No commenters objected to
this approach.
In the analysis of the proposed rule published in 2005, OSHA
estimated the resources necessary to achieve compliance with the
relevant requirements to average about $64 per employee.\549\ This cost
is equivalent to that associated with compliance with existing Sec.
1910.269, as supported by the public record developed during
promulgation of that standard (59 FR 4320). There were no comments on
the PRIA questioning this estimate but OSHA has updated it from $64 in
2005 dollars to $70 in 2009 dollars to account for inflation, using the
Bureau of Economic Analysis' Implicit Price Deflator for Gross Domestic
Product [32].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\549\ OSHA derived this cost, which represents a composite of
the various annualized nontraining costs divided by the number of
affected employees, from the regulatory impact analysis supporting
the 1994 Sec. 1910.269 rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, the total estimated annual costs associated with achieving
compliance with the nontraining requirements of existing Sec. 1910.269
for the construction industry is $0.2 million, as shown in Table 36.
Table 36 also shows the costs of compliance for each affected
industry.\550\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\550\ This estimated cost increased over that estimated cost in
the PRIA because OSHA updated the unit cost and the estimates of
power workers in the affected industries (see the approach outlined
under the heading "Profile of Affected Industries").
Table 36--Annual Costs To Comply With Existing Sec. 1910.269 (Other Than Training) for Employees Not Already
Covered by Sec. 1910.269
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average
Employees cost per Compliance Annual
Industry code Industry name affected affected rates (%) compliance
(%) employee costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910..................... Water, Sewer, and 5 $70 0/0/0/0 $4,427
Pipeline Construction.
NAICS 234920..................... Power and Communication 5 70 0/0/0/0 121,855
Transmission Line
Construction.
NAICS 234930..................... Industrial Nonbuilding 0 NA NA NA
Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990..................... All Other Heavy 5 70 0/0/0/0 25,941
Construction.
NAICS 235310..................... Electrical Contractors... 5 70 0/0/0/0 76,067
NAICS 235910..................... Structural Steel Erection 0 NA NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 235950..................... Building Equipment and 0 NA NA NA
Other Machine
Installation Contractors.
NAICS 235990..................... All Other Special Trade 0 NA NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 221110..................... Electric Power Generation 0 NA NA NA
NAICS 221120..................... Electric Power 0 NA NA NA
Transmission, Control,
and Distribution.
NAICS 2211....................... Major Publicly Owned 0 NA NA NA
Utilities.
Various.......................... Industrial Power 0 NA NA NA
Generators.
SIC 0783......................... Ornamental Shrub and Tree 0 NA NA NA
Services.
---------------------------------------------------
Total........................ ......................... ........... ........... ........... 228,289
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large
establishments.
Sources: CONSAD [5], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
8. Annual Costs for Required Communications Between Host Employers and
Contract Employers
The final rule requires specific communications between host
employers and contract employers. These requirements would apply for
each project performed by a contractor.\551\ For a complete discussion
of the host-contractor provisions of the final rule, see relevant
discussion for Sec. 1926.950(c) in Section V, Summary and Explanation
of the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\551\ Final Sec. 1926.968 defines "contract employer" as
"[a]n employer, other than a host employer, that performs work
covered by Subpart V of this part under contract." That section
also defines "host employer" as "[a]n employer that operates, or
that controls the operating procedures for, an electric power
generation, transmission, or distribution installation on which a
contract employer is performing work covered by Subpart V of this
part." Thus, under the final rule the contract employer (also
called "contractor" in the FEA) is not always under contract to a
host employer. However, to simplify the analysis of costs under the
final rule, the FEA assumes that every contract employer is working
under contract to a host employer. This simplifying assumption
should have a negligible effect on costs since contract employers
will almost always be working for host employers and, in the
remaining cases, the host employer and the contract employer (which
is working for a different entity) must still exchange information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contractors perform an estimated 4,596,731 projects for host
employers annually. Contractors in establishments classified in the
Power and Communication Transmission Line Construction industry perform
about 1,701,656 of those projects, and contractors in establishments
classified in the Electrical Contractors industry perform another
1,247,104 of those projects [5, updated by OSHA].\552\ OSHA estimates
that the requirements for communications between host employers and
contract employers will affect 50 percent of projects performed by
contractors from small establishments and 100 percent of projects
performed by contractors from large establishments. Furthermore, OSHA
estimates that between 50 and 90 percent of these projects are already
in compliance.\553\ This compliance rate results in a total of 932,061
projects that will incur costs under the rule. The final requirements
will not affect projects performed by host employers without the use of
contract employers, so only projects performed by contract employers
result in costs for host employers. To calculate the projects for which
hosts will incur costs, OSHA relied on CONSAD's [5] estimate of the
percentage of projects performed using contractors, as shown in Table
37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\552\ OSHA used CONSAD's approach to estimating the number of
projects. That is, the estimated number of projects per year for a
given industry is equal to the number of crews (that is, the number
of power workers divided by the crew size) multiplied by the number
of projects per crew per day (that is, one project), multiplied by
the number of workdays per year (250). For most industries, OSHA
estimates that a crew consists of three power workers at small
establishments and six power workers at large establishments. For
Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783), however, OSHA
estimates that a crew consists of two workers at a small
establishment and four workers at a large establishment [5].
\553\ OSHA notes that there are no costs associated with the
provision in the final rule requiring the contract employer and the
host employer to coordinate their work rules and procedures so that
each employee of the contract employer and the host employer is
protected. Because such coordination is essential for the reliable
operation of electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution systems, OSHA anticipates that host employers and
contract employers are virtually in 100-percent compliance already.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some projects will be sufficiently simple, straightforward, and
routine as to avoid the need for additional communication beyond what
was already occurring between host employers and their contractors
before the promulgation of the final rule. The new communication
requirements will not affect an estimated 50 percent of the projects
performed by establishments with fewer than 20 employees [5]. OSHA
determined that these requirements will affect all projects performed
by establishments with 20 or more employees [id.]
OSHA estimated the costs associated with these provisions as
involving resources (including labor costs or other expenditures)
equivalent to 10 minutes of supervisory time each for the host employer
and the contractor on affected projects involving establishments with
fewer than 20 employees and involving resources equivalent to 15
minutes of supervisory time each for the host employer and the
contractor on affected projects involving establishments with 20 or
more employees [5].\554\ OSHA also
estimates that the average cost of compliance for contractors
associated with the host-contractor provisions will range from $4.87 to
$10.62 per affected project. The corresponding cost of compliance for
utilities (host employers) associated with these requirements range
from $8.43 to $12.65 per affected project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\554\ OSHA's estimates include the time for gathering, as well
as disseminating, the required information. The Agency believes that
host employers will most likely gather the required information for
each contract as a whole, instead of gathering the information for
each project, as this approach to gathering information would be the
most cost-effective approach. Thus, the costs of gathering
information would be distributed over all projects covered by each
contract. Information on the safety aspects of the project should
flow from the purely technical aspects of the project, for which
consultation should be a logical outcome, thereby resulting in
limited and incidental additional burden.
The final rule's time estimates are likely conservative. OSHA
retained its estimates from the proposal. However, OSHA also revised
the host-contractor requirements in the final rule in response to
numerous comments, including comments from the Small Business
Administration's Office of Advocacy (Ex. 0207). The revisions should
lower compliance burdens and reduce costs for host employers and
contract employers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA estimates that the communications required by the final rule
already occur for most affected projects. Employers involved in an
estimated 50 percent of the affected projects performed by smaller
establishments are already in compliance with the final requirements,
and an estimated 75 to 90 percent of the affected projects performed by
larger contractors are also already in compliance. These projects will
incur no additional costs to achieve compliance with the final host-
contractor provisions. No commenter questioned these estimates of
current compliance, originally developed by CONSAD for the PRIA [5].
Thus, OSHA estimates the total annual cost of compliance associated
with the final host-contractor provisions to be approximately $17.8
million, as shown in Table 37. This total represents an increase from
the PRIA due to a general increase in the number of contractor projects
performed annually; furthermore, for reasons discussed in the summary
and explanation for final Sec. 1926.950(c), in Section V, Summary and
Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble, the increase
also results from accounting for the percentage of projects affected in
the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry. Table 37 also shows
the costs of compliance for each affected industry.
EEI questioned OSHA's cost estimate for the host-contractor
requirements in the proposed rule (Ex. 0501). EEI's first objection was
that "CONSAD gave no attention to the host-contractor provisions when
assessing the risk to be addressed by the standard."
OSHA does not find that the extent to which the host-contractor
provisions obviate risk has any bearing on the reasonableness of the
estimated cost of complying with these provisions.
EEI's second objection was that "the nature of such communications
varies widely [depending on] the nature of the particular work being
performed, and the relative size of the owners and contractors
involved."
As explained previously under the summary and explanation for final
Sec. 1926.950(c), in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final
Rule, earlier in this preamble, OSHA revised the host-contractor
provisions to more clearly define the information that hosts and
contractors must exchange. With the host-contractor requirements now
more clearly defined, OSHA believes that the 10 to 15 minutes of
supervisory time used to estimate the costs of these provisions are
reasonable. The Agency notes that neither EEI nor any other commenter
provided specific information that would enable the Agency to revise
its estimate.
Table 37--Annual Costs for Required Communications Between Host Employers and Contractors
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Projects
Contractor affected Contractor Host % of Host Cost per Cost per Annual
Industry code Industry name projects (%) Compliance projects contractor projects project project compliance
performed small/ rate (%) affected work affected (small (large costs
annually* large est.) est.)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contractors
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910............. Water, Sewer, and 65,078 50/100 50/50/75/75 16,270 NA NA $7.06 $10.59 $150,214
Pipeline
Construction.
NAICS 234920............. Power and 1,701,656 50/100 65/65/90/90 208,292 NA NA 7.06 10.59 1,891,463
Communication
Transmission Line
Construction.
NAICS 234930............. Industrial 78,017 50/100 50/50/75/75 19,504 NA NA 7.05 10.57 204,286
Nonbuilding
Structure
Construction.
NAICS 234990............. All Other Heavy 410,541 50/100 50/50/75/75 102,635 NA NA 6.97 10.45 894,356
Construction.
NAICS 235310............. Electrical 1,247,104 50/100 50/50/75/75 311,776 NA NA 7.08 10.62 2,702,235
Contractors.
NAICS 235910............. Structural Steel 21,066 50/100 50/50/75/75 5,267 NA NA 7.04 10.57 47,763
Erection
Contractors.
NAICS 235950............. Building Equipment 19,739 50/100 50/50/75/75 4,935 NA NA 7.08 10.62 44,957
and Other Machine
Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990............. All Other Special 62,701 50/100 50/50/75/75 15,675 NA NA 6.92 10.39 124,535
Trade Contractors.
SIC 0783................. Ornamental Shrub 990,830 50/100 50/75 247,707 NA NA 4.87 7.30 1,749,688
and Tree Services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contractor Subtotal.. ................... 4,596,731 ......... ........... 932,061 .......... ......... ......... ......... 7,809,497
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Host Employers
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 221110............. Electric Power .......... ......... ........... .......... 23 217,357 8.43 12.65 2,397,541
Generation.
NAICS 221120............. Electric Power .......... ......... ........... .......... 62 579,649 8.43 12.65 6,393,786
Transmission,
Control, and
Distribution.
NAICS 2211............... Major Publicly .......... ......... ........... .......... 6 51,823 8.43 12.65 571,626
Owned Utilities.
Various.................. Industrial Power .......... ......... ........... .......... 9 83,233 NA 12.65 648,391
Generators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Various Host Employer ................... .......... ......... ........... .......... .......... 932,061 ......... ......... 10,011,344
Subtotal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................ ................... .......... ......... ........... .......... .......... 932,061 ......... ......... 17,820,841
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The table excludes projects performed directly by host employer utilities as they do not involve communications between
host employers and contractors. The costs to utilities consist of costs to communicate with contractors on the projects
contractors perform for utilities.
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large establishments.
Sources: CONSAD [5], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
9. Annual Costs Associated With Expanded Requirements for Job Briefings
The final rule expands existing requirements for employers to
conduct job briefings before employees begin work on affected projects.
Specifically, the final rule requires affected employers to provide the
employee in charge of the job with all available information that
relates to the determination of existing characteristics and conditions
that the crew must complete.
OSHA estimates that employers perform 9,953,249 projects in the
construction, utility, power generation, and line-clearance tree-
trimming industries annually [5, updated by OSHA]. Of these employers,
the industries with the highest annual compliance costs, the Power and
Communication Transmission Line Construction industry and the
Electrical Contractors industry, perform an estimated 1,701,656
projects and 1,247,104 projects, respectively (id.). While the final
rule potentially affects 100 percent of all 9,953,249 projects, between
85 and 98 percent of the projects are already in compliance [5].
Employers can achieve compliance with the final rule through the
following small addition to routine communications that already take
place regularly between employers and employees involved in the
affected projects. Specifically, OSHA estimates the costs of compliance
associated with the final job-briefing requirement to involve resources
(including labor costs or other expenditures) equivalent to 5 minutes
of supervisory time and 5 minutes of employee time for each employee on
each affected project [5].\555\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\555\ Consistent with the assumption on the number of total
employees per project, the costs also reflect one supervisor per
project, plus two regular employees per project at small
establishments, and five regular employees at large establishments,
except in Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783), where it is
one regular employee at small establishments and three at large
establishments. OSHA's cost estimate is probably overly
conservative. OSHA believes that it should not, on average, take any
additional time (over the time already required to conduct a job
briefing under existing Sec. 1910.269) for the employee in charge
to brief the rest of the employees about the information the
employer must supply the employee in charge pursuant to the final
rule. In fact, in some cases, the final rule could reduce the time
needed to conduct a job briefing. For example, if the employer tells
the employee in charge that a utility pole on the job is cracked and
that the pole's ability to support additional weight is suspect, the
employee in charge would no longer need to go over the pole
inspection in as much detail, although the employee in charge would
have to discuss pole-bracing procedures, during the job briefing. If
the employer had not reported this information, the employee in
charge would cover the pole inspection, but not bracing procedures,
during the job briefing. However, after the employees discovered the
crack, the employee in charge would need to hold a second job
briefing (and expend additional time) to go over the bracing
procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, OSHA estimates that the average cost of compliance associated
with the final requirements for job briefings will be $8.48 to $21.21
per affected project performed by utilities, other power generators,
and construction contractors. The estimated average cost of compliance
for projects performed by establishments in the Ornamental Shrub and
Tree Services industry is about $4.20 to $7.75 per project.
For the PRIA, based on research by CONSAD, OSHA estimated that
employers already provide the required information to the employee in
charge for most affected projects. Commenters on the proposal did not
question these assumptions. OSHA estimates that employers (other than
utilities and other power generators) involved in an estimated 85
percent of the affected projects performed by establishments with fewer
than 20 employees are already in compliance with the final
requirements, while employers (other than utilities and other power
generators) involved in an estimated 95 percent of the affected
projects performed by establishments with 20 or more employees also are
already in compliance with the final requirements [5]. Among utilities
and other power generators, an estimated 95 percent to 98 percent of
the potentially affected projects involve employers already fully in
compliance with the final provisions [id.]. For projects already in
compliance, employers will incur no additional costs to achieve
compliance with the final rule [id.].
The total estimated annual cost of compliance associated with the
final requirement to provide information to the employee in charge is,
thus, approximately $6.7 million, as shown in Table 38. Table 38 also
shows the costs of compliance for each affected industry.
Table 38--Annual Costs Associated With Job Briefings
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Projects Cost per Cost per
Projects affected project project Compliance Annual
Industry code Industry name performed (%) small/ (small (large rate (%) compliance
annually large est.) est.) costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910........................... Water, Sewer, and Pipeline 65,078 100/100 $9.29 $17.92 85/85/95/95 $70,743
Construction.
NAICS 234920........................... Power and Communication 1,701,656 100/100 9.29 17.92 85/85/95/95 1,777,657
Transmission Line
Construction.
NAICS 234930........................... Industrial Nonbuilding 78,017 100/100 9.28 17.92 85/85/95/95 70,999
Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990........................... All Other Heavy Construction.. 410,541 100/100 8.48 15.98 85/85/95/95 424,921
NAICS 235310........................... Electrical Contractors........ 1,247,104 100/100 9.79 19.16 85/85/95/95 1,545,162
NAICS 235910........................... Structural Steel Erection 21,066 100/100 9.77 19.14 85/85/95/95 24,717
Contractors.
NAICS 235950........................... Building Equipment and Other 19,739 100/100 9.79 19.16 85/85/95/95 23,197
Machine Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990........................... All Other Special Trade 62,701 100/100 8.58 16.26 85/85/95/95 71,957
Contractors.
NAICS 221110........................... Electric Power Generation..... 1,582,025 100/100 11.01 21.21 95/95/98/98 675,284
NAICS 221120........................... Electric Power Transmission, 2,689,805 100/100 11.01 21.21 95/95/98/98 1,144,815
Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211............................. Major Publicly Owned Utilities 360,869 100/100 11.01 21.21 95/98 153,887
Various................................ Industrial Power Generators... 723,820 100/100 21.21 21.21 98 306,992
SIC 0783............................... Ornamental Shrub and Tree 990,830 100/100 4.20 7.75 85/95 407,227
Services.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.............................. .............................. 9,953,249 ........... ........... ........... .............. 6,697,557
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large establishments.
Sources: CONSAD [5], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
10. Costs Associated With Arc-Hazard Assessment
Paragraph (g)(1) of final Sec. 1926.960 requires the employer to
assess employee workplace exposures to hazards from flames or from
electric arcs. Paragraph (g)(2) of final Sec. 1926.960 requires the
employer to make a reasonable estimate, for each exposed employee, of
the incident heat energy associated with hazards from electric arcs.
The FEA estimates the cost for both provisions simultaneously in this
section because, as part of the effort to calculate incident energy,
the employer necessarily must assess the hazards to employees. The FEA
also uses the term "arc-hazard assessment" to refer to both
requirements.
For the proposed rule, the PRIA used an approach based on the
CONSAD report [5], calculating annual costs on a per-project and per-
employee basis. Some commenters questioned this approach, which
projected a cost of $2 per project. (See, for example, Exs. 0208,
0505.) OSHA modified the PRIA methodology for arc-hazard assessment and
instead is calculating primarily one-time costs on a per-firm basis.
OSHA modified the methodology because it is not necessary to
recalculate the costs for each project; the Agency believes that,
except with respect to power generation installations as discussed
later, a system-wide calculation is a more logical outcome of the
rule.\556\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\556\ Since employers do not need to perform extensive
recalculations of their systems annually, as assumed in the PRIA,
the estimated annualized cost of this provision is substantially
less than the estimated cost in the PRIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA also is not accounting for costs to contractors in the final
rule (a second modification from the PRIA). The Agency believes that,
as utilities will need to perform the calculations on their own systems
either in-house or using engineering consultants, utilities will
provide information on potential heat energy to contractors, even
though the final rule does not explicitly require utilities to do so.
Otherwise, host employers would incur costs associated with those
estimates twice, once when the host employer generates the estimate and
a second time when the contractor passes the costs of generating the
estimate back to the host employer.
As in the PRIA, OSHA estimates that 75 percent of small utilities
and 85 percent of large utilities already performed the necessary
calculations and will not incur costs under the rule. For the remaining
utilities, which will have to estimate the available heat energy that
would result from electric arcs, the approach will likely vary
depending on the size of the utility. OSHA believes that small
utilities would likely hire a consultant to perform the calculations
for them, while large utilities would likely use commercially available
software and perform the calculations in-house.
OSHA estimates that the 25 percent of small utilities that do not
already perform the calculations will hire a consultant to provide
estimates of incident-heat-energy exposures. OSHA estimates that it
will take a consultant 28 hours to perform the calculations at a rate
of $250 per hour, for an average cost of $7000 per affected utility and
a total of approximately $1.2 million for all affected small
utilities.\557\ When OSHA annualized this cost at 7 percent over 10
years, it results in annualized costs for affected small utilities of
approximately $0.03 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\557\ While small utilities have the option of using the tables
OSHA provides, this FEA conservatively assumed they will use the
more expensive option of hiring consultants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large utilities are more likely than small utilities to face
situations not
covered by the tables in Appendix E. These utilities can perform the
calculations using several different methods. The proposed rule allowed
employers to use Allen Privette's Heat Flux Calculator, a free software
program widely available on the Internet, to perform the calculations.
After considering comments from rulemaking participants, OSHA
determined that the Heat Flux Calculator is not a reasonable method for
estimating incident energy regardless of exposure or voltage. (See the
discussion of final Sec. 1926.960(g)(2) in Section V, Summary and
Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble.) Many
utilities already use a more reliable means of calculating incident
heat energy, but some utilities will have to buy software to estimate
incident heat energy. OSHA estimates that 15 percent of large utilities
will need to purchase software, at a cost of approximately $2,500 per
firm [7].
For the large utilities buying software, an engineer will have to
input parameters into the software to determine the incident-heat
energy that would result from electric arcs. These parameters include
fault current, the expected length of the electric arc, the distance
from the arc to the employee, and the clearing time for the fault. OSHA
estimates that performing this task for all affected large-utility
employees will require 500 engineering hours per affected firm, at the
estimated hourly rate for an engineer of $47.17. This determination
results in engineering costs of $25,970 per affected firm, and total
engineering costs for all affected firms of $6.5 million. Consistent
with the ratio of engineering time to clerical time used in the PRIA,
these same firms will also incur clerical costs, equivalent to 25 hours
of clerical time at a wage of $28.75 per hour, or $719 per utility.
This determination results in total clerical costs for all affected
firms of approximately $0.2 million. Summing software, engineering
labor, and clerical labor costs for all affected large firms results in
total costs of $6.7 million and annualized costs of $2.1 million.
TVA estimated that costs should be about $300 per employee (Ex.
0213). The PRIA estimated 2 hours of engineering time per employee and
$2 per project.\558\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\558\ OSHA believes that (with the exception of power generation
facilities, as discussed later) it likely overestimated the cost of
performing the calculations, particularly with respect to
distribution installations. This belief is based in part on expert
opinion provided to ERG, which suggested that the calculations would
require substantially fewer hours than indicated by TVA [8].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency concluded that, because electric utilities will likely
perform calculations on a per-circuit, rather than per-project or per-
employee, basis and because the number of circuits operated by a
utility is generally proportional to the size of that utility, the
costs should be based on the number of hours the utility will take to
perform the calculations as determined by the size of the utility.
Consequently, the per-employee basis used by TVA and the per-employee
and per-project basis used by the PRIA are generally unsuitable for
estimating costs related to calculating incident energy.
However, TVA's description of the methodology it used in
calculating incident energy suggests that TVA included costs associated
with lowering incident energy at a nuclear power generation plant. As
explained in the summary and explanation for final Sec.
1926.960(g)(5), in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final
Rule, earlier in this preamble, OSHA believes that any such measures
requiring substantial expenditures are likely to be necessary only for
electric power generation installations. To account for the costs of
adopting incident-energy-control measures for electric power generation
installations, OSHA included costs for reducing incident-energy
exposures that, when combined with OSHA's estimated costs for
calculating incident energy, correspond to TVA's estimate of $300 per
employee for firms in industries with generation installations.
Thus, OSHA included costs in this FEA to account for additional
engineering controls that employers with power generation installations
might need to implement to reduce the incident energy of particular
circuits to no more than 100 cal/cm\2\ (the maximum level for which
protective clothing and equipment are generally available). Such
engineering controls might include installing current-limiting devices,
resetting circuit breaker trip devices, and using remote control
operating and test equipment.
To estimate the cost of these potential engineering controls, OSHA
relied on the TVA estimate that the arc-hazard assessment will cost
about $300 per employee. For each relevant industry affected by the
need to implement these potential controls (the utilities in the
Electric Power Generation industry (NAICS 221100), all Industrial Power
Generators (Various NAICS), and Major Publicly-Owned Utilities (NAICS
2211) judged to operate power generation installations), TVA's total
estimated costs for the arc-hazard assessment were higher than the
costs estimated by OSHA for this assessment. OSHA attributed the
difference in cost between the two estimates to the additional
engineering controls that OSHA identified for the final rule. TVA
stated in its comments to the proposed rule that TVA based its
estimates "on all circuits" (including, presumably, circuits that
require a reduction in incident energy using engineering controls) and
that its estimates did not include the cost of purchasing arc-flash
protective equipment (Ex. 0213).
To account for the additional engineering control costs, OSHA
increased the cost of the arc-hazard assessments (which include the
cost for engineering controls) for utilities having power generation
installations above what OSHA already estimated for the assessment so
that the total averaged $300 per power worker employee, consistent with
TVA's cost estimate. (For example, for a given industry, if the cost of
the arc-hazard assessment, without the engineering controls adjustment,
amounted to $150 per employee, OSHA increased the cost by $150 per
employee to account for the adjustment.) OSHA also assumed that
existing compliance rates associated with these engineering controls
are identical to the compliance rates estimated for the unadjusted arc-
hazard assessment (that is, the compliance rate estimated for the arc-
hazard assessment without the addition of engineering controls).
To calculate the percentage of firms in the Major Publicly-Owned
Utilities industry that operate generating plants (and thus power
generation installations), OSHA first cross-referenced OSHA's estimate
of 277 firms that are in the Major Publicly-Owned Utilities industry
against the 2008 EIA Form 860 database, which provides a nationwide
census of generating plants by owner [49]. This comparison showed that
106 of the firms that are in the Major Publicly-Owned Utilities
industry and that are under the scope of the final rule own generating
plants. OSHA then assumed that the distribution by size of this subset
would mirror that of the entire Major Publicly-Owned Utilities
population, resulting in an estimated 13 small firms and 93 large firms
that are Major Publicly-Owned Utilities with generating facilities.
As indicated in Table 39, the Agency estimates that the annualized
one-time cost for these engineering controls is approximately $26,737
for small firms and $2,123,110 for large firms, for a total of
$2,149,847 for all affected firms.
Summing software costs, engineering labor, clerical labor,
consulting, and incident-energy reduction costs for both
small and large firms results in total estimated costs for all affected
firms of $10.6 million. When this one-time cost is annualized at a 7-
percent interest rate over 10 years, the resulting annualized costs are
approximately $1.5 million as shown in Table 39. Table 39 also shows
the costs of compliance for each affected industry.
TVA asserted that the costs associated with arc-hazard assessments
recur annually (Ex. 0213). TVA indicated that performing such a
calculation, while time consuming initially, is not nearly as time
consuming when performed on an ongoing basis. TVA suggested the ongoing
cost would be only 3 percent of the initial cost (id.).
As explained later, the Agency took a more conservative approach by
assuming annual ongoing costs of 10 percent of the initial cost. This
approach includes an annual assessment to examine any changes in
conditions and the costs of a potential recalculation of the system.
(See Table 40.)
One commenter suggested that liability costs would rise due to
consultants underestimating incident heat energy (Ex. 0178).
OSHA believes that this comment is speculative and without merit.
Moreover, as a practical matter, the typical consultant would likely
carry personal liability insurance and, therefore, factors this cost
into his or her consulting fees (which the Agency is assuming will be
$250 an hour, on average). Also, the commenter did not establish why
these determinations present a new source of liability, as firms
(whether consultants or utilities) that perform such calculations now
are liable for any flawed estimates given to others.
Another commenter suggested that electrical contractors may find it
especially demanding to comply with the arc-hazard assessment provision
because of the difficulties involved in training a highly mobile
workforce to understand a constantly changing variety of electrical
systems and because of the difficulties resulting from contractors'
working for a variety of utilities (Ex. 0501).
OSHA believes that the commenter's concerns are groundless. First,
as stated earlier, the Agency accounted for any costs related to
training and included in its calculations the costs specific to each
affected industry. Second, as also stated earlier, the Agency expects
that host employers will pass information related to potential heat-
energy hazards to the contractors during the exchange of information
between host employers and contract employers, as doing so is in their
economic self-interest. As such, varying work situations and a mobile
workforce should not pose major issues for contractors.\559\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\559\ The commenter also stated that electrical contractors
would incur a special burden in conjunction with the final rule's
arc-flash protective equipment requirements. As discussed later, the
Agency is costing eight pairs of flame-resistant clothing, which
should be sufficient to cover the different situations contractors
might face.
Table 39--Annualized One-Time Costs Associated With Arc-Hazard Assessment
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Firms using Incident- Total
Compliance consultant Consulting Total energy annualized
Industry code Industry name rate (%) (% of hours per consulting reduction costs--small
small) firm costs costs firms
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Small Firms
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910............................ Water, Sewer, and Pipeline NA NA NA NA NA NA
Construction.
NAICS 234920............................ Power and Communication NA NA NA NA NA NA
Transmission Line Construction.
NAICS 234930............................ Industrial Nonbuilding NA NA NA NA NA NA
Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990............................ All Other Heavy Construction... NA NA NA NA NA NA
NAICS 235310............................ Electrical Contractors......... NA NA NA NA NA NA
NAICS 235910............................ Structural Steel Erection NA NA NA NA NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 235950............................ Building Equipment and Other NA NA NA NA NA NA
Machine Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990............................ All Other Special Trade NA NA NA NA NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 221110............................ Electric Power Generation...... 75 25 28 $553,000 $25,461 $82,360
NAICS 221120............................ Electric Power Transmission, 75 25 28 563,500 NA 80,230
Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211.............................. Major Publicly Owned Utilities. 75 25 28 57,750 1,276 8,404
Various................................. Industrial Power Generators.... NA NA NA NA NA 0
SIC 0783................................ Ornamental Shrub and Tree NA NA NA NA NA NA
Services.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................... ............................... ........... ........... ........... 1,174,250 26,737 170,994
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 39--Annualized One-Time Costs Associated With Arc-Hazard
Assessment
[Continued]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Firms
purchasing Software Total Firms with Engineering Total Clerical Total Incident- Total
Industry code Industry name Compliance software cost per software engineering hours per engineering hours per clerical energy annualized
rate (%) (% of firm cost hours (% firm costs firm costs reduction costs--large
large) of large) costs firms
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Firms
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910................ Water, Sewer, and NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Pipeline Construction.
NAICS 234920................ Power and Communication NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Transmission Line
Construction.
NAICS 234930................ Industrial Nonbuilding NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990................ All Other Heavy NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Construction.
NAICS 235310................ Electrical Contractors... NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
NAICS 235910................ Structural Steel Erection NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 235950................ Building Equipment and NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Other Machine
Installation Contractors.
NAICS 235990................ All Other Special Trade NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 221110................ Electric Power Generation 85 15 $2,500 $116,250 15 500 $1,207,532 25 $33,424 $1,388,374 $390,909
NAICS 221120................ Electric Power 85 15 2,500 341,250 15 500 3,544,692 25 98,115 NA 567,240
Transmission, Control,
and Distribution.
NAICS 2211.................. Major Publicly Owned 85 15 2,500 91,500 15 500 950,445 25 26,308 82,382 163,825
Utilities.
Various..................... Industrial Power 85 15 2,500 73,875 15 500 767,367 25 21,240 652,353 215,679
Generators.
SIC 0783.................... Ornamental Shrub and Tree NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Services.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................... ......................... .......... .......... .......... 622,875 ........... ........... 6,470,036 .......... 179,088 2,123,110 1,337,652
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 39--Annualized One-Time Costs Associated With Arc-Hazard
Assessment
[Continued]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total
annualized
Industry code Industry name costs--all
firms
------------------------------------------------------------------------
All Firms
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910.................. Water, Sewer, and Pipeline NA
Construction.
NAICS 234920.................. Power and Communication NA
Transmission Line
Construction.
NAICS 234930.................. Industrial Nonbuilding NA
Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990.................. All Other Heavy NA
Construction.
NAICS 235310.................. Electrical Contractors..... NA
NAICS 235910.................. Structural Steel Erection NA
Contractors.
NAICS 235950.................. Building Equipment and NA
Other Machine Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990.................. All Other Special Trade NA
Contractors.
NAICS 221110.................. Electric Power Generation.. 473,269
NAICS 221120.................. Electric Power 647,470
Transmission, Control, and
Distribution.
NAICS 2211.................... Major Publicly Owned 172,228
Utilities.
Various....................... Industrial Power Generators 215,679
SIC 0783...................... Ornamental Shrub and Tree NA
Services.
------------
Total..................... ........................... 1,508,646
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to
rounding.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
(3) All Industrial Power Generators are large establishments.
Sources: ERG estimates, Cress [7], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
OSHA also accounted for the periodic costs associated with updating
arc-hazard assessments, as necessary. As explained in discussion of
final Sec. 1926.960(g)(2) in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the
Final Rule, earlier in this preamble, while commenters' concerns that
employers would need to constantly update their incident-energy
estimates are baseless, periodic updates may be necessary under certain
limited circumstances. As mentioned earlier, OSHA estimates that this
periodic labor cost is equal to 10 percent of the total one-time
consulting, engineering, and clerical costs indicated in Table 39. When
OSHA annualized the present value of this recurring labor cost \560\ at
7 percent over 10 years, total annualized costs for all affected
industries are $0.7 million. When OSHA included these periodic costs
with the one-time arc-hazard assessment costs calculated earlier, total
annualized arc-hazard assessment costs are approximately $2.2 million,
as shown in Table 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\560\ OSHA computed the present value for 9 years of costs,
beginning with the year after the arc-hazard assessment provision
goes into effect and lasting through year 10.
Table 40--Total Annualized Costs Associated With Arc-Hazard Assessment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total
Annual labor Present value Total annualized arc-
Industry code Industry name costs (years 2- of labor costs annualized hazard
10) (years 2-10) updating cost assessment
costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910............... Water, Sewer, and NA NA NA NA
Pipeline
Construction.
NAICS 234920............... Power and NA NA NA NA
Communication
Transmission Line
Construction.
NAICS 234930............... Industrial NA NA NA NA
Nonbuilding
Structure
Construction.
NAICS 234990............... All Other Heavy NA NA NA NA
Construction.
NAICS 235310............... Electrical NA NA NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 235910............... Structural Steel NA NA NA NA
Erection
Contractors.
NAICS 235950............... Building Equipment NA NA NA NA
and Other Machine
Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990............... All Other Special NA NA NA NA
Trade Contractors.
NAICS 221110............... Electric Power $179,396 $1,092,340 $155,525 $628,793
Generation.
NAICS 221120............... Electric Power 420,631 2,561,221 364,660 1,012,130
Transmission,
Control, and
Distribution.
NAICS 2211................. Major Publicly 103,450 629,909 89,685 261,913
Owned Utilities.
Various.................... Industrial Power 78,861 480,183 68,367 284,046
Generators.
SIC 0783................... Ornamental Shrub NA NA NA NA
and Tree Services.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total.................. ................... 782,337 4,763,654 678,237 2,186,883
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
Source: ERG estimate.
Costs for Providing Arc-Flash Protective Equipment
The final rule requires affected employers to ensure that employees
exposed to certain hazards wear flame-resistant clothing. The final
rule also requires employers to ensure that each employee exposed to
electric-arc hazards wears clothing with an arc rating greater than or
equal to the applicable estimate of incident heat energy. Generally,
the arc-rated clothing must cover the employee's entire body, although
there are limited situations in which the final rule does not require
arc-rated protection for the employee's hands, feet, or head. As
previously mentioned in this analysis, OSHA uses the term "flame-
resistant clothing" to refer generally to the flame-resistant and arc-
rated clothing, and the term "arc-flash protective equipment" to
refer to the flame-resistant and arc-rated clothing and equipment,
required by Sec. 1926.960(g).
OSHA estimated the average costs associated with providing the
clothing that will be necessary to achieve full compliance with the
final rule to involve resources equivalent to those associated with the
following case example. An employer could generally achieve compliance
with the final rule's clothing provisions by purchasing eight sets of
flame-resistant clothing per employee and one switching coat or flash
suit for every three employees.
OSHA estimated a single set of flame-resistant clothing to cost
$191.75 [13]; and, with eight sets provided for each employee (at a
total cost of $1,534.00 per employee), the Agency assumed that the
useful life of this apparel was 4 years [5]. OSHA estimated a switching
coat or flash suit to cost about $226.00 [19] and to have an expected
life of 10 years [5]. Because use of the switching coat or flash suit
will be intermittent, OSHA estimated that employers will need to
provide only one switching coat or flash suit for every three affected
employees [5].
Frank Brockman of the Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative
Corporation commented on the costs of flame-resistant apparel (Ex.
0173). Mr. Brockman estimated that the cost of flame-resistant clothing
would be in excess of $1,000 per employee.
OSHA notes that the cost estimate used in this FEA ($1,534.00 per
employee for flame-resistant clothing exclusive of switching coats) is
consistent with Mr. Brockman's estimate.
Employers generally will substitute flame-resistant clothing for
clothing that the employee or the employer would already be providing.
OSHA did not include in this analysis the savings associated with
employees' no longer needing to purchase and launder the clothing that
employees would otherwise wear.
The final rule does not require employers to launder protective
clothing for employees. To the extent that employers choose to begin
laundering clothing or provide laundering services for employees in
conjunction with providing flame-resistant clothing, the cost is not
attributable to this final rule; and OSHA regards any such costs as
transfers from employers to employees rather than additional costs to
society.
Based on research conducted by CONSAD, OSHA estimates that most
establishments in all affected industries already provide employees
with flame-resistant clothing that fully complies with the requirements
of the final rule [5]. These establishments, therefore, will incur no
additional costs to achieve compliance with the final rule's
requirements for flame-resistant clothing.
For each affected industry, OSHA estimated rates of current
compliance with the final requirements to provide arc-rated clothing.
Within each industry, the Agency estimated rates of current compliance
separately for establishments based on their size. Among construction
contractors, the estimated average rate of current compliance for
establishments with fewer than 20 employees is 50 percent. The average
rate of current compliance among construction-contractor establishments
with 20 or more employees is an estimated 75 percent. Among electric
utilities and other electric power generators, current compliance is an
estimated 80 percent for establishments with fewer than 20 employees
and 90 percent for establishments with 20 or more employees [5].
In his comments, Frank Brockman of the Farmers Rural Electric
Cooperatives Corporation estimated that the flame-resistant clothing
provision of the rule would affect 25 percent of the relevant
workforce, for an implied compliance rate of 75 percent (Ex. 0173).
This estimate is similar to the compliance estimates developed by
CONSAD [5], which range from 50 percent to 90 percent depending on the
industry and establishment size, for an industry-wide average of 78-
percent compliance.
The total estimated annualized cost of compliance for providing
flame-resistant clothing is approximately $15.6 million, as shown in
Table 41. The total estimated annualized cost of compliance for
providing switching coats or flash suits is approximately $0.4 million
as shown in Table 42. Table 41 and Table 42 also show the costs of
compliance for each affected industry. Together, the total estimated
annualized cost of providing flame-resistant apparel and switching
coats is approximately $16.0 million.
In addition to clothing and switching coats or flash suits, the
final rule requires the provision of face and head protection for
workers in certain circumstances, typically when the workers perform
energized work on equipment in enclosures and when work involves
exposures to three-phase arcs. OSHA did not estimate costs in
connection with face and head protection for the PRIA. To estimate the
number of affected Electrical Power-Line Installers and Repairers (SOC
49-9051) for the final rule, OSHA calculated the number of line
installers and repairers (that is, 51,440) as a percentage of total
employment in NAICS 221100--Electric Power Generation, Transmission and
Distribution (that is, 395,570) [39, 40], and assumed that this
percentage (that is, 13 percent) was similar across all affected NAICS.
OSHA believes that none of these workers currently use arc-rated face
and head protection. To estimate the number of affected Electrical and
Electronics Repairers working in generating stations, substations, and
in-service relays (SOC 49-2095), OSHA calculated the number of
Electrical and Electronics Repairers (that is, 17,240) as a percentage
of total employment in NAICS 221100--Electric Power Generation,
Transmission and Distribution (that is, 395,570) [40, 41] and assumed
that this percentage (that is, 4 percent) was similar across all
affected NAICSs. OSHA believes that the use of arc-rated face and head
protection is fairly common by these workers and estimates current
compliance among the affected industry groups to range from 50 to 90
percent (equivalent to the compliance rates for flame-resistant
clothing (Table 41) and switching coats or flash suits (Table 42).
Based on publicly available information from vendors of electrical
protective equipment, OSHA estimates that a faceshield costs $86.50
(with a useful life of 2 years), and that head protection such as a
balaclava costs $29.75 (with a useful life of 2 years) [11, 12].
Testimony suggesting that faceshields might run $60 and that balaclava
might run $30 corroborates these cost estimates (Tr. 479).
When OSHA annualized the costs of arc-rated face and head
protection at a 7-percent interest rate over the useful
life of the equipment, the resulting total estimated costs are
approximately $0.9 million for faceshields and $0.3 million for head
protection, as shown in Table 43 and Table 44, and Table 45 and Table
46, respectively. These tables also show the costs of compliance for
each affected industry.
Summing the costs for flame-resistant clothing, switching coats or
flash suits, faceshields, and head protection results in total
estimated annualized costs of approximately $17.2 million.\561\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\561\ While the final rule added some minor cost elements to the
costs estimated in the proposal, the higher estimated cost of
protective clothing in the FEA, relative to the PRIA, is due
primarily to the higher estimated unit cost for the eight pairs of
flame-resistant clothing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using Mr. Brockman's (Ex. 0173) approach to calculating costs for
flame-resistant clothing, along with OSHA's estimate of the number of
affected workers, results in a "Brockman" estimate of $48.9
million.\562\ However, Mr. Brockman did not annualize his estimated
costs. Doing so using an interest rate of 7 percent over the 4-year
expected life of flame-resistant clothing \563\ results in an
annualized cost estimate of $14.4 million. OSHA notes that this
estimate is less than both OSHA's estimate of annualized costs for
flame-resistant clothing alone $15.6 million) and OSHA's estimate of
annualized costs for all arc-flash protective equipment ($17.3
million). As such, OSHA's estimate is entirely reasonable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\562\ In his comments, Mr. Brockman calculated costs for workers
in all affected establishments. This approach was erroneous,
however, because the protective-clothing provisions of the final
rule do not cover employees in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree
Services industry. OSHA excluded the tree-care employees from Mr.
Brockman's calculation to arrive at a corrected estimate, using Mr.
Brockman's analysis, of $48.9 million.
\563\ Mr. Brockman apparently estimated a cost for flame-
resistant clothing only, but not other equipment such as switching
coats or flash suits, as Mr. Brockman's estimate referred only to
OSHA's proposed 4-year useful-life estimate for flame-resistant
clothing, not OSHA's proposed 10-year useful-life estimate for
switching coats or flash suits (Ex. 0173; 70 FR 34915-34916).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One commenter emphasized that workers typically wear multiple
layers of clothing and complained that the proposal would require
additional costs for the various layers of clothing (Ex. 0186).
The final rule clarifies that only the outer layer of clothing must
be flame-resistant.
Another commenter suggested the cost analysis should account for
"selecting and fitting" of apparel (Ex. 0240).
The commenter's use of the terms "selecting and fitting" here is
somewhat ambiguous; in any event, the Agency already accounted for the
key informational element in selecting and fitting apparel--the arc-
hazard assessment. OSHA believes that once employers perform this
assessment, any other elements of selecting and fitting clothing (such
as selecting brand or vendor or size) is a negligible part of the
overall cost.
Some commenters argued that flame-resistant clothing required
special laundering and that this would be an additional cost. (See, for
example, Ex. 0186.)
OSHA concludes that there is no additional cost associated with
laundering the flame-resistant clothing required by the final rule.
First, as stated, the final rule does not require employers to launder
protective clothing for employees; and, therefore, while employers may
choose to launder protective clothing for their employees, the rule
does not impose the cost of laundering on employers. Second, according
to the record, employers or their employees can generally follow the
manufacturers' care instructions that come with the clothing (Tr. 305--
306, 1373--1374), and there is generally no additional cost to
employees over that of laundering normal (that is, non-flame-resistant)
clothing. Even if employees needed some training on how to care for
flame-resistant clothing to ensure that the clothing does not lose its
flame-resistant properties (as some commenters argued (Ex. 0186)), the
training provisions of the final rule (costed previously in this
analysis) would cover this cost (that is, the Agency assumes all
employers will give their employees the requisite training to come into
compliance with the standard).
One commenter argued that the life of flame-resistant clothing was
less than the 4-year period used by OSHA in its calculations (Ex.
0173). A witness at the 2006 public hearing testified that the life of
flame-resistant clothing varied considerably and might well last more
than 4 years; this witness spoke of the enhanced durability of newer
flame-resistant materials that were emerging at the time of the hearing
(Tr. 1374). (See, also, Tr. 1192.) One commenter believed that OSHA
should assume that employees require a slightly larger number of sets
of clothing (Ex. 0186). Other commenters stated that less clothing
would be adequate (Ex. 0099; Tr. 387, 828, 1374). Another commenter
mentioned a possible range of 5 to 14 sets (Tr. 309).\564\ Other
commenters stated that the estimate does not take into account all
types of clothing required, such as winter wear (see, for example, Ex.
0173).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\564\ OSHA examined the effect of changing the costs for flame-
resistant clothing using either end of this range--the costs range
from $9.8 million for 5 sets to $27.3 million for 14 sets (with
OSHA's estimate of $15.6 million for 8 sets between the two ends).
As discussed under the heading "Economic Feasibility and Impacts,"
later in this section of the preamble, costs must increase
substantially beyond this range to raise an issue regarding economic
feasibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA notes that its estimate of eight sets is in the middle of the
number of sets recommended by the commenters. Moreover, as indicated in
the PRIA, OSHA significantly increased its initial estimate of clothing
costs in response to comments from SERs during the SBREFA Panel
process. For the FEA, the Agency is basing its estimates on a cost of
$1,534.00 per employee for eight sets of flame-resistant clothing
(using the estimated cost of $191.75 per set), or on an annualized cost
of approximately $452.88 per employee. The Agency believes this final
estimate is reasonable and captures the average cost of all flame-
resistant clothing required by the new provisions of the final
standard. In this regard, the record indicates that annual employee
stipends to cover all flame-resistant clothing typically run $125--250
(Tr. 828). This evidence supports the conclusion that OSHA's estimate
is reasonable, if not conservative.
Table 41--Annualized Costs Associated With Providing Flame-Resistant Clothing
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Useful
Sets of life of
Employees Compliance FRC Cost per FRC with Annualized
Industry code Industry name affected rates (%) provided set of 8 sets/ compliance
(%) per FRC employee costs
employee (years)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910............ Water, Sewer, 100 50/50/75/75 8 $191.75 4 $176,836
and Pipeline
Construction.
NAICS 234920............ Power and 100 50/50/75/75 8 191.75 4 4,623,876
Communication
Transmission
Line
Construction.
NAICS 234930............ Industrial 100 50/50/75/75 8 191.75 4 211,993
Nonbuilding
Structure
Construction.
NAICS 234990............ All Other Heavy 100 50/50/75/75 8 191.75 4 1,115,554
Construction.
NAICS 235310............ Electrical 100 50/50/75/75 8 191.75 4 3,388,729
Contractors.
NAICS 235910............ Structural 100 50/50/75/75 8 191.75 4 57,243
Steel Erection
Contractors.
NAICS 235950............ Building 100 50/50/75/75 8 191.75 4 53,637
Equipment and
Other Machine
Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990............ All Other 100 50/50/75/75 8 191.75 4 170,375
Special Trade
Contractors.
NAICS 221110............ Electric Power 100 80/80/90/90 8 191.75 4 1,719,508
Generation.
NAICS 221120............ Electric Power 100 80/80/90/90 8 191.75 4 2,923,654
Transmission,
Control, and
Distribution.
NAICS 2211.............. Major Publicly 100 80/90 8 191.75 4 392,232
Owned
Utilities.
Various................. Industrial 100 90 8 191.75 4 786,729
Power
Generators.
SIC 0783................ Ornamental NA NA NA NA NA NA
Shrub and Tree
Services.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............... ............... ......... ............ ......... ......... ......... 15,620,365
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large
establishments.
Sources: CONSAD [5], Grainger [13], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
Table 42--Annualized Costs Associated With Providing Switching Coats or Flash Suits
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Useful
Switching Cost per life of
Employees coat or switching switching Annualized
Industry code Industry name affected Compliance flash coat or coat or compliance
(%) rates (%) suit per flash flash costs
employee suit suit
(years)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910............ Water, Sewer, 100 50/50/75/75 0.33 $226.00 10 $4,146
and Pipeline
Construction.
NAICS 234920............ Power and 100 50/50/75/75 0.33 226.00 10 108,414
Communication
Transmission
Line
Construction.
NAICS 234930............ Industrial 100 50/50/75/75 0.33 226.00 10 4,971
Nonbuilding
Structure
Construction.
NAICS 234990............ All Other Heavy 100 50/50/75/75 0.33 226.00 10 26,156
Construction.
NAICS 235310............ Electrical 100 50/50/75/75 0.33 226.00 10 79,454
Contractors.
NAICS 235910............ Structural 100 50/50/75/75 0.33 226.00 10 1,342
Steel Erection
Contractors.
NAICS 235950............ Building 100 50/50/75/75 0.33 226.00 10 1,258
Equipment and
Other Machine
Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990............ All Other 100 50/50/75/75 0.33 226.00 10 3,995
Special Trade
Contractors.
NAICS 221110............ Electric Power 100 80/80/90/90 0.33 226.00 10 40,317
Generation.
NAICS 221120............ Electric Power 100 80/80/90/90 0.33 226.00 10 68,550
Transmission,
Control, and
Distribution.
NAICS 2211.............. Major Publicly 100 80/90 0.33 226.00 10 9,197
Owned
Utilities.
Various................. Industrial 100 90 0.33 226.00 10 18,446
Power
Generators.
SIC 0783................ Ornamental NA NA NA NA NA NA
Shrub and Tree
Services.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............... ............... ......... ............ ......... ......... ......... 366,245
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large
establishments.
Sources: CONSAD [5], Lab Safety Supply [18], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
Table 43--Annualized Costs Associated With Providing Arc-Rated Faceshield for Electrical Power-Line Installers
and Repairers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Useful life
Employees Cost per of Compliance Annualized
Industry code Industry name affected faceshield faceshield rate (%) compliance
(%) (years) costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910............... Water, Sewer, and 0 NA 2 NA NA
Pipeline
Construction.
NAICS 234920............... Power and 13 $86.50 2 0/0/0/0 $216,130
Communication
Transmission Line
Construction.
NAICS 234930............... Industrial 0 NA NA NA NA
Nonbuilding
Structure
Construction.
NAICS 234990............... All Other Heavy 0 NA NA NA NA
Construction.
NAICS 235310............... Electrical 0 NA NA NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 235910............... Structural Steel 0 NA NA NA NA
Erection
Contractors.
NAICS 235950............... Building Equipment 0 NA NA NA NA
and Other Machine
Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990............... All Other Special 0 NA NA NA NA
Trade Contractors.
NAICS 221110............... Electric Power 13 86.50 2 0/0/0/0 233,674
Generation.
NAICS 221120............... Electric Power 13 86.50 2 0/0/0/0 399,296
Transmission,
Control, and
Distribution.
NAICS 2211................. Major Publicly 13 86.50 2 0/0 53,391
Owned Utilities.
Various.................... Industrial Power 0 NA NA NA NA
Generators.
SIC 0783................... Ornamental Shrub 0 NA NA NA NA
and Tree Services.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total.................. .................. ........... ........... ........... ........... 902,492
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large
establishments.
Sources: BLS [39, 40], Grainger [11], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
Table 44--Annualized Costs Associated With Providing Arc-Rated Faceshield for Electrical and Electronics
Repairers Working in Generating Stations, Substations, and in-Service Relays
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Useful life
Employees Cost per of Compliance Annualized
Industry code Industry name affected faceshield faceshield rate (%) compliance
(%) (years) costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910............... Water, Sewer, and 0 NA NA NA NA
Pipeline
Construction.
NAICS 234920............... Power and 4 $86.50 2 50/50/75/75 $21,289
Communication
Transmission Line
Construction.
NAICS 234930............... Industrial 0 NA NA NA NA
Nonbuilding
Structure
Construction.
NAICS 234990............... All Other Heavy 0 NA NA NA NA
Construction.
NAICS 235310............... Electrical 0 NA NA NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 235910............... Structural Steel 0 NA NA NA NA
Erection
Contractors.
NAICS 235950............... Building Equipment 0 NA NA NA NA
and Other Machine
Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990............... All Other Special 0 NA NA NA NA
Trade Contractors.
NAICS 221110............... Electric Power 4 86.50 2 80/80/90/90 7,917
Generation.
NAICS 221120............... Electric Power 4 86.50 2 80/80/90/90 13,461
Transmission,
Control, and
Distribution.
NAICS 2211................. Major Publicly 4 86.50 2 80/90 1,806
Owned Utilities.
Various.................... Industrial Power 0 NA NA NA NA
Generators.
SIC 0783................... Ornamental Shrub 0 NA NA NA NA
and Tree Services.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total.................. .................. ........... ........... ........... ........... 44,472
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large
establishments.
Sources: BLS [40, 41], Grainger [11], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
Table 45--Annualized Costs Associated With Providing Arc-Rated Head Protection for Electrical Power-Line
Installers and Repairers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Useful life
Employees Cost per of Compliance Annualized
Industry code Industry name affected balaclava balaclava rate (%) compliance
(%) (years) costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910............... Water, Sewer, and 0 NA NA NA NA
Pipeline
Construction.
NAICS 234920............... Power and 13 $29.75 2 0/0/0/0 $74,334
Communication
Transmission Line
Construction.
NAICS 234930............... Industrial 0 NA NA NA NA
Nonbuilding
Structure
Construction.
NAICS 234990............... All Other Heavy 0 NA NA NA NA
Construction.
NAICS 235310............... Electrical 0 NA NA NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 235910............... Structural Steel 0 NA NA NA NA
Erection
Contractors.
NAICS 235950............... Building Equipment 0 NA NA NA NA
and Other Machine
Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990............... All Other Special 0 NA NA NA NA
Trade Contractors.
NAICS 221110............... Electric Power 13 29.75 2 0/0/0/0 80,368
Generation.
NAICS 221120............... Electric Power 13 29.75 2 0/0/0/0 137,330
Transmission,
Control, and
Distribution.
NAICS 2211................. Major Publicly 13 29.75 2 0/0 18,363
Owned Utilities.
Various.................... Industrial Power 0 NA NA NA NA
Generators.
SIC 0783................... Ornamental Shrub 0 NA NA NA NA
and Tree Services.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total.................. .................. ........... ........... ........... ........... 310,395
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments. respectively. Major Publicly Owned
Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large
establishments.
Sources: BLS [39, 40], Grainger [12], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
Table 46--Annualized Associated With Providing Arc-Rated Head Protection for Electrical and Electronics
Repairers Working in Generating Stations, Substations, and In-Service Relays
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Useful life
Employees Cost per of Compliance Annualized
Industry code Industry name affected balaclava balaclava rate (%) compliance
(%) (years) costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910.............. Water, Sewer, and 0 NA NA NA NA
Pipeline
Construction.
NAICS 234920.............. Power and 4 $29.75 2 50/50/75/75 $7,322
Communication
Transmission Line
Construction.
NAICS 234930.............. Industrial 0 NA NA NA NA
Nonbuilding
Structure
Construction.
NAICS 234990.............. All Other Heavy 0 NA NA NA NA
Construction.
NAICS 235310.............. Electrical 0 NA NA NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 235910.............. Structural Steel 0 NA NA NA NA
Erection
Contractors.
NAICS 235950.............. Building Equipment 0 NA NA NA NA
and Other Machine
Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990.............. All Other Special 0 NA NA NA NA
Trade Contractors.
NAICS 221110.............. Electric Power 4 29.75 2 80/80/90/90 2,723
Generation.
NAICS 221120.............. Electric Power 4 29.75 2 80/80/90/90 4,630
Transmission,
Control, and
Distribution.
NAICS 2211................ Major Publicly 4 29.75 2 80/90 621
Owned Utilities.
Various................... Industrial Power 0 NA NA NA NA
Generators.
SIC 0783.................. Ornamental Shrub 0 NA NA NA NA
and Tree Services.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total................. .................. ........... ........... ........... ............ 15,295
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large
establishments.
Sources: BLS [40, 41], Grainger [12], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
12. Annual Costs for Providing Harnesses for Fall Arrest in Aerial
Lifts
Under the final rule, employees in aerial lifts performing work
covered by Sec. 1910.269 will no longer be able to use body belts as
part of fall arrest systems and instead must use harnesses. However,
OSHA estimates that while the final rule affects employees of
construction contractors or utilities, employers in these industries
are in 100-percent compliance with the final rule. Employers already
must use harnesses for equivalent work in construction (see Sec.
1926.502(d) and the discussion of final Sec. 1926.954(b) in Section V,
Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble),
and employers in these industries perform construction work. Moreover,
research conducted by CONSAD reveals that establishments in these
industries already provide employees with harnesses as required by the
final rule [5]. (To simplify analysis, Table 47 treats the costs for
all industries other than Industrial Power Generators and Ornamental
Shrub and Tree Services as not applicable.)
OSHA estimates that employers in the Industrial Power Generators
and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industries will incur costs
under the final rule. OSHA bases its cost estimates on CONSAD's finding
that, unlike the other industries, a substantial portion of
establishments in the Industrial Power Generators and Ornamental Shrub
and Tree Services industries do not provide their workers with
harnesses [5].\565\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\565\ This estimate may be an overestimate. First, the pattern
of providing harnesses to employees may now differ from what CONSAD
observed in 2005. Second, as explained earlier in this analysis,
since repair or maintenance work and construction work are often
identical, companies are not likely to restrict themselves to only
repair or maintenance work, or to only construction work, with
regard to potential jobs involving electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution. Therefore, employers that are in the
Industrial Power Generators industry, that perform construction
work, and that are not providing harnesses to their employees may
simply be out of compliance with the existing construction
requirement. OSHA's analysis assumes that employers in the
Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry do not perform
construction work. To the extent that these employees do perform
construction work, as during site-clearing operations, Sec.
1926.502(d) currently requires harnesses when employees are
performing this work from aerial lifts. Consequently, OSHA estimates
of current compliance in this industry also should be conservative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For employers in the Industrial Power Generators industry, the
harness provisions would affect an estimated 67 percent of the
employees who perform electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution work [5]. Among employees in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree
Services industry who perform line-clearance tree-trimming operations,
these provisions affect an estimated 50 percent of the workforce (id.).
OSHA estimated the rates of current compliance with the final
requirements for each affected industry. The Agency estimated the
average rate of compliance currently among employers in the Industrial
Power Generators industry, which have employees potentially affected by
the final rule, to be 75 percent. Similarly, among employees performing
line-clearance tree-trimming operations, OSHA estimated current
compliance to be 25 percent for establishments with fewer than 20
employees and 50 percent for establishments with 20 or more employees
[5]. OSHA concludes that this estimate is reasonable. While one
commenter questioned this estimate for line-clearance tree trimmers
(Ex. 0174), another commenter confirmed that it was generally accurate
(Ex. 0419).
The Agency estimated the average cost associated with providing a
harness instead of a body belt to be about $69 per affected employee
[19, 20].\566\ When OSHA annualized the costs of compliance for
providing harnesses for fall arrest in aerial lifts at a 7-percent
interest rate over the useful life of the equipment (5 years), the
resulting total estimated annualized cost is approximately $0.1
million, as shown in Table 47. Table 47 also shows the costs of
compliance for each affected industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\566\ In the PRIA, OSHA estimated that the average cost
associated with providing a harness instead of a belt was about $100
per affected employee (70 FR 34917). OSHA's new estimate reflects
data showing that the cost differential between harnesses and belts
fell between the time of the PRIA and the FEA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While one commenter indicated that the cost would be several times
larger than OSHA estimated, the commenter failed to annualize the costs
associated with providing harnesses (Ex. 0174). The commenter also
failed to account for the manner in which OSHA estimated the percentage
of employees affected, that is, by excluding from the percentage of
employees affected employees who do not work from aerial lifts and
affected employees who must wear harnesses as the existing construction
standard requires.
Table 47--Annualized Costs for Providing Harnesses for Fall Arrest in Aerial Lifts
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incremental
Employees cost of Useful life of Compliance Annualized
Industry code Industry name affected (%) harness in harness rates (%) compliance
lieu of belt (years) costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910.......................... Water, Sewer, and Pipeline 0 NA NA NA NA
Construction.
NAICS 234920.......................... Power and Communication 0 NA NA NA NA
Transmission Line Construction.
NAICS 234930.......................... Industrial Nonbuilding Structure 0 NA NA NA NA
Construction.
NAICS 234990.......................... All Other Heavy Construction.... 0 NA NA NA NA
NAICS 235310.......................... Electrical Contractors.......... 0 NA NA NA NA
NAICS 235910.......................... Structural Steel Erection 0 NA NA NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 235950.......................... Building Equipment and Other 0 NA NA NA NA
Machine Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990.......................... All Other Special Trade 0 NA NA NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 221110.......................... Electric Power Generation....... 0 NA NA NA NA
NAICS 221120.......................... Electric Power Transmission, 0 NA NA NA NA
Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211............................ Major Publicly Owned Utilities.. 0 NA NA NA NA
Various............................... Industrial Power Generators..... 67 $69 5 75 $48,612
SIC 0783.............................. Ornamental Shrub and Tree 50 69 5 25/50 64,610
Services.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................. ................................ .............. .............. .............. .............. 113,222
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
(3) Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small and large establishments,
and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large establishments.
Sources: CONSAD [5], Lab Safety Supply [19, 20], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
13. Costs for Upgrading Fall Protection Equipment
An additional cost for fall protection equipment that OSHA did not
include in the analysis of the proposed rule is the cost of upgrading
fall protection equipment for line workers in the affected industries.
Paragraph (b)(3)(iv) of final Sec. 1926.954 requires that employers
ensure that employees rig work-positioning systems so that the employee
can free fall not more than 0.6 meters (2 feet). Paragraph (b)(3)(v) of
final Sec. 1926.954 requires that anchorages for work-positioning
equipment be capable of supporting at least twice the potential impact
load of an employee's fall, or 13.3 kilonewtons (3,000 pounds-force),
whichever is greater. Paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C) of final Sec. 1926.954
provides that, on and after April 1, 2015, employers must ensure that
qualified employees climbing or changing location on poles, towers, or
similar structures use fall protection unless the employer can
demonstrate that climbing or changing location with fall protection is
infeasible or creates a greater hazard than climbing or changing
location without fall protection. Therefore, these three provisions, as
explained in the discussion of final Sec. 1926.954(b)(3) in Section V,
Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble,
require replacement of most positioning straps and lanyards currently
in use. To estimate the number of line workers affected by these
provisions, OSHA calculated the percentage of line installers and
repairers in NAICS 221100--Electric Power Generation, Transmission and
Distribution from the number of line installers and repairers (that is,
51,440) and the total employment (that is, 402,840) in that industry
[37, 38] and assumed that this percentage (that is, 13 percent) was
similar across all affected NAICSs. Based on publicly available
information from vendors of electrical protective equipment, OSHA
estimates that positioning straps cost approximately $200 [4].\567\
Estimating a compliance rate of 50 percent across all industries \568\
and annualizing the cost of the positioning straps over a 5-year useful
life, results in estimated annualized compliance costs of approximately
$0.5 million, as shown in Table 48. Table 48 also shows the costs of
compliance for each affected industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\567\ The final rule generally gives employers the option of
using different types of fall protection equipment. OSHA estimated
costs for replacing positioning straps only and did not estimate
costs associated with using other types of fall protection required
by the relevant provisions of the final rule. OSHA believes that the
cost of replacing positioning straps (per employee) is
representative of the per-employee cost for any type of fall
protection. In any event, employees can and do use work-positioning
equipment in the vast majority of applicable cases. OSHA also
assumed that, on average, employers need purchase only one type of
fall protection for each affected worker. OSHA believes this is a
valid assumption. On the one hand, the fall protection requirements
at issue will not require employers to provide fall protection to
qualified employees, such as underground power line workers, who do
not climb or change location on poles, towers, or similar
structures. On the other hand, some employers will need to provide
different types of fall protection to some line workers who work on
multiple types of structures.
\568\ Comments to the record suggested that, as of 2005,
compliance with this provision was common, but less than universal
(Ex. 0230; Tr. 1357). The Agency believes that compliance with the
provision has become more widespread in the interim, in part because
the Agency already requires attachment under certain circumstances.
Therefore, the estimate of 50-percent current compliance likely is
conservative.
Table 48--Annualized Costs for Upgrading Fall Protection Equipment
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost of Useful life of Annualized
Industry code Industry name Employees positioning positioning Compliance compliance
affected (%) straps strap (years) rate (%) costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910.......................... Water, Sewer, and Pipeline NA NA NA NA NA
Construction.
NAICS 234920.......................... Power and Communication 13 $200 5 50/50/50/50 $108,190
Transmission Line Construction.
NAICS 234930.......................... Industrial Nonbuilding Structure NA NA NA NA NA
Construction.
NAICS 234990.......................... All Other Heavy Construction.... NA NA NA NA NA
NAICS 235310.......................... Electrical Contractors.......... NA NA NA NA NA
NAICS 235910.......................... Structural Steel Erection NA NA NA NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 235950.......................... Building Equipment and Other NA NA NA NA NA
Machine Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990.......................... All Other Special Trade NA NA NA NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 221110.......................... Electric Power Generation....... 13 200 5 50/50/50/50 116,972
NAICS 221120.......................... Electric Power Transmission, 13 200 5 50/50/50/50 199,879
Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211............................ Major Publicly Owned Utilities.. 13 200 5 50/50 26,727
Various............................... Industrial Power Generators..... NA NA NA NA NA
SIC 0783.............................. Ornamental Shrub and Tree NA NA NA NA NA
Services.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................. ................................ .............. .............. .............. .............. 451,768
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large establishments.
Sources: Buckingham Manufacturing [4], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
14. Costs Related to Minimum Approach Distances
The final rule contains provisions related to the calculation of
minimum approach distances that are new to both Sec. 1910.269 and
Subpart V. The final rule is more protective and more technologically
sound than the existing standards; in some cases the final rule will
require employers to either perform an engineering analysis or use
portable protective gaps to ensure implementation of the required
minimum approach distance.
To calculate the cost of these provisions, OSHA first determined
the number of potentially affected entities by estimating the number of
utilities performing transmission work.\569\ The Census' NAICS
categories used elsewhere in this analysis do not differentiate between
utilities performing transmission work and utilities performing
generation or distribution work, so OSHA used data from the Department
of Energy to estimate the number of utilities performing transmission
work. The Department of Energy's U.S. Energy Information Administration
Form EIA-861 Final Data File for 2008 [50] suggests that there are
approximately 623 utilities performing transmission work. Of these
utilities, 6 utilities list 0 sales, and 105 are missing sales data. Of
the remaining 512 utilities with sales data, 265 (52 percent) are small
businesses by SBA standards [51], with sales of less than 4 million
megawatt-hours annually. The remaining 247 (48 percent) are large
businesses, with sales of over 4 million megawatt-hours annually.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\569\ For reasons explained in the summary and explanation of
final Sec. 1926.960(c)(1), in Section V, Summary and Explanation of
the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble, the Agency believes that
the final rule will have a substantial effect only on transmission
work involving voltages of 230 kilovolts or more. Utilities use
portable protective gaps to reduce the maximum transient overvoltage
on a line (and thereby reduce the required minimum approach
distance). According to ERG, electric utilities perform most of the
affected work themselves [8]. Accounting for this factor, OSHA's
analysis assumes that contractors will not be using portable
protective gaps to achieve reduced minimum approach distances. In
any event, given the small amount of relevant work performed by
contractors, any costs for portable protective gaps borne by
contractors will be negligible.
As with other provisions of the standard, the Agency made a
reasonable estimate of whether the contractor or the utility would
immediately bear the cost of this requirement. The Agency expects
that, to the extent that contractors incur this cost, utilities
ultimately will bear it, as contracts between contractors and
utilities will most likely pass through the cost to utilities.
Moreover, to the extent the Agency overallocated cost estimates
directly to the utility sector, it should not affect questions of
economic feasibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSHA next estimated the percentage of utilities performing
transmission work that have lines operating at voltages of 230
kilovolts or more. Recent data on publicly owned utilities are not
available because EIA terminated its Form EIA-412 database of annual
electric industry financial reports from publicly owned utilities in
2005. However, a similar database of investor-owned utilities is
available from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Form No. 1:
Annual Report of Major Electric Utilities [10]. ERG downloaded
transmission-line statistics for a random selection of investor-owned
utilities that perform transmission work and analyzed the operational
voltage for all of their transmission lines. ERG found that 28 percent
of these utilities had transmission lines with operational voltages of
at least 230 kilovolts. ERG then applied this percentage to all
publicly owned and investor-owned utilities performing transmission
work. This approach found that 143 utilities performing transmission
work have transmission lines operating at these voltages and, thus,
will incur costs related to MAD [8].
OSHA estimates that these 143 affected utilities will calculate the
maximum anticipated transient overvoltage (that is, T) on their systems
to determine appropriate minimum approach distances. OSHA estimated
costs based on 4 engineering hours for small utilities and 8
engineering hours for large utilities to perform this calculation [8].
This approach results in total estimated labor costs of $26,097. When
annualized at a rate of 7 percent over 10 years, this approach results
in total estimated costs of $6,286 (see Table 49).
Some commenters, such as EEI (Ex. 0575.1), expressed concern that
substantially increased minimum approach distances would require the
purchase of additional hardware, such as aerial lifts with longer
booms, or possibly result in more scheduled outages.
As discussed in depth in the discussion of final Sec.
1926.960(c)(1) in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule,
earlier in this preamble, the Agency believes that the regulated
community can largely avoid these costs. In some cases, however, after
performing the engineering analysis, utilities may find that they are
not able to perform work in accordance with the minimum approach
distances required by the final rule without using portable protective
gaps to reduce the maximum per-unit transient overvoltage on a
line.\570\ OSHA estimated that this impact will occur for 10 percent of
the 143 affected utilities, or 14 utilities [8]. Each of these 14
utilities will incur fixed costs of approximately $25,000 to design and
test the portable protective gaps, regardless of how many portable
protective gaps they use (id.). The portable protective gaps will cost
approximately $5,000, and OSHA estimates that each affected utility
will purchase 24 portable protective gaps, resulting in total costs for
portable protective gaps of approximately $2.1 million (id.). When
annualized at a rate of 7 percent over 10 years, the estimated costs
are approximately $0.3 million (see Table 49).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\570\ See the summary and explanation for final Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)(i), in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the
Final Rule, earlier in this preamble, for a discussion of how
employers will comply with increased minimum approach distances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, utilities will incur costs to install the portable
protective gaps on affected projects. OSHA estimated the number of
projects performed per year by the 143 affected utilities performing
transmission work by calculating the ratio of affected utilities to
total firms in the Electric Power Transmission, Control, and
Distribution (NAICS 221120) and Major Publicly Owned Utilities (NAICS
2211) categories (see Table 19). Applying this ratio (approximately
0.095) to the total number of projects for all firms in these two
industries (see Table 38) results in a total of 289,824 projects for
the affected firms. With an estimated 10 percent of these projects
using portable protective gaps, the total number of affected projects
is 28,982.\571\ The number of portable protective gaps used per
project, and the time it will take to install each portable protective
gap, will vary depending on the number of phase conductors and the
voltage of the lines. OSHA estimates that, on average, it will take a
crew of two individuals using an aerial lift half an hour per project
to install the appropriate number of portable protective gaps,
resulting in estimated total annual labor costs for the 14 affected
utilities of approximately $1.5 million, as shown in Table 49. (Note
that this analysis conservatively assumes that no firms currently
employ portable protective gaps.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\571\ ERG estimated that utilities in dense urban areas use
portable protective gaps about 10 percent of the time and that they
normally use portable protective gaps on compact design lines found
in major population areas [8]. Since utilities are less likely to
use portable protective gags in nonurban areas, the 10-percent
statistic is a conservative measure of the extent of portable-
protective-gap use among all utilities with high-voltage
transmission lines (id.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summing the annualized costs for utilities to calculate the maximum
anticipated transient overvoltage and to purchase and install portable
protective gaps results in an estimated total cost of approximately
$1.8 million for the new minimum approach-distance requirements in the
final rule, as shown in Table 49.
Table 49--Annualized Costs for Calculating New MADs and Using Portable Protective Gaps
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized one-
Share of power Affected time Annualized PPG Annual PPG Total
Industry code Industry name projects (%) utilities engineering capital costs installation annualized
cost costs costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 221120.................. Electric Power 88.2 126 $5,542 $260,953 $1,327,197 $1,593,692
Transmission, Control,
and Distribution.
NAICS 2211.................... Major Publicly Owned 11.8 17 744 35,010 178,059 213,812
Utilities.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total..................... ........................ .............. 143 6,286 295,963 1,505,256 1,807,505
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
Sources: BLS [36, 37], CONSAD [5], EIA [49], ERG [8], FERC [10], SBA [51].
15. First-Year Costs
The first-year nonnegligible costs for the final rule include
unannualized capital costs, unannualized costs for other one-time
expenses (such as the cost of revising training programs), and any
annual costs borne in the first year. In the case of training, first-
year costs include one-time costs for revising training programs, one-
time costs for providing additional training to employees already
receiving training in accordance with existing Sec. 1910.269, one-time
costs for additional training for employees not already receiving
training in accordance with existing Sec. 1910.269, and one-time costs
for training in the use of fall protection for qualified employees.
First-year costs also include one-time costs for the arc-hazard
assessment (but not the annual cost of updating the assessment), the
costs of providing appropriate arc-flash protective equipment
(including flame-resistant clothing, switching coats and flash suits,
head protection, and face protection), the cost of providing harnesses
for fall arrest for employees working from aerial lifts, the cost of
upgrading fall protection equipment, one-time engineering costs for
calculating new minimum approach distances, and capital costs for
portable-protective-gaps. Finally, first-year costs include the first
year's annual costs for installing portable protective gaps, the first
year's annual costs for host-contractor communication, the first year's
annual costs for job briefings, and the first year's annual costs of
complying with existing Sec. 1910.269 (other than training) for
employees not already covered by Sec. 1910.269. These first year costs
total $113.8 million and are summarized in Table 50.
Table 50--First Year Costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calculating
Other costs incident
Host- for employees energy and arc-
Industry code Industry name Training contractor Job briefing not already hazard
communication covered by assessment
Sec. (arc-hazard
1910.269 assessment)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910.......................... Water, Sewer, and Pipeline $240,468 $150,214 $70,743 $4,427 NA
Construction.
NAICS 234920.......................... Power and Communication 5,670,126 1,891,463 1,777,657 121,855 NA
Transmission Line Construction.
NAICS 234930.......................... Industrial Nonbuilding Structure 22,591 204,286 70,999 NA NA
Construction.
NAICS 234990.......................... All Other Heavy Construction.... 1,132,361 894,356 424,921 25,941 NA
NAICS 235310.......................... Electrical Contractors.......... 3,519,375 2,702,235 1,545,162 76,067 NA
NAICS 235910.......................... Structural Steel Erection 39,624 47,763 24,717 NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 235950.......................... Building Equipment and Other 57,131 44,957 23,197 NA NA
Machine Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990.......................... All Other Special Trade 163,570 124,535 71,957 NA NA
Contractors.
NAICS 221110.......................... Electric Power Generation....... 207,776 2,397,541 675,284 NA 1,910,206
NAICS 221120.......................... Electric Power Transmission, 383,402 6,393,786 1,144,815 NA 4,547,557
Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211............................ Major Publicly Owned Utilities.. 51,589 571,626 153,887 NA 1,126,003
Various............................... Industrial Power Generators..... 33,561 648,391 306,992 NA 862,483
SIC 0783.............................. Ornamental Shrub and Tree 114,631 1,749,688 407,227 NA NA
Services.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................. ................................ 11,636,205 17,820,841 6,697,557 228,289 8,446,249
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 50--First Year Costs (Continued)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Provision of
appropriate Use of Upgrading fall Total first
Industry code Industry name arc-flash harnesses in protection MAD year
protective aerial lifts equipment compliance
equipment costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910.......................... Water, Sewer, and Pipeline $687,227 NA NA NA $1,153,078
Construction.
NAICS 234920.......................... Power and Communication 18,546,383 NA 443,601 NA 28,451,085
Transmission Line Construction.
NAICS 234930.......................... Industrial Nonbuilding Structure 823,855 NA NA NA 1,121,731
Construction.
NAICS 234990.......................... All Other Heavy Construction.... 4,335,309 NA NA NA 6,812,888
NAICS 235310.......................... Electrical Contractors.......... 13,169,413 NA NA NA 21,012,253
NAICS 235910.......................... Structural Steel Erection 222,458 NA NA NA 334,562
Contractors.
NAICS 235950.......................... Building Equipment and Other 208,445 NA NA NA 333,729
Machine Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990.......................... All Other Special Trade 662,120 NA NA NA 1,022,182
Contractors.
NAICS 221110.......................... Electric Power Generation....... 7,269,449 NA 479,610 NA 12,939,866
NAICS 221120.......................... Electric Power Transmission, 12,364,959 NA 819,545 3,198,950 28,853,013
Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211............................ Major Publicly Owned Utilities.. 1,658,430 NA 109,585 429,176 4,100,296
Various............................... Industrial Power Generators..... 3,057,416 199,318 NA NA 5,108,161
SIC 0783.............................. Ornamental Shrub and Tree 0 264,915 NA NA 2,536,461
Services.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................. ................................ 63,005,465 464,233 1,852,340 3,628,126 113,779,305
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
Sources: Office of Regulatory Analysis, OSHA (see text).
16. Economic Feasibility and Impacts
This portion of the analysis presents OSHA's analysis of the
economic impacts of the final rule and an assessment of the economic
feasibility of compliance with the requirements imposed by the
rulemaking. To assess the types and magnitude of the economic impacts
associated with compliance with the final rule, OSHA developed
quantitative estimates of the economic impact of the requirements on
entities in each of the affected industries. OSHA compared the
estimated costs of compliance presented previously in this economic
analysis with industry revenues and profits to provide an assessment of
potential economic impacts. (Following the assessment of potential
economic impacts, OSHA presents a separate analysis of the economic
impacts of the final rule on small entities as part of the Final
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis.)
Table 51 presents data on the revenues for each affected industry,
along with the corresponding industry profits and the estimated costs
of compliance in each industry. For the FEA, OSHA updated revenue data
for the 1997 NAICS and SIC categories used in the CONSAD analysis using
the U.S. Census Bureau's 1997 NAICS and 1987 SIC Correspondence Tables
[44], the 1997 NAICS to 2002 NAICS Correspondence Tables [45], and the
2002 NAICS to 2007 NAICS Correspondence Tables [46]. As explained
earlier in this FEA, in many cases, a single 1997 NAICS code maps to
multiple 2007 NAICS codes (see the discussion under the heading
"Profile of Affected Industries"). Revenue data is drawn from the
U.S. Census' Statistics of U.S. Businesses [43]. In most cases, once
OSHA matched a 1997 category with its corresponding 2007 categories,
OSHA averaged revenue for the 2007 NAICS categories to produce a single
updated estimate for the 1997 NAICS category. In the case of Electric
Power Generation (1997 NAICS 221110) and Electric Power Transmission,
Control, and Distribution (1997 NAICS 221120), however, the updated
estimates for the respective 1997 NAICS categories are the sum of the
corresponding 2007 NAICS categories. After updating the revenue data,
OSHA calculated the average revenue per establishment for each 1997
NAICS or SIC category by dividing the updated data for each category by
the updated estimate of total establishments in each 1997 category.
Then, to estimate the weighted average revenues and profits for
affected establishments, OSHA multiplied the revenue per establishment
by the updated estimate of affected establishments in each 1997 NAICS
category \572\ (see Table 19).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\572\ In most affected industry sectors, the earlier NAICS code
fragmented into several different NAICS codes that would be
difficult to reassemble. In the case of the Electric Power
Generation (1997 NAICS 221110) and Electric Power Transmission,
Control, and Distribution (1997 NAICS 221120) industries, however,
the NAICS codes still largely align with their earlier version. For
this reason, OSHA estimated revenues for these two industries than
for the other affected industries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Generally, the Agency assumed that the revenue profiles of affected
establishments mirrored the profiles of the other establishments in the
designated NAICS codes. However, CONSAD's industry profile evidenced
significantly larger than average affected establishments for
Electrical Contractors (NAICS 235310) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree
Services (SIC 0783), as the affected establishments in these two
industries had more "power workers" than the average number of
employees per establishment for all establishments in those industries.
For these two industries, the Agency increased the average revenues by
the respective ratios of power workers to total average employees.
In addition, in the case of these two industries, the Agency needed
to further adjust the estimated revenue profile to better match the
establishments that the final standard would affect. First, the Agency
determined that the establishments and firms in the Electrical
Contractors industry (NAICS 235310), on average, do only a small
portion of their work on electric power installations covered by the
final standard. OSHA based this determination, in part, on the NAICS
definitions--if the establishments did
most of their work on electric utility systems, the establishments
would be in another NAICS code. Moreover, the Agency believes that
Electrical Contractors (NAICS 235310) affected by the final rule are
different in kind than Electrical Contractors (NAICS 235310) not
affected by the final rule, as those affected by the final rule are
part of a small minority of specialized firms and establishments in
NAICS 235310 that do high-voltage work and are larger and invest in
more specialized capital equipment than the typical small electrical
contractor (which typically does only low-voltage work in settings such
as residential construction). Based on these factors, the Agency
assumed that power workers comprise only 25 percent of the typical
workforce in establishments that are in the Electrical Contractors
industry and that the final rule affects. The Agency also assumed that
the relevant revenue figures for these establishments and for firms
controlling these establishments would be four times those of the
average electrical contractor.
Second, as discussed under the heading "Profile of Affected
Industries," earlier in this section of the preamble, the affected
establishments in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry (SIC
0783) are primarily large establishments having 20 or more employees.
The size of affected establishment is decidedly different from the
average in the industry, which, the Profile of Affected Industries
shows, consists mostly of small establishments having fewer than 20
employees. Therefore, to analyze the economic impact for the Ornamental
Shrub and Tree Services industry (SIC 0783), the Agency used the
projected economic profile of the affected set of establishments, as
opposed to that of all establishments, in the industry. (Consistent
with this approach, for the analysis of firms with fewer than 20
employees, the analysis incorporated only the information from this
small subset of smaller establishments.)
To calculate profit rates, OSHA used data from the Internal Revenue
Service's (IRS) Corporation Sourcebook, which contains accounting
information for the various industries established by the NAICS system.
OSHA calculated profit rates using IRS data for each year from 2000
through 2006 and averaged these rates to produce an average profit rate
for each 2007 NAICS. OSHA then averaged the profit rates for each 2007
NAICS to produce an estimate for the profit rate for each of the 1997
NAICS, consistent with the original CONSAD analysis. OSHA then
multiplied the updated revenue estimates by the profit rate to
determine profits.
Table 51--Costs as a Percent of Revenues and Profits for Affected Establishments
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costs as a Costs as a
Industry code Industry name Number of Costs per Revenues per Profits per percent of percent of
affected est. affected est. est. est. revenues profits
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910.................. Water, Sewer, and 1,021 $456 $8,513,020 $444,380 0.005 0.103
Pipeline Construction.
NAICS 234920.................. Power and Communication 3,412 3,086 5,973,947 311,840 0.052 0.990
Transmission Line
Construction.
NAICS 234930.................. Industrial Nonbuilding 321 1,544 8,616,909 434,005 0.018 0.356
Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990.................. All Other Heavy 791 3,545 3,426,792 166,062 0.103 2.135
Construction.
NAICS 235310.................. Electrical Contractors.. 1,945 4,438 6,231,556 269,203 0.071 1.648
NAICS 235910.................. Structural Steel 786 174 2,346,498 103,715 0.007 0.168
Erection Contractors.
NAICS 235950.................. Building Equipment and 1,148 114 3,463,515 153,087 0.003 0.075
Other Machine
Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990.................. All Other Special Trade 3,150 125 2,948,895 135,944 0.004 0.092
Contractors.
NAICS 221110.................. Electric Power 2,171 2,733 101,021,115 19,113,195 0.003 0.014
Generation.
NAICS 221120.................. Electric Power 7,440 1,874 44,202,675 4,181,573 0.004 0.045
Transmission, Control,
and Distribution.
NAICS 2211.................... Major Publicly Owned 927 1,846 48,441,576 NA 0.004 NA
Utilities.
Various....................... Industrial Power 913 2,298 2,819,000 ND 0.082 ND
Generators.
SIC 0783...................... Ornamental Shrub and 381 5,867 5,259,031 274,424 0.112 2.138
Tree Services.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total..................... ........................ 24,407 2,029 27,018,684 3,101,847 0.008 0.065
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
(3) "ND" = No Data is available.
Sources: CONSAD [5], IRS [15], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
As is evident from the data presented in Table 51, the costs of
compliance with the present rulemaking are not large in relation to the
corresponding annual financial flows associated with the regulated
activities. The estimated
costs of compliance represent about 0.008 percent of revenues and 0.065
percent of profits, on average, across all entities; compliance costs
do not represent more than about 0.11 percent of revenues or more than
about 2.14 percent of profits in any affected industry.
The economic impact of the present rulemaking is most likely to
consist of a small increase in prices for electricity of about 0.008
percent, on average. It is unlikely that a price increase of the
magnitude of 0.008 percent will significantly alter the services
demanded by the public or any other affected customers or
intermediaries. If the regulated community can substantially recoup the
compliance costs of the present rulemaking with such a minimal increase
in prices, there may be little effect on profits.\573\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\573\ One commenter questioned the ability of electric
cooperatives to adjust their rates, as they are "highly regulated"
(Ex. 0173). The commenter asserted that it could take more than a
year to raise rates, if at all.
The Agency does not assume cost pass-through in establishing
economic feasibility; the estimate of costs as a percentage of
profits represents the possibility that there is no cost pass-
through. Moreover, for this rulemaking, the profit impacts would be
small. Finally, this economic-impact analysis captures ongoing
issues for economic feasibility, not just the first year. If it
takes a year or two to raise prices, this is well within the realm
of possibilities. Industries may not be able to raise prices
immediately for a variety of reasons--for market, as well as
regulatory, reasons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In general, it is unlikely that most establishments could pass none
of the compliance costs along in the form of increased prices. In the
event that unusual circumstances may inhibit even a price increase of
0.11 percent, the maximum reduction in profits in any of the affected
industries would be about 2.14 percent.
OSHA established a minimum threshold of annualized costs equal to 1
percent of annual revenues and 10 percent of annual profits. OSHA also
determined that costs below this minimum threshold will not threaten
the economic viability of an affected industry. Table 51 shows that the
estimated annualized cost of the final rule is, on average, equal to
only 0.008 percent of annual revenue and 0.065 percent of annual
profit, far below the minimum threshold. Similarly, there is no
individual affected industry in which the annualized costs of the final
rule approaches 1 percent of annual revenues or 10 percent of annual
profits. The industries with the highest cost impacts, NAICS 234990
(All Other Heavy Construction) and SIC 0783 (Ornamental Shrub and Tree
Services), have cost impacts as a percentage of revenues of only about
0.1 percent each and cost impacts as a percentage of profits of only
about 2 percent each. Based on these results, there would be no threat
to the economic viability of any affected industry even if the costs of
the final rule were nine times higher than OSHA estimated, as the
highest cost impact as a percentage of revenues in any affected
industry would still be less than 1 percent. Furthermore, the costs of
the final rule would have to be five times higher than OSHA estimated
for the cost impact as a percentage of revenues in any affected
industry to approach 10 percent, the point at which further, more
detailed, examination is needed to determine if the final rule might
threaten the economic viability of any affected industry. For these
reasons, the Agency believes that the finding of economic feasibility
is robust for this rulemaking. A simple sensitivity analysis of the
results finds that even if aggregate costs were several times larger
than those estimated here, the rule would still be economically
feasible.
In profit-earning entities, establishments generally can absorb
compliance costs through a combination of increases in prices and
reduction in profits. The extent to which the impacts of cost increases
affect prices or profits depends on the price elasticity of demand for
the products or services produced and sold by the entity.
Price elasticity of demand refers to the relationship between
changes in the price charged for a product and the resulting changes in
the demand for that product. A greater degree of elasticity of demand
implies that an entity or industry is less able to pass increases in
costs through to its customers in the form of a price increase and,
therefore, must absorb more of the cost increase through a reduction in
profits.
Given the small incremental increases in prices potentially
resulting from compliance with the final rule, and the lack of readily
available substitutes for the products and services provided by the
covered industries, demand is likely to be sufficiently inelastic in
each affected industry to enable entities to substantially offset
compliance costs through minor price increases without experiencing any
significant reduction in total revenues or in net profits.
For the economy as a whole, OSHA expects the economic impact of the
present rulemaking to be both an increase in the efficiency of
production of goods and services and an improvement in the welfare of
society. First, as demonstrated by the analysis of costs and benefits
associated with compliance with the requirements of the final rule,
OSHA expects that societal welfare will increase as a result of these
standards because the benefits achieved clearly and strongly justify
the relatively small costs. The impacts of the final rule involve net
benefits of over $100 million achieved in a relatively cost-effective
manner.
Second, until now, society externalized many of the costs
associated with the injuries and fatalities resulting from the risks
addressed by the final rule. That is, the costs incurred by society to
supply certain products and services associated with electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution work did not fully reflect
in the prices of those products and services. Workers who suffer the
consequences associated with the activities causing these risks partly
bore the costs of production. To the extent society externalizes fewer
of these costs, the price mechanism will enable the market to result in
a more efficient allocation of resources. Note that reductions in
externalities alone do not necessarily increase efficiency or social
welfare unless the associated benefits outweigh the costs of achieving
the reductions.
OSHA concludes that compliance with the requirements of the final
rule is economically feasible in every affected industry. The Agency
based this conclusion on the criteria established by the OSH Act, as
interpreted in relevant case law. In general, the courts hold that a
standard is economically feasible if there is a reasonable likelihood
that the estimated costs of compliance "will not threaten the
existence or competitive structure of an industry, even if it does
portend disaster for some marginal firms" (United Steelworkers of
America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). As
demonstrated by this Final Economic Analysis and the supporting
evidence, the potential impacts associated with achieving compliance
with the final rule fall well within the bounds of economic feasibility
in each industry. OSHA does not expect compliance with the requirements
of the final rule to threaten the viability of entities or the
existence or competitive structure of any of the affected industries.
No commenters suggested that the regulation would not be economically
feasible.
In addition, based on an analysis of the costs and economic impacts
associated with this rulemaking, OSHA concludes that the effects of the
final rule on international trade, employment, wages, and economic
growth for the United States will be negligible.
17. Statement of Energy Effects
As required by Executive Order 13211 and in accordance with the
guidance for implementing Executive Order 13211 and with the
definitions provided therein as prescribed by the Office of Management
and Budget, OSHA analyzed the final rule with regard to its potential
to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or
use of energy. As a result of this analysis, OSHA determined that this
action is not a significant energy action as defined by the relevant
OMB guidance.
H. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
The Regulatory Flexibility Act, as amended in 1996, requires the
preparation of a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) for
certain rules (5 U.S.C. 601-612). Under the provisions of the law, each
such analysis must contain:
1. A succinct statement of the need for, and objectives of, the
rule;
2. A summary of the significant issues raised by the public
comments in response to the initial regulatory flexibility analysis, a
summary of the assessment of the agency of such issues, and a statement
of any changes made in the final rule as a result of such comments;
3. A description and an estimate of the number of small entities to
which the rule will apply or an explanation of why no such estimate is
available;
4. A description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and
other compliance requirements of the rule, including an estimate of the
classes of small entities that will be subject to the requirement and
the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report
or record; and
5. A description of the steps the agency took to minimize the
significant economic impact on small entities consistent with the
stated objectives of applicable statutes, including a statement of the
factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the alternative
adopted in the final rule and why the agency rejected each one of the
other significant alternatives to the rule considered by the agency
that affect the impact on small entities.
The Regulatory Flexibility Act further states that an agency may
perform the required elements of the FRFA in conjunction with, or as
part of, any other agenda or analysis required by any other law if such
other analysis satisfies the relevant requirements.
1. A Succinct Statement of the Need for, and Objectives of, the Rule
The primary objective of the final rule is to provide an increased
degree of occupational safety for employees performing electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution work. As stated earlier, the
final rule will prevent an estimated 119 injuries and about 20
fatalities annually through compliance with the final rule, in addition
to injuries and fatalities prevented through compliance with existing
standards.
Another objective of the present rulemaking is to provide updated,
clear, and consistent safety standards regarding electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution work to relevant employers
and employees and interested members of the public. The final rule is
easier to understand and to apply than existing standards, which will
improve safety by facilitating compliance.
2. A Summary of the Significant Issues Raised by the Public Comments in
Response to the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, a Summary of
the Assessment of the Agency of Such Issues, and a Statement of Any
Changes Made in the Final Rule as a Result of Such Comments
Few public commenters focused on the specific results of the
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. OSHA responds to the few
issues raised by the commenters elsewhere in this FEA.
3. A Description and an Estimate of the Number of Small Entities To
Which the Rule Will Apply or an Explanation of Why No Such Estimate Is
Available
OSHA completed an analysis of the type and number of small and very
small entities to which the final rule will apply. Relying on the Small
Business Administration definitions [51], OSHA estimated the number of
firms in the construction and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC
0783) industries that are small businesses based on revenue and
estimated the number of firms in the utilities industries that are
small businesses based on sales (in megawatt-hours). With the exception
of Major Publically Owned Utilities, the Agency converted definitions
based on megawatt-hours to revenue cutoffs using the EIA's Form EIA-860
Database Annual Electric Generator Report, which estimates the average
revenue per mega watt-hour to be $99.59 [49]. Multiplying $99.59 by the
4-million megawatt-hour cutoff in the SBA definitions suggests a
revenue cutoff for small utilities of $398,363,132. After determining
revenue cutoffs implied by the SBA definitions for every affected
NAICS, OSHA found the revenue of the largest employment-size class in
the U.S. Census' Statistics of U.S. Businesses [43] equal to, or
smaller than, the revenue implied in the SBA definition and then
designated entities of that size or smaller as "small."
In the case of Major Publicly Owned Utilities, as explained earlier
in this FEA, OSHA estimates, based on EIA's Form-861 Annual Electric
Power Industry Report, that there are now 277 firms that are major
publicly owned utilities [50]. (See the discussion under the heading
"Profile of Affected Industries," earlier in this section of the
preamble). Of the 277 Major Publicly Owned Utilities in the EIA Form-
861 database, 261 have sales of less than 4-million megawatt-hours, and
16 have sales of more than 4-million megawatt-hours. OSHA did not
convert this sales data to a revenue or employment-size class
equivalent because EIA's Form 861 database does not include employment
data and because the U.S. Census' Statistics of U.S. Businesses does
not include data for Major Publicly Owned Utilities distinct from
nonmajor or privately owned utilities. Thus, OSHA used the 4-million
megawatt-hour cutoff in the SBA definitions to designate as small the
261 entities with sales of less than 4 million megawatt-hours.
Table 52 summarizes the small business definitions discussed
herein.
For small entities, OSHA estimates the total cost of the final rule
per small firm to be $3,159. (See Table 53.)
To assess the potential economic impact of the rule on small
entities, OSHA calculated the ratios of compliance costs to profits and
to revenues. Table 53 presents these ratios for each affected industry.
OSHA expects that, among small firms potentially affected by the rule,
the average increase in prices necessary to completely offset the
compliance costs will be less than 0.138 percent in any individual
affected industry and an average of 0.010 percent for all affected
industries.
Only to the extent that such price increases are not possible would
there be any effect on the average profits of small firms. Even in the
unlikely event that these firms could not pass the costs through, the
firms could absorb the compliance costs completely through an average
reduction in profits of no more than 2.9 percent in any single affected
industry and through an average reduction in profits of 0.086 percent
in all affected industries.
OSHA also separately examined the impact of the final rule on very
small entities, defined as entities with fewer than 20 employees. In
the proposed rule, the numbers presented in the CONSAD report for
small, large, and total establishments were from the 1997
U.S. Economic Census. For this FEA, OSHA used the U.S. Census Bureau's
2007 Statistics of U.S. Businesses [43] to update the numbers used in
the PRIA. Based on these data, OSHA estimated that the final rule would
affect a total of approximately 11,004 very small firms. Table 54
presents the estimated number of affected very small firms in each
industry.
OSHA modified the analysis it made in the PRIA to accurately
reflect the number of affected very small entities, as well as
compliance costs, revenues, and profits per affected entity. In
general, OSHA assumed that the profile of the affected firms mirrored
the profile of rest of industry. However, in the case of Ornamental
Tree and Shrub Services, SIC 0723, the Agency recognized that the
limited number of very small entities actually involved in line-
clearance tree trimming was atypical for the industry, as very small
entities involved in line-clearance tree trimming have significantly
more employees than the average firm in this SIC category.
Corresponding to their relatively larger employment, very small
entities involved in line-clearance tree trimming likely have larger
revenue than the average firm in the industry.
OSHA calculated the ratios of compliance costs to profits and to
revenues for very small firms. Table 54 presents these ratios for each
affected industry. OSHA expects that, among very small firms affected
by the final rule, the average increase in prices necessary to
completely offset the compliance costs will be 0.040 percent.
Only to the extent that such price increases are not possible would
there be any effect on the average profits of small firms. Even in the
unlikely event that these firms could not pass the costs through, the
firms could absorb the compliance costs completely through an average
reduction in profits of less than 0.040 percent.
Table 52--Small Business Definitions
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Equivalent
Equivalent employment
CONSAD/1997 NAICS CONSAD industry name 2002/2007 2002/2007 industry SBA size standard ($ million or revenue ($ size category
NAICS name mega watt-hours, as applicable) million) (max.
employees)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
234910................... Water, Sewer, and 237110 Water and Sewer $33.5............................. NA 100
Pipeline Line and Related
Construction. Structures
Construction.
237120 Oil and Gas 33.5.............................. NA 100
Pipeline and
Related Structures
Construction.
234920................... Power and 237130 Power and 33.5.............................. NA All
Communication Communication Line
Transmission Line and Related
Construction. Structures
Construction.
237120................... Industrial 236210 Industrial Building 33.5.............................. NA 100
Nonbuilding Construction.
Structure
Construction.
237120 Oil and Gas 33.5.............................. NA 100
Pipeline and
Related Structures
Construction.
237130 Power and 33.5.............................. NA All
Communication Line
and Related
Structures
Construction.
234990................... All Other Heavy 236210 Industrial Building 33.5.............................. NA 100
Construction. Construction.
237110 Water and Sewer 33.5.............................. NA 100
Line and Related
Structures
Construction.
237990 Other Heavy and 33.5.............................. NA 500
Civil Engineering
Construction.
238910 Site Preparation 14.0.............................. NA 100
Contractors.
238990 All Other Specialty 14.0.............................. NA 100
Trade Contractors.
235310................... Electrical 238210 Electrical 14.0.............................. NA 100
Contractors. Contractors.
235910................... Structural Steel 238120 Structural Steel 14.0.............................. NA 100
Erection and Precast
Contractors. Concrete
Contractors.
238190 Other Foundation, 14.0.............................. NA 100
Structure, and
Building Exterior
Contractors.
235950................... Building Equipment 238290 Other Building 14.0.............................. NA 100
and Other Machine Equipment
Installation Contractors.
Contractors.
235990................... All Other Special 236220 Commercial and 33.5.............................. NA 100
Trade Contractors. Institutional
Building
Construction.
237990 Other Heavy and 33.5.............................. NA 500
Civil Engineering
Construction.
238190 Other Foundation, 14.0.............................. NA 100
Structure, and
Building Exterior
Contractors.
238290 Other Building 14.0.............................. NA 100
Equipment
Contractors.
238390 Other Building 14.0.............................. NA 100
Finishing
Contractors.
238910 Site Preparation 14.0.............................. NA 100
Contractors.
238990 All Other Specialty 14.0.............................. NA 100
Trade Contractors.
221110................... Electric Power 221111 Hydroelectric Power 4 million mega watt-hours......... 398.4 All
Generation. Generation.
221112 Fossil Fuel 4 million mega watt-hours......... 398.4 500
Electric Power
Generation.
221113 Nuclear Electric 4 million mega watt-hours......... 398.4 500
Power Generation.
221119 Other Electric 4 million mega watt-hours......... 398.4 All
Power Generation.
221120................... Electric Power 221121 Electric Bulk Power 4 million mega watt-hours......... 398.4 All
Transmission, Transmission and
Control, and Control.
Distribution.
221122 Electric Power 4 million mega watt-hours......... 398.4 500
Distribution.
2211..................... Major Publicly Owned 2211 Major Publicly 4 million mega watt-hours......... NA NA
Utilities. Owned Utilities.
SIC 0783................. Ornamental Shrub and 561730 Landscaping 7.0............................... NA 100
Tree Services. Services.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: "NA" = Not Applicable.
Sources: EIA [49, 50], SBA [51], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
Table 53--Costs as a Percent of Revenues and Profits for Affected Small Entities (as Defined by SBA)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Compliance Costs as a Costs as a
Industry code Industry name Affected costs per Revenues per Profits per percent of percent of
small firms firm firm firm revenues profits
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910.................. Water, Sewer, and 968 $465 $8,846,770 $461,801 0.005 0.101
Pipeline Construction.
NAICS 234920.................. Power and Communication 3,347 3,147 6,736,654 351,653 0.047 0.895
Transmission Line
Construction.
NAICS 234930.................. Industrial Nonbuilding 304 1,574 9,022,755 454,446 0.017 0.346
Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990.................. All Other Heavy 768 3,605 3,466,142 167,969 0.104 2.146
Construction.
NAICS 235310.................. Electrical Contractors.. 1,903 4,474 6,236,853 269,432 0.072 1.660
NAICS 235910.................. Structural Steel 760 176 2,310,169 102,109 0.008 0.172
Erection Contractors.
NAICS 235950.................. Building Equipment and 921 138 3,896,757 172,237 0.004 0.080
Other Machine
Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990.................. All Other Special Trade 3,063 127 3,046,117 140,426 0.004 0.090
Contractors.
NAICS 221110.................. Electric Power 530 9,477 283,932,698 53,720,066 0.003 0.018
Generation.
NAICS 221120.................. Electric Power 1,134 11,320 162,314,688 15,354,970 0.007 0.074
Transmission, Control,
and Distribution.
NAICS 2211.................... Major Publicly Owned 261 6,177 162,113,144 NA 0.004 NA
Utilities.
Various....................... Industrial Power 0 NA NA NA NA NA
Generators.
SIC 0783...................... Ornamental Shrub and 303 7,231 5,259,210 225,620 0.138 3.205
Tree Services.
Total..................... ........................ 14,263 3,159 30,956,353 3,437,179 0.010 0.092
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
Sources: CONSAD [5], EIA [49, 50], IRS [15], SBA [51], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
Table 54--Costs as a Percent of Revenues and Profits for Affected Very Small Entities (Those With Fewer Than 20 Employees)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Affected firms
with fewer Compliance Revenues per Profits per Costs as a Costs as a
Industry code Industry name than 20 costs per Firm Firm percent of percent of
employees firm `revenues profits
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910.................. Water, Sewer, and 759 $220 $1,088,731 $56,832 0.020 0.388
Pipeline Construction.
NAICS 234920.................. Power and Communication 2,651 1,187 913,129 47,665 0.130 2.490
Transmission Line
Construction.
NAICS 234930.................. Industrial Nonbuilding 142 100 1,164,177 58,636 0.009 0.171
Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990.................. All Other Heavy 689 1,895 958,076 46,428 0.198 4.082
Construction.
NAICS 235310.................. Electrical Contractors.. 1,731 2,597 2,223,705 96,064 0.117 2.704
NAICS 235910.................. Structural Steel 608 96 734,692 32,473 0.013 0.296
Erection Contractors.
NAICS 235950.................. Building Equipment and 748 77 832,404 36,792 0.009 0.209
Other Machine
Installation
Contractors.
NAICS 235990.................. All Other Special Trade 2,916 96 836,651 38,570 0.011 0.248
Contractors.
NAICS 221110.................. Electric Power 316 2,841 29,775,772 5,633,576 0.010 0.050
Generation.
NAICS 221120.................. Electric Power 322 6,415 33,598,972 3,178,463 0.019 0.202
Transmission, Control,
and Distribution.
NAICS 2211.................... Major Publicly Owned 33 5,868 4,740,998 NA 0.124 NA
Utilities.
Various....................... Industrial Power 0 NA NA NA NA NA
Generators.
SIC 0783...................... Ornamental Shrub and 90 2,047 849,923 36,462 0.241 5.614
Tree Services.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total..................... ........................ 11,004 1,169 2,898,088 303,777 0.040 0.385
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) "NA" = Not Applicable.
Sources: CONSAD [5], IRS [15], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].
4. A Description of the Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other
Compliance Requirements of the Rule, Including an Estimate of the
Classes of Small Entities That Will Be Subject to the Requirement and
the Type of Professional Skills Necessary for Preparation of the Report
or Record
OSHA is revising the standards addressing the work practices
employers will use, and other requirements they will follow, for the
operation and maintenance of, and for construction work involving,
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
installations. OSHA issued the existing rules for this type of work in
1972 for construction work and in 1994 for work covered by general
industry standards. The construction standards, in particular, are out
of date and are not consistent with the more recent, corresponding
general industry rules for the operation and maintenance of electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution systems. As described
in detail earlier, this final rule will make the construction and
general industry standards for this type of work more consistent than
is currently the case.
Existing Sec. 1910.269 contains requirements for the maintenance
and operation of electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution installations. Section 1910.269 is primarily a work-
practices standard. OSHA based the requirements in Sec. 1910.269 on
recognized safe industry practices as reflected in current national
consensus standards covering this type of work, such as the National
Electrical Safety Code.
Section 1910.269 contains provisions protecting employees from the
most serious hazards they face in performing this type of work,
primarily hazards causing falls, burns, and electric shocks.
Requirements in Sec. 1910.269 include provisions on training, job
briefings, working near energized parts, deenergizing lines and
equipment and grounding them for employee protection, work on
underground and overhead installations, work in power-generating
stations and substations, work in enclosed spaces, and other special
conditions and equipment unique to the generation, transmission, and
distribution of electric energy.
OSHA also is extending its general industry standard on electrical
protective equipment (Sec. 1910.137) to the construction industry. The
existing construction standards for the design of electrical protective
equipment, which apply only to electric power transmission and
distribution work, adopted several national consensus standards by
reference. This final rule replaces the incorporation of these out-of-
date consensus standards with a set of performance-oriented
requirements that are consistent with the latest revisions of these
consensus standards and with the corresponding standard for general
industry. Additionally, OSHA is issuing new requirements for the safe
use and care of electrical protective equipment to complement the
equipment-design provisions. The final rule, which will apply to all
construction work, will update the existing OSHA industry-specific
standards and will prevent accidents caused by inadequate electrical
protective equipment.
As discussed in detail earlier, OSHA does not expect this transfer
to the construction standards of the existing general industry
standards in Sec. 1910.137 and Sec. 1910.269 to impose a significant
burden on employers. Generally, many employers doing construction work
also do general industry work; thus, OSHA believes that they are
already following the existing general industry standards in their
construction work. The final provisions in Subpart V also are generally
consistent with the latest national consensus standards.
In addition, OSHA also is making miscellaneous changes to the
existing requirements in Sec. 1910.137 and Sec. 1910.269. These
changes include requirements for: Class 00 rubber insulating gloves;
electrical protective equipment made from materials other than rubber;
training for electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
workers; host-contractor responsibilities; job briefings; fall
protection equipment; insulation and working position of employees
working on or near live parts; protective clothing; minimum approach
distances; deenergizing transmission and
distribution lines and equipment; protective grounding; operating
mechanical equipment near overhead power lines; and working in manholes
and vaults.
These changes to the general industry standards, because they also
apply to construction, will ensure that consistent requirements, when
appropriate, apply to employers engaged in work performed under the
construction and general industry standards. As explained more fully in
Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this
preamble, OSHA believes that this consistency will further protect
employees performing electrical work covered under the general industry
standards. The rule also updates references to consensus standards in
Sec. Sec. 1910.137 and 1910.269 and adds a new appendix to assist
employers to comply with the new clothing provisions.
Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in
this preamble, provides further detail regarding the requirements of
the final rule.
The preceding sections of this economic analysis present a
description of the classes of small entities that are subject to the
final rule, as well as the types of professional skills necessary to
comply with the requirements.
5. A Description of the Steps the Agency Took To Minimize the
Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities Consistent With the
Stated Objectives of Applicable Statutes, Including a Statement of the
Factual, Policy, and Legal Reasons for Selecting the Alternative
Adopted in the Final Rule, and Why the Agency Rejected Each One of the
Other Significant Alternatives to the Rule Considered by the Agency
That Affect the Impact on Small Entities
OSHA evaluated many alternatives to the final rule to ensure that
the final requirements will best accomplish the stated objectives of
applicable statutes and minimize any significant economic impact of the
rule on small entities.
In developing the rule, and especially in establishing compliance,
reporting requirements, or timetables that affect small entities, OSHA
took the resources available to small entities into account. To the
extent practicable, OSHA clarified, consolidated, and simplified
compliance and reporting requirements under the rule that are
applicable to small entities. Wherever possible, OSHA stated the final
rule's requirements in terms of performance rather than design
specifications. OSHA did not consider an exemption from coverage of the
rule for small entities to be a viable option because such an exemption
would unduly jeopardize the safety and health of the affected
employees.
OSHA considered many other specific alternatives to the present
requirements. Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule,
earlier in this preamble, provides a discussion and explanation of the
particular requirements of the rule and the alternatives OSHA
considered.
OSHA considered other regulatory alternatives raised by the Small
Business Advocacy Review Panel, which OSHA convened for purposes of
soliciting comments on the rule from affected small entities. The
Agency discusses these alternatives later in this economic analysis.
OSHA also considered nonregulatory alternatives in determining the
appropriate approach to reducing occupational hazards associated with
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work. The
Agency discusses these alternatives under the heading "Examination of
Alternative Regulatory Approaches," earlier in this section of the
preamble.
Alternatives Considered and Changes Made in Response to Comments From
SERs and Recommendations From the Small Business Advocacy Review Panel
On May 1, 2003, OSHA convened a Small Business Advocacy Review
Panel (SBAR Panel or Panel) for this rulemaking in accordance with the
provisions of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of
1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), as codified at 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. The SBAR
Panel consisted of representatives from OSHA, the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget,
and the Office of Advocacy within the U.S. Small Business
Administration. The Panel received, from small entities potentially
affected by this rulemaking, oral and written comments on a draft rule
and on a draft economic analysis. The Panel, in turn, prepared a
written report, which it delivered to the Assistant Secretary for
Occupational Safety and Health [29]. The report summarized the comments
received from the small entities and included recommendations from the
Panel to OSHA regarding the rule and the associated analysis of
compliance costs.
Table 55 lists each of the recommendations made by the Panel and
describes the corresponding answers or changes made by OSHA in response
to the issues raised.
Table 55--Panel Recommendations and OSHA Responses
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Panel recommendations * OSHA Responses
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. The SERs generally [believed] that OSHA revised its economic and
OSHA had underestimated the costs and regulatory flexibility
may have overestimated the benefits in analysis as appropriate in
[the draft] economic analysis light of the additional
[provided to the SERs]. The Panel information received from the
recommends that OSHA revise its SERs and rulemaking
economic and regulatory flexibility participants. Many of the
analysis as appropriate, and that OSHA comments from the SERs
specifically discuss the alternative asserting deficiencies in the
estimates and assumptions provided by estimates of the compliance
SERs and compare them to OSHA's costs were the result of
revised estimates. differing interpretations of
what would have to be done to
achieve compliance with
particular requirements.
Some SERs remarked that OSHA
underestimated the time and
resources that would be
necessary to develop and
maintain written records
associated with requirements
for making determinations
regarding training and
protective clothing, for
documenting employee training,
and for communicating with
host employers or contractors
about hazards and appropriate
safety practices. OSHA
clarified, in some cases in
the preamble and other cases
in the regulatory text, that
the final rule does not
require written records to
achieve compliance with these
provisions of the final rule.
In some cases, the SERs also
interpreted the draft
requirements associated with
job briefings, host-contractor
responsibilities, and incident-
energy calculations in ways
that would involve higher
compliance costs than those
estimated by OSHA, but that
were not consistent with the
way in which OSHA intended
employers to achieve
compliance. In these cases,
OSHA clarified, in the
preamble and regulatory text,
what would be necessary to
comply with the standards to
alleviate the corresponding
potential cost and impact
concerns raised by the SERs.
With regard to the cost for
training that will be
necessary for employees
currently not requiring
training in accordance with
the existing training
requirements in Sec.
1910.269, OSHA revised its
compliance cost calculations
to account for one-time and
annual cost of the additional
training these employees will
receive, as described under
the headings "One-Time Costs
for Additional Training for
Employees Not Already
Receiving Training in
Accordance with Existing Sec.
1910.269" and "Annual Costs
for Additional Training for
Employees Not Already Covered
by Sec. 1910.269," earlier
in this section of the
preamble.
For employees currently
provided the training required
by existing Sec. 1910.269,
OSHA generally included costs
equivalent to 1.5 hours of
employee time, 12 minutes of
supervisory time, and 3
minutes of clerical time per
employee. In the case of line-
clearance tree trimmers, OSHA
assumed 0.75 hours of employee
time, 6 minutes of supervisory
time, and 3 minutes of
clerical time per employee.
Most SERs indicated that the
job briefing requirements were
generally consistent with
current practices and that 5
minutes for the additional job
briefing requirements per
project would be a reasonable
estimate for the amount of
time involved. For purposes of
estimating compliance costs in
this analysis, OSHA used
estimates of current
compliance of 85 percent to 98
percent, and estimated that
each affected project would
require resources equivalent
to 5 minutes of supervisor
time and 5 minutes of employee
time.
With regard to the cost
associated with providing
flame-resistant clothing to
employees, the SERs generally
suggested that OSHA's estimate
of two sets per employee per
year for small establishments
and five sets per employee
every 5 years for large
establishments was an
underestimate. The SERs also
gave OSHA broad estimates of
the costs of flame-resistant
clothing, ranging from $50 per
shirt to $150 for switching
coats or flash suits. Several
SERs agreed that many
companies contract with
uniform companies to supply
and launder clothing. In the
FEA, in the analysis of
compliance costs associated
with the requirements to
provide flame-resistant
clothing, OSHA estimates that,
on average, employers will
provide eight sets of clothing
per employee, and that, with
eight sets per employee, the
useful life of the clothing
will average 4 years. OSHA
estimated the cost per set of
clothing to be $110 in the
analysis of the proposed rule,
but increased that estimate to
$192 in this analysis to
reflect current costs [13].
This analysis excluded
laundering costs because the
rule does not require
employers to launder the
clothing. OSHA estimated the
cost per switching coat or
flash suit to be $200 in the
analysis of the proposed rule
and increased that estimate to
$226 in this analysis to
reflect current costs [19].
2. In [the draft] economic and RFA OSHA's final economic and
analyses [provided to the SERs], OSHA regulatory flexibility
assumed that all affected firms apply analyses reflect additional
existing [Sec. ]1910.269 to costs for firms previously not
construction related activities, even required to comply with Sec.
though not required to do so. The 1910.269. Specifically, OSHA
reason OSHA made this assumption is estimated that these firms
[that] OSHA thought that all affected would incur compliance costs
firms are either covered solely by equivalent to the costs
[Part] 1910, or engage in both [Part] incurred by firms affected by
1910 and [Part] 1926 activities, and the new requirements of Sec.
find it easiest to adopt the general 1910.269 when OSHA promulgated
industry standard for all activities. it originally in 1994.
SERs confirmed that most firms do in In addition, OSHA considered
fact follow [Sec. ]1910.269. the SER comments on training
However, they also pointed out that and revised its estimate of
there are some firms that are engaged training costs accordingly.
solely in construction activities and OSHA added a separate training
thus may not be following the [Part] cost for firms not currently
1910 standards. The Panel recommends covered by the existing
that OSHA revise its economic and training requirements in Sec.
regulatory flexibility analyses to 1910.269, as described under
reflect the costs associated with some the heading "Costs of
firms coming into compliance with Compliance," earlier in this
[Sec. ]1910.269. The SERs also section of the preamble.
reported that compliance training
under [Sec. ]1910.269 is extensive.
One SER estimated that in excess of 30
hours per employee is necessary in the
first year. The Panel recommends that
OSHA consider the SER comments on
training and revise its estimate of
training costs as necessary.
3. Most SERs were concerned that a The final rule does not require
"performance standard" such as [the employers to maintain records
draft proposal provided to SERs] means of training. Employees
that even in cases where OSHA does not themselves can attest to the
require recordkeeping, such as for training they receive, and
training, many small entities will OSHA will determine compliance
find recordkeeping (1) useful for with the training requirements
internal purposes and (2) virtually primarily through employee
the only way they will be able to interviews
demonstrate compliance with the rule.
The Panel recommends that OSHA
consider whether recordkeeping is
necessary to demonstrate compliance
with the standard, and, if not, that
OSHA explicitly discuss ways in which
employers can demonstrate compliance
without using recordkeeping.
4. SERs pointed out that the [draft The final rule does not require
proposed host-contractor] requirements host employers to supervise
for observation and follow-up would contractors' employees or
result in paperwork and reporting change their practices for
requirements not presented in the cost observing or inspecting the
analysis. The Panel recommends that work of contractors.
OSHA include such costs and paperwork OSHA has eliminated the draft
burdens in its economic analysis as proposed requirement for the
appropriate. host employer "to note any
failures of the contract
employer to correct such
violations, take appropriate
measures to correct the
violations, and consider the
contract employer's failure to
correct violations in
evaluating the contract
employer." Thus, OSHA did not
include costs for the host
employer to follow up to
ensure that the contract
employer corrected any
violations.
OSHA included estimates of the
costs of information
collection requirements, and
of the associated paperwork
burdens, in the paperwork
analysis for the final rule.
5. Several SERs argued that [the draft The final rule does not contain
proposal's requirement for] a requirement for the host
consideration of safety records would employer to obtain and
restrict the number of eligible evaluate information on
contractors, resulting in both contractors' safety
increased costs and potential impacts performance and programs.
on small firms. Several SERs also were Consequently, the final
concerned that the draft requirement regulatory flexibility
would result in the increased use of analysis does not include
methods such as pre-qualification in costs associated with this
the hiring of contractors or would draft proposed provision.
increase reliance on favored
contractors; the SERs said that both
of these effects could result in
increased costs and restricted
business opportunities, especially for
small businesses. The Panel recommends
that OSHA study the extent of such
costs and impacts and solicit comment
on them.
6. Several SERs questioned OSHA's In the development of the FEA,
estimates of the number of sets of OSHA reexamined its
flame-resistant clothing an employee assumptions and cost estimates
would need, and its assumptions and with regard to the entire
cost estimates. The Panel recommends final rule, including the
that OSHA reexamine its assumptions requirements to provide flame-
and cost estimates in light of these resistant clothing. OSHA's
comments. response to Panel
recommendation 1, earlier in
this table, describes the
comments from the SERs and
OSHA's revised estimates made
in response to these comments.
7. Many SERs questioned whether the * * OSHA collected and compiled
* revisions to [Sec. ]1910.269 would information from a variety of
in fact save any lives or prevent any sources to document and
accidents. Some commented that they support the need for the
had never seen an accident that would provisions of the final rule.
have been prevented by any of the new OSHA analyzed the data on the
provisions [in the draft proposal]. fatalities and injuries that
Some SERs suggested that [the draft] occurred among the affected
analysis [provided to SERs] might have workforce over the past decade
included fatalities in municipal specifically with regard to
facilities that may not be covered by the effectiveness of both the
the standard. Others suggested OSHA existing and final
should discuss the extent to which the requirements in preventing
existing general industry standard had such incidents. The discussion
resulted in reduced fatalities and under the heading "Benefits,
injuries, and how this compares with Net Benefits, and Cost
OSHA estimates of how many fatalities Effectiveness," earlier in
and injuries would be prevented by the this section of the preamble,
proposal. The Panel recommends that summarizes this evaluation;
OSHA provide more documentation the corresponding research
regarding the sources and nature of report [5] provides a detailed
the anticipated benefits attributed to explanation of this
the draft proposal. The [Panel also evaluation.
recommends that the] estimated To quantitatively determine the
benefits [in the draft analysis] * * * effectiveness of the existing
be reexamined in light of the SER and final rules in preventing
comments and experiences regarding the injuries and fatalities, OSHA
perceived effectiveness of the new performed a detailed review of
provisions. In particular, [the Panel the descriptions of accidents.
recommends that] OSHA * * * focus For each accident reviewed,
attention on the benefits associated OSHA analyzed the detailed
with the provisions on flame- description of the accident,
resistant] apparel, training, host/ along with the citations
contractor responsibilities, and fall issued, the type of injuries
protection. incurred, and the causes
associated with the accident
to estimate the likelihood
that the accident was
preventable under, first, the
existing applicable standards,
and second, the final rule.
Based on these analyses,
CONSAD found that full
compliance with the existing
standards would prevent 52.9
percent of the injuries and
fatalities; compliance with
the final rule, however, would
prevent 79.8 percent of the
relevant injuries and
fatalities. Compared to the
existing standards, the final
standard increases safety by
preventing an additional 20
fatalities and 119 injuries
annually.
In addition, the final rule
improves safety by clarifying
and updating the existing
standards to reflect modern
technologies, work practices,
and terminology and by making
the standards consistent with
current consensus standards
and other related standards
and documents. By facilitating
the understanding of, and
compliance with, these
important safety standards,
the final rule increases
protection of employees while
reducing uncertainty,
confusion, and compliance
burdens on employers.
Section V, Summary and
Explanation of the Final Rule,
earlier in this preamble,
includes explanations of the
need for, and the expected
benefits associated with,
specific provisions of the
final rule. In particular, see
the summary and explanation of
final Sec. Sec. 1926.950(c)
(host-contractor
responsibilities), 1926.954(b)
(fall protection), and
1926.960(g) (flame-resistant
clothing) for a discussion of
the need for, and a
qualitative explanation of,
the benefits of these
provisions.
8. There were no comments from the SERs As discussed under the heading
on OSHA's estimates [in the draft "Costs of Compliance,"
analysis provided to the SERs] of the earlier in this section of the
number and type of small entities preamble, OSHA's FEA,
affected by the proposal. However, including its estimates of
some [SERs] pointed out that there may baseline activities and its
be some small entities that engage in cost estimates, reflect the
only construction related activities. possible existence of some
The Panel recommends that OSHA's firms not currently covered by
estimates of current baseline existing Sec. 1910.269 and
activities and OSHA's cost estimates that do not comply with these
reflect such firms. provisions when performing
construction work on electric
power generation,
transmission, or distribution
installations.
9. Most SERs were uncertain about how OSHA included appendices
to comply with performance oriented containing guidelines on the
provisions of the proposal, and inspection of work-positioning
further, that additional expenses equipment to assist employers
might be required to be confident that in complying with the
they were in compliance with such requirement to conduct such
provisions. The Panel recommends that inspections described in Sec.
OSHA study and address these issues Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(A)
and consider the use of guidance and 1926.954(b)(3)(i). The
material (e.g. non-mandatory final rule also includes
appendices) to describe specific ways appendices on clothing in Sec.
of meeting the standard, which will 1910.269 and Subpart V of
help small employers comply, without Part 1926. These appendices
making the standard more prescriptive. should assist employers to
comply with the clothing
provisions in Sec. Sec.
1910.269(l)(8) and
1926.960(g).
The rule also includes many
references to consensus
standards that contain
information that can assist
employers to comply with
various provisions of the
final rule. For example, the
note to Sec. 1926.957(b)
directs employers to the
Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers' IEEE
Guide for Maintenance Methods
on Energized Power Lines, IEEE
Std 516-2009 for guidance on
the examination, cleaning,
repairing, and in-service
testing of live-line tools to
help employers comply with
that provision in the OSHA
standards. Lastly, Appendix G
to Sec. 1910.269 and
Appendix G to Subpart V of
Part 1926 contain lists of
reference documents that
employers can access for help
in complying with the final
rule.
The preamble and this analysis
both contain additional
descriptions of what OSHA
considers necessary and
sufficient for purposes of
achieving compliance with the
requirements of the final
rule.
10. Most SERs were highly critical of OSHA modified the provisions on
the host contractor provisions [in the host-contractor
draft proposal provided to the SERs] responsibilities substantially
and had trouble understanding what from the requirements in the
OSHA required. If these provisions are draft proposal reviewed by the
to be retained, the Panel recommends SERs. The Agency believes that
that they be revised. The Panel the changes address the
recommends that OSHA clarify what concerns expressed by the
constitutes adequate consideration of SERs.
contractor safety performance, clarify The final rule does not contain
what is meant by "observation," requirements for the host
clarify how the multi-employer employer to consider a
citation policy is related to the contract employer's safety
proposal, and clarify whether the performance or for the host
requirement to communicate hazards employer to observe or
does or does not represent a supervise contract employers'
requirement for the host employer to work. In addition, the final
conduct their own risk assessment. The rule does not include the
Panel also recommends that OSHA proposed requirement that host
examine the extent to which state employers report observed
contractor licensing could make the contract-employer-related
host contractor provisions in the violations to the contract
proposal unnecessary. employer.
The discussion of final Sec.
1926.950(c), in Section V,
Summary and Explanation of the
Final Rule, earlier in this
preamble, provides
clarification of the purpose
and application of the host-
contractor requirements and
their relationship to OSHA's
multiemployer citation policy.
The discussion of final Sec.
1926.950(c)(1), in Section V,
Summary and Explanation of the
Final Rule, earlier in this
preamble, makes it clear that
the purpose of the
requirements for host
employers to provide
information to contractors is
to facilitate the contractors'
efforts to perform their own
assessments as required by the
final rule.
OSHA does not believe that
State contractor-licensing
requirements make the final
host-contractor provisions
unnecessary. Not all States
require electric power
generation, transmission, and
distribution contractors to
have a license. For example,
Illinois and New York do not
require licensing at the State
level (see http://www.electric-find.com/license.htm).
Additionally, States with such
licensing requirements judge
primarily the contractors'
ability to install electric
equipment in accordance with
State or national installation
codes, and not their ability
to perform electric power
generation, transmission, and
distribution work safely.
11. Some SERs questioned the need for OSHA considered these issues in
flame-resistant clothing beyond the the development of the final
existing clothing provisions in [Sec. clothing requirements, as
]1910.269. Some argued that there was explained in the discussion of
a trade-off between possible decreased final Sec. 1926.960(g), in
injuries from burns and heat stress Section V, Summary and
injuries as a result of using flame- Explanation of the Final Rule,
resistant clothing. The Panel earlier in this preamble.
recommends that OSHA consider and
solicit comments on these issues.
12. Many SERs were uncertain whether OSHA adopted requirements in
[the draft proposal's] requirements the final rule that provide
for determining the need for flame- guidance explaining ways an
resistant clothing would allow the use employer can comply with the
of such methods as 1) "worst case" arc-flash protection
analysis or 2) specifying minimum requirements in Sec. Sec.
levels of protection for use when a 1910.269(l)(8) and
system does not exceed certain limits. 1926.960(g). For example, the
The Panel recommends that OSHA clarify Agency included two notes and
what methods are acceptable to meet additional appendix material
these requirements, and specify these explaining how an employer can
methods in such a way that small calculate estimates of
entities can be confident that they available heat energy. For
have met the requirements of the additional information, see
standards. the discussion of final Sec.
1926.960(g) in Section V,
Summary and Explanation of the
Final Rule, earlier in this
preamble.
13. OSHA[`s draft proposal included] OSHA believes that the changes
some changes to the training this final rule makes to the
provisions in [Sec. ]1910.269, training requirements in
including dropping certification existing Sec. 1910.269
requirements and allowing training to clarify the standard and
vary with risk. OSHA stated that both reduce burdens on employers.
of these changes were designed to give See the discussion of final
the rules a greater performance Sec. 1926.950(b), in Section
orientation and to ease compliance. V, Summary and Explanation of
Some SERs felt that these changes the Final Rule, earlier in
might make compliance more complicated this preamble, for additional
by making it less clear what needs to clarification on how to comply
be done. The Panel recommends that with the training requirements
OSHA clarify the performance in the final rule. OSHA did
orientation of these [draft proposed] not state that compliance with
changes and consider explaining that the training provisions in
existing compliance methods would existing Sec. 1910.269 will
still be considered adequate under the constitute compliance with the
new rules. The Panel further training provisions in the
recommends that OSHA examine the final rule because employers
requirement [in existing Sec. will need to develop and
1910.269(a)(2)(vii)] that employees provide additional training to
demonstrate proficiency and provide address the new and revised
examples of how that can be safety-related work-practice
accomplished. The Panel also requirements in the final
recommends that OSHA consider the rule. Thus, training that
possibility that the proposed draft complies with existing Sec.
may introduce costs to small 1910.269 will not be
businesses that are uncertain of how sufficient under the final
to comply with the new performance rule.
oriented training provisions. Existing Sec.
1910.269(a)(2)(vii) already
requires employees to
demonstrate proficiency in the
work practices involved. OSHA
believes that most employers
are already complying with
this requirement in various
ways. For example, some
employers have employees
demonstrate proficiency in
climbing after completing a
pole-climbing class that
includes climbing on practice
poles as part of the
curriculum. In addition, many
employers use an
apprenticeship program, in
which journeyman line workers
acting as crew leaders observe
trainees over the course of
the program. The trainees pass
through the apprenticeship
program by successfully
completing each step,
demonstrating proficiency in
various tasks along the way,
until the trainees reach the
journeyman level.
In addition to the guidance
provided in the preamble and
appendices on how to comply
with the new training
requirements, the Agency is
planning to issue a Small
Entity Compliance Guide
covering these issues
following publication of the
standard.
14. Several SERS argued that the OSHA clarified the purpose of
[draft] proposal placed restrictions the changes to the fall
on the length of [a] lanyard and that protection requirements in
these restrictions were unworkable. final Sec. 1926.954(b)(1)(i)
The Panel recommends that OSHA clarify and (b)(2) in the discussion
the intent of the fall protection of those provisions in Section
provisions. Other SERs argued that V, Summary and Explanation of
fall fatalities from aerial lifts were the Final Rule, earlier in
either the result of catastrophic this preamble. The Agency also
failures in which case fall protection clarified the requirements in
would not have prevented the death, or final Sec.
the result of failure to use any form 1926.954(b)(3)(iii) to use
of fall arrest or fall restraint. Some fall protection equipment to
SERs argued that some workers might make it clear what each type
find harnesses more awkward than belts of fall protection system is
and be less likely to wear them. The and when it is acceptable. The
Panel recommends that OSHA consider discussion of final Sec.
and solicit comment on these issues. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii), in
Section V, Summary and
Explanation of the Final Rule,
earlier in this preamble,
describes why the reasons
provided by the SERs did not
persuade the Agency to permit
the use of body belts in a
fall arrest system.
15. This rule was designed by OSHA to OSHA does not believe that the
eliminate confusing differences provisions on host-contractor
between the applicable construction responsibilities duplicate or
and general industry standards by overlap the Agency's
making the standards consistent. multiemployer policy or create
Several SERs felt this was a employer-employee
worthwhile goal. Some SERs felt that relationships for FLSA or IRS
the host contractor provisions of the purposes. See the discussion
rule could result in causing of final Sec. 1926.950(c) in
contractor employees to be considered Section V, Summary and
employees of the host employer under Explanation of the Final Rule,
the Fair Labor Standards Act and under earlier in this preamble, for
the Internal Revenue Service a full discussion of these
regulations. In addition, the SERs issues.
identified OSHA's multi-employer
citation policy as duplicative and
overlapping of the host contractor
provisions in the proposal. The Panel
recommends that, if this provision is
retained, OSHA investigate this issue
and clarify these provisions to assure
that contractor employees do not
become direct employees of the host
employer as a result of complying with
possible OSHA requirements.
16. Some SERs were unconvinced about The Agency received no comments
the need for revisions to the existing on the regulatory alternative
[Sec. ]1910.269 standard in light of of extending existing Sec.
their potential to improve safety 1910.269, in its entirety, to
beyond what compliance with the construction without further
requirements in existing [Sec. modification. In any event,
]1910.269 would achieve. The Panel the Agency finds that the
recommends that OSHA consider and additional changes to both
solicit comment on the regulatory Sec. 1910.269 and Subpart V
alternative of extending the will prevent a significant
requirements of [Sec. ]1910.269 to number of fatalities and
construction, without further injuries each year.
modification.
17. The Panel notes that [the draft OSHA considered these options
proposed host-contractor] provisions and adopted several of them.
were particularly troublesome for See the discussion of final
almost all SERs, and that as a result, Sec. 1926.950(c) in Section
OSHA should provide either some change V, Summary and Explanation of
or provide extensive clarification to the Final Rule, earlier in
these [draft proposed] provisions. The this preamble, for additional
Panel recommends that OSHA consider, discussion of these
analyze, and solicit comment on a provisions.
variety of alternatives to these
[draft proposed] provisions,
including:
(1) Dropping all or some of these
provisions.
(2) Specifying in detail methods
that would be considered adequate
for purposes of compliance for
those provisions retained..
(3) Changing the provision for
consideration of safety
performance to indicate how
employers can be sure they have
complied with the provision..
(4) Changing the provisions
concerning observed violations by:
Dropping the provision
concerning observed violations
entirely;
Changing the provision
concerning observed violations
to clearly indicate that
"inspections" are not
required;
Minimizing the amount
of follow-up and
responsibility placed on the
host employer when a violation
is observed;
Requiring only that
the contractor be notified of
observed violations (no
requirement for subsequent
monitoring or evaluation);
Changing the provision
to require observation for the
purpose of determining if the
contractor is performing safe
work practices, and requiring
observed violations to be
reported to the contractor (no
requirement for subsequent
monitoring or evaluation);
Providing explicit
language that line clearance
tree trimmers are not covered
by this provision;
Specifying that only
observations made by a
"safety professional" or
other individual qualified to
identify hazards must be
reported to the contractor.
(5) Changing the provision for
hazard communication to make clear
that the host employer is not
required to conduct his or her own
hazard analysis, but only to
communicate such hazards of which
the host employer may be aware.
18. The Panel recommends that OSHA OSHA considered the options
consider and solicit comment on two recommended by the Panel. The
kinds of options with respect to flame- Agency adopted the second
resistant clothing. First, [the Panel option suggested by the Panel.
recommends that] OSHA consider the Appendix E to Sec. 1910.269
alternative of no further requirements and Appendix E to Part 1926,
beyond existing [Sec. ]1910.269 for Subpart V, contain tables that
the use of flame-resistant clothing. employers may use to estimate
Second, [the Panel recommends that,] available heat energy.
should the draft requirement be Although these tables do not
retained in some manner, OSHA * * * cover every circumstance, they
consider and solicit comment on one or do address many exposure
a combination of alternative means of conditions found in overhead
determining how much protection is electric power transmission
needed or required. These alternatives and distribution work. Other
should include:. assessment aids are available,
and also listed in the two
appendices, for other exposure
conditions, including typical
electric power generation
exposures.
(1) Allowing the employer to OSHA did not incorporate any of
estimate the exposure assuming the other Panel-recommended
that the distance from the options into the final rule
employee to the electric arc is because the Agency either
equal to the minimum approach currently believes that they
distance. are not sufficiently
(2) Providing tables showing heat protective or has insufficient
energy for different exposure information to incorporate
conditions as an alternative them. See the discussion of
assessment method.. final Sec. 1926.960(g), in
(3) Specifying a minimum level of Section V, Summary and
protection for overhead line work Explanation of the Final Rule,
(for example, 10 cal/cm2) for use earlier in this preamble, for
when the system does not exceed a discussion of the regulatory
certain limits as an alternative alternatives recommended by
to hazard assessment.. rulemaking participants and
considered by the Agency.
(4) Allowing the employer to reduce
protection when other factors
interfere with the safe
performance of the work (for
example, severe heat stress) after
the employer has considered
alternative methods of performing
the work, including the use of
live-line tools and deenergizing
the lines and equipment, and has
found them to be unacceptable.
(5) Allowing employers to base
their assessments on a "worst
case analysis.".
(6) Requiring employers to use
appropriate flame-retard[a]nt
clothing without specifying any
assessment method..
19. Some SERs were concerned that the See OSHA's response to Panel
revised training requirements recommendation 13, earlier in
[contained in the draft proposal] this table, and the discussion
complicated the question of of final Sec. 1926.950(b),
demonstrating that training had been in Section V, Summary and
provided, and that the [draft Explanation of the Final Rule,
proposed] requirement that training be earlier in this preamble.
related to the risk would require
additional training, additional
documentation, or both. The Panel
recommends that OSHA consider making
it clear that employers that follow
the existing training provisions in
[Sec. ]1910.269 will be in
compliance with the new rules, and
that OSHA clarify alternative methods
that would be considered acceptable
for demonstrating adequacy of training
and the relation of the training to
risk.
20. In response to comment by some OSHA is adopting only one new
SERs, the Panel recommends that OSHA requirement related to job
consider and solicit comment on the briefings. Final Sec. Sec.
issue of whether the additional job 1910.269(c)(1)(i) and
briefing requirements [in the draft 1926.952(a)(1) require the
proposal] are needed and how they can employer to provide the
be met in situations in which the employee in charge of the job
employee is working at a distant with all available information
location. that relates to the
determination of existing
characteristics and conditions
that the crew must complete.
For additional discussion of
this provision and related
comments, see the discussion
of final Sec. 1926.952(a)(1)
in Section V, Summary and
Explanation of the Final Rule,
earlier in this preamble.
The Agency believes that many
employers are already
providing relevant information
about a job when they assign
that job to a crew of
employees or to an employee
working alone. OSHA
anticipates that employers
will pass along the required
information when they assign
jobs to employees. Where the
employees are working has no
effect on the employer's
ability to communicate the
information.
21. All of the affected SERs felt that Over the course of the
the provisions of the [draft proposal] rulemaking, OSHA examined the
with respect to fall restraint systems issue of whether using fall
would make it difficult for a person restraint systems to protect
using a fall restraint system to employees working from aerial
perform the necessary work. The SERs lifts was practical and
also raised the possibility of safety explored with manufacturers
problems associated with wearing a the nonregulatory option of
safety harness as opposed to a safety improving fall protection
belt, such as an increased likelihood systems for use in aerial
of the harness being snagged and as a lifts. The final rule requires
result the employee being either that employers ensure that
pulled into a wood chipper while on employees use a fall restraint
the ground or pulled out of the bucket system or a personal fall
when it is lowered. The Panel arrest system when working
recommends that OSHA consider and from aerial lifts. The final
solicit comment on the alternative of rule also requires that
making no changes to its existing fall employers ensure that
protection requirements. [The Panel employees use a personal fall
recommends that, i]f the provision is arrest system, work-
retained, OSHA should carefully positioning equipment, or fall-
examine the issue of whether the fall restraint system, as
restraint system requirements in the appropriate, when working at
draft make use of fall restraint elevated locations more than
systems unworkable in aerial lifts. 1.2 meters (4 feet) above the
[The Panel recommends that] OSHA * * * ground on poles, towers, or
also consider the nonregulatory similar structures if the
alternative of working with aerial employer does not provide
device manufacturers and aerial device other fall protection. See the
users (for example, electric and discussion of final Sec.
telecommunications utilities, painting 1926.954(b)(3)(ii) and
and electrical contractors, tree- (b)(3)(iii) in Section V,
trimming firms) in the development of Summary and Explanation of the
improved fall restraint systems that Final Rule, earlier in this
are more comfortable than existing preamble, for a discussion of
systems and maintain the appropriate comments received on the
degree of protection for employees. regulatory alternatives.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* OSHA took the Panel recommendations listed in the table directly from
the Panel's report (Ex. 0019). OSHA made editorial modifications, as
necessary, for the purpose of clarity. Any modifications to the
original recommendations are nonsubstantive and clearly indicated.
I. References
1. "Analysis of CONSAD IMIS Accident Records, Inspection Detail,"
prepared by OSHA Directorate of Standards and Guidance, April 30,
2013.
2. Analysis of CONSAD Records.xls, Excel spreadsheet showing OSHA's
analysis of CONSAD accident data with one record per accident and
summary table, November 30, 2013.
3. Ashford, N.A., 2007. "Workers' Compensation," in Environmental
and Occupational Medicine, Fourth Edition, W.N. Rom & S. Markowitz
(Eds.), Lippincott-Raven Publishers, Philadelphia, pp. 1712-1719.
4. Buckingham Manufacturing. 2010. Buckingham Linemen's Catalog. See
http://www.buckinghammfg.com (December 15, 2010 \574\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\574\ In these references, a date in parentheses indicates the
date on which ERG visited the pertinent Web site to retrieve pricing
information that OSHA used in this FEA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. CONSAD. June 8, 2005. "Revised Final Report. Analytical Support
and Data Gathering for a Preliminary Economic Analysis for Proposed
Standards for Work on Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and
Distribution Lines and Equipment (29 CFR 1910.269 and 29 CFR 1926--
Subpart V)." Ex. 0080.
6. CONSAD. "Summary of 1910.269 and Subpart V Accidents from the
IMIS Database, by State, 1992-2000." January 13, 2004.
7. Cress, S. 2010. Email between Stephen Cress, Kinectrics, and
Eastern Research Group. October 22, 2010.
8. Eastern Research Group, Inc. 2011. Memo to OSHA re Supporting
Analysis on Final Electric Power Generation Rule. March 6, 2012.
9. Excel spreadsheet showing calculation of breakeven rates taking
account of baseline compliance.
10. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 2009. Form No. 1: Annual
Report of Major Electric Utility. See http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/forms.asp#1.
11. Grainger. 2010a. SALISBURY Face Shield, Arc Flash. See
http://www.grainger.com/Grainger/SALISBURY-Arc-Flash-Face-Shield-3YA90
(September 9, 2010).
12. Grainger. 2010b. NATIONAL SAFETY APPAREL Arc Flash Balaclava,
Navy Blue. See http://www.grainger.com/Grainger/NATIONAL-SAFETY-APPAREL-Arc-Flash-Balaclava-2NNJ8 (September 9, 2010).
13. Grainger. 2010c. SALISBURY Coverall, Arc Flash, L, 8 cal/cm\2\.
See http://www.grainger.com/Grainger/SALISBURY-Coverall-5EU57
(September 9, 2010).
14. Grainger. 2010d. SALISBURY Coverall, Arc Flash, L, 12 cal/cm\2\.
See http://www.grainger.com/Grainger/SALISBURY-Coverall-5EU60
(September 9, 2010).
15. Internal Revenue Service. 2010. Corporation Sourcebook. See
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/bustaxstats/article/0,,id=149687,00.html.
16. Internal Revenue Service. 2012. Publication 525, "Taxable and
Nontaxable Income." Available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/
Publication-525,-Taxable-and-Nontaxable-Income--1.
17. Internal Revenue Service. 2013. "Topic 751--Social Security and
Medicare Withholding Rates." Available at http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc751.html.
18. Lab Safety Supply. 2010a. Safety and Industrial Supplies: Indura
UltraSoft Arc Flash Protective Apparel. See
http://www.labsafety.com/catalog/Safety-Industrial-BB0/F/429
(October 19, 2010).
19. Lab Safety Supply. 2010b. Safety and Industrial Supplies: TITAN
Double D-Ring Body Belts. See http://www.labsafety.com/TITAN-Double-D-Ring-Body-Belts_24529135/ (October 19, 2010).
20. Lab Safety Supply. 2010c. Safety and Industrial Supplies: MILLER
DuraLite Full Body Harnesses. See
http://www.labsafety.com/MILLER-DuraLite-Full-Body-Harnesses_24536125/ (October 19, 2010).
21. Leigh, J.P., and Marcin, J.P. 2012. "Workers' compensation
benefits and shifting costs for occupational injury and illness,"
Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, April, 54(4):
445-450.
22. Magat, W.A, Viscusi, W.K, and Huber, J, 1996. "A Reference
Lottery Metric for Valuing Health." Management Science 42: 1118-
1130.
23. National Academy of Social Insurance. 2012. "Workers'
Compensation: Benefits, Coverage, and Costs, 2010," August.
Available at http://www.nasi.org/research/2012/report-workers-compensation-benefits-coverage-costs-2010.
24. National Council on Compensation Insurance. 2013. "ABCs of
Experience Rating." Available at https://www.ncci.com/NCCIMain/Education/ExperienceRating/Pages/default.aspx.
25. National Fire Protection Association. 2009. NFPA 70E: Standard
for Electrical Safety in the Workplace. See http://www.nfpa.org.
26. National Safety Council. 2011. Estimating the Costs of
Unintentional Injuries. See http://www.nsc.org/news_resources/injury_and_death_statistics/Pages/EstimatingtheCostsofUnintentionalInjuries.aspx
(January 19, 2011).
27. Neuhauser, F.W., Seabury, S.S., and Mendeloff, J. 2013. "The
Impact of Experience Rating on Small Employers: Would Lowering the
Threshold for Experience Rating Improve Safety?" Rand Working
Papers WR-955. Newsletter discussion available at
http://www.rand.org/jie/centers/workplace-health-safety/projects/experience-rating.html.
28. NTT Workforce Development Institute. 2011. NFPA 70E/Arc Flash
Elec Safety/Safety for Power Gen & Trans & Dist. See
http://www.nttinc.com/content/nfpa-70earc-flash-electrical-safety-electric-power-generation-transmission-and-distribution.
29. Occupational Safety and Health Administration Small Business
Advocacy Review Panel. 2003. "Report of the Small Business Advocacy
Review Panel on the Draft OSHA Standard for Electric Power
Generation, Transmission, and Distribution," submitted to Mr. John
Henshaw, Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health,
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration. June 17, 2003. Ex. 0019.
30. Office of Management and Budget. 2003. Circular A-4. See
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/.
31. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2010. National Income and
Product Accounts Gross Domestic Product, 3rd quarter 2010 (second
estimate); Corporate Profits, 3rd quarter 2010 (preliminary). See
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm.
32. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2011. Implicit Price Deflators
for Gross Domestic Product. See
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=13&ViewSeries=NO&Java=no&Request3Place=N&3Place=N
&FromView=YES&Freq=Year&FirstYear=2005&LastYear=2009&3Place=N&Update=Update&JavaBox=no (September 1, 2011).
33. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2001. 2001 Occupational
Employment and Wage Estimates, National 3-digit SIC Industry-
Specific estimates. See http://www.bls.gov/oes/oes_dl.htm#2007.
34. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 2007a. National 5-digit
NAICS Industry-Specific estimates. See http://bls.gov/oes/oes_dl.htm.
35. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 2007b. Quarterly Census
of Employment and Wages. See http://www.bls.gov/cew/data.htm.
36. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2009a. Employer Costs for
Employee Compensation Summary, September 10, 2009. See
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.nr0.htm.
37. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2009b. May 2009 Occupational
Employment and Wage Estimates, National 4-digit NAICS Industry-
Specific Estimates. See http://www.bls.gov/oes/oes_dl.htm.
38. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2009c. Occupational Employment
and Wages, May 2009: SOC 37-3013 Tree Trimmers and Pruners. See
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes373013.htm.
39. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2010a. Occupational Employment
and Wages, May 2010: 49-9051 Electrical Power-Line Installers and
Repairers. See http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes499051.htm.
40. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2010b. May 2010 National
Industry-Specific Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates: NAICS
221100--Electric Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution.
See http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_221100.htm.
41. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2010c. Occupational Employment
and Wages, May 2010 49-2095 Electrical and Electronics Repairers,
Powerhouse, Substation, and Relay. See http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes492095.htm.
42. U.S. Census Bureau. 2002. Statistics of U.S. Businesses.
43. U.S. Census Bureau. 2007. Statistics of U.S. Businesses.
44. U.S. Census Bureau. 2009a. 1997 NAICS and 1987 SIC
Correspondence Tables. See http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/naicstab.htm.
45. U.S. Census Bureau. 2009b. 1997 NAICS to 2002 NAICS
Correspondence Tables. See http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/1997_NAICS_to_2002_NAICS.xls*.
46. U.S. Census Bureau. 2009c. 2002 NAICS to 2007 NAICS
Correspondence Tables. See http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/2002_to_2007_NAICS.xls*.
47. U.S. Census Bureau. 2011. County Business Patterns, 1997 and
2007. Growth in establishments and employment in combined Heavy
Construction (NAICS 234000) and Special Trades Contractors (NAICS
235000). See http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/index.html.
48. U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2003. Form EIA-412
General Information. See
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=eia+form+412&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CC4QFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.eia.gov%2Fsurvey
%2Fform%2Feia_412%2Finstructions_form.doc&ei=bEo5T4b5EozLrQfNnJ3WBQ&usg=AFQjCNHtrUZPjFTB08VAwGyOomBrBAjFsA.
49. U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2008a. Form EIA-860
Database Annual Electric Generator Report. See http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia860.html.
50. U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2008b. Form EIA-861
Database. See http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia861.html.
51. U.S. Small Business Administration. 2008. Small Business Size
Standards. See http://www.sba.gov/content/table-small-business-size-standards.
52. Urban Institute/Brookings, 2012. "Historical Average Federal
Tax Rates for All Households," Tax Policy Center, October.
Available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=456.
53. Viscusi, W.K., and Aldy, J.E. 2003. "The Value of a Statistical
Life: A Critical
Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World." Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty, 27(1): 5-76. See http://camra.msu.edu/documents/ViscusiandAldy2003.pdf*.
VII. Federalism
OSHA reviewed this final rule in accordance with the most recent
Executive Order (E.O.) on Federalism (E.O. 13132, 64 FR 43255 (Aug. 10,
1999)). This E.O. requires that Federal agencies, to the extent
possible, refrain from limiting State policy options, consult with
States prior to taking any actions that would restrict State policy
options, and take such actions only when clear constitutional authority
exists and the problem is national in scope. E.O. 13132 provides for
preemption of State law only with the expressed consent of Congress.
Any such preemption must be limited to the extent possible.
Under Section 18 of the OSH Act, Congress expressly provides that
States may adopt, with Federal approval, a plan for the development and
enforcement of occupational safety and health standards; States that
obtain Federal approval for such a plan are referred to as "State-plan
States" (29 U.S.C. 667). Occupational safety and health standards
developed by State-plan States must be at least as effective in
providing safe and healthful employment and places of employment as the
Federal standards. Subject to these requirements, State-plan States are
free to develop and enforce under State law their own requirements for
safety and health standards.
While OSHA drafted this final rule to protect employees in every
State, Section 18(c)(2) of the Act permits State-plan States and
Territories to develop and enforce their own standards for electric
power generation, transmission, and distribution and electrical
protective equipment provided that those requirements are at least as
effective in providing safe and healthful employment and places of
employment as the requirements in this final rule.
In summary, this final rule complies with E.O. 13132. In States
without OSHA-approved State plans, this final rule limits State policy
options in the same manner as every standard promulgated by OSHA. In
States with OSHA-approved State plans, this rulemaking does not
significantly limit State policy options.
VIII. Unfunded Mandates
OSHA reviewed this final rule according to the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) (2 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.) and E.O. 13132 (64 FR
43255 (Aug. 10, 1999)). As discussed in the Final Economic and
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, OSHA estimates that compliance with
the rule will require expenditures of less than $100 million per year
by all affected employers. Therefore, this rule is not a significant
regulatory action within the meaning of Section 202 of UMRA (2 U.S.C.
1532).
OSHA standards do not apply to State or local governments except in
States that have elected voluntarily to adopt a State plan approved by
the Agency. Consequently, the rule does not meet the definition of a
"Federal intergovernmental mandate" (2 U.S.C. 658(5)).
Therefore, for the purposes of UMRA, the Agency certifies that this
final rule does not mandate that State, local, or Tribal governments
adopt new, unfunded regulatory obligations or increase expenditures by
the private sector of more than $100 million in any year.
IX. Consultation and Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments
OSHA reviewed this final rule in accordance with Executive Order
13175, (65 FR 67249 (Nov. 9, 2000)) and determined that it does not
have "tribal implications" as defined in that order. The final rule
does not have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian tribes,
on the relationship between the Federal government and Indian tribes,
or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the
Federal government and Indian tribes.
X. Office of Management and Budget Review Under the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995
The final rule revising the general industry and construction
standards for electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution, and for electrical protective equipment, contains
collection of information requirements (paperwork) subject to review by
OMB. In accordance with Sec. 3506(c)(2) of the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), OSHA solicited comments on the
information collections included in the proposal. For the proposal, the
Department of Labor also submitted an information collection request to
OMB for review in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 3507(d). OMB subsequently
informed the Department of Labor that its "action [was] not an
approval to conduct or sponsor an information collection under the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995."
A. Information Collection Request for the Proposed Rule
In the information request for the proposal, OSHA submitted to OMB
the following proposed new collections of information and proposed
removing existing collections of information:
1. Proposed Electrical Protective Equipment in Construction Collections
of Information
Proposed Sec. 1926.97(c)(2)(xii) provided that the employer must
certify that it tested equipment in accordance with the requirements of
proposed paragraphs (c)(2)(iv), (c)(2)(vii)(C), (c)(2)(viii),
(c)(2)(ix), and(c)(2)(xi) of that section and must ensure that the
certification identified the equipment that passed the test and the
date of the test; the provision also specified that marking the
equipment and entering the results of the tests and the dates of
testing in logs are two acceptable means of meeting these requirements.
2. Proposed Information-Transfer Collections of Information for General
Industry and Construction
Proposed Sec. Sec. 1926.950(c)(1)(i) and 1910.269(a)(4)(i)(A)
provided that the host employer must inform the contractor of any known
hazards that might be related to the contractor's work and that the
contractor might not recognize; the host employer also must notify the
contractor of any information needed to do assessments required by the
standard.
Proposed Sec. Sec. 1926.950(c)(1)(ii) and 1910.269(a)(4)(i)(B)
provided that the host employer must report any observed contract-
employer-related violations of the standards to the contract employer.
Proposed Sec. Sec. 1926.950(c)(2)(iii) and 1910.269(a)(4)(ii)(C)
provided that the contract employer must advise the host employer of
unique hazards presented by the contract employer's work, unanticipated
hazards found during the contract employer's work that the host
employer did not mention, and measures the contractor took to correct
and prevent recurrences of violations reported by the host employer.
3. Proposed Enclosed Spaces Collections of Information for Construction
Proposed Sec. 1926.953(a) provided that, if, after the employer
takes the precautions specified by Sec. Sec. 1926.953 and 1926.965,
the hazards remaining in the enclosed space endanger the life of an
entrant or could interfere with escape from the space, then entry into
the enclosed space must meet the permit-
space entry requirements of paragraphs (d) through (k) of Sec.
1910.146.\575\
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\575\ Some of the requirements in paragraphs (d) through (k) of
Sec. 1910.146 involve collections of information aimed at
protecting employees from the hazards of entry into permit-required
confined spaces. The proposal noted that Sec. 1910.146 already has
a control number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Proposed Removal of General Industry Training Certification
Existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(vii) requires the employer to certify
that each employee received the training required by Sec.
1910.269(a)(2). The employer must make this certification when the
employee demonstrates proficiency in the work practices involved and
maintain the certification for the duration of the employee's
employment. OSHA proposed to remove the certification requirement
contained in existing Sec. 1910.269(a)(2)(vii).
B. Information Collection Requirements in the Final Rule
OSHA responded to public comments addressing the proposed rule's
requirements in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule,
earlier in this preamble. Also, OSHA has submitted to OMB a new
information collection request in connection with the final rule: a new
information collection request in connection with the final rule titled
"Supporting Statement for the Information Collection Requirements of
the Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Standards
for Construction and General Industry (29 CFR 1926 Subpart V and 29 CFR
1910.269) and the Electrical Protective Equipment Standards for
Construction and General Industry (29 CFR 1926.97and 29 CFR
1910.137)." This information collection request includes both the
existing information collection requirements from the general industry
standards and the new information collection requirements from the
construction standards, resulting in a single information collection
request for both the general industry and construction standards.
Therefore, upon publication of the new information collection request,
the Agency will discontinue the existing information collection request
for the general industry standards titled "Supporting Statement for
the Electrical Protective Equipment Standard (29 CFR 1910.137) and the
Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Standard (29
CFR 1910.269)," OMB Control Number 1218-0190.
The new information collection request contains several newly
identified collections of information requirements in both construction
and general industry (that is, collections of information not included
in the information collection requests for either the proposal or
existing Sec. Sec. 1910.137 and 1910.269). As OSHA explains in detail
in the new information collection request, the majority of the
requirements covered by these newly identified collections of
information consist of usual and customary practices with zero burden.
In addition to adding newly identified collections of information
to the new information collection request, OSHA modified the following
collections of information. First, the final electrical protective
equipment provision for construction (final Sec. 1926.97(c)(2)(xii))
requires, in addition to the collections of information noted in the
information collection request for the proposal, that the employer make
the required certification available upon request to the Assistant
Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health and to employees and their
authorized representatives. Second, as described in Section V, Summary
and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble, the final
information-transfer provisions for construction and general industry
(final Sec. Sec. 1926.950(c)(1) and (c)(2) and final Sec. Sec.
1910.269(a)(3)(i) and (a)(3)(ii)) differ substantially from the
proposal, and the information collection requests for Sec. Sec.
1910.137 and 1910.269 and for Sec. 1926.97 and Subpart V reflect these
revisions.
Table 56 lists the provisions of the final rule that OSHA
identified as containing collections of information.
Table 56--Collections of Information in the Final Rule
------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Industry Standards Construction Standards
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 1910.137(c)(2)(xii) Sec. 1926.97(c)(2)(xii)
Sec. 1910.269(a)(3)(i) Sec. 1926.950(c)(1)
Sec. 1910.269(a)(3)(ii) Sec. 1926.950(c)(2)
Sec. 1910.269(c)(1)(i) Sec. 1926.952(a)(1)
Sec. 1910.269(d)(2)(iii) NA
Sec. 1910.269(d)(2)(v) NA
Sec. 1910.269(d)(2)(ix) NA
Sec. 1910.269(d)(3)(ii)(F) NA
Sec. 1910.269(d)(5) NA
Sec. 1910.269(d)(8)(iv) NA
NA Sec. 1926.953(a)
NA Sec. 1926.953(g)
Sec. 1910.269(f) NA
Sec. 1910.269(l)(3)(ii) Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(ii)
Sec. 1910.269(m)(3)(i) Sec. 1926.961(c)(1)
Sec. 1910.269(m)(3)(v) Sec. 1926.961(c)(5)
Sec. 1910.269(m)(3)(ix) Sec. 1926.961(c)(9)
Sec. 1910.269(m)(3)(x)(A) Sec. 1926.961(c)(10)(i)
Sec. 1910.269(m)(3)(x)(D) Sec. 1926.961(c)(10)(iv)
Sec. 1910.269(o)(3)(iii)(A) Sec. 1926.963(c)(3)(i)
Sec. 1910.269(p)(4)(ii) Sec. 1926.959(d)(2)
Sec. 1910.269(s)(1)(ii) Sec. 1926.967(k)(1)(ii)
Sec. 1910.269(u)(4)(iv) Sec. 1926.966(e)(4)
Sec. 1910.269(u)(6)(i) Sec. 1926.966(g)(1)
Sec. 1910.269(v)(4)(iv) NA
Sec. 1910.269(v)(7)(i)(A) NA
Sec. 1910.269(v)(8)(i) NA
Sec. 1910.269(v)(10)(i) NA
Sec. 1910.269(v)(11)(ii) NA
Sec. 1910.269(v)(11)(ix) NA
Sec. 1910.269(v)(11)(x) NA
Sec. 1910.269(v)(12) NA
Sec. 1910.269(w)(6)(ii) Sec. 1926.967(g)(2)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: "NA" = Not Applicable.
Before publishing this final rule, the Department of Labor
submitted the new information collection request to OMB for its
approval.\576\ The new information collection request contains a full
analysis and description of the burden hours and costs associated with
paperwork requirements of the final rule. The public may obtain copies
of the new information collection request on April 14, 2014 at
www.reginfo.gov or by contacting OSHA at 202-693-2222. OSHA will
publish a separate notice in the Federal Register that will announce
the results of OMB's review and include in that notice any applicable
OMB control number. Upon publication of that notice, any revisions to
the new information collection request made as a result of OMB's review
will be available at www.reginfo.gov by searching for the OMB-approved
control number for the new information request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\576\ OSHA notes that 24,407 business or other for-profit
establishments are affected by the final rule and estimates that
there are no capital or start-up costs associated with the final
rule's information collection requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department of Labor notes that a Federal agency cannot conduct
or sponsor a collection of information unless OMB approves the
collection of information under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and
the information collection requirement displays a currently valid OMB
control number. Also, notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
employer may be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a
collection of information if the collection of information does not
display a currently valid OMB control number.
XI. State-Plan Requirements
When Federal OSHA promulgates a new standard or more stringent
amendment to an existing standard, the 27 States and U.S. Territories
with their own OSHA-approved occupational safety and health plans must
amend their standards to reflect the new standard or amendment, or show
OSHA
why such action is unnecessary, for example, because an existing State
standard covering this area is "at least as effective" as the new
Federal standard or amendment (29 CFR 1953.5(a)). The State standard
must be at least as effective as the final Federal rule, must be
applicable to both the private and public (State and local government
employees) sectors, and must be completed within 6 months of the
promulgation date of the final Federal rule. When OSHA promulgates a
new standard or amendment that does not impose additional or more
stringent requirements than an existing standard, State-Plan States are
not required to amend their standards, although the Agency may
encourage them to do so.
The 21 States and one U.S. Territory with OSHA-approved
occupational safety and health plans covering private employers and
State and local government employees are: Alaska, Arizona, California,
Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. In
addition, four States and one U.S. Territory have OSHA-approved State
Plans that apply to State and local government employees only:
Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and the Virgin Islands.
This final rule results in more stringent requirements for the work
it covers. Therefore, States and Territories with OSHA-approved State
Plans must adopt comparable amendments to their standards within 6
months of the promulgation date of this rule unless they demonstrate
that such amendments are not necessary because their existing standards
are at least as effective in protecting workers as this final rule.
Each State Plan's existing requirements will continue to be in effect
until it adopts the required revisions.
XII. Dates
When OSHA promulgates a final rule, the Agency typically provides a
delay to allow employers to become familiar with the rule and to come
into compliance. The Agency requested comments generally on what an
appropriate delay would be for this rule, on how long employers would
need to make purchases necessary for compliance with the proposed rule,
and on the expected useful life of equipment that the proposal would
have required employers to replace.
OSHA received a wide range of recommendations. A few commenters
noted that the proposed rule was largely the same as existing Sec.
1910.269 and suggested that employers would need minimal time to comply
with the final rule. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0480.) BGE commented
that employers would need 2 months "to evaluate the changes" (Ex.
0126). IBEW noted that the proposed changes would require only minimal
new training and that employers could implement those changes within 6
months (Ex. 0480).
Many commenters stated that employers would need time to complete
the budgetary process necessary to acquire funding for compliance and
training. (See, for example, Exs. 0175, 0183, 0202, 0210, 0225, 0229,
0233, 0238, 0239, 0504.) One of these commenters suggested that OSHA
should allow for one complete budget cycle (Ex. 0175). Another
recommended a 3-year delay (Ex. 0238). The rest of these commenters
recommended a 2-year delay. APPA maintained that small employers "will
require additional time and budget allocations to execute any rules
that may come from this process" and recommended that OSHA take this
factor into consideration in adopting the final rule (Ex. 0504).
Siemens Power Generation commented that the proposed rules on
protection from electric arcs were "so costly and onerous that they
would require sophisticated employers two to three years to implement"
(Ex. 0163). The company contended that small employers would need even
more time so that they could "take advantage of OSHA outreach programs
and obtain information from industry associations" (id.).
Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives recommended at least a 2-year
period "to replace and upgrade equipment," noting that "FR clothing
in use at the time these change[s] become final will still have useable
life before they need replacement" (Ex. 0186). The company noted that
equipment currently in use provides a measure of protection even though
it may not be compliant with the final rule (id.).
TVA recommended a 3-year delay for the requirement to estimate
employee exposure to incident heat energy, explaining, "We recommend a
three year delay . . . to complete estimation of heat energy exposures.
This is based on our experience of performing calculations on plant and
transmission circuits down to the 480 V board and panel level" (Ex.
0213).
TVA also recommended a 6- to 9-month delay for the arc-flash
protection requirements,\577\ commenting:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\577\ OSHA understands TVA's comment to indicate that it will
take employers 6 to 9 months to purchase protective clothing and
other protective equipment after they determine what protection to
purchase.
To provide daily-wear FR clothing with an ATPV of 4 to 8 cal/
cm\2\ to meet the minimum proposed requirements for arc flash
protection, we recommend a 6 to 9-month delay . . .. This
recommendation is based on our experience of providing 3,600
employees five sets of daily-wear FR garments until we calculated
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the heat energy exposures. [Id.]
IBEW commented that the only purchases potentially requiring a
delayed compliance deadline involve the acquisition of arc-rated
clothing, although the union also stated that, "[b]ased on reports
from protective clothing manufacturers and vendors, there is plenty of
it to go around" (Ex. 0230). IBEW acknowledged that employers might
need some time to implement new protective-clothing policies and
recommended that the final rule provide no more than an 12-month delay
in that regard (Tr. 899).
A few commenters, such as EEI, stated that, without knowing what
the content of the final rule would be, they could not predict how long
it would take to acquire new equipment, put it into place, and train
employees in its use (Exs. 0177, 0209, 0227). These commenters
recommended that OSHA consider their input after the Agency publishes
the final rule.
OSHA believes that there will be little impact on the regulated
community as a result of adopting requirements from existing Sec.
1910.137 into new Sec. 1926.97 or existing Sec. 1910.269 into Subpart
V. Almost all affected employers are already complying with these
requirements. (See Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis, earlier in the preamble.) Additionally, many of
the revisions in existing Sec. Sec. 1910.137 and 1910.269 are
clarifications of existing requirements or impose requirements that
employers can implement quickly. For example, OSHA is revising
provisions in existing Sec. 1910.269(t) to cover vaults as well as
manholes. The definitions of "manhole" and "vault" are so
similar,\578\ that OSHA believes that most employers already apply the
relevant provisions to both manholes and vaults.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\578\ Existing Sec. 1910.269(x) defines "manhole" as "[a]
subsurface enclosure which personnel may enter and which is used for
the purpose of installing, operating, and maintaining submersible
equipment or cable." Existing Sec. 1910.269(x) defines "vault"
as "[a]n enclosure, above or below ground, which personnel may
enter and which is used for the purpose of installing, operating, or
maintaining equipment or cable." The only vaults addressed in Sec.
1910.269(t), which applies to underground installations, are
underground vaults.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency is setting a 90-day effective date for the final rule,
although
OSHA will be imposing compliance deadlines more than 90 days after
publication of the final rule for specific new or revised requirements,
as explained later.
Four sets of requirements in the final rule set substantial new or
revised duties on employers: The new requirements for transferring
information between host employers and contract employers, revised
provisions on the use of fall protection systems, revised requirements
for minimum approach distances, and new requirements for protecting
employees from the hazards associated with flames and electric arcs. As
described in the following paragraphs, OSHA is adopting delayed
compliance dates for some of these provisions:
A. The New Requirements for Transferring Information Between Host
Employers and Contract Employers (Sec. Sec. 1926.950(c) and
1910.269(a)(3))
Despite the controversy surrounding these provisions, OSHA believes
that many host employers and contract employers already are
implementing the practices required by final Sec. Sec. 1926.950(c) and
1910.269(a)(3).\579\ Additionally, the host-contractor provisions
generally require the host employer and contract employer to provide
information that they already have to each other, and the provisions do
not require the outlay of any capital expenditures. Therefore, OSHA
does not believe it is necessary to delay enforcement of these
provisions beyond the effective date for the final rule. OSHA expects
employers to be in compliance with the host-contractor requirements
starting 90 days after publication of the final rule in the Federal
Register.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\579\ As the Agency noted in the preamble to the proposed rule,
"Based on research conducted by CONSAD, OSHA believes that the
communications that would be required by the proposed standards
already occur for most affected projects" (70 FR 34911).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Revised Provisions on the Use of Fall Protection Systems (Sec. Sec.
1926.954(b)(3)(iii) and (b)(3)(iv) and 1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C), and
(g)(2)(iv)(D))
As discussed earlier under the summary and explanation for final
Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii), some provisions in that paragraph and in
final Sec. 1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C) have compliance deadlines. In
Sec. Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(B) and 1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(2), the
final rule requires employees to use a personal fall arrest system,
work-positioning equipment, or fall restraint system, as appropriate,
when working at elevated locations more than 1.2 meters (4 feet) above
the ground on poles, towers, or similar structures if the employer does
not provide other fall protection meeting Subpart M of Part 1926.
Paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C) of Sec. 1926.954 and paragraph
(g)(2)(iv)(C)(3) of Sec. 1910.269 provide exceptions to these general
rules requiring fall protection. Paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C) of Sec.
1926.954 and paragraph (g)(2)(iv)(C)(3) of Sec. 1910.269 provide that,
until March 31, 2015, qualified employees need not use fall protection
equipment for climbing or changing location on poles, towers, or
similar structures, unless conditions could cause the employee to lose
his or her grip or footing. After that date, qualified employees must
use fall protection for climbing poles, towers, or similar structures,
unless the employer can demonstrate that climbing with fall protection
is infeasible or creates a greater hazard than climbing without it.
Starting April 1, 2015, Sec. Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iv) and
1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(D) require the employer to ensure that employees rig
work-positioning systems so that the employee can free fall no more
than 0.6 meters (2 feet).
C. Revised Requirements for Minimum Approach Distances (Sec. Sec.
1926.960(c)(1) and 1910.269(l)(3))
As discussed in the summary and explanation for Sec.
1926.960(c)(1), that provision in the final rule, and the comparable
one in final Sec. 1910.269(l)(3), set revised requirements for minimum
approach distances. For voltages of 5.1 kilovolts and more, employers
have until April 1, 2015, to comply with the revised provisions,
including the requirement for employers to determine the maximum
anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, through an
engineering analysis.
D. New Requirements for Protecting Employees From the Hazards
Associated With Electric Arcs (Sec. Sec. 1926.960(g) and
1910.269(l)(8))
Paragraph (g)(1) of final Sec. 1926.960 and paragraph (l)(8)(i) of
final Sec. 1910.269 require the employer to assess the workplace to
identify employees exposed to hazards from flames or from electric
arcs. Although existing Sec. 1910.269 does not explicitly require the
employer to perform such an assessment, this requirement is implicit in
existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(6)(iii). This existing rule requires the
employer to ensure that each employee exposed to the hazards of flames
or electric arcs does not wear clothing that, when exposed to flames or
electric arcs, could increase the extent of injury that would be
sustained by the employee. To comply with this existing provision, the
employer needs to determine if employees are exposed to hazards from
flames or electric arcs. Consequently, OSHA concludes that employers
already should be in substantial compliance with paragraphs (g)(1) of
final Sec. 1926.960 and (l)(8)(i) of final Sec. 1910.269 and that no
compliance delay beyond the effective date for the final rule is
necessary.
Paragraph (g)(2) of final Sec. 1926.960 and paragraph (l)(8)(ii)
of final Sec. 1910.269 provide that, for each employee exposed to
hazards from electric arcs, the employer make a reasonable estimate of
the incident heat energy to which the employee would be exposed. TVA's
experience estimating incident energy for exposures at its electric
power generation plants and transmission lines led them to recommend a
3-year delay for this element of the standard (id.). However, OSHA does
not believe that TVA's experience forms a reasonable basis for setting
compliance deadlines. In this regard, TVA indicated that it instituted
measures to reduce energy below 100 cal/cm\2\, including modifying some
installations (Ex. 0213). OSHA believes that the initial incident-
energy estimates conducted by TVA took only a fraction of the 3-year
period and that the vast majority of this period involved retrofitting
the circuits to reduce energy exposure below 100 cal/cm\2\.
Mr. James Tomaseski with IBEW stated that the NESC was adopting
requirements for a similar estimate of incident heat energy that was to
become effective in 2009 (Tr. 898-899).\580\ Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI
stated that a delay of 12 to 18 months for OSHA's clothing-related
provisions would be reasonable (Tr. 1275-1276). Based on Mr.
Tomaseski's testimony, the Agency believes that most employers already
have estimates of incident heat energy for many exposures. Moreover,
the guidance provided in Appendix E should facilitate employers'
efforts to complete these estimates. Consequently, the Agency concludes
that a reasonable compliance date for the requirements to estimate
incident heat energy under final Sec. Sec. 1926.960(g)(2) and
1910.269(l)(8)(ii) is January 1, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\580\ Although the 2007 edition of the NESC to which Mr.
Tomaseski referred was not final at the time of his testimony, the
2007 NESC ultimately set the effective date for its protective
clothing provisions as January 1, 2009 (Ex. 0533).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (g)(3) of final Sec. 1926.960 and paragraph (l)(8)(iii)
of final Sec. 1910.269 require the employer to ensure that each
employee exposed to hazards from flames or electric arcs does not wear
clothing that could melt onto
his or her skin or that could ignite and continue to burn when exposed
to flames or the heat energy estimated under Sec. Sec. 1926.960(g)(2)
and 1910.269(l)(8)(ii). Existing Sec. 1910.269(l)(6)(iii) contains a
comparable requirement without the reference to incident heat-energy
estimates. As previously indicated, the final rule delays the
requirements for incident heat-energy estimates until January 1, 2015.
However, the Agency believes that it is important to continue the
protection against clothing ignition contained in existing Sec.
1910.269(l)(6)(iii). Therefore, OSHA is not setting a delayed
compliance date for final Sec. Sec. 1926.960(g)(3) and
1910.269(l)(8)(iii) beyond the effective date for the final rule. Until
the employer completes the estimates required by final Sec. Sec.
1926.960(g)(2) and 1910.269(l)(8)(ii), OSHA will enforce Sec. Sec.
1926.960(g)(3) and 1910.269(l)(8)(iii) as it does existing Sec.
1910.269(l)(6)(iii); that is, the clothing must not ignite and continue
to burn when exposed to electric arcs the employee may encounter.
Paragraph (g)(4) of final Sec. 1926.960 and paragraph (l)(8)(iv)
of final Sec. 1910.269 generally require the employer to ensure that
the outer layer of clothing worn by an employees is flame resistant
under specified conditions. The first three conditions are: (1) There
is employee exposure to contact with energized circuit parts operating
at more than 600 volts; (2) an electric arc could ignite flammable
material in the work area that could, in turn, ignite the employee's
clothing, and (3) molten metal or electric arcs from faulted conductors
in the work area could ignite the employee's clothing. As a practical
matter, the employer's assessment of employee exposure to hazards from
flames or from electric arcs (as required by final Sec. Sec.
1926.960(g)(1) and 1910.269(l)(8)(i)) will determine whether one or
more of these conditions are present. As previously noted, the
requirement for the employer to perform the assessment becomes
effective with the rest of the rule, and OSHA determined that employers
need no additional delay to comply with final Sec. Sec.
1926.960(g)(4)(i) through (g)(4)(iii) and 1910.269(l)(8)(iv)(A) through
(l)(8)(iv)(C).
Final Sec. Sec. 1926.960(g)(4)(iv) and 1910.269(l)(8)(iv)(D)
generally require flame-resistant clothing when the incident energy
estimated under Sec. Sec. 1926.960(g)(2) and 1910.269(l)(8)(ii)
exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\. This is a substantially new requirement, and
compliance is dependent on completion of the incident heat-energy
estimates required by Sec. Sec. 1926.960(g)(2) and 1910.269(l)(8)(ii).
As noted earlier, OSHA does not require compliance with the provisions
on incident heat-energy estimates until January 1, 2015. Moreover, as
explained later, OSHA is delaying requirements for arc-rated protection
under final Sec. Sec. 1926.960(g)(5) and 1910.269(l)(8)(v) until April
1, 2015. For these reasons, the Agency is adopting a compliance date
for final Sec. Sec. 1926.960(g)(4)(iv) and 1910.269(l)(8)(iv)(D) of
April 1, 2015.
Final Sec. Sec. 1926.960(g)(5) and 1910.269(l)(8)(v) provide that,
with some exceptions, employers ensure that employees exposed to
electric-arc hazards wear protective clothing and other protective
equipment with an arc rating greater than or equal to the heat energy
estimated under final Sec. Sec. 1926.960(g)(2) and 1910.269(l)(8)(ii).
Clearly, the employer must complete those incident heat-energy
estimates before purchasing protection with an appropriate arc rating.
Therefore, employers may delay complying with Sec. Sec. 1926.960(g)(5)
and 1910.269(l)(8)(v) until April 1, 2015. This delay provides
employers additional time, when added to the period provided for
estimating incident heat energy under Sec. Sec. 1926.960(g)(2) and
1910.269(l)(8)(ii), to purchase compliant protective clothing and other
protective equipment. The Agency could impose the same deadline for the
requirements to estimate incident heat energy and to provide protective
clothing and other protective equipment based those estimates; however,
OSHA believes that having separate deadlines will ensure that employers
have additional time after initially making estimates of heat energy to
make necessary adjustments in work practices and circuit protection to
reduce those estimates to a level where employers can use arc-rated
protection with acceptably low arc ratings. If OSHA were to require
compliance with both sets of requirements at the same time, employers
initially might have to provide protection with high arc ratings. The
dates adopted by this final rule provide employers with adequate time
to ensure that incident heat-energy exposure levels for employees are
as low as practical when the Agency begins enforcing Sec. Sec.
1926.960(g)(5) and 1910.269(l)(8)(v).
The following table shows important compliance dates for the final
rule.
The final rule becomes effective on July 10, 2014. Employer
obligations under the specific provisions listed in this table commence
on the dates indicated.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requirement Subpart V Sec. 1910.269 Compliance date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fall protection must be used by a Sec. (g)(2)(iv)(C)(3)...... April 1, 2015.
qualified employee climbing or 1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(C
changing location on poles, ).
towers, or similar structures
unless the employer can
demonstrate that climbing with
fall protection is infeasible or
creates a greater hazard than
climbing or changing location
without it.
Work-positioning systems must be Sec. (g)(2)(iv)(D)......... April 1, 2015.
rigged so that an employee can 1926.954(b)(3)(iv).
free fall no more than 0.6 m (2
ft).
Until the compliance deadline, Sec. 1926.960(c)(1) (l)(3) and Table April 1, 2015.
employers may continue to use the and Table V[dash]2. R[dash]3.
minimum approach distances in
existing Subpart V and Sec.
1910.269 for voltages of 5.1
kilovolts and more. (Table 6 in
Appendix B to Subpart V and in
Table 6 through Table 13 in
Appendix B to Sec. 1910.269
specify the existing minimum
approach distances.\1\) After the
compliance deadline, employers
must determine the maximum
anticipated per-unit transient
overvoltage, phase-to-ground in
accordance with Sec. Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)(ii) and
1910.269(l)(3)(ii) and must
establish minimum approach
distances in accordance with Sec.
Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(i) and
1910.269(l)(3)(i).
The employer must make a reasonable Sec. 1926.960(g)(2). (l)(8)(ii)............ January 1, 2015.
estimate of the incident heat
energy to which the employee would
be exposed.
The employer must ensure that the Sec. Sec. (l)(8)(iv)(D)......... April 1, 2015.
outer layer of clothing, except 1926.960(g)(4)(iv).
for clothing not required to be
arc rated, is flame resistant when
the estimated incident heat energy
exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\.
The employer must ensure that Sec. Sec. (l)(8)(v)............. April 1, 2015.
employees with exposure to 1926.960(g)(5).
electric-arc hazards wear
protective clothing and other
protective equipment with an arc
rating greater than or equal to
the estimated heat energy whenever
that estimate exceeds 2.0 cal/
cm\2\.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Table 6 in Appendix B to Subpart V and in Table 6 through Table 13 in Appendix B to Sec. 1910.269 contain
minimum approach distances that duplicate the minimum approach distances in Table V-1 and Table V-2 in
existing Subpart V and Table R-6 through R-8 in existing Sec. 1910.269. OSHA reformatted and deleted
extraneous information from these tables in the final rule; however, the relevant distances are identical to
the existing tables.
List of Subjects in 29 CFR Parts 1910 and 1926
Electric power, Fire prevention, Hazardous substances,
Incorporation by reference, Occupational safety and health, Safety.
Authority and Signature
David Michaels, Ph.D., MPH, Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Labor, 200
Constitution Ave. NW., Washington, DC 20210, authorized the preparation
of this notice.
This action is taken pursuant to sections 3704 et seq., Pub. L.
107-217, 116 STAT. 1062, (40 U.S.C. 3704 et seq.); sections 4, 6, and
8, Pub. L. 91-596, 84 STAT. 1590 (29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657), Secretary
of Labor's Order No. 1-2012 (77 FR 3912 (Jan. 25, 2012)), and 29 CFR
Part 1911.
Signed at Washington, DC, on December 6, 2013.
David Michaels,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.
Accordingly, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
amends Parts 1910 and 1926 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal
Regulation as follows:
PART 1910--[AMENDED]
Subpart I--Personal Protective Equipment
0
1. Revise the authority citation for Subpart I of part 1910 to read as
follows:
Authority: 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657; Secretary of Labor's Order
No. 12-71 (36 FR 8754), 8-76 (41 FR 25059), 9-83 (48 FR 35736), 1-90
(55 FR 9033), 6-96 (62 FR 111), 3-2000 (65 FR 50017), 5-2002 (67 FR
65008), 5-2007 (72 FR 31160), 4-2010 (75 FR 55355), or 1-2012 (77 FR
3912), as applicable, and 29 CFR Part 1911.
0
2. Revise Sec. 1910.136(a) to read as follows:
Sec. 1910.136 Foot protection.
(a) General requirements. The employer shall ensure that each
affected employee uses protective footwear when working in areas where
there is a danger of foot injuries due to falling or rolling objects,
or objects piercing the sole, or when the use of protective footwear
will protect the affected employee from an electrical hazard, such as a
static-discharge or electric-shock hazard, that remains after the
employer takes other necessary protective measures.
* * * * *
0
3. Revise Sec. 1910.137 to read as follows:
Sec. 1910.137 Electrical protective equipment.
(a) Design requirements for specific types of electrical protective
equipment. Rubber insulating blankets, rubber insulating matting,
rubber insulating covers, rubber insulating line hose, rubber
insulating gloves, and rubber insulating sleeves shall meet the
following requirements:
(1) Manufacture and marking of rubber insulating equipment. (i)
Blankets, gloves, and sleeves shall be produced by a seamless process.
(ii) Each item shall be clearly marked as follows:
(A) Class 00 equipment shall be marked Class 00.
(B) Class 0 equipment shall be marked Class 0.
(C) Class 1 equipment shall be marked Class 1.
(D) Class 2 equipment shall be marked Class 2.
(E) Class 3 equipment shall be marked Class 3.
(F) Class 4 equipment shall be marked Class 4.
(G) Nonozone-resistant equipment shall be marked Type I.
(H) Ozone-resistant equipment shall be marked Type II.
(I) Other relevant markings, such as the manufacturer's
identification and the size of the equipment, may also be provided.
(iii) Markings shall be nonconducting and shall be applied in such
a manner as not to impair the insulating qualities of the equipment.
(iv) Markings on gloves shall be confined to the cuff portion of
the glove.
(2) Electrical requirements. (i) Equipment shall be capable of
withstanding the ac proof-test voltage specified in Table I-1 or the dc
proof-test voltage specified in Table I-2.
(A) The proof test shall reliably indicate that the equipment can
withstand the voltage involved.
(B) The test voltage shall be applied continuously for 3 minutes
for equipment other than matting and shall be applied continuously for
1 minute for matting.
(C) Gloves shall also be capable of separately withstanding the ac
proof-test voltage specified in Table I-1 after a 16-hour water soak.
(See the note following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.)
(ii) When the ac proof test is used on gloves, the 60-hertz proof-
test current may not exceed the values specified in Table I-1 at any
time during the test period.
(A) If the ac proof test is made at a frequency other than 60
hertz, the permissible proof-test current shall be computed from the
direct ratio of the frequencies.
(B) For the test, gloves (right side out) shall be filled with tap
water and immersed in water to a depth that is in accordance with Table
I-3. Water shall be added to or removed from the glove, as necessary,
so that the water level is the same inside and outside the glove.
(C) After the 16-hour water soak specified in paragraph
(a)(2)(i)(C) of this section, the 60-hertz proof-test current may not
exceed the values given in Table I-1 by more than 2 milliamperes.
(iii) Equipment that has been subjected to a minimum breakdown
voltage test may not be used for electrical protection. (See the note
following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.)
(iv) Material used for Type II insulating equipment shall be
capable of withstanding an ozone test, with no visible effects. The
ozone test shall reliably indicate that the material will resist ozone
exposure in actual use. Any visible signs of ozone deterioration of the
material, such as checking, cracking, breaks, or pitting, is evidence
of failure to meet the requirements for ozone-resistant material. (See
the note following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.)
(3) Workmanship and finish. (i) Equipment shall be free of physical
irregularities that can adversely affect the insulating properties of
the equipment and that can be detected by the tests or inspections
required under this section.
(ii) Surface irregularities that may be present on all rubber goods
(because of imperfections on forms or molds or because of inherent
difficulties in the manufacturing process) and that may appear as
indentations, protuberances, or imbedded foreign material are
acceptable under the following conditions:
(A) The indentation or protuberance blends into a smooth slope when
the material is stretched.
(B) Foreign material remains in place when the insulating material
is folded and stretches with the insulating material surrounding it.
Note to paragraph (a): Rubber insulating equipment meeting the
following national consensus standards is deemed to be in compliance
with the performance requirements of paragraph (a) of this section:
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) D120-09,
Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves.
ASTM D178-01 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber
Insulating Matting.
ASTM D1048-12, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Blankets.
ASTM D1049-98 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber
Insulating Covers.
ASTM D1050-05 (2011), Standard Specification for Rubber
Insulating Line Hose.
ASTM D1051-08, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Sleeves.
The preceding standards also contain specifications for
conducting the various tests required in paragraph (a) of this
section. For example, the ac and dc proof tests, the breakdown test,
the water-soak procedure, and the ozone test mentioned in this
paragraph are described in detail in these ASTM standards.
ASTM F1236-96 (2012), Standard Guide for Visual Inspection of
Electrical Protective Rubber Products, presents methods and
techniques for the visual inspection of electrical protective
equipment made of rubber. This guide also contains descriptions and
photographs of irregularities that can be found in this equipment.
ASTM F819-10, Standard Terminology Relating to Electrical
Protective Equipment for Workers, includes definitions of terms
relating to the electrical protective equipment covered under this
section.
(b) Design requirements for other types of electrical protective
equipment. The following requirements apply to the design and
manufacture of electrical protective equipment that is not covered by
paragraph (a) of this section:
(1)Voltage withstand. Insulating equipment used for the protection
of employees shall be capable of withstanding, without failure, the
voltages that may be imposed upon it.
Note to paragraph (b)(1): These voltages include transient
overvoltages, such as switching surges, as well as nominal line
voltage. See Appendix B to Sec. 1910.269 for a discussion of
transient overvoltages on electric power transmission and
distribution systems. See IEEE Std 516-2009, IEEE Guide for
Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines, for methods of
determining the magnitude of transient overvoltages on an electrical
system and for a discussion comparing the ability of insulation
equipment to withstand a transient overvoltage based on its ability
to withstand ac voltage testing.
(2) Equipment current. (i) Protective equipment used for the
primary insulation of employees from energized circuit parts shall be
capable of passing a current test when subjected to the highest nominal
voltage on which the equipment is to be used.
(ii) When insulating equipment is tested in accordance with
paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section, the equipment current may not
exceed 1 microampere per kilovolt of phase-to-phase applied voltage.
Note 1 to paragraph (b)(2): This paragraph applies to equipment
that provides primary insulation of employees from energized parts.
It does not apply to equipment used for secondary insulation or
equipment used for brush contact only.
Note 2 to paragraph (b)(2): For ac excitation, this current
consists of three components: Capacitive current because of the
dielectric properties of the insulating material itself; conduction
current through the volume of the insulating equipment; and leakage
current along the surface of the tool or equipment. The conduction
current is normally negligible. For clean, dry insulating equipment,
the leakage current is small, and the capacitive current
predominates.
Note to paragraph (b): Plastic guard equipment is deemed to
conform to the performance requirements of paragraph (b) of this
section if it meets, and is used in accordance with, ASTM F712-06
(2011), Standard Test Methods and Specifications for Electrically
Insulating Plastic Guard Equipment for Protection of Workers.
(c) In-service care and use of electrical protective equipment. (1)
General. Electrical protective equipment shall be maintained in a safe,
reliable condition.
(2) Specific requirements. The following specific requirements
apply to rubber insulating blankets, rubber insulating covers, rubber
insulating line hose, rubber insulating gloves, and rubber insulating
sleeves:
(i) Maximum use voltages shall conform to those listed in Table I-
4.
(ii) Insulating equipment shall be inspected for damage before each
day's use and immediately following any incident that can reasonably be
suspected of causing damage. Insulating gloves shall be given an air
test, along with the inspection.
Note to paragraph (c)(2)(ii): ASTM F1236-96 (2012), Standard
Guide for Visual Inspection of Electrical Protective Rubber
Products, presents methods and techniques for the visual inspection
of electrical protective equipment made of rubber. This guide also
contains descriptions and photographs of irregularities that can be
found in this equipment.
(iii) Insulating equipment with any of the following defects may
not be used:
(A) A hole, tear, puncture, or cut;
(B) Ozone cutting or ozone checking (that is, a series of
interlacing cracks produced by ozone on rubber under mechanical
stress);
(C) An embedded foreign object;
(D) Any of the following texture changes: swelling, softening,
hardening, or becoming sticky or inelastic.
(E) Any other defect that damages the insulating properties.
(iv) Insulating equipment found to have other defects that might
affect its insulating properties shall be removed from service and
returned for testing under paragraphs (c)(2)(viii) and (c)(2)(ix) of
this section.
(v) Insulating equipment shall be cleaned as needed to remove
foreign substances.
(vi) Insulating equipment shall be stored in such a location and in
such a manner as to protect it from light, temperature extremes,
excessive humidity, ozone, and other damaging substances and
conditions.
(vii) Protector gloves shall be worn over insulating gloves, except
as follows:
(A) Protector gloves need not be used with Class 0 gloves, under
limited-use conditions, when small equipment and parts manipulation
necessitate unusually high finger dexterity.
Note to paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(A): Persons inspecting rubber
insulating gloves used under these conditions need to take extra
care in visually examining them. Employees using rubber insulating
gloves under these conditions need to take extra care to avoid
handling sharp objects.
(B) If the voltage does not exceed 250 volts, ac, or 375 volts, dc,
protector gloves need not be used with Class 00 gloves, under limited-
use conditions, when small equipment and parts manipulation necessitate
unusually high finger dexterity.
Note to paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(B): Persons inspecting rubber
insulating gloves used under these conditions need to take extra
care in visually examining them. Employees using rubber insulating
gloves under these conditions need to take extra care to avoid
handling sharp objects.
(C) Any other class of glove may be used without protector gloves,
under limited-use conditions, when small equipment and parts
manipulation necessitate unusually high finger dexterity but only if
the employer can demonstrate that the possibility of physical damage to
the gloves is small and if the class of glove is one class higher than
that required for the voltage involved.
(D) Insulating gloves that have been used without protector gloves
may not be reused until they have been tested under the provisions of
paragraphs (c)(2)(viii) and (c)(2)(ix) of this section.
(viii) Electrical protective equipment shall be subjected to
periodic electrical tests. Test voltages and the maximum intervals
between tests shall be in accordance with Table I-4 and Table I-5.
(ix) The test method used under paragraphs (c)(2)(viii) and
(c)(2)(xi) of this section shall reliably indicate whether the
insulating equipment can withstand the voltages involved.
Note to paragraph (c)(2)(ix): Standard electrical test methods
considered as meeting this paragraph are given in the following
national consensus standards:
ASTM D120-09, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Gloves.
ASTM D178-01 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber
Insulating Matting.
ASTM D1048-12, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Blankets.
ASTM D1049-98 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber
Insulating Covers.
ASTM D1050-05 (2011), Standard Specification for Rubber
Insulating Line Hose.
ASTM D1051-08, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Sleeves.
ASTM F478-09, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of
Insulating Line Hose and Covers.
ASTM F479-06 (2011), Standard Specification for In-Service Care
of Insulating Blankets.
ASTM F496-08, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of
Insulating Gloves and Sleeves.
(x) Insulating equipment failing to pass inspections or electrical
tests may not be used by employees, except as follows:
(A) Rubber insulating line hose may be used in shorter lengths with
the defective portion cut off.
(B) Rubber insulating blankets may be salvaged by severing the
defective area from the undamaged portion of the blanket. The resulting
undamaged area may not be smaller than 560 millimeters by 560
millimeters (22 inches by 22 inches) for Class 1, 2, 3, and 4 blankets.
(C) Rubber insulating blankets may be repaired using a compatible
patch that results in physical and electrical properties equal to those
of the blanket.
(D) Rubber insulating gloves and sleeves with minor physical
defects, such as small cuts, tears, or punctures, may be repaired by
the application of a compatible patch. Also, rubber insulating gloves
and sleeves with minor surface blemishes may be repaired with a
compatible liquid compound. The repaired area shall have electrical and
physical properties equal to those of the surrounding material. Repairs
to gloves are permitted only in the area between the wrist and the
reinforced edge of the opening.
(xi) Repaired insulating equipment shall be retested before it may
be used by employees.
(xii) The employer shall certify that equipment has been tested in
accordance with the requirements of paragraphs (c)(2)(iv),
(c)(2)(vii)(D), (c)(2)(viii), (c)(2)(ix), and (c)(2)(xi) of this
section. The certification shall identify the equipment that passed the
test and the date it was tested and shall be made available upon
request to the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health
and to employees or their authorized representatives.
Note to paragraph (c)(2)(xii): Marking equipment with, and
entering onto logs, the results of the tests and the dates of
testing are two acceptable means of meeting the certification
requirement.
Table I-1--AC Proof-Test Requirements
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum proof-test current, mA (gloves only)
Proof-test -----------------------------------------------------------------------
Class of Equipment Voltage rms V 280-mm (11-in) 360-mm (14-in) 410-mm (16-in) 460-mm (18-in)
glove glove glove glove
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
00............................................................ 2,500 8 12 ................ ................
0............................................................. 5,000 8 12 14 16
1............................................................. 10,000 ................ 14 16 18
2............................................................. 20,000 ................ 16 18 20
3............................................................. 30,000 ................ 18 20 22
4............................................................. 40,000 ................ ................ 22 24
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table I-2--DC Proof-Test Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proof-test
Class of equipment voltage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
00...................................................... 10,000
0....................................................... 20,000
1....................................................... 40,000
2....................................................... 50,000
3....................................................... 60,000
4....................................................... 70,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The dc voltages listed in this table are not appropriate for proof
testing rubber insulating line hose or covers. For this equipment, dc
proof tests shall use a voltage high enough to indicate that the
equipment can be safely used at the voltages listed in Table I-4. See
ASTM D1050-05 (2011) and ASTM D1049-98 (2010) for further information
on proof tests for rubber insulating line hose and covers,
respectively.
Table I-3--Glove Tests--Water Level \1\ \2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AC proof test DC proof test
Class of glove ------------------------------------------------------------------------
mm in mm in
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
00..................................... 38 1.5 38 1.5
0...................................... 38 1.5 38 1.5
1...................................... 38 1.5 51 2.0
2...................................... 64 2.5 76 3.0
3...................................... 89 3.5 102 4.0
4...................................... 127 5.0 153 6.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The water level is given as the clearance from the reinforced edge of the glove to the water line, with a
tolerance of 13 mm. (0.5 in.).
\2\ If atmospheric conditions make the specified clearances impractical, the clearances may be increased by a
maximum of 25 mm. (1 in.).
Table I-4--Rubber Insulating Equipment, Voltage Requirements
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum use
Class of equipment voltage \1\ AC Retest voltage Retest voltage
rms \2\ AC rms \2\ DC avg
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
00........................................................ 500 2,500 10,000
0......................................................... 1,000 5,000 20,000
1......................................................... 7,500 10,000 40,000
2......................................................... 17,000 20,000 50,000
3......................................................... 26,500 30,000 60,000
4......................................................... 36,000 40,000 70,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The maximum use voltage is the ac voltage (rms) classification of the protective equipment that designates
the maximum nominal design voltage of the energized system that may be safely worked. The nominal design
voltage is equal to the phase-to-phase voltage on multiphase circuits. However, the phase-to-ground potential
is considered to be the nominal design voltage if:
(1) There is no multiphase exposure in a system area and the voltage exposure is limited to the phase-to-ground
potential, or
(2) The electric equipment and devices are insulated or isolated or both so that the multiphase exposure on a
grounded wye circuit is removed.
\2\ The proof-test voltage shall be applied continuously for at least 1 minute, but no more than 3 minutes.
Table I-5--Rubber Insulating Equipment, Test Intervals
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type of equipment When to test
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rubber insulating line hose.. Upon indication that insulating value is
suspect and after repair.
Rubber insulating covers..... Upon indication that insulating value is
suspect and after repair.
Rubber insulating blankets... Before first issue and every 12 months
thereafter; \1\ upon indication that
insulating value is suspect; and after
repair.
Rubber insulating gloves..... Before first issue and every 6 months
thereafter; \1\ upon indication that
insulating value is suspect; after
repair; and after use without
protectors.
Rubber insulating sleeves.... Before first issue and every 12 months
thereafter; \1\ upon indication that
insulating value is suspect; and after
repair.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ If the insulating equipment has been electrically tested but not
issued for service, the insulating equipment may not be placed into
service unless it has been electrically tested within the previous 12
months.
0
4. In Appendix B to Subpart I of Part 1910, revise the heading and
paragraph 10 to read as follows:
Appendix B to Subpart I of Part 1910--Nonmandatory Compliance
Guidelines for Hazard Assessment and Personal Protective Equipment
Selection
* * * * *
10. Selection guidelines for foot protection. Safety shoes and
boots which meet the ANSI Z41-1991 Standard provide both impact and
compression protection. Where necessary, safety shoes can be
obtained which provide puncture protection. In some work situations,
metatarsal protection should be provided, and in other special
situations electrical conductive or insulating safety shoes would be
appropriate.
Safety shoes or boots with impact protection would be required
for carrying or handling materials such as packages, objects, parts
or heavy tools, which could be dropped; and, for other activities
where objects might fall onto the feet. Safety shoes or boots with
compression protection would be required for work activities
involving skid trucks (manual material handling carts) around bulk
rolls (such as paper rolls) and around heavy pipes, all of which
could potentially roll over an employee's feet. Safety shoes or
boots with puncture protection would be required where sharp objects
such as nails, wire, tacks, screws, large staples, scrap metal etc.,
could be stepped on by employees causing a foot injury. Electrically
conductive shoes would be required as a supplementary form of
protection for work activities in which there is a danger of fire or
explosion from the discharge of static electricity. Electrical-
hazard or dielectric footwear would be required as a supplementary
form of protection when an employee standing on the ground is
exposed to hazardous step or touch potential (the difference in
electrical potential between the feet or between the hands and feet)
or when primary forms of electrical protective equipment, such as
rubber insulating gloves and blankets, do not provide complete
protection for an employee standing on the ground.
Some occupations (not a complete list) for which foot protection
should be routinely considered are: Shipping and receiving clerks,
stock clerks, carpenters, electricians, machinists, mechanics and
repairers, plumbers and pipe fitters, structural metal workers,
assemblers, drywall installers and lathers, packers, wrappers,
craters, punch and stamping press operators, sawyers, welders,
laborers, freight handlers, gardeners and grounds-keepers, timber
cutting and logging workers, stock handlers and warehouse laborers.
* * * * *
Subpart R--Special Industries
0
5. Revise the authority citation for Subpart R of Part 1910 to read as
follows:
Authority: 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657; Secretary of Labor's Order
No. 12-71 (36 FR 8754), 8-76 (41 FR 25059), 9-83 (48 FR 35736), 1-90
(55 FR 9033), 6-96 (62 FR 111), 5-2007 (72 FR 31159), 4-2010 (75 FR
55355), or 1-2012 (77 FR 3912), as applicable; and 29 CFR Part 1911.
0
6. Revise Sec. 1910.269 to read as follows:
Sec. 1910.269 Electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution.
(a) General--(1) Application. (i) This section covers the operation
and maintenance of electric power generation, control, transformation,
transmission, and distribution lines and equipment. These provisions
apply to:
(A) Power generation, transmission, and distribution installations,
including related equipment for the purpose of communication or
metering that are accessible only to qualified employees;
Note to paragraph (a)(1)(i)(A): The types of installations
covered by this paragraph include the generation, transmission, and
distribution installations of electric utilities, as well as
equivalent installations of industrial establishments. Subpart S of
this part covers supplementary electric generating equipment that is
used to supply a workplace for emergency, standby, or similar
purposes only. (See paragraph (a)(1)(i)(B) of this section.)
(B) Other installations at an electric power generating station, as
follows:
(1) Fuel and ash handling and processing installations, such as
coal conveyors,
(2) Water and steam installations, such as penstocks, pipelines,
and tanks, providing a source of energy for electric generators, and
(3) Chlorine and hydrogen systems;
(C) Test sites where employees perform electrical testing involving
temporary measurements associated with electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution in laboratories, in the field, in
substations, and on lines, as opposed to metering, relaying, and
routine line work;
(D) Work on, or directly associated with, the installations covered
in paragraphs (a)(1)(i)(A) through (a)(1)(i)(C) of this section; and
(E) Line-clearance tree-trimming operations, as follows:
(1) Entire Sec. 1910.269 of this part, except paragraph (r)(1) of
this section, applies to line-clearance tree-trimming operations
performed by qualified employees (those who are knowledgeable in the
construction and operation of the electric power generation,
transmission, or distribution equipment involved, along with the
associated hazards).
(2) Paragraphs (a)(2), (a)(3), (b), (c), (g), (k), (p), and (r) of
this section apply to line-clearance tree-trimming operations performed
by line-clearance tree trimmers who are not qualified employees.
(ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section, Sec.
1910.269 of this part does not apply:
(A) To construction work, as defined in Sec. 1910.12 of this part,
except for line-clearance tree-trimming operations and work involving
electric power generation installations as specified in Sec.
1926.950(a)(3) of this chapter; or
(B) To electrical installations, electrical safety-related work
practices, or electrical maintenance considerations covered by Subpart
S of this part.
Note 1 to paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(B): The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration considers work practices conforming to
Sec. Sec. 1910.332 through 1910.335 as complying with the
electrical safety-related work-practice requirements of Sec.
1910.269 identified in Table 1 of Appendix A-2 to this section,
provided that employers are performing the work on a generation or
distribution installation meeting Sec. Sec. 1910.303 through
1910.308. This table also identifies provisions in Sec. 1910.269
that apply to work by qualified persons directly on, or associated
with, installations of electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution lines or equipment, regardless of compliance with
Sec. Sec. 1910.332 through 1910.335.
Note 2 to paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(B): The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration considers work practices performed by
qualified persons and conforming to Sec. 1910.269 as complying with
Sec. Sec. 1910.333(c) and 1910.335.
(iii) This section applies in addition to all other applicable
standards contained in this Part 1910. Employers covered under this
section are not exempt from complying with other applicable provisions
in Part 1910 by the operation of Sec. 1910.5(c). Specific references
in this section to other sections of Part 1910 are for emphasis only.
(2) Training. (i) All employees performing work covered by this
section shall be trained as follows:
(A) Each employee shall be trained in, and familiar with, the
safety-related work practices, safety procedures, and other safety
requirements in this section that pertain to his or her job
assignments.
(B) Each employee shall also be trained in and familiar with any
other safety practices, including applicable emergency procedures (such
as pole-top and manhole rescue), that are not specifically addressed by
this section but that are related to his or her work and are necessary
for his or her safety.
(C) The degree of training shall be determined by the risk to the
employee for the hazard involved.
(ii) Each qualified employee shall also be trained and competent
in:
(A) The skills and techniques necessary to distinguish exposed live
parts from other parts of electric equipment,
(B) The skills and techniques necessary to determine the nominal
voltage of exposed live parts,
(C) The minimum approach distances specified in this section
corresponding to the voltages to which the qualified employee will be
exposed and the skills and techniques necessary to maintain those
distances,
(D) The proper use of the special precautionary techniques,
personal protective equipment, insulating and shielding materials, and
insulated tools for working on or near exposed energized parts of
electric equipment, and
(E) The recognition of electrical hazards to which the employee may
be exposed and the skills and techniques necessary to control or avoid
these hazards.
Note to paragraph (a)(2)(ii): For the purposes of this section,
a person must have the training required by paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of
this section to be considered a qualified person.
(iii) Each line-clearance tree trimmer who is not a qualified
employee shall also be trained and competent in:
(A) The skills and techniques necessary to distinguish exposed live
parts from other parts of electric equipment,
(B) The skills and techniques necessary to determine the nominal
voltage of exposed live parts, and
(C) The minimum approach distances specified in this section
corresponding to the voltages to which the employee will be exposed and
the skills and techniques necessary to maintain those distances.
(iv) The employer shall determine, through regular supervision and
through inspections conducted on at least an annual basis, that each
employee is complying with the safety-related work practices required
by this section.
(v) An employee shall receive additional training (or retraining)
under any of the following conditions:
(A) If the supervision or annual inspections required by paragraph
(a)(2)(iv) of this section indicate that the employee is not complying
with the safety-related work practices required by this section, or
(B) If new technology, new types of equipment, or changes in
procedures necessitate the use of safety-related work practices that
are different from those which the employee would normally use, or
(C) If he or she must employ safety-related work practices that are
not normally used during his or her regular job duties.
Note to paragraph (a)(2)(v)(C): The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration considers tasks that are performed less often
than once per year to necessitate retraining before the performance
of the work practices involved.
(vi) The training required by paragraph (a)(2) of this section
shall be of the classroom or on-the-job type.
(vii) The training shall establish employee proficiency in the work
practices required by this section and shall introduce the procedures
necessary for compliance with this section.
(viii) The employer shall ensure that each employee has
demonstrated proficiency in the work practices involved before that
employee is considered as having completed the training required by
paragraph (a)(2) of this section.
Note 1 to paragraph (a)(2)(viii): Though they are not required
by this paragraph, employment records that indicate that an employee
has successfully completed the required training are one way of
keeping track of when an employee has demonstrated proficiency.
Note 2 to paragraph (a)(2)(viii): For an employee with previous
training, an employer may determine that that employee has
demonstrated the proficiency required by this paragraph using the
following process:
(1) Confirm that the employee has the training required by
paragraph (a)(2) of this section,
(2) Use an examination or interview to make an initial
determination that the employee understands the relevant safety-
related work practices before he or she performs any work covered by
this section, and
(3) Supervise the employee closely until that employee has
demonstrated proficiency as required by this paragraph.
(3) Information transfer.
(i) Before work begins, the host employer shall inform contract
employers of:
(A) The characteristics of the host employer's installation that
are related to the safety of the work to be performed and are listed in
paragraphs (a)(4)(i) through (a)(4)(v) of this section;
Note to paragraph (a)(3)(i)(A): This paragraph requires the host
employer to obtain information listed in paragraphs (a)(4)(i)
through (a)(4)(v) of this section if it does not have this
information in existing records.
(B) Conditions that are related to the safety of the work to be
performed, that are listed in paragraphs (a)(4)(vi) through
(a)(4)(viii) of this section, and that are known to the host employer;
Note to paragraph (a)(3)(i)(B): For the purposes of this
paragraph, the host employer need only provide information to
contract employers that the host employer can obtain from its
existing records through the exercise of reasonable diligence. This
paragraph does not require the host employer to make inspections of
worksite conditions to obtain this information.
(C) Information about the design and operation of the host
employer's installation that the contract employer needs to make the
assessments required by this section; and
Note to paragraph (a)(3)(i)(C): This paragraph requires the host
employer to obtain information about the design and operation of its
installation that contract employers need to make required
assessments if it does not have this information in existing
records.
(D) Any other information about the design and operation of the
host employer's installation that is known by the host employer, that
the contract employer requests, and that is related to the protection
of the contract employer's employees.
Note to paragraph (a)(3)(i)(D): For the purposes of this
paragraph, the host employer need only provide information to
contract employers that the host employer can obtain from its
existing records through the exercise of reasonable diligence. This
paragraph does not require the host employer to make inspections of
worksite conditions to obtain this information.
(ii) Contract employers shall comply with the following
requirements:
(A) The contract employer shall ensure that each of its employees
is instructed in the hazardous conditions relevant to the employee's
work that the contract employer is aware of as a result of information
communicated to the contract employer by the host employer under
paragraph (a)(3)(i) of this section.
(B) Before work begins, the contract employer shall advise the host
employer of any unique hazardous conditions presented by the contract
employer's work.
(C) The contract employer shall advise the host employer of any
unanticipated hazardous conditions found during the contract employer's
work that the host employer did not mention under paragraph (a)(3)(i)
of this section. The contract employer shall provide this information
to the host employer within 2 working days after discovering the
hazardous condition.
(iii) The contract employer and the host employer shall coordinate
their work rules and procedures so that each employee of the contract
employer and the host employer is protected as required by this
section.
(4) Existing characteristics and conditions. Existing
characteristics and
conditions of electric lines and equipment that are related to the
safety of the work to be performed shall be determined before work on
or near the lines or equipment is started. Such characteristics and
conditions include, but are not limited to:
(i) The nominal voltages of lines and equipment,
(ii) The maximum switching-transient voltages,
(iii) The presence of hazardous induced voltages,
(iv) The presence of protective grounds and equipment grounding
conductors,
(v) The locations of circuits and equipment, including electric
supply lines, communication lines, and fire-protective signaling
circuits,
(vi) The condition of protective grounds and equipment grounding
conductors,
(vii) The condition of poles, and
(viii) Environmental conditions relating to safety.
(b) Medical services and first aid. The employer shall provide
medical services and first aid as required in Sec. 1910.151. In
addition to the requirements of Sec. 1910.151, the following
requirements also apply:
(1) First-aid training. When employees are performing work on, or
associated with, exposed lines or equipment energized at 50 volts or
more, persons with first-aid training shall be available as follows:
(i) For field work involving two or more employees at a work
location, at least two trained persons shall be available. However, for
line-clearance tree trimming operations performed by line-clearance
tree trimmers who are not qualified employees, only one trained person
need be available if all new employees are trained in first aid within
3 months of their hiring dates.
(ii) For fixed work locations such as substations, the number of
trained persons available shall be sufficient to ensure that each
employee exposed to electric shock can be reached within 4 minutes by a
trained person. However, where the existing number of employees is
insufficient to meet this requirement (at a remote substation, for
example), each employee at the work location shall be a trained
employee.
(2) First-aid supplies. First-aid supplies required by Sec.
1910.151(b) shall be placed in weatherproof containers if the supplies
could be exposed to the weather.
(3) First-aid kits. The employer shall maintain each first-aid kit,
shall ensure that it is readily available for use, and shall inspect it
frequently enough to ensure that expended items are replaced. The
employer also shall inspect each first aid kit at least once per year.
(c) Job briefing. (1) Before each job. (i) In assigning an employee
or a group of employees to perform a job, the employer shall provide
the employee in charge of the job with all available information that
relates to the determination of existing characteristics and conditions
required by paragraph (a)(4) of this section.
(ii) The employer shall ensure that the employee in charge conducts
a job briefing that meets paragraphs (c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4) of this
section with the employees involved before they start each job.
(2) Subjects to be covered. The briefing shall cover at least the
following subjects: hazards associated with the job, work procedures
involved, special precautions, energy-source controls, and personal
protective equipment requirements.
(3) Number of briefings. (i) If the work or operations to be
performed during the work day or shift are repetitive and similar, at
least one job briefing shall be conducted before the start of the first
job of each day or shift.
(ii) Additional job briefings shall be held if significant changes,
which might affect the safety of the employees, occur during the course
of the work.
(4) Extent of briefing. (i) A brief discussion is satisfactory if
the work involved is routine and if the employees, by virtue of
training and experience, can reasonably be expected to recognize and
avoid the hazards involved in the job.
(ii) A more extensive discussion shall be conducted:
(A) If the work is complicated or particularly hazardous, or
(B) If the employee cannot be expected to recognize and avoid the
hazards involved in the job.
Note to paragraph (c)(4): The briefing must address all the
subjects listed in paragraph (c)(2) of this section.
(5) Working alone. An employee working alone need not conduct a job
briefing. However, the employer shall ensure that the tasks to be
performed are planned as if a briefing were required.
(d) Hazardous energy control (lockout/tagout) procedures. (1)
Application. The provisions of paragraph (d) of this section apply to
the use of lockout/tagout procedures for the control of energy sources
in installations for the purpose of electric power generation,
including related equipment for communication or metering. Locking and
tagging procedures for the deenergizing of electric energy sources
which are used exclusively for purposes of transmission and
distribution are addressed by paragraph (m) of this section.
Note to paragraph (d)(1): Installations in electric power
generation facilities that are not an integral part of, or
inextricably commingled with, power generation processes or
equipment are covered under Sec. 1910.147 and Subpart S of this
part.
(2) General. (i) The employer shall establish a program consisting
of energy control procedures, employee training, and periodic
inspections to ensure that, before any employee performs any servicing
or maintenance on a machine or equipment where the unexpected
energizing, start up, or release of stored energy could occur and cause
injury, the machine or equipment is isolated from the energy source and
rendered inoperative.
(ii) The employer's energy control program under paragraph (d)(2)
of this section shall meet the following requirements:
(A) If an energy isolating device is not capable of being locked
out, the employer's program shall use a tagout system.
(B) If an energy isolating device is capable of being locked out,
the employer's program shall use lockout, unless the employer can
demonstrate that the use of a tagout system will provide full employee
protection as follows:
(1) When a tagout device is used on an energy isolating device
which is capable of being locked out, the tagout device shall be
attached at the same location that the lockout device would have been
attached, and the employer shall demonstrate that the tagout program
will provide a level of safety equivalent to that obtained by the use
of a lockout program.
(2) In demonstrating that a level of safety is achieved in the
tagout program equivalent to the level of safety obtained by the use of
a lockout program, the employer shall demonstrate full compliance with
all tagout-related provisions of this standard together with such
additional elements as are necessary to provide the equivalent safety
available from the use of a lockout device. Additional means to be
considered as part of the demonstration of full employee protection
shall include the implementation of additional safety measures such as
the removal of an isolating circuit element, blocking of a controlling
switch, opening of an extra disconnecting device, or the removal of a
valve handle to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent energizing.
(C) After November 1, 1994, whenever replacement or major repair,
renovation, or modification of a machine or equipment is performed, and
whenever new machines or equipment are installed, energy isolating
devices for such machines or equipment shall be designed to accept a
lockout device.
(iii) Procedures shall be developed, documented, and used for the
control of potentially hazardous energy covered by paragraph (d) of
this section.
(iv) The procedure shall clearly and specifically outline the
scope, purpose, responsibility, authorization, rules, and techniques to
be applied to the control of hazardous energy, and the measures to
enforce compliance including, but not limited to, the following:
(A) A specific statement of the intended use of this procedure;
(B) Specific procedural steps for shutting down, isolating,
blocking and securing machines or equipment to control hazardous
energy;
(C) Specific procedural steps for the placement, removal, and
transfer of lockout devices or tagout devices and the responsibility
for them; and
(D) Specific requirements for testing a machine or equipment to
determine and verify the effectiveness of lockout devices, tagout
devices, and other energy control measures.
(v) The employer shall conduct a periodic inspection of the energy
control procedure at least annually to ensure that the procedure and
the provisions of paragraph (d) of this section are being followed.
(A) The periodic inspection shall be performed by an authorized
employee who is not using the energy control procedure being inspected.
(B) The periodic inspection shall be designed to identify and
correct any deviations or inadequacies.
(C) If lockout is used for energy control, the periodic inspection
shall include a review, between the inspector and each authorized
employee, of that employee's responsibilities under the energy control
procedure being inspected.
(D) Where tagout is used for energy control, the periodic
inspection shall include a review, between the inspector and each
authorized and affected employee, of that employee's responsibilities
under the energy control procedure being inspected, and the elements
set forth in paragraph (d)(2)(vii) of this section.
(E) The employer shall certify that the inspections required by
paragraph (d)(2)(v) of this section have been accomplished. The
certification shall identify the machine or equipment on which the
energy control procedure was being used, the date of the inspection,
the employees included in the inspection, and the person performing the
inspection.
Note to paragraph (d)(2)(v)(E): If normal work schedule and
operation records demonstrate adequate inspection activity and
contain the required information, no additional certification is
required.
(vi) The employer shall provide training to ensure that the purpose
and function of the energy control program are understood by employees
and that the knowledge and skills required for the safe application,
usage, and removal of energy controls are acquired by employees. The
training shall include the following:
(A) Each authorized employee shall receive training in the
recognition of applicable hazardous energy sources, the type and
magnitude of energy available in the workplace, and in the methods and
means necessary for energy isolation and control.
(B) Each affected employee shall be instructed in the purpose and
use of the energy control procedure.
(C) All other employees whose work operations are or may be in an
area where energy control procedures may be used shall be instructed
about the procedures and about the prohibition relating to attempts to
restart or reenergize machines or equipment that are locked out or
tagged out.
(vii) When tagout systems are used, employees shall also be trained
in the following limitations of tags:
(A) Tags are essentially warning devices affixed to energy
isolating devices and do not provide the physical restraint on those
devices that is provided by a lock.
(B) When a tag is attached to an energy isolating means, it is not
to be removed without authorization of the authorized person
responsible for it, and it is never to be bypassed, ignored, or
otherwise defeated.
(C) Tags must be legible and understandable by all authorized
employees, affected employees, and all other employees whose work
operations are or may be in the area, in order to be effective.
(D) Tags and their means of attachment must be made of materials
which will withstand the environmental conditions encountered in the
workplace.
(E) Tags may evoke a false sense of security, and their meaning
needs to be understood as part of the overall energy control program.
(F) Tags must be securely attached to energy isolating devices so
that they cannot be inadvertently or accidentally detached during use.
(viii) Retraining shall be provided by the employer as follows:
(A) Retraining shall be provided for all authorized and affected
employees whenever there is a change in their job assignments, a change
in machines, equipment, or processes that present a new hazard or
whenever there is a change in the energy control procedures.
(B) Retraining shall also be conducted whenever a periodic
inspection under paragraph (d)(2)(v) of this section reveals, or
whenever the employer has reason to believe, that there are deviations
from or inadequacies in an employee's knowledge or use of the energy
control procedures.
(C) The retraining shall reestablish employee proficiency and shall
introduce new or revised control methods and procedures, as necessary.
(ix) The employer shall certify that employee training has been
accomplished and is being kept up to date. The certification shall
contain each employee's name and dates of training.
(3) Protective materials and hardware. (i) Locks, tags, chains,
wedges, key blocks, adapter pins, self-locking fasteners, or other
hardware shall be provided by the employer for isolating, securing, or
blocking of machines or equipment from energy sources.
(ii) Lockout devices and tagout devices shall be singularly
identified; shall be the only devices used for controlling energy; may
not be used for other purposes; and shall meet the following
requirements:
(A) Lockout devices and tagout devices shall be capable of
withstanding the environment to which they are exposed for the maximum
period of time that exposure is expected.
(1) Tagout devices shall be constructed and printed so that
exposure to weather conditions or wet and damp locations will not cause
the tag to deteriorate or the message on the tag to become illegible.
(2) Tagout devices shall be so constructed as not to deteriorate
when used in corrosive environments.
(B) Lockout devices and tagout devices shall be standardized within
the facility in at least one of the following criteria: color, shape,
size. Additionally, in the case of tagout devices, print and format
shall be standardized.
(C) Lockout devices shall be substantial enough to prevent removal
without the use of excessive force or unusual techniques, such as with
the use of bolt cutters or metal cutting tools.
(D) Tagout devices, including their means of attachment, shall be
substantial enough to prevent
inadvertent or accidental removal. Tagout device attachment means shall
be of a non-reusable type, attachable by hand, self-locking, and
nonreleasable with a minimum unlocking strength of no less than 50
pounds and shall have the general design and basic characteristics of
being at least equivalent to a one-piece, all-environment-tolerant
nylon cable tie.
(E) Each lockout device or tagout device shall include provisions
for the identification of the employee applying the device.
(F) Tagout devices shall warn against hazardous conditions if the
machine or equipment is energized and shall include a legend such as
the following: Do Not Start, Do Not Open, Do Not Close, Do Not
Energize, Do Not Operate.
Note to paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(F): For specific provisions
covering accident prevention tags, see Sec. 1910.145.
(4) Energy isolation. Lockout and tagout device application and
removal may only be performed by the authorized employees who are
performing the servicing or maintenance.
(5) Notification. Affected employees shall be notified by the
employer or authorized employee of the application and removal of
lockout or tagout devices. Notification shall be given before the
controls are applied and after they are removed from the machine or
equipment.
Note to paragraph (d)(5): See also paragraph (d)(7) of this
section, which requires that the second notification take place
before the machine or equipment is reenergized.
(6) Lockout/tagout application. The established procedures for the
application of energy control (the lockout or tagout procedures) shall
include the following elements and actions, and these procedures shall
be performed in the following sequence:
(i) Before an authorized or affected employee turns off a machine
or equipment, the authorized employee shall have knowledge of the type
and magnitude of the energy, the hazards of the energy to be
controlled, and the method or means to control the energy.
(ii) The machine or equipment shall be turned off or shut down
using the procedures established for the machine or equipment. An
orderly shutdown shall be used to avoid any additional or increased
hazards to employees as a result of the equipment stoppage.
(iii) All energy isolating devices that are needed to control the
energy to the machine or equipment shall be physically located and
operated in such a manner as to isolate the machine or equipment from
energy sources.
(iv) Lockout or tagout devices shall be affixed to each energy
isolating device by authorized employees.
(A) Lockout devices shall be attached in a manner that will hold
the energy isolating devices in a "safe" or "off" position.
(B) Tagout devices shall be affixed in such a manner as will
clearly indicate that the operation or movement of energy isolating
devices from the "safe" or "off" position is prohibited.
(1) Where tagout devices are used with energy isolating devices
designed with the capability of being locked out, the tag attachment
shall be fastened at the same point at which the lock would have been
attached.
(2) Where a tag cannot be affixed directly to the energy isolating
device, the tag shall be located as close as safely possible to the
device, in a position that will be immediately obvious to anyone
attempting to operate the device.
(v) Following the application of lockout or tagout devices to
energy isolating devices, all potentially hazardous stored or residual
energy shall be relieved, disconnected, restrained, or otherwise
rendered safe.
(vi) If there is a possibility of reaccumulation of stored energy
to a hazardous level, verification of isolation shall be continued
until the servicing or maintenance is completed or until the
possibility of such accumulation no longer exists.
(vii) Before starting work on machines or equipment that have been
locked out or tagged out, the authorized employee shall verify that
isolation and deenergizing of the machine or equipment have been
accomplished. If normally energized parts will be exposed to contact by
an employee while the machine or equipment is deenergized, a test shall
be performed to ensure that these parts are deenergized.
(7) Release from lockout/tagout. Before lockout or tagout devices
are removed and energy is restored to the machine or equipment,
procedures shall be followed and actions taken by the authorized
employees to ensure the following:
(i) The work area shall be inspected to ensure that nonessential
items have been removed and that machine or equipment components are
operationally intact.
(ii) The work area shall be checked to ensure that all employees
have been safely positioned or removed.
(iii) After lockout or tagout devices have been removed and before
a machine or equipment is started, affected employees shall be notified
that the lockout or tagout devices have been removed.
(iv) Each lockout or tagout device shall be removed from each
energy isolating device by the authorized employee who applied the
lockout or tagout device. However, if that employee is not available to
remove it, the device may be removed under the direction of the
employer, provided that specific procedures and training for such
removal have been developed, documented, and incorporated into the
employer's energy control program. The employer shall demonstrate that
the specific procedure provides a degree of safety equivalent to that
provided by the removal of the device by the authorized employee who
applied it. The specific procedure shall include at least the following
elements:
(A) Verification by the employer that the authorized employee who
applied the device is not at the facility;
(B) Making all reasonable efforts to contact the authorized
employee to inform him or her that his or her lockout or tagout device
has been removed; and
(C) Ensuring that the authorized employee has this knowledge before
he or she resumes work at that facility.
(8) Additional requirements. (i) If the lockout or tagout devices
must be temporarily removed from energy isolating devices and the
machine or equipment must be energized to test or position the machine,
equipment, or component thereof, the following sequence of actions
shall be followed:
(A) Clear the machine or equipment of tools and materials in
accordance with paragraph (d)(7)(i) of this section;
(B) Remove employees from the machine or equipment area in
accordance with paragraphs (d)(7)(ii) and (d)(7)(iii) of this section;
(C) Remove the lockout or tagout devices as specified in paragraph
(d)(7)(iv) of this section;
(D) Energize and proceed with the testing or positioning; and
(E) Deenergize all systems and reapply energy control measures in
accordance with paragraph (d)(6) of this section to continue the
servicing or maintenance.
(ii) When servicing or maintenance is performed by a crew, craft,
department, or other group, they shall use a procedure which affords
the employees a level of protection equivalent to that provided by the
implementation of a personal lockout or tagout device. Group lockout or
tagout devices shall be used in accordance with the procedures required
by paragraphs (d)(2)(iii) and (d)(2)(iv) of this section including, but
not limited to, the following specific requirements:
(A) Primary responsibility shall be vested in an authorized
employee for a set number of employees working under the protection of
a group lockout or tagout device (such as an operations lock);
(B) Provision shall be made for the authorized employee to
ascertain the exposure status of all individual group members with
regard to the lockout or tagout of the machine or equipment;
(C) When more than one crew, craft, department, or other group is
involved, assignment of overall job-associated lockout or tagout
control responsibility shall be given to an authorized employee
designated to coordinate affected work forces and ensure continuity of
protection; and
(D) Each authorized employee shall affix a personal lockout or
tagout device to the group lockout device, group lockbox, or comparable
mechanism when he or she begins work and shall remove those devices
when he or she stops working on the machine or equipment being serviced
or maintained.
(iii) Procedures shall be used during shift or personnel changes to
ensure the continuity of lockout or tagout protection, including
provision for the orderly transfer of lockout or tagout device
protection between off-going and on-coming employees, to minimize their
exposure to hazards from the unexpected energizing or start-up of the
machine or equipment or from the release of stored energy.
(iv) Whenever outside servicing personnel are to be engaged in
activities covered by paragraph (d) of this section, the on-site
employer and the outside employer shall inform each other of their
respective lockout or tagout procedures, and each employer shall ensure
that his or her personnel understand and comply with restrictions and
prohibitions of the energy control procedures being used.
(v) If energy isolating devices are installed in a central location
and are under the exclusive control of a system operator, the following
requirements apply:
(A) The employer shall use a procedure that affords employees a
level of protection equivalent to that provided by the implementation
of a personal lockout or tagout device.
(B) The system operator shall place and remove lockout and tagout
devices in place of the authorized employee under paragraphs (d)(4),
(d)(6)(iv), and (d)(7)(iv) of this section.
(C) Provisions shall be made to identify the authorized employee
who is responsible for (that is, being protected by) the lockout or
tagout device, to transfer responsibility for lockout and tagout
devices, and to ensure that an authorized employee requesting removal
or transfer of a lockout or tagout device is the one responsible for it
before the device is removed or transferred.
Note to paragraph (d): Lockout and tagging procedures that
comply with paragraphs (c) through (f) of Sec. 1910.147 will also
be deemed to comply with paragraph (d) of this section if the
procedures address the hazards covered by paragraph (d) of this
section.
(e) Enclosed spaces. This paragraph covers enclosed spaces that may
be entered by employees. It does not apply to vented vaults if the
employer makes a determination that the ventilation system is operating
to protect employees before they enter the space. This paragraph
applies to routine entry into enclosed spaces in lieu of the permit-
space entry requirements contained in paragraphs (d) through (k) of
Sec. 1910.146. If, after the employer takes the precautions given in
paragraphs (e) and (t) of this section, the hazards remaining in the
enclosed space endanger the life of an entrant or could interfere with
an entrant's escape from the space, then entry into the enclosed space
shall meet the permit-space entry requirements of paragraphs (d)
through (k) of Sec. 1910.146.
(1) Safe work practices. The employer shall ensure the use of safe
work practices for entry into, and work in, enclosed spaces and for
rescue of employees from such spaces.
(2) Training. Each employee who enters an enclosed space or who
serves as an attendant shall be trained in the hazards of enclosed-
space entry, in enclosed-space entry procedures, and in enclosed-space
rescue procedures.
(3) Rescue equipment. Employers shall provide equipment to ensure
the prompt and safe rescue of employees from the enclosed space.
(4) Evaluating potential hazards. Before any entrance cover to an
enclosed space is removed, the employer shall determine whether it is
safe to do so by checking for the presence of any atmospheric pressure
or temperature differences and by evaluating whether there might be a
hazardous atmosphere in the space. Any conditions making it unsafe to
remove the cover shall be eliminated before the cover is removed.
Note to paragraph (e)(4): The determination called for in this
paragraph may consist of a check of the conditions that might
foreseeably be in the enclosed space. For example, the cover could
be checked to see if it is hot and, if it is fastened in place,
could be loosened gradually to release any residual pressure. An
evaluation also needs to be made of whether conditions at the site
could cause a hazardous atmosphere, such as an oxygen-deficient or
flammable atmosphere, to develop within the space.
(5) Removing covers. When covers are removed from enclosed spaces,
the opening shall be promptly guarded by a railing, temporary cover, or
other barrier designed to prevent an accidental fall through the
opening and to protect employees working in the space from objects
entering the space.
(6) Hazardous atmosphere. Employees may not enter any enclosed
space while it contains a hazardous atmosphere, unless the entry
conforms to the permit-required confined spaces standard in Sec.
1910.146.
(7) Attendants. While work is being performed in the enclosed
space, an attendant with first-aid training shall be immediately
available outside the enclosed space to provide assistance if a hazard
exists because of traffic patterns in the area of the opening used for
entry. The attendant is not precluded from performing other duties
outside the enclosed space if these duties do not distract the
attendant from: monitoring employees within the space or ensuring that
it is safe for employees to enter and exit the space.
Note to paragraph (e)(7): See paragraph (t) of this section for
additional requirements on attendants for work in manholes and
vaults.
(8) Calibration of test instruments. Test instruments used to
monitor atmospheres in enclosed spaces shall be kept in calibration and
shall have a minimum accuracy of 10 percent.
(9) Testing for oxygen deficiency. Before an employee enters an
enclosed space, the atmosphere in the enclosed space shall be tested
for oxygen deficiency with a direct-reading meter or similar
instrument, capable of collection and immediate analysis of data
samples without the need for off-site evaluation. If continuous forced-
air ventilation is provided, testing is not required provided that the
procedures used ensure that employees are not exposed to the hazards
posed by oxygen deficiency.
(10) Testing for flammable gases and vapors. Before an employee
enters an enclosed space, the internal atmosphere shall be tested for
flammable gases and vapors with a direct-reading meter or similar
instrument capable of collection and immediate analysis of data samples
without the need for off-site evaluation. This test shall be performed
after the oxygen testing and ventilation required by paragraph (e)(9)
of this section demonstrate that there is sufficient oxygen to ensure
the accuracy of the test for flammability.
(11) Ventilation, and monitoring for flammable gases or vapors. If
flammable gases or vapors are detected or if an oxygen deficiency is
found, forced-air ventilation shall be used to maintain oxygen at a
safe level and to prevent a hazardous concentration of flammable gases
and vapors from accumulating. A continuous monitoring program to ensure
that no increase in flammable gas or vapor concentration above safe
levels occurs may be followed in lieu of ventilation if flammable gases
or vapors are initially detected at safe levels.
Note to paragraph (e)(11): See the definition of "hazardous
atmosphere" for guidance in determining whether a specific
concentration of a substance is hazardous.
(12) Specific ventilation requirements. If continuous forced-air
ventilation is used, it shall begin before entry is made and shall be
maintained long enough for the employer to be able to demonstrate that
a safe atmosphere exists before employees are allowed to enter the work
area. The forced-air ventilation shall be so directed as to ventilate
the immediate area where employees are present within the enclosed
space and shall continue until all employees leave the enclosed space.
(13) Air supply. The air supply for the continuous forced-air
ventilation shall be from a clean source and may not increase the
hazards in the enclosed space.
(14) Open flames. If open flames are used in enclosed spaces, a
test for flammable gases and vapors shall be made immediately before
the open flame device is used and at least once per hour while the
device is used in the space. Testing shall be conducted more frequently
if conditions present in the enclosed space indicate that once per hour
is insufficient to detect hazardous accumulations of flammable gases or
vapors.
Note to paragraph (e)(14): See the definition of "hazardous
atmosphere" for guidance in determining whether a specific
concentration of a substance is hazardous.
Note to paragraph (e): Entries into enclosed spaces conducted in
accordance with the permit-space entry requirements of paragraphs
(d) through (k) of Sec. 1910.146 are considered as complying with
paragraph (e) of this section.
(f) Excavations. Excavation operations shall comply with Subpart P
of Part 1926 of this chapter.
(g) Personal protective equipment. (1) General. Personal protective
equipment shall meet the requirements of Subpart I of this part.
Note to paragraph (g)(1) of this section: Paragraph (h) of Sec.
1910.132 sets employer payment obligations for the personal
protective equipment required by this section, including, but not
limited to, the fall protection equipment required by paragraph
(g)(2) of this section, the electrical protective equipment required
by paragraph (l)(3) of this section, and the flame-resistant and
arc-rated clothing and other protective equipment required by
paragraph (l)(8) of this section.
(2) Fall protection. (i) Personal fall arrest systems shall meet
the requirements of Subpart M of Part 1926 of this chapter.
(ii) Personal fall arrest equipment used by employees who are
exposed to hazards from flames or electric arcs, as determined by the
employer under paragraph (l)(8)(i) of this section, shall be capable of
passing a drop test equivalent to that required by paragraph
(g)(2)(iii)(L) of this section after exposure to an electric arc with a
heat energy of 405 cal/cm\2\.
(iii) Body belts and positioning straps for work-positioning
equipment shall meet the following requirements:
(A) Hardware for body belts and positioning straps shall meet the
following requirements:
(1) Hardware shall be made of drop-forged steel, pressed steel,
formed steel, or equivalent material.
(2) Hardware shall have a corrosion-resistant finish.
(3) Hardware surfaces shall be smooth and free of sharp edges.
(B) Buckles shall be capable of withstanding an 8.9-kilonewton
(2,000-pound-force) tension test with a maximum permanent deformation
no greater than 0.4 millimeters (0.0156 inches).
(C) D rings shall be capable of withstanding a 22-kilonewton
(5,000-pound-force) tensile test without cracking or breaking.
(D) Snaphooks shall be capable of withstanding a 22-kilonewton
(5,000-pound-force) tension test without failure.
Note to paragraph (g)(2)(iii)(D): Distortion of the snaphook
sufficient to release the keeper is considered to be tensile failure
of a snaphook.
(E) Top grain leather or leather substitute may be used in the
manufacture of body belts and positioning straps; however, leather and
leather substitutes may not be used alone as a load-bearing component
of the assembly.
(F) Plied fabric used in positioning straps and in load-bearing
parts of body belts shall be constructed in such a way that no raw
edges are exposed and the plies do not separate.
(G) Positioning straps shall be capable of withstanding the
following tests:
(1) A dielectric test of 819.7 volts, AC, per centimeter (25,000
volts per foot) for 3 minutes without visible deterioration;
(2) A leakage test of 98.4 volts, AC, per centimeter (3,000 volts
per foot) with a leakage current of no more than 1 mA;
Note to paragraphs (g)(2)(iii)(G)(1) and (g)(2)(iii)(G)(2):
Positioning straps that pass direct-current tests at equivalent
voltages are considered as meeting this requirement.
(3) Tension tests of 20 kilonewtons (4,500 pounds-force) for
sections free of buckle holes and of 15 kilonewtons (3,500 pounds-
force) for sections with buckle holes;
(4) A buckle-tear test with a load of 4.4 kilonewtons (1,000
pounds-force); and
(5) A flammability test in accordance with Table R-2.
Table R-2--Flammability Test
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Test method Criteria for passing the test
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vertically suspend a 500-mm (19.7-inch) Any flames on the positioning
length of strapping supporting a 100- strap shall self extinguish.
kg (220.5-lb) weight. The positioning strap shall
Use a butane or propane burner with a continue to support the 100-kg
76-mm (3-inch) flame.. (220.5-lb) mass.
Direct the flame to an edge of the
strapping at a distance of 25 mm (1
inch).
Remove the flame after 5 seconds.......
Wait for any flames on the positioning
strap to stop burning.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(H) The cushion part of the body belt shall contain no exposed
rivets on the inside and shall be at least 76 millimeters (3 inches) in
width.
(I) Tool loops shall be situated on the body of a body belt so that
the 100
millimeters (4 inches) of the body belt that is in the center of the
back, measuring from D ring to D ring, is free of tool loops and any
other attachments.
(J) Copper, steel, or equivalent liners shall be used around the
bars of D rings to prevent wear between these members and the leather
or fabric enclosing them.
(K) Snaphooks shall be of the locking type meeting the following
requirements:
(1) The locking mechanism shall first be released, or a destructive
force shall be placed on the keeper, before the keeper will open.
(2) A force in the range of 6.7 N (1.5 lbf) to 17.8 N (4 lbf) shall
be required to release the locking mechanism.
(3) With the locking mechanism released and with a force applied on
the keeper against the face of the nose, the keeper may not begin to
open with a force of 11.2 N (2.5 lbf) or less and shall begin to open
with a maximum force of 17.8 N (4 lbf).
(L) Body belts and positioning straps shall be capable of
withstanding a drop test as follows:
(1) The test mass shall be rigidly constructed of steel or
equivalent material with a mass of 100 kg (220.5 lbm). For work-
positioning equipment used by employees weighing more than 140 kg (310
lbm) fully equipped, the test mass shall be increased proportionately
(that is, the test mass must equal the mass of the equipped worker
divided by 1.4).
(2) For body belts, the body belt shall be fitted snugly around the
test mass and shall be attached to the test-structure anchorage point
by means of a wire rope.
(3) For positioning straps, the strap shall be adjusted to its
shortest length possible to accommodate the test and connected to the
test-structure anchorage point at one end and to the test mass on the
other end.
(4) The test mass shall be dropped an unobstructed distance of 1
meter (39.4 inches) from a supporting structure that will sustain
minimal deflection during the test.
(5) Body belts shall successfully arrest the fall of the test mass
and shall be capable of supporting the mass after the test.
(6) Positioning straps shall successfully arrest the fall of the
test mass without breaking, and the arrest force may not exceed 17.8
kilonewtons (4,000 pounds-force). Additionally, snaphooks on
positioning straps may not distort to such an extent that the keeper
would release.
Note to paragraph (g)(2)(iii) of this section: When used by
employees weighing no more than 140 kg (310 lbm) fully equipped,
body belts and positioning straps that conform to American Society
of Testing and Materials Standard Specifications for Personal
Climbing Equipment, ASTM F887-12\e1\, are deemed to be in compliance
with paragraph (g)(2)(iii) of this section.
(iv) The following requirements apply to the care and use of
personal fall protection equipment.
(A) Work-positioning equipment shall be inspected before use each
day to determine that the equipment is in safe working condition. Work-
positioning equipment that is not in safe working condition may not be
used.
Note to paragraph (g)(2)(iv)(A): Appendix F to this section
contains guidelines for inspecting work-positioning equipment.
(B) Personal fall arrest systems shall be used in accordance with
Sec. 1926.502(d).
Note to paragraph (g)(2)(iv)(B): Fall protection equipment
rigged to arrest falls is considered a fall arrest system and must
meet the applicable requirements for the design and use of those
systems. Fall protection equipment rigged for work positioning is
considered work-positioning equipment and must meet the applicable
requirements for the design and use of that equipment.
(C) The employer shall ensure that employees use fall protection
systems as follows:
(1) Each employee working from an aerial lift shall use a fall
restraint system or a personal fall arrest system. Paragraph (c)(2)(v)
of Sec. 1910.67 does not apply.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (g)(2)(iv)(C)(3) of this
section, each employee in elevated locations more than 1.2 meters (4
feet) above the ground on poles, towers, or similar structures shall
use a personal fall arrest system, work-positioning equipment, or fall
restraint system, as appropriate, if the employer has not provided
other fall protection meeting Subpart D of this part.
(3) Until March 31, 2015, a qualified employee climbing or changing
location on poles, towers, or similar structures need not use fall
protection equipment, unless conditions, such as, but not limited to,
ice, high winds, the design of the structure (for example, no provision
for holding on with hands), or the presence of contaminants on the
structure, could cause the employee to lose his or her grip or footing.
On and after April 1, 2015, each qualified employee climbing or
changing location on poles, towers, or similar structures must use fall
protection equipment unless the employer can demonstrate that climbing
or changing location with fall protection is infeasible or creates a
greater hazard than climbing or changing location without it.
Note 1 to paragraphs (g)(2)(iv)(C)(2) and (g)(2)(iv)(C)(3):
These paragraphs apply to structures that support overhead
electric power transmission and distribution lines and equipment.
They do not apply to portions of buildings, such as loading docks,
or to electric equipment, such as transformers and capacitors.
Subpart D of this part contains the duty to provide fall protection
associated with walking and working surfaces.
Note 2 to paragraphs (g)(2)(iv)(C)(2) and (g)(2)(iv)(C)(3):
Until the employer ensures that employees are proficient in
climbing and the use of fall protection under paragraph (a)(2)(viii)
of this section, the employees are not considered "qualified
employees" for the purposes of paragraphs (g)(2)(iv)(C)(2) and
(g)(2)(iv)(C)(3) of this section. These paragraphs require
unqualified employees (including trainees) to use fall protection
any time they are more than 1.2 meters (4 feet) above the ground.
(D) On and after April 1, 2015, work-positioning systems shall be
rigged so that an employee can free fall no more than 0.6 meters (2
feet).
(E) Anchorages for work-positioning equipment shall be capable of
supporting at least twice the potential impact load of an employee's
fall, or 13.3 kilonewtons (3,000 pounds-force), whichever is greater.
Note to paragraph (g)(2)(iv)(E): Wood-pole fall-restriction
devices meeting American Society of Testing and Materials Standard
Specifications for Personal Climbing Equipment, ASTM F887-12\e1\,
are deemed to meet the anchorage-strength requirement when they are
used in accordance with manufacturers' instructions.
(F) Unless the snaphook is a locking type and designed specifically
for the following connections, snaphooks on work-positioning equipment
may not be engaged:
(1) Directly to webbing, rope, or wire rope;
(2) To each other;
(3) To a D ring to which another snaphook or other connector is
attached;
(4) To a horizontal lifeline; or
(5) To any object that is incompatibly shaped or dimensioned in
relation to the snaphook such that accidental disengagement could occur
should the connected object sufficiently depress the snaphook keeper to
allow release of the object.
(h) Portable ladders and platforms. (1) General. Requirements for
portable ladders contained in Subpart D of this part apply in addition
to the requirements of paragraph (h) of this section, except as
specifically noted in paragraph (h)(2) of this section.
(2) Special ladders and platforms. Portable ladders used on
structures or
conductors in conjunction with overhead line work need not meet Sec.
1910.25(d)(2)(i) and (d)(2)(iii) or Sec. 1910.26(c)(3)(iii). Portable
ladders and platforms used on structures or conductors in conjunction
with overhead line work shall meet the following requirements:
(i) In the configurations in which they are used, portable
platforms shall be capable of supporting without failure at least 2.5
times the maximum intended load.
(ii) Portable ladders and platforms may not be loaded in excess of
the working loads for which they are designed.
(iii) Portable ladders and platforms shall be secured to prevent
them from becoming dislodged.
(iv) Portable ladders and platforms may be used only in
applications for which they are designed.
(3) Conductive ladders. Portable metal ladders and other portable
conductive ladders may not be used near exposed energized lines or
equipment. However, in specialized high-voltage work, conductive
ladders shall be used when the employer demonstrates that nonconductive
ladders would present a greater hazard to employees than conductive
ladders.
(i) Hand and portable power equipment. (1) General. Paragraph
(i)(2) of this section applies to electric equipment connected by cord
and plug. Paragraph (i)(3) of this section applies to portable and
vehicle-mounted generators used to supply cord- and plug-connected
equipment. Paragraph (i)(4) of this section applies to hydraulic and
pneumatic tools.
(2) Cord- and plug-connected equipment. Cord- and plug-connected
equipment not covered by Subpart S of this part shall comply with one
of the following instead of Sec. 1910.243(a)(5):
(i) The equipment shall be equipped with a cord containing an
equipment grounding conductor connected to the equipment frame and to a
means for grounding the other end of the conductor (however, this
option may not be used where the introduction of the ground into the
work environment increases the hazard to an employee); or
(ii) The equipment shall be of the double-insulated type conforming
to Subpart S of this part; or
(iii) The equipment shall be connected to the power supply through
an isolating transformer with an ungrounded secondary of not more than
50 volts.
(3) Portable and vehicle-mounted generators. Portable and vehicle-
mounted generators used to supply cord- and plug-connected equipment
covered by paragraph (i)(2) of this section shall meet the following
requirements:
(i) The generator may only supply equipment located on the
generator or the vehicle and cord- and plug-connected equipment through
receptacles mounted on the generator or the vehicle.
(ii) The non-current-carrying metal parts of equipment and the
equipment grounding conductor terminals of the receptacles shall be
bonded to the generator frame.
(iii) For vehicle-mounted generators, the frame of the generator
shall be bonded to the vehicle frame.
(iv) Any neutral conductor shall be bonded to the generator frame.
(4) Hydraulic and pneumatic tools. (i) Safe operating pressures for
hydraulic and pneumatic tools, hoses, valves, pipes, filters, and
fittings may not be exceeded.
Note to paragraph (i)(4)(i): If any hazardous defects are
present, no operating pressure is safe, and the hydraulic or
pneumatic equipment involved may not be used. In the absence of
defects, the maximum rated operating pressure is the maximum safe
pressure.
(ii) A hydraulic or pneumatic tool used where it may contact
exposed energized parts shall be designed and maintained for such use.
(iii) The hydraulic system supplying a hydraulic tool used where it
may contact exposed live parts shall provide protection against loss of
insulating value, for the voltage involved, due to the formation of a
partial vacuum in the hydraulic line.
Note to paragraph (i)(4)(iii): Use of hydraulic lines that do
not have check valves and that have a separation of more than 10.7
meters (35 feet) between the oil reservoir and the upper end of the
hydraulic system promotes the formation of a partial vacuum.
(iv) A pneumatic tool used on energized electric lines or
equipment, or used where it may contact exposed live parts, shall
provide protection against the accumulation of moisture in the air
supply.
(v) Pressure shall be released before connections are broken,
unless quick-acting, self-closing connectors are used.
(vi) Employers must ensure that employees do not use any part of
their bodies to locate, or attempt to stop, a hydraulic leak.
(vii) Hoses may not be kinked.
(j) Live-line tools. (1) Design of tools. Live-line tool rods,
tubes, and poles shall be designed and constructed to withstand the
following minimum tests:
(i) If the tool is made of fiberglass-reinforced plastic (FRP), it
shall withstand 328,100 volts per meter (100,000 volts per foot) of
length for 5 minutes, or
Note to paragraph (j)(1)(i): Live-line tools using rod and tube
that meet ASTM F711-02 (2007), Standard Specification for
Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod and Tube Used in Live Line
Tools, are deemed to comply with paragraph (j)(1) of this section.
(ii) If the tool is made of wood, it shall withstand 246,100 volts
per meter (75,000 volts per foot) of length for 3 minutes, or
(iii) The tool shall withstand other tests that the employer can
demonstrate are equivalent.
(2) Condition of tools. (i) Each live-line tool shall be wiped
clean and visually inspected for defects before use each day.
(ii) If any defect or contamination that could adversely affect the
insulating qualities or mechanical integrity of the live-line tool is
present after wiping, the tool shall be removed from service and
examined and tested according to paragraph (j)(2)(iii) of this section
before being returned to service.
(iii) Live-line tools used for primary employee protection shall be
removed from service every 2 years, and whenever required under
paragraph (j)(2)(ii) of this section, for examination, cleaning,
repair, and testing as follows:
(A) Each tool shall be thoroughly examined for defects.
(B) If a defect or contamination that could adversely affect the
insulating qualities or mechanical integrity of the live-line tool is
found, the tool shall be repaired and refinished or shall be
permanently removed from service. If no such defect or contamination is
found, the tool shall be cleaned and waxed.
(C) The tool shall be tested in accordance with paragraphs
(j)(2)(iii)(D) and (j)(2)(iii)(E) of this section under the following
conditions:
(1) After the tool has been repaired or refinished; and
(2) After the examination if repair or refinishing is not
performed, unless the tool is made of FRP rod or foam-filled FRP tube
and the employer can demonstrate that the tool has no defects that
could cause it to fail during use.
(D) The test method used shall be designed to verify the tool's
integrity along its entire working length and, if the tool is made of
fiberglass-reinforced plastic, its integrity under wet conditions.
(E) The voltage applied during the tests shall be as follows:
(1) 246,100 volts per meter (75,000 volts per foot) of length for 1
minute if the tool is made of fiberglass, or
(2) 164,000 volts per meter (50,000 volts per foot) of length for 1
minute if the tool is made of wood, or
(3) Other tests that the employer can demonstrate are equivalent.
Note to paragraph (j)(2): Guidelines for the examination,
cleaning, repairing, and in-service testing of live-line tools are
specified in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers'
IEEE Guide for Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines, IEEE
Std 516-2009.
(k) Materials handling and storage. (1) General. Materials handling
and storage shall comply with applicable material-handling and
material-storage requirements in this part, including those in Subpart
N of this part.
(2) Materials storage near energized lines or equipment. (i) In
areas to which access is not restricted to qualified persons only,
materials or equipment may not be stored closer to energized lines or
exposed energized parts of equipment than the following distances, plus
a distance that provides for the maximum sag and side swing of all
conductors and for the height and movement of material-handling
equipment:
(A) For lines and equipment energized at 50 kilovolts or less, the
distance is 3.05 meters (10 feet).
(B) For lines and equipment energized at more than 50 kilovolts,
the distance is 3.05 meters (10 feet) plus 0.10 meter (4 inches) for
every 10 kilovolts over 50 kilovolts.
(ii) In areas restricted to qualified employees, materials may not
be stored within the working space about energized lines or equipment.
Note to paragraph (k)(2)(ii): Paragraphs (u)(1) and (v)(3) of
this section specify the size of the working space.
(l) Working on or near exposed energized parts. This paragraph
applies to work on exposed live parts, or near enough to them to expose
the employee to any hazard they present.
(1) General. (i) Only qualified employees may work on or with
exposed energized lines or parts of equipment.
(ii) Only qualified employees may work in areas containing
unguarded, uninsulated energized lines or parts of equipment operating
at 50 volts or more.
(iii) Electric lines and equipment shall be considered and treated
as energized unless they have been deenergized in accordance with
paragraph (d) or (m) of this section.
(2) At least two employees. (i) Except as provided in paragraph
(l)(2)(ii) of this section, at least two employees shall be present
while any employees perform the following types of work:
(A) Installation, removal, or repair of lines energized at more
than 600 volts,
(B) Installation, removal, or repair of deenergized lines if an
employee is exposed to contact with other parts energized at more than
600 volts,
(C) Installation, removal, or repair of equipment, such as
transformers, capacitors, and regulators, if an employee is exposed to
contact with parts energized at more than 600 volts,
(D) Work involving the use of mechanical equipment, other than
insulated aerial lifts, near parts energized at more than 600 volts,
and
(E) Other work that exposes an employee to electrical hazards
greater than, or equal to, the electrical hazards posed by operations
listed specifically in paragraphs (l)(2)(i)(A) through (l)(2)(i)(D) of
this section.
(ii) Paragraph (l)(2)(i) of this section does not apply to the
following operations:
(A) Routine circuit switching, when the employer can demonstrate
that conditions at the site allow safe performance of this work,
(B) Work performed with live-line tools when the position of the
employee is such that he or she is neither within reach of, nor
otherwise exposed to contact with, energized parts, and
(C) Emergency repairs to the extent necessary to safeguard the
general public.
(3) Minimum approach distances. (i) The employer shall establish
minimum approach distances no less than the distances computed by Table
R-3 for ac systems or Table R-8 for dc systems.
(ii) No later than April 1, 2015, for voltages over 72.5 kilovolts,
the employer shall determine the maximum anticipated per-unit transient
overvoltage, phase-to-ground, through an engineering analysis or assume
a maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground,
in accordance with Table R-9. When the employer uses portable
protective gaps to control the maximum transient overvoltage, the value
of the maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-
ground, must provide for five standard deviations between the
statistical sparkover voltage of the gap and the statistical withstand
voltage corresponding to the electrical component of the minimum
approach distance. The employer shall make any engineering analysis
conducted to determine maximum anticipated per-unit transient
overvoltage available upon request to employees and to the Assistant
Secretary or designee for examination and copying.
Note to paragraph (l)(3)(ii): See Appendix B to this section for
information on how to calculate the maximum anticipated per-unit
transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, when the employer uses
portable protective gaps to reduce maximum transient overvoltages.
(iii) The employer shall ensure that no employee approaches or
takes any conductive object closer to exposed energized parts than the
employer's established minimum approach distance, unless:
(A) The employee is insulated from the energized part (rubber
insulating gloves or rubber insulating gloves and sleeves worn in
accordance with paragraph (l)(4) of this section constitutes insulation
of the employee from the energized part upon which the employee is
working provided that the employee has control of the part in a manner
sufficient to prevent exposure to uninsulated portions of the
employee's body), or
(B) The energized part is insulated from the employee and from any
other conductive object at a different potential, or
(C) The employee is insulated from any other exposed conductive
object in accordance with the requirements for live-line barehand work
in paragraph (q)(3) of this section.
(4) Type of insulation. (i) When an employee uses rubber insulating
gloves as insulation from energized parts (under paragraph
(l)(3)(iii)(A) of this section), the employer shall ensure that the
employee also uses rubber insulating sleeves. However, an employee need
not use rubber insulating sleeves if:
(A) Exposed energized parts on which the employee is not working
are insulated from the employee; and
(B) When installing insulation for purposes of paragraph
(l)(4)(i)(A) of this section, the employee installs the insulation from
a position that does not expose his or her upper arm to contact with
other energized parts.
(ii) When an employee uses rubber insulating gloves or rubber
insulating gloves and sleeves as insulation from energized parts (under
paragraph (l)(3)(iii)(A) of this section), the employer shall ensure
that the employee:
(A) Puts on the rubber insulating gloves and sleeves in a position
where he or she cannot reach into the minimum approach distance,
established by the employer under paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section;
and
(B) Does not remove the rubber insulating gloves and sleeves until
he or she is in a position where he or she cannot reach into the
minimum approach distance, established by the employer under paragraph
(l)(3)(i) of this section.
(5) Working position. (i) The employer shall ensure that each
employee, to the extent that other safety-related conditions at the
worksite permit, works in a position from which a slip or shock will
not bring the employee's body into contact with exposed, uninsulated
parts energized at a potential different from the employee's.
(ii) When an employee performs work near exposed parts energized at
more than 600 volts, but not more than 72.5 kilovolts, and is not
wearing rubber insulating gloves, being protected by insulating
equipment covering the energized parts, performing work using live-line
tools, or performing live-line barehand work under paragraph (q)(3) of
this section, the employee shall work from a position where he or she
cannot reach into the minimum approach distance, established by the
employer under paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section.
(6) Making connections. The employer shall ensure that employees
make connections as follows:
(i) In connecting deenergized equipment or lines to an energized
circuit by means of a conducting wire or device, an employee shall
first attach the wire to the deenergized part;
(ii) When disconnecting equipment or lines from an energized
circuit by means of a conducting wire or device, an employee shall
remove the source end first; and
(iii) When lines or equipment are connected to or disconnected from
energized circuits, an employee shall keep loose conductors away from
exposed energized parts.
(7) Conductive articles. When an employee performs work within
reaching distance of exposed energized parts of equipment, the employer
shall ensure that the employee removes or renders nonconductive all
exposed conductive articles, such as keychains or watch chains, rings,
or wrist watches or bands, unless such articles do not increase the
hazards associated with contact with the energized parts.
(8) Protection from flames and electric arcs. (i) The employer
shall assess the workplace to identify employees exposed to hazards
from flames or from electric arcs.
(ii) For each employee exposed to hazards from electric arcs, the
employer shall make a reasonable estimate of the incident heat energy
to which the employee would be exposed.
Note 1 to paragraph (l)(8)(ii): Appendix E to this section
provides guidance on estimating available heat energy. The
Occupational Safety and Health Administration will deem employers
following the guidance in Appendix E to this section to be in
compliance with paragraph (l)(8)(ii) of this section. An employer
may choose a method of calculating incident heat energy not included
in Appendix E to this section if the chosen method reasonably
predicts the incident energy to which the employee would be exposed.
Note 2 to paragraph (l)(8)(ii): This paragraph does not require
the employer to estimate the incident heat energy exposure for every
job task performed by each employee. The employer may make broad
estimates that cover multiple system areas provided the employer
uses reasonable assumptions about the energy-exposure distribution
throughout the system and provided the estimates represent the
maximum employee exposure for those areas. For example, the employer
could estimate the heat energy just outside a substation feeding a
radial distribution system and use that estimate for all jobs
performed on that radial system.
(iii) The employer shall ensure that each employee who is exposed
to hazards from flames or electric arcs does not wear clothing that
could melt onto his or her skin or that could ignite and continue to
burn when exposed to flames or the heat energy estimated under
paragraph (l)(8)(ii) of this section.
Note to paragraph (l)(8)(iii) of this section: This paragraph
prohibits clothing made from acetate, nylon, polyester, rayon and
polypropylene, either alone or in blends, unless the employer
demonstrates that the fabric has been treated to withstand the
conditions that may be encountered by the employee or that the
employee wears the clothing in such a manner as to eliminate the
hazard involved.
(iv) The employer shall ensure that the outer layer of clothing
worn by an employee, except for clothing not required to be arc rated
under paragraphs (l)(8)(v)(A) through (l)(8)(v)(E) of this section, is
flame resistant under any of the following conditions:
(A) The employee is exposed to contact with energized circuit parts
operating at more than 600 volts,
(B) An electric arc could ignite flammable material in the work
area that, in turn, could ignite the employee's clothing,
(C) Molten metal or electric arcs from faulted conductors in the
work area could ignite the employee's clothing, or
Note to paragraph (l)(8)(iv)(C): This paragraph does not apply
to conductors that are capable of carrying, without failure, the
maximum available fault current for the time the circuit protective
devices take to interrupt the fault.
(D) The incident heat energy estimated under paragraph (l)(8)(ii)
of this section exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\.
(v) The employer shall ensure that each employee exposed to hazards
from electric arcs wears protective clothing and other protective
equipment with an arc rating greater than or equal to the heat energy
estimated under paragraph (l)(8)(ii) of this section whenever that
estimate exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\. This protective equipment shall cover
the employee's entire body, except as follows:
(A) Arc-rated protection is not necessary for the employee's hands
when the employee is wearing rubber insulating gloves with protectors
or, if the estimated incident energy is no more than 14 cal/cm\2\,
heavy-duty leather work gloves with a weight of at least 407 gm/m\2\
(12 oz/yd\2\),
(B) Arc-rated protection is not necessary for the employee's feet
when the employee is wearing heavy-duty work shoes or boots,
(C) Arc-rated protection is not necessary for the employee's head
when the employee is wearing head protection meeting Sec. 1910.135 if
the estimated incident energy is less than 9 cal/cm\2\ for exposures
involving single-phase arcs in open air or 5 cal/cm\2\ for other
exposures,
(D) The protection for the employee's head may consist of head
protection meeting Sec. 1910.135 and a faceshield with a minimum arc
rating of 8 cal/cm\2\ if the estimated incident-energy exposure is less
than 13 cal/cm\2\ for exposures involving single-phase arcs in open air
or 9 cal/cm\2\ for other exposures, and
(E) For exposures involving single-phase arcs in open air, the arc
rating for the employee's head and face protection may be 4 cal/cm\2\
less than the estimated incident energy.
Note to paragraph (l)(8): See Appendix E to this section for
further information on the selection of appropriate protection.
(vi) Dates. (A) The obligation in paragraph (l)(8)(ii) of this
section for the employer to make reasonable estimates of incident
energy commences January 1, 2015.
(B) The obligation in paragraph (l)(8)(iv)(D) of this section for
the employer to ensure that the outer layer of clothing worn by an
employee is flame-resistant when the estimated incident heat energy
exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\ commences April 1, 2015.
(C) The obligation in paragraph (l)(8)(v) of this section for the
employer to ensure that each employee exposed to hazards from electric
arcs wears the required arc-rated protective equipment commences April
1, 2015.
(9) Fuse handling. When an employee must install or remove fuses
with one or both terminals energized at more than 300 volts, or with
exposed parts energized at more than 50 volts, the
employer shall ensure that the employee uses tools or gloves rated for
the voltage. When an employee installs or removes expulsion-type fuses
with one or both terminals energized at more than 300 volts, the
employer shall ensure that the employee wears eye protection meeting
the requirements of Subpart I of this part, uses a tool rated for the
voltage, and is clear of the exhaust path of the fuse barrel.
(10) Covered (noninsulated) conductors. The requirements of this
section that pertain to the hazards of exposed live parts also apply
when an employee performs work in proximity to covered (noninsulated)
wires.
(11) Non-current-carrying metal parts. Non-current-carrying metal
parts of equipment or devices, such as transformer cases and circuit-
breaker housings, shall be treated as energized at the highest voltage
to which these parts are exposed, unless the employer inspects the
installation and determines that these parts are grounded before
employees begin performing the work.
(12) Opening and closing circuits under load. (i) The employer
shall ensure that devices used by employees to open circuits under load
conditions are designed to interrupt the current involved.
(ii) The employer shall ensure that devices used by employees to
close circuits under load conditions are designed to safely carry the
current involved.
Table R-3--AC Live-Line Work Minimum Approach Distance
[The minimum approach distance (MAD; in meters) shall conform to the following equations.]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For phase-to-phase system voltages of 50 V to 300 V:\ 1\
MAD = avoid contact
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For phase-to-phase system voltages of 301 V to 5 kV: \ 1\
MAD = M + D, where
D = 0.02 m.................. the electrical component of the minimum approach distance.
M = 0.31 m for voltages up the inadvertent movement factor.
to 750 V and 0.61 m
otherwise.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For phase-to-phase system
voltages of 5.1 kV to 72.5 kV:
\1\ \4\
MAD = M + AD, where
M = 0.61 m.................. the inadvertent movement factor.
A = the applicable value the altitude correction factor.
from Table R-5.
D = the value from Table R-4 the electrical component of the minimum approach distance.
corresponding to the
voltage and exposure or the
value of the electrical
component of the minimum
approach distance
calculated using the method
provided in Appendix B to
this section.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For phase-to-phase system voltages of more than 72.5 kV, nominal: \2\ \4\
MAD = 0.3048(C + )VL-GTA + M, where
C = 0.01 for phase-to-ground exposures that the employer can demonstrate consist only of air across the
approach distance (gap),.
0.01 for phase-to-phase exposures if the employer can demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap
and that no large conductive object is in the gap, or.
0.011 otherwise.........................................................................................
VL-G = phase-to-ground rms voltage, in kV...................................................................
T = maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage; for phase-to-ground exposures, T equals TL-G, the
maximum per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, determined by the employer under paragraph
(l)(3)(ii) of this section; for phase-to-phase exposures, T equals 1.35TL-G + 0.45.
A = altitude correction factor from Table R-5...............................................................
M = 0.31 m, the inadvertent movement factor.................................................................
a = saturation factor, as follows:..........................................................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-Ground Exposures
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VPeak = TL-GVL-G[radic]2................ 635 kV or less 635.1 to 915 kV 915.1 to 1,050 kV More than 1,050 kV
a....................................... 0 (VPeak-635)/140,000 (VPeak-645)/135,000 (VPeak-675)/125,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-Phase Exposures \3\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VPeak = (1.35TL-G + 0.45)VL-G[radic]2... 630 kV or less 630.1 to 848 kV 848.1 to 1,131 kV 1,131.1 to 1,485 kV More than 1,485 kV
a....................................... 0 (VPeak-630)/155,000 (VPeak-633.6)/152,207 (VPeak-628)/153,846 (VPeak-350.5)/203,666
\1\ Employers may use the minimum approach distances in Table R-6. If the worksite is at an elevation of more than
900 meters (3,000 feet), see footnote
1 to Table R-6.
\2\ Employers may use the minimum approach distances in Table R-7, except that the employer may not use the minimum approach
distances in Table R-7 for phase-to-phase exposures if an insulated tool spans the gap or if any large conductive object
is in the gap. If the worksite is at an elevation of more than 900 meters (3,000 feet), see footnote 1 to Table R-7.
Employers may use the minimum approach distances in Table 6 through Table 13 in Appendix B to this section, which
calculated MAD for various values of T, provided the employer follows the notes to those tables.
\3\ Use the equations for phase-to-ground exposures (with VPeak for phase-to-phase exposures) unless the employer can
demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap and that no large conductive object is in the gap.
\4\ Until March 31, 2015, employers may use the minimum approach distances in Table 6 through Table 13 in Appendix B to this
section.
Table R-4--Electrical Component of the Minimum Approach Distance at 5.1 to 72.5 kV
[D; In meters]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
Nominal voltage (kV) phase-to-phase ----------------------------------------------------------
D (m) D (m)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5.1 to 15.0.......................................... 0.04 0.07
15.1 to 36.0......................................... 0.16 0.28
36.1 to 46.0......................................... 0.23 0.37
46.1 to 72.5......................................... 0.39 0.59
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table R-5--Altitude Correction Factor
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Altitude above sea level (m) A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 to 900................................... 1.00
901 to 1,200............................... 1.02
1,201 to 1,500............................. 1.05
1,501 to 1,800............................. 1.08
1,801 to 2,100............................. 1.11
2,101 to 2,400............................. 1.14
2,401 to 2,700............................. 1.17
2,701 to 3,000............................. 1.20
3,001 to 3,600............................. 1.25
3,601 to 4,200............................. 1.30
4,201 to 4,800............................. 1.35
4,801 to 5,400............................. 1.39
5,401 to 6,000............................. 1.44
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table R-6--Alternative Minimum Approach Distances for Voltages of 72.5 kV and Less \1\
[In meters or feet and inches]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Distance
----------------------------------------------------------------
Nominal voltage (kV) phase-to-phase Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.50 to 0.300 \2\.............................. Avoid Contact
Avoid Contact
----------------------------------------------------------------
0.301 to 0.750 \2\............................. 0.33 1.09 0.33 1.09
0.751 to 5.0................................... 0.63 2.07 0.63 2.07
5.1 to 15.0.................................... 0.65 2.14 0.68 2.24
15.1 to 36.0................................... 0.77 2.53 0.89 2.92
36.1 to 46.0................................... 0.84 2.76 0.98 3.22
46.1 to 72.5................................... 1.00 3.29 1.20 3.94
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Employers may use the minimum approach distances in this table provided the worksite is at an elevation of
900 meters (3,000 feet) or less. If employees will be working at elevations greater than 900 meters (3,000
feet) above mean sea level, the employer shall determine minimum approach distances by multiplying the
distances in this table by the correction factor in Table R-5 corresponding to the altitude of the work.
\2\ For single-phase systems, use voltage-to-ground.
Table R-7--Alternative Minimum Approach Distances for Voltages of More Than 72.5 kV \1\ \2\ \3\
[In meters or feet and inches]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
Voltage range phase to phase (kV) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
72.6 to 121.0.................................. 1.13 3.71 1.42 4.66
121.1 to 145.0................................. 1.30 4.27 1.64 5.38
145.1 to 169.0................................. 1.46 4.79 1.94 6.36
169.1 to 242.0................................. 2.01 6.59 3.08 10.10
242.1 to 362.0................................. 3.41 11.19 5.52 18.11
362.1 to 420.0................................. 4.25 13.94 6.81 22.34
420.1 to 550.0................................. 5.07 16.63 8.24 27.03
550.1 to 800.0................................. 6.88 22.57 11.38 37.34
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Employers may use the minimum approach distances in this table provided the worksite is at an elevation of
900 meters (3,000 feet) or less. If employees will be working at elevations greater than 900 meters (3,000
feet) above mean sea level, the employer shall determine minimum approach distances by multiplying the
distances in this table by the correction factor in Table R-5 corresponding to the altitude of the work.
\2\ Employers may use the phase-to-phase minimum approach distances in this table provided that no insulated
tool spans the gap and no large conductive object is in the gap.
\3\ The clear live-line tool distance shall equal or exceed the values for the indicated voltage ranges.
Table R-8--DC Live-Line Minimum Approach Distance with Overvoltage Factor \1\
[In meters]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Distance (m) maximum line-to-ground voltage (kV)
Maximum anticipated per-unit -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
transient overvoltage 250 400 500 600 750
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5 or less..................... 1.12 1.60 2.06 2.62 3.61
1.6............................. 1.17 1.69 2.24 2.86 3.98
1.7............................. 1.23 1.82 2.42 3.12 4.37
1.8............................. 1.28 1.95 2.62 3.39 4.79
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The distances specified in this table are for air, bare-hand, and live-line tool conditions. If employees
will be working at elevations greater than 900 meters (3,000 feet) above mean sea level, the employer shall
determine minimum approach distances by multiplying the distances in this table by the correction factor in
Table R-5 corresponding to the altitude of the work.
Table R-9--Assumed Maximum Per-Unit Transient Overvoltage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assumed maximum
Type of current per-unit
Voltage range (kV) (ac or dc) transient
overvoltage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
72.6 to 420.0..................... ac 3.5
420.1 to 550.0.................... ac 3.0
550.1 to 800.0.................... ac 2.5
250 to 750........................ dc 1.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(m) Deenergizing lines and equipment for employee protection. (1)
Application. Paragraph (m) of this section applies to the deenergizing
of transmission and distribution lines and equipment for the purpose of
protecting employees. See paragraph (d) of this section for
requirements on the control of hazardous energy sources used in the
generation of electric energy. Conductors and parts of electric
equipment that have been deenergized under procedures other than those
required by paragraph (d) or (m) of this section, as applicable, shall
be treated as energized.
(2) General. (i) If a system operator is in charge of the lines or
equipment and their means of disconnection, the employer shall
designate one employee in the crew to be in charge of the clearance and
shall comply with all of the requirements of paragraph (m)(3) of this
section in the order specified.
(ii) If no system operator is in charge of the lines or equipment
and their means of disconnection, the employer shall designate one
employee in the crew to be in charge of the clearance and to perform
the functions that the system operator would otherwise perform under
paragraph (m) of this section. All of the requirements of paragraph
(m)(3) of this section apply, in the order specified, except as
provided in paragraph (m)(2)(iii) of this section.
(iii) If only one crew will be working on the lines or equipment
and if the means of disconnection is accessible and visible to, and
under the sole control of, the employee in charge of the clearance,
paragraphs (m)(3)(i), (m)(3)(iii), and (m)(3)(v) of this section do not
apply. Additionally, the employer does not need to use the tags
required by the remaining provisions of paragraph (m)(3) of this
section.
(iv) If two or more crews will be working on the same lines or
equipment, then:
(A) The crews shall coordinate their activities under paragraph (m)
of this section with a single employee in charge of the clearance for
all of the crews and follow the requirements of paragraph (m) of this
section as if all of the employees formed a single crew, or
(B) Each crew shall independently comply with paragraph (m) of this
section and, if there is no system operator in charge of the lines or
equipment, shall have separate tags and coordinate deenergizing and
reenergizing the lines and equipment with the other crews.
(v) The employer shall render any disconnecting means that are
accessible to individuals outside the employer's control (for example,
the general public) inoperable while the disconnecting means are open
for the purpose of protecting employees.
(3) Deenergizing lines and equipment. (i) The employee that the
employer designates pursuant to paragraph (m)(2) of this section as
being in charge of the clearance shall make a request of the system
operator to deenergize the particular section of line or equipment. The
designated employee becomes the employee in charge (as this term is
used in paragraph (m)(3) of this section) and is responsible for the
clearance.
(ii) The employer shall ensure that all switches, disconnectors,
jumpers, taps, and other means through which known sources of electric
energy may be supplied to the particular lines and equipment to be
deenergized are open. The employer shall render such means inoperable,
unless its design does not so permit, and then ensure that such means
are tagged to indicate that employees are at work.
(iii) The employer shall ensure that automatically and remotely
controlled switches that could cause the opened disconnecting means to
close are also tagged at the points of control. The employer shall
render the automatic or remote control feature inoperable, unless its
design does not so permit.
(iv) The employer need not use the tags mentioned in paragraphs
(m)(3)(ii) and (m)(3)(iii) of this section on a network protector for
work on the primary feeder for the network protector's associated
network transformer when the employer can demonstrate all of the
following conditions:
(A) Every network protector is maintained so that it will
immediately trip open if closed when a primary conductor is
deenergized;
(B) Employees cannot manually place any network protector in a
closed position without the use of tools, and any manual override
position is blocked, locked, or otherwise disabled; and
(C) The employer has procedures for manually overriding any network
protector that incorporate provisions for determining, before anyone
places a network protector in a closed position, that: The line
connected to the network protector is not deenergized for the
protection of any employee working on the line; and (if the line
connected to the network protector is not deenergized for the
protection of any employee working on the line) the primary conductors
for the network protector are energized.
(v) Tags shall prohibit operation of the disconnecting means and
shall indicate that employees are at work.
(vi) After the applicable requirements in paragraphs (m)(3)(i)
through (m)(3)(v) of this section have been followed and the system
operator gives a clearance to the employee in charge, the employer
shall ensure that the lines and equipment are deenergized by testing
the lines and equipment to be worked with a device designed to detect
voltage.
(vii) The employer shall ensure the installation of protective
grounds as required by paragraph (n) of this section.
(viii) After the applicable requirements of paragraphs (m)(3)(i)
through (m)(3)(vii) of this section have been followed, the lines and
equipment involved may be considered deenergized.
(ix) To transfer the clearance, the employee in charge (or the
employee's supervisor if the employee in charge must leave the worksite
due to illness or other emergency) shall inform the system operator and
employees in the crew; and the new employee in charge shall be
responsible for the clearance.
(x) To release a clearance, the employee in charge shall:
(A) Notify each employee under that clearance of the pending
release of the clearance;
(B) Ensure that all employees under that clearance are clear of the
lines and equipment;
(C) Ensure that all protective grounds protecting employees under
that clearance have been removed; and
(D) Report this information to the system operator and then release
the clearance.
(xi) Only the employee in charge who requested the clearance may
release the clearance, unless the employer transfers responsibility
under paragraph (m)(3)(ix) of this section.
(xii) No one may remove tags without the release of the associated
clearance as specified under paragraphs (m)(3)(x) and (m)(3)(xi) of
this section.
(xiii) The employer shall ensure that no one initiates action to
reenergize the lines or equipment at a point of disconnection until all
protective grounds have been removed, all crews working on the lines or
equipment release their clearances, all employees are clear of the
lines and equipment, and all protective tags are removed from that
point of disconnection.
(n) Grounding for the protection of employees. (1) Application.
Paragraph (n) of this section applies to grounding of generation,
transmission, and distribution lines and equipment for the purpose of
protecting employees. Paragraph (n)(4) of this section also applies to
protective grounding of other equipment as required elsewhere in this
section.
Note to paragraph (n)(1): This paragraph covers grounding of
generation, transmission, and distribution lines and equipment when
this section requires protective grounding and whenever the employer
chooses to ground such lines and equipment for the protection of
employees.
(2) General. For any employee to work transmission and distribution
lines or equipment as deenergized, the employer shall ensure that the
lines or equipment are deenergized under the provisions of paragraph
(m) of this section and shall ensure proper grounding of the lines or
equipment as specified in paragraphs (n)(3) through (n)(8) of this
section. However, if the employer can demonstrate that installation of
a ground is impracticable or that the conditions resulting from the
installation of a ground would present greater hazards to employees
than working without grounds, the lines and equipment may be treated as
deenergized provided that the employer establishes that all of the
following conditions apply:
(i) The employer ensures that the lines and equipment are
deenergized under the provisions of paragraph (m) of this section.
(ii) There is no possibility of contact with another energized
source.
(iii) The hazard of induced voltage is not present.
(3) Equipotential zone. Temporary protective grounds shall be
placed at such locations and arranged in such a manner that the
employer can demonstrate will prevent each employee from being exposed
to hazardous differences in electric potential.
Note to paragraph (n)(3): Appendix C to this section contains
guidelines for establishing the equipotential zone required by this
paragraph. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration will
deem grounding practices meeting these guidelines as complying with
paragraph (n)(3) of this section.
(4) Protective grounding equipment. (i) Protective grounding
equipment shall be capable of conducting the maximum fault current that
could flow at the point of grounding for the time necessary to clear
the fault.
(ii) Protective grounding equipment shall have an ampacity greater
than or equal to that of No. 2 AWG copper.
(iii) Protective grounds shall have an impedance low enough so that
they do not delay the operation of protective devices in case of
accidental energizing of the lines or equipment.
Note to paragraph (n)(4): American Society for Testing and
Materials Standard Specifications for Temporary Protective Grounds
to Be Used on De-Energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment, ASTM
F855-09, contains guidelines for protective grounding equipment. The
Institute of Electrical Engineers Guide for Protective Grounding of
Power Lines, IEEE Std 1048-2003, contains guidelines for selecting
and installing protective grounding equipment.
(5) Testing. The employer shall ensure that, unless a previously
installed ground is present, employees test lines and equipment and
verify the absence of nominal voltage before employees install any
ground on those lines or that equipment.
(6) Connecting and removing grounds. (i) The employer shall ensure
that, when an employee attaches a ground to a line or to equipment, the
employee attaches the ground-end connection first and then attaches the
other end by means of a live-line tool. For lines or equipment
operating at 600 volts or less, the employer may permit the employee to
use insulating equipment other than a live-line tool if the employer
ensures that the line or equipment is not energized at the time the
ground is connected or if the employer can demonstrate that each
employee is protected from hazards that may develop if the line or
equipment is energized.
(ii) The employer shall ensure that, when an employee removes a
ground, the employee removes the grounding device from the line or
equipment using a live-line tool before he or she removes the ground-
end connection. For lines or equipment operating at 600 volts or less,
the employer may permit the employee to use insulating equipment other
than a live-line tool if the employer ensures that the line or
equipment is not energized at the time the ground is disconnected or if
the employer can
demonstrate that each employee is protected from hazards that may
develop if the line or equipment is energized.
(7) Additional precautions. The employer shall ensure that, when an
employee performs work on a cable at a location remote from the cable
terminal, the cable is not grounded at the cable terminal if there is a
possibility of hazardous transfer of potential should a fault occur.
(8) Removal of grounds for test. The employer may permit employees
to remove grounds temporarily during tests. During the test procedure,
the employer shall ensure that each employee uses insulating equipment,
shall isolate each employee from any hazards involved, and shall
implement any additional measures necessary to protect each exposed
employee in case the previously grounded lines and equipment become
energized.
(o) Testing and test facilities. (1) Application. Paragraph (o) of
this section provides for safe work practices for high-voltage and
high-power testing performed in laboratories, shops, and substations,
and in the field and on electric transmission and distribution lines
and equipment. It applies only to testing involving interim
measurements using high voltage, high power, or combinations of high
voltage and high power, and not to testing involving continuous
measurements as in routine metering, relaying, and normal line work.
Note to paragraph (o)(1): OSHA considers routine inspection and
maintenance measurements made by qualified employees to be routine
line work not included in the scope of paragraph (o) of this
section, provided that the hazards related to the use of intrinsic
high-voltage or high-power sources require only the normal
precautions associated with routine work specified in the other
paragraphs of this section. Two typical examples of such excluded
test work procedures are "phasing-out" testing and testing for a
"no-voltage" condition.
(2) General requirements. (i) The employer shall establish and
enforce work practices for the protection of each worker from the
hazards of high-voltage or high-power testing at all test areas,
temporary and permanent. Such work practices shall include, as a
minimum, test area safeguarding, grounding, the safe use of measuring
and control circuits, and a means providing for periodic safety checks
of field test areas.
(ii) The employer shall ensure that each employee, upon initial
assignment to the test area, receives training in safe work practices,
with retraining provided as required by paragraph (a)(2) of this
section.
(3) Safeguarding of test areas. (i) The employer shall provide
safeguarding within test areas to control access to test equipment or
to apparatus under test that could become energized as part of the
testing by either direct or inductive coupling and to prevent
accidental employee contact with energized parts.
(ii) The employer shall guard permanent test areas with walls,
fences, or other barriers designed to keep employees out of the test
areas.
(iii) In field testing, or at a temporary test site not guarded by
permanent fences and gates, the employer shall ensure the use of one of
the following means to prevent employees without authorization from
entering:
(A) Distinctively colored safety tape supported approximately waist
high with safety signs attached to it,
(B) A barrier or barricade that limits access to the test area to a
degree equivalent, physically and visually, to the barricade specified
in paragraph (o)(3)(iii)(A) of this section, or
(C) One or more test observers stationed so that they can monitor
the entire area.
(iv) The employer shall ensure the removal of the safeguards
required by paragraph (o)(3)(iii) of this section when employees no
longer need the protection afforded by the safeguards.
(4) Grounding practices. (i) The employer shall establish and
implement safe grounding practices for the test facility.
(A) The employer shall maintain at ground potential all conductive
parts accessible to the test operator while the equipment is operating
at high voltage.
(B) Wherever ungrounded terminals of test equipment or apparatus
under test may be present, they shall be treated as energized until
tests demonstrate that they are deenergized.
(ii) The employer shall ensure either that visible grounds are
applied automatically, or that employees using properly insulated tools
manually apply visible grounds, to the high-voltage circuits after they
are deenergized and before any employee performs work on the circuit or
on the item or apparatus under test. Common ground connections shall be
solidly connected to the test equipment and the apparatus under test.
(iii) In high-power testing, the employer shall provide an isolated
ground-return conductor system designed to prevent the intentional
passage of current, with its attendant voltage rise, from occurring in
the ground grid or in the earth. However, the employer need not provide
an isolated ground-return conductor if the employer can demonstrate
that both of the following conditions exist:
(A) The employer cannot provide an isolated ground-return conductor
due to the distance of the test site from the electric energy source,
and
(B) The employer protects employees from any hazardous step and
touch potentials that may develop during the test.
Note to paragraph (o)(4)(iii)(B): See Appendix C to this section
for information on measures that employers can take to protect
employees from hazardous step and touch potentials.
(iv) For tests in which using the equipment grounding conductor in
the equipment power cord to ground the test equipment would result in
greater hazards to test personnel or prevent the taking of satisfactory
measurements, the employer may use a ground clearly indicated in the
test set-up if the employer can demonstrate that this ground affords
protection for employees equivalent to the protection afforded by an
equipment grounding conductor in the power supply cord.
(v) The employer shall ensure that, when any employee enters the
test area after equipment is deenergized, a ground is placed on the
high-voltage terminal and any other exposed terminals.
(A) Before any employee applies a direct ground, the employer shall
discharge high capacitance equipment through a resistor rated for the
available energy.
(B) A direct ground shall be applied to the exposed terminals after
the stored energy drops to a level at which it is safe to do so.
(vi) If the employer uses a test trailer or test vehicle in field
testing, its chassis shall be grounded. The employer shall protect each
employee against hazardous touch potentials with respect to the
vehicle, instrument panels, and other conductive parts accessible to
employees with bonding, insulation, or isolation.
(5) Control and measuring circuits. (i) The employer may not run
control wiring, meter connections, test leads, or cables from a test
area unless contained in a grounded metallic sheath and terminated in a
grounded metallic enclosure or unless the employer takes other
precautions that it can demonstrate will provide employees with
equivalent safety.
(ii) The employer shall isolate meters and other instruments with
accessible terminals or parts from test personnel to protect against
hazards that could arise should such terminals and parts become
energized during testing. If the employer
provides this isolation by locating test equipment in metal
compartments with viewing windows, the employer shall provide
interlocks to interrupt the power supply when someone opens the
compartment cover.
(iii) The employer shall protect temporary wiring and its
connections against damage, accidental interruptions, and other
hazards. To the maximum extent possible, the employer shall keep
signal, control, ground, and power cables separate from each other.
(iv) If any employee will be present in the test area during
testing, a test observer shall be present. The test observer shall be
capable of implementing the immediate deenergizing of test circuits for
safety purposes.
(6) Safety check. (i) Safety practices governing employee work at
temporary or field test areas shall provide, at the beginning of each
series of tests, for a routine safety check of such test areas.
(ii) The test operator in charge shall conduct these routine safety
checks before each series of tests and shall verify at least the
following conditions:
(A) Barriers and safeguards are in workable condition and placed
properly to isolate hazardous areas;
(B) System test status signals, if used, are in operable condition;
(C) Clearly marked test-power disconnects are readily available in
an emergency;
(D) Ground connections are clearly identifiable;
(E) Personal protective equipment is provided and used as required
by Subpart I of this part and by this section; and
(F) Proper separation between signal, ground, and power cables.
(p) Mechanical equipment. (1) General requirements. (i) The
critical safety components of mechanical elevating and rotating
equipment shall receive a thorough visual inspection before use on each
shift.
Note to paragraph (p)(1)(i): Critical safety components of
mechanical elevating and rotating equipment are components for which
failure would result in free fall or free rotation of the boom.
(ii) No motor vehicle or earthmoving or compacting equipment having
an obstructed view to the rear may be operated on off-highway jobsites
where any employee is exposed to the hazards created by the moving
vehicle, unless:
(A) The vehicle has a reverse signal alarm audible above the
surrounding noise level, or
(B) The vehicle is backed up only when a designated employee
signals that it is safe to do so.
(iii) Rubber-tired self-propelled scrapers, rubber-tired front-end
loaders, rubber-tired dozers, wheel-type agricultural and industrial
tractors, crawler-type tractors, crawler-type loaders, and motor
graders, with or without attachments, shall have rollover protective
structures that meet the requirements of Subpart W of Part 1926 of this
chapter.
(iv) The operator of an electric line truck may not leave his or
her position at the controls while a load is suspended, unless the
employer can demonstrate that no employee (including the operator) is
endangered.
(2) Outriggers. (i) Mobile equipment, if provided with outriggers,
shall be operated with the outriggers extended and firmly set, except
as provided in paragraph (p)(2)(iii) of this section.
(ii) Outriggers may not be extended or retracted outside of the
clear view of the operator unless all employees are outside the range
of possible equipment motion.
(iii) If the work area or the terrain precludes the use of
outriggers, the equipment may be operated only within its maximum load
ratings specified by the equipment manufacturer for the particular
configuration of the equipment without outriggers.
(3) Applied loads. Mechanical equipment used to lift or move lines
or other material shall be used within its maximum load rating and
other design limitations for the conditions under which the mechanical
equipment is being used.
(4) Operations near energized lines or equipment. (i) Mechanical
equipment shall be operated so that the minimum approach distances,
established by the employer under paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section,
are maintained from exposed energized lines and equipment. However, the
insulated portion of an aerial lift operated by a qualified employee in
the lift is exempt from this requirement if the applicable minimum
approach distance is maintained between the uninsulated portions of the
aerial lift and exposed objects having a different electrical
potential.
(ii) A designated employee other than the equipment operator shall
observe the approach distance to exposed lines and equipment and
provide timely warnings before the minimum approach distance required
by paragraph (p)(4)(i) of this section is reached, unless the employer
can demonstrate that the operator can accurately determine that the
minimum approach distance is being maintained.
(iii) If, during operation of the mechanical equipment, that
equipment could become energized, the operation also shall comply with
at least one of paragraphs (p)(4)(iii)(A) through (p)(4)(iii)(C) of
this section.
(A) The energized lines or equipment exposed to contact shall be
covered with insulating protective material that will withstand the
type of contact that could be made during the operation.
(B) The mechanical equipment shall be insulated for the voltage
involved. The mechanical equipment shall be positioned so that its
uninsulated portions cannot approach the energized lines or equipment
any closer than the minimum approach distances, established by the
employer under paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section.
(C) Each employee shall be protected from hazards that could arise
from mechanical equipment contact with energized lines or equipment.
The measures used shall ensure that employees will not be exposed to
hazardous differences in electric potential. Unless the employer can
demonstrate that the methods in use protect each employee from the
hazards that could arise if the mechanical equipment contacts the
energized line or equipment, the measures used shall include all of the
following techniques:
(1) Using the best available ground to minimize the time the lines
or electric equipment remain energized,
(2) Bonding mechanical equipment together to minimize potential
differences,
(3) Providing ground mats to extend areas of equipotential, and
(4) Employing insulating protective equipment or barricades to
guard against any remaining hazardous electrical potential differences.
Note to paragraph (p)(4)(iii)(C): Appendix C to this section
contains information on hazardous step and touch potentials and on
methods of protecting employees from hazards resulting from such
potentials.
(q) Overhead lines and live-line barehand work. This paragraph
provides additional requirements for work performed on or near overhead
lines and equipment and for live-line barehand work.
(1) General. (i) Before allowing employees to subject elevated
structures, such as poles or towers, to such stresses as climbing or
the installation or removal of equipment may impose, the employer shall
ascertain that the structures are capable of sustaining the additional
or unbalanced stresses. If the pole or other structure cannot withstand
the expected loads, the employer shall brace or otherwise support the
pole or structure so as to prevent failure.
Note to paragraph (q)(1)(i): Appendix D to this section contains
test methods that
employers can use in ascertaining whether a wood pole is capable of
sustaining the forces imposed by an employee climbing the pole. This
paragraph also requires the employer to ascertain that the pole can
sustain all other forces imposed by the work employees will perform.
(ii) When a pole is set, moved, or removed near an exposed
energized overhead conductor, the pole may not contact the conductor.
(iii) When a pole is set, moved, or removed near an exposed
energized overhead conductor, the employer shall ensure that each
employee wears electrical protective equipment or uses insulated
devices when handling the pole and that no employee contacts the pole
with uninsulated parts of his or her body.
(iv) To protect employees from falling into holes used for placing
poles, the employer shall physically guard the holes, or ensure that
employees attend the holes, whenever anyone is working nearby.
(2) Installing and removing overhead lines. The following
provisions apply to the installation and removal of overhead conductors
or cable (overhead lines).
(i) When lines that employees are installing or removing can
contact energized parts, the employer shall use the tension-stringing
method, barriers, or other equivalent measures to minimize the
possibility that conductors and cables the employees are installing or
removing will contact energized power lines or equipment.
(ii) For conductors, cables, and pulling and tensioning equipment,
the employer shall provide the protective measures required by
paragraph (p)(4)(iii) of this section when employees are installing or
removing a conductor or cable close enough to energized conductors that
any of the following failures could energize the pulling or tensioning
equipment or the conductor or cable being installed or removed:
(A) Failure of the pulling or tensioning equipment,
(B) Failure of the conductor or cable being pulled, or
(C) Failure of the previously installed lines or equipment.
(iii) If the conductors that employees are installing or removing
cross over energized conductors in excess of 600 volts and if the
design of the circuit-interrupting devices protecting the lines so
permits, the employer shall render inoperable the automatic-reclosing
feature of these devices.
(iv) Before employees install lines parallel to existing energized
lines, the employer shall make a determination of the approximate
voltage to be induced in the new lines, or work shall proceed on the
assumption that the induced voltage is hazardous. Unless the employer
can demonstrate that the lines that employees are installing are not
subject to the induction of a hazardous voltage or unless the lines are
treated as energized, temporary protective grounds shall be placed at
such locations and arranged in such a manner that the employer can
demonstrate will prevent exposure of each employee to hazardous
differences in electric potential.
Note 1 to paragraph (q)(2)(iv): If the employer takes no
precautions to protect employees from hazards associated with
involuntary reactions from electric shock, a hazard exists if the
induced voltage is sufficient to pass a current of 1 milliampere
through a 500-ohm resistor. If the employer protects employees from
injury due to involuntary reactions from electric shock, a hazard
exists if the resultant current would be more than 6 milliamperes.
Note 2 to paragraph (q)(2)(iv): Appendix C to this section
contains guidelines for protecting employees from hazardous
differences in electric potential as required by this paragraph.
(v) Reel-handling equipment, including pulling and tensioning
devices, shall be in safe operating condition and shall be leveled and
aligned.
(vi) The employer shall ensure that employees do not exceed load
ratings of stringing lines, pulling lines, conductor grips, load-
bearing hardware and accessories, rigging, and hoists.
(vii) The employer shall repair or replace defective pulling lines
and accessories.
(viii) The employer shall ensure that employees do not use
conductor grips on wire rope unless the manufacturer specifically
designed the grip for this application.
(ix) The employer shall ensure that employees maintain reliable
communications, through two-way radios or other equivalent means,
between the reel tender and the pulling-rig operator.
(x) Employees may operate the pulling rig only when it is safe to
do so.
Note to paragraph (q)(2)(x): Examples of unsafe conditions
include: employees in locations prohibited by paragraph (q)(2)(xi)
of this section, conductor and pulling line hang-ups, and slipping
of the conductor grip.
(xi) While a power-driven device is pulling the conductor or
pulling line and the conductor or pulling line is in motion, the
employer shall ensure that employees are not directly under overhead
operations or on the crossarm, except as necessary for the employees to
guide the stringing sock or board over or through the stringing sheave.
(3) Live-line barehand work. In addition to other applicable
provisions contained in this section, the following requirements apply
to live-line barehand work:
(i) Before an employee uses or supervises the use of the live-line
barehand technique on energized circuits, the employer shall ensure
that the employee completes training conforming to paragraph (a)(2) of
this section in the technique and in the safety requirements of
paragraph (q)(3) of this section.
(ii) Before any employee uses the live-line barehand technique on
energized high-voltage conductors or parts, the employer shall
ascertain the following information in addition to information about
other existing conditions required by paragraph (a)(4) of this section:
(A) The nominal voltage rating of the circuit on which employees
will perform the work,
(B) The clearances to ground of lines and other energized parts on
which employees will perform the work, and
(C) The voltage limitations of equipment employees will use.
(iii) The employer shall ensure that the insulated equipment,
insulated tools, and aerial devices and platforms used by employees are
designed, tested, and made for live-line barehand work.
(iv) The employer shall ensure that employees keep tools and
equipment clean and dry while they are in use.
(v) The employer shall render inoperable the automatic-reclosing
feature of circuit-interrupting devices protecting the lines if the
design of the devices permits.
(vi) The employer shall ensure that employees do not perform work
when adverse weather conditions would make the work hazardous even
after the employer implements the work practices required by this
section. Additionally, employees may not perform work when winds reduce
the phase-to-phase or phase-to-ground clearances at the work location
below the minimum approach distances specified in paragraph (q)(3)(xiv)
of this section, unless insulating guards cover the grounded objects
and other lines and equipment.
Note to paragraph (q)(3)(vi): Thunderstorms in the vicinity,
high winds, snow storms, and ice storms are examples of adverse
weather conditions that make live-line barehand work too hazardous
to perform safely even after the employer implements the work
practices required by this section.
(vii) The employer shall provide and ensure that employees use a
conductive bucket liner or other conductive device for bonding the
insulated aerial device to the energized line or equipment.
(A) The employee shall be connected to the bucket liner or other
conductive device by the use of conductive shoes, leg clips, or other
means.
(B) Where differences in potentials at the worksite pose a hazard
to employees, the employer shall provide electrostatic shielding
designed for the voltage being worked.
(viii) The employer shall ensure that, before the employee contacts
the energized part, the employee bonds the conductive bucket liner or
other conductive device to the energized conductor by means of a
positive connection. This connection shall remain attached to the
energized conductor until the employee completes the work on the
energized circuit.
(ix) Aerial lifts used for live-line barehand work shall have dual
controls (lower and upper) as follows:
(A) The upper controls shall be within easy reach of the employee
in the bucket. On a two-bucket-type lift, access to the controls shall
be within easy reach of both buckets.
(B) The lower set of controls shall be near the base of the boom
and shall be designed so that they can override operation of the
equipment at any time.
(x) Lower (ground-level) lift controls may not be operated with an
employee in the lift except in case of emergency.
(xi) The employer shall ensure that, before employees elevate an
aerial lift into the work position, the employees check all controls
(ground level and bucket) to determine that they are in proper working
condition.
(xii) The employer shall ensure that, before employees elevate the
boom of an aerial lift, the employees ground the body of the truck or
barricade the body of the truck and treat it as energized.
(xiii) The employer shall ensure that employees perform a boom-
current test before starting work each day, each time during the day
when they encounter a higher voltage, and when changed conditions
indicate a need for an additional test.
(A) This test shall consist of placing the bucket in contact with
an energized source equal to the voltage to be encountered for a
minimum of 3 minutes.
(B) The leakage current may not exceed 1 microampere per kilovolt
of nominal phase-to-ground voltage.
(C) The employer shall immediately suspend work from the aerial
lift when there is any indication of a malfunction in the equipment.
(xiv) The employer shall ensure that employees maintain the minimum
approach distances, established by the employer under paragraph
(l)(3)(i) of this section, from all grounded objects and from lines and
equipment at a potential different from that to which the live-line
barehand equipment is bonded, unless insulating guards cover such
grounded objects and other lines and equipment.
(xv) The employer shall ensure that, while an employee is
approaching, leaving, or bonding to an energized circuit, the employee
maintains the minimum approach distances, established by the employer
under paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section, between the employee and any
grounded parts, including the lower boom and portions of the truck and
between the employee and conductive objects energized at different
potentials.
(xvi) While the bucket is alongside an energized bushing or
insulator string, the employer shall ensure that employees maintain the
phase-to-ground minimum approach distances, established by the employer
under paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section, between all parts of the
bucket and the grounded end of the bushing or insulator string or any
other grounded surface.
(xvii) The employer shall ensure that employees do not use
handlines between the bucket and the boom or between the bucket and the
ground. However, employees may use nonconductive-type handlines from
conductor to ground if not supported from the bucket. The employer
shall ensure that no one uses ropes used for live-line barehand work
for other purposes.
(xviii) The employer shall ensure that employees do not pass
uninsulated equipment or material between a pole or structure and an
aerial lift while an employee working from the bucket is bonded to an
energized part.
(xix) A nonconductive measuring device shall be readily accessible
to employees performing live-line barehand work to assist them in
maintaining the required minimum approach distance.
(4) Towers and structures. The following requirements apply to work
performed on towers or other structures that support overhead lines.
(i) The employer shall ensure that no employee is under a tower or
structure while work is in progress, except when the employer can
demonstrate that such a working position is necessary to assist
employees working above.
(ii) The employer shall ensure that employees use tag lines or
other similar devices to maintain control of tower sections being
raised or positioned, unless the employer can demonstrate that the use
of such devices would create a greater hazard to employees.
(iii) The employer shall ensure that employees do not detach the
loadline from a member or section until they safely secure the load.
(iv) The employer shall ensure that, except during emergency
restoration procedures, employees discontinue work when adverse weather
conditions would make the work hazardous in spite of the work practices
required by this section.
Note to paragraph (q)(4)(iv): Thunderstorms in the vicinity,
high winds, snow storms, and ice storms are examples of adverse
weather conditions that make this work too hazardous to perform even
after the employer implements the work practices required by this
section.
(r) Line-clearance tree trimming operations. This paragraph
provides additional requirements for line-clearance tree-trimming
operations and for equipment used in these operations.
(1) Electrical hazards. This paragraph does not apply to qualified
employees.
(i) Before an employee climbs, enters, or works around any tree, a
determination shall be made of the nominal voltage of electric power
lines posing a hazard to employees. However, a determination of the
maximum nominal voltage to which an employee will be exposed may be
made instead, if all lines are considered as energized at this maximum
voltage.
(ii) There shall be a second line-clearance tree trimmer within
normal (that is, unassisted) voice communication under any of the
following conditions:
(A) If a line-clearance tree trimmer is to approach more closely
than 3.05 meters (10 feet) to any conductor or electric apparatus
energized at more than 750 volts or
(B) If branches or limbs being removed are closer to lines
energized at more than 750 volts than the distances listed in Table R-
5, Table R-6, Table R-7, and Table R-8 or
(C) If roping is necessary to remove branches or limbs from such
conductors or apparatus.
(iii) Line-clearance tree trimmers shall maintain the minimum
approach distances from energized conductors given in Table R-5, Table
R-6, Table R-7, and Table R-8.
(iv) Branches that are contacting exposed energized conductors or
equipment or that are within the distances specified in Table R-5,
Table R-6, Table R-7, and Table R-8 may be removed only through the use
of insulating equipment.
Note to paragraph (r)(1)(iv): A tool constructed of a material
that the employer can demonstrate has insulating qualities
meeting paragraph (j)(1) of this section is considered as insulated
under paragraph (r)(1)(iv) of this section if the tool is clean and
dry.
(v) Ladders, platforms, and aerial devices may not be brought
closer to an energized part than the distances listed in Table R-5,
Table R-6, Table R-7, and Table R-8.
(vi) Line-clearance tree-trimming work may not be performed when
adverse weather conditions make the work hazardous in spite of the work
practices required by this section. Each employee performing line-
clearance tree trimming work in the aftermath of a storm or under
similar emergency conditions shall be trained in the special hazards
related to this type of work.
Note to paragraph (r)(1)(vi): Thunderstorms in the immediate
vicinity, high winds, snow storms, and ice storms are examples of
adverse weather conditions that are presumed to make line-clearance
tree trimming work too hazardous to perform safely.
(2) Brush chippers. (i) Brush chippers shall be equipped with a
locking device in the ignition system.
(ii) Access panels for maintenance and adjustment of the chipper
blades and associated drive train shall be in place and secure during
operation of the equipment.
(iii) Brush chippers not equipped with a mechanical infeed system
shall be equipped with an infeed hopper of length sufficient to prevent
employees from contacting the blades or knives of the machine during
operation.
(iv) Trailer chippers detached from trucks shall be chocked or
otherwise secured.
(v) Each employee in the immediate area of an operating chipper
feed table shall wear personal protective equipment as required by
Subpart I of this part.
(3) Sprayers and related equipment. (i) Walking and working
surfaces of sprayers and related equipment shall be covered with slip-
resistant material. If slipping hazards cannot be eliminated, slip-
resistant footwear or handrails and stair rails meeting the
requirements of Subpart D of this part may be used instead of slip-
resistant material.
(ii) Equipment on which employees stand to spray while the vehicle
is in motion shall be equipped with guardrails around the working area.
The guardrail shall be constructed in accordance with Subpart D of this
part.
(4) Stump cutters. (i) Stump cutters shall be equipped with
enclosures or guards to protect employees.
(ii) Each employee in the immediate area of stump grinding
operations (including the stump cutter operator) shall wear personal
protective equipment as required by Subpart I of this part.
(5) Gasoline-engine power saws. Gasoline-engine power saw
operations shall meet the requirements of Sec. 1910.266(e) and the
following:
(i) Each power saw weighing more than 6.8 kilograms (15 pounds,
service weight) that is used in trees shall be supported by a separate
line, except when work is performed from an aerial lift and except
during topping or removing operations where no supporting limb will be
available.
(ii) Each power saw shall be equipped with a control that will
return the saw to idling speed when released.
(iii) Each power saw shall be equipped with a clutch and shall be
so adjusted that the clutch will not engage the chain drive at idling
speed.
(iv) A power saw shall be started on the ground or where it is
otherwise firmly supported. Drop starting of saws over 6.8 kilograms
(15 pounds), other than chain saws, is permitted outside of the bucket
of an aerial lift only if the area below the lift is clear of
personnel.
Note to paragraph (r)(5)(iv): Paragraph (e)(2)(vi) of Sec.
1910.266 prohibits drop starting of chain saws.
(v) A power saw engine may be started and operated only when all
employees other than the operator are clear of the saw.
(vi) A power saw may not be running when the saw is being carried
up into a tree by an employee.
(vii) Power saw engines shall be stopped for all cleaning,
refueling, adjustments, and repairs to the saw or motor, except as the
manufacturer's servicing procedures require otherwise.
(6) Backpack power units for use in pruning and clearing. (i) While
a backpack power unit is running, no one other than the operator may be
within 3.05 meters (10 feet) of the cutting head of a brush saw.
(ii) A backpack power unit shall be equipped with a quick shutoff
switch readily accessible to the operator.
(iii) Backpack power unit engines shall be stopped for all
cleaning, refueling, adjustments, and repairs to the saw or motor,
except as the manufacturer's servicing procedures require otherwise.
(7) Rope. (i) Climbing ropes shall be used by employees working
aloft in trees. These ropes shall have a minimum diameter of 12
millimeters (0.5 inch) with a minimum breaking strength of 10.2
kilonewtons (2,300 pounds). Synthetic rope shall have elasticity of not
more than 7 percent.
(ii) Rope shall be inspected before each use and, if unsafe (for
example, because of damage or defect), may not be used.
(iii) Rope shall be stored away from cutting edges and sharp tools.
Rope contact with corrosive chemicals, gas, and oil shall be avoided.
(iv) When stored, rope shall be coiled and piled, or shall be
suspended, so that air can circulate through the coils.
(v) Rope ends shall be secured to prevent their unraveling.
(vi) Climbing rope may not be spliced to effect repair.
(vii) A rope that is wet, that is contaminated to the extent that
its insulating capacity is impaired, or that is otherwise not
considered to be insulated for the voltage involved may not be used
near exposed energized lines.
(8) Fall protection. Each employee shall be tied in with a climbing
rope and safety saddle when the employee is working above the ground in
a tree, unless he or she is ascending into the tree.
(s) Communication facilities. (1) Microwave transmission. (i) The
employer shall ensure that no employee looks into an open waveguide or
antenna connected to an energized microwave source.
(ii) If the electromagnetic-radiation level within an accessible
area associated with microwave communications systems exceeds the
radiation-protection guide specified by Sec. 1910.97(a)(2), the
employer shall post the area with warning signs containing the warning
symbol described in Sec. 1910.97(a)(3). The lower half of the warning
symbol shall include the following statements, or ones that the
employer can demonstrate are equivalent: "Radiation in this area may
exceed hazard limitations and special precautions are required. Obtain
specific instruction before entering."
(iii) When an employee works in an area where the electromagnetic
radiation could exceed the radiation-protection guide, the employer
shall institute measures that ensure that the employee's exposure is
not greater than that permitted by that guide. Such measures may
include administrative and engineering controls and personal protective
equipment.
(2) Power-line carrier. The employer shall ensure that employees
perform power-line carrier work, including work on equipment used for
coupling carrier current to power line conductors, in accordance with
the requirements of this section pertaining to work on energized lines.
(t) Underground electrical installations. This paragraph provides
additional requirements for work on underground electrical
installations.
(1) Access. The employer shall ensure that employees use a ladder
or other climbing device to enter and exit a manhole or subsurface
vault exceeding 1.22 meters (4 feet) in depth. No employee may climb
into or out of a manhole or vault by stepping on cables or hangers.
(2) Lowering equipment into manholes. (i) Equipment used to lower
materials and tools into manholes or vaults shall be capable of
supporting the weight to be lowered and shall be checked for defects
before use.
(ii) Before anyone lowers tools or material into the opening for a
manhole or vault, each employee working in the manhole or vault shall
be clear of the area directly under the opening.
(3) Attendants for manholes and vaults. (i) While work is being
performed in a manhole or vault containing energized electric
equipment, an employee with first-aid training shall be available on
the surface in the immediate vicinity of the manhole or vault entrance
to render emergency assistance.
(ii) Occasionally, the employee on the surface may briefly enter a
manhole or vault to provide nonemergency assistance.
Note 1 to paragraph (t)(3)(ii): Paragraph (e)(7) of this section
may also require an attendant and does not permit this attendant to
enter the manhole or vault.
Note 2 to paragraph (t)(3)(ii): Paragraph (l)(1)(ii) of this
section requires employees entering manholes or vaults containing
unguarded, uninsulated energized lines or parts of electric
equipment operating at 50 volts or more to be qualified.
(iii) For the purpose of inspection, housekeeping, taking readings,
or similar work, an employee working alone may enter, for brief periods
of time, a manhole or vault where energized cables or equipment are in
service if the employer can demonstrate that the employee will be
protected from all electrical hazards.
(iv) The employer shall ensure that employees maintain reliable
communications, through two-way radios or other equivalent means, among
all employees involved in the job.
(4) Duct rods. The employer shall ensure that, if employees use
duct rods, the employees install the duct rods in the direction
presenting the least hazard to employees. The employer shall station an
employee at the far end of the duct line being rodded to ensure that
the employees maintain the required minimum approach distances.
(5) Multiple cables. When multiple cables are present in a work
area, the employer shall identify the cable to be worked by electrical
means, unless its identity is obvious by reason of distinctive
appearance or location or by other readily apparent means of
identification. The employer shall protect cables other than the one
being worked from damage.
(6) Moving cables. Except when paragraph (t)(7)(ii) of this section
permits employees to perform work that could cause a fault in an
energized cable in a manhole or vault, the employer shall ensure that
employees inspect energized cables to be moved for abnormalities.
(7) Protection against faults. (i) Where a cable in a manhole or
vault has one or more abnormalities that could lead to a fault or be an
indication of an impending fault, the employer shall deenergize the
cable with the abnormality before any employee may work in the manhole
or vault, except when service-load conditions and a lack of feasible
alternatives require that the cable remain energized. In that case,
employees may enter the manhole or vault provided the employer protects
them from the possible effects of a failure using shields or other
devices that are capable of containing the adverse effects of a fault.
The employer shall treat the following abnormalities as indications of
impending faults unless the employer can demonstrate that the
conditions could not lead to a fault: Oil or compound leaking from
cable or joints, broken cable sheaths or joint sleeves, hot localized
surface temperatures of cables or joints, or joints swollen beyond
normal tolerance.
(ii) If the work employees will perform in a manhole or vault could
cause a fault in a cable, the employer shall deenergize that cable
before any employee works in the manhole or vault, except when service-
load conditions and a lack of feasible alternatives require that the
cable remain energized. In that case, employees may enter the manhole
or vault provided the employer protects them from the possible effects
of a failure using shields or other devices that are capable of
containing the adverse effects of a fault.
(8) Sheath continuity. When employees perform work on buried cable
or on cable in a manhole or vault, the employer shall maintain
metallic-sheath continuity, or the cable sheath shall be treated as
energized.
(u) Substations. This paragraph provides additional requirements
for substations and for work performed in them.
(1) Access and working space. The employer shall provide and
maintain sufficient access and working space about electric equipment
to permit ready and safe operation and maintenance of such equipment by
employees.
Note to paragraph (u)(1): American National Standard National
Electrical Safety Code, ANSI/IEEE C2-2012 contains guidelines for
the dimensions of access and working space about electric equipment
in substations. Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply
with paragraph (u)(1) of this section. The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration will determine whether an installation that
does not conform to this ANSI standard complies with paragraph
(u)(1) of this section based on the following criteria:
(1) Whether the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2
that was in effect when the installation was made,
(2) Whether the configuration of the installation enables
employees to maintain the minimum approach distances, established by
the employer under paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section, while the
employees are working on exposed, energized parts, and
(3) Whether the precautions taken when employees perform work on
the installation provide protection equivalent to the protection
provided by access and working space meeting ANSI/IEEE C2-2012.
(2) Draw-out-type circuit breakers. The employer shall ensure that,
when employees remove or insert draw-out-type circuit breakers, the
breaker is in the open position. The employer shall also render the
control circuit inoperable if the design of the equipment permits.
(3) Substation fences. Conductive fences around substations shall
be grounded. When a substation fence is expanded or a section is
removed, fence sections shall be isolated, grounded, or bonded as
necessary to protect employees from hazardous differences in electric
potential.
Note to paragraph (u)(3): IEEE Std 80-2000, IEEE Guide for
Safety in AC Substation Grounding, contains guidelines for
protection against hazardous differences in electric potential.
(4) Guarding of rooms and other spaces containing electric supply
equipment. (i) Rooms and other spaces in which electric supply lines or
equipment are installed shall meet the requirements of paragraphs
(u)(4)(ii) through (u)(4)(v) of this section under the following
conditions:
(A) If exposed live parts operating at 50 to 150 volts to ground
are within 2.4 meters (8 feet) of the ground or other working surface
inside the room or other space,
(B) If live parts operating at 151 to 600 volts to ground and
located within 2.4 meters (8 feet) of the ground or other working
surface inside the room or other space are guarded only by location, as
permitted under paragraph (u)(5)(i) of this section, or
(C) If live parts operating at more than 600 volts to ground are
within the room or other space, unless:
(1) The live parts are enclosed within grounded, metal-enclosed
equipment whose only openings are designed so that foreign objects
inserted in these openings will be deflected from energized parts, or
(2) The live parts are installed at a height, above ground and any
other working surface, that provides protection at the voltage on the
live parts corresponding to the protection provided by a 2.4-meter (8-
foot) height at 50 volts.
(ii) Fences, screens, partitions, or walls shall enclose the rooms
and other spaces so as to minimize the possibility that unqualified
persons will enter.
(iii) Unqualified persons may not enter the rooms or other spaces
while the electric supply lines or equipment are energized.
(iv) The employer shall display signs at entrances to the rooms and
other spaces warning unqualified persons to keep out.
(v) The employer shall keep each entrance to a room or other space
locked, unless the entrance is under the observation of a person who is
attending the room or other space for the purpose of preventing
unqualified employees from entering.
(5) Guarding of energized parts. (i) The employer shall provide
guards around all live parts operating at more than 150 volts to ground
without an insulating covering unless the location of the live parts
gives sufficient clearance (horizontal, vertical, or both) to minimize
the possibility of accidental employee contact.
Note to paragraph (u)(5)(i): American National Standard National
Electrical Safety Code, ANSI/IEEE C2-2002 contains guidelines for
the dimensions of clearance distances about electric equipment in
substations. Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply with
paragraph (u)(5)(i) of this section. The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration will determine whether an installation that
does not conform to this ANSI standard complies with paragraph
(u)(5)(i) of this section based on the following criteria:
(1) Whether the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2
that was in effect when the installation was made,
(2) Whether each employee is isolated from energized parts at
the point of closest approach; and
(3) Whether the precautions taken when employees perform work on
the installation provide protection equivalent to the protection
provided by horizontal and vertical clearances meeting ANSI/IEEE C2-
2002.
(ii) Except for fuse replacement and other necessary access by
qualified persons, the employer shall maintain guarding of energized
parts within a compartment during operation and maintenance functions
to prevent accidental contact with energized parts and to prevent
dropped tools or other equipment from contacting energized parts.
(iii) Before guards are removed from energized equipment, the
employer shall install barriers around the work area to prevent
employees who are not working on the equipment, but who are in the
area, from contacting the exposed live parts.
(6) Substation entry. (i) Upon entering an attended substation,
each employee, other than employees regularly working in the station,
shall report his or her presence to the employee in charge of
substation activities to receive information on special system
conditions affecting employee safety.
(ii) The job briefing required by paragraph (c) of this section
shall cover information on special system conditions affecting employee
safety, including the location of energized equipment in or adjacent to
the work area and the limits of any deenergized work area.
(v) Power generation. This paragraph provides additional
requirements and related work practices for power generating plants.
(1) Interlocks and other safety devices. (i) Interlocks and other
safety devices shall be maintained in a safe, operable condition.
(ii) No interlock or other safety device may be modified to defeat
its function, except for test, repair, or adjustment of the device.
(2) Changing brushes. Before exciter or generator brushes are
changed while the generator is in service, the exciter or generator
field shall be checked to determine whether a ground condition exists.
The brushes may not be changed while the generator is energized if a
ground condition exists.
(3) Access and working space. The employer shall provide and
maintain sufficient access and working space about electric equipment
to permit ready and safe operation and maintenance of such equipment by
employees.
Note to paragraph (v)(3) of this section: American National
Standard National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI/IEEE C2-2012 contains
guidelines for the dimensions of access and working space about
electric equipment in substations. Installations meeting the ANSI
provisions comply with paragraph (v)(3) of this section. The
Occupational Safety and Health Administration will determine whether
an installation that does not conform to this ANSI standard complies
with paragraph (v)(3) of this section based on the following
criteria:
(1) Whether the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2
that was in effect when the installation was made;
(2) Whether the configuration of the installation enables
employees to maintain the minimum approach distances, established by
the employer under paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section, while the
employees are working on exposed, energized parts, and;
(3) Whether the precautions taken when employees perform work on
the installation provide protection equivalent to the protection
provided by access and working space meeting ANSI/IEEE C2-2012.
(4) Guarding of rooms and other spaces containing electric supply
equipment. (i) Rooms and other spaces in which electric supply lines or
equipment are installed shall meet the requirements of paragraphs
(v)(4)(ii) through (v)(4)(v) of this section under the following
conditions:
(A) If exposed live parts operating at 50 to 150 volts to ground
are within 2.4 meters (8 feet) of the ground or other working surface
inside the room or other space,
(B) If live parts operating at 151 to 600 volts to ground and
located within 2.4 meters (8 feet) of the ground or other working
surface inside the room or other space are guarded only by location, as
permitted under paragraph (v)(5)(i) of this section, or
(C) If live parts operating at more than 600 volts to ground are
within the room or other space, unless:
(1) The live parts are enclosed within grounded, metal-enclosed
equipment whose only openings are designed so that foreign objects
inserted in these openings will be deflected from energized parts, or
(2) The live parts are installed at a height, above ground and any
other working surface, that provides protection at the voltage on the
live parts corresponding to the protection provided by a 2.4-meter (8-
foot) height at 50 volts.
(ii) Fences, screens, partitions, or walls shall enclose the rooms
and other spaces so as to minimize the possibility that unqualified
persons will enter.
(iii) Unqualified persons may not enter the rooms or other spaces
while the electric supply lines or equipment are energized.
(iv) The employer shall display signs at entrances to the rooms and
other spaces warning unqualified persons to keep out.
(v) The employer shall keep each entrance to a room or other space
locked, unless the entrance is under the observation of a person who is
attending the room or other space for the purpose of preventing
unqualified employees from entering.
(5) Guarding of energized parts. (i) The employer shall provide
guards around all live parts operating at more than 150 volts to ground
without an insulating covering unless the location of the live parts
gives sufficient clearance (horizontal, vertical, or both) to minimize
the possibility of accidental employee contact.
Note to paragraph (v)(5)(i): American National Standard National
Electrical Safety Code, ANSI/IEEE C2-2002 contains guidelines for
the dimensions of clearance distances about electric equipment in
substations. Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply with
paragraph (v)(5)(i) of this section. The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration will determine whether an installation that
does not conform to this ANSI standard complies with paragraph
(v)(5)(i) of this section based on the following criteria:
(1) Whether the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2
that was in effect when the installation was made;
(2) Whether each employee is isolated from energized parts at
the point of closest approach; and
(3) Whether the precautions taken when employees perform work on
the installation provide protection equivalent to the protection
provided by horizontal and vertical clearances meeting ANSI/IEEE C2-
2002.
(ii) Except for fuse replacement and other necessary access by
qualified persons, the employer shall maintain guarding of energized
parts within a compartment during operation and maintenance functions
to prevent accidental contact with energized parts and to prevent
dropped tools or other equipment from contacting energized parts.
(iii) Before guards are removed from energized equipment, the
employer shall install barriers around the work area to prevent
employees who are not working on the equipment, but who are in the
area, from contacting the exposed live parts.
(6) Water or steam spaces. The following requirements apply to work
in water and steam spaces associated with boilers:
(i) A designated employee shall inspect conditions before work is
permitted and after its completion. Eye protection, or full face
protection if necessary, shall be worn at all times when condenser,
heater, or boiler tubes are being cleaned.
(ii) Where it is necessary for employees to work near tube ends
during cleaning, shielding shall be installed at the tube ends.
(7) Chemical cleaning of boilers and pressure vessels. The
following requirements apply to chemical cleaning of boilers and
pressure vessels:
(i) Areas where chemical cleaning is in progress shall be cordoned
off to restrict access during cleaning. If flammable liquids, gases, or
vapors or combustible materials will be used or might be produced
during the cleaning process, the following requirements also apply:
(A) The area shall be posted with signs restricting entry and
warning of the hazards of fire and explosion; and
(B) Smoking, welding, and other possible ignition sources are
prohibited in these restricted areas.
(ii) The number of personnel in the restricted area shall be
limited to those necessary to accomplish the task safely.
(iii) There shall be ready access to water or showers for emergency
use.
Note to paragraph (v)(7)(iii): See Sec. 1910.141 for
requirements that apply to the water supply and to washing
facilities.
(iv) Employees in restricted areas shall wear protective equipment
meeting the requirements of Subpart I of this part and including, but
not limited to, protective clothing, boots, goggles, and gloves.
(8) Chlorine systems. (i) Chlorine system enclosures shall be
posted with signs restricting entry and warning of the hazard to health
and the hazards of fire and explosion.
Note to paragraph (v)(8)(i): See Subpart Z of this part for
requirements necessary to protect the health of employees from the
effects of chlorine.
(ii) Only designated employees may enter the restricted area.
Additionally, the number of personnel shall be limited to those
necessary to accomplish the task safely.
(iii) Emergency repair kits shall be available near the shelter or
enclosure to allow for the prompt repair of leaks in chlorine lines,
equipment, or containers.
(iv) Before repair procedures are started, chlorine tanks, pipes,
and equipment shall be purged with dry air and isolated from other
sources of chlorine.
(v) The employer shall ensure that chlorine is not mixed with
materials that would react with the chlorine in a dangerously
exothermic or other hazardous manner.
(9) Boilers. (i) Before internal furnace or ash hopper repair work
is started, overhead areas shall be inspected for possible falling
objects. If the hazard of falling objects exists, overhead protection
such as planking or nets shall be provided.
(ii) When opening an operating boiler door, employees shall stand
clear of the opening of the door to avoid the heat blast and gases
which may escape from the boiler.
(10) Turbine generators. (i) Smoking and other ignition sources are
prohibited near hydrogen or hydrogen sealing systems, and signs warning
of the danger of explosion and fire shall be posted.
(ii) Excessive hydrogen makeup or abnormal loss of pressure shall
be considered as an emergency and shall be corrected immediately.
(iii) A sufficient quantity of inert gas shall be available to
purge the hydrogen from the largest generator.
(11) Coal and ash handling. (i) Only designated persons may operate
railroad equipment.
(ii) Before a locomotive or locomotive crane is moved, a warning
shall be given to employees in the area.
(iii) Employees engaged in switching or dumping cars may not use
their feet to line up drawheads.
(iv) Drawheads and knuckles may not be shifted while locomotives or
cars are in motion.
(v) When a railroad car is stopped for unloading, the car shall be
secured from displacement that could endanger employees.
(vi) An emergency means of stopping dump operations shall be
provided at railcar dumps.
(vii) The employer shall ensure that employees who work in coal- or
ash-handling conveyor areas are trained and knowledgeable in conveyor
operation and in the requirements of paragraphs (v)(11)(viii) through
(v)(11)(xii) of this section.
(viii) Employees may not ride a coal- or ash-handling conveyor belt
at any time. Employees may not cross over the conveyor belt, except at
walkways, unless the conveyor's energy source has been deenergized and
has been locked out or tagged in accordance with paragraph (d) of this
section.
(ix) A conveyor that could cause injury when started may not be
started until personnel in the area are alerted by a signal or by a
designated person that the conveyor is about to start.
(x) If a conveyor that could cause injury when started is
automatically controlled or is controlled from a remote location, an
audible device shall be provided that sounds an alarm that will be
recognized by each employee as a warning that the conveyor will start
and
that can be clearly heard at all points along the conveyor where
personnel may be present. The warning device shall be actuated by the
device starting the conveyor and shall continue for a period of time
before the conveyor starts that is long enough to allow employees to
move clear of the conveyor system. A visual warning may be used in
place of the audible device if the employer can demonstrate that it
will provide an equally effective warning in the particular
circumstances involved. However if the employer can demonstrate that
the system's function would be seriously hindered by the required time
delay, warning signs may be provided in place of the audible warning
device. If the system was installed before January 31, 1995, warning
signs may be provided in place of the audible warning device until such
time as the conveyor or its control system is rebuilt or rewired. These
warning signs shall be clear, concise, and legible and shall indicate
that conveyors and allied equipment may be started at any time, that
danger exists, and that personnel must keep clear. These warning signs
shall be provided along the conveyor at areas not guarded by position
or location.
(xi) Remotely and automatically controlled conveyors, and conveyors
that have operating stations which are not manned or which are beyond
voice and visual contact from drive areas, loading areas, transfer
points, and other locations on the conveyor path not guarded by
location, position, or guards shall be furnished with emergency stop
buttons, pull cords, limit switches, or similar emergency stop devices.
However, if the employer can demonstrate that the design, function, and
operation of the conveyor do not expose an employee to hazards, an
emergency stop device is not required.
(A) Emergency stop devices shall be easily identifiable in the
immediate vicinity of such locations.
(B) An emergency stop device shall act directly on the control of
the conveyor involved and may not depend on the stopping of any other
equipment.
(C) Emergency stop devices shall be installed so that they cannot
be overridden from other locations.
(xii) Where coal-handling operations may produce a combustible
atmosphere from fuel sources or from flammable gases or dust, sources
of ignition shall be eliminated or safely controlled to prevent
ignition of the combustible atmosphere.
Note to paragraph (v)(11)(xii): Locations that are hazardous
because of the presence of combustible dust are classified as Class
II hazardous locations. See Sec. 1910.307.
(xiii) An employee may not work on or beneath overhanging coal in
coal bunkers, coal silos, or coal storage areas, unless the employee is
protected from all hazards posed by shifting coal.
(xiv) An employee entering a bunker or silo to dislodge the
contents shall wear a body harness with lifeline attached. The lifeline
shall be secured to a fixed support outside the bunker and shall be
attended at all times by an employee located outside the bunker or
facility.
(12) Hydroplants and equipment. Employees working on or close to
water gates, valves, intakes, forebays, flumes, or other locations
where increased or decreased water flow or levels may pose a
significant hazard shall be warned and shall vacate such dangerous
areas before water flow changes are made.
(w) Special conditions. (1) Capacitors. The following additional
requirements apply to work on capacitors and on lines connected to
capacitors.
Note to paragraph (w)(1): See paragraphs (m) and (n) of this
section for requirements pertaining to the deenergizing and
grounding of capacitor installations.
(i) Before employees work on capacitors, the employer shall
disconnect the capacitors from energized sources and short circuit the
capacitors. The employer shall ensure that the employee short
circuiting the capacitors waits at least 5 minutes from the time of
disconnection before applying the short circuit,
(ii) Before employees handle the units, the employer shall short
circuit each unit in series-parallel capacitor banks between all
terminals and the capacitor case or its rack. If the cases of
capacitors are on ungrounded substation racks, the employer shall bond
the racks to ground.
(iii) The employer shall short circuit any line connected to
capacitors before the line is treated as deenergized.
(2) Current transformer secondaries. The employer shall ensure that
employees do not open the secondary of a current transformer while the
transformer is energized. If the employer cannot deenergize the primary
of the current transformer before employees perform work on an
instrument, a relay, or other section of a current transformer
secondary circuit, the employer shall bridge the circuit so that the
current transformer secondary does not experience an open-circuit
condition.
(3) Series streetlighting. (i) If the open-circuit voltage exceeds
600 volts, the employer shall ensure that employees work on series
streetlighting circuits in accordance with paragraph (q) or (t) of this
section, as appropriate.
(ii) Before any employee opens a series loop, the employer shall
deenergize the streetlighting transformer and isolate it from the
source of supply or shall bridge the loop to avoid an open-circuit
condition.
(4) Illumination. The employer shall provide sufficient
illumination to enable the employee to perform the work safely.
(5) Protection against drowning. (i) Whenever an employee may be
pulled or pushed, or might fall, into water where the danger of
drowning exists, the employer shall provide the employee with, and
shall ensure that the employee uses, a U.S. Coast Guard-approved
personal flotation device.
(ii) The employer shall maintain each personal flotation device in
safe condition and shall inspect each personal flotation device
frequently enough to ensure that it does not have rot, mildew, water
saturation, or any other condition that could render the device
unsuitable for use.
(iii) An employee may cross streams or other bodies of water only
if a safe means of passage, such as a bridge, is available.
(6) Employee protection in public work areas. (i) Traffic-control
signs and traffic-control devices used for the protection of employees
shall meet Sec. 1926.200(g)(2) of this chapter.
(ii) Before employees begin work in the vicinity of vehicular or
pedestrian traffic that may endanger them, the employer shall place
warning signs or flags and other traffic-control devices in conspicuous
locations to alert and channel approaching traffic.
(iii) The employer shall use barricades where additional employee
protection is necessary.
(iv) The employer shall protect excavated areas with barricades.
(v) The employer shall display warning lights prominently at night.
(7) Backfeed. When there is a possibility of voltage backfeed from
sources of cogeneration or from the secondary system (for example,
backfeed from more than one energized phase feeding a common load), the
requirements of paragraph (l) of this section apply if employees will
work the lines or equipment as energized, and the requirements of
paragraphs (m) and (n) of this section apply if employees will work the
lines or equipment as deenergized.
(8) Lasers. The employer shall install, adjust, and operate laser
equipment in accordance with Sec. 1926.54 of this chapter.
(9) Hydraulic fluids. Hydraulic fluids used for the insulated
sections of
equipment shall provide insulation for the voltage involved.
(x) Definitions.
Affected employee. An employee whose job requires him or her to
operate or use a machine or equipment on which servicing or maintenance
is being performed under lockout or tagout, or whose job requires him
or her to work in an area in which such servicing or maintenance is
being performed.
Attendant. An employee assigned to remain immediately outside the
entrance to an enclosed or other space to render assistance as needed
to employees inside the space.
Authorized employee. An employee who locks out or tags out machines
or equipment in order to perform servicing or maintenance on that
machine or equipment. An affected employee becomes an authorized
employee when that employee's duties include performing servicing or
maintenance covered under this section.
Automatic circuit recloser. A self-controlled device for
automatically interrupting and reclosing an alternating-current
circuit, with a predetermined sequence of opening and reclosing
followed by resetting, hold closed, or lockout.
Barricade. A physical obstruction such as tapes, cones, or A-frame
type wood or metal structures that provides a warning about, and limits
access to, a hazardous area.
Barrier. A physical obstruction that prevents contact with
energized lines or equipment or prevents unauthorized access to a work
area.
Bond. The electrical interconnection of conductive parts designed
to maintain a common electric potential.
Bus. A conductor or a group of conductors that serve as a common
connection for two or more circuits.
Bushing. An insulating structure that includes a through conductor
or that provides a passageway for such a conductor, and that, when
mounted on a barrier, insulates the conductor from the barrier for the
purpose of conducting current from one side of the barrier to the
other.
Cable. A conductor with insulation, or a stranded conductor with or
without insulation and other coverings (single-conductor cable), or a
combination of conductors insulated from one another (multiple-
conductor cable).
Cable sheath. A conductive protective covering applied to cables.
Note to the definition of "cable sheath": A cable sheath may
consist of multiple layers one or more of which is conductive.
Circuit. A conductor or system of conductors through which an
electric current is intended to flow.
Clearance (between objects). The clear distance between two objects
measured surface to surface.
Clearance (for work). Authorization to perform specified work or
permission to enter a restricted area.
Communication lines. (See Lines; (1) Communication lines.)
Conductor. A material, usually in the form of a wire, cable, or bus
bar, used for carrying an electric current.
Contract employer. An employer, other than a host employer, that
performs work covered by this section under contract.
Covered conductor. A conductor covered with a dielectric having no
rated insulating strength or having a rated insulating strength less
than the voltage of the circuit in which the conductor is used.
Current-carrying part. A conducting part intended to be connected
in an electric circuit to a source of voltage. Non-current-carrying
parts are those not intended to be so connected.
Deenergized. Free from any electrical connection to a source of
potential difference and from electric charge; not having a potential
that is different from the potential of the earth.
Note to the definition of "deenergized": The term applies only
to current-carrying parts, which are sometimes energized (alive).
Designated employee (designated person). An employee (or person)
who is assigned by the employer to perform specific duties under the
terms of this section and who has sufficient knowledge of the
construction and operation of the equipment, and the hazards involved,
to perform his or her duties safely.
Electric line truck. A truck used to transport personnel, tools,
and material for electric supply line work.
Electric supply equipment. Equipment that produces, modifies,
regulates, controls, or safeguards a supply of electric energy.
Electric supply lines. (See Lines; (2) Electric supply lines.)
Electric utility. An organization responsible for the installation,
operation, or maintenance of an electric supply system.
Enclosed space. A working space, such as a manhole, vault, tunnel,
or shaft, that has a limited means of egress or entry, that is designed
for periodic employee entry under normal operating conditions, and
that, under normal conditions, does not contain a hazardous atmosphere,
but may contain a hazardous atmosphere under abnormal conditions.
Note to the definition of "enclosed space": The Occupational
Safety and Health Administration does not consider spaces that are
enclosed but not designed for employee entry under normal operating
conditions to be enclosed spaces for the purposes of this section.
Similarly, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration does
not consider spaces that are enclosed and that are expected to
contain a hazardous atmosphere to be enclosed spaces for the
purposes of this section. Such spaces meet the definition of permit
spaces in Sec. 1910.146, and entry into them must conform to that
standard.
Energized (alive, live). Electrically connected to a source of
potential difference, or electrically charged so as to have a potential
significantly different from that of earth in the vicinity.
Energy isolating device. A physical device that prevents the
transmission or release of energy, including, but not limited to, the
following: a manually operated electric circuit breaker, a disconnect
switch, a manually operated switch, a slide gate, a slip blind, a line
valve, blocks, and any similar device with a visible indication of the
position of the device. (Push buttons, selector switches, and other
control-circuit-type devices are not energy isolating devices.)
Energy source. Any electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic,
chemical, nuclear, thermal, or other energy source that could cause
injury to employees.
Entry (as used in paragraph (e) of this section). The action by
which a person passes through an opening into an enclosed space. Entry
includes ensuing work activities in that space and is considered to
have occurred as soon as any part of the entrant's body breaks the
plane of an opening into the space.
Equipment (electric). A general term including material, fittings,
devices, appliances, fixtures, apparatus, and the like used as part of
or in connection with an electrical installation.
Exposed, Exposed to contact (as applied to energized parts). Not
isolated or guarded.
Fall restraint system. A fall protection system that prevents the
user from falling any distance.
First-aid training. Training in the initial care, including
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (which includes chest compressions,
rescue breathing, and, as appropriate, other heart and lung
resuscitation techniques), performed by a person who is not a medical
practitioner, of a sick or injured person until definitive medical
treatment can be administered.
Ground. A conducting connection, whether planned or unplanned,
between an electric circuit or equipment and the earth, or to some
conducting body that serves in place of the earth.
Grounded. Connected to earth or to some conducting body that serves
in place of the earth.
Guarded. Covered, fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected, by
means of suitable covers or casings, barrier rails or screens, mats, or
platforms, designed to minimize the possibility, under normal
conditions, of dangerous approach or inadvertent contact by persons or
objects.
Note to the definition of "guarded": Wires that are insulated,
but not otherwise protected, are not guarded.
Hazardous atmosphere. An atmosphere that may expose employees to
the risk of death, incapacitation, impairment of ability to self-rescue
(that is, escape unaided from an enclosed space), injury, or acute
illness from one or more of the following causes:
(1) Flammable gas, vapor, or mist in excess of 10 percent of its
lower flammable limit (LFL);
(2) Airborne combustible dust at a concentration that meets or
exceeds its LFL;
Note to the definition of "hazardous atmosphere" (2): This
concentration may be approximated as a condition in which the dust
obscures vision at a distance of 1.52 meters (5 feet) or less.
(3) Atmospheric oxygen concentration below 19.5 percent or above
23.5 percent;
(4) Atmospheric concentration of any substance for which a dose or
a permissible exposure limit is published in Subpart G, Occupational
Health and Environmental Control, or in Subpart Z, Toxic and Hazardous
Substances, of this part and which could result in employee exposure in
excess of its dose or permissible exposure limit;
Note to the definition of "hazardous atmosphere" (4): An
atmospheric concentration of any substance that is not capable of
causing death, incapacitation, impairment of ability to self-rescue,
injury, or acute illness due to its health effects is not covered by
this provision.
(5) Any other atmospheric condition that is immediately dangerous
to life or health.
Note to the definition of "hazardous atmosphere" (5): For air
contaminants for which the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration has not determined a dose or permissible exposure
limit, other sources of information, such as Material Safety Data
Sheets that comply with the Hazard Communication Standard, Sec.
1910.1200, published information, and internal documents can provide
guidance in establishing acceptable atmospheric conditions.
High-power tests. Tests in which the employer uses fault currents,
load currents, magnetizing currents, and line-dropping currents to test
equipment, either at the equipment's rated voltage or at lower
voltages.
High-voltage tests. Tests in which the employer uses voltages of
approximately 1,000 volts as a practical minimum and in which the
voltage source has sufficient energy to cause injury.
High wind. A wind of such velocity that one or more of the
following hazards would be present:
(1) The wind could blow an employee from an elevated location,
(2) The wind could cause an employee or equipment handling material
to lose control of the material, or
(3) The wind would expose an employee to other hazards not
controlled by the standard involved.
Note to the definition of "high wind": The Occupational Safety
and Health Administration normally considers winds exceeding 64.4
kilometers per hour (40 miles per hour), or 48.3 kilometers per hour
(30 miles per hour) if the work involves material handling, as
meeting this criteria, unless the employer takes precautions to
protect employees from the hazardous effects of the wind.
Host employer. An employer that operates, or that controls the
operating procedures for, an electric power generation, transmission,
or distribution installation on which a contract employer is performing
work covered by this section.
Note to the definition of "host employer": The Occupational
Safety and Health Administration will treat the electric utility or
the owner of the installation as the host employer if it operates or
controls operating procedures for the installation. If the electric
utility or installation owner neither operates nor controls
operating procedures for the installation, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration will treat the employer that the utility
or owner has contracted with to operate or control the operating
procedures for the installation as the host employer. In no case
will there be more than one host employer.
Immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH). Any condition that
poses an immediate or delayed threat to life or that would cause
irreversible adverse health effects or that would interfere with an
individual's ability to escape unaided from a permit space.
Note to the definition of "immediately dangerous to life or
health": Some materials--hydrogen fluoride gas and cadmium vapor,
for example--may produce immediate transient effects that, even if
severe, may pass without medical attention, but are followed by
sudden, possibly fatal collapse 12-72 hours after exposure. The
victim "feels normal" from recovery from transient effects until
collapse. Such materials in hazardous quantities are considered to
be "immediately" dangerous to life or health.
Insulated. Separated from other conducting surfaces by a dielectric
(including air space) offering a high resistance to the passage of
current.
Note to the definition of "insulated": When any object is said
to be insulated, it is understood to be insulated for the conditions
to which it normally is subjected. Otherwise, it is, for the purpose
of this section, uninsulated.
Insulation (cable). Material relied upon to insulate the conductor
from other conductors or conducting parts or from ground.
Isolated. Not readily accessible to persons unless special means
for access are used.
Line-clearance tree trimmer. An employee who, through related
training or on-the-job experience or both, is familiar with the special
techniques and hazards involved in line-clearance tree trimming.
Note 1 to the definition of "line-clearance tree trimmer": An
employee who is regularly assigned to a line-clearance tree-trimming
crew and who is undergoing on-the-job training and who, in the
course of such training, has demonstrated an ability to perform
duties safely at his or her level of training and who is under the
direct supervision of a line-clearance tree trimmer is considered to
be a line-clearance tree trimmer for the performance of those
duties.
Note 2 to the definition of "line-clearance tree trimmer": A
line-clearance tree trimmer is not considered to be a "qualified
employee" under this section unless he or she has the training
required for a qualified employee under paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this
section. However, under the electrical safety-related work practices
standard in Subpart S of this part, a line-clearance tree trimmer is
considered to be a "qualified employee". Tree trimming performed
by such "qualified employees" is not subject to the electrical
safety-related work practice requirements contained in Sec. Sec.
1910.331 through 1910.335 of this part. (See also the note following
Sec. 1910.332(b)(3) of this part for information regarding the
training an employee must have to be considered a qualified employee
under Sec. Sec. 1910.331 through 1910.335 of this part.)
Line-clearance tree trimming. The pruning, trimming, repairing,
maintaining, removing, or clearing of trees, or the cutting of brush,
that is within the following distance of electric supply lines and
equipment:
(1) For voltages to ground of 50 kilovolts or less--3.05 meters (10
feet);
(2) For voltages to ground of more than 50 kilovolts--3.05 meters
(10 feet) plus 0.10 meters (4 inches) for every 10 kilovolts over 50
kilovolts.
Lines. (1) Communication lines. The conductors and their supporting
or containing structures which are used for public or private signal or
communication service, and which operate at potentials not exceeding
400 volts to ground or 750 volts between any two points of the circuit,
and the transmitted power of which does not exceed 150 watts. If the
lines are operating at less than 150 volts, no limit is placed on the
transmitted power of the system. Under certain conditions,
communication cables may include communication circuits exceeding these
limitations where such circuits are also used to supply power solely to
communication equipment.
Note to the definition of "communication lines": Telephone,
telegraph, railroad signal, data, clock, fire, police alarm, cable
television, and other systems conforming to this definition are
included. Lines used for signaling purposes, but not included under
this definition, are considered as electric supply lines of the same
voltage.
(2) Electric supply lines. Conductors used to transmit electric
energy and their necessary supporting or containing structures. Signal
lines of more than 400 volts are always supply lines within this
section, and those of less than 400 volts are considered as supply
lines, if so run and operated throughout.
Manhole. A subsurface enclosure that personnel may enter and that
is used for installing, operating, and maintaining submersible
equipment or cable.
Minimum approach distance. The closest distance an employee may
approach an energized or a grounded object.
Note to the definition of "minimum approach distance":
Paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section requires employers to establish
minimum approach distances.
Personal fall arrest system. A system used to arrest an employee in
a fall from a working level.
Qualified employee (qualified person). An employee (person)
knowledgeable in the construction and operation of the electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution equipment involved, along
with the associated hazards.
Note 1 to the definition of "qualified employee (qualified
person)": An employee must have the training required by (a)(2)(ii)
of this section to be a qualified employee.
Note 2 to the definition of "qualified employee (qualified
person)": Except under (g)(2)(iv)(C)(2) and (g)(2)(iv)(C)(3) of
this section, an employee who is undergoing on-the-job training and
who has demonstrated, in the course of such training, an ability to
perform duties safely at his or her level of training and who is
under the direct supervision of a qualified person is a qualified
person for the performance of those duties.
Statistical sparkover voltage. A transient overvoltage level that
produces a 97.72-percent probability of sparkover (that is, two
standard deviations above the voltage at which there is a 50-percent
probability of sparkover).
Statistical withstand voltage. A transient overvoltage level that
produces a 0.14-percent probability of sparkover (that is, three
standard deviations below the voltage at which there is a 50-percent
probability of sparkover).
Switch. A device for opening and closing or for changing the
connection of a circuit. In this section, a switch is manually
operable, unless otherwise stated.
System operator. A qualified person designated to operate the
system or its parts.
Vault. An enclosure, above or below ground, that personnel may
enter and that is used for installing, operating, or maintaining
equipment or cable.
Vented vault. A vault that has provision for air changes using
exhaust-flue stacks and low-level air intakes operating on pressure and
temperature differentials that provide for airflow that precludes a
hazardous atmosphere from developing.
Voltage. The effective (root mean square, or rms) potential
difference between any two conductors or between a conductor and
ground. This section expresses voltages in nominal values, unless
otherwise indicated. The nominal voltage of a system or circuit is the
value assigned to a system or circuit of a given voltage class for the
purpose of convenient designation. The operating voltage of the system
may vary above or below this value.
Work-positioning equipment. A body belt or body harness system
rigged to allow an employee to be supported on an elevated vertical
surface, such as a utility pole or tower leg, and work with both hands
free while leaning.
Appendix A to Sec. 1910.269--Flow Charts
This appendix presents information, in the form of flow charts,
that illustrates the scope and application of Sec. 1910.269. This
appendix addresses the interface between Sec. 1910.269 and Subpart
S of this Part (Electrical), between Sec. 1910.269 and Sec.
1910.146 (Permit-required confined spaces), and between Sec.
1910.269 and Sec. 1910.147 (The control of hazardous energy
(lockout/tagout)). These flow charts provide guidance for employers
trying to implement the requirements of Sec. 1910.269 in
combination with other General Industry Standards contained in Part
1910. Employers should always consult the relevant standards, in
conjunction with this appendix, to ensure compliance with all
applicable requirements.
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Appendix B to Sec. 1910.269--Working on Exposed Energized Parts
I. Introduction
Electric utilities design electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution installations to meet National
Electrical Safety Code (NESC), ANSI C2, requirements. Electric
utilities also design transmission and distribution lines to limit
line outages as required by system reliability criteria \1\ and to
withstand the maximum overvoltages impressed on the system.
Conditions such as switching surges, faults, and lightning can cause
overvoltages. Electric utilities generally select insulator design
and lengths and the clearances to structural parts so as to prevent
outages from contaminated line insulation and during storms. Line
insulator lengths and structural clearances have, over the years,
come closer to the minimum approach distances used by workers. As
minimum approach distances and structural clearances converge, it is
increasingly important that system designers and system operating
and maintenance personnel understand the concepts underlying minimum
approach distances.
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\1\ Federal, State, and local regulatory bodies and electric
utilities set reliability requirements that limit the number and
duration of system outages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The information in this appendix will assist employers in
complying with the minimum approach-distance requirements contained
in Sec. 1910.269(l)(3) and (q)(3). Employers must use the technical
criteria and methodology presented in this appendix in establishing
minimum approach distances in accordance with Sec.
1910.269(l)(3)(i) and Table R-3 and Table R-8. This appendix
provides essential background information and technical criteria for
the calculation of the required minimum approach distances for live-
line work on electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution installations.
Unless an employer is using the maximum transient overvoltages
specified in Table R-9 for voltages over 72.5 kilovolts, the
employer must use persons knowledgeable in the techniques discussed
in this appendix, and competent in the field of electric
transmission and distribution system design, to determine the
maximum transient overvoltage.
II. General
A. Definitions. The following definitions from Sec. 1910.269(x)
relate to work on or near electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution lines and equipment and the electrical hazards they
present.
Exposed. . . . Not isolated or guarded.
Guarded. Covered, fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected, by
means of suitable covers or casings, barrier rails or screens, mats,
or platforms, designed to minimize the possibility, under normal
conditions, of dangerous approach or inadvertent contact by persons
or objects.
Note to the definition of "guarded": Wires that are insulated,
but not otherwise protected, are not guarded.
Insulated. Separated from other conducting surfaces by a
dielectric (including air space) offering a high resistance to the
passage of current.
Note to the definition of "insulated": When any object is said
to be insulated, it is understood to be insulated for the conditions
to which it normally is subjected. Otherwise, it is, for the purpose
of this section, uninsulated.
Isolated. Not readily accessible to persons unless special means
for access are used.
Statistical sparkover voltage. A transient overvoltage level
that produces a 97.72-percent probability of sparkover (that is, two
standard deviations above the voltage at which there is a 50-percent
probability of sparkover).
Statistical withstand voltage. A transient overvoltage level
that produces a 0.14-percent probability of sparkover (that is,
three standard deviations below the voltage at which there is a 50-
percent probability of sparkover).
B. Installations energized at 50 to 300 volts. The hazards posed
by installations energized at 50 to 300 volts are the same as those
found in many other workplaces. That is not to say that there is no
hazard, but the complexity of electrical protection required does
not compare to that required for high-voltage systems. The employee
must avoid contact with the exposed parts, and the protective
equipment used (such as rubber insulating gloves) must provide
insulation for the voltages involved.
C. Exposed energized parts over 300 volts AC. Paragraph
(l)(3)(i) of Sec. 1910.269 requires the employer to establish
minimum approach distances no less than the distances computed by
Table R-3 for ac systems so that employees can work safely without
risk of sparkover.\2\
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\2\ Sparkover is a disruptive electric discharge in which an
electric arc forms and electric current passes through air.
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Unless the employee is using electrical protective equipment,
air is the insulating medium between the employee and energized
parts. The distance between the employee and an energized part must
be sufficient for the air to withstand the maximum transient
overvoltage that can reach the worksite under the working conditions
and practices the employee is using. This distance is the minimum
air insulation distance, and it is equal to the electrical component
of the minimum approach distance.
Normal system design may provide or include a means (such as
lightning arrestors) to control maximum anticipated transient
overvoltages, or the employer may use temporary devices (portable
protective gaps) or measures (such as preventing automatic circuit
breaker reclosing) to achieve the same result. Paragraph (l)(3)(ii)
of Sec. 1910.269 requires the employer to determine the maximum
anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, through
an engineering analysis or assume a maximum anticipated per-unit
transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, in accordance with Table R-
9, which specifies the following maximums for ac systems:
72.6 to 420.0 kilovolts--3.5 per unit
420.1 to 550.0 kilovolts--3.0 per unit
550.1 to 800.0 kilovolts--2.5 per unit
See paragraph IV.A.2, later in this appendix, for additional
discussion of maximum transient overvoltages.
D. Types of exposures. Employees working on or near energized
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution systems
face two kinds of exposures: Phase-to-ground and phase-to-phase. The
exposure is phase-to-ground: (1) With respect to an energized part,
when the employee is at ground potential or (2) with respect to
ground, when an employee is at the potential of the energized part
during live-line barehand work. The exposure is phase-to-phase, with
respect to an energized part, when an employee is at the potential
of another energized part (at a different potential) during live-
line barehand work.
III. Determination of Minimum Approach Distances for AC Voltages
Greater Than 300 Volts
A. Voltages of 301 to 5,000 volts. Test data generally forms the
basis of minimum air insulation distances. The lowest voltage for
which sufficient test data exists is 5,000 volts, and these data
indicate that the minimum air insulation distance at that voltage is
20 millimeters (1 inch). Because the minimum air insulation distance
increases with increasing voltage, and, conversely, decreases with
decreasing voltage, an assumed minimum air insulation distance of 20
millimeters will protect against sparkover at voltages of 301 to
5,000 volts. Thus, 20 millimeters is the electrical component of the
minimum approach distance for these voltages.
B. Voltages of 5.1 to 72.5 kilovolts. For voltages from 5.1 to
72.5 kilovolts, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
bases the methodology for calculating the electrical component of
the minimum approach distance on Institute of Electrical and
Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard 4-1995, Standard Techniques for
High-Voltage Testing. Table 1 lists the critical sparkover distances
from that standard as listed in IEEE Std 516-2009, IEEE Guide for
Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines.
Table 1--Sparkover Distance for Rod-to-Rod Gap
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gap spacing from
60 Hz Rod-to-Rod sparkover (kV peak) IEEE Std 4-1995
(cm)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
25.................................................... 2
36.................................................... 3
46.................................................... 4
53.................................................... 5
60.................................................... 6
70.................................................... 8
79.................................................... 10
86.................................................... 12
95.................................................... 14
104................................................... 16
112................................................... 18
120................................................... 20
143................................................... 25
167................................................... 30
192................................................... 35
218................................................... 40
243................................................... 45
270................................................... 50
322................................................... 60
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: IEEE Std 516-2009.
To use this table to determine the electrical component of the
minimum approach distance, the employer must determine the peak
phase-to-ground transient overvoltage and select a gap from the
table that corresponds to that voltage as a withstand voltage rather
than a critical sparkover voltage. To calculate the electrical
component of the minimum approach distance for voltages between 5
and 72.5 kilovolts, use the following procedure:
1. Divide the phase-to-phase voltage by the square root of 3 to
convert it to a phase-to-ground voltage.
2. Multiply the phase-to-ground voltage by the square root of 2
to convert the rms value of the voltage to the peak phase-to-ground
voltage.
3. Multiply the peak phase-to-ground voltage by the maximum per-
unit transient overvoltage, which, for this voltage range, is 3.0,
as discussed later in this appendix. This is the maximum phase-to-
ground transient overvoltage, which corresponds to the withstand
voltage for the relevant exposure.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The withstand voltage is the voltage at which sparkover is
not likely to occur across a specified distance. It is the voltage
taken at the 3[sigma] point below the sparkover voltage, assuming
that the sparkover curve follows a normal distribution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Divide the maximum phase-to-ground transient overvoltage by
0.85 to determine the corresponding critical sparkover voltage. (The
critical sparkover voltage is 3 standard deviations (or 15 percent)
greater than the withstand voltage.)
5. Determine the electrical component of the minimum approach
distance from Table 1 through interpolation.
Table 2 illustrates how to derive the electrical component of
the minimum approach distance for voltages from 5.1 to 72.5
kilovolts, before the application of any altitude correction factor,
as explained later.
Table 2--Calculating the Electrical Component of MAD 751 V to 72.5 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum system phase-to-phase voltage (kV)
Step -----------------------------------------------------------------------
15 36 46 72.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Divide by [radic]3................... 8.7 20.8 26.6 41.9
2. Multiply by [radic]2................. 12.2 29.4 37.6 59.2
3. Multiply by 3.0...................... 36.7 88.2 112.7 177.6
4. Divide by 0.85....................... 43.2 103.7 132.6 208.9
5. Interpolate from Table 1............. 3+(7.2/10)*1 14+(8.7/9)*2 20+(12.6/23)*5 35+(16.9/26)*5
Electrical component of MAD (cm)........ 3.72 15.93 22.74 38.25
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Voltages of 72.6 to 800 kilovolts. For voltages of 72.6
kilovolts to 800 kilovolts, this section bases the electrical
component of minimum approach distances, before the application of
any altitude correction factor, on the following formula:
Equation 1--For Voltages of 72.6 kV to 800 kV
D = 0.3048(C + a) VL-GT
Where:
D = Electrical component of the minimum approach distance in air in
meters;
C = a correction factor associated with the variation of gap
sparkover with voltage;
a = A factor relating to the saturation of air at system voltages of
345 kilovolts or higher; \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Test data demonstrates that the saturation factor is greater
than 0 at peak voltages of about 630 kilovolts. Systems operating at
345 kilovolts (or maximum system voltages of 362 kilovolts) can have
peak maximum transient overvoltages exceeding 630 kilovolts. Table
R-3 sets equations for calculating a based on peak voltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VL-G = Maximum system line-to-ground rms voltage in kilovolts--it
should be the "actual" maximum, or the normal highest voltage for
the range (for example, 10 percent above the nominal voltage); and
T = Maximum transient overvoltage factor in per unit.
In Equation 1, C is 0.01: (1) For phase-to-ground exposures that
the employer can demonstrate consist only of air across the approach
distance (gap) and (2) for phase-to-phase exposures if the employer
can demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap and that no
large conductive object is in the gap. Otherwise, C is 0.011.
In Equation 1, the term a varies depending on whether the
employee's exposure is phase-to-ground or phase-to-phase and on
whether objects are in the gap. The employer must use the equations
in Table 3 to calculate a. Sparkover test data with insulation
spanning the gap form the basis for the equations for phase-to-
ground exposures, and sparkover test data with only air in the gap
form the basis for the equations for phase-to-phase exposures. The
phase-to-ground equations result in slightly higher values of a,
and, consequently, produce larger minimum approach distances, than
the phase-to-phase equations for the same value of VPeak.
Table 3--Equations for Calculating the Surge Factor, a
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposures
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VPeak = TL-GVL-G [radic]2......... 635 kV or less 635.1 to 915 kV 915.1 to 1,050 kV
a................................. 0 (VPeak- 635)/140,000 (VPeak-645)/135,000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
VPeak = TL-GVL-G[radic]2.......... More than 1,050 kV
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
a................................. (VPeak-675)/125,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-phase exposures \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VPeak = (1.35TL-G + 0.45)VL- 630 kV or less 630.1 to 848 kV 848.1 to 1,131 kV
G[radic]2........................
a................................. 0 (VPeak-630)/155,000 (VPeak-633.6)/152,207
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VPeak = (1.35TL-G + 0.45)VL- 1,131.1 to 1,485 kV More than 1,485 kV
G[radic]2..........................
a................................... (VPeak-628)/153,846 (VPeak-350.5)/203,666
\1\ Use the equations for phase-to-ground exposures (with VPeak for phase-to-phase exposures) unless the
employer can demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap and that no large conductive object is in the
gap.
In Equation 1, T is the maximum transient overvoltage factor in
per unit. As noted earlier, Sec. 1910.269(l)(3)(ii) requires the
employer to determine the maximum anticipated per-unit transient
overvoltage, phase-to-ground, through an engineering analysis or
assume a maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-
to-ground, in accordance with Table R-9. For phase-to-ground
exposures, the employer uses this value, called TL-G, as T in
Equation 1. IEEE Std 516-2009 provides the following formula to
calculate the phase-to-phase maximum transient overvoltage, TL-L,
from TL-G:
TL-L = 1.35TL-G + 0.45
For phase-to-phase exposures, the employer uses this value as T in
Equation 1.
D. Provisions for inadvertent movement. The minimum approach
distance must include an "adder" to compensate for the inadvertent
movement of the worker relative to an energized part or the movement
of the part relative to the worker. This "adder" must account for
this possible inadvertent movement and provide the worker with a
comfortable and safe zone in which to work. Employers must add the
distance for inadvertent movement (called the "ergonomic component
of the minimum approach distance") to the electrical component to
determine the total safe minimum approach distances used in live-
line work.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration based the
ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance on response
time-distance analysis. This technique uses an estimate of the total
response time to a hazardous incident and converts that time to the
distance traveled. For example, the driver of a car takes a given
amount of time to respond to a "stimulus" and stop the vehicle.
The elapsed time involved results in the car's traveling some
distance before coming to a complete stop. This distance depends on
the speed of the car
at the time the stimulus appears and the reaction time of the
driver.
In the case of live-line work, the employee must first perceive
that he or she is approaching the danger zone. Then, the worker
responds to the danger and must decelerate and stop all motion
toward the energized part. During the time it takes to stop, the
employee will travel some distance. This is the distance the
employer must add to the electrical component of the minimum
approach distance to obtain the total safe minimum approach
distance.
At voltages from 751 volts to 72.5 kilovolts,\5\ the electrical
component of the minimum approach distance is smaller than the
ergonomic component. At 72.5 kilovolts, the electrical component is
only a little more than 0.3 meters (1 foot). An ergonomic component
of the minimum approach distance must provide for all the worker's
unanticipated movements. At these voltages, workers generally use
rubber insulating gloves; however, these gloves protect only a
worker's hands and arms. Therefore, the energized object must be at
a safe approach distance to protect the worker's face. In this case,
0.61 meters (2 feet) is a sufficient and practical ergonomic
component of the minimum approach distance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ For voltages of 50 to 300 volts, Table R-3 specifies a
minimum approach distance of "avoid contact." The minimum approach
distance for this voltage range contains neither an electrical
component nor an ergonomic component.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For voltages between 72.6 and 800 kilovolts, employees must use
different work practices during energized line work. Generally,
employees use live-line tools (hot sticks) to perform work on
energized equipment. These tools, by design, keep the energized part
at a constant distance from the employee and, thus, maintain the
appropriate minimum approach distance automatically.
The location of the worker and the type of work methods the
worker is using also influence the length of the ergonomic component
of the minimum approach distance. In this higher voltage range, the
employees use work methods that more tightly control their movements
than when the workers perform work using rubber insulating gloves.
The worker, therefore, is farther from the energized line or
equipment and must be more precise in his or her movements just to
perform the work. For these reasons, this section adopts an
ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance of 0.31 m (1
foot) for voltages between 72.6 and 800 kilovolts.
Table 4 summarizes the ergonomic component of the minimum
approach distance for various voltage ranges.
Table 4--Ergonomic Component of Minimum Approach Distance
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Distance
Voltage range (kV) -----------------------------------
m ft
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.301 to 0.750...................... 0.31 1.0
0.751 to 72.5....................... 0.61 2.0
72.6 to 800......................... 0.31 1.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The employer must add this distance to the electrical component of
the minimum approach distance to obtain the full minimum approach
distance.
The ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance
accounts for errors in maintaining the minimum approach distance
(which might occur, for example, if an employee misjudges the length
of a conductive object he or she is holding), and for errors in
judging the minimum approach distance. The ergonomic component also
accounts for inadvertent movements by the employee, such as
slipping. In contrast, the working position selected to properly
maintain the minimum approach distance must account for all of an
employee's reasonably likely movements and still permit the employee
to adhere to the applicable minimum approach distance. (See Figure
1.) Reasonably likely movements include an employee's adjustments to
tools, equipment, and working positions and all movements needed to
perform the work. For example, the employee should be able to
perform all of the following actions without straying into the
minimum approach distance:
Adjust his or her hardhat,
maneuver a tool onto an energized part with a
reasonable amount of overreaching or underreaching,
reach for and handle tools, material, and equipment
passed to him or her, and
adjust tools, and replace components on them, when
necessary during the work procedure.
The training of qualified employees required under Sec.
1910.269(a)(2), and the job planning and briefing required under
Sec. 1910.269(c), must address selection of a proper working
position.
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.024
BILLING CODE 4510-26-C
E. Miscellaneous correction factors. Changes in the air medium
that forms the insulation influences the strength of an air gap. A
brief discussion of each factor follows.
1. Dielectric strength of air. The dielectric strength of air in
a uniform electric field at standard atmospheric conditions is
approximately 3 kilovolts per millimeter.\6\ The pressure,
temperature, and humidity of the air, the shape, dimensions, and
separation of the electrodes, and the
characteristics of the applied voltage (wave shape) affect the
disruptive gradient.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ For the purposes of estimating arc length, Sec. 1910.269
generally assumes a more conservative dielectric strength of 10
kilovolts per 25.4 millimeters, consistent with assumptions made in
consensus standards such as the National Electrical Safety Code
(IEEE C2-2012). The more conservative value accounts for variables
such as electrode shape, wave shape, and a certain amount of
overvoltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Atmospheric effect. The empirically determined electrical
strength of a given gap is normally applicable at standard
atmospheric conditions (20 [deg]C, 101.3 kilopascals, 11 grams/cubic
centimeter humidity). An increase in the density (humidity) of the
air inhibits sparkover for a given air gap. The combination of
temperature and air pressure that results in the lowest gap
sparkover voltage is high temperature and low pressure. This
combination of conditions is not likely to occur. Low air pressure,
generally associated with high humidity, causes increased electrical
strength. An average air pressure generally correlates with low
humidity. Hot and dry working conditions normally result in reduced
electrical strength. The equations for minimum approach distances in
Table R-3 assume standard atmospheric conditions.
3. Altitude. The reduced air pressure at high altitudes causes a
reduction in the electrical strength of an air gap. An employer must
increase the minimum approach distance by about 3 percent per 300
meters (1,000 feet) of increased altitude for altitudes above 900
meters (3,000 feet). Table R-5 specifies the altitude correction
factor that the employer must use in calculating minimum approach
distances.
IV. Determining Minimum Approach Distances
A. Factors Affecting Voltage Stress at the Worksite
1. System voltage (nominal). The nominal system voltage range
determines the voltage for purposes of calculating minimum approach
distances. The employer selects the range in which the nominal
system voltage falls, as given in the relevant table, and uses the
highest value within that range in per-unit calculations.
2. Transient overvoltages. Operation of switches or circuit
breakers, a fault on a line or circuit or on an adjacent circuit,
and similar activities may generate transient overvoltages on an
electrical system. Each overvoltage has an associated transient
voltage wave shape. The wave shape arriving at the site and its
magnitude vary considerably.
In developing requirements for minimum approach distances, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration considered the most
common wave shapes and the magnitude of transient overvoltages found
on electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
systems. The equations in Table R-3 for minimum approach distances
use per-unit maximum transient overvoltages, which are relative to
the nominal maximum voltage of the system. For example, a maximum
transient overvoltage value of 3.0 per unit indicates that the
highest transient overvoltage is 3.0 times the nominal maximum
system voltage.
3. Typical magnitude of overvoltages. Table 5 lists the
magnitude of typical transient overvoltages.
Table 5--Magnitude of Typical Transient Overvoltages
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Magnitude (per
Cause unit)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Energized 200-mile line without closing resistors..... 3.5
Energized 200-mile line with one-step closing resistor 2.1
Energized 200-mile line with multistep resistor....... 2.5
Reclosing with trapped charge one-step resistor....... 2.2
Opening surge with single restrike.................... 3.0
Fault initiation unfaulted phase...................... 2.1
Fault initiation adjacent circuit..................... 2.5
Fault clearing........................................ 1.7 to 1.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Standard deviation--air-gap withstand. For each air gap
length under the same atmospheric conditions, there is a statistical
variation in the breakdown voltage. The probability of breakdown
against voltage has a normal (Gaussian) distribution. The standard
deviation of this distribution varies with the wave shape, gap
geometry, and atmospheric conditions. The withstand voltage of the
air gap is three standard deviations (3[sigma]) below the critical
sparkover voltage. (The critical sparkover voltage is the crest
value of the impulse wave that, under specified conditions, causes
sparkover 50 percent of the time. An impulse wave of three standard
deviations below this value, that is, the withstand voltage, has a
probability of sparkover of approximately 1 in 1,000.)
5. Broken Insulators. Tests show reductions in the insulation
strength of insulator strings with broken skirts. Broken units may
lose up to 70 percent of their withstand capacity. Because an
employer cannot determine the insulating capability of a broken unit
without testing it, the employer must consider damaged units in an
insulator to have no insulating value. Additionally, the presence of
a live-line tool alongside an insulator string with broken units may
further reduce the overall insulating strength. The number of good
units that must be present in a string for it to be "insulated" as
defined by Sec. 1910.269(x) depends on the maximum overvoltage
possible at the worksite.
B. Minimum Approach Distances Based on Known, Maximum-Anticipated
Per-Unit Transient Overvoltages
1. Determining the minimum approach distance for AC systems.
Under Sec. 1910.269(l)(3)(ii), the employer must determine the
maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground,
through an engineering analysis or must assume a maximum anticipated
per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, in accordance with
Table R-9. When the employer conducts an engineering analysis of the
system and determines that the maximum transient overvoltage is
lower than specified by Table R-9, the employer must ensure that any
conditions assumed in the analysis, for example, that employees
block reclosing on a circuit or install portable protective gaps,
are present during energized work. To ensure that these conditions
are present, the employer may need to institute new live-work
procedures reflecting the conditions and limitations set by the
engineering analysis.
2. Calculation of reduced approach distance values. An employer
may take the following steps to reduce minimum approach distances
when the maximum transient overvoltage on the system (that is, the
maximum transient overvoltage without additional steps to control
overvoltages) produces unacceptably large minimum approach
distances:
Step 1. Determine the maximum voltage (with respect to a given
nominal voltage range) for the energized part.
Step 2. Determine the technique to use to control the maximum
transient overvoltage. (See paragraphs IV.C and IV.D of this
appendix.) Determine the maximum transient overvoltage that can
exist at the worksite with that form of control in place and with a
confidence level of 3[sigma]. This voltage is the withstand voltage
for the purpose of calculating the appropriate minimum approach
distance.
Step 3. Direct employees to implement procedures to ensure that
the control technique is in effect during the course of the work.
Step 4. Using the new value of transient overvoltage in per
unit, calculate the required minimum approach distance from Table R-
3.
C. Methods of Controlling Possible Transient Overvoltage Stress
Found on a System
1. Introduction. There are several means of controlling
overvoltages that occur on transmission systems. For example, the
employer can modify the operation of circuit breakers or other
switching devices to reduce switching transient overvoltages.
Alternatively, the employer can hold the overvoltage to an
acceptable level by installing surge arresters or portable
protective gaps on the system. In addition, the employer can change
the transmission system to minimize the effect of switching
operations. Section 4.8 of IEEE Std 516-2009 describes various ways
of controlling, and thereby reducing, maximum transient
overvoltages.
2. Operation of circuit breakers. \7\ The maximum transient
overvoltage that can reach the worksite is often the result of
switching on the line on which employees are working. Disabling
automatic reclosing during energized line work, so that the line
will not be reenergized after being opened for any reason, limits
the maximum switching surge overvoltage to the larger of the opening
surge or the greatest possible fault-generated surge, provided that
the devices (for example, insertion resistors) are operable and will
function to limit the transient overvoltage and that circuit breaker
restrikes do not occur. The employer must ensure the proper
functioning of insertion resistors and other overvoltage-limiting
devices when the employer's engineering analysis assumes their
proper operation to limit the overvoltage level. If the employer
cannot disable the reclosing feature (because of system operating
conditions), other methods of controlling the switching surge level
may be necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The detailed design of a circuit interrupter, such as the
design of the contacts, resistor insertion, and breaker timing
control, are beyond the scope of this appendix. The design of the
system generally accounts for these features. This appendix only
discusses features that can limit the maximum switching transient
overvoltage on a system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transient surges on an adjacent line, particularly for double
circuit construction, may cause a significant overvoltage on the
line on which employees are working. The employer's engineering
analysis must account for coupling to adjacent lines.
3. Surge arresters. The use of modern surge arresters allows a
reduction in the basic impulse-insulation levels of much
transmission system equipment. The primary function of early
arresters was to protect the system insulation from the effects of
lightning. Modern arresters not only dissipate lightning-caused
transients, but may also control many other system transients caused
by switching or faults.
The employer may use properly designed arresters to control
transient overvoltages along a transmission line and thereby reduce
the requisite length of the insulator string and possibly the
maximum transient overvoltage on the line.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Surge arrester application is beyond the scope of this
appendix. However, if the employer installs the arrester near the
work site, the application would be similar to the protective gaps
discussed in paragraph IV.D of this appendix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Switching Restrictions. Another form of overvoltage control
involves establishing switching restrictions, whereby the employer
prohibits the operation of circuit breakers until certain system
conditions are present. The employer restricts switching by using a
tagging system, similar to that used for a permit, except that the
common term used for this activity is a "hold-off" or
"restriction." These terms indicate that the restriction does not
prevent operation, but only modifies the operation during the live-
work activity.
D. Minimum Approach Distance Based on Control of Maximum Transient
Overvoltage at the Worksite
When the employer institutes control of maximum transient
overvoltage at the worksite by installing portable protective gaps,
the employer may calculate the minimum approach distance as follows:
Step 1. Select the appropriate withstand voltage for the
protective gap based on system requirements and an acceptable
probability of gap sparkover.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The employer should check the withstand voltage to ensure
that it results in a probability of gap flashover that is acceptable
from a system outage perspective. (In other words, a gap sparkover
will produce a system outage. The employer should determine whether
such an outage will impact overall system performance to an
acceptable degree.) In general, the withstand voltage should be at
least 1.25 times the maximum crest operating voltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Step 2. Determine a gap distance that provides a withstand
voltage \10\ greater than or equal to the one selected in the first
step.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ The manufacturer of the gap provides, based on test data,
the critical sparkover voltage for each gap spacing (for example, a
critical sparkover voltage of 665 kilovolts for a gap spacing of 1.2
meters). The withstand voltage for the gap is equal to 85 percent of
its critical sparkover voltage.
\11\ Switch steps 1 and 2 if the length of the protective gap is
known.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Step 3. Use 110 percent of the gap's critical sparkover voltage
to determine the phase-to-ground peak voltage at gap sparkover (VPPG
Peak).
Step 4. Determine the maximum transient overvoltage, phase-to-
ground, at the worksite from the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.025
Step 5. Use this value of T \12\ in the equation in Table R-3 to
obtain the minimum approach distance. If the worksite is no more
than 900 meters (3,000 feet) above sea level, the employer may use
this value of T to determine the minimum approach distance from
Table 7 through Table 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ IEEE Std 516-2009 states that most employers add 0.2 to the
calculated value of T as an additional safety factor.
Note: All rounding must be to the next higher value (that is,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
always round up).
Sample protective gap calculations.
Problem: Employees are to perform work on a 500-kilovolt
transmission line at sea level that is subject to transient
overvoltages of 2.4 p.u. The maximum operating voltage of the line
is 550 kilovolts. Determine the length of the protective gap that
will provide the minimum practical safe approach distance. Also,
determine what that minimum approach distance is.
Step 1. Calculate the smallest practical maximum transient
overvoltage (1.25 times the crest phase-to-ground voltage): \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ To eliminate sparkovers due to minor system disturbances,
the employer should use a withstand voltage no lower than 1.25 p.u.
Note that this is a practical, or operational, consideration only.
It may be feasible for the employer to use lower values of withstand
voltage.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.026
This value equals the withstand voltage of the protective gap.
Step 2. Using test data for a particular protective gap, select
a gap that has a critical sparkover voltage greater than or equal
to:
561kV / 0.85 = 660kV
For example, if a protective gap with a 1.22-m (4.0-foot) spacing
tested to a critical sparkover voltage of 665 kilovolts (crest),
select this gap spacing.
Step 3. The phase-to-ground peak voltage at gap sparkover (VPPG
Peak) is 110 percent of the value from the previous step:
665kV x 1.10 = 732kV
This value corresponds to the withstand voltage of the electrical
component of the minimum approach distance.
Step 4. Use this voltage to determine the worksite value of T:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.027
Step 5. Use this value of T in the equation in Table R-3 to
obtain the minimum approach distance, or look up the minimum
approach distance in Table 7 through Table 14:
MAD = 2.29m (7.6 ft).
E. Location of Protective Gaps
1. Adjacent structures. The employer may install the protective
gap on a structure adjacent to the worksite, as this practice does
not significantly reduce the protection afforded by the gap.
2. Terminal stations. Gaps installed at terminal stations of
lines or circuits provide a level of protection; however, that level
of protection may not extend throughout the length of the line to
the worksite. The use of substation terminal gaps raises the
possibility that separate surges could enter the line at opposite
ends, each with low enough magnitude to pass the terminal gaps
without sparkover. When voltage surges occur simultaneously at each
end of a line and travel toward each other, the total voltage on the
line at the point where they meet is the arithmetic sum of the two
surges. A gap installed within 0.8 km (0.5 mile) of the worksite
will protect against such intersecting waves. Engineering studies of
a particular line or system may indicate that employers can
adequately protect employees by installing gaps at even more distant
locations. In any event, unless using the default values for T from
Table R-9, the employer must determine T at the worksite.
3. Worksite. If the employer installs protective gaps at the
worksite, the gap setting establishes the worksite impulse
insulation strength. Lightning strikes as far as 6 miles from the
worksite can cause a voltage surge greater than the gap withstand
voltage, and a gap sparkover can occur. In addition, the gap can
sparkover from overvoltages on the line that exceed the withstand
voltage of the gap. Consequently, the employer must protect
employees from hazards resulting from any sparkover that could
occur.
F. Disabling automatic reclosing. There are two reasons to
disable the automatic-reclosing feature of circuit-interrupting
devices while employees are performing live-line work:
To prevent reenergization of a circuit faulted during
the work, which could create a hazard or result in more serious
injuries or damage than the injuries or damage produced by the
original fault;
To prevent any transient overvoltage caused by the
switching surge that would result if the circuit were reenergized.
However, due to system stability considerations, it may not always
be feasible to disable the automatic-reclosing feature.
V. Minimum Approach-Distance Tables
A. Legacy tables. Employers may use the minimum approach
distances in Table 6 through Table 13 until March 31, 2015.
Table 6--Minimum Approach Distances Until March 31, 2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
Voltage range phase to phase (kV) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.05 to 1.0.................................... Avoid Contact
Avoid Contact
----------------------------------------------------------------
1.1 to 15.0.................................... 2.10 0.64 2.20 0.66
15.1 to 36.0................................... 2.30 0.72 2.60 0.77
36.1 to 46.0................................... 2.60 0.77 2.80 0.85
46.1 to 72.5................................... 3.00 0.90 3.50 1.05
72.6 to 121.................................... 3.20 0.95 4.30 1.29
138 to 145..................................... 3.60 1.09 4.90 1.50
161 to 169..................................... 4.00 1.22 5.70 1.71
230 to 242..................................... 5.30 1.59 7.50 2.27
345 to 362..................................... 8.50 2.59 12.50 3.80
500 to 550..................................... 11.30 3.42 18.10 5.50
765 to 800..................................... 14.90 4.53 26.00 7.91
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The clear live-line tool distance must equal or exceed the values for the indicated voltage ranges.
Table 7--Minimum Approach Distances Until March 31, 2015--72.6 to 121.0 kV With Overvoltage Factor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.0............................................ 0.74 2.42 1.09 3.58
2.1............................................ 0.76 2.50 1.09 3.58
2.2............................................ 0.79 2.58 1.12 3.67
2.3............................................ 0.81 2.67 1.14 3.75
2.4............................................ 0.84 2.75 1.17 3.83
2.5............................................ 0.84 2.75 1.19 3.92
2.6............................................ 0.86 2.83 1.22 4.00
2.7............................................ 0.89 2.92 1.24 4.08
2.8............................................ 0.91 3.00 1.24 4.08
2.9............................................ 0.94 3.08 1.27 4.17
3.0............................................ 0.97 3.17 1.30 4.25
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The employer may apply the distance specified in this table only where the employer determines the
maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage by engineering analysis. (Table 6 applies otherwise.)
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.
Table 8--Minimum Approach Distances Until March 31, 2015--121.1 to 145.0 kV With Overvoltage Factor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.0............................................ 0.84 2.75 1.24 4.08
2.1............................................ 0.86 2.83 1.27 4.17
2.2............................................ 0.89 2.92 1.30 4.25
2.3............................................ 0.91 3.00 1.32 4.33
2.4............................................ 0.94 3.08 1.35 4.42
2.5............................................ 0.97 3.17 1.37 4.50
2.6............................................ 0.99 3.25 1.40 4.58
2.7............................................ 1.02 3.33 1.42 4.67
2.8............................................ 1.04 3.42 1.45 4.75
2.9............................................ 1.07 3.50 1.47 4.83
3.0............................................ 1.09 3.58 1.50 4.92
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The employer may apply the distance specified in this table only where the employer determines the
maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage by engineering analysis. (Table 6 applies otherwise.)
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.
Table 9--Minimum Approach Distances Until March 31, 2015--145.1 to 169.0 kV With Overvoltage Factor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.0............................................ 0.91 3.00 1.42 4.67
2.1............................................ 0.97 3.17 1.45 4.75
2.2............................................ 0.99 3.25 1.47 4.83
2.3............................................ 1.02 3.33 1.50 4.92
2.4............................................ 1.04 3.42 1.52 5.00
2.5............................................ 1.07 3.50 1.57 5.17
2.6............................................ 1.12 3.67 1.60 5.25
2.7............................................ 1.14 3.75 1.63 5.33
2.8............................................ 1.17 3.83 1.65 5.42
2.9............................................ 1.19 3.92 1.68 5.50
3.0............................................ 1.22 4.00 1.73 5.67
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The employer may apply the distance specified in this table only where the employer determines the
maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage by engineering analysis. (Table 6 applies otherwise.)
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.
Table 10--Minimum Approach Distances Until March 31, 2015--169.1 to 242.0 kV With Overvoltage Factor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.0............................................ 1.17 3.83 1.85 6.08
2.1............................................ 1.22 4.00 1.91 6.25
2.2............................................ 1.24 4.08 1.93 6.33
2.3............................................ 1.30 4.25 1.98 6.50
2.4............................................ 1.35 4.42 2.01 6.58
2.5............................................ 1.37 4.50 2.06 6.75
2.6............................................ 1.42 4.67 2.11 6.92
2.7............................................ 1.47 4.83 2.13 7.00
2.8............................................ 1.50 4.92 2.18 7.17
2.9............................................ 1.55 5.08 2.24 7.33
3.0............................................ 1.60 5.25 2.29 7.50
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The employer may apply the distance specified in this table only where the employer determines the
maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage by engineering analysis. (Table 6 applies otherwise.)
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.
Table 11--Minimum Approach Distances Until March 31, 2015--242.1 to 362.0 kV With Overvoltage Factor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.0............................................ 1.60 5.25 2.62 8.58
2.1............................................ 1.65 5.42 2.69 8.83
2.2............................................ 1.75 5.75 2.79 9.17
2.3............................................ 1.85 6.08 2.90 9.50
2.4............................................ 1.93 6.33 3.02 9.92
2.5............................................ 2.03 6.67 3.15 10.33
2.6............................................ 2.16 7.08 3.28 10.75
2.7............................................ 2.26 7.42 3.40 11.17
2.8............................................ 2.36 7.75 3.53 11.58
2.9............................................ 2.49 8.17 3.68 12.08
3.0............................................ 2.59 8.50 3.81 12.50
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The employer may apply the distance specified in this table only where the employer determines the
maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage by engineering analysis. (Table 6 applies otherwise.)
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.
Table 12--Minimum Approach Distances Until March 31, 2015--362.1 to 552.0 kV With Overvoltage Factor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................ 1.83 6.00 2.24 7.33
1.6............................................ 1.98 6.50 2.67 8.75
1.7............................................ 2.13 7.00 3.10 10.17
1.8............................................ 2.31 7.58 3.53 11.58
1.9............................................ 2.46 8.08 4.01 13.17
2.0............................................ 2.67 8.75 4.52 14.83
2.1............................................ 2.84 9.33 4.75 15.58
2.2............................................ 3.02 9.92 4.98 16.33
2.3............................................ 3.20 10.50 5.23 17.17
2.4............................................ 3.43 11.25 5.51 18.08
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The employer may apply the distance specified in this table only where the employer determines the
maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage by engineering analysis. (Table 6 applies otherwise.)
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.
Table 13--Minimum Approach Distances Until March 31, 2015--552.1 to 800.0 kV With Overvoltage Factor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................ 2.95 9.67 3.68 12.08
1.6............................................ 3.25 10.67 4.42 14.50
1.7............................................ 3.56 11.67 5.23 17.17
1.8............................................ 3.86 12.67 6.07 19.92
1.9............................................ 4.19 13.75 6.99 22.92
2.0............................................ 4.55 14.92 7.92 26.00
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The employer may apply the distance specified in this table only where the employer determines the
maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage by engineering analysis. (Table 6 applies otherwise.)
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.
B. Alternative minimum approach distances. Employers may use the
minimum approach distances in Table 14 through Table 21 provided
that the employer follows the notes to those tables.
Table 14--AC Minimum Approach Distances--72.6 to 121.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................ 0.67 2.2 0.84 2.8
1.6............................................ 0.69 2.3 0.87 2.9
1.7............................................ 0.71 2.3 0.90 3.0
1.8............................................ 0.74 2.4 0.93 3.1
1.9............................................ 0.76 2.5 0.96 3.1
2.0............................................ 0.78 2.6 0.99 3.2
2.1............................................ 0.81 2.7 1.01 3.3
2.2............................................ 0.83 2.7 1.04 3.4
2.3............................................ 0.85 2.8 1.07 3.5
2.4............................................ 0.88 2.9 1.10 3.6
2.5............................................ 0.90 3.0 1.13 3.7
2.6............................................ 0.92 3.0 1.16 3.8
2.7............................................ 0.95 3.1 1.19 3.9
2.8............................................ 0.97 3.2 1.22 4.0
2.9............................................ 0.99 3.2 1.24 4.1
3.0............................................ 1.02 3.3 1.27 4.2
3.1............................................ 1.04 3.4 1.30 4.3
3.2............................................ 1.06 3.5 1.33 4.4
3.3............................................ 1.09 3.6 1.36 4.5
3.4............................................ 1.11 3.6 1.39 4.6
3.5............................................ 1.13 3.7 1.42 4.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 15--AC Minimum Approach Distances--121.1 to 145.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................ 0.74 2.4 0.95 3.1
1.6............................................ 0.76 2.5 0.98 3.2
1.7............................................ 0.79 2.6 1.02 3.3
1.8............................................ 0.82 2.7 1.05 3.4
1.9............................................ 0.85 2.8 1.08 3.5
2.0............................................ 0.88 2.9 1.12 3.7
2.1............................................ 0.90 3.0 1.15 3.8
2.2............................................ 0.93 3.1 1.19 3.9
2.3............................................ 0.96 3.1 1.22 4.0
2.4............................................ 0.99 3.2 1.26 4.1
2.5............................................ 1.02 3.3 1.29 4.2
2.6............................................ 1.04 3.4 1.33 4.4
2.7............................................ 1.07 3.5 1.36 4.5
2.8............................................ 1.10 3.6 1.39 4.6
2.9............................................ 1.13 3.7 1.43 4.7
3.0............................................ 1.16 3.8 1.46 4.8
3.1............................................ 1.19 3.9 1.50 4.9
3.2............................................ 1.21 4.0 1.53 5.0
3.3............................................ 1.24 4.1 1.57 5.2
3.4............................................ 1.27 4.2 1.60 5.2
3.5............................................ 1.30 4.3 1.64 5.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 16--AC Minimum Approach Distances--145.1 to 169.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................ 0.81 2.7 1.05 3.4
1.6............................................ 0.84 2.8 1.09 3.6
1.7............................................ 0.87 2.9 1.13 3.7
1.8............................................ 0.90 3.0 1.17 3.8
1.9............................................ 0.94 3.1 1.21 4.0
2.0............................................ 0.97 3.2 1.25 4.1
2.1............................................ 1.00 3.3 1.29 4.2
2.2............................................ 1.03 3.4 1.33 4.4
2.3............................................ 1.07 3.5 1.37 4.5
2.4............................................ 1.10 3.6 1.41 4.6
2.5............................................ 1.13 3.7 1.45 4.8
2.6............................................ 1.17 3.8 1.49 4.9
2.7............................................ 1.20 3.9 1.53 5.0
2.8............................................ 1.23 4.0 1.57 5.2
2.9............................................ 1.26 4.1 1.61 5.3
3.0............................................ 1.30 4.3 1.65 5.4
3.1............................................ 1.33 4.4 1.70 5.6
3.2............................................ 1.36 4.5 1.76 5.8
3.3............................................ 1.39 4.6 1.82 6.0
3.4............................................ 1.43 4.7 1.88 6.2
3.5............................................ 1.46 4.8 1.94 6.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 17--AC Minimum Approach Distances--169.1 to 242.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................ 1.02 3.3 1.37 4.5
1.6............................................ 1.06 3.5 1.43 4.7
1.7............................................ 1.11 3.6 1.48 4.9
1.8............................................ 1.16 3.8 1.54 5.1
1.9............................................ 1.21 4.0 1.60 5.2
2.0............................................ 1.25 4.1 1.66 5.4
2.1............................................ 1.30 4.3 1.73 5.7
2.2............................................ 1.35 4.4 1.81 5.9
2.3............................................ 1.39 4.6 1.90 6.2
2.4............................................ 1.44 4.7 1.99 6.5
2.5............................................ 1.49 4.9 2.08 6.8
2.6............................................ 1.53 5.0 2.17 7.1
2.7............................................ 1.58 5.2 2.26 7.4
2.8............................................ 1.63 5.3 2.36 7.7
2.9............................................ 1.67 5.5 2.45 8.0
3.0............................................ 1.72 5.6 2.55 8.4
3.1............................................ 1.77 5.8 2.65 8.7
3.2............................................ 1.81 5.9 2.76 9.1
3.3............................................ 1.88 6.2 2.86 9.4
3.4............................................ 1.95 6.4 2.97 9.7
3.5............................................ 2.01 6.6 3.08 10.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 18--AC Minimum Approach Distances--242.1 to 362.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................ 1.37 4.5 1.99 6.5
1.6............................................ 1.44 4.7 2.13 7.0
1.7............................................ 1.51 5.0 2.27 7.4
1.8............................................ 1.58 5.2 2.41 7.9
1.9............................................ 1.65 5.4 2.56 8.4
2.0............................................ 1.72 5.6 2.71 8.9
2.1............................................ 1.79 5.9 2.87 9.4
2.2............................................ 1.87 6.1 3.03 9.9
2.3............................................ 1.97 6.5 3.20 10.5
2.4............................................ 2.08 6.8 3.37 11.1
2.5............................................ 2.19 7.2 3.55 11.6
2.6............................................ 2.29 7.5 3.73 12.2
2.7............................................ 2.41 7.9 3.91 12.8
2.8............................................ 2.52 8.3 4.10 13.5
2.9............................................ 2.64 8.7 4.29 14.1
3.0............................................ 2.76 9.1 4.49 14.7
3.1............................................ 2.88 9.4 4.69 15.4
3.2............................................ 3.01 9.9 4.90 16.1
3.3............................................ 3.14 10.3 5.11 16.8
3.4............................................ 3.27 10.7 5.32 17.5
3.5............................................ 3.41 11.2 5.52 18.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 19--AC Minimum Approach Distances--362.1 to 420.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................ 1.53 5.0 2.40 7.9
1.6............................................ 1.62 5.3 2.58 8.5
1.7............................................ 1.70 5.6 2.75 9.0
1.8............................................ 1.78 5.8 2.94 9.6
1.9............................................ 1.88 6.2 3.13 10.3
2.0............................................ 1.99 6.5 3.33 10.9
2.1............................................ 2.12 7.0 3.53 11.6
2.2............................................ 2.24 7.3 3.74 12.3
2.3............................................ 2.37 7.8 3.95 13.0
2.4............................................ 2.50 8.2 4.17 13.7
2.5............................................ 2.64 8.7 4.40 14.4
2.6............................................ 2.78 9.1 4.63 15.2
2.7............................................ 2.93 9.6 4.87 16.0
2.8............................................ 3.07 10.1 5.11 16.8
2.9............................................ 3.23 10.6 5.36 17.6
3.0............................................ 3.38 11.1 5.59 18.3
3.1............................................ 3.55 11.6 5.82 19.1
3.2............................................ 3.72 12.2 6.07 19.9
3.3............................................ 3.89 12.8 6.31 20.7
3.4............................................ 4.07 13.4 6.56 21.5
3.5............................................ 4.25 13.9 6.81 22.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 20--AC Minimum Approach Distances--420.1 to 550.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................ 1.95 6.4 3.46 11.4
1.6............................................ 2.11 6.9 3.73 12.2
1.7............................................ 2.28 7.5 4.02 13.2
1.8............................................ 2.45 8.0 4.31 14.1
1.9............................................ 2.62 8.6 4.61 15.1
2.0............................................ 2.81 9.2 4.92 16.1
2.1............................................ 3.00 9.8 5.25 17.2
2.2............................................ 3.20 10.5 5.55 18.2
2.3............................................ 3.40 11.2 5.86 19.2
2.4............................................ 3.62 11.9 6.18 20.3
2.5............................................ 3.84 12.6 6.50 21.3
2.6............................................ 4.07 13.4 6.83 22.4
2.7............................................ 4.31 14.1 7.18 23.6
2.8............................................ 4.56 15.0 7.52 24.7
2.9............................................ 4.81 15.8 7.88 25.9
3.0............................................ 5.07 16.6 8.24 27.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 21--AC Minimum Approach Distances--550.1 to 800.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................ 3.16 10.4 5.97 19.6
1.6............................................ 3.46 11.4 6.43 21.1
1.7............................................ 3.78 12.4 6.92 22.7
1.8............................................ 4.12 13.5 7.42 24.3
1.9............................................ 4.47 14.7 7.93 26.0
2.0............................................ 4.83 15.8 8.47 27.8
2.1............................................ 5.21 17.1 9.02 29.6
2.2............................................ 5.61 18.4 9.58 31.4
2.3............................................ 6.02 19.8 10.16 33.3
2.4............................................ 6.44 21.1 10.76 35.3
2.5............................................ 6.88 22.6 11.38 37.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes to Table 14 through Table 21:
1. The employer must determine the maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, through
an engineering analysis, as required by Sec. 1910.269(l)(3)(ii), or assume a maximum anticipated per-unit
transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, in accordance with Table R-9.
2. For phase-to-phase exposures, the employer must demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap and that no
large conductive object is in the gap.
3. The worksite must be at an elevation of 900 meters (3,000 feet) or less above sea level.
Appendix C to Sec. 1910.269--Protection From Hazardous Differences in
Electric Potential
I. Introduction
Current passing through an impedance impresses voltage across
that impedance. Even conductors have some, albeit low, value of
impedance. Therefore, if a "grounded" \14\ object, such as a crane
or deenergized and grounded power line, results in a ground fault on
a power line, voltage is impressed on that grounded object. The
voltage impressed on the grounded object depends largely on the
voltage on the line, on the impedance of the faulted conductor, and
on the impedance to "true," or "absolute," ground represented by
the object. If the impedance of the object causing the fault is
relatively large, the voltage impressed on the object is essentially
the phase-to-ground system voltage. However, even faults to grounded
power lines or to well grounded transmission towers or substation
structures (which have relatively low values of impedance to ground)
can result in hazardous voltages.\15\ In all cases, the degree of
the hazard depends on the magnitude of the current through the
employee and the time of exposure. This appendix discusses methods
of protecting workers against the possibility that grounded objects,
such as cranes and other mechanical equipment, will contact
energized power lines and that deenergized and grounded power lines
will become accidentally energized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ This appendix generally uses the term "grounded" only
with respect to grounding that the employer intentionally installs,
for example, the grounding an employer installs on a deenergized
conductor. However, in this case, the term "grounded" means
connected to earth, regardless of whether or not that connection is
intentional.
\15\ Thus, grounding systems for transmission towers and
substation structures should be designed to minimize the step and
touch potentials involved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Voltage-Gradient Distribution
A. Voltage-gradient distribution curve. Absolute, or true,
ground serves as a reference and always has a voltage of 0 volts
above ground potential. Because there is an impedance between a
grounding electrode and absolute ground, there will be a voltage
difference between the grounding electrode and absolute ground under
ground-fault conditions. Voltage dissipates from the grounding
electrode (or from the grounding point) and creates a ground
potential gradient. The voltage decreases rapidly with increasing
distance from the grounding electrode. A voltage drop associated
with this dissipation of voltage is a ground potential. Figure 1 is
a typical voltage-gradient distribution curve (assuming a uniform
soil texture).
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.028
B. Step and touch potentials. Figure 1 also shows that workers
are at risk from step and touch potentials. Step potential is the
voltage between the feet of a person standing near an energized
grounded object (the electrode). In Figure 1, the step potential is
equal to the difference in voltage between two points at different
distances from the electrode (where the points represent the
location of each foot in relation to the electrode). A person could
be at risk of injury during a fault simply by standing near the
object.
Touch potential is the voltage between the energized grounded
object (again, the electrode) and the feet of a person in contact
with the object. In Figure 1, the touch potential is equal to the
difference in voltage between the electrode (which is at a distance
of 0 meters) and a point some distance away from the electrode
(where the point represents the location of the feet of the person
in contact with the object). The touch potential could be nearly the
full voltage across the grounded object if that object is grounded
at a point remote from the place where the person is in contact with
it. For example, a crane grounded to the system neutral and that
contacts an energized line would expose any person in contact with
the crane or its uninsulated load line to a touch potential nearly
equal to the full fault voltage.
Figure 2 illustrates step and touch potentials.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.029
III. Protecting Workers From Hazardous Differences in Electrical
Potential
A. Definitions. The following definitions apply to section III
of this appendix:
Bond. The electrical interconnection of conductive parts
designed to maintain a common electric potential.
Bonding cable (bonding jumper). A cable connected to two
conductive parts to bond the parts together.
Cluster bar. A terminal temporarily attached to a structure that
provides a means for the attachment and bonding of grounding and
bonding cables to the structure.
Ground. A conducting connection between an electric circuit or
equipment and the earth, or to some conducting body that serves in
place of the earth.
Grounding cable (grounding jumper). A cable connected between a
deenergized part and ground. Note that grounding cables carry fault
current and bonding cables generally do
not. A cable that bonds two conductive parts but carries substantial
fault current (for example, a jumper connected between one phase and
a grounded phase) is a grounding cable.
Ground mat (grounding grid). A temporarily or permanently
installed metallic mat or grating that establishes an equipotential
surface and provides connection points for attaching grounds.
B. Analyzing the hazard. The employer can use an engineering
analysis of the power system under fault conditions to determine
whether hazardous step and touch voltages will develop. The analysis
should determine the voltage on all conductive objects in the work
area and the amount of time the voltage will be present. Based on
the this analysis, the employer can select appropriate measures and
protective equipment, including the measures and protective
equipment outlined in Section III of this appendix, to protect each
employee from hazardous differences in electric potential. For
example, from the analysis, the employer will know the voltage
remaining on conductive objects after employees install bonding and
grounding equipment and will be able to select insulating equipment
with an appropriate rating, as described in paragraph III.C.2 of
this appendix.
C. Protecting workers on the ground. The employer may use
several methods, including equipotential zones, insulating
equipment, and restricted work areas, to protect employees on the
ground from hazardous differences in electrical potential.
1. An equipotential zone will protect workers within it from
hazardous step and touch potentials. (See Figure 3.) Equipotential
zones will not, however, protect employees located either wholly or
partially outside the protected area. The employer can establish an
equipotential zone for workers on the ground, with respect to a
grounded object, through the use of a metal mat connected to the
grounded object. The employer can use a grounding grid to equalize
the voltage within the grid or bond conductive objects in the
immediate work area to minimize the potential between the objects
and between each object and ground. (Bonding an object outside the
work area can increase the touch potential to that object, however.)
Section III.D of this appendix discusses equipotential zones for
employees working on deenergized and grounded power lines.
2. Insulating equipment, such as rubber gloves, can protect
employees handling grounded equipment and conductors from hazardous
touch potentials. The insulating equipment must be rated for the
highest voltage that can be impressed on the grounded objects under
fault conditions (rather than for the full system voltage).
3. Restricting employees from areas where hazardous step or
touch potentials could arise can protect employees not directly
involved in performing the operation. The employer must ensure that
employees on the ground in the vicinity of transmission structures
are at a distance where step voltages would be insufficient to cause
injury. Employees must not handle grounded conductors or equipment
likely to become energized to hazardous voltages unless the
employees are within an equipotential zone or protected by
insulating equipment.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.030
BILLING CODE 4510-25-C
D. Protecting employees working on deenergized and grounded
power lines. This Section III.D of Appendix C establishes guidelines
to help employers comply with requirements in Sec. 1910.269(n) for
using protective grounding to protect employees working on
deenergized power lines. Paragraph (n) of Sec. 1910.269 applies to
grounding of transmission and distribution lines and equipment for
the purpose of protecting workers. Paragraph (n)(3) of Sec.
1910.269 requires temporary protective grounds to be placed at such
locations and arranged in such a manner that the employer can
demonstrate will prevent exposure of each employee to hazardous
differences in electric potential.\16\ Sections III.D.1 and III.D.2
of this appendix provide guidelines that employers can use in making
the demonstration required by Sec. 1910.269(n)(3). Section III.D.1
of this appendix provides guidelines on how the employer can
determine whether particular grounding practices expose employees to
hazardous differences in electric potential. Section III.D.2 of this
appendix describes grounding methods that the employer can use in
lieu of an engineering analysis to make the demonstration required
by Sec. 1910.269(n)(3). The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration will consider employers that comply with the criteria
in this appendix as meeting Sec. 1910.269(n)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ The protective grounding required by Sec. 1910.269(n)
limits to safe values the potential differences between accessible
objects in each employee's work environment. Ideally, a protective
grounding system would create a true equipotential zone in which
every point is at the same electric potential. In practice, current
passing through the grounding and bonding elements creates potential
differences. If these potential differences are hazardous, the
employer may not treat the zone as an equipotential zone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, Section III.D.3 of this appendix discusses other safety
considerations that will help the employer comply with other
requirements in Sec. 1910.269(n). Following these guidelines will
protect workers from hazards that can occur when a deenergized and
grounded line becomes energized.
1. Determining safe body current limits. This Section III.D.1 of
Appendix C provides guidelines on how an employer can determine
whether any differences in electric potential to which workers could
be exposed are hazardous as part of the demonstration required by
Sec. 1910.269(n)(3).
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard
1048-2003, IEEE Guide for Protective Grounding of Power Lines,
provides the following equation for determining the threshold of
ventricular fibrillation when the duration of the electric shock is
limited:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.031
where I is the current through the worker's body, and t is the
duration of the current in seconds. This equation represents the
ventricular fibrillation threshold for 95.5 percent of the adult
population with a mass of 50 kilograms (110 pounds) or more. The
equation is valid for current durations between 0.0083 to 3.0
seconds.
To use this equation to set safe voltage limits in an
equipotential zone around the worker, the employer will need to
assume a value for the resistance of the worker's body. IEEE Std
1048-2003 states that "total body resistance is usually taken as
1000 [Omega] for determining . . . body current limits." However,
employers should be aware that the impedance of a worker's body can
be substantially less than that value. For instance, IEEE Std 1048-
2003 reports a minimum hand-to-hand resistance of 610 ohms and an
internal body resistance of 500 ohms. The internal resistance of the
body better represents the minimum resistance of a worker's body
when the skin resistance drops near zero, which occurs, for example,
when there are breaks in the worker's skin, for instance, from cuts
or from blisters formed as a result of the current from an electric
shock, or when the worker is wet at the points of contact.
Employers may use the IEEE Std 1048-2003 equation to determine
safe body current limits only if the employer protects workers from
hazards associated with involuntary muscle reactions from electric
shock (for example, the hazard to a worker from falling as a result
of an electric shock). Moreover, the equation applies only when the
duration of the electric shock is limited. If the precautions the
employer takes, including those required by applicable standards, do
not adequately protect employees from hazards associated with
involuntary reactions from electric shock, a hazard exists if the
induced voltage is sufficient to pass a current of 1 milliampere
through a 500-ohm resistor. (The 500-ohm resistor represents the
resistance of an employee. The 1-milliampere current is the
threshold of perception.) Finally, if the employer protects
employees from injury due to involuntary reactions from electric
shock, but the duration of the electric shock is unlimited (that is,
when the fault current at the work location will be insufficient to
trip the devices protecting the circuit), a hazard exists if the
resultant current would be more than 6 milliamperes (the recognized
let-go threshold for workers \17\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Electric current passing through the body has varying
effects depending on the amount of the current. At the let-go
threshold, the current overrides a person's control over his or her
muscles. At that level, an employee grasping an object will not be
able to let go of the object. The let-go threshold varies from
person to person; however, the recognized value for workers is 6
milliamperes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Acceptable methods of grounding for employers that do not
perform an engineering determination. The grounding methods
presented in this section of this appendix ensure that differences
in electric potential are as low as possible and, therefore, meet
Sec. 1910.269(n)(3) without an engineering determination of the
potential differences. These methods follow two principles: (i) The
grounding method must ensure that the circuit opens in the fastest
available clearing time, and (ii) the grounding method must ensure
that the potential differences between conductive objects in the
employee's work area are as low as possible.
Paragraph (n)(3) of Sec. 1910.269 does not require grounding
methods to meet the criteria embodied in these principles. Instead,
the paragraph requires that protective grounds be "placed at such
locations and arranged in such a manner that the employer can
demonstrate will prevent exposure of each employee to hazardous
differences in electric potential." However, when the employer's
grounding practices do not follow these two principles, the employer
will need to perform an engineering analysis to make the
demonstration required by Sec. 1910.269(n)(3).
i. Ensuring that the circuit opens in the fastest available
clearing time. Generally, the higher the fault current, the shorter
the clearing times for the same type of fault. Therefore, to ensure
the fastest available clearing time, the grounding method must
maximize the fault current with a low impedance connection to
ground. The employer accomplishes this objective by grounding the
circuit conductors to the best ground available at the worksite.
Thus, the employer must ground to a grounded system neutral
conductor, if one is present. A grounded system neutral has a direct
connection to the system ground at the source, resulting in an
extremely low impedance to ground. In a substation, the employer may
instead ground to the substation grid, which also has an extremely
low impedance to the system ground and, typically, is connected to a
grounded system neutral when one is present. Remote system grounds,
such as pole and tower grounds, have a higher impedance to the
system ground than grounded system neutrals and substation grounding
grids; however, the employer may use a remote ground when lower
impedance grounds are not available. In the absence of a grounded
system neutral, substation grid, and remote ground, the employer may
use a temporary driven ground at the worksite.
In addition, if employees are working on a three-phase system,
the grounding method must short circuit all three phases. Short
circuiting all phases will ensure faster clearing and lower the
current through the grounding cable connecting the deenergized line
to ground, thereby lowering the voltage across that cable. The short
circuit need not be at the worksite; however, the employer must
treat any conductor that is not grounded at the worksite as
energized because the ungrounded conductors will be energized at
fault voltage during a fault.
ii. Ensuring that the potential differences between conductive
objects in the employee's work area are as low as possible. To
achieve as low a voltage as possible across any two conductive
objects in the work area, the employer must bond all conductive
objects in the work area. This section of this appendix discusses
how to create a zone that minimizes differences in electric
potential between conductive objects in the work area.
The employer must use bonding cables to bond conductive objects,
except for metallic objects bonded through metal-to-metal contact.
The employer must ensure that metal-to-metal contacts are tight and
free of contamination, such as oxidation, that can increase the
impedance across the connection. For example, a bolted connection
between metal lattice tower members is acceptable if the connection
is tight and free of corrosion and other contamination. Figure 4
shows how to create an equipotential zone for metal lattice towers.
Wood poles are conductive objects. The poles can absorb moisture
and conduct electricity, particularly at distribution and
transmission voltages. Consequently, the employer must either: (1)
Provide a conductive platform, bonded to a grounding cable, on which
the worker stands or (2) use cluster bars to bond wood poles to the
grounding cable. The employer must ensure that employees install the
cluster bar below, and close to, the worker's feet. The inner
portion of the wood pole is more conductive than the outer shell, so
it is important that the cluster bar be in conductive contact with a
metal spike or nail that penetrates the wood to a depth greater than
or equal to the depth the worker's climbing gaffs will penetrate the
wood. For example, the employer could mount the cluster bar on a
bare pole ground wire fastened to the pole with nails or staples
that penetrate to the required depth. Alternatively, the employer
may temporarily nail a conductive strap to the pole and connect the
strap to the cluster bar. Figure 5 shows how to create an
equipotential zone for wood poles.
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.032
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.033
BILLING CODE 4510-26-C
For underground systems, employers commonly install grounds at
the points of disconnection of the underground cables. These
grounding points are typically remote from the manhole or
underground vault where employees will be working on the cable.
Workers in contact with a cable grounded at a remote location can
experience hazardous potential differences if the cable becomes
energized or if a fault occurs on a different, but nearby, energized
cable. The fault current causes potential gradients in the earth,
and a potential difference will exist between the earth where the
worker is standing and the earth where the cable is grounded.
Consequently, to create an equipotential zone for the worker, the
employer must provide a means of connecting the deenergized cable to
ground at the worksite by having the worker stand on a conductive
mat bonded to the deenergized cable. If the cable is cut, the
employer must install a bond across the opening in the cable or
install one bond on each side of the opening to ensure that the
separate cable ends are at the same potential. The employer must
protect the worker from any hazardous differences in potential any
time there is no bond between the mat and the cable (for example,
before the worker installs the bonds).
3. Other safety-related considerations. To ensure that the
grounding system is safe and effective, the employer should also
consider the following factors: \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ This appendix only discusses factors that relate to
ensuring an equipotential zone for employees. The employer must
consider other factors in selecting a grounding system that is
capable of conducting the maximum fault current that could flow at
the point of grounding for the time necessary to clear the fault, as
required by Sec. 1910.269(n)(4)(i). IEEE Std 1048-2003 contains
guidelines for selecting and installing grounding equipment that
will meet Sec. 1910.269(n)(4)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
i. Maintenance of grounding equipment. It is essential that the
employer properly maintain grounding equipment. Corrosion in the
connections between grounding cables and clamps and on the clamp
surface can increase the resistance of the cable, thereby increasing
potential differences. In addition, the surface to which a clamp
attaches, such as a conductor or tower member, must be clean and
free of corrosion and oxidation to ensure a low-resistance
connection. Cables must be free of damage that could reduce their
current-carrying capacity so that they can carry the full fault
current without failure. Each clamp must have a tight connection to
the cable to ensure a low resistance and to ensure that the clamp
does not separate from the cable during a fault.
ii. Grounding cable length and movement. The electromagnetic
forces on grounding cables during a fault increase with increasing
cable length. These forces can cause the cable to move violently
during a fault and can be high enough to damage the cable or clamps
and cause the cable to fail. In addition, flying cables can injure
workers. Consequently, cable lengths should be as short as possible,
and grounding cables that might carry high fault current should be
in positions where the cables will not injure workers during a
fault.
Appendix D to Sec. 1910.269--Methods of Inspecting and Testing Wood
Poles
I. Introduction
When employees are to perform work on a wood pole, it is
important to determine the condition of the pole before employees
climb it. The weight of the employee, the weight of equipment to be
installed, and other working stresses (such as the removal or
retensioning of conductors) can lead to the failure of a defective
pole or a pole that is not designed to handle the additional
stresses.\19\ For these reasons, it is essential that, before an
employee climbs a wood pole, the employer ascertain that the pole is
capable of sustaining the stresses of the work. The determination
that the pole is capable of sustaining these stresses includes an
inspection of the condition of the pole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ A properly guyed pole in good condition should, at a
minimum, be able to handle the weight of an employee climbing it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the employer finds the pole to be unsafe to climb or to work
from, the employer must secure the pole so that it does not fail
while an employee is on it. The employer can secure the pole by a
line truck boom, by ropes or guys, or by lashing a new pole
alongside it. If a new one is lashed alongside the defective pole,
employees should work from the new one.
II. Inspecting Wood Poles
A qualified employee should inspect wood poles for the following
conditions: \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ The presence of any of these conditions is an indication
that the pole may not be safe to climb or to work from. The employee
performing the inspection must be qualified to make a determination
as to whether it is safe to perform the work without taking
additional precautions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. General condition. Buckling at the ground line or an unusual
angle with respect to the ground may indicate that the pole has
rotted or is broken.
B. Cracks. Horizontal cracks perpendicular to the grain of the
wood may weaken the pole. Vertical cracks, although not normally
considered to be a sign of a defective pole, can pose a hazard to
the climber, and the employee should keep his or her gaffs away from
them while climbing.
C. Holes. Hollow spots and woodpecker holes can reduce the
strength of a wood pole.
D. Shell rot and decay. Rotting and decay are cutout hazards and
possible indications of the age and internal condition of the pole.
E. Knots. One large knot or several smaller ones at the same
height on the pole may be evidence of a weak point on the pole.
F. Depth of setting. Evidence of the existence of a former
ground line substantially above the existing ground level may be an
indication that the pole is no longer buried to a sufficient depth.
G. Soil conditions. Soft, wet, or loose soil around the base of
the pole may indicate that the pole will not support any change in
stress.
H. Burn marks. Burning from transformer failures or conductor
faults could damage the pole so that it cannot withstand changes in
mechanical stress.
III. Testing Wood Poles
The following tests, which are from Sec. 1910.268(n)(3), are
acceptable methods of testing wood poles:
A. Hammer test. Rap the pole sharply with a hammer weighing
about 1.4 kg (3 pounds), starting near the ground line and
continuing upwards circumferentially around the pole to a height of
approximately 1.8 meters (6 feet). The hammer will produce a clear
sound and rebound sharply when striking sound wood. Decay pockets
will be indicated by a dull sound or a less pronounced hammer
rebound. Also, prod the pole as near the ground line as possible
using a pole prod or a screwdriver with a blade at least 127
millimeters (5 inches) long. If substantial decay is present, the
pole is unsafe.
B. Rocking test. Apply a horizontal force to the pole and
attempt to rock it back and forth in a direction perpendicular to
the line. Exercise caution to avoid causing power lines to swing
together. Apply the force to the pole either by pushing it with a
pike pole or pulling the pole with a rope. If the pole cracks during
the test, it is unsafe.
Appendix E to Sec. 1910.269--Protection From Flames and Electric Arcs
I. Introduction
Paragraph (l)(8) of Sec. 1910.269 addresses protecting
employees from flames and electric arcs. This paragraph requires
employers to: (1) Assess the workplace for flame and electric-arc
hazards (paragraph (l)(8)(i)); (2) estimate the available heat
energy from electric arcs to which employees would be exposed
(paragraph (l)(8)(ii)); (3) ensure that employees wear clothing that
will not melt, or ignite and continue to burn, when exposed to
flames or the estimated heat energy (paragraph (l)(8)(iii)); and (4)
ensure that employees wear flame-resistant clothing \21\ and
protective clothing and other protective equipment that has an arc
rating greater than or equal to the available heat energy under
certain conditions (paragraphs (l)(8)(iv) and (l)(8)(v)). This
appendix contains information to help employers estimate available
heat energy as required by Sec. 1910.269(l)(8)(ii), select
protective clothing and other protective equipment with an arc
rating suitable for the available heat energy as required by Sec.
1910.269(l)(8)(v), and ensure that employees do not wear flammable
clothing that could lead to burn injury as addressed by Sec. Sec.
1910.269(l)(8)(iii) and (l)(8)(iv).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Flame-resistant clothing includes clothing that is
inherently flame resistant and clothing chemically treated with a
flame retardant. (See ASTM F1506-10a, Standard Performance
Specification for Flame Resistant Textile Materials for Wearing
Apparel for Use by Electrical Workers Exposed to Momentary Electric
Arc and Related Thermal Hazards, and ASTM F1891-12 Standard
Specification for Arc and Flame Resistant Rainwear.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Assessing the Workplace for Flame and Electric-Arc Hazards
Paragraph (l)(8)(i) of Sec. 1910.269 requires the employer to
assess the workplace to identify employees exposed to hazards from
flames or from electric arcs. This provision ensures that the
employer evaluates employee exposure to flames and electric arcs so
that employees who face such exposures receive the required
protection. The employer must conduct an assessment for each
employee who performs work on or near exposed, energized parts of
electric circuits.
A. Assessment Guidelines
Sources electric arcs. Consider possible sources of electric
arcs, including:
Energized circuit parts not guarded or insulated,
Switching devices that produce electric arcs in normal
operation,
Sliding parts that could fault during operation (for
example, rack-mounted circuit breakers), and
Energized electric equipment that could fail (for
example, electric equipment with damaged insulation or with evidence
of arcing or overheating).
Exposure to flames. Identify employees exposed to hazards from
flames. Factors to consider include:
The proximity of employees to open flames, and
For flammable material in the work area, whether there
is a reasonable likelihood that an electric arc or an open flame can
ignite the material.
Probability that an electric arc will occur. Identify employees
exposed to electric-arc hazards. The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration will consider an employee exposed to electric-arc
hazards if there is a reasonable likelihood that an electric arc
will occur in the employee's work area, in other words, if the
probability of such an event is higher than it is for the normal
operation of enclosed equipment. Factors to consider include:
For energized circuit parts not guarded or insulated,
whether conductive objects can
come too close to or fall onto the energized parts,
For exposed, energized circuit parts, whether the
employee is closer to the part than the minimum approach distance
established by the employer (as permitted by Sec.
1910.269(l)(3)(iii)).
Whether the operation of electric equipment with
sliding parts that could fault during operation is part of the
normal operation of the equipment or occurs during servicing or
maintenance, and
For energized electric equipment, whether there is
evidence of impending failure, such as evidence of arcing or
overheating.
B. Examples
Table 1 provides task-based examples of exposure assessments.
Table 1--Example Assessments for Various Tasks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Task Is employee exposed to flame or
electric-arc hazard?
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Normal operation of enclosed equipment, The employer properly installs No.
such as closing or opening a switch. and maintains enclosed
equipment, and there is no
evidence of impending failure.
There is evidence of arcing or Yes.
overheating.
Parts of the equipment are Yes.
loose or sticking, or the
equipment otherwise exhibits
signs of lack of maintenance.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Servicing electric equipment, such as racking in a circuit breaker or Yes.
replacing a switch.
-----------------------------------------
Inspection of electric equipment with The employee is not holding No.
exposed energized parts. conductive objects and remains
outside the minimum approach
distance established by the
employer.
The employee is holding a Yes.
conductive object, such as a
flashlight, that could fall or
otherwise contact energized
parts (irrespective of whether
the employee maintains the
minimum approach distance).
The employee is closer than the Yes.
minimum approach distance
established by the employer
(for example, when wearing
rubber insulating gloves or
rubber insulating gloves and
sleeves).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using open flames, for example, in wiping cable splice sleeves........... Yes.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Protection Against Burn Injury
A. Estimating Available Heat Energy
Calculation methods. Paragraph (l)(8)(ii) of Sec. 1910.269
provides that, for each employee exposed to an electric-arc hazard,
the employer must make a reasonable estimate of the heat energy to
which the employee would be exposed if an arc occurs. Table 2 lists
various methods of calculating values of available heat energy from
an electric circuit. The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration does not endorse any of these specific methods. Each
method requires the input of various parameters, such as fault
current, the expected length of the electric arc, the distance from
the arc to the employee, and the clearing time for the fault (that
is, the time the circuit protective devices take to open the circuit
and clear the fault). The employer can precisely determine some of
these parameters, such as the fault current and the clearing time,
for a given system. The employer will need to estimate other
parameters, such as the length of the arc and the distance between
the arc and the employee, because such parameters vary widely.
Table 2--Methods of Calculating Incident Heat Energy From an Electric
Arc
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Standard for Electrical Safety Requirements for Employee Workplaces,
NFPA 70E-2012, Annex D, "Sample Calculation of Flash Protection
Boundary."
2. Doughty, T.E., Neal, T.E., and Floyd II, H.L., "Predicting Incident
Energy to Better Manage the Electric Arc Hazard on 600 V Power
Distribution Systems," Record of Conference Papers IEEE IAS 45th
Annual Petroleum and Chemical Industry Conference, September 28-30,
1998.
3. Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations, IEEE Std 1584-
2002, 1584a-2004 (Amendment 1 to IEEE Std 1584-2002), and 1584b-2011
(Amendment 2: Changes to Clause 4 of IEEE Std 1584-2002).*
4. ARCPRO, a commercially available software program developed by
Kinectrics, Toronto, ON, CA.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* This appendix refers to IEEE Std 1584-2002 with both amendments as
IEEE Std 1584b-2011.
The amount of heat energy calculated by any of the methods is
approximately inversely proportional to the square of the distance
between the employee and the arc. In other words, if the employee is
very close to the arc, the heat energy is very high; but if the
employee is just a few more centimeters away, the heat energy drops
substantially. Thus, estimating the distance from the arc to the
employee is key to protecting employees.
The employer must select a method of estimating incident heat
energy that provides a reasonable estimate of incident heat energy
for the exposure involved. Table 3 shows which methods provide
reasonable estimates for various exposures.
Table 3--Selecting a Reasonable Incident-Energy Calculation Method \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
600 V and Less \2\ 601 V to 15 kV \2\ More than 15 kV
Incident-energy calculation -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
method 1[Phi] 3[Phi]a 3[Phi]b 1[Phi] 3[Phi]a 3[Phi]b 1[Phi] 3[Phi]a 3[Phi]b
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NFPA 70E-2012 Annex D (Lee Y-C Y N Y-C Y-C N N \3\ N \3\ N \3\
equation).
Doughty, Neal, and Floyd........ Y-C Y Y N N N N N N
IEEE Std 1584b-2011............. Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N
ARCPRO.......................... Y N N Y N N Y Y \4\ Y \4\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key:
1[Phi]: Single-phase arc in open air.
3[Phi]a: Three-phase arc in open air.
3[Phi]b: Three-phase arc in an enclosure (box).
Y: Acceptable; produces a reasonable estimate of incident heat energy from this type of electric arc.
N: Not acceptable; does not produce a reasonable estimate of incident heat energy from this type of electric arc.
Y-C: Acceptable; produces a reasonable, but conservative, estimate of incident heat energy from this type of electric arc.
Notes:
\1\ Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration will consider these methods reasonable for enforcement
purposes when employers use the methods in accordance with this table, employers should be aware that the listed
methods do not necessarily result in estimates that will provide full protection from internal faults in transformers
and similar equipment or from arcs in underground manholes or vaults.
\2\ At these voltages, the presumption is that the arc is three-phase unless the employer can demonstrate that only one
phase is present or that the spacing of the phases is sufficient to prevent a multiphase arc from occurring.
\3\ Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration will consider this method acceptable for purposes of
assessing whether incident energy exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\, the results at voltages of more than 15 kilovolts are
extremely conservative and unrealistic.
\4\ The Occupational Safety and Health Administration will deem the results of this method reasonable when the employer
adjusts them using the conversion factors for three-phase arcs in open air or in an enclosure, as indicated in the
program's instructions.
Selecting a reasonable distance from the employee to the arc. In
estimating available heat energy, the employer must make some
reasonable assumptions about how far the employee will be from the
electric arc. Table 4 lists reasonable distances from the employee
to the electric arc. The distances in Table 4 are consistent with
national consensus standards, such as the Institute of Electrical
and Electronic Engineers' National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI/IEEE
C2-2012, and IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard
Calculations, IEEE Std 1584b-2011. The employer is free to use other
reasonable distances, but must consider equipment enclosure size and
the working distance to the employee in selecting a distance from
the employee to the arc. The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration will consider a distance reasonable when the employer
bases it on equipment size and working distance.
Table 4--Selecting a Reasonable Distance From the Employee to the Electric Arc
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Single-phase arc mm Three-phase arc mm
Class of equipment (inches) (inches)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cable......................................................... * NA 455 (18)
Low voltage MCCs and panelboards.............................. NA 455 (18)
Low-voltage switchgear........................................ NA 610 (24)
5-kV switchgear............................................... NA 910 (36)
15-kV switchgear.............................................. NA 910 (36)
Single conductors in air (up to 46 kilovolts), work with 380 (15) NA
rubber insulating gloves.....................................
Single conductors in air, work with live-line tools and live- MAD - (2 x kV x 2.54) NA
line barehand work........................................... (MAD - (2 x kV /10))
[dagger]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* NA = not applicable.
[dagger] The terms in this equation are:
MAD = The applicable minimum approach distance, and
kV = The system voltage in kilovolts.
Selecting a reasonable arc gap. For a single-phase arc in air,
the electric arc will almost always occur when an energized
conductor approaches too close to ground. Thus, an employer can
determine the arc gap, or arc length, for these exposures by the
dielectric strength of air and the voltage on the line. The
dielectric strength of air is approximately 10 kilovolts for every
25.4 millimeters (1 inch). For example, at 50 kilovolts, the arc gap
would be 50 / 10 x 25.4 (or 50 x 2.54), which equals 127 millimeters
(5 inches).
For three-phase arcs in open air and in enclosures, the arc gap
will generally be dependent on the spacing between parts energized
at different electrical potentials. Documents such as IEEE Std
1584b-2011 provide information on these distances. Employers may
select a reasonable arc gap from Table 5, or they may select any
other reasonable arc gap based on sparkover distance or on the
spacing between (1) live parts at different potentials or (2) live
parts and grounded parts (for example, bus or conductor spacings in
equipment). In any event, the employer must use an estimate that
reasonably resembles the actual exposures faced by the employee.
Table 5--Selecting a Reasonable Arc Gap
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Class of equipment Single-phase arc mm (inches) Three-phase arc mm \1\ (inches)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cable............................ NA \2\................................ 13 (0.5).
Low voltage MCCs and panelboards. NA.................................... 25 (1.0).
Low-voltage switchgear........... NA.................................... 32 (1.25).
5-kV switchgear.................. NA.................................... 104 (4.0).
15-kV switchgear................. NA.................................... 152 (6.0).
Single conductors in air, 15 kV 51 (2.0).............................. Phase conductor spacing.
and less..
Single conductor in air, more Voltage in kV x 2.54.................. Phase conductor spacing.
than 15 kV. (Voltage in kV x 0.1), but no less
than 51 mm (2 inches).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Source: IEEE Std 1584b-2011.
\2\ NA = not applicable.
Making estimates over multiple system areas. The employer need
not estimate the heat-energy exposure for every job task performed
by each employee. Paragraph (l)(8)(ii) of Sec. 1910.269 permits the
employer to make broad estimates that cover multiple system areas
provided that: (1) The employer uses reasonable assumptions about
the energy-exposure distribution throughout the system, and (2) the
estimates represent the maximum exposure for those areas. For
example, the employer can use the maximum fault current and clearing
time to cover several system areas at once.
Incident heat energy for single-phase-to-ground exposures. Table
6 and Table 7 provide incident heat energy levels for open-air,
phase-to-ground electric-arc exposures typical for overhead
systems.\22\ Table 6 presents estimates of available energy for
employees using rubber insulating gloves to perform work on overhead
systems operating at 4 to 46 kilovolts. The table assumes that the
employee will be 380 millimeters (15 inches) from the electric arc,
which is a reasonable estimate for rubber insulating glove work.
Table 6 also assumes that the arc length equals the sparkover
distance for the maximum transient overvoltage of each voltage
range.\23\ To use the table, an employer would use the voltage,
maximum fault current, and maximum clearing time for a system area
and, using the appropriate voltage range and fault-current and
clearing-time values corresponding to the next higher values listed
in the table, select the appropriate heat energy (4, 5, 8, or 12
cal/cm\2\) from the table. For example, an employer might have a
12,470-volt power line supplying a system area. The power line can
supply a maximum fault current of 8 kiloamperes with a maximum
clearing time of 10 cycles. For rubber glove work, this system falls
in the 4.0-to-15.0-kilovolt range; the next-higher fault current is
10 kA (the second row in that voltage range); and the clearing time
is under 18 cycles (the first column to the right of the fault
current column). Thus, the available heat energy for this part of
the system will be 4 cal/cm\2\ or less (from the column heading),
and the employer could select protection with a 5-cal/cm\2\ rating
to meet Sec. 1910.269(l)(8)(v). Alternatively, an employer could
select a base incident-energy value and ensure that the clearing
times for each voltage range and fault current listed in the table
do not exceed the corresponding clearing time specified in the
table. For example, an employer that provides employees with arc-
flash protective equipment rated at 8 cal/cm\2\ can use the table to
determine if any system area exceeds 8 cal/cm\2\ by checking the
clearing time for the highest fault current for each voltage range
and ensuring that the clearing times do not exceed the values
specified in the 8-cal/cm\2\ column in the table.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ The Occupational Safety and Health Administration used
metric values to calculate the clearing times in Table 6 and Table
7. An employer may use English units to calculate clearing times
instead even though the results will differ slightly.
\23\ The Occupational Safety and Health Administration based
this assumption, which is more conservative than the arc length
specified in Table 5, on Table 410-2 of the 2012 NESC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 7 presents similar estimates for employees using live-line
tools to perform work on overhead systems operating at voltages of 4
to 800 kilovolts. The table assumes that the arc length will be
equal to the sparkover distance \24\ and that the employee will be a
distance from the arc equal to the minimum approach distance minus
twice the sparkover distance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ The dielectric strength of air is about 10 kilovolts for
every 25.4 millimeters (1 inch). Thus, the employer can estimate the
arc length in millimeters to be the phase-to-ground voltage in
kilovolts multiplied by 2.54 (or voltage (in kilovolts) x 2.54).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The employer will need to use other methods for estimating
available heat energy in situations not addressed by Table 6 or
Table 7. The calculation methods listed in Table 2 and the guidance
provided in Table 3 will help employers do this. For example,
employers can use IEEE Std 1584b-2011 to estimate the available heat
energy (and to select appropriate protective equipment) for many
specific conditions, including lower-voltage, phase-to-phase arc,
and enclosed arc exposures.
Table 6--Incident Heat Energy for Various Fault Currents, Clearing Times, and Voltages of 4.0 to 46.0 kV: Rubber
Insulating Glove Exposures Involving Phase-to-Ground Arcs in Open Air Only * [dagger] [Dagger]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum clearing time (cycles)
Voltage range (kV) ** Fault current ---------------------------------------------------------------
(kA) 4 cal/cm\2\ 5 cal/cm\2\ 8 cal/cm\2\ 12 cal/cm\2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.0 to 15.0..................... 5 46 58 92 138
10 18 22 36 54
15 10 12 20 30
20 6 8 13 19
15.1 to 25.0.................... 5 28 34 55 83
10 11 14 23 34
15 7 8 13 20
20 4 5 9 13
25.1 to 36.0.................... 5 21 26 42 62
10 9 11 18 26
15 5 6 10 16
20 4 4 7 11
36.1 to 46.0.................... 5 16 20 32 48
10 7 9 14 21
15 4 5 8 13
20 3 4 6 9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:* This table is for open-air, phase-to-ground electric-arc exposures. It is not for phase-to-phase arcs or
enclosed arcs (arc in a box).
[dagger] The table assumes that the employee will be 380 mm (15 in.) from the electric arc. The table also
assumes the arc length to be the sparkover distance for the maximum transient overvoltage of each voltage
range (see Appendix B to Sec. 1910.269), as follows:
4.0 to 15.0 kV 51 mm (2 in.)
15.1 to 25.0 kV 102 mm (4 in.)
25.1 to 36.0 kV 152 mm (6 in.)
36.1 to 46.0 kV 229 mm (9 in.)
[Dagger]The Occupational Safety and Health Administration calculated the values in this table using the ARCPRO
method listed in Table 2.
** The voltage range is the phase-to-phase system voltage.
Table 7--Incident Heat Energy for Various Fault Currents, Clearing Times, and Voltages: Live-Line Tool Exposures
Involving Phase-to-Ground Arcs in Open Air Only * [dagger] [Dagger]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum clearing time (cycles)
Voltage range (kV) ** Fault current ---------------------------------------------------------------
(kA) 4 cal/cm\2\ 5 cal/cm\2\ 8 cal/cm\2\ 12 cal/cm\2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.0 to 15.0..................... 5 197 246 394 591
10 73 92 147 220
15 39 49 78 117
20 24 31 49 73
15.1 to 25.0.................... 5 197 246 394 591
10 75 94 150 225
15 41 51 82 122
20 26 33 52 78
25.1 to 36.0.................... 5 138 172 275 413
10 53 66 106 159
15 30 37 59 89
20 19 24 38 58
36.1 to 46.0.................... 5 129 161 257 386
10 51 64 102 154
15 29 36 58 87
20 19 24 38 57
46.1 to 72.5.................... 20 18 23 36 55
30 10 13 20 30
40 6 8 13 19
50 4 6 9 13
72.6 to 121.0................... 20 10 12 20 30
30 6 7 11 17
40 4 5 7 11
50 3 3 5 8
121.1 to 145.0.................. 20 12 15 24 35
30 7 9 15 22
40 5 6 10 15
50 4 5 8 11
145.1 to 169.0.................. 20 12 15 24 36
30 7 9 15 22
40 5 7 10 16
50 4 5 8 12
169.1 to 242.0.................. 20 13 17 27 40
30 8 10 17 25
40 6 7 12 17
50 4 5 9 13
242.1 to 362.0.................. 20 25 32 51 76
30 16 19 31 47
40 11 14 22 33
50 8 10 16 25
362.1 to 420.0.................. 20 12 15 25 37
30 8 10 15 23
40 5 7 11 16
50 4 5 8 12
420.1 to 550.0.................. 20 23 29 47 70
30 14 18 29 43
40 10 13 20 30
50 8 9 15 23
550.1 to 800.0.................. 20 25 31 50 75
30 15 19 31 46
40 11 13 21 32
50 8 10 16 24
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
* This table is for open-air, phase-to-ground electric-arc exposures. It is not for phase-to-phase arcs or
enclosed arcs (arc in a box).
[dagger] The table assumes the arc length to be the sparkover distance for the maximum phase-to-ground voltage
of each voltage range (see Appendix B to this section). The table also assumes that the employee will be the
minimum approach distance minus twice the arc length from the electric arc.
[Dagger] The Occupational Safety and Health Administration calculated the values in this table using the ARCPRO
method listed in Table 2.
For voltages of more than 72.6 kV, employers may use this table only when the minimum approach
distance established under Sec. 1910.269(l)(3)(i) is greater than or equal to the following values:
72.6 to 121.0 kV 1.02 m.
121.1 to 145.0 kV 1.16 m.
145.1 to 169.0 kV 1.30 m.
169.1 to 242.0 kV 1.72 m.
242.1 to 362.0 kV 2.76 m.
362.1 to 420.0 kV 2.50 m.
420.1 to 550.0 kV 3.62 m.
550.1 to 800.0 kV 4.83 m.
** The voltage range is the phase-to-phase system voltage.
B. Selecting Protective Clothing and Other Protective Equipment
Paragraph (l)(8)(v) of Sec. 1910.269 requires employers, in
certain situations, to select protective clothing and other
protective equipment with an arc rating that is greater than or
equal to the incident heat energy estimated under Sec.
1910.269(l)(8)(ii). Based on laboratory testing required by ASTM
F1506-10a, the expectation is that protective clothing with an arc
rating equal to the estimated incident heat energy will be capable
of preventing second-degree burn injury to an employee exposed to
that incident heat energy from an electric arc. Note that actual
electric-arc exposures may be more or less severe than the estimated
value because of factors such as arc movement, arc length, arcing
from reclosing of the system, secondary fires or explosions, and
weather conditions. Additionally, for arc rating based on the
fabric's arc thermal performance value \25\ (ATPV), a worker exposed
to incident energy at the arc rating has a 50-percent chance of just
barely receiving a second-degree burn. Therefore, it is possible
(although not likely) that an employee will sustain a second-degree
(or worse) burn wearing clothing conforming to Sec.
1910.269(l)(8)(v) under certain circumstances. However, reasonable
employer estimates and maintaining appropriate minimum approach
distances for employees should limit burns to relatively small burns
that just barely extend beyond the epidermis (that is, just barely a
second-degree burn). Consequently, protective clothing and other
protective equipment meeting Sec. 1910.269(l)(8)(v) will provide an
appropriate degree of protection for an employee exposed to
electric-arc hazards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ ASTM F1506-10a defines "arc thermal performance value" as
"the incident energy on a material or a multilayer system of
materials that results in a 50% probability that sufficient heat
transfer through the tested specimen is predicted to cause the onset
of a second-degree skin burn injury based on the Stoll [footnote]
curve, cal/cm\2\." The footnote to this definition reads: "Derived
from: Stoll, A. M., and Chianta, M. A., `Method and Rating System
for Evaluations of Thermal Protection,' Aerospace Medicine, Vol 40,
1969, pp. 1232-1238 and Stoll, A. M., and Chianta, M. A., `Heat
Transfer through Fabrics as Related to Thermal Injury,'
Transactions--New York Academy of Sciences, Vol 33(7), Nov. 1971,
pp. 649-670."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (l)(8)(v) of Sec. 1910.269 does not require arc-rated
protection for exposures of 2 cal/cm\2\ or less. Untreated cotton
clothing will reduce a 2-cal/cm\2\ exposure below the 1.2- to 1.5-
cal/cm\2\ level necessary to cause burn injury, and this material
should not ignite at such low heat energy levels. Although Sec.
1910.269(l)(8)(v) does not require clothing to have an arc rating
when exposures are 2 cal/cm\2\ or less, Sec. 1910.269(l)(8)(iv)
requires the outer layer of clothing to be flame resistant under
certain conditions, even when the estimated incident heat energy is
less than 2 cal/cm\2\, as discussed later in this appendix.
Additionally, it is especially important to ensure that employees do
not wear undergarments made from fabrics listed in the note to Sec.
1910.269(l)(8)(iii) even when the outer layer is flame resistant or
arc rated. These fabrics can melt or ignite easily when an electric
arc occurs. Logos and name tags made from non-flame-resistant
material can adversely affect the arc rating or the flame-resistant
characteristics of arc-rated or flame-resistant clothing. Such logos
and name tags may violate Sec. 1910.269(l)(8)(iii), (l)(8)(iv), or
(l)(8)(v).
Paragraph (l)(8)(v) of Sec. 1910.269 requires that arc-rated
protection cover the employee's entire body, with limited exceptions
for the employee's hands, feet, face, and head. Paragraph
(l)(8)(v)(A) of Sec. 1910.269 provides that arc-rated protection is
not necessary for the employee's hands under the following
conditions:
For any estimated incident heat energy. When the employee is wearing
rubber insulating gloves with
protectors.
If the estimated incident heat energy When the employee is wearing
does not exceed 14 cal/cm\2\. heavy-duty leather work gloves
with a weight of at least 407
gm/m\2\ (12 oz/yd\2\).
Paragraph (l)(8)(v)(B) of Sec. 1910.269 provides that arc-rated
protection is not necessary for the employee's feet when the
employee is wearing heavy-duty work shoes or boots. Finally, Sec.
1910.269(l)(8)(v)(C), (l)(8)(v)(D), and (l)(8)(v)(E) require arc-
rated head and face protection as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minimum head and face protection
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arc-rated
Exposure faceshield with a Arc-rated hood or faceshield with
None * minimum rating of balaclava
8 cal/cm\2\*
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Single-phase, open air.......... 2-8 cal/cm\2\...... 9-12 cal/cm\2\..... 13 cal/cm\2\ or higher [dagger].
Three-phase..................... 2-4 cal/cm\2\...... 5-8 cal/cm\2\...... 9 cal/cm\2\ or higher [Dagger].
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* These ranges assume that employees are wearing hardhats meeting the specifications in Sec. 1910.135 or Sec.
1926.100(b)(2), as applicable.
[dagger] The arc rating must be a minimum of 4 cal/cm\2\ less than the estimated incident energy. Note that Sec.
1910.269(l)(8)(v)(E) permits this type of head and face protection, with a minimum arc rating of 4 cal/cm\2\
less than the estimated incident energy, at any incident energy level.
[Dagger] Note that Sec. 1910.269(l)(8)(v) permits this type of head and face protection at any incident energy
level.
IV. Protection Against Ignition
Paragraph (l)(8)(iii) of Sec. 1910.269 prohibits clothing that
could melt onto an employee's skin or that could ignite and continue
to burn when exposed to flames or to the available heat energy
estimated by the employer under Sec. 1910.269(l)(8)(ii). Meltable
fabrics, such as acetate, nylon, polyester, and polypropylene, even
in blends, must be avoided. When these fibers melt, they can adhere
to the skin, thereby transferring heat rapidly, exacerbating burns,
and complicating treatment. These outcomes can result even if the
meltable fabric is not directly next to the skin. The remainder of
this section focuses on the prevention of ignition.
Paragraph (l)(8)(v) of Sec. 1910.269 generally requires
protective clothing and other protective equipment with an arc
rating greater than or equal to the employer's estimate of available
heat energy. As explained earlier in this appendix, untreated cotton
is usually acceptable for exposures of 2 cal/cm\2\ or less.\26\ If
the exposure is greater than that, the employee generally must wear
flame-resistant clothing with a suitable arc rating in accordance
with Sec. 1910.269(l)(8)(iv) and (l)(8)(v). However, even if an
employee is wearing a layer of flame-resistant clothing, there are
circumstances under which flammable layers of clothing would be
uncovered, and an electric arc could ignite them. For example,
clothing ignition is possible if the employee is wearing flammable
clothing under the flame-resistant clothing and the underlayer is
uncovered because of an opening in the flame-resistant clothing.
Thus, for purposes of Sec. 1910.269(l)(8)(iii), it is important for
the employer to consider the possibility of clothing ignition even
when an employee is wearing flame-resistant clothing with a suitable
arc rating.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ See Sec. 1910.269(l)(8)(iv)(A), (l)(8)(iv)(B), and
(l)(8)(iv)(C) for conditions under which employees must wear flame-
resistant clothing as the outer layer of clothing even when the
incident heat energy does not exceed 2 cal/cm\2\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under Sec. 1910.269(l)(8)(iii), employees may not wear
flammable clothing in conjunction with flame-resistant clothing if
the flammable clothing poses an ignition hazard.\27\ Although outer
flame-resistant layers may not have openings that expose flammable
inner layers, when an outer flame-resistant layer would be unable to
resist breakopen,\28\ the next (inner) layer must be flame-resistant
if it could ignite.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Paragraph (l)(8)(iii) of Sec. 1910.269 prohibits clothing
that could ignite and continue to burn when exposed to the heat
energy estimated under paragraph (l)(8)(ii) of that section.
\28\ Breakopen occurs when a hole, tear, or crack develops in
the exposed fabric such that the fabric no longer effectively blocks
incident heat energy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-flame-resistant clothing can ignite even when the heat
energy from an electric arc is insufficient to ignite the clothing.
For example, nearby flames can ignite an employee's clothing; and,
even in the absence of flames, electric arcs pose ignition hazards
beyond the hazard of ignition from incident energy under certain
conditions. In addition to requiring flame-resistant clothing when
the estimated incident energy exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\, Sec.
1910.269(l)(8)(iv) requires flame-resistant clothing when: The
employee is exposed to contact with energized circuit parts
operating at more than 600 volts (Sec. 1910.269(l)(8)(iv)(A)), an
electric arc could ignite flammable material in the work area that,
in turn, could ignite the employee's clothing (Sec.
1910.269(l)(8)(iv)(B)), and molten metal or electric arcs from
faulted conductors in the work area could ignite the employee's
clothing (Sec. 1910.269(l)(8)(iv)(C)). For example, grounding
conductors can become a source of heat energy if they cannot carry
fault current without failure. The employer must consider these
possible sources of electric arcs \29\ in determining whether the
employee's clothing could ignite under Sec. 1910.269(l)(8)(iv)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Static wires and pole grounds are examples of grounding
conductors that might not be capable of carrying fault current
without failure. Grounds that can carry the maximum available fault
current are not a concern, and employers need not consider such
grounds a possible electric arc source.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix F to Sec. 1910.269--Work-Positioning Equipment Inspection
Guidelines
I. Body Belts
Inspect body belts to ensure that:
A. The hardware has no cracks, nicks, distortion, or corrosion;
B. No loose or worn rivets are present;
C. The waist strap has no loose grommets;
D. The fastening straps are not 100-percent leather; and
E. No worn materials that could affect the safety of the user
are present.
II. Positioning Straps
Inspect positioning straps to ensure that:
A. The warning center of the strap material is not exposed;
B. No cuts, burns, extra holes, or fraying of strap material is
present;
C. Rivets are properly secured;
D. Straps are not 100-percent leather; and
E. Snaphooks do not have cracks, burns, or corrosion.
III. Climbers
Inspect pole and tree climbers to ensure that:
A. Gaffs are at least as long as the manufacturer's recommended
minimums (generally 32 and 51 millimeters (1.25 and 2.0 inches) for
pole and tree climbers, respectively, measured on the underside of
the gaff);
Note: Gauges are available to assist in determining whether
gaffs are long enough and shaped to easily penetrate poles or trees.
B. Gaffs and leg irons are not fractured or cracked;
C. Stirrups and leg irons are free of excessive wear;
D. Gaffs are not loose;
E. Gaffs are free of deformation that could adversely affect
use;
F. Gaffs are properly sharpened; and
G. There are no broken straps or buckles.
Appendix G to Sec. 1910.269--Reference Documents
The references contained in this appendix provide information
that can be helpful in understanding and complying with the
requirements contained in Sec. 1910.269. The national consensus
standards referenced in this appendix contain detailed
specifications that employers may follow in complying with the more
performance-based requirements of Sec. 1910.269. Except as
specifically noted in Sec. 1910.269, however, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration will not necessarily deem
compliance with the national consensus standards to be compliance
with the provisions of Sec. 1910.269.
ANSI/SIA A92.2-2009, American National Standard for Vehicle-Mounted
Elevating and Rotating Aerial Devices.
ANSI Z133-2012, American National Standard Safety Requirements for
Arboricultural Operations--Pruning, Trimming, Repairing,
Maintaining, and Removing Trees, and Cutting Brush.
ANSI/IEEE Std 935-1989, IEEE Guide on Terminology for Tools and
Equipment to Be Used in Live Line Working.
ASME B20.1-2012, Safety Standard for Conveyors and Related
Equipment.
ASTM D120-09, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves.
ASTM D149-09 (2013), Standard Test Method for Dielectric Breakdown
Voltage and Dielectric Strength of Solid Electrical Insulating
Materials at Commercial Power Frequencies.
ASTM D178-01 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Matting.
ASTM D1048-12, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Blankets.
ASTM D1049-98 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Covers.
ASTM D1050-05 (2011), Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Line Hose.
ASTM D1051-08, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Sleeves.
ASTM F478-09, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of
Insulating Line Hose and Covers.
ASTM F479-06 (2011), Standard Specification for In-Service Care of
Insulating Blankets.
ASTM F496-08, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of
Insulating Gloves and Sleeves.
ASTM F711-02 (2007), Standard Specification for Fiberglass-
Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod and Tube Used in Live Line Tools.
ASTM F712-06 (2011), Standard Test Methods and Specifications for
Electrically Insulating Plastic Guard Equipment for Protection of
Workers.
ASTM F819-10, Standard Terminology Relating to Electrical Protective
Equipment for Workers.
ASTM F855-09, Standard Specifications for Temporary Protective
Grounds to Be Used on De-energized Electric Power Lines and
Equipment.
ASTM F887-12\e1\, Standard Specifications for Personal Climbing
Equipment.
ASTM F914/F914M-10, Standard Test Method for Acoustic Emission for
Aerial Personnel Devices Without Supplemental Load Handling
Attachments.
ASTM F1116-03 (2008), Standard Test Method for Determining
Dielectric Strength of Dielectric Footwear.
ASTM F1117-03 (2008), Standard Specification for Dielectric
Footwear.
ASTM F1236-96 (2012), Standard Guide for Visual Inspection of
Electrical Protective Rubber Products.
ASTM F1430/F1430M-10, Standard Test Method for Acoustic Emission
Testing of Insulated and Non-Insulated Aerial Personnel Devices with
Supplemental Load Handling Attachments.
ASTM F1505-10, Standard Specification for Insulated and Insulating
Hand Tools.
ASTM F1506-10a, Standard Performance Specification for Flame
Resistant and Arc Rated Textile Materials for Wearing Apparel for
Use by Electrical Workers Exposed to Momentary Electric Arc and
Related Thermal Hazards.
ASTM F1564-13, Standard Specification for Structure-Mounted
Insulating Work Platforms for Electrical Workers.
ASTM F1701-12, Standard Specification for Unused Polypropylene Rope
with Special Electrical Properties.
ASTM F1742-03 (2011), Standard Specification for PVC Insulating
Sheeting.
ASTM F1796-09, Standard Specification for High Voltage Detectors--
Part 1 Capacitive Type to be Used for Voltages Exceeding 600 Volts
AC.
ASTM F1797-09[egr]\1\, Standard Test Method for Acoustic Emission
Testing of Insulated and Non-Insulated Digger Derricks.
ASTM F1825-03 (2007), Standard Specification for Clampstick Type
Live Line Tools.
ASTM F1826-00 (2011), Standard Specification for Live Line and
Measuring Telescoping Tools.
ASTM F1891-12, Standard Specification for Arc and Flame Resistant
Rainwear.
ASTM F1958/F1958M-12, Standard Test Method for Determining the
Ignitability of Non-flame-Resistant Materials for Clothing by
Electric Arc Exposure Method Using Mannequins.
ASTM F1959/F1959M-12, Standard Test Method for Determining the Arc
Rating of Materials for Clothing.
IEEE Stds 4-1995, 4a-2001 (Amendment to IEEE Standard Techniques for
High-Voltage Testing), IEEE Standard Techniques for High-Voltage
Testing.
IEEE Std 62-1995, IEEE Guide for Diagnostic Field Testing of
Electric Power Apparatus--Part 1: Oil Filled Power Transformers,
Regulators, and Reactors.
IEEE Std 80-2000, Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding.
IEEE Std 100-2000, The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards
Terms Seventh Edition.
IEEE Std 516-2009, IEEE Guide for Maintenance Methods on Energized
Power Lines.
IEEE Std 524-2003, IEEE Guide to the Installation of Overhead
Transmission Line Conductors .
IEEE Std 957-2005, IEEE Guide for Cleaning Insulators.
IEEE Std 1048-2003, IEEE Guide for Protective Grounding of Power
Lines.
IEEE Std 1067-2005, IEEE Guide for In-Service Use, Care,
Maintenance, and Testing of Conductive Clothing for Use on Voltages
up to 765 kV AC and 750 kV DC.
IEEE Std 1307-2004, IEEE Standard for Fall Protection for Utility
Work.
IEEE Stds 1584-2002, 1584a-2004 (Amendment 1 to IEEE Std 1584-2002),
and 1584b-2011 (Amendment 2: Changes to Clause 4 of IEEE Std 1584-
2002), IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations.
IEEE C2-2012, National Electrical Safety Code.
NFPA 70E-2012, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace.
Subpart S--Electrical
0
7. Revise the authority citation for Subpart S of part 1910 to read as
follows:
Authority: 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657; Secretary of Labor's Order
No. 8-76 (41 FR 25059), 1-90 (55 FR 9033), 5-2002 (67 FR 65008), 5-
2007 (72 FR 31160), or 1-2012 (77 FR 3912), as applicable; and 29
CFR Part 1911.
0
8. In Sec. 1910.331(c)(1), revise the headings to Notes 1 and 2 and
revise Note 3 to read as follows:
Sec. 1910.331 Scope.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(1) * * *
Note 1 to paragraph (c)(1): * * *
Note 2 to paragraph (c)(1): * * *
Note 3 to paragraph (c)(1): Work on or directly associated with
generation, transmission, or distribution installations includes:
(1) Work performed directly on such installations, such as
repairing overhead or underground distribution lines or repairing a
feed-water pump for the boiler in a generating plant.
(2) Work directly associated with such installations, such as line-
clearance tree trimming and replacing utility poles (see the definition
of "line-clearance tree trimming" in Sec. 1910.269(x)).
(3) Work on electric utilization circuits in a generating plant
provided that:
(A) Such circuits are commingled with installations of power
generation equipment or circuits, and
(B) The generation equipment or circuits present greater electrical
hazards than those posed by the utilization equipment or circuits (such
as exposure to higher voltages or lack of overcurrent protection).
This work is covered by Sec. 1910.269 of this part.
Sec. 1910.399 [Amended]
0
9. Remove the definition of "line-clearance tree trimming" from Sec.
1910.399.
PART 1926--[AMENDED]
Subpart A--General
0
10. The authority citation for Subpart A of part 1926 is revised to
read as follows:
Authority: 40 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657;
Secretary of Labor's Order No. 12-71 (36 FR 8754), 8-76 (41 FR
25059), 9-83 (48 FR 35736), 1-90 (55 FR 9033), 6-96 (62 FR 111), 3-
2000 (65 FR 50017), 5-2002 (67 FR 65008), or 5-2007 (72 FR 31160),
5-2007 (72 FR 31160), 4-2010 (75 FR 55355), or 1-2012 (77 FR 3912),
as applicable; and 29 CFR Part 1911.
0
11. In Sec. 1926.6, remove and reserve paragraphs (h)(17), (h)(18),
(h)(19), (h)(20), (h)(21), (h)(22), and (j)(2).
Sec. 1926.6 Incorporation by reference.
* * * * *
(h) * * *
(17) [Reserved]
(18) [Reserved]
(19) [Reserved]
(20) [Reserved]
(21) [Reserved]
(22) [Reserved]
* * * * *
(j) * * *
(2) [Reserved]
* * * * *
Subpart E--Personal Protective and Life Saving Equipment
0
12. Revise the authority citation for Subpart E of Part 1926 to read as
follows:
Authority: 40 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657;
Secretary of Labor's Order No. 12-71 (36 FR 8754), 8-76 (41 FR
25059), 9-83 (48 FR 35736), 1-90 (55 FR 9033), 6-96 (62 FR 111), 5-
2002 (67 FR 65008), 5-2007 (72 FR 31160), or 1-2012 (77 FR 3912), as
applicable; and 29 CFR Part 1911.
0
13. Add Sec. 1926.97 to read as follows:
Sec. 1926.97 Electrical protective equipment.
(a) Design requirements for specific types of electrical protective
equipment. Rubber insulating blankets, rubber insulating matting,
rubber insulating covers, rubber insulating line hose, rubber
insulating gloves, and rubber insulating sleeves shall meet the
following requirements:
(1) Manufacture and marking of rubber insulating equipment. (i)
Blankets, gloves, and sleeves shall be produced by a seamless process.
(ii) Each item shall be clearly marked as follows:
(A) Class 00 equipment shall be marked Class 00.
(B) Class 0 equipment shall be marked Class 0.
(C) Class 1 equipment shall be marked Class 1.
(D) Class 2 equipment shall be marked Class 2.
(E) Class 3 equipment shall be marked Class 3.
(F) Class 4 equipment shall be marked Class 4.
(G) Nonozone-resistant equipment shall be marked Type I.
(H) Ozone-resistant equipment shall be marked Type II.
(I) Other relevant markings, such as the manufacturer's
identification and the size of the equipment, may also be provided.
(iii) Markings shall be nonconducting and shall be applied in such
a manner as not to impair the insulating qualities of the equipment.
(iv) Markings on gloves shall be confined to the cuff portion of
the glove.
(2) Electrical requirements. (i) Equipment shall be capable of
withstanding the ac proof-test voltage specified in Table E-1 or the dc
proof-test voltage specified in Table E-2.
(A) The proof test shall reliably indicate that the equipment can
withstand the voltage involved.
(B) The test voltage shall be applied continuously for 3 minutes
for equipment other than matting and shall be applied continuously for
1 minute for matting.
(C) Gloves shall also be capable of separately withstanding the ac
proof-test voltage specified in Table E-1 after a 16-hour water soak.
(See the note following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.)
(ii) When the ac proof test is used on gloves, the 60-hertz proof-
test current may not exceed the values specified in Table E-1 at any
time during the test period.
(A) If the ac proof test is made at a frequency other than 60
hertz, the permissible proof-test current shall be computed from the
direct ratio of the frequencies.
(B) For the test, gloves (right side out) shall be filled with tap
water and immersed in water to a depth that is in accordance with Table
E-3. Water shall be added to or removed from the glove, as necessary,
so that the water level is the same inside and outside the glove.
(C) After the 16-hour water soak specified in paragraph
(a)(2)(i)(C) of this section, the 60-hertz proof-test current may not
exceed the values given in Table E-1 by more than 2 milliamperes.
(iii) Equipment that has been subjected to a minimum breakdown
voltage test may not be used for electrical protection. (See the note
following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.)
(iv) Material used for Type II insulating equipment shall be
capable of withstanding an ozone test, with no visible effects. The
ozone test shall reliably indicate that the material will resist ozone
exposure in actual use. Any visible signs of ozone deterioration of the
material, such as checking, cracking, breaks, or pitting, is evidence
of failure to meet the requirements for ozone-resistant material. (See
the note following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.)
(3) Workmanship and finish. (i) Equipment shall be free of physical
irregularities that can adversely affect the insulating properties of
the equipment and that can be detected by the tests or inspections
required under this section.
(ii) Surface irregularities that may be present on all rubber goods
(because of imperfections on forms or molds or because of inherent
difficulties in the manufacturing process) and that may appear as
indentations, protuberances, or imbedded foreign material are
acceptable under the following conditions:
(A) The indentation or protuberance blends into a smooth slope when
the material is stretched.
(B) Foreign material remains in place when the insulating material
is folded and stretches with the insulating material surrounding it.
Note to paragraph (a): Rubber insulating equipment meeting the
following national consensus standards is deemed to be in compliance
with the performance requirements of paragraph (a) of this section:
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) D120-09,
Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves.
ASTM D178-01 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber
Insulating Matting.
ASTM D1048-12, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Blankets.
ASTM D1049-98 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber
Insulating Covers.
ASTM D1050-05 (2011), Standard Specification for Rubber
Insulating Line Hose.
ASTM D1051-08, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Sleeves.
The preceding standards also contain specifications for
conducting the various tests required in paragraph (a) of this
section. For example, the ac and dc proof tests, the breakdown test,
the water-soak procedure, and the ozone test mentioned in this
paragraph are described in detail in these ASTM standards.
ASTM F1236-96 (2012), Standard Guide for Visual Inspection of
Electrical Protective Rubber Products, presents methods and
techniques for the visual inspection of electrical protective
equipment made of rubber. This guide also contains descriptions and
photographs of irregularities that can be found in this equipment.
ASTM F819-10, Standard Terminology Relating to Electrical
Protective Equipment for Workers, includes definitions of terms
relating to the electrical protective equipment covered under this
section.
(b) Design requirements for other types of electrical protective
equipment. The following requirements apply to the design and
manufacture of electrical protective equipment that is not covered by
paragraph (a) of this section:
(1) Voltage withstand. Insulating equipment used for the protection
of employees shall be capable of withstanding, without failure, the
voltages that may be imposed upon it.
Note to paragraph (b)(1): These voltages include transient
overvoltages, such as switching surges, as well as nominal line
voltage. See Appendix B to Subpart V of this part for a discussion
of transient overvoltages on electric power transmission and
distribution systems. See IEEE Std 516-2009, IEEE Guide for
Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines, for methods of
determining the magnitude of transient overvoltages on an electrical
system and for a discussion comparing the ability of insulation
equipment to withstand a transient overvoltage based on its ability
to withstand ac voltage testing.
(2) Equipment current. (i) Protective equipment used for the
primary insulation of employees from energized
circuit parts shall be capable of passing a current test when subjected
to the highest nominal voltage on which the equipment is to be used.
(ii) When insulating equipment is tested in accordance with
paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section, the equipment current may not
exceed 1 microampere per kilovolt of phase-to-phase applied voltage.
Note 1 to paragraph (b)(2): This paragraph applies to equipment
that provides primary insulation of employees from energized parts.
It does not apply to equipment used for secondary insulation or
equipment used for brush contact only.
Note 2 to paragraph (b)(2): For ac excitation, this current
consists of three components: Capacitive current because of the
dielectric properties of the insulating material itself, conduction
current through the volume of the insulating equipment, and leakage
current along the surface of the tool or equipment. The conduction
current is normally negligible. For clean, dry insulating equipment,
the leakage current is small, and the capacitive current
predominates.
Note to paragraph (b): Plastic guard equipment is deemed to
conform to the performance requirements of paragraph (b) of this
section if it meets, and is used in accordance with, ASTM F712-06
(2011), Standard Test Methods and Specifications for Electrically
Insulating Plastic Guard Equipment for Protection of Workers.
(c) In-service care and use of electrical protective equipment. (1)
General. Electrical protective equipment shall be maintained in a safe,
reliable condition.
(2) Specific requirements. The following specific requirements
apply to rubber insulating blankets, rubber insulating covers, rubber
insulating line hose, rubber insulating gloves, and rubber insulating
sleeves:
(i) Maximum use voltages shall conform to those listed in Table E-
4.
(ii) Insulating equipment shall be inspected for damage before each
day's use and immediately following any incident that can reasonably be
suspected of causing damage. Insulating gloves shall be given an air
test, along with the inspection.
Note to paragraph (c)(2)(ii): ASTM F1236-96 (2012), Standard
Guide for Visual Inspection of Electrical Protective Rubber
Products, presents methods and techniques for the visual inspection
of electrical protective equipment made of rubber. This guide also
contains descriptions and photographs of irregularities that can be
found in this equipment.
(iii) Insulating equipment with any of the following defects may
not be used:
(A) A hole, tear, puncture, or cut;
(B) Ozone cutting or ozone checking (that is, a series of
interlacing cracks produced by ozone on rubber under mechanical
stress);
(C) An embedded foreign object;
(D) Any of the following texture changes: Swelling, softening,
hardening, or becoming sticky or inelastic.
(E) Any other defect that damages the insulating properties.
(iv) Insulating equipment found to have other defects that might
affect its insulating properties shall be removed from service and
returned for testing under paragraphs (c)(2)(viii) and (c)(2)(ix) of
this section.
(v) Insulating equipment shall be cleaned as needed to remove
foreign substances.
(vi) Insulating equipment shall be stored in such a location and in
such a manner as to protect it from light, temperature extremes,
excessive humidity, ozone, and other damaging substances and
conditions.
(vii) Protector gloves shall be worn over insulating gloves, except
as follows:
(A) Protector gloves need not be used with Class 0 gloves, under
limited-use conditions, when small equipment and parts manipulation
necessitate unusually high finger dexterity.
Note to paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(A): Persons inspecting rubber
insulating gloves used under these conditions need to take extra
care in visually examining them. Employees using rubber insulating
gloves under these conditions need to take extra care to avoid
handling sharp objects.
(B) If the voltage does not exceed 250 volts, ac, or 375 volts, dc,
protector gloves need not be used with Class 00 gloves, under limited-
use conditions, when small equipment and parts manipulation necessitate
unusually high finger dexterity.
Note to paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(B): Persons inspecting rubber
insulating gloves used under these conditions need to take extra
care in visually examining them. Employees using rubber insulating
gloves under these conditions need to take extra care to avoid
handling sharp objects.
(C) Any other class of glove may be used without protector gloves,
under limited-use conditions, when small equipment and parts
manipulation necessitate unusually high finger dexterity but only if
the employer can demonstrate that the possibility of physical damage to
the gloves is small and if the class of glove is one class higher than
that required for the voltage involved.
(D) Insulating gloves that have been used without protector gloves
may not be reused until they have been tested under the provisions of
paragraphs (c)(2)(viii) and (c)(2)(ix) of this section.
(viii) Electrical protective equipment shall be subjected to
periodic electrical tests. Test voltages and the maximum intervals
between tests shall be in accordance with Table E-4 and Table E-5.
(ix) The test method used under paragraphs (c)(2)(viii) and
(c)(2)(xi) of this section shall reliably indicate whether the
insulating equipment can withstand the voltages involved.
Note to paragraph (c)(2)(ix): Standard electrical test methods
considered as meeting this paragraph are given in the following
national consensus standards:
ASTM D120-09, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Gloves.
ASTM D178-01 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber
Insulating Matting.
ASTM D1048-12, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Blankets.
ASTM D1049-98 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber
Insulating Covers.
ASTM D1050-05 (2011), Standard Specification for Rubber
Insulating Line Hose.
ASTM D1051-08, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Sleeves.
ASTM F478-09, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of
Insulating Line Hose and Covers.
ASTM F479-06 (2011), Standard Specification for In-Service Care
of Insulating Blankets.
ASTM F496-08, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of
Insulating Gloves and Sleeves.
(x) Insulating equipment failing to pass inspections or electrical
tests may not be used by employees, except as follows:
(A) Rubber insulating line hose may be used in shorter lengths with
the defective portion cut off.
(B) Rubber insulating blankets may be salvaged by severing the
defective area from the undamaged portion of the blanket. The resulting
undamaged area may not be smaller than 560 millimeters by 560
millimeters (22 inches by 22 inches) for Class 1, 2, 3, and 4 blankets.
(C) Rubber insulating blankets may be repaired using a compatible
patch that results in physical and electrical properties equal to those
of the blanket.
(D) Rubber insulating gloves and sleeves with minor physical
defects, such as small cuts, tears, or punctures, may be repaired by
the application of a compatible patch. Also, rubber insulating gloves
and sleeves with minor surface blemishes may be repaired with a
compatible liquid compound. The repaired area shall have electrical and
physical properties equal to those of the surrounding material. Repairs
to gloves are permitted only in the area between the wrist and the
reinforced edge of the opening.
(xi) Repaired insulating equipment shall be retested before it may
be used by employees.
(xii) The employer shall certify that equipment has been tested in
accordance with the requirements of paragraphs (c)(2)(iv),
(c)(2)(vii)(D), (c)(2)(viii), (c)(2)(ix), and (c)(2)(xi) of this
section. The certification shall identify the equipment that passed the
test and the date it was tested and shall be made available upon
request to the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health
and to employees or their authorized representatives.
Note to paragraph (c)(2)(xii): Marking equipment with, and
entering onto logs, the results of the tests and the dates of
testing are two acceptable means of meeting the certification
requirement.
Table E-1--AC Proof-Test Requirements
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum proof-test current, mA (gloves only)
Proof-test ---------------------------------------------------------------
Class of equipment voltage rms V 280-mm (11-in) 360-mm (14-in) 410-mm (16-in) 460-mm (18-in)
glove glove glove glove
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
00.............................. 2,500 8 12 .............. ..............
0............................... 5,000 8 12 14 16
1............................... 10,000 .............. 14 16 18
2............................... 20,000 .............. 16 18 20
3............................... 30,000 .............. 18 20 22
4............................... 40,000 .............. .............. 22 24
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table E-2--DC Proof-Test Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proof-test
Class of equipment voltage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
00...................................................... 10,000
0....................................................... 20,000
1....................................................... 40,000
2....................................................... 50,000
3....................................................... 60,000
4....................................................... 70,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The dc voltages listed in this table are not appropriate for proof
testing rubber insulating line hose or covers. For this equipment, dc
proof tests shall use a voltage high enough to indicate that the
equipment can be safely used at the voltages listed in Table E-4. See
ASTM D1050-05 (2011) and ASTM D1049-98 (2010) for further information
on proof tests for rubber insulating line hose and covers,
respectively.
Table E-3--Glove Tests--Water Level \1\ \2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AC proof test DC proof test
Class of glove ---------------------------------------------------------------
mm in mm in
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
00.............................................. 38 1.5 38 1.5
0............................................... 38 1.5 38 1.5
1............................................... 38 1.5 51 2.0
2............................................... 64 2.5 76 3.0
3............................................... 89 3.5 102 4.0
4............................................... 127 5.0 153 6.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The water level is given as the clearance from the reinforced edge of the glove to the water line, with a
tolerance of 13 mm. (0.5 in.).
\2\ If atmospheric conditions make the specified clearances impractical, the clearances may be increased by a
maximum of 25 mm. (1 in.).
Table E-4--Rubber Insulating Equipment, Voltage Requirements
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum use
Class of equipment voltage \1\ AC Retest voltage Retest voltage
rms \2\ AC rms \2\ DC avg
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
00................................................ 500 2,500 10,000
0................................................. 1,000 5,000 20,000
1................................................. 7,500 10,000 40,000
2................................................. 17,000 20,000 50,000
3................................................. 26,500 30,000 60,000
4................................................. 36,000 40,000 70,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The maximum use voltage is the ac voltage (rms) classification of the protective equipment that designates
the maximum nominal design voltage of the energized system that may be safely worked. The nominal design
voltage is equal to the phase-to-phase voltage on multiphase circuits. However, the phase-to-ground potential
is considered to be the nominal design voltage if:
(1) There is no multiphase exposure in a system area and the voltage exposure is limited to the phase-to-ground
potential, or
(2) The electric equipment and devices are insulated or isolated or both so that the multiphase exposure on a
grounded wye circuit is removed.
\2\ The proof-test voltage shall be applied continuously for at least 1 minute, but no more than 3 minutes.
Table E-5--Rubber Insulating Equipment, Test Intervals
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type of equipment When to test
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rubber insulating line hose...................................... Upon indication that insulating value is
suspect and after repair.
Rubber insulating covers......................................... Upon indication that insulating value is
suspect and after repair.
Rubber insulating blankets....................................... Before first issue and every 12 months
thereafter;\1\ upon indication that
insulating value is suspect; and after
repair.
Rubber insulating gloves......................................... Before first issue and every 6 months
thereafter;\1\ upon indication that
insulating value is suspect; after repair;
and after use without protectors.
Rubber insulating sleeves........................................ Before first issue and every 12 months
thereafter;\1\ upon indication that
insulating value is suspect; and after
repair.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ If the insulating equipment has been electrically tested but not issued for service, the insulating
equipment may not be placed into service unless it has been electrically tested within the previous 12 months.
Subpart M--Fall Protection
0
14. Revise the authority citation for Subpart M of part 1926 to read as
follows:
Authority: 40 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657;
Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-90 (55 FR 9033), 6-96 (62 FR 111),
3-2000 (65 FR 50017), 5-2007 (72 FR 31159), or 1-2012 (77 FR 3912),
as applicable; and 29 CFR Part 1911.
0
15. Revise paragraphs (a)(2)(vi) and (a)(3)(iii) of Sec. 1926.500 to
read as follows:
Sec. 1926.500 Scope, application, and definitions applicable to this
subpart.
(a) * * *
(2) * * *
(vi) Subpart V of this part provides requirements relating to fall
protection for employees working from aerial lifts or on poles, towers,
or similar structures while engaged in the construction of electric
transmission or distribution lines or equipment.
* * * * *
(3) * * *
(iii) Additional performance requirements for fall arrest and work-
positioning equipment are provided in Subpart V of this part.
* * * * *
0
16. Revise the authority citation for Subpart V of Part 1926 to read as
follows:
Authority: 40 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657;
Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-2012 (77 FR 3912); and 29 CFR Part
1911.
0
17. Revise Subpart V of Part 1926 to read as follows:
Subpart V--Electric Power Transmission and Distribution
Sec.
1926.950 General.
1926.951 Medical services and first aid.
1926.952 Job briefing.
1926.953 Enclosed spaces.
1926.954 Personal protective equipment.
1926.955 Portable ladders and platforms.
1926.956 Hand and portable power equipment.
1926.957 Live-line tools.
1926.958 Materials handling and storage.
1926.959 Mechanical equipment.
1926.960 Working on or near exposed energized parts.
1926.961 Deenergizing lines and equipment for employee protection.
1926.962 Grounding for the protection of employees.
1926.963 Testing and test facilities.
1926.964 Overhead lines and live-line barehand work.
1926.965 Underground electrical installations.
1926.966 Substations.
1926.967 Special conditions.
1926.968 Definitions.
Appendix A to Subpart V of Part 1926--[Reserved]
Appendix B to Subpart V of Part 1926--Working on Exposed Energized
Parts
Appendix C to Subpart V of Part 1926--Protection from Hazardous
Differences in Electric Potential
Appendix D to Subpart V of Part 1926--Methods of Inspecting and
Testing Wood Poles
Appendix E to Subpart V of Part 1926--Protection from Flames and
Electric Arcs
Appendix F to Subpart V of Part 1926--Work-Positioning Equipment
Inspection Guidelines
Appendix G to Subpart V of Part 1926--Reference Documents
Subpart V--Electric Power Transmission and Distribution
Sec. 1926.950 General.
(a) Application. (1) Scope. (i) This subpart, except for paragraph
(a)(3) of this section, covers the construction of electric power
transmission and distribution lines and equipment. As used in this
subpart, the term "construction" includes the erection of new
electric transmission and distribution lines and equipment, and the
alteration, conversion, and improvement of existing electric
transmission and distribution lines and equipment.
Note to paragraph (a)(1)(i): An employer that complies with
Sec. 1910.269 of this chapter will be considered in compliance with
requirements in this subpart that do not reference other subparts of
this part. Compliance with Sec. 1910.269 of this chapter will not
excuse an employer from compliance obligations under other subparts
of this part.
(ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section, this
subpart does not apply to electrical safety-related work practices for
unqualified employees.
(2) Other Part 1926 standards. This subpart applies in addition to
all other applicable standards contained in this Part 1926. Employers
covered under this subpart are not exempt from complying with other
applicable provisions in Part 1926 by the operation of Sec. 1910.5(c)
of this chapter. Specific references in this subpart to other sections
of Part 1926 are provided for emphasis only.
(3) Applicable Part 1910 requirements. Line-clearance tree-trimming
operations and work involving electric power generation installations
shall comply with Sec. 1910.269 of this chapter.
(b) Training. (1) All employees. (i) Each employee shall be trained
in, and familiar with, the safety-related work practices, safety
procedures, and other safety requirements in this subpart that pertain
to his or her job assignments.
(ii) Each employee shall also be trained in and familiar with any
other safety practices, including applicable emergency procedures (such
as pole-top and manhole rescue), that are not specifically addressed by
this subpart but that are related to his or her work and are necessary
for his or her safety.
(iii) The degree of training shall be determined by the risk to the
employee for the hazard involved.
(2) Qualified employees. Each qualified employee shall also be
trained and competent in:
(i) The skills and techniques necessary to distinguish exposed live
parts from other parts of electric equipment,
(ii) The skills and techniques necessary to determine the nominal
voltage of exposed live parts,
(iii) The minimum approach distances specified in this subpart
corresponding to the voltages to which the qualified
employee will be exposed and the skills and techniques necessary to
maintain those distances,
(iv) The proper use of the special precautionary techniques,
personal protective equipment, insulating and shielding materials, and
insulated tools for working on or near exposed energized parts of
electric equipment, and
(v) The recognition of electrical hazards to which the employee may
be exposed and the skills and techniques necessary to control or avoid
these hazards.
Note to paragraph (b)(2): For the purposes of this subpart, a
person must have the training required by paragraph (b)(2) of this
section to be considered a qualified person.
(3) Supervision and annual inspection. The employer shall
determine, through regular supervision and through inspections
conducted on at least an annual basis, that each employee is complying
with the safety-related work practices required by this subpart.
(4) Additional training. An employee shall receive additional
training (or retraining) under any of the following conditions:
(i) If the supervision or annual inspections required by paragraph
(b)(3) of this section indicate that the employee is not complying with
the safety-related work practices required by this subpart, or
(ii) If new technology, new types of equipment, or changes in
procedures necessitate the use of safety-related work practices that
are different from those which the employee would normally use, or
(iii) If he or she must employ safety-related work practices that
are not normally used during his or her regular job duties.
Note to paragraph (b)(4)(iii): The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration considers tasks that are performed less often
than once per year to necessitate retraining before the performance
of the work practices involved.
(5) Type of training. The training required by paragraph (b) of
this section shall be of the classroom or on-the-job type.
(6) Training goals. The training shall establish employee
proficiency in the work practices required by this subpart and shall
introduce the procedures necessary for compliance with this subpart.
(7) Demonstration of proficiency. The employer shall ensure that
each employee has demonstrated proficiency in the work practices
involved before that employee is considered as having completed the
training required by paragraph (b) of this section.
Note 1 to paragraph (b)(7): Though they are not required by this
paragraph, employment records that indicate that an employee has
successfully completed the required training are one way of keeping
track of when an employee has demonstrated proficiency.
Note 2 to paragraph (b)(7): For an employee with previous
training, an employer may determine that that employee has
demonstrated the proficiency required by this paragraph using the
following process: (1) Confirm that the employee has the training
required by paragraph (b) of this section, (2) use an examination or
interview to make an initial determination that the employee
understands the relevant safety-related work practices before he or
she performs any work covered by this subpart, and (3) supervise the
employee closely until that employee has demonstrated proficiency as
required by this paragraph.
(c) Information transfer. (1) Host employer responsibilities.
Before work begins, the host employer shall inform contract employers
of:
(i) The characteristics of the host employer's installation that
are related to the safety of the work to be performed and are listed in
paragraphs (d)(1) through (d)(5) of this section;
Note to paragraph (c)(1)(i): This paragraph requires the host
employer to obtain information listed in paragraphs (d)(1) through
(d)(5) of this section if it does not have this information in
existing records.
(ii) Conditions that are related to the safety of the work to be
performed, that are listed in paragraphs (d)(6) through (d)(8) of this
section, and that are known to the host employer;
Note to paragraph (c)(1)(ii): For the purposes of this
paragraph, the host employer need only provide information to
contract employers that the host employer can obtain from its
existing records through the exercise of reasonable diligence. This
paragraph does not require the host employer to make inspections of
worksite conditions to obtain this information.
(iii) Information about the design and operation of the host
employer's installation that the contract employer needs to make the
assessments required by this subpart; and
Note to paragraph (c)(1)(iii): This paragraph requires the host
employer to obtain information about the design and operation of its
installation that contract employers need to make required
assessments if it does not have this information in existing
records.
(iv) Any other information about the design and operation of the
host employer's installation that is known by the host employer, that
the contract employer requests, and that is related to the protection
of the contract employer's employees.
Note to paragraph (c)(1)(iv): For the purposes of this
paragraph, the host employer need only provide information to
contract employers that the host employer can obtain from its
existing records through the exercise of reasonable diligence. This
paragraph does not require the host employer to make inspections of
worksite conditions to obtain this information.
(2) Contract employer responsibilities. (i) The contract employer
shall ensure that each of its employees is instructed in the hazardous
conditions relevant to the employee's work that the contract employer
is aware of as a result of information communicated to the contract
employer by the host employer under paragraph (c)(1) of this section.
(ii) Before work begins, the contract employer shall advise the
host employer of any unique hazardous conditions presented by the
contract employer's work.
(iii) The contract employer shall advise the host employer of any
unanticipated hazardous conditions found during the contract employer's
work that the host employer did not mention under paragraph (c)(1) of
this section. The contract employer shall provide this information to
the host employer within 2 working days after discovering the hazardous
condition.
(3) Joint host- and contract-employer responsibilities. The
contract employer and the host employer shall coordinate their work
rules and procedures so that each employee of the contract employer and
the host employer is protected as required by this subpart.
(d) Existing characteristics and conditions. Existing
characteristics and conditions of electric lines and equipment that are
related to the safety of the work to be performed shall be determined
before work on or near the lines or equipment is started. Such
characteristics and conditions include, but are not limited to:
(1) The nominal voltages of lines and equipment,
(2) The maximum switching-transient voltages,
(3) The presence of hazardous induced voltages,
(4) The presence of protective grounds and equipment grounding
conductors,
(5) The locations of circuits and equipment, including electric
supply lines, communication lines, and fire-protective signaling
circuits,
(6) The condition of protective grounds and equipment grounding
conductors,
(7) The condition of poles, and
(8) Environmental conditions relating to safety.
Sec. 1926.951 Medical services and first aid.
(a) General. The employer shall provide medical services and first
aid as required in Sec. 1926.50.
(b) First-aid training. In addition to the requirements of Sec.
1926.50, when employees are performing work on, or associated with,
exposed lines or equipment energized at 50 volts or more, persons with
first-aid training shall be available as follows:
(1) Field work. For field work involving two or more employees at a
work location, at least two trained persons shall be available.
(2) Fixed work locations. For fixed work locations such as
substations, the number of trained persons available shall be
sufficient to ensure that each employee exposed to electric shock can
be reached within 4 minutes by a trained person. However, where the
existing number of employees is insufficient to meet this requirement
(at a remote substation, for example), each employee at the work
location shall be a trained employee.
Sec. 1926.952 Job briefing.
(a) Before each job. (1) Information provided by the employer. In
assigning an employee or a group of employees to perform a job, the
employer shall provide the employee in charge of the job with all
available information that relates to the determination of existing
characteristics and conditions required by Sec. 1926.950(d).
(2) Briefing by the employee in charge. The employer shall ensure
that the employee in charge conducts a job briefing that meets
paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of this section with the employees
involved before they start each job.
(b) Subjects to be covered. The briefing shall cover at least the
following subjects: Hazards associated with the job, work procedures
involved, special precautions, energy-source controls, and personal
protective equipment requirements.
(c) Number of briefings. (1) At least one before each day or shift.
If the work or operations to be performed during the work day or shift
are repetitive and similar, at least one job briefing shall be
conducted before the start of the first job of each day or shift.
(2) Additional briefings. Additional job briefings shall be held if
significant changes, which might affect the safety of the employees,
occur during the course of the work.
(d) Extent of briefing. (1) Short discussion. A brief discussion is
satisfactory if the work involved is routine and if the employees, by
virtue of training and experience, can reasonably be expected to
recognize and avoid the hazards involved in the job.
(2) Detailed discussion. A more extensive discussion shall be
conducted:
(i) If the work is complicated or particularly hazardous, or
(ii) If the employee cannot be expected to recognize and avoid the
hazards involved in the job.
Note to paragraph (d): The briefing must address all the
subjects listed in paragraph (b) of this section.
(e) Working alone. An employee working alone need not conduct a job
briefing. However, the employer shall ensure that the tasks to be
performed are planned as if a briefing were required.
Sec. 1926.953 Enclosed spaces.
(a) General. This section covers enclosed spaces that may be
entered by employees. It does not apply to vented vaults if the
employer makes a determination that the ventilation system is operating
to protect employees before they enter the space. This section applies
to routine entry into enclosed spaces. If, after the employer takes the
precautions given in this section and in Sec. 1926.965, the hazards
remaining in the enclosed space endanger the life of an entrant or
could interfere with an entrant's escape from the space, then entry
into the enclosed space shall meet the permit-space entry requirements
of paragraphs (d) through (k) of Sec. 1910.146 of this chapter.
(b) Safe work practices. The employer shall ensure the use of safe
work practices for entry into, and work in, enclosed spaces and for
rescue of employees from such spaces.
(c) Training. Each employee who enters an enclosed space or who
serves as an attendant shall be trained in the hazards of enclosed-
space entry, in enclosed-space entry procedures, and in enclosed-space
rescue procedures.
(d) Rescue equipment. Employers shall provide equipment to ensure
the prompt and safe rescue of employees from the enclosed space.
(e) Evaluating potential hazards. Before any entrance cover to an
enclosed space is removed, the employer shall determine whether it is
safe to do so by checking for the presence of any atmospheric pressure
or temperature differences and by evaluating whether there might be a
hazardous atmosphere in the space. Any conditions making it unsafe to
remove the cover shall be eliminated before the cover is removed.
Note to paragraph (e): The determination called for in this
paragraph may consist of a check of the conditions that might
foreseeably be in the enclosed space. For example, the cover could
be checked to see if it is hot and, if it is fastened in place,
could be loosened gradually to release any residual pressure. An
evaluation also needs to be made of whether conditions at the site
could cause a hazardous atmosphere, such as an oxygen-deficient or
flammable atmosphere, to develop within the space.
(f) Removing covers. When covers are removed from enclosed spaces,
the opening shall be promptly guarded by a railing, temporary cover, or
other barrier designed to prevent an accidental fall through the
opening and to protect employees working in the space from objects
entering the space.
(g) Hazardous atmosphere. Employees may not enter any enclosed
space while it contains a hazardous atmosphere, unless the entry
conforms to the permit-required confined spaces standard in Sec.
1910.146 of this chapter.
(h) Attendants. While work is being performed in the enclosed
space, an attendant with first-aid training shall be immediately
available outside the enclosed space to provide assistance if a hazard
exists because of traffic patterns in the area of the opening used for
entry. The attendant is not precluded from performing other duties
outside the enclosed space if these duties do not distract the
attendant from: Monitoring employees within the space or ensuring that
it is safe for employees to enter and exit the space.
Note to paragraph (h): See Sec. 1926.965 for additional
requirements on attendants for work in manholes and vaults.
(i) Calibration of test instruments. Test instruments used to
monitor atmospheres in enclosed spaces shall be kept in calibration and
shall have a minimum accuracy of 10 percent.
(j) Testing for oxygen deficiency. Before an employee enters an
enclosed space, the atmosphere in the enclosed space shall be tested
for oxygen deficiency with a direct-reading meter or similar
instrument, capable of collection and immediate analysis of data
samples without the need for off-site evaluation. If continuous forced-
air ventilation is provided, testing is not required provided that the
procedures used ensure that employees are not exposed to the hazards
posed by oxygen deficiency.
(k) Testing for flammable gases and vapors. Before an employee
enters an enclosed space, the internal atmosphere shall be tested for
flammable gases and vapors with a direct-reading meter or similar
instrument capable of collection and immediate analysis of data samples
without the need for off-site evaluation. This test shall be performed
after the oxygen testing and ventilation required
by paragraph (j) of this section demonstrate that there is sufficient
oxygen to ensure the accuracy of the test for flammability.
(l) Ventilation, and monitoring for flammable gases or vapors. If
flammable gases or vapors are detected or if an oxygen deficiency is
found, forced-air ventilation shall be used to maintain oxygen at a
safe level and to prevent a hazardous concentration of flammable gases
and vapors from accumulating. A continuous monitoring program to ensure
that no increase in flammable gas or vapor concentration above safe
levels occurs may be followed in lieu of ventilation if flammable gases
or vapors are initially detected at safe levels.
Note to paragraph (l): See the definition of "hazardous
atmosphere" for guidance in determining whether a specific
concentration of a substance is hazardous.
(m) Specific ventilation requirements. If continuous forced-air
ventilation is used, it shall begin before entry is made and shall be
maintained long enough for the employer to be able to demonstrate that
a safe atmosphere exists before employees are allowed to enter the work
area. The forced-air ventilation shall be so directed as to ventilate
the immediate area where employees are present within the enclosed
space and shall continue until all employees leave the enclosed space.
(n) Air supply. The air supply for the continuous forced-air
ventilation shall be from a clean source and may not increase the
hazards in the enclosed space.
(o) Open flames. If open flames are used in enclosed spaces, a test
for flammable gases and vapors shall be made immediately before the
open flame device is used and at least once per hour while the device
is used in the space. Testing shall be conducted more frequently if
conditions present in the enclosed space indicate that once per hour is
insufficient to detect hazardous accumulations of flammable gases or
vapors.
Note to paragraph (o): See the definition of "hazardous
atmosphere" for guidance in determining whether a specific
concentration of a substance is hazardous.
Note to Sec. 1926.953: Entries into enclosed spaces conducted
in accordance with the permit-space entry requirements of paragraphs
(d) through (k) of Sec. 1910.146 of this chapter are considered as
complying with this section.
Sec. 1926.954 Personal protective equipment.
(a) General. Personal protective equipment shall meet the
requirements of Subpart E of this part.
Note to paragraph (a): Paragraph (d) of Sec. 1926.95 sets
employer payment obligations for the personal protective equipment
required by this subpart, including, but not limited to, the fall
protection equipment required by paragraph (b) of this section, the
electrical protective equipment required by Sec. 1926.960(c), and
the flame-resistant and arc-rated clothing and other protective
equipment required by Sec. 1926.960(g).
(b) Fall protection. (1) Personal fall arrest systems. (i) Personal
fall arrest systems shall meet the requirements of Subpart M of this
part.
(ii) Personal fall arrest equipment used by employees who are
exposed to hazards from flames or electric arcs, as determined by the
employer under Sec. 1926.960(g)(1), shall be capable of passing a drop
test equivalent to that required by paragraph (b)(2)(xii) of this
section after exposure to an electric arc with a heat energy of
405 cal/cm\2\.
(2) Work-positioning equipment. Body belts and positioning straps
for work-positioning equipment shall meet the following requirements:
(i) Hardware for body belts and positioning straps shall meet the
following requirements:
(A) Hardware shall be made of drop-forged steel, pressed steel,
formed steel, or equivalent material.
(B) Hardware shall have a corrosion-resistant finish.
(C) Hardware surfaces shall be smooth and free of sharp edges.
(ii) Buckles shall be capable of withstanding an 8.9-kilonewton
(2,000-pound-force) tension test with a maximum permanent deformation
no greater than 0.4 millimeters (0.0156 inches).
(iii) D rings shall be capable of withstanding a 22-kilonewton
(5,000-pound-force) tensile test without cracking or breaking.
(iv) Snaphooks shall be capable of withstanding a 22-kilonewton
(5,000-pound-force) tension test without failure.
Note to paragraph (b)(2)(iv): Distortion of the snaphook
sufficient to release the keeper is considered to be tensile failure
of a snaphook.
(v) Top grain leather or leather substitute may be used in the
manufacture of body belts and positioning straps; however, leather and
leather substitutes may not be used alone as a load-bearing component
of the assembly.
(vi) Plied fabric used in positioning straps and in load-bearing
parts of body belts shall be constructed in such a way that no raw
edges are exposed and the plies do not separate.
(vii) Positioning straps shall be capable of withstanding the
following tests:
(A) A dielectric test of 819.7 volts, AC, per centimeter (25,000
volts per foot) for 3 minutes without visible deterioration;
(B) A leakage test of 98.4 volts, AC, per centimeter (3,000 volts
per foot) with a leakage current of no more than 1 mA;
Note to paragraphs (b)(2)(vii)(A) and (b)(2)(vii)(B):
Positioning straps that pass direct-current tests at equivalent
voltages are considered as meeting this requirement.
(C) Tension tests of 20 kilonewtons (4,500 pounds-force) for
sections free of buckle holes and of 15 kilonewtons (3,500 pounds-
force) for sections with buckle holes;
(D) A buckle-tear test with a load of 4.4 kilonewtons (1,000
pounds-force); and
(E) A flammability test in accordance with Table V-1.
Table V-1--Flammability Test
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Test method Criteria for passing the test
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vertically suspend a 500-mm (19.7-inch) Any flames on the positioning
length of strapping supporting a 100- strap shall self extinguish.
kg (220.5-lb) weight.
Use a butane or propane burner with a The positioning strap shall
76-mm (3-inch) flame. continue to support the 100-kg
(220.5-lb) mass.
Direct the flame to an edge of the
strapping at a distance of 25 mm (1
inch).
Remove the flame after 5 seconds.
Wait for any flames on the positioning
strap to stop burning.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(viii) The cushion part of the body belt shall contain no exposed
rivets on the inside and shall be at least 76 millimeters (3 inches) in
width.
(ix) Tool loops shall be situated on the body of a body belt so
that the 100 millimeters (4 inches) of the body belt that is in the
center of the back, measuring from D ring to D ring, is free of tool
loops and any other attachments.
(x) Copper, steel, or equivalent liners shall be used around the
bars of D rings to prevent wear between these members and the leather
or fabric enclosing them.
(xi) Snaphooks shall be of the locking type meeting the following
requirements:
(A) The locking mechanism shall first be released, or a destructive
force shall be placed on the keeper, before the keeper will open.
(B) A force in the range of 6.7 N (1.5 lbf) to 17.8 N (4 lbf) shall
be required to release the locking mechanism.
(C) With the locking mechanism released and with a force applied on
the keeper against the face of the nose, the keeper may not begin to
open with a force of 11.2 N (2.5 lbf) or less and shall begin to open
with a maximum force of 17.8 N (4 lbf).
(xii) Body belts and positioning straps shall be capable of
withstanding a drop test as follows:
(A) The test mass shall be rigidly constructed of steel or
equivalent material with a mass of 100 kg (220.5 lbm). For work-
positioning equipment used by employees weighing more than 140 kg (310
lbm) fully equipped, the test mass shall be increased proportionately
(that is, the test mass must equal the mass of the equipped worker
divided by 1.4).
(B) For body belts, the body belt shall be fitted snugly around the
test mass and shall be attached to the test-structure anchorage point
by means of a wire rope.
(C) For positioning straps, the strap shall be adjusted to its
shortest length possible to accommodate the test and connected to the
test-structure anchorage point at one end and to the test mass on the
other end.
(D) The test mass shall be dropped an unobstructed distance of 1
meter (39.4 inches) from a supporting structure that will sustain
minimal deflection during the test.
(E) Body belts shall successfully arrest the fall of the test mass
and shall be capable of supporting the mass after the test.
(F) Positioning straps shall successfully arrest the fall of the
test mass without breaking, and the arrest force may not exceed 17.8
kilonewtons (4,000 pounds-force). Additionally, snaphooks on
positioning straps may not distort to such an extent that the keeper
would release.
Note to paragraph (b)(2): When used by employees weighing no
more than 140 kg (310 lbm) fully equipped, body belts and
positioning straps that conform to American Society of Testing and
Materials Standard Specifications for Personal Climbing Equipment,
ASTM F887-12\e1\, are deemed to be in compliance with paragraph
(b)(2) of this section.
(3) Care and use of personal fall protection equipment. (i) Work-
positioning equipment shall be inspected before use each day to
determine that the equipment is in safe working condition. Work-
positioning equipment that is not in safe working condition may not be
used.
Note to paragraph (b)(3)(i): Appendix F to this subpart contains
guidelines for inspecting work-positioning equipment.
(ii) Personal fall arrest systems shall be used in accordance with
Sec. 1926.502(d).
Note to paragraph (b)(3)(ii): Fall protection equipment rigged
to arrest falls is considered a fall arrest system and must meet the
applicable requirements for the design and use of those systems.
Fall protection equipment rigged for work positioning is considered
work-positioning equipment and must meet the applicable requirements
for the design and use of that equipment.
(iii) The employer shall ensure that employees use fall protection
systems as follows:
(A) Each employee working from an aerial lift shall use a fall
restraint system or a personal fall arrest system. Paragraph (b)(2)(v)
of Sec. 1926.453 does not apply.
(B) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C) of this section,
each employee in elevated locations more than 1.2 meters (4 feet) above
the ground on poles, towers, or similar structures shall use a personal
fall arrest system, work-positioning equipment, or fall restraint
system, as appropriate, if the employer has not provided other fall
protection meeting Subpart M of this part.
(C) Until March 31, 2015, a qualified employee climbing or changing
location on poles, towers, or similar structures need not use fall
protection equipment, unless conditions, such as, but not limited to,
ice, high winds, the design of the structure (for example, no provision
for holding on with hands), or the presence of contaminants on the
structure, could cause the employee to lose his or her grip or footing.
On and after April 1, 2015, each qualified employee climbing or
changing location on poles, towers, or similar structures must use fall
protection equipment unless the employer can demonstrate that climbing
or changing location with fall protection is infeasible or creates a
greater hazard than climbing or changing location without it.
Note 1 to paragraphs (b)(3)(iii)(B) and (b)(3)(iii)(C): These
paragraphs apply to structures that support overhead electric power
transmission and distribution lines and equipment. They do not apply
to portions of buildings, such as loading docks, or to electric
equipment, such as transformers and capacitors. Subpart M of this
part contains the duty to provide fall protection associated with
walking and working surfaces.
Note 2 to paragraphs (b)(3)(iii)(B) and (b)(3)(iii)(C): Until
the employer ensures that employees are proficient in climbing and
the use of fall protection under Sec. 1926.950(b)(7), the employees
are not considered "qualified employees" for the purposes of
paragraphs (b)(3)(iii)(B) and (b)(3)(iii)(C) of this section. These
paragraphs require unqualified employees (including trainees) to use
fall protection any time they are more than 1.2 meters (4 feet)
above the ground.
(iv) On and after April 1, 2015, work-positioning systems shall be
rigged so that an employee can free fall no more than 0.6 meters (2
feet).
(v) Anchorages for work-positioning equipment shall be capable of
supporting at least twice the potential impact load of an employee's
fall, or 13.3 kilonewtons (3,000 pounds-force), whichever is greater.
Note to paragraph (b)(3)(v): Wood-pole fall-restriction devices
meeting American Society of Testing and Materials Standard
Specifications for Personal Climbing Equipment, ASTM F887-12\e1\,
are deemed to meet the anchorage-strength requirement when they are
used in accordance with manufacturers' instructions.
(vi) Unless the snaphook is a locking type and designed
specifically for the following connections, snaphooks on work-
positioning equipment may not be engaged:
(A) Directly to webbing, rope, or wire rope;
(B) To each other;
(C) To a D ring to which another snaphook or other connector is
attached;
(D) To a horizontal lifeline; or
(E) To any object that is incompatibly shaped or dimensioned in
relation to the snaphook such that accidental disengagement could occur
should the connected object sufficiently depress the snaphook keeper to
allow release of the object.
Sec. 1926.955 Portable ladders and platforms.
(a) General. Requirements for portable ladders contained in Subpart
X of this part apply in addition to the
requirements of this section, except as specifically noted in paragraph
(b) of this section.
(b) Special ladders and platforms. Portable ladders used on
structures or conductors in conjunction with overhead line work need
not meet Sec. 1926.1053(b)(5)(i) and (b)(12). Portable ladders and
platforms used on structures or conductors in conjunction with overhead
line work shall meet the following requirements:
(1) Design load. In the configurations in which they are used,
portable platforms shall be capable of supporting without failure at
least 2.5 times the maximum intended load.
(2) Maximum load. Portable ladders and platforms may not be loaded
in excess of the working loads for which they are designed.
(3) Securing in place. Portable ladders and platforms shall be
secured to prevent them from becoming dislodged.
(4) Intended use. Portable ladders and platforms may be used only
in applications for which they are designed.
(c) Conductive ladders. Portable metal ladders and other portable
conductive ladders may not be used near exposed energized lines or
equipment. However, in specialized high-voltage work, conductive
ladders shall be used when the employer demonstrates that nonconductive
ladders would present a greater hazard to employees than conductive
ladders.
Sec. 1926.956 Hand and portable power equipment.
(a) General. Paragraph (b) of this section applies to electric
equipment connected by cord and plug. Paragraph (c) of this section
applies to portable and vehicle-mounted generators used to supply cord-
and plug-connected equipment. Paragraph (d) of this section applies to
hydraulic and pneumatic tools.
(b) Cord- and plug-connected equipment. Cord- and plug-connected
equipment not covered by Subpart K of this part shall comply with one
of the following instead of Sec. 1926.302(a)(1):
(1) The equipment shall be equipped with a cord containing an
equipment grounding conductor connected to the equipment frame and to a
means for grounding the other end of the conductor (however, this
option may not be used where the introduction of the ground into the
work environment increases the hazard to an employee); or
(2) The equipment shall be of the double-insulated type conforming
to Subpart K of this part; or
(3) The equipment shall be connected to the power supply through an
isolating transformer with an ungrounded secondary of not more than 50
volts.
(c) Portable and vehicle-mounted generators. Portable and vehicle-
mounted generators used to supply cord- and plug-connected equipment
covered by paragraph (b) of this section shall meet the following
requirements:
(1) Equipment to be supplied. The generator may only supply
equipment located on the generator or the vehicle and cord- and plug-
connected equipment through receptacles mounted on the generator or the
vehicle.
(2) Equipment grounding. The non-current-carrying metal parts of
equipment and the equipment grounding conductor terminals of the
receptacles shall be bonded to the generator frame.
(3) Bonding the frame. For vehicle-mounted generators, the frame of
the generator shall be bonded to the vehicle frame.
(4) Bonding the neutral conductor. Any neutral conductor shall be
bonded to the generator frame.
(d) Hydraulic and pneumatic tools. (1) Hydraulic fluid in
insulating tools. Paragraph (d)(1) of Sec. 1926.302 does not apply to
hydraulic fluid used in insulating sections of hydraulic tools.
(2) Operating pressure. Safe operating pressures for hydraulic and
pneumatic tools, hoses, valves, pipes, filters, and fittings may not be
exceeded.
Note to paragraph (d)(2): If any hazardous defects are present,
no operating pressure is safe, and the hydraulic or pneumatic
equipment involved may not be used. In the absence of defects, the
maximum rated operating pressure is the maximum safe pressure.
(3) Work near energized parts. A hydraulic or pneumatic tool used
where it may contact exposed energized parts shall be designed and
maintained for such use.
(4) Protection against vacuum formation. The hydraulic system
supplying a hydraulic tool used where it may contact exposed live parts
shall provide protection against loss of insulating value, for the
voltage involved, due to the formation of a partial vacuum in the
hydraulic line.
Note to paragraph (d)(4): Use of hydraulic lines that do not
have check valves and that have a separation of more than 10.7
meters (35 feet) between the oil reservoir and the upper end of the
hydraulic system promotes the formation of a partial vacuum.
(5) Protection against the accumulation of moisture. A pneumatic
tool used on energized electric lines or equipment, or used where it
may contact exposed live parts, shall provide protection against the
accumulation of moisture in the air supply.
(6) Breaking connections. Pressure shall be released before
connections are broken, unless quick-acting, self-closing connectors
are used.
(7) Leaks. Employers must ensure that employees do not use any part
of their bodies to locate, or attempt to stop, a hydraulic leak.
(8) Hoses. Hoses may not be kinked.
Sec. 1926.957 Live-line tools.
(a) Design of tools. Live-line tool rods, tubes, and poles shall be
designed and constructed to withstand the following minimum tests:
(1) Fiberglass-reinforced plastic. If the tool is made of
fiberglass-reinforced plastic (FRP), it shall withstand 328,100 volts
per meter (100,000 volts per foot) of length for 5 minutes, or
Note to paragraph (a)(1): Live-line tools using rod and tube
that meet ASTM F711-02 (2007), Standard Specification for
Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod and Tube Used in Live Line
Tools, are deemed to comply with paragraph (a)(1) of this section.
(2) Wood. If the tool is made of wood, it shall withstand 246,100
volts per meter (75,000 volts per foot) of length for 3 minutes, or
(3) Equivalent tests. The tool shall withstand other tests that the
employer can demonstrate are equivalent.
(b) Condition of tools. (1) Daily inspection. Each live-line tool
shall be wiped clean and visually inspected for defects before use each
day.
(2) Defects. If any defect or contamination that could adversely
affect the insulating qualities or mechanical integrity of the live-
line tool is present after wiping, the tool shall be removed from
service and examined and tested according to paragraph (b)(3) of this
section before being returned to service.
(3) Biennial inspection and testing. Live-line tools used for
primary employee protection shall be removed from service every 2
years, and whenever required under paragraph (b)(2) of this section,
for examination, cleaning, repair, and testing as follows:
(i) Each tool shall be thoroughly examined for defects.
(ii) If a defect or contamination that could adversely affect the
insulating qualities or mechanical integrity of the live-line tool is
found, the tool shall be repaired and refinished or shall be
permanently removed from service. If no such defect or contamination is
found, the tool shall be cleaned and waxed.
(iii) The tool shall be tested in accordance with paragraphs
(b)(3)(iv)
and (b)(3)(v) of this section under the following conditions:
(A) After the tool has been repaired or refinished; and
(B) After the examination if repair or refinishing is not
performed, unless the tool is made of FRP rod or foam-filled FRP tube
and the employer can demonstrate that the tool has no defects that
could cause it to fail during use.
(iv) The test method used shall be designed to verify the tool's
integrity along its entire working length and, if the tool is made of
fiberglass-reinforced plastic, its integrity under wet conditions.
(v) The voltage applied during the tests shall be as follows:
(A) 246,100 volts per meter (75,000 volts per foot) of length for 1
minute if the tool is made of fiberglass, or
(B) 164,000 volts per meter (50,000 volts per foot) of length for 1
minute if the tool is made of wood, or
(C) Other tests that the employer can demonstrate are equivalent.
Note to paragraph (b): Guidelines for the examination, cleaning,
repairing, and in-service testing of live-line tools are specified
in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers' IEEE Guide
for Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines, IEEE Std 516-2009.
Sec. 1926.958 Materials handling and storage.
(a) General. Materials handling and storage shall comply with
applicable material-handling and material-storage requirements in this
part, including those in Subparts N and CC of this part.
(b) Materials storage near energized lines or equipment. (1)
Unrestricted areas. In areas to which access is not restricted to
qualified persons only, materials or equipment may not be stored closer
to energized lines or exposed energized parts of equipment than the
following distances, plus a distance that provides for the maximum sag
and side swing of all conductors and for the height and movement of
material-handling equipment:
(i) For lines and equipment energized at 50 kilovolts or less, the
distance is 3.05 meters (10 feet).
(ii) For lines and equipment energized at more than 50 kilovolts,
the distance is 3.05 meters (10 feet) plus 0.10 meter (4 inches) for
every 10 kilovolts over 50 kilovolts.
(2) Restricted areas. In areas restricted to qualified employees,
materials may not be stored within the working space about energized
lines or equipment.
Note to paragraph (b)(2): Paragraph (b) of Sec. 1926.966
specifies the size of the working space.
Sec. 1926.959 Mechanical equipment.
(a) General requirements. (1) Other applicable requirements.
Mechanical equipment shall be operated in accordance with applicable
requirements in this part, including Subparts N, O, and CC of this
part, except that Sec. 1926.600(a)(6) does not apply to operations
performed by qualified employees.
(2) Inspection before use. The critical safety components of
mechanical elevating and rotating equipment shall receive a thorough
visual inspection before use on each shift.
Note to paragraph (a)(2): Critical safety components of
mechanical elevating and rotating equipment are components for which
failure would result in free fall or free rotation of the boom.
(3) Operator. The operator of an electric line truck may not leave
his or her position at the controls while a load is suspended, unless
the employer can demonstrate that no employee (including the operator)
is endangered.
(b) Outriggers. (1) Extend outriggers. Mobile equipment, if
provided with outriggers, shall be operated with the outriggers
extended and firmly set, except as provided in paragraph (b)(3) of this
section.
(2) Clear view. Outriggers may not be extended or retracted outside
of the clear view of the operator unless all employees are outside the
range of possible equipment motion.
(3) Operation without outriggers. If the work area or the terrain
precludes the use of outriggers, the equipment may be operated only
within its maximum load ratings specified by the equipment manufacturer
for the particular configuration of the equipment without outriggers.
(c) Applied loads. Mechanical equipment used to lift or move lines
or other material shall be used within its maximum load rating and
other design limitations for the conditions under which the mechanical
equipment is being used.
(d) Operations near energized lines or equipment. (1) Minimum
approach distance. Mechanical equipment shall be operated so that the
minimum approach distances, established by the employer under Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)(i), are maintained from exposed energized lines and
equipment. However, the insulated portion of an aerial lift operated by
a qualified employee in the lift is exempt from this requirement if the
applicable minimum approach distance is maintained between the
uninsulated portions of the aerial lift and exposed objects having a
different electrical potential.
(2) Observer. A designated employee other than the equipment
operator shall observe the approach distance to exposed lines and
equipment and provide timely warnings before the minimum approach
distance required by paragraph (d)(1) of this section is reached,
unless the employer can demonstrate that the operator can accurately
determine that the minimum approach distance is being maintained.
(3) Extra precautions. If, during operation of the mechanical
equipment, that equipment could become energized, the operation also
shall comply with at least one of paragraphs (d)(3)(i) through
(d)(3)(iii) of this section.
(i) The energized lines or equipment exposed to contact shall be
covered with insulating protective material that will withstand the
type of contact that could be made during the operation.
(ii) The mechanical equipment shall be insulated for the voltage
involved. The mechanical equipment shall be positioned so that its
uninsulated portions cannot approach the energized lines or equipment
any closer than the minimum approach distances, established by the
employer under Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(i).
(iii) Each employee shall be protected from hazards that could
arise from mechanical equipment contact with energized lines or
equipment. The measures used shall ensure that employees will not be
exposed to hazardous differences in electric potential. Unless the
employer can demonstrate that the methods in use protect each employee
from the hazards that could arise if the mechanical equipment contacts
the energized line or equipment, the measures used shall include all of
the following techniques:
(A) Using the best available ground to minimize the time the lines
or electric equipment remain energized,
(B) Bonding mechanical equipment together to minimize potential
differences,
(C) Providing ground mats to extend areas of equipotential, and
(D) Employing insulating protective equipment or barricades to
guard against any remaining hazardous electrical potential differences.
Note to paragraph (d)(3)(iii): Appendix C to this subpart
contains information on hazardous step and touch potentials and on
methods of protecting employees from hazards resulting from such
potentials.
Sec. 1926.960 Working on or near exposed energized parts.
(a) Application. This section applies to work on exposed live
parts, or near enough to them to expose the employee to any hazard they
present.
(b) General. (1) Qualified employees only. (i) Only qualified
employees may work on or with exposed energized lines or parts of
equipment.
(ii) Only qualified employees may work in areas containing
unguarded, uninsulated energized lines or parts of equipment operating
at 50 volts or more.
(2) Treat as energized. Electric lines and equipment shall be
considered and treated as energized unless they have been deenergized
in accordance with Sec. 1926.961.
(3) At least two employees. (i) Except as provided in paragraph
(b)(3)(ii) of this section, at least two employees shall be present
while any employees perform the following types of work:
(A) Installation, removal, or repair of lines energized at more
than 600 volts,
(B) Installation, removal, or repair of deenergized lines if an
employee is exposed to contact with other parts energized at more than
600 volts,
(C) Installation, removal, or repair of equipment, such as
transformers, capacitors, and regulators, if an employee is exposed to
contact with parts energized at more than 600 volts,
(D) Work involving the use of mechanical equipment, other than
insulated aerial lifts, near parts energized at more than 600 volts,
and
(E) Other work that exposes an employee to electrical hazards
greater than, or equal to, the electrical hazards posed by operations
listed specifically in paragraphs (b)(3)(i)(A) through (b)(3)(i)(D) of
this section.
(ii) Paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section does not apply to the
following operations:
(A) Routine circuit switching, when the employer can demonstrate
that conditions at the site allow safe performance of this work,
(B) Work performed with live-line tools when the position of the
employee is such that he or she is neither within reach of, nor
otherwise exposed to contact with, energized parts, and
(C) Emergency repairs to the extent necessary to safeguard the
general public.
(c) Live work. (1) Minimum approach distances. (i) The employer
shall establish minimum approach distances no less than the distances
computed by Table V-2 for ac systems or Table V-7 for dc systems.
(ii) No later than April 1, 2015, for voltages over 72.5 kilovolts,
the employer shall determine the maximum anticipated per-unit transient
overvoltage, phase-to-ground, through an engineering analysis or assume
a maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground,
in accordance with Table V-8. When the employer uses portable
protective gaps to control the maximum transient overvoltage, the value
of the maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-
ground, must provide for five standard deviations between the
statistical sparkover voltage of the gap and the statistical withstand
voltage corresponding to the electrical component of the minimum
approach distance. The employer shall make any engineering analysis
conducted to determine maximum anticipated per-unit transient
overvoltage available upon request to employees and to the Assistant
Secretary or designee for examination and copying.
Note to paragraph (c)(1)(ii): See Appendix B to this subpart for
information on how to calculate the maximum anticipated per-unit
transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, when the employer uses
portable protective gaps to reduce maximum transient overvoltages.
(iii) The employer shall ensure that no employee approaches or
takes any conductive object closer to exposed energized parts than the
employer's established minimum approach distance, unless:
(A) The employee is insulated from the energized part (rubber
insulating gloves or rubber insulating gloves and sleeves worn in
accordance with paragraph (c)(2) of this section constitutes insulation
of the employee from the energized part upon which the employee is
working provided that the employee has control of the part in a manner
sufficient to prevent exposure to uninsulated portions of the
employee's body), or
(B) The energized part is insulated from the employee and from any
other conductive object at a different potential, or
(C) The employee is insulated from any other exposed conductive
object in accordance with the requirements for live-line barehand work
in Sec. 1926.964(c).
(2) Type of insulation. (i) When an employee uses rubber insulating
gloves as insulation from energized parts (under paragraph
(c)(1)(iii)(A) of this section), the employer shall ensure that the
employee also uses rubber insulating sleeves. However, an employee need
not use rubber insulating sleeves if:
(A) Exposed energized parts on which the employee is not working
are insulated from the employee; and
(B) When installing insulation for purposes of paragraph
(c)(2)(i)(A) of this section, the employee installs the insulation from
a position that does not expose his or her upper arm to contact with
other energized parts.
(ii) When an employee uses rubber insulating gloves or rubber
insulating gloves and sleeves as insulation from energized parts (under
paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(A) of this section), the employer shall ensure
that the employee:
(A) Puts on the rubber insulating gloves and sleeves in a position
where he or she cannot reach into the minimum approach distance,
established by the employer under paragraph (c)(1) of this section; and
(B) Does not remove the rubber insulating gloves and sleeves until
he or she is in a position where he or she cannot reach into the
minimum approach distance, established by the employer under paragraph
(c)(1) of this section.
(d) Working position. (1) Working from below. The employer shall
ensure that each employee, to the extent that other safety-related
conditions at the worksite permit, works in a position from which a
slip or shock will not bring the employee's body into contact with
exposed, uninsulated parts energized at a potential different from the
employee's.
(2) Requirements for working without electrical protective
equipment. When an employee performs work near exposed parts energized
at more than 600 volts, but not more than 72.5 kilovolts, and is not
wearing rubber insulating gloves, being protected by insulating
equipment covering the energized parts, performing work using live-line
tools, or performing live-line barehand work under Sec. 1926.964(c),
the employee shall work from a position where he or she cannot reach
into the minimum approach distance, established by the employer under
paragraph (c)(1) of this section.
(e) Making connections. The employer shall ensure that employees
make connections as follows:
(1) Connecting. In connecting deenergized equipment or lines to an
energized circuit by means of a conducting wire or device, an employee
shall first attach the wire to the deenergized part;
(2) Disconnecting. When disconnecting equipment or lines from an
energized circuit by means of a conducting wire or device, an employee
shall remove the source end first; and
(3) Loose conductors. When lines or equipment are connected to or
disconnected from energized circuits, an employee shall keep loose
conductors away from exposed energized parts.
(f) Conductive articles. When an employee performs work within
reaching distance of exposed energized parts of equipment, the employer
shall
ensure that the employee removes or renders nonconductive all exposed
conductive articles, such as keychains or watch chains, rings, or wrist
watches or bands, unless such articles do not increase the hazards
associated with contact with the energized parts.
(g) Protection from flames and electric arcs. (1) Hazard
assessment. The employer shall assess the workplace to identify
employees exposed to hazards from flames or from electric arcs.
(2) Estimate of available heat energy. For each employee exposed to
hazards from electric arcs, the employer shall make a reasonable
estimate of the incident heat energy to which the employee would be
exposed.
Note 1 to paragraph (g)(2): Appendix E to this subpart provides
guidance on estimating available heat energy. The Occupational
Safety and Health Administration will deem employers following the
guidance in Appendix E to this subpart to be in compliance with
paragraph (g)(2) of this section. An employer may choose a method of
calculating incident heat energy not included in Appendix E to this
subpart if the chosen method reasonably predicts the incident energy
to which the employee would be exposed.
Note 2 to paragraph (g)(2): This paragraph does not require the
employer to estimate the incident heat energy exposure for every job
task performed by each employee. The employer may make broad
estimates that cover multiple system areas provided the employer
uses reasonable assumptions about the energy-exposure distribution
throughout the system and provided the estimates represent the
maximum employee exposure for those areas. For example, the employer
could estimate the heat energy just outside a substation feeding a
radial distribution system and use that estimate for all jobs
performed on that radial system.
(3) Prohibited clothing. The employer shall ensure that each
employee who is exposed to hazards from flames or electric arcs does
not wear clothing that could melt onto his or her skin or that could
ignite and continue to burn when exposed to flames or the heat energy
estimated under paragraph (g)(2) of this section.
Note to paragraph (g)(3): This paragraph prohibits clothing made
from acetate, nylon, polyester, rayon and polypropylene, either
alone or in blends, unless the employer demonstrates that the fabric
has been treated to withstand the conditions that may be encountered
by the employee or that the employee wears the clothing in such a
manner as to eliminate the hazard involved.
(4) Flame-resistant clothing. The employer shall ensure that the
outer layer of clothing worn by an employee, except for clothing not
required to be arc rated under paragraphs (g)(5)(i) through (g)(5)(v)
of this section, is flame resistant under any of the following
conditions:
(i) The employee is exposed to contact with energized circuit parts
operating at more than 600 volts,
(ii) An electric arc could ignite flammable material in the work
area that, in turn, could ignite the employee's clothing,
(iii) Molten metal or electric arcs from faulted conductors in the
work area could ignite the employee's clothing, or
Note to paragraph (g)(4)(iii): This paragraph does not apply to
conductors that are capable of carrying, without failure, the
maximum available fault current for the time the circuit protective
devices take to interrupt the fault.
(iv) The incident heat energy estimated under paragraph (g)(2) of
this section exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\.
(5) Arc rating. The employer shall ensure that each employee
exposed to hazards from electric arcs wears protective clothing and
other protective equipment with an arc rating greater than or equal to
the heat energy estimated under paragraph (g)(2) of this section
whenever that estimate exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\. This protective equipment
shall cover the employee's entire body, except as follows:
(i) Arc-rated protection is not necessary for the employee's hands
when the employee is wearing rubber insulating gloves with protectors
or, if the estimated incident energy is no more than 14 cal/cm\2\,
heavy-duty leather work gloves with a weight of at least 407 gm/m\2\
(12 oz/yd\2\),
(ii) Arc-rated protection is not necessary for the employee's feet
when the employee is wearing heavy-duty work shoes or boots,
(iii) Arc-rated protection is not necessary for the employee's head
when the employee is wearing head protection meeting Sec.
1926.100(b)(2) if the estimated incident energy is less than 9 cal/
cm\2\ for exposures involving single-phase arcs in open air or 5 cal/
cm\2\ for other exposures,
(iv) The protection for the employee's head may consist of head
protection meeting Sec. 1926.100(b)(2) and a faceshield with a minimum
arc rating of 8 cal/cm\2\ if the estimated incident-energy exposure is
less than 13 cal/cm\2\ for exposures involving single-phase arcs in
open air or 9 cal/cm\2\ for other exposures, and
(v) For exposures involving single-phase arcs in open air, the arc
rating for the employee's head and face protection may be 4 cal/cm\2\
less than the estimated incident energy.
Note to paragraph (g): See Appendix E to this subpart for
further information on the selection of appropriate protection.
(6) Dates. (i) The obligation in paragraph (g)(2) of this section
for the employer to make reasonable estimates of incident energy
commences January 1, 2015.
(ii) The obligation in paragraph (g)(4)(iv) of this section for the
employer to ensure that the outer layer of clothing worn by an employee
is flame-resistant when the estimated incident heat energy exceeds 2.0
cal/cm\2\ commences April 1, 2015.
(iii) The obligation in paragraph (g)(5) of this section for the
employer to ensure that each employee exposed to hazards from electric
arcs wears the required arc-rated protective equipment commences April
1, 2015.
(h) Fuse handling. When an employee must install or remove fuses
with one or both terminals energized at more than 300 volts, or with
exposed parts energized at more than 50 volts, the employer shall
ensure that the employee uses tools or gloves rated for the voltage.
When an employee installs or removes expulsion-type fuses with one or
both terminals energized at more than 300 volts, the employer shall
ensure that the employee wears eye protection meeting the requirements
of Subpart E of this part, uses a tool rated for the voltage, and is
clear of the exhaust path of the fuse barrel.
(i) Covered (noninsulated) conductors. The requirements of this
section that pertain to the hazards of exposed live parts also apply
when an employee performs work in proximity to covered (noninsulated)
wires.
(j) Non-current-carrying metal parts. Non-current-carrying metal
parts of equipment or devices, such as transformer cases and circuit-
breaker housings, shall be treated as energized at the highest voltage
to which these parts are exposed, unless the employer inspects the
installation and determines that these parts are grounded before
employees begin performing the work.
(k) Opening and closing circuits under load. (1) The employer shall
ensure that devices used by employees to open circuits under load
conditions are designed to interrupt the current involved.
(2) The employer shall ensure that devices used by employees to
close circuits under load conditions are designed to safely carry the
current involved.
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.034
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.035
BILLING CODE 4510-26-C
Table V-3--Electrical Component of the Minimum Approach Distance (D; in Meters) at 5.1 to 72.5 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
Nominal voltage (kV) phase-to-phase --------------------------------------------------
D (m) D (m)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5.1 to 15.0.................................................. 0.04 0.07
15.1 to 36.0................................................. 0.16 0.28
36.1 to 46.0................................................. 0.23 0.37
46.1 to 72.5................................................. 0.39 0.59
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table V-4--Altitude Correction Factor
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Altitude above sea level (m) A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 to 900....................................... 1.00
901 to 1,200................................... 1.02
1,201 to 1,500................................. 1.05
1,501 to 1,800................................. 1.08
1,801 to 2,100................................. 1.11
2,101 to 2,400................................. 1.14
2,401 to 2,700................................. 1.17
2,701 to 3,000................................. 1.20
3,001 to 3,600................................. 1.25
3,601 to 4,200................................. 1.30
4,201 to 4,800................................. 1.35
4,801 to 5,400................................. 1.39
5,401 to 6,000................................. 1.44
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table V-5--Alternative Minimum Approach Distances (in Meters or Feet and Inches) for Voltages of 72.5 kV and
Less \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Distance
----------------------------------------------------------------
Nominal voltage (kV) phase-to-phase Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.50 0.300 \2\................................. Avoid contact
Avoid contact
----------------------------------------------------------------
0.301 to 0.750 \2\............................. 0.33 1.09 0.33 1.09
0.751 to 5.0................................... 0.63 2.07 0.63 2.07
5.1 to 15.0.................................... 0.65 2.14 0.68 2.24
15.1 to 36.0................................... 0.77 2.53 0.89 2.92
36.1 to 46.0................................... 0.84 2.76 0.98 3.22
46.1 to 72.5................................... 1.00 3.29 1.20 3.94
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Employers may use the minimum approach distances in this table provided the worksite is at an elevation of
900 meters (3,000 feet) or less. If employees will be working at elevations greater than 900 meters (3,000
feet) above mean sea level, the employer shall determine minimum approach distances by multiplying the
distances in this table by the correction factor in Table V-4 corresponding to the altitude of the work.
\2\ For single-phase systems, use voltage-to-ground.
Table V-6--Alternative Minimum Approach Distances (in Meters or Feet and Inches) for Voltages of More Than 72.5
kV 1 2 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
Voltage range phase to phase (kV) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
72.6 to 121.0.................................. 1.13 3.71 1.42 4.66
121.1 to 145.0................................. 1.30 4.27 1.64 5.38
145.1 to 169.0................................. 1.46 4.79 1.94 6.36
169.1 to 242.0................................. 2.01 6.59 3.08 10.10
242.1 to 362.0................................. 3.41 11.19 5.52 18.11
362.1 to 420.0................................. 4.25 13.94 6.81 22.34
420.1 to 550.0................................. 5.07 16.63 8.24 27.03
550.1 to 800.0................................. 6.88 22.57 11.38 37.34
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Employers may use the minimum approach distances in this table provided the worksite is at an elevation of
900 meters (3,000 feet) or less. If employees will be working at elevations greater than 900 meters (3,000
feet) above mean sea level, the employer shall determine minimum approach distances by multiplying the
distances in this table by the correction factor in Table V-4 corresponding to the altitude of the work.
\2\ Employers may use the phase-to-phase minimum approach distances in this table provided that no insulated
tool spans the gap and no large conductive object is in the gap.
\3\ The clear live-line tool distance shall equal or exceed the values for the indicated voltage ranges.
Table V-7--DC Live-Line Minimum Approach Distance (in Meters) With Overvoltage Factor \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
distance (m) maximum line-to-ground voltage (kV)
Maximum anticipated per-unit -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
transient overvoltage 250 400 500 600 750
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5 or less..................... 1.12 1.60 2.06 2.62 3.61
1.6............................. 1.17 1.69 2.24 2.86 3.98
1.7............................. 1.23 1.82 2.42 3.12 4.37
1.8............................. 1.28 1.95 2.62 3.39 4.79
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The distances specified in this table are for air, bare-hand, and live-line tool conditions. If employees
will be working at elevations greater than 900 meters (3,000 feet) above mean sea level, the employer shall
determine minimum approach distances by multiplying the distances in this table by the correction factor in
Table V-4 corresponding to the altitude of the work.
Table V-8--Assumed Maximum Per-Unit Transient Overvoltage
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assumed maximum per-
Voltage range (kV) Type of current (ac or unit transient
dc) overvoltage
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
72.6 to 420.0................................................. ac 3.5
420.1 to 550.0................................................ ac 3.0
550.1 to 800.0................................................ ac 2.5
250 to 750.................................................... dc 1.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 1926.961 Deenergizing lines and equipment for employee
protection.
(a) Application. This section applies to the deenergizing of
transmission and distribution lines and equipment for the purpose of
protecting employees. Conductors and parts of electric equipment that
have been deenergized under procedures other than those required by
this section shall be treated as energized.
(b) General. (1) System operator. If a system operator is in charge
of the lines or equipment and their means of disconnection, the
employer shall designate one employee in the crew to be in charge of
the clearance and shall comply with all of the requirements of
paragraph (c) of this section in the order specified.
(2) No system operator. If no system operator is in charge of the
lines or equipment and their means of disconnection, the employer shall
designate one employee in the crew to be in charge of the clearance and
to perform the functions that the system operator would otherwise
perform under this section. All of the requirements of paragraph (c) of
this section apply, in the order specified, except as provided in
paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
(3) Single crews working with the means of disconnection under the
control of the employee in charge of the clearance. If only one crew
will be working on the lines or equipment and if the means of
disconnection is accessible and visible to, and under the sole control
of, the employee in charge of the clearance, paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(3),
and (c)(5) of this section do not apply. Additionally, the employer
does not need to use the tags required by the remaining provisions of
paragraph (c) of this section.
(4) Multiple crews. If two or more crews will be working on the
same lines or equipment, then:
(i) The crews shall coordinate their activities under this section
with a single employee in charge of the clearance for all of the crews
and follow the requirements of this section as if all of the employees
formed a single crew, or
(ii) Each crew shall independently comply with this section and, if
there is no system operator in charge of the lines or equipment, shall
have separate tags and coordinate deenergizing and reenergizing the
lines and equipment with the other crews.
(5) Disconnecting means accessible to general public. The employer
shall render any disconnecting means that are accessible to individuals
outside the employer's control (for example, the general public)
inoperable while the disconnecting means are open for the purpose of
protecting employees.
(c) Deenergizing lines and equipment. (1) Request to deenergize.
The employee that the employer designates pursuant to paragraph (b) of
this section as being in charge of the clearance shall make a request
of the system operator to deenergize the particular section of line or
equipment. The designated employee becomes the employee in charge (as
this term is used in paragraph (c) of this section) and is responsible
for the clearance.
(2) Open disconnecting means. The employer shall ensure that all
switches, disconnectors, jumpers, taps, and other means through which
known sources of electric energy may be supplied to the particular
lines and equipment to be deenergized are open. The employer shall
render such means inoperable, unless its design does not so permit, and
then ensure that such means are tagged to indicate that employees are
at work.
(3) Automatically and remotely controlled switches. The employer
shall ensure that automatically and remotely controlled switches that
could cause the opened disconnecting means to close are also tagged at
the points of control. The employer shall render the automatic or
remote control feature inoperable, unless its design does not so
permit.
(4) Network protectors. The employer need not use the tags
mentioned in paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) of this section on a network
protector for work on the primary feeder for the network protector's
associated network transformer when the employer can demonstrate all of
the following conditions:
(i) Every network protector is maintained so that it will
immediately trip open if closed when a primary conductor is
deenergized;
(ii) Employees cannot manually place any network protector in a
closed position without the use of tools, and any manual override
position is blocked, locked, or otherwise disabled; and
(iii) The employer has procedures for manually overriding any
network protector that incorporate provisions for determining, before
anyone places a network protector in a closed position,
that: The line connected to the network protector is not deenergized
for the protection of any employee working on the line; and (if the
line connected to the network protector is not deenergized for the
protection of any employee working on the line) the primary conductors
for the network protector are energized.
(5) Tags. Tags shall prohibit operation of the disconnecting means
and shall indicate that employees are at work.
(6) Test for energized condition. After the applicable requirements
in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this section have been followed
and the system operator gives a clearance to the employee in charge,
the employer shall ensure that the lines and equipment are deenergized
by testing the lines and equipment to be worked with a device designed
to detect voltage.
(7) Install grounds. The employer shall ensure the installation of
protective grounds as required by Sec. 1926.962.
(8) Consider lines and equipment deenergized. After the applicable
requirements of paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(7) of this section have
been followed, the lines and equipment involved may be considered
deenergized.
(9) Transferring clearances. To transfer the clearance, the
employee in charge (or the employee's supervisor if the employee in
charge must leave the worksite due to illness or other emergency) shall
inform the system operator and employees in the crew; and the new
employee in charge shall be responsible for the clearance.
(10) Releasing clearances. To release a clearance, the employee in
charge shall:
(i) Notify each employee under that clearance of the pending
release of the clearance;
(ii) Ensure that all employees under that clearance are clear of
the lines and equipment;
(iii) Ensure that all protective grounds protecting employees under
that clearance have been removed; and
(iv) Report this information to the system operator and then
release the clearance.
(11) Person releasing clearance. Only the employee in charge who
requested the clearance may release the clearance, unless the employer
transfers responsibility under paragraph (c)(9) of this section.
(12) Removal of tags. No one may remove tags without the release of
the associated clearance as specified under paragraphs (c)(10) and
(c)(11) of this section.
(13) Reenergizing lines and equipment. The employer shall ensure
that no one initiates action to reenergize the lines or equipment at a
point of disconnection until all protective grounds have been removed,
all crews working on the lines or equipment release their clearances,
all employees are clear of the lines and equipment, and all protective
tags are removed from that point of disconnection.
Sec. 1926.962 Grounding for the protection of employees.
(a) Application. This section applies to grounding of transmission
and distribution lines and equipment for the purpose of protecting
employees. Paragraph (d) of this section also applies to protective
grounding of other equipment as required elsewhere in this Subpart.
Note to paragraph (a): This section covers grounding of
transmission and distribution lines and equipment when this subpart
requires protective grounding and whenever the employer chooses to
ground such lines and equipment for the protection of employees.
(b) General. For any employee to work transmission and distribution
lines or equipment as deenergized, the employer shall ensure that the
lines or equipment are deenergized under the provisions of Sec.
1926.961 and shall ensure proper grounding of the lines or equipment as
specified in paragraphs (c) through (h) of this section. However, if
the employer can demonstrate that installation of a ground is
impracticable or that the conditions resulting from the installation of
a ground would present greater hazards to employees than working
without grounds, the lines and equipment may be treated as deenergized
provided that the employer establishes that all of the following
conditions apply:
(1) Deenergized. The employer ensures that the lines and equipment
are deenergized under the provisions of Sec. 1926.961.
(2) No possibility of contact. There is no possibility of contact
with another energized source.
(3) No induced voltage. The hazard of induced voltage is not
present.
(c) Equipotential zone. Temporary protective grounds shall be
placed at such locations and arranged in such a manner that the
employer can demonstrate will prevent each employee from being exposed
to hazardous differences in electric potential.
Note to paragraph (c): Appendix C to this subpart contains
guidelines for establishing the equipotential zone required by this
paragraph. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration will
deem grounding practices meeting these guidelines as complying with
paragraph (c) of this section.
(d) Protective grounding equipment. (1) Ampacity. (i) Protective
grounding equipment shall be capable of conducting the maximum fault
current that could flow at the point of grounding for the time
necessary to clear the fault.
(ii) Protective grounding equipment shall have an ampacity greater
than or equal to that of No. 2 AWG copper.
(2) Impedance. Protective grounds shall have an impedance low
enough so that they do not delay the operation of protective devices in
case of accidental energizing of the lines or equipment.
Note to paragraph (d): American Society for Testing and
Materials Standard Specifications for Temporary Protective Grounds
to Be Used on De-Energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment, ASTM
F855-09, contains guidelines for protective grounding equipment. The
Institute of Electrical Engineers Guide for Protective Grounding of
Power Lines, IEEE Std 1048-2003, contains guidelines for selecting
and installing protective grounding equipment.
(e) Testing. The employer shall ensure that, unless a previously
installed ground is present, employees test lines and equipment and
verify the absence of nominal voltage before employees install any
ground on those lines or that equipment.
(f) Connecting and removing grounds. (1) Order of connection. The
employer shall ensure that, when an employee attaches a ground to a
line or to equipment, the employee attaches the ground-end connection
first and then attaches the other end by means of a live-line tool. For
lines or equipment operating at 600 volts or less, the employer may
permit the employee to use insulating equipment other than a live-line
tool if the employer ensures that the line or equipment is not
energized at the time the ground is connected or if the employer can
demonstrate that each employee is protected from hazards that may
develop if the line or equipment is energized.
(2) Order of removal. The employer shall ensure that, when an
employee removes a ground, the employee removes the grounding device
from the line or equipment using a live-line tool before he or she
removes the ground-end connection. For lines or equipment operating at
600 volts or less, the employer may permit the employee to use
insulating equipment other than a live-line tool if the employer
ensures that the line or equipment is not energized at the time the
ground is disconnected or if the employer can demonstrate that each
employee is
protected from hazards that may develop if the line or equipment is
energized.
(g) Additional precautions. The employer shall ensure that, when an
employee performs work on a cable at a location remote from the cable
terminal, the cable is not grounded at the cable terminal if there is a
possibility of hazardous transfer of potential should a fault occur.
(h) Removal of grounds for test. The employer may permit employees
to remove grounds temporarily during tests. During the test procedure,
the employer shall ensure that each employee uses insulating equipment,
shall isolate each employee from any hazards involved, and shall
implement any additional measures necessary to protect each exposed
employee in case the previously grounded lines and equipment become
energized.
Sec. 1926.963 Testing and test facilities.
(a) Application. This section provides for safe work practices for
high-voltage and high-power testing performed in laboratories, shops,
and substations, and in the field and on electric transmission and
distribution lines and equipment. It applies only to testing involving
interim measurements using high voltage, high power, or combinations of
high voltage and high power, and not to testing involving continuous
measurements as in routine metering, relaying, and normal line work.
Note to paragraph (a): OSHA considers routine inspection and
maintenance measurements made by qualified employees to be routine
line work not included in the scope of this section, provided that
the hazards related to the use of intrinsic high-voltage or high-
power sources require only the normal precautions associated with
routine work specified in the other paragraphs of this subpart. Two
typical examples of such excluded test work procedures are
"phasing-out" testing and testing for a "no-voltage" condition.
(b) General requirements. (1) Safe work practices. The employer
shall establish and enforce work practices for the protection of each
worker from the hazards of high-voltage or high-power testing at all
test areas, temporary and permanent. Such work practices shall include,
as a minimum, test area safeguarding, grounding, the safe use of
measuring and control circuits, and a means providing for periodic
safety checks of field test areas.
(2) Training. The employer shall ensure that each employee, upon
initial assignment to the test area, receives training in safe work
practices, with retraining provided as required by Sec. 1926.950(b).
(c) Safeguarding of test areas. (1) Safeguarding. The employer
shall provide safeguarding within test areas to control access to test
equipment or to apparatus under test that could become energized as
part of the testing by either direct or inductive coupling and to
prevent accidental employee contact with energized parts.
(2) Permanent test areas. The employer shall guard permanent test
areas with walls, fences, or other barriers designed to keep employees
out of the test areas.
(3) Temporary test areas. In field testing, or at a temporary test
site not guarded by permanent fences and gates, the employer shall
ensure the use of one of the following means to prevent employees
without authorization from entering:
(i) Distinctively colored safety tape supported approximately waist
high with safety signs attached to it,
(ii) A barrier or barricade that limits access to the test area to
a degree equivalent, physically and visually, to the barricade
specified in paragraph (c)(3)(i) of this section, or
(iii) One or more test observers stationed so that they can monitor
the entire area.
(4) Removal of safeguards. The employer shall ensure the removal of
the safeguards required by paragraph (c)(3) of this section when
employees no longer need the protection afforded by the safeguards.
(d) Grounding practices. (1) Establish and implement practices. The
employer shall establish and implement safe grounding practices for the
test facility.
(i) The employer shall maintain at ground potential all conductive
parts accessible to the test operator while the equipment is operating
at high voltage.
(ii) Wherever ungrounded terminals of test equipment or apparatus
under test may be present, they shall be treated as energized until
tests demonstrate that they are deenergized.
(2) Installation of grounds. The employer shall ensure either that
visible grounds are applied automatically, or that employees using
properly insulated tools manually apply visible grounds, to the high-
voltage circuits after they are deenergized and before any employee
performs work on the circuit or on the item or apparatus under test.
Common ground connections shall be solidly connected to the test
equipment and the apparatus under test.
(3) Isolated ground return. In high-power testing, the employer
shall provide an isolated ground-return conductor system designed to
prevent the intentional passage of current, with its attendant voltage
rise, from occurring in the ground grid or in the earth. However, the
employer need not provide an isolated ground-return conductor if the
employer can demonstrate that both of the following conditions exist:
(i) The employer cannot provide an isolated ground-return conductor
due to the distance of the test site from the electric energy source,
and
(ii) The employer protects employees from any hazardous step and
touch potentials that may develop during the test.
Note to paragraph (d)(3)(ii): See Appendix C to this subpart for
information on measures that employers can take to protect employees
from hazardous step and touch potentials.
(4) Equipment grounding conductors. For tests in which using the
equipment grounding conductor in the equipment power cord to ground the
test equipment would result in greater hazards to test personnel or
prevent the taking of satisfactory measurements, the employer may use a
ground clearly indicated in the test set-up if the employer can
demonstrate that this ground affords protection for employees
equivalent to the protection afforded by an equipment grounding
conductor in the power supply cord.
(5) Grounding after tests. The employer shall ensure that, when any
employee enters the test area after equipment is deenergized, a ground
is placed on the high-voltage terminal and any other exposed terminals.
(i) Before any employee applies a direct ground, the employer shall
discharge high capacitance equipment or apparatus through a resistor
rated for the available energy.
(ii) A direct ground shall be applied to the exposed terminals
after the stored energy drops to a level at which it is safe to do so.
(6) Grounding test vehicles. If the employer uses a test trailer or
test vehicle in field testing, its chassis shall be grounded. The
employer shall protect each employee against hazardous touch potentials
with respect to the vehicle, instrument panels, and other conductive
parts accessible to employees with bonding, insulation, or isolation.
(e) Control and measuring circuits. (1) Control wiring. The
employer may not run control wiring, meter connections, test leads, or
cables from a test area unless contained in a grounded metallic sheath
and terminated in a grounded metallic enclosure or unless the employer
takes other precautions that it can demonstrate will provide employees
with equivalent safety.
(2) Instruments. The employer shall isolate meters and other
instruments
with accessible terminals or parts from test personnel to protect
against hazards that could arise should such terminals and parts become
energized during testing. If the employer provides this isolation by
locating test equipment in metal compartments with viewing windows, the
employer shall provide interlocks to interrupt the power supply when
someone opens the compartment cover.
(3) Routing temporary wiring. The employer shall protect temporary
wiring and its connections against damage, accidental interruptions,
and other hazards. To the maximum extent possible, the employer shall
keep signal, control, ground, and power cables separate from each
other.
(4) Test observer. If any employee will be present in the test area
during testing, a test observer shall be present. The test observer
shall be capable of implementing the immediate deenergizing of test
circuits for safety purposes.
(f) Safety check. (1) Before each test. Safety practices governing
employee work at temporary or field test areas shall provide, at the
beginning of each series of tests, for a routine safety check of such
test areas.
(2) Conditions to be checked. The test operator in charge shall
conduct these routine safety checks before each series of tests and
shall verify at least the following conditions:
(i) Barriers and safeguards are in workable condition and placed
properly to isolate hazardous areas;
(ii) System test status signals, if used, are in operable
condition;
(iii) Clearly marked test-power disconnects are readily available
in an emergency;
(iv) Ground connections are clearly identifiable;
(v) Personal protective equipment is provided and used as required
by Subpart E of this part and by this subpart; and
(vi) Proper separation between signal, ground, and power cables.
Sec. 1926.964 Overhead lines and live-line barehand work.
(a) General. (1) Application. This section provides additional
requirements for work performed on or near overhead lines and equipment
and for live-line barehand work.
(2) Checking structure before climbing. Before allowing employees
to subject elevated structures, such as poles or towers, to such
stresses as climbing or the installation or removal of equipment may
impose, the employer shall ascertain that the structures are capable of
sustaining the additional or unbalanced stresses. If the pole or other
structure cannot withstand the expected loads, the employer shall brace
or otherwise support the pole or structure so as to prevent failure.
Note to paragraph (a)(2): Appendix D to this subpart contains
test methods that employers can use in ascertaining whether a wood
pole is capable of sustaining the forces imposed by an employee
climbing the pole. This paragraph also requires the employer to
ascertain that the pole can sustain all other forces imposed by the
work employees will perform.
(3) Setting and moving poles. (i) When a pole is set, moved, or
removed near an exposed energized overhead conductor, the pole may not
contact the conductor.
(ii) When a pole is set, moved, or removed near an exposed
energized overhead conductor, the employer shall ensure that each
employee wears electrical protective equipment or uses insulated
devices when handling the pole and that no employee contacts the pole
with uninsulated parts of his or her body.
(iii) To protect employees from falling into holes used for placing
poles, the employer shall physically guard the holes, or ensure that
employees attend the holes, whenever anyone is working nearby.
(b) Installing and removing overhead lines. The following
provisions apply to the installation and removal of overhead conductors
or cable (overhead lines).
(1) Tension stringing method. When lines that employees are
installing or removing can contact energized parts, the employer shall
use the tension-stringing method, barriers, or other equivalent
measures to minimize the possibility that conductors and cables the
employees are installing or removing will contact energized power lines
or equipment.
(2) Conductors, cables, and pulling and tensioning equipment. For
conductors, cables, and pulling and tensioning equipment, the employer
shall provide the protective measures required by Sec. 1926.959(d)(3)
when employees are installing or removing a conductor or cable close
enough to energized conductors that any of the following failures could
energize the pulling or tensioning equipment or the conductor or cable
being installed or removed:
(i) Failure of the pulling or tensioning equipment,
(ii) Failure of the conductor or cable being pulled, or
(iii) Failure of the previously installed lines or equipment.
(3) Disable automatic-reclosing feature. If the conductors that
employees are installing or removing cross over energized conductors in
excess of 600 volts and if the design of the circuit-interrupting
devices protecting the lines so permits, the employer shall render
inoperable the automatic-reclosing feature of these devices.
(4) Induced voltage. (i) Before employees install lines parallel to
existing energized lines, the employer shall make a determination of
the approximate voltage to be induced in the new lines, or work shall
proceed on the assumption that the induced voltage is hazardous.
(ii) Unless the employer can demonstrate that the lines that
employees are installing are not subject to the induction of a
hazardous voltage or unless the lines are treated as energized,
temporary protective grounds shall be placed at such locations and
arranged in such a manner that the employer can demonstrate will
prevent exposure of each employee to hazardous differences in electric
potential.
Note to paragraph (b)(4)(ii): Appendix C to this subpart
contains guidelines for protecting employees from hazardous
differences in electric potential as required by this paragraph.
Note to paragraph (b)(4): If the employer takes no precautions
to protect employees from hazards associated with involuntary
reactions from electric shock, a hazard exists if the induced
voltage is sufficient to pass a current of 1 milliampere through a
500-ohm resistor. If the employer protects employees from injury due
to involuntary reactions from electric shock, a hazard exists if the
resultant current would be more than 6 milliamperes.
(5) Safe operating condition. Reel-handling equipment, including
pulling and tensioning devices, shall be in safe operating condition
and shall be leveled and aligned.
(6) Load ratings. The employer shall ensure that employees do not
exceed load ratings of stringing lines, pulling lines, conductor grips,
load-bearing hardware and accessories, rigging, and hoists.
(7) Defective pulling lines. The employer shall repair or replace
defective pulling lines and accessories.
(8) Conductor grips. The employer shall ensure that employees do
not use conductor grips on wire rope unless the manufacturer
specifically designed the grip for this application.
(9) Communications. The employer shall ensure that employees
maintain reliable communications, through two-way radios or other
equivalent means, between the reel tender and the pulling-rig operator.
(10) Operation of pulling rig. Employees may operate the pulling
rig only when it is safe to do so.
Note to paragraph (b)(10): Examples of unsafe conditions
include: employees in locations prohibited by paragraph (b)(11) of
this section, conductor and pulling line hang-ups, and slipping of
the conductor grip.
(11) Working under overhead operations. While a power-driven device
is pulling the conductor or pulling line and the conductor or pulling
line is in motion, the employer shall ensure that employees are not
directly under overhead operations or on the crossarm, except as
necessary for the employees to guide the stringing sock or board over
or through the stringing sheave.
(c) Live-line barehand work. In addition to other applicable
provisions contained in this subpart, the following requirements apply
to live-line barehand work:
(1) Training. Before an employee uses or supervises the use of the
live-line barehand technique on energized circuits, the employer shall
ensure that the employee completes training conforming to Sec.
1926.950(b) in the technique and in the safety requirements of
paragraph (c) of this section.
(2) Existing conditions. Before any employee uses the live-line
barehand technique on energized high-voltage conductors or parts, the
employer shall ascertain the following information in addition to
information about other existing conditions required by Sec.
1926.950(d):
(i) The nominal voltage rating of the circuit on which employees
will perform the work,
(ii) The clearances to ground of lines and other energized parts on
which employees will perform the work, and
(iii) The voltage limitations of equipment employees will use.
(3) Insulated tools and equipment. (i) The employer shall ensure
that the insulated equipment, insulated tools, and aerial devices and
platforms used by employees are designed, tested, and made for live-
line barehand work.
(ii) The employer shall ensure that employees keep tools and
equipment clean and dry while they are in use.
(4) Disable automatic-reclosing feature. The employer shall render
inoperable the automatic-reclosing feature of circuit-interrupting
devices protecting the lines if the design of the devices permits.
(5) Adverse weather conditions. The employer shall ensure that
employees do not perform work when adverse weather conditions would
make the work hazardous even after the employer implements the work
practices required by this subpart. Additionally, employees may not
perform work when winds reduce the phase-to-phase or phase-to-ground
clearances at the work location below the minimum approach distances
specified in paragraph (c)(13) of this section, unless insulating
guards cover the grounded objects and other lines and equipment.
Note to paragraph (c)(5): Thunderstorms in the vicinity, high
winds, snow storms, and ice storms are examples of adverse weather
conditions that make live-line barehand work too hazardous to
perform safely even after the employer implements the work practices
required by this subpart.
(6) Bucket liners and electrostatic shielding. The employer shall
provide and ensure that employees use a conductive bucket liner or
other conductive device for bonding the insulated aerial device to the
energized line or equipment.
(i) The employee shall be connected to the bucket liner or other
conductive device by the use of conductive shoes, leg clips, or other
means.
(ii) Where differences in potentials at the worksite pose a hazard
to employees, the employer shall provide electrostatic shielding
designed for the voltage being worked.
(7) Bonding the employee to the energized part. The employer shall
ensure that, before the employee contacts the energized part, the
employee bonds the conductive bucket liner or other conductive device
to the energized conductor by means of a positive connection. This
connection shall remain attached to the energized conductor until the
employee completes the work on the energized circuit.
(8) Aerial-lift controls. Aerial lifts used for live-line barehand
work shall have dual controls (lower and upper) as follows:
(i) The upper controls shall be within easy reach of the employee
in the bucket. On a two-bucket-type lift, access to the controls shall
be within easy reach of both buckets.
(ii) The lower set of controls shall be near the base of the boom
and shall be designed so that they can override operation of the
equipment at any time.
(9) Operation of lower controls. Lower (ground-level) lift controls
may not be operated with an employee in the lift except in case of
emergency.
(10) Check controls. The employer shall ensure that, before
employees elevate an aerial lift into the work position, the employees
check all controls (ground level and bucket) to determine that they are
in proper working condition.
(11) Body of aerial lift truck. The employer shall ensure that,
before employees elevate the boom of an aerial lift, the employees
ground the body of the truck or barricade the body of the truck and
treat it as energized.
(12) Boom-current test. The employer shall ensure that employees
perform a boom-current test before starting work each day, each time
during the day when they encounter a higher voltage, and when changed
conditions indicate a need for an additional test.
(i) This test shall consist of placing the bucket in contact with
an energized source equal to the voltage to be encountered for a
minimum of 3 minutes.
(ii) The leakage current may not exceed 1 microampere per kilovolt
of nominal phase-to-ground voltage.
(iii) The employer shall immediately suspend work from the aerial
lift when there is any indication of a malfunction in the equipment.
(13) Minimum approach distance. The employer shall ensure that
employees maintain the minimum approach distances, established by the
employer under Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(i), from all grounded objects and
from lines and equipment at a potential different from that to which
the live-line barehand equipment is bonded, unless insulating guards
cover such grounded objects and other lines and equipment.
(14) Approaching, leaving, and bonding to energized part. The
employer shall ensure that, while an employee is approaching, leaving,
or bonding to an energized circuit, the employee maintains the minimum
approach distances, established by the employer under Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)(i), between the employee and any grounded parts,
including the lower boom and portions of the truck and between the
employee and conductive objects energized at different potentials.
(15) Positioning bucket near energized bushing or insulator string.
While the bucket is alongside an energized bushing or insulator string,
the employer shall ensure that employees maintain the phase-to-ground
minimum approach distances, established by the employer under Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)(i), between all parts of the bucket and the grounded end
of the bushing or insulator string or any other grounded surface.
(16) Handlines. The employer shall ensure that employees do not use
handlines between the bucket and the boom or between the bucket and the
ground. However, employees may use nonconductive-type handlines from
conductor to ground if not supported from the bucket. The employer
shall ensure that no one uses ropes used for live-line barehand work
for other purposes.
(17) Passing objects to employee. The employer shall ensure that
employees do not pass uninsulated equipment or material between a pole
or structure and an aerial lift while an employee working from the
bucket is bonded to an energized part.
(18) Nonconductive measuring device. A nonconductive measuring
device shall be readily accessible to employees performing live-line
barehand work to assist them in maintaining the required minimum
approach distance.
(d) Towers and structures. The following requirements apply to work
performed on towers or other structures that support overhead lines.
(1) Working beneath towers and structures. The employer shall
ensure that no employee is under a tower or structure while work is in
progress, except when the employer can demonstrate that such a working
position is necessary to assist employees working above.
(2) Tag lines. The employer shall ensure that employees use tag
lines or other similar devices to maintain control of tower sections
being raised or positioned, unless the employer can demonstrate that
the use of such devices would create a greater hazard to employees.
(3) Disconnecting load lines. The employer shall ensure that
employees do not detach the loadline from a member or section until
they safely secure the load.
(4) Adverse weather conditions. The employer shall ensure that,
except during emergency restoration procedures, employees discontinue
work when adverse weather conditions would make the work hazardous in
spite of the work practices required by this subpart.
Note to paragraph (d)(4): Thunderstorms in the vicinity, high
winds, snow storms, and ice storms are examples of adverse weather
conditions that make this work too hazardous to perform even after
the employer implements the work practices required by this subpart.
Sec. 1926.965 Underground electrical installations.
(a) Application. This section provides additional requirements for
work on underground electrical installations.
(b) Access. The employer shall ensure that employees use a ladder
or other climbing device to enter and exit a manhole or subsurface
vault exceeding 1.22 meters (4 feet) in depth. No employee may climb
into or out of a manhole or vault by stepping on cables or hangers.
(c) Lowering equipment into manholes. (1) Hoisting equipment.
Equipment used to lower materials and tools into manholes or vaults
shall be capable of supporting the weight to be lowered and shall be
checked for defects before use.
(2) Clear the area of employees. Before anyone lowers tools or
material into the opening for a manhole or vault, each employee working
in the manhole or vault shall be clear of the area directly under the
opening.
(d) Attendants for manholes and vaults. (1) When required. While
work is being performed in a manhole or vault containing energized
electric equipment, an employee with first-aid training shall be
available on the surface in the immediate vicinity of the manhole or
vault entrance to render emergency assistance.
(2) Brief entries allowed. Occasionally, the employee on the
surface may briefly enter a manhole or vault to provide nonemergency
assistance.
Note 1 to paragraph (d)(2): Paragraph (h) of 1926.953 may also
require an attendant and does not permit this attendant to enter the
manhole or vault.
Note 2 to paragraph (d)(2): Paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of Sec.
1926.960 requires employees entering manholes or vaults containing
unguarded, uninsulated energized lines or parts of electric
equipment operating at 50 volts or more to be qualified.
(3) Entry without attendant. For the purpose of inspection,
housekeeping, taking readings, or similar work, an employee working
alone may enter, for brief periods of time, a manhole or vault where
energized cables or equipment are in service if the employer can
demonstrate that the employee will be protected from all electrical
hazards.
(4) Communications. The employer shall ensure that employees
maintain reliable communications, through two-way radios or other
equivalent means, among all employees involved in the job.
(e) Duct rods. The employer shall ensure that, if employees use
duct rods, the employees install the duct rods in the direction
presenting the least hazard to employees. The employer shall station an
employee at the far end of the duct line being rodded to ensure that
the employees maintain the required minimum approach distances.
(f) Multiple cables. When multiple cables are present in a work
area, the employer shall identify the cable to be worked by electrical
means, unless its identity is obvious by reason of distinctive
appearance or location or by other readily apparent means of
identification. The employer shall protect cables other than the one
being worked from damage.
(g) Moving cables. Except when paragraph (h)(2) of this section
permits employees to perform work that could cause a fault in an
energized cable in a manhole or vault, the employer shall ensure that
employees inspect energized cables to be moved for abnormalities.
(h) Protection against faults. (1) Cables with abnormalities. Where
a cable in a manhole or vault has one or more abnormalities that could
lead to a fault or be an indication of an impending fault, the employer
shall deenergize the cable with the abnormality before any employee may
work in the manhole or vault, except when service-load conditions and a
lack of feasible alternatives require that the cable remain energized.
In that case, employees may enter the manhole or vault provided the
employer protects them from the possible effects of a failure using
shields or other devices that are capable of containing the adverse
effects of a fault. The employer shall treat the following
abnormalities as indications of impending faults unless the employer
can demonstrate that the conditions could not lead to a fault: Oil or
compound leaking from cable or joints, broken cable sheaths or joint
sleeves, hot localized surface temperatures of cables or joints, or
joints swollen beyond normal tolerance.
(2) Work-related faults. If the work employees will perform in a
manhole or vault could cause a fault in a cable, the employer shall
deenergize that cable before any employee works in the manhole or
vault, except when service-load conditions and a lack of feasible
alternatives require that the cable remain energized. In that case,
employees may enter the manhole or vault provided the employer protects
them from the possible effects of a failure using shields or other
devices that are capable of containing the adverse effects of a fault.
(i) Sheath continuity. When employees perform work on buried cable
or on cable in a manhole or vault, the employer shall maintain
metallic-sheath continuity, or the cable sheath shall be treated as
energized.
Sec. 1926.966 Substations.
(a) Application. This section provides additional requirements for
substations and for work performed in them.
(b) Access and working space. The employer shall provide and
maintain sufficient access and working space about electric equipment
to permit ready and safe operation and maintenance of such equipment by
employees.
Note to paragraph (b): American National Standard National
Electrical Safety Code, ANSI/IEEE C2-2012 contains guidelines for
the dimensions of access and working space about electric equipment
in substations. Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply
with paragraph (b) of this section. The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration will determine whether an installation that
does not conform to this ANSI standard complies with paragraph (b)
of this section based on the following criteria:
(1) Whether the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2
that was in effect when the installation was made;
(2) Whether the configuration of the installation enables
employees to maintain the minimum approach distances, established by
the employer under Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(i), while the employees are
working on exposed, energized parts; and
(3) Whether the precautions taken when employees perform work on
the installation provide protection equivalent to the protection
provided by access and working space meeting ANSI/IEEE C2-2012.
(c) Draw-out-type circuit breakers. The employer shall ensure that,
when employees remove or insert draw-out-type circuit breakers, the
breaker is in the open position. The employer shall also render the
control circuit inoperable if the design of the equipment permits.
(d) Substation fences. Conductive fences around substations shall
be grounded. When a substation fence is expanded or a section is
removed, fence sections shall be isolated, grounded, or bonded as
necessary to protect employees from hazardous differences in electric
potential.
Note to paragraph (d): IEEE Std 80-2000, IEEE Guide for Safety
in AC Substation Grounding, contains guidelines for protection
against hazardous differences in electric potential.
(e) Guarding of rooms and other spaces containing electric supply
equipment. (1) When to guard rooms and other spaces. Rooms and other
spaces in which electric supply lines or equipment are installed shall
meet the requirements of paragraphs (e)(2) through (e)(5) of this
section under the following conditions:
(i) If exposed live parts operating at 50 to 150 volts to ground
are within 2.4 meters (8 feet) of the ground or other working surface
inside the room or other space,
(ii) If live parts operating at 151 to 600 volts to ground and
located within 2.4 meters (8 feet) of the ground or other working
surface inside the room or other space are guarded only by location, as
permitted under paragraph (f)(1) of this section, or
(iii) If live parts operating at more than 600 volts to ground are
within the room or other space, unless:
(A) The live parts are enclosed within grounded, metal-enclosed
equipment whose only openings are designed so that foreign objects
inserted in these openings will be deflected from energized parts, or
(B) The live parts are installed at a height, above ground and any
other working surface, that provides protection at the voltage on the
live parts corresponding to the protection provided by a 2.4-meter (8-
foot) height at 50 volts.
(2) Prevent access by unqualified persons. Fences, screens,
partitions, or walls shall enclose the rooms and other spaces so as to
minimize the possibility that unqualified persons will enter.
(3) Restricted entry. Unqualified persons may not enter the rooms
or other spaces while the electric supply lines or equipment are
energized.
(4) Warning signs. The employer shall display signs at entrances to
the rooms and other spaces warning unqualified persons to keep out.
(5) Entrances to rooms and other. The employer shall keep each
entrance to a room or other space locked, unless the entrance is under
the observation of a person who is attending the room or other space
for the purpose of preventing unqualified employees from entering.
(f) Guarding of energized parts. (1) Type of guarding. The employer
shall provide guards around all live parts operating at more than 150
volts to ground without an insulating covering unless the location of
the live parts gives sufficient clearance (horizontal, vertical, or
both) to minimize the possibility of accidental employee contact.
Note to paragraph (f)(1): American National Standard National
Electrical Safety Code, ANSI/IEEE C2-2002 contains guidelines for
the dimensions of clearance distances about electric equipment in
substations. Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply with
paragraph (f)(1) of this section. The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration will determine whether an installation that does not
conform to this ANSI standard complies with paragraph (f)(1) of this
section based on the following criteria:
(1) Whether the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2
that was in effect when the installation was made;
(2) Whether each employee is isolated from energized parts at
the point of closest approach; and
(3) Whether the precautions taken when employees perform work on
the installation provide protection equivalent to the protection
provided by horizontal and vertical clearances meeting ANSI/IEEE C2-
2002.
(2) Maintaining guards during operation. Except for fuse
replacement and other necessary access by qualified persons, the
employer shall maintain guarding of energized parts within a
compartment during operation and maintenance functions to prevent
accidental contact with energized parts and to prevent dropped tools or
other equipment from contacting energized parts.
(3) Temporary removal of guards. Before guards are removed from
energized equipment, the employer shall install barriers around the
work area to prevent employees who are not working on the equipment,
but who are in the area, from contacting the exposed live parts.
(g) Substation entry. (1) Report upon entering. Upon entering an
attended substation, each employee, other than employees regularly
working in the station, shall report his or her presence to the
employee in charge of substation activities to receive information on
special system conditions affecting employee safety.
(2) Job briefing. The job briefing required by Sec. 1926.952 shall
cover information on special system conditions affecting employee
safety, including the location of energized equipment in or adjacent to
the work area and the limits of any deenergized work area.
Sec. 1926.967 Special conditions.
(a) Capacitors. The following additional requirements apply to work
on capacitors and on lines connected to capacitors.
Note to paragraph (a): See Sec. Sec. 1926.961 and 1926.962 for
requirements pertaining to the deenergizing and grounding of
capacitor installations.
(1) Disconnect from energized source. Before employees work on
capacitors, the employer shall disconnect the capacitors from energized
sources and short circuit the capacitors. The employer shall ensure
that the employee short circuiting the capacitors waits at least 5
minutes from the time of disconnection before applying the short
circuit,
(2) Short circuiting units. Before employees handle the units, the
employer shall short circuit each unit in series-parallel capacitor
banks between all terminals and the capacitor case or its rack. If the
cases of capacitors are on ungrounded substation racks, the employer
shall bond the racks to ground.
(3) Short circuiting connected lines. The employer shall short
circuit any line connected to capacitors before the line is treated as
deenergized.
(b) Current transformer secondaries. The employer shall ensure that
employees do not open the secondary of a current transformer while the
transformer is energized. If the employer cannot deenergize the primary
of the current transformer before employees perform work on an
instrument, a relay, or other section of a current transformer
secondary circuit, the employer shall bridge the circuit so that the
current transformer secondary does not experience an open-circuit
condition.
(c) Series streetlighting. (1) Applicable requirements. If the
open-circuit voltage exceeds 600 volts, the employer shall ensure that
employees work on series streetlighting circuits in accordance with
Sec. 1926.964 or Sec. 1926.965, as appropriate.
(2) Opening a series loop. Before any employee opens a series loop,
the employer shall deenergize the streetlighting transformer and
isolate it from the source of supply or shall bridge the loop to avoid
an open-circuit condition.
(d) Illumination. The employer shall provide sufficient
illumination to enable the employee to perform the work safely.
Note to paragraph (d): See Sec. 1926.56, which requires
specific levels of illumination.
(e) Protection against drowning. (1) Personal flotation devices.
Whenever an employee may be pulled or pushed, or might fall, into water
where the danger of drowning exists, the employer shall provide the
employee with, and shall ensure that the employee uses, a personal
flotation device meeting Sec. 1926.106.
(2) Maintaining flotation devices in safe condition. The employer
shall maintain each personal flotation device in safe condition and
shall inspect each personal flotation device frequently enough to
ensure that it does not have rot, mildew, water saturation, or any
other condition that could render the device unsuitable for use.
(3) Crossing bodies of water. An employee may cross streams or
other bodies of water only if a safe means of passage, such as a
bridge, is available.
(f) Excavations. Excavation operations shall comply with Subpart P
of this part.
(g) Employee protection in public work areas. (1) Traffic control
devices. Traffic-control signs and traffic-control devices used for the
protection of employees shall meet Sec. 1926.200(g)(2).
(2) Controlling traffic. Before employees begin work in the
vicinity of vehicular or pedestrian traffic that may endanger them, the
employer shall place warning signs or flags and other traffic-control
devices in conspicuous locations to alert and channel approaching
traffic.
(3) Barricades. The employer shall use barricades where additional
employee protection is necessary.
(4) Excavated areas. The employer shall protect excavated areas
with barricades.
(5) Warning lights. The employer shall display warning lights
prominently at night.
(h) Backfeed. When there is a possibility of voltage backfeed from
sources of cogeneration or from the secondary system (for example,
backfeed from more than one energized phase feeding a common load), the
requirements of Sec. 1926.960 apply if employees will work the lines
or equipment as energized, and the requirements of Sec. Sec. 1926.961
and 1926.962 apply if employees will work the lines or equipment as
deenergized.
(i) Lasers. The employer shall install, adjust, and operate laser
equipment in accordance with Sec. 1926.54.
(j) Hydraulic fluids. Hydraulic fluids used for the insulated
sections of equipment shall provide insulation for the voltage
involved.
(k) Communication facilities. (1) Microwave transmission. (i) The
employer shall ensure that no employee looks into an open waveguide or
antenna connected to an energized microwave source.
(ii) If the electromagnetic-radiation level within an accessible
area associated with microwave communications systems exceeds the
radiation-protection guide specified by Sec. 1910.97(a)(2) of this
chapter, the employer shall post the area with warning signs containing
the warning symbol described in Sec. 1910.97(a)(3) of this chapter.
The lower half of the warning symbol shall include the following
statements, or ones that the employer can demonstrate are equivalent:
"Radiation in this area may exceed hazard limitations and special
precautions are required. Obtain specific instruction before
entering."
(iii) When an employee works in an area where the electromagnetic
radiation could exceed the radiation-protection guide, the employer
shall institute measures that ensure that the employee's exposure is
not greater than that permitted by that guide. Such measures may
include administrative and engineering controls and personal protective
equipment.
(2) Power-line carrier. The employer shall ensure that employees
perform power-line carrier work, including work on equipment used for
coupling carrier current to power line conductors, in accordance with
the requirements of this subpart pertaining to work on energized lines.
Sec. 1926.968 Definitions.
Attendant. An employee assigned to remain immediately outside the
entrance to an enclosed or other space to render assistance as needed
to employees inside the space.
Automatic circuit recloser. A self-controlled device for
automatically interrupting and reclosing an alternating-current
circuit, with a predetermined sequence of opening and reclosing
followed by resetting, hold closed, or lockout.
Barricade. A physical obstruction such as tapes, cones, or A-frame
type wood or metal structures that provides a warning about, and limits
access to, a hazardous area.
Barrier. A physical obstruction that prevents contact with
energized lines or equipment or prevents unauthorized access to a work
area.
Bond. The electrical interconnection of conductive parts designed
to maintain a common electric potential.
Bus. A conductor or a group of conductors that serve as a common
connection for two or more circuits.
Bushing. An insulating structure that includes a through conductor
or that provides a passageway for such a conductor, and that, when
mounted on a barrier, insulates the conductor from the barrier for the
purpose of conducting current from one side of the barrier to the
other.
Cable. A conductor with insulation, or a stranded conductor with or
without insulation and other coverings (single-conductor cable), or a
combination of conductors insulated from one another (multiple-
conductor cable).
Cable sheath. A conductive protective covering applied to cables.
Note to the definition of "cable sheath": A cable sheath may
consist of multiple layers one or more of which is conductive.
Circuit. A conductor or system of conductors through which an
electric current is intended to flow.
Clearance (between objects). The clear distance between two objects
measured surface to surface.
Clearance (for work). Authorization to perform specified work or
permission to enter a restricted area.
Communication lines. (See Lines; (1) Communication lines.)
Conductor. A material, usually in the form of a wire, cable, or bus
bar, used for carrying an electric current.
Contract employer. An employer, other than a host employer, that
performs work covered by Subpart V of this part under contract.
Covered conductor. A conductor covered with a dielectric having no
rated insulating strength or having a
rated insulating strength less than the voltage of the circuit in which
the conductor is used.
Current-carrying part. A conducting part intended to be connected
in an electric circuit to a source of voltage. Non-current-carrying
parts are those not intended to be so connected.
Deenergized. Free from any electrical connection to a source of
potential difference and from electric charge; not having a potential
that is different from the potential of the earth.
Note to the definition of "deenergized": The term applies only
to current-carrying parts, which are sometimes energized (alive).
Designated employee (designated person). An employee (or person)
who is assigned by the employer to perform specific duties under the
terms of this subpart and who has sufficient knowledge of the
construction and operation of the equipment, and the hazards involved,
to perform his or her duties safely.
Electric line truck. A truck used to transport personnel, tools,
and material for electric supply line work.
Electric supply equipment. Equipment that produces, modifies,
regulates, controls, or safeguards a supply of electric energy.
Electric supply lines. (See "Lines; (2) Electric supply lines.")
Electric utility. An organization responsible for the installation,
operation, or maintenance of an electric supply system.
Enclosed space. A working space, such as a manhole, vault, tunnel,
or shaft, that has a limited means of egress or entry, that is designed
for periodic employee entry under normal operating conditions, and
that, under normal conditions, does not contain a hazardous atmosphere,
but may contain a hazardous atmosphere under abnormal conditions.
Energized (alive, live). Electrically connected to a source of
potential difference, or electrically charged so as to have a potential
significantly different from that of earth in the vicinity.
Energy source. Any electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic,
chemical, nuclear, thermal, or other energy source that could cause
injury to employees.
Entry (as used in Sec. 1926.953). The action by which a person
passes through an opening into an enclosed space. Entry includes
ensuing work activities in that space and is considered to have
occurred as soon as any part of the entrant's body breaks the plane of
an opening into the space.
Equipment (electric). A general term including material, fittings,
devices, appliances, fixtures, apparatus, and the like used as part of
or in connection with an electrical installation.
Exposed, Exposed to contact (as applied to energized parts). Not
isolated or guarded.
Fall restraint system. A fall protection system that prevents the
user from falling any distance.
First-aid training. Training in the initial care, including
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (which includes chest compressions,
rescue breathing, and, as appropriate, other heart and lung
resuscitation techniques), performed by a person who is not a medical
practitioner, of a sick or injured person until definitive medical
treatment can be administered.
Ground. A conducting connection, whether planned or unplanned,
between an electric circuit or equipment and the earth, or to some
conducting body that serves in place of the earth.
Grounded. Connected to earth or to some conducting body that serves
in place of the earth.
Guarded. Covered, fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected, by
means of suitable covers or casings, barrier rails or screens, mats, or
platforms, designed to minimize the possibility, under normal
conditions, of dangerous approach or inadvertent contact by persons or
objects.
Note to the definition of "guarded": Wires that are insulated,
but not otherwise protected, are not guarded.
Hazardous atmosphere. An atmosphere that may expose employees to
the risk of death, incapacitation, impairment of ability to self-rescue
(that is, escape unaided from an enclosed space), injury, or acute
illness from one or more of the following causes:
(1) Flammable gas, vapor, or mist in excess of 10 percent of its
lower flammable limit (LFL);
(2) Airborne combustible dust at a concentration that meets or
exceeds its LFL;
Note to the definition of "hazardous atmosphere" (2): This
concentration may be approximated as a condition in which the dust
obscures vision at a distance of 1.52 meters (5 feet) or less.
(3) Atmospheric oxygen concentration below 19.5 percent or above
23.5 percent;
(4) Atmospheric concentration of any substance for which a dose or
a permissible exposure limit is published in Subpart D, Occupational
Health and Environmental Controls, or in Subpart Z, Toxic and Hazardous
Substances, of this part and which could result in employee exposure in
excess of its dose or permissible exposure limit;
Note to the definition of "hazardous atmosphere" (4): An
atmospheric concentration of any substance that is not capable of
causing death, incapacitation, impairment of ability to self-rescue,
injury, or acute illness due to its health effects is not covered by
this provision.
(5) Any other atmospheric condition that is immediately dangerous
to life or health.
Note to the definition of "hazardous atmosphere" (5): For air
contaminants for which the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration has not determined a dose or permissible exposure
limit, other sources of information, such as Material Safety Data
Sheets that comply with the Hazard Communication Standard, Sec.
1926.1200, published information, and internal documents can provide
guidance in establishing acceptable atmospheric conditions.
High-power tests. Tests in which the employer uses fault currents,
load currents, magnetizing currents, and line-dropping currents to test
equipment, either at the equipment's rated voltage or at lower
voltages.
High-voltage tests. Tests in which the employer uses voltages of
approximately 1,000 volts as a practical minimum and in which the
voltage source has sufficient energy to cause injury.
High wind. A wind of such velocity that one or more of the
following hazards would be present:
(1) The wind could blow an employee from an elevated location,
(2) The wind could cause an employee or equipment handling material
to lose control of the material, or
(3) The wind would expose an employee to other hazards not
controlled by the standard involved.
Note to the definition of "high wind": The Occupational Safety
and Health Administration normally considers winds exceeding 64.4
kilometers per hour (40 miles per hour), or 48.3 kilometers per hour
(30 miles per hour) if the work involves material handling, as
meeting this criteria, unless the employer takes precautions to
protect employees from the hazardous effects of the wind.
Host employer. An employer that operates, or that controls the
operating procedures for, an electric power generation, transmission,
or distribution installation on which a contract employer is performing
work covered by Subpart V of this part.
Note to the definition of "host employer": The Occupational
Safety and Health Administration will treat the electric utility or
the owner of the installation as the host employer if it operates or
controls operating procedures for the installation. If the electric
utility or installation owner neither operates
nor controls operating procedures for the installation, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration will treat the
employer that the utility or owner has contracted with to operate or
control the operating procedures for the installation as the host
employer. In no case will there be more than one host employer.
Immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH). Any condition that
poses an immediate or delayed threat to life or that would cause
irreversible adverse health effects or that would interfere with an
individual's ability to escape unaided from a permit space.
Note to the definition of "immediately dangerous to life or
health": Some materials--hydrogen fluoride gas and cadmium vapor,
for example--may produce immediate transient effects that, even if
severe, may pass without medical attention, but are followed by
sudden, possibly fatal collapse 12-72 hours after exposure. The
victim "feels normal" from recovery from transient effects until
collapse. Such materials in hazardous quantities are considered to
be "immediately" dangerous to life or health.
Insulated. Separated from other conducting surfaces by a dielectric
(including air space) offering a high resistance to the passage of
current.
Note to the definition of "insulated": When any object is said
to be insulated, it is understood to be insulated for the conditions
to which it normally is subjected. Otherwise, it is, for the purpose
of this subpart, uninsulated.
Insulation (cable). Material relied upon to insulate the conductor
from other conductors or conducting parts or from ground.
Isolated. Not readily accessible to persons unless special means
for access are used.
Line-clearance tree trimming. The pruning, trimming, repairing,
maintaining, removing, or clearing of trees, or the cutting of brush,
that is within the following distance of electric supply lines and
equipment:
(1) For voltages to ground of 50 kilovolts or less--3.05 meters (10
feet);
(2) For voltages to ground of more than 50 kilovolts--3.05 meters
(10 feet) plus 0.10 meters (4 inches) for every 10 kilovolts over 50
kilovolts.
Lines. (1) Communication lines. The conductors and their supporting
or containing structures which are used for public or private signal or
communication service, and which operate at potentials not exceeding
400 volts to ground or 750 volts between any two points of the circuit,
and the transmitted power of which does not exceed 150 watts. If the
lines are operating at less than 150 volts, no limit is placed on the
transmitted power of the system. Under certain conditions,
communication cables may include communication circuits exceeding these
limitations where such circuits are also used to supply power solely to
communication equipment.
Note to the definition of "communication lines": Telephone,
telegraph, railroad signal, data, clock, fire, police alarm, cable
television, and other systems conforming to this definition are
included. Lines used for signaling purposes, but not included under
this definition, are considered as electric supply lines of the same
voltage.
(2) Electric supply lines. Conductors used to transmit electric
energy and their necessary supporting or containing structures. Signal
lines of more than 400 volts are always supply lines within this
section, and those of less than 400 volts are considered as supply
lines, if so run and operated throughout.
Manhole. A subsurface enclosure that personnel may enter and that
is used for installing, operating, and maintaining submersible
equipment or cable.
Minimum approach distance. The closest distance an employee may
approach an energized or a grounded object.
Note to the definition of "minimum approach distance":
Paragraph (c)(1)(i) of Sec. 1926.960 requires employers to
establish minimum approach distances.
Personal fall arrest system. A system used to arrest an employee in
a fall from a working level.
Qualified employee (qualified person). An employee (person)
knowledgeable in the construction and operation of the electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution equipment involved, along
with the associated hazards.
Note 1 to the definition of "qualified employee (qualified
person)": An employee must have the training required by Sec.
1926.950(b)(2) to be a qualified employee.
Note 2 to the definition of "qualified employee (qualified
person)": Except under Sec. 1926.954(b)(3)(iii), an employee who
is undergoing on-the-job training and who has demonstrated, in the
course of such training, an ability to perform duties safely at his
or her level of training and who is under the direct supervision of
a qualified person is a qualified person for the performance of
those duties.
Statistical sparkover voltage. A transient overvoltage level that
produces a 97.72-percent probability of sparkover (that is, two
standard deviations above the voltage at which there is a 50-percent
probability of sparkover).
Statistical withstand voltage. A transient overvoltage level that
produces a 0.14-percent probability of sparkover (that is, three
standard deviations below the voltage at which there is a 50-percent
probability of sparkover).
Switch. A device for opening and closing or for changing the
connection of a circuit. In this subpart, a switch is manually
operable, unless otherwise stated.
System operator. A qualified person designated to operate the
system or its parts.
Vault. An enclosure, above or below ground, that personnel may
enter and that is used for installing, operating, or maintaining
equipment or cable.
Vented vault. A vault that has provision for air changes using
exhaust-flue stacks and low-level air intakes operating on pressure and
temperature differentials that provide for airflow that precludes a
hazardous atmosphere from developing.
Voltage. The effective (root mean square, or rms) potential
difference between any two conductors or between a conductor and
ground. This subpart expresses voltages in nominal values, unless
otherwise indicated. The nominal voltage of a system or circuit is the
value assigned to a system or circuit of a given voltage class for the
purpose of convenient designation. The operating voltage of the system
may vary above or below this value.
Work-positioning equipment. A body belt or body harness system
rigged to allow an employee to be supported on an elevated vertical
surface, such as a utility pole or tower leg, and work with both hands
free while leaning.
Appendix A to Subpart V of Part 1926--[Reserved]
Appendix B to Subpart V of Part 1926--Working on Exposed Energized
Parts
I. Introduction
Electric utilities design electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution installations to meet National
Electrical Safety Code (NESC), ANSI C2, requirements. Electric
utilities also design transmission and distribution lines to limit
line outages as required by system reliability criteria \1\ and to
withstand the maximum overvoltages impressed on the system.
Conditions such as switching surges, faults, and lightning can cause
overvoltages. Electric utilities generally select insulator design
and lengths and the clearances to structural parts so as to prevent
outages from contaminated line insulation and during storms. Line
insulator lengths and structural clearances have, over the years,
come closer to the minimum approach distances used by workers. As
minimum approach distances and structural clearances converge, it is
increasingly important that system designers and system operating
and maintenance personnel understand the
concepts underlying minimum approach distances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Federal, State, and local regulatory bodies and electric
utilities set reliability requirements that limit the number and
duration of system outages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The information in this appendix will assist employers in
complying with the minimum approach-distance requirements contained
in Sec. Sec. 1926.960(c)(1) and 1926.964(c). Employers must use the
technical criteria and methodology presented in this appendix in
establishing minimum approach distances in accordance with Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)(i) and Table V-2 and Table V-7. This appendix
provides essential background information and technical criteria for
the calculation of the required minimum approach distances for live-
line work on electric power generation, transmission, and
distribution installations.
Unless an employer is using the maximum transient overvoltages
specified in Table V-8 for voltages over 72.5 kilovolts, the
employer must use persons knowledgeable in the techniques discussed
in this appendix, and competent in the field of electric
transmission and distribution system design, to determine the
maximum transient overvoltage.
II. General
A. Definitions. The following definitions from Sec. 1926.968
relate to work on or near electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution lines and equipment and the electrical hazards they
present.
Exposed. . . . Not isolated or guarded.
Guarded. Covered, fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected, by
means of suitable covers or casings, barrier rails or screens, mats,
or platforms, designed to minimize the possibility, under normal
conditions, of dangerous approach or inadvertent contact by persons
or objects.
Note to the definition of "guarded": Wires that are insulated,
but not otherwise protected, are not guarded.
Insulated. Separated from other conducting surfaces by a
dielectric (including air space) offering a high resistance to the
passage of current.
Note to the definition of "insulated": When any object is said
to be insulated, it is understood to be insulated for the conditions
to which it normally is subjected. Otherwise, it is, for the purpose
of this subpart, uninsulated.
Isolated. Not readily accessible to persons unless special means
for access are used.
Statistical sparkover voltage. A transient overvoltage level
that produces a 97.72-percent probability of sparkover (that is, two
standard deviations above the voltage at which there is a 50-percent
probability of sparkover).
Statistical withstand voltage. A transient overvoltage level
that produces a 0.14-percent probability of sparkover (that is,
three standard deviations below the voltage at which there is a 50-
percent probability of sparkover).
B. Installations energized at 50 to 300 volts. The hazards posed
by installations energized at 50 to 300 volts are the same as those
found in many other workplaces. That is not to say that there is no
hazard, but the complexity of electrical protection required does
not compare to that required for high-voltage systems. The employee
must avoid contact with the exposed parts, and the protective
equipment used (such as rubber insulating gloves) must provide
insulation for the voltages involved.
C. Exposed energized parts over 300 volts AC. Paragraph
(c)(1)(i) of Sec. 1926.960 requires the employer to establish
minimum approach distances no less than the distances computed by
Table V-2 for ac systems so that employees can work safely without
risk of sparkover.\2\
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\2\ Sparkover is a disruptive electric discharge in which an
electric arc forms and electric current passes through air.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unless the employee is using electrical protective equipment,
air is the insulating medium between the employee and energized
parts. The distance between the employee and an energized part must
be sufficient for the air to withstand the maximum transient
overvoltage that can reach the worksite under the working conditions
and practices the employee is using. This distance is the minimum
air insulation distance, and it is equal to the electrical component
of the minimum approach distance.
Normal system design may provide or include a means (such as
lightning arrestors) to control maximum anticipated transient
overvoltages, or the employer may use temporary devices (portable
protective gaps) or measures (such as preventing automatic circuit
breaker reclosing) to achieve the same result. Paragraph (c)(1)(ii)
of Sec. 1926.960 requires the employer to determine the maximum
anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, through
an engineering analysis or assume a maximum anticipated per-unit
transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, in accordance with Table V-
8, which specifies the following maximums for ac systems:
72.6 to 420.0 kilovolts.................. 3.5 per unit.
420.1 to 550.0 kilovolts................. 3.0 per unit.
550.1 to 800.0 kilovolts................. 2.5 per unit.
See paragraph IV.A.2, later in this appendix, for additional
discussion of maximum transient overvoltages.
D. Types of exposures. Employees working on or near energized
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution systems
face two kinds of exposures: Phase-to-ground and phase-to-phase. The
exposure is phase-to-ground: (1) With respect to an energized part,
when the employee is at ground potential or (2) with respect to
ground, when an employee is at the potential of the energized part
during live-line barehand work. The exposure is phase-to-phase, with
respect to an energized part, when an employee is at the potential
of another energized part (at a different potential) during live-
line barehand work.
III. Determination of Minimum Approach Distances for AC Voltages
Greater Than 300 Volts
A. Voltages of 301 to 5,000 volts. Test data generally forms the
basis of minimum air insulation distances. The lowest voltage for
which sufficient test data exists is 5,000 volts, and these data
indicate that the minimum air insulation distance at that voltage is
20 millimeters (1 inch). Because the minimum air insulation distance
increases with increasing voltage, and, conversely, decreases with
decreasing voltage, an assumed minimum air insulation distance of 20
millimeters will protect against sparkover at voltages of 301 to
5,000 volts. Thus, 20 millimeters is the electrical component of the
minimum approach distance for these voltages.
B. Voltages of 5.1 to 72.5 kilovolts. For voltages from 5.1 to
72.5 kilovolts, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
bases the methodology for calculating the electrical component of
the minimum approach distance on Institute of Electrical and
Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard 4-1995, Standard Techniques for
High-Voltage Testing. Table 1 lists the critical sparkover distances
from that standard as listed in IEEE Std 516-2009, IEEE Guide for
Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines.
Table 1--Sparkover Distance for Rod-to-Rod Gap
------------------------------------------------------------------------
60 Hz rod-to-rod sparkover (kV Gap spacing from IEEE Std 4-1995
peak) (cm)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
25 2
36 3
46 4
53 5
60 6
70 8
79 10
86 12
95 14
104 16
112 18
120 20
143 25
167 30
192 35
218 40
243 45
270 50
322 60
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: IEEE Std 516-2009.
To use this table to determine the electrical component of the
minimum approach distance, the employer must determine the peak
phase-to-ground transient overvoltage and select a gap from the
table that corresponds to that voltage as a withstand voltage rather
than a critical sparkover voltage. To calculate the electrical
component of the minimum approach distance for voltages between 5
and 72.5 kilovolts, use the following procedure:
1. Divide the phase-to-phase voltage by the square root of 3 to
convert it to a phase-to-ground voltage.
2. Multiply the phase-to-ground voltage by the square root of 2
to convert the rms value of the voltage to the peak phase-to-ground
voltage.
3. Multiply the peak phase-to-ground voltage by the maximum per-
unit transient overvoltage, which, for this voltage range, is 3.0,
as discussed later in this appendix. This is the maximum phase-to-
ground transient
overvoltage, which corresponds to the withstand voltage for the
relevant exposure.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The withstand voltage is the voltage at which sparkover is
not likely to occur across a specified distance. It is the voltage
taken at the 3[sigma] point below the sparkover voltage, assuming
that the sparkover curve follows a normal distribution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Divide the maximum phase-to-ground transient overvoltage by
0.85 to determine the corresponding critical sparkover voltage. (The
critical sparkover voltage is 3 standard deviations (or 15 percent)
greater than the withstand voltage.)
5. Determine the electrical component of the minimum approach
distance from Table 1 through interpolation.
Table 2 illustrates how to derive the electrical component of
the minimum approach distance for voltages from 5.1 to 72.5
kilovolts, before the application of any altitude correction factor,
as explained later.
Table 2--Calculating the Electrical Component of MAD--751 V to 72.5 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum system phase-to-phase voltage (kV)
Step ---------------------------------------------------------------
15 36 46 72.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Divide by [radic]3........................... 8.7 20.8 26.6 41.9
2. Multiply by [radic]3......................... 12.2 29.4 37.6 59.2
3. Multiply by 3.0.............................. 36.7 88.2 112.7 177.6
4. Divide by 0.85............................... 43.2 103.7 132.6 208.9
5. Interpolate from Table 1..................... 3+(7.2/10)*1 14+(8.7/9)*2 20+(12.6/23)*5 35+(16.9/26)*5
Electrical component of MAD (cm)................ 3.72 15.93 22.74 38.25
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Voltages of 72.6 to 800 kilovolts. For voltages of 72.6
kilovolts to 800 kilovolts, this subpart bases the electrical
component of minimum approach distances, before the application of
any altitude correction factor, on the following formula:
Equation 1--For voltages of 72.6 kV to 800 kV
D = 0.3048(C + a)VL-GT
Where:
D = Electrical component of the minimum approach distance in air in
meters;
C = a correction factor associated with the variation of gap
sparkover with voltage;
a = A factor relating to the saturation of air at system
voltages of 345 kilovolts or higher; \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Test data demonstrates that the saturation factor is greater
than 0 at peak voltages of about 630 kilovolts. Systems operating at
345 kilovolts (or maximum system voltages of 362 kilovolts) can have
peak maximum transient overvoltages exceeding 630 kilovolts. Table
V-2 sets equations for calculating a based on peak voltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VL-G = Maximum system line-to-ground rms voltage in kilovolts--
it should be the "actual" maximum, or the normal highest voltage
for the range (for example, 10 percent above the nominal voltage);
and
T = Maximum transient overvoltage factor in per unit.
In Equation 1, C is 0.01: (1) For phase-to-ground exposures that
the employer can demonstrate consist only of air across the approach
distance (gap) and (2) for phase-to-phase exposures if the employer
can demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap and that no
large conductive object is in the gap. Otherwise, C is 0.011.
In Equation 1, the term a varies depending on whether the
employee's exposure is phase-to-ground or phase-to-phase and on
whether objects are in the gap. The employer must use the equations
in Table 3 to calculate a. Sparkover test data with insulation
spanning the gap form the basis for the equations for phase-to-
ground exposures, and sparkover test data with only air in the gap
form the basis for the equations for phase-to-phase exposures. The
phase-to-ground equations result in slightly higher values of a,
and, consequently, produce larger minimum approach distances, than
the phase-to-phase equations for the same value of VPeak.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.036
In Equation 1, T is the maximum transient overvoltage factor in
per unit. As noted earlier, Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(ii) requires the
employer to determine the maximum anticipated per-unit transient
overvoltage, phase-to-ground, through an engineering analysis or
assume a maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-
to-ground, in accordance with Table V-8. For phase-to-ground
exposures, the employer uses this value, called TL-G, as T in
Equation 1. IEEE Std 516-2009 provides the following formula to
calculate the phase-to-phase maximum transient overvoltage, TL-L,
from TL-G:
TL-L = 1.35TL-G + 0.45.
For phase-to-phase exposures, the employer uses this value as T in
Equation 1.
D. Provisions for inadvertent movement. The minimum approach
distance must include an "adder" to compensate for the inadvertent
movement of the worker relative to an energized part or the movement
of the part relative to the worker. This "adder" must account for
this possible inadvertent movement and provide the worker with a
comfortable and safe zone in which to work. Employers must add the
distance for inadvertent movement (called the "ergonomic component
of the minimum approach distance") to the electrical component to
determine the total safe minimum approach distances used in live-
line work.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration based the
ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance on response
time-distance analysis. This technique uses an estimate of the total
response time to a hazardous incident and converts that time to the
distance traveled. For example, the driver of a car takes a given
amount of time to respond to a "stimulus" and stop the vehicle.
The elapsed time involved results in the car's traveling some
distance before coming to a complete stop. This distance depends on
the speed of the car at the time the stimulus appears and the
reaction time of the driver.
In the case of live-line work, the employee must first perceive
that he or she is approaching the danger zone. Then, the worker
responds to the danger and must decelerate and stop all motion
toward the energized part. During the time it takes to stop, the
employee will travel some distance. This is the distance the
employer must add to the electrical component of the minimum
approach distance to obtain the total safe minimum approach
distance.
At voltages from 751 volts to 72.5 kilovolts,\5\ the electrical
component of the minimum approach distance is smaller than the
ergonomic component. At 72.5 kilovolts, the electrical component is
only a little more than 0.3 meters (1 foot). An ergonomic component
of the minimum approach distance must provide for all the worker's
unanticipated movements. At these voltages, workers generally use
rubber insulating gloves; however, these gloves protect only a
worker's hands and arms. Therefore, the energized object must be at
a safe approach distance to protect the worker's face. In this case,
0.61 meters (2 feet) is a sufficient and practical ergonomic
component of the minimum approach distance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ For voltages of 50 to 300 volts, Table V-2 specifies a
minimum approach distance of "avoid contact." The minimum approach
distance for this voltage range contains neither an electrical
component nor an ergonomic component.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For voltages between 72.6 and 800 kilovolts, employees must use
different work practices during energized line work. Generally,
employees use live-line tools (hot sticks) to perform work on
energized equipment. These tools, by design, keep the energized part
at a constant distance from the employee and, thus, maintain the
appropriate minimum approach distance automatically.
The location of the worker and the type of work methods the
worker is using also influence the length of the ergonomic component
of the minimum approach distance. In this higher voltage range, the
employees use work methods that more tightly control their movements
than when the workers perform work using rubber insulating gloves.
The worker, therefore, is farther from the energized line or
equipment and must be more precise in his or her movements just to
perform the work. For these reasons, this subpart adopts an
ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance of 0.31 m (1
foot) for voltages between 72.6 and 800 kilovolts.
Table 4 summarizes the ergonomic component of the minimum
approach distance for various voltage ranges.
Table 4--Ergonomic Component of Minimum Approach Distance
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Distance
Voltage range (kV) -----------------------------------
m ft
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.301 to 0.750...................... 0.31 1.0
0.751 to 72.5....................... 0.61 2.0
72.6 to 800......................... 0.31 1.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The employer must add this distance to the electrical component of
the minimum approach distance to obtain the full minimum approach
distance.
The ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance
accounts for errors in maintaining the minimum approach distance
(which might occur, for example, if an employee misjudges the length
of a conductive object he or she is holding), and for errors in
judging the minimum approach distance. The ergonomic component also
accounts for inadvertent movements by the employee, such as
slipping. In contrast, the working position selected to properly
maintain the minimum approach distance must account for all of an
employee's reasonably likely movements and still permit the employee
to adhere to the applicable minimum approach distance. (See Figure
1.) Reasonably likely movements include an employee's adjustments to
tools, equipment, and working positions and all movements needed to
perform the work. For example, the employee should be able to
perform all of the following actions without straying into the
minimum approach distance:
Adjust his or her hardhat,
maneuver a tool onto an energized part with a
reasonable amount of overreaching or underreaching,
reach for and handle tools, material, and equipment
passed to him or her, and
adjust tools, and replace components on them, when
necessary during the work procedure.
The training of qualified employees required under Sec.
1926.950, and the job planning and briefing required under Sec.
1926.952, must address selection of a proper working position.
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.037
BILLING CODE 4510-26-C
E. Miscellaneous correction factors. Changes in the air medium
that forms the insulation influences the strength of an air gap. A
brief discussion of each factor follows.
1. Dielectric strength of air. The dielectric strength of air in
a uniform electric field at standard atmospheric conditions is
approximately 3 kilovolts per millimeter.\6\ The pressure,
temperature, and humidity of the air, the shape, dimensions, and
separation of the electrodes, and the
characteristics of the applied voltage (wave shape) affect the
disruptive gradient.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ For the purposes of estimating arc length, Subpart V
generally assumes a more conservative dielectric strength of 10
kilovolts per 25.4 millimeters, consistent with assumptions made in
consensus standards such as the National Electrical Safety Code
(IEEE C2-2012). The more conservative value accounts for variables
such as electrode shape, wave shape, and a certain amount of
overvoltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Atmospheric effect. The empirically determined electrical
strength of a given gap is normally applicable at standard
atmospheric conditions (20 [deg]C, 101.3 kilopascals, 11 grams/cubic
centimeter humidity). An increase in the density (humidity) of the
air inhibits sparkover for a given air gap. The combination of
temperature and air pressure that results in the lowest gap
sparkover voltage is high temperature and low pressure. This
combination of conditions is not likely to occur. Low air pressure,
generally associated with high humidity, causes increased electrical
strength. An average air pressure generally correlates with low
humidity. Hot and dry working conditions normally result in reduced
electrical strength. The equations for minimum approach distances in
Table V-2 assume standard atmospheric conditions.
3. Altitude. The reduced air pressure at high altitudes causes a
reduction in the electrical strength of an air gap. An employer must
increase the minimum approach distance by about 3 percent per 300
meters (1,000 feet) of increased altitude for altitudes above 900
meters (3,000 feet). Table V-4 specifies the altitude correction
factor that the employer must use in calculating minimum approach
distances.
IV. Determining Minimum Approach Distances
A. Factors Affecting Voltage Stress at the Worksite
1. System voltage (nominal). The nominal system voltage range
determines the voltage for purposes of calculating minimum approach
distances. The employer selects the range in which the nominal
system voltage falls, as given in the relevant table, and uses the
highest value within that range in per-unit calculations.
2. Transient overvoltages. Operation of switches or circuit
breakers, a fault on a line or circuit or on an adjacent circuit,
and similar activities may generate transient overvoltages on an
electrical system. Each overvoltage has an associated transient
voltage wave shape. The wave shape arriving at the site and its
magnitude vary considerably.
In developing requirements for minimum approach distances, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration considered the most
common wave shapes and the magnitude of transient overvoltages found
on electric power generation, transmission, and distribution
systems. The equations in Table V-2 for minimum approach distances
use per-unit maximum transient overvoltages, which are relative to
the nominal maximum voltage of the system. For example, a maximum
transient overvoltage value of 3.0 per unit indicates that the
highest transient overvoltage is 3.0 times the nominal maximum
system voltage.
3. Typical magnitude of overvoltages. Table 5 lists the
magnitude of typical transient overvoltages.
Table 5--Magnitude of Typical Transient Overvoltages
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Magnitude (per
Cause unit)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Energized 200-mile line without closing resistors..... 3.5
Energized 200-mile line with one-step closing resistor 2.1
Energized 200-mile line with multistep resistor....... 2.5
Reclosing with trapped charge one-step resistor....... 2.2
Opening surge with single restrike.................... 3.0
Fault initiation unfaulted phase...................... 2.1
Fault initiation adjacent circuit..................... 2.5
Fault clearing........................................ 1.7 to 1.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Standard deviation--air-gap withstand. For each air gap
length under the same atmospheric conditions, there is a statistical
variation in the breakdown voltage. The probability of breakdown
against voltage has a normal (Gaussian) distribution. The standard
deviation of this distribution varies with the wave shape, gap
geometry, and atmospheric conditions. The withstand voltage of the
air gap is three standard deviations (3[sigma]) below the critical
sparkover voltage. (The critical sparkover voltage is the crest
value of the impulse wave that, under specified conditions, causes
sparkover 50 percent of the time. An impulse wave of three standard
deviations below this value, that is, the withstand voltage, has a
probability of sparkover of approximately 1 in 1,000.)
5. Broken Insulators. Tests show reductions in the insulation
strength of insulator strings with broken skirts. Broken units may
lose up to 70 percent of their withstand capacity. Because an
employer cannot determine the insulating capability of a broken unit
without testing it, the employer must consider damaged units in an
insulator to have no insulating value. Additionally, the presence of
a live-line tool alongside an insulator string with broken units may
further reduce the overall insulating strength. The number of good
units that must be present in a string for it to be "insulated" as
defined by Sec. 1926.968 depends on the maximum overvoltage
possible at the worksite.
B. Minimum Approach Distances Based on Known, Maximum-Anticipated
Per-Unit Transient Overvoltages
1. Determining the minimum approach distance for AC systems.
Under Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(ii), the employer must determine the
maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground,
through an engineering analysis or must assume a maximum anticipated
per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, in accordance with
Table V-8. When the employer conducts an engineering analysis of the
system and determines that the maximum transient overvoltage is
lower than specified by Table V-8, the employer must ensure that any
conditions assumed in the analysis, for example, that employees
block reclosing on a circuit or install portable protective gaps,
are present during energized work. To ensure that these conditions
are present, the employer may need to institute new live-work
procedures reflecting the conditions and limitations set by the
engineering analysis.
2. Calculation of reduced approach distance values. An employer
may take the following steps to reduce minimum approach distances
when the maximum transient overvoltage on the system (that is, the
maximum transient overvoltage without additional steps to control
overvoltages) produces unacceptably large minimum approach
distances:
Step 1. Determine the maximum voltage (with respect to a given
nominal voltage range) for the energized part.
Step 2. Determine the technique to use to control the maximum
transient overvoltage. (See paragraphs IV.C and IV.D of this
appendix.) Determine the maximum transient overvoltage that can
exist at the worksite with that form of control in place and with a
confidence level of 3[sigma] . This voltage is the withstand voltage
for the purpose of calculating the appropriate minimum approach
distance.
Step 3. Direct employees to implement procedures to ensure that
the control technique is in effect during the course of the work.
Step 4. Using the new value of transient overvoltage in per
unit, calculate the required minimum approach distance from Table V-
2.
C. Methods of Controlling Possible Transient Overvoltage Stress
Found on a System
1. Introduction. There are several means of controlling
overvoltages that occur on transmission systems. For example, the
employer can modify the operation of circuit breakers or other
switching devices to reduce switching transient overvoltages.
Alternatively, the employer can hold the overvoltage to an
acceptable level by installing surge arresters or portable
protective gaps on the system. In addition, the employer can change
the transmission system to minimize the effect of switching
operations. Section 4.8 of IEEE Std 516-2009 describes various ways
of controlling, and thereby reducing, maximum transient
overvoltages.
2. Operation of circuit breakers.\7\ The maximum transient
overvoltage that can reach the worksite is often the result of
switching on the line on which employees are working. Disabling
automatic reclosing during energized line work, so that the line
will not be reenergized after being opened for any reason, limits
the maximum switching surge overvoltage to the larger of the opening
surge or the greatest possible fault-generated surge, provided that
the devices (for example, insertion resistors) are operable and will
function to limit the transient overvoltage and that circuit breaker
restrikes do not occur. The employer must ensure the proper
functioning of insertion resistors and other overvoltage-limiting
devices when the employer's engineering analysis assumes their
proper operation to limit the overvoltage level. If the employer
cannot disable the reclosing feature (because of system operating
conditions), other methods of controlling the switching surge level
may be necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The detailed design of a circuit interrupter, such as the
design of the contacts, resistor insertion, and breaker timing
control, are beyond the scope of this appendix. The design of the
system generally accounts for these features. This appendix only
discusses features that can limit the maximum switching transient
overvoltage on a system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transient surges on an adjacent line, particularly for double
circuit construction, may cause a significant overvoltage on the
line on which employees are working. The employer's engineering
analysis must account for coupling to adjacent lines.
3. Surge arresters. The use of modern surge arresters allows a
reduction in the basic impulse-insulation levels of much
transmission system equipment. The primary function of early
arresters was to protect the system insulation from the effects of
lightning. Modern arresters not only dissipate lightning-caused
transients, but may also control many other system transients caused
by switching or faults.
The employer may use properly designed arresters to control
transient overvoltages along a transmission line and thereby reduce
the requisite length of the insulator string and possibly the
maximum transient overvoltage on the line.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Surge arrester application is beyond the scope of this
appendix. However, if the employer installs the arrester near the
work site, the application would be similar to the protective gaps
discussed in paragraph IV.D of this appendix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Switching Restrictions. Another form of overvoltage control
involves establishing switching restrictions, whereby the employer
prohibits the operation of circuit breakers until certain system
conditions are present. The employer restricts switching by using a
tagging system, similar to that used for a permit, except that the
common term used for this activity is a "hold-off" or
"restriction." These terms indicate that the restriction does not
prevent operation, but only modifies the operation during the live-
work activity.
D. Minimum Approach Distance Based on Control of Maximum Transient
Overvoltage at the Worksite
When the employer institutes control of maximum transient
overvoltage at the worksite by installing portable protective gaps,
the employer may calculate the minimum approach distance as follows:
Step 1. Select the appropriate withstand voltage for the
protective gap based on system requirements and an acceptable
probability of gap sparkover.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The employer should check the withstand voltage to ensure
that it results in a probability of gap flashover that is acceptable
from a system outage perspective. (In other words, a gap sparkover
will produce a system outage. The employer should determine whether
such an outage will impact overall system performance to an
acceptable degree.) In general, the withstand voltage should be at
least 1.25 times the maximum crest operating voltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Step 2. Determine a gap distance that provides a withstand
voltage \10\ greater than or equal to the one selected in the first
step.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ The manufacturer of the gap provides, based on test data,
the critical sparkover voltage for each gap spacing (for example, a
critical sparkover voltage of 665 kilovolts for a gap spacing of 1.2
meters). The withstand voltage for the gap is equal to 85 percent of
its critical sparkover voltage.
\11\ Switch steps 1 and 2 if the length of the protective gap is
known.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Step 3. Use 110 percent of the gap's critical sparkover voltage
to determine the phase-to-ground peak voltage at gap sparkover (VPPG
Peak).
Step 4. Determine the maximum transient overvoltage, phase-to-
ground, at the worksite from the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.038
Step 5. Use this value of T \12\ in the equation in Table V-2 to
obtain the minimum approach distance. If the worksite is no more
than 900 meters (3,000 feet) above sea level, the employer may use
this value of T to determine the minimum approach distance from
Table 7 through Table 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ IEEE Std 516-2009 states that most employers add 0.2 to the
calculated value of T as an additional safety factor.
Note: All rounding must be to the next higher value (that is,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
always round up).
Sample protective gap calculations.
Problem: Employees are to perform work on a 500-kilovolt
transmission line at sea level that is subject to transient
overvoltages of 2.4 p.u. The maximum operating voltage of the line
is 550 kilovolts. Determine the length of the protective gap that
will provide the minimum practical safe approach distance. Also,
determine what that minimum approach distance is.
Step 1. Calculate the smallest practical maximum transient
overvoltage (1.25 times the crest phase-to-ground voltage): \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ To eliminate sparkovers due to minor system disturbances,
the employer should use a withstand voltage no lower than 1.25 p.u.
Note that this is a practical, or operational, consideration only.
It may be feasible for the employer to use lower values of withstand
voltage.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.039
This value equals the withstand voltage of the protective gap.
Step 2. Using test data for a particular protective gap, select
a gap that has a critical sparkover voltage greater than or equal
to:
561kV / 0.85 = 660kV
For example, if a protective gap with a 1.22-m (4.0-foot) spacing
tested to a critical sparkover voltage of 665 kilovolts (crest),
select this gap spacing.
Step 3. The phase-to-ground peak voltage at gap sparkover (VPPG
Peak) is 110 percent of the value from the previous step:
665kVx 1.10 = 732kV
This value corresponds to the withstand voltage of the electrical
component of the minimum approach distance.
Step 4. Use this voltage to determine the worksite value of T:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.040
Step 5. Use this value of T in the equation in Table V-2 to
obtain the minimum approach distance, or look up the minimum
approach distance in Table 7 through Table 14:
MAD = 2.29m(7.6ft)
E. Location of Protective Gaps
1. Adjacent structures. The employer may install the protective
gap on a structure adjacent to the worksite, as this practice does
not significantly reduce the protection afforded by the gap.
2. Terminal stations. Gaps installed at terminal stations of
lines or circuits provide a level of protection; however, that level
of protection may not extend throughout the length of the line to
the worksite. The use of substation terminal gaps raises the
possibility that separate surges could enter the line at opposite
ends, each with low enough magnitude to pass the terminal gaps
without sparkover. When voltage surges occur simultaneously at each
end of a line and travel toward each other, the total voltage on the
line at the point where they meet is the arithmetic sum of the two
surges. A gap installed within 0.8 km (0.5 mile) of the worksite
will protect against such intersecting waves. Engineering studies of
a particular line or system may indicate that employers can
adequately protect employees by installing gaps at even more distant
locations. In any event, unless using the default values for T from
Table V-8, the employer must determine T at the worksite.
3. Worksite. If the employer installs protective gaps at the
worksite, the gap setting establishes the worksite impulse
insulation strength. Lightning strikes as far as 6 miles from the
worksite can cause a voltage surge greater than the gap withstand
voltage, and a gap sparkover can occur. In addition, the gap can
sparkover from overvoltages on the line that exceed the withstand
voltage of the gap. Consequently, the employer must protect
employees from hazards resulting from any sparkover that could
occur.
F. Disabling automatic reclosing. There are two reasons to
disable the automatic-reclosing feature of circuit-interrupting
devices while employees are performing live-line work:
To prevent reenergization of a circuit faulted during
the work, which could create a hazard or result in more serious
injuries or damage than the injuries or damage produced by the
original fault;
To prevent any transient overvoltage caused by the
switching surge that would result if the circuit were reenergized.
However, due to system stability considerations, it may not
always be feasible to disable the automatic-reclosing feature.
V. Minimum Approach-Distance Tables
A. Legacy tables. Employers may use the minimum approach
distances in Table 6 until March 31, 2015.
Table 6--Minimum Approach Distances Until March 31, 2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
Voltage range phase to phase (kV) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.1 to 15.0.................................... 0.64 2.1 0.61 2.0
15.1 to 35.0................................... 0.71 2.3 0.71 2.3
35.1 to 46.0................................... 0.76 2.5 0.76 2.5
46.1 to 72.5................................... 0.91 3.0 0.91 3.0
72.6 to 121.................................... 1.02 3.3 1.37 4.5
138 to 145..................................... 1.07 3.5 1.52 5.0
161 to 169..................................... 1.12 3.7 1.68 5.5
230 to 242..................................... 1.52 5.0 2.54 8.3
345 to 362 *................................... 2.13 7.0 4.06 13.3
500 to 552 *................................... 3.35 11.0 6.10 20.0
700 to 765 *................................... 4.57 15.0 9.45 31.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The minimum approach distance may be the shortest distance between the energized part and the grounded
surface.
B. Alternative minimum approach distances. Employers may use the
minimum approach distances in Table 7 through Table 14 provided that
the employer follows the notes to those tables.
Table 7--AC Minimum Approach Distances--72.6 to 121.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................ 0.67 2.2 0.84 2.8
1.6............................................ 0.69 2.3 0.87 2.9
1.7............................................ 0.71 2.3 0.90 3.0
1.8............................................ 0.74 2.4 0.93 3.1
1.9............................................ 0.76 2.5 0.96 3.1
2.0............................................ 0.78 2.6 0.99 3.2
2.1............................................ 0.81 2.7 1.01 3.3
2.2............................................ 0.83 2.7 1.04 3.4
2.3............................................ 0.85 2.8 1.07 3.5
2.4............................................ 0.88 2.9 1.10 3.6
2.5............................................ 0.90 3.0 1.13 3.7
2.6............................................ 0.92 3.0 1.16 3.8
2.7............................................ 0.95 3.1 1.19 3.9
2.8............................................ 0.97 3.2 1.22 4.0
2.9............................................ 0.99 3.2 1.24 4.1
3.0............................................ 1.02 3.3 1.27 4.2
3.1............................................ 1.04 3.4 1.30 4.3
3.2............................................ 1.06 3.5 1.33 4.4
3.3............................................ 1.09 3.6 1.36 4.5
3.4............................................ 1.11 3.6 1.39 4.6
3.5............................................ 1.13 3.7 1.42 4.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 8--AC Minimum Approach Distances--121.1 to 145.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground rxposure Phase-to-phase rxposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................ 0.74 2.4 0.95 3.1
1.6............................................ 0.76 2.5 0.98 3.2
1.7............................................ 0.79 2.6 1.02 3.3
1.8............................................ 0.82 2.7 1.05 3.4
1.9............................................ 0.85 2.8 1.08 3.5
2.0............................................ 0.88 2.9 1.12 3.7
2.1............................................ 0.90 3.0 1.15 3.8
2.2............................................ 0.93 3.1 1.19 3.9
2.3............................................ 0.96 3.1 1.22 4.0
2.4............................................ 0.99 3.2 1.26 4.1
2.5............................................ 1.02 3.3 1.29 4.2
2.6............................................ 1.04 3.4 1.33 4.4
2.7............................................ 1.07 3.5 1.36 4.5
2.8............................................ 1.10 3.6 1.39 4.6
2.9............................................ 1.13 3.7 1.43 4.7
3.0............................................ 1.16 3.8 1.46 4.8
3.1............................................ 1.19 3.9 1.50 4.9
3.2............................................ 1.21 4.0 1.53 5.0
3.3............................................ 1.24 4.1 1.57 5.2
3.4............................................ 1.27 4.2 1.60 5.2
3.5............................................ 1.30 4.3 1.64 5.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 9--AC Minimum Approach Distances--145.1 to 169.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................ 0.81 2.7 1.05 3.4
1.6............................................ 0.84 2.8 1.09 3.6
1.7............................................ 0.87 2.9 1.13 3.7
1.8............................................ 0.90 3.0 1.17 3.8
1.9............................................ 0.94 3.1 1.21 4.0
2.0............................................ 0.97 3.2 1.25 4.1
2.1............................................ 1.00 3.3 1.29 4.2
2.2............................................ 1.03 3.4 1.33 4.4
2.3............................................ 1.07 3.5 1.37 4.5
2.4............................................ 1.10 3.6 1.41 4.6
2.5............................................ 1.13 3.7 1.45 4.8
2.6............................................ 1.17 3.8 1.49 4.9
2.7............................................ 1.20 3.9 1.53 5.0
2.8............................................ 1.23 4.0 1.57 5.2
2.9............................................ 1.26 4.1 1.61 5.3
3.0............................................ 1.30 4.3 1.65 5.4
3.1............................................ 1.33 4.4 1.70 5.6
3.2............................................ 1.36 4.5 1.76 5.8
3.3............................................ 1.39 4.6 1.82 6.0
3.4............................................ 1.43 4.7 1.88 6.2
3.5............................................ 1.46 4.8 1.94 6.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 10--AC Minimum Approach Distances--169.1 to 242.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................ 1.02 3.3 1.37 4.5
1.6............................................ 1.06 3.5 1.43 4.7
1.7............................................ 1.11 3.6 1.48 4.9
1.8............................................ 1.16 3.8 1.54 5.1
1.9............................................ 1.21 4.0 1.60 5.2
2.0............................................ 1.25 4.1 1.66 5.4
2.1............................................ 1.30 4.3 1.73 5.7
2.2............................................ 1.35 4.4 1.81 5.9
2.3............................................ 1.39 4.6 1.90 6.2
2.4............................................ 1.44 4.7 1.99 6.5
2.5............................................ 1.49 4.9 2.08 6.8
2.6............................................ 1.53 5.0 2.17 7.1
2.7............................................ 1.58 5.2 2.26 7.4
2.8............................................ 1.63 5.3 2.36 7.7
2.9............................................ 1.67 5.5 2.45 8.0
3.0............................................ 1.72 5.6 2.55 8.4
3.1............................................ 1.77 5.8 2.65 8.7
3.2............................................ 1.81 5.9 2.76 9.1
3.3............................................ 1.88 6.2 2.86 9.4
3.4............................................ 1.95 6.4 2.97 9.7
3.5............................................ 2.01 6.6 3.08 10.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 11--AC Minimum Approach Distances--242.1 to 362.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................ 1.37 4.5 1.99 6.5
1.6............................................ 1.44 4.7 2.13 7.0
1.7............................................ 1.51 5.0 2.27 7.4
1.8............................................ 1.58 5.2 2.41 7.9
1.9............................................ 1.65 5.4 2.56 8.4
2.0............................................ 1.72 5.6 2.71 8.9
2.1............................................ 1.79 5.9 2.87 9.4
2.2............................................ 1.87 6.1 3.03 9.9
2.3............................................ 1.97 6.5 3.20 10.5
2.4............................................ 2.08 6.8 3.37 11.1
2.5............................................ 2.19 7.2 3.55 11.6
2.6............................................ 2.29 7.5 3.73 12.2
2.7............................................ 2.41 7.9 3.91 12.8
2.8............................................ 2.52 8.3 4.10 13.5
2.9............................................ 2.64 8.7 4.29 14.1
3.0............................................ 2.76 9.1 4.49 14.7
3.1............................................ 2.88 9.4 4.69 15.4
3.2............................................ 3.01 9.9 4.90 16.1
3.3............................................ 3.14 10.3 5.11 16.8
3.4............................................ 3.27 10.7 5.32 17.5
3.5............................................ 3.41 11.2 5.52 18.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 12--AC Minimum Approach Distances--362.1 to 420.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................ 1.53 5.0 2.40 7.9
1.6............................................ 1.62 5.3 2.58 8.5
1.7............................................ 1.70 5.6 2.75 9.0
1.8............................................ 1.78 5.8 2.94 9.6
1.9............................................ 1.88 6.2 3.13 10.3
2.0............................................ 1.99 6.5 3.33 10.9
2.1............................................ 2.12 7.0 3.53 11.6
2.2............................................ 2.24 7.3 3.74 12.3
2.3............................................ 2.37 7.8 3.95 13.0
2.4............................................ 2.50 8.2 4.17 13.7
2.5............................................ 2.64 8.7 4.40 14.4
2.6............................................ 2.78 9.1 4.63 15.2
2.7............................................ 2.93 9.6 4.87 16.0
2.8............................................ 3.07 10.1 5.11 16.8
2.9............................................ 3.23 10.6 5.36 17.6
3.0............................................ 3.38 11.1 5.59 18.3
3.1............................................ 3.55 11.6 5.82 19.1
3.2............................................ 3.72 12.2 6.07 19.9
3.3............................................ 3.89 12.8 6.31 20.7
3.4............................................ 4.07 13.4 6.56 21.5
3.5............................................ 4.25 13.9 6.81 22.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 13--AC Minimum Approach Distances--420.1 to 550.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................ 1.95 6.4 3.46 11.4
1.6............................................ 2.11 6.9 3.73 12.2
1.7............................................ 2.28 7.5 4.02 13.2
1.8............................................ 2.45 8.0 4.31 14.1
1.9............................................ 2.62 8.6 4.61 15.1
2.0............................................ 2.81 9.2 4.92 16.1
2.1............................................ 3.00 9.8 5.25 17.2
2.2............................................ 3.20 10.5 5.55 18.2
2.3............................................ 3.40 11.2 5.86 19.2
2.4............................................ 3.62 11.9 6.18 20.3
2.5............................................ 3.84 12.6 6.50 21.3
2.6............................................ 4.07 13.4 6.83 22.4
2.7............................................ 4.31 14.1 7.18 23.6
2.8............................................ 4.56 15.0 7.52 24.7
2.9............................................ 4.81 15.8 7.88 25.9
3.0............................................ 5.07 16.6 8.24 27.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 14--AC Minimum Approach Distances--550.1 to 800.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase-to-ground exposure Phase-to-phase exposure
T (p.u.) ----------------------------------------------------------------
m ft m ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................ 3.16 10.4 5.97 19.6
1.6............................................ 3.46 11.4 6.43 21.1
1.7............................................ 3.78 12.4 6.92 22.7
1.8............................................ 4.12 13.5 7.42 24.3
1.9............................................ 4.47 14.7 7.93 26.0
2.0............................................ 4.83 15.8 8.47 27.8
2.1............................................ 5.21 17.1 9.02 29.6
2.2............................................ 5.61 18.4 9.58 31.4
2.3............................................ 6.02 19.8 10.16 33.3
2.4............................................ 6.44 21.1 10.76 35.3
2.5............................................ 6.88 22.6 11.38 37.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes to Table 7 through Table 14:
1. The employer must determine the maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, through
an engineering analysis, as required by Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(ii), or assume a maximum anticipated per-unit
transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, in accordance with Table V-8.
2. For phase-to-phase exposures, the employer must demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap and that no
large conductive object is in the gap.
3. The worksite must be at an elevation of 900 meters (3,000 feet) or less above sea level.
Appendix C to Subpart V of Part 1926--Protection From Hazardous
Differences in Electric Potential
I. Introduction
Current passing through an impedance impresses voltage across
that impedance. Even conductors have some, albeit low, value of
impedance. Therefore, if a "grounded" \1\ object, such as a crane
or deenergized and grounded power line, results in a ground fault on
a power line, voltage is impressed on that grounded object. The
voltage impressed on the grounded object depends largely on the
voltage on the line, on the impedance of the faulted conductor, and
on the impedance to "true," or "absolute," ground represented by
the object. If the impedance of the object causing the fault is
relatively large, the voltage impressed on the object is essentially
the phase-to-ground system voltage. However, even faults to grounded
power lines or to well grounded transmission towers or substation
structures (which have relatively low values of impedance to ground)
can result in hazardous voltages.\2\ In all cases, the degree of the
hazard depends on the magnitude of the current through the employee
and the time of exposure. This appendix discusses methods of
protecting workers against the possibility that grounded objects,
such as cranes and other mechanical equipment, will contact
energized power lines and that deenergized and grounded power lines
will become accidentally energized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This appendix generally uses the term "grounded" only with
respect to grounding that the employer intentionally installs, for
example, the grounding an employer installs on a deenergized
conductor. However, in this case, the term "grounded" means
connected to earth, regardless of whether or not that connection is
intentional.
\2\ Thus, grounding systems for transmission towers and
substation structures should be designed to minimize the step and
touch potentials involved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Voltage-Gradient Distribution
A. Voltage-gradient distribution curve. Absolute, or true,
ground serves as a reference and always has a voltage of 0 volts
above ground potential. Because there is an impedance between a
grounding electrode and absolute ground, there will be a voltage
difference between the grounding electrode and absolute ground under
ground-fault conditions. Voltage dissipates from the grounding
electrode (or from the grounding point) and creates a ground
potential gradient. The voltage decreases rapidly with increasing
distance from the grounding electrode. A voltage drop associated
with this dissipation of voltage is a ground potential. Figure 1 is
a typical voltage-gradient distribution curve (assuming a uniform
soil texture).
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.041
BILLING CODE 4510-26-C
B. Step and touch potentials. Figure 1 also shows that workers
are at risk from step and touch potentials. Step potential is the
voltage between the feet of a person standing near an energized
grounded object (the electrode). In Figure 1, the step potential is
equal to the difference in voltage between two points at different
distances from the electrode (where the points represent the
location of each foot in relation to the electrode). A person could
be at risk of injury during a fault simply by standing near the
object.
Touch potential is the voltage between the energized grounded
object (again, the
electrode) and the feet of a person in contact with the object. In
Figure 1, the touch potential is equal to the difference in voltage
between the electrode (which is at a distance of 0 meters) and a
point some distance away from the electrode (where the point
represents the location of the feet of the person in contact with
the object). The touch potential could be nearly the full voltage
across the grounded object if that object is grounded at a point
remote from the place where the person is in contact with it. For
example, a crane grounded to the system neutral and that contacts an
energized line would expose any person in contact with the crane or
its uninsulated load line to a touch potential nearly equal to the
full fault voltage.
Figure 2 illustrates step and touch potentials.
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.042
BILLING CODE 4510-26-C
III. Protecting Workers From Hazardous Differences in Electrical
Potential
A. Definitions. The following definitions apply to section III
of this appendix:
Bond. The electrical interconnection of conductive parts
designed to maintain a common electric potential.
Bonding cable (bonding jumper). A cable connected to two
conductive parts to bond the parts together.
Cluster bar. A terminal temporarily attached to a structure that
provides a means for the attachment and bonding of grounding and
bonding cables to the structure.
Ground. A conducting connection between an electric circuit or
equipment and the earth, or to some conducting body that serves in
place of the earth.
Grounding cable (grounding jumper). A cable connected between a
deenergized part
and ground. Note that grounding cables carry fault current and
bonding cables generally do not. A cable that bonds two conductive
parts but carries substantial fault current (for example, a jumper
connected between one phase and a grounded phase) is a grounding
cable.
Ground mat (grounding grid). A temporarily or permanently
installed metallic mat or grating that establishes an equipotential
surface and provides connection points for attaching grounds.
B. Analyzing the hazard. The employer can use an engineering
analysis of the power system under fault conditions to determine
whether hazardous step and touch voltages will develop. The analysis
should determine the voltage on all conductive objects in the work
area and the amount of time the voltage will be present. Based on
the this analysis, the employer can select appropriate measures and
protective equipment, including the measures and protective
equipment outlined in Section III of this appendix, to protect each
employee from hazardous differences in electric potential. For
example, from the analysis, the employer will know the voltage
remaining on conductive objects after employees install bonding and
grounding equipment and will be able to select insulating equipment
with an appropriate rating, as described in paragraph III.C.2 of
this appendix.
C. Protecting workers on the ground. The employer may use
several methods, including equipotential zones, insulating
equipment, and restricted work areas, to protect employees on the
ground from hazardous differences in electrical potential.
1. An equipotential zone will protect workers within it from
hazardous step and touch potentials. (See Figure 3.) Equipotential
zones will not, however, protect employees located either wholly or
partially outside the protected area. The employer can establish an
equipotential zone for workers on the ground, with respect to a
grounded object, through the use of a metal mat connected to the
grounded object. The employer can use a grounding grid to equalize
the voltage within the grid or bond conductive objects in the
immediate work area to minimize the potential between the objects
and between each object and ground. (Bonding an object outside the
work area can increase the touch potential to that object, however.)
Section III.D of this appendix discusses equipotential zones for
employees working on deenergized and grounded power lines.
2. Insulating equipment, such as rubber gloves, can protect
employees handling grounded equipment and conductors from hazardous
touch potentials. The insulating equipment must be rated for the
highest voltage that can be impressed on the grounded objects under
fault conditions (rather than for the full system voltage).
3. Restricting employees from areas where hazardous step or
touch potentials could arise can protect employees not directly
involved in performing the operation. The employer must ensure that
employees on the ground in the vicinity of transmission structures
are at a distance where step voltages would be insufficient to cause
injury. Employees must not handle grounded conductors or equipment
likely to become energized to hazardous voltages unless the
employees are within an equipotential zone or protected by
insulating equipment.
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.043
BILLING CODE 4510-26-C
D. Protecting employees working on deenergized and grounded
power lines. This Section III.D of Appendix C establishes guidelines
to help employers comply with requirements in Sec. 1926.962 for
using protective grounding to protect employees working on
deenergized power lines. Section 1926.962 applies to grounding of
transmission and distribution lines and equipment for the purpose of
protecting workers. Paragraph (c) of Sec. 1926.962 requires
temporary protective grounds to be placed at such locations and
arranged in such a manner that the employer can demonstrate will
prevent exposure of each employee to hazardous differences in
electric potential.\3\ Sections III.D.1 and III.D.2 of this appendix
provide guidelines that employers can use in making the
demonstration required by Sec. 1926.962(c). Section III.D.1 of this
appendix provides guidelines on how the employer can determine
whether particular grounding practices expose employees to hazardous
differences in electric potential. Section III.D.2 of this appendix
describes grounding methods that the employer can use in lieu of an
engineering analysis to make the demonstration required by Sec.
1926.962(c). The Occupational Safety and Health Administration will
consider employers that comply with the criteria in this appendix as
meeting Sec. 1926.962(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The protective grounding required by Sec. 1926.962 limits
to safe values the potential differences between accessible objects
in each employee's work environment. Ideally, a protective grounding
system would create a true equipotential zone in which every point
is at the same electric potential. In practice, current passing
through the grounding and bonding elements creates potential
differences. If these potential differences are hazardous, the
employer may not treat the zone as an equipotential zone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, Section III.D.3 of this appendix discusses other safety
considerations that will help the employer comply with other
requirements in Sec. 1926.962. Following these guidelines will
protect workers from hazards that can occur when a deenergized and
grounded line becomes energized.
1. Determining safe body current limits. This Section III.D.1 of
Appendix C provides guidelines on how an employer can determine
whether any differences in electric potential to which workers could
be exposed are hazardous as part of the demonstration required by
Sec. 1926.962(c).
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard
1048-2003, IEEE
Guide for Protective Grounding of Power Lines, provides the
following equation for determining the threshold of ventricular
fibrillation when the duration of the electric shock is limited:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.044
where I is the current through the worker's body, and t is the
duration of the current in seconds. This equation represents the
ventricular fibrillation threshold for 95.5 percent of the adult
population with a mass of 50 kilograms (110 pounds) or more. The
equation is valid for current durations between 0.0083 to 3.0
seconds.
To use this equation to set safe voltage limits in an
equipotential zone around the worker, the employer will need to
assume a value for the resistance of the worker's body. IEEE Std
1048-2003 states that "total body resistance is usually taken as
1000 [Omega] for determining . . . body current limits." However,
employers should be aware that the impedance of a worker's body can
be substantially less than that value. For instance, IEEE Std 1048-
2003 reports a minimum hand-to-hand resistance of 610 ohms and an
internal body resistance of 500 ohms. The internal resistance of the
body better represents the minimum resistance of a worker's body
when the skin resistance drops near zero, which occurs, for example,
when there are breaks in the worker's skin, for instance, from cuts
or from blisters formed as a result of the current from an electric
shock, or when the worker is wet at the points of contact.
Employers may use the IEEE Std 1048-2003 equation to determine
safe body current limits only if the employer protects workers from
hazards associated with involuntary muscle reactions from electric
shock (for example, the hazard to a worker from falling as a result
of an electric shock). Moreover, the equation applies only when the
duration of the electric shock is limited. If the precautions the
employer takes, including those required by applicable standards, do
not adequately protect employees from hazards associated with
involuntary reactions from electric shock, a hazard exists if the
induced voltage is sufficient to pass a current of 1 milliampere
through a 500-ohm resistor. (The 500-ohm resistor represents the
resistance of an employee. The 1-milliampere current is the
threshold of perception.) Finally, if the employer protects
employees from injury due to involuntary reactions from electric
shock, but the duration of the electric shock is unlimited (that is,
when the fault current at the work location will be insufficient to
trip the devices protecting the circuit), a hazard exists if the
resultant current would be more than 6 milliamperes (the recognized
let-go threshold for workers \4\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Electric current passing through the body has varying
effects depending on the amount of the current. At the let-go
threshold, the current overrides a person's control over his or her
muscles. At that level, an employee grasping an object will not be
able to let go of the object. The let-go threshold varies from
person to person; however, the recognized value for workers is 6
milliamperes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Acceptable methods of grounding for employers that do not
perform an engineering determination. The grounding methods
presented in this section of this appendix ensure that differences
in electric potential are as low as possible and, therefore, meet
Sec. 1926.962(c) without an engineering determination of the
potential differences. These methods follow two principles: (i) The
grounding method must ensure that the circuit opens in the fastest
available clearing time, and (ii) the grounding method must ensure
that the potential differences between conductive objects in the
employee's work area are as low as possible.
Paragraph (c) of Sec. 1926.962 does not require grounding
methods to meet the criteria embodied in these principles. Instead,
the paragraph requires that protective grounds be "placed at such
locations and arranged in such a manner that the employer can
demonstrate will prevent exposure of each employee to hazardous
differences in electric potential." However, when the employer's
grounding practices do not follow these two principles, the employer
will need to perform an engineering analysis to make the
demonstration required by Sec. 1926.962(c).
i. Ensuring that the circuit opens in the fastest available
clearing time. Generally, the higher the fault current, the shorter
the clearing times for the same type of fault. Therefore, to ensure
the fastest available clearing time, the grounding method must
maximize the fault current with a low impedance connection to
ground. The employer accomplishes this objective by grounding the
circuit conductors to the best ground available at the worksite.
Thus, the employer must ground to a grounded system neutral
conductor, if one is present. A grounded system neutral has a direct
connection to the system ground at the source, resulting in an
extremely low impedance to ground. In a substation, the employer may
instead ground to the substation grid, which also has an extremely
low impedance to the system ground and, typically, is connected to a
grounded system neutral when one is present. Remote system grounds,
such as pole and tower grounds, have a higher impedance to the
system ground than grounded system neutrals and substation grounding
grids; however, the employer may use a remote ground when lower
impedance grounds are not available. In the absence of a grounded
system neutral, substation grid, and remote ground, the employer may
use a temporary driven ground at the worksite.
In addition, if employees are working on a three-phase system,
the grounding method must short circuit all three phases. Short
circuiting all phases will ensure faster clearing and lower the
current through the grounding cable connecting the deenergized line
to ground, thereby lowering the voltage across that cable. The short
circuit need not be at the worksite; however, the employer must
treat any conductor that is not grounded at the worksite as
energized because the ungrounded conductors will be energized at
fault voltage during a fault.
ii. Ensuring that the potential differences between conductive
objects in the employee's work area are as low as possible. To
achieve as low a voltage as possible across any two conductive
objects in the work area, the employer must bond all conductive
objects in the work area. This section of this appendix discusses
how to create a zone that minimizes differences in electric
potential between conductive objects in the work area.
The employer must use bonding cables to bond conductive objects,
except for metallic objects bonded through metal-to-metal contact.
The employer must ensure that metal-to-metal contacts are tight and
free of contamination, such as oxidation, that can increase the
impedance across the connection. For example, a bolted connection
between metal lattice tower members is acceptable if the connection
is tight and free of corrosion and other contamination. Figure 4
shows how to create an equipotential zone for metal lattice towers.
Wood poles are conductive objects. The poles can absorb moisture
and conduct electricity, particularly at distribution and
transmission voltages. Consequently, the employer must either: (1)
Provide a conductive platform, bonded to a grounding cable, on which
the worker stands or (2) use cluster bars to bond wood poles to the
grounding cable. The employer must ensure that employees install the
cluster bar below, and close to, the worker's feet. The inner
portion of the wood pole is more conductive than the outer shell, so
it is important that the cluster bar be in conductive contact with a
metal spike or nail that penetrates the wood to a depth greater than
or equal to the depth the worker's climbing gaffs will penetrate the
wood. For example, the employer could mount the cluster bar on a
bare pole ground wire fastened to the pole with nails or staples
that penetrate to the required depth. Alternatively, the employer
may temporarily nail a conductive strap to the pole and connect the
strap to the cluster bar. Figure 5 shows how to create an
equipotential zone for wood poles.
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.045
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.046
BILLING CODE 4510-26-C
For underground systems, employers commonly install grounds at
the points of disconnection of the underground cables. These
grounding points are typically remote from the manhole or
underground vault where employees will be working on the cable.
Workers in contact with a cable grounded at a remote location can
experience hazardous potential differences if the cable becomes
energized or if a fault occurs on a different, but nearby, energized
cable. The fault current causes potential gradients in the earth,
and a potential difference will exist between the earth where the
worker is standing and the earth where the cable is grounded.
Consequently, to create an equipotential zone for the worker, the
employer must provide a means of connecting the deenergized cable to
ground at the worksite by having the worker stand on a conductive
mat bonded to the deenergized cable. If the cable is cut, the
employer must install a bond across the opening in the cable or
install one bond on each side of the opening to ensure that the
separate cable ends are at the same potential. The employer must
protect the worker from any hazardous differences in potential any
time there is no bond between the mat and the cable (for example,
before the worker installs the bonds).
3. Other safety-related considerations. To ensure that the
grounding system is safe and effective, the employer should also
consider the following factors: \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ This appendix only discusses factors that relate to ensuring
an equipotential zone for employees. The employer must consider
other factors in selecting a grounding system that is capable of
conducting the maximum fault current that could flow at the point of
grounding for the time necessary to clear the fault, as required by
Sec. 1926.962(d)(1)(i). IEEE Std 1048-2003 contains guidelines for
selecting and installing grounding equipment that will meet Sec.
1926.962(d)(1)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
i. Maintenance of grounding equipment. It is essential that the
employer properly maintain grounding equipment. Corrosion in the
connections between grounding cables and clamps and on the clamp
surface can increase the resistance of the cable, thereby increasing
potential differences. In addition, the surface to which a clamp
attaches, such as a conductor or tower member, must be clean and
free of corrosion and oxidation to ensure a low-resistance
connection. Cables must be free of damage that could reduce their
current-carrying capacity so that they can carry the full fault
current without failure. Each clamp must have a tight connection to
the cable to ensure a low resistance and to ensure that the clamp
does not separate from the cable during a fault.
ii. Grounding cable length and movement. The electromagnetic
forces on grounding cables during a fault increase with increasing
cable length. These forces can cause the cable to move violently
during a fault and can be high enough to damage the cable or clamps
and cause the cable to fail. In addition, flying cables can injure
workers. Consequently, cable lengths should be as short as possible,
and grounding cables that might carry high fault current should be
in positions where the cables will not injure workers during a
fault.
Appendix D to Subpart V of Part 1926--Methods of Inspecting and Testing
Wood Poles
I. Introduction
When employees are to perform work on a wood pole, it is
important to determine the condition of the pole before employees
climb it. The weight of the employee, the weight of equipment to be
installed, and other working stresses (such as the removal or
retensioning of conductors) can lead to the failure of a defective
pole or a pole that is not designed to handle the additional
stresses.\1\ For these reasons, it is essential that, before an
employee climbs a wood pole, the employer ascertain that the pole is
capable of sustaining the stresses of the work. The determination
that the pole is capable of sustaining these stresses includes an
inspection of the condition of the pole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ A properly guyed pole in good condition should, at a
minimum, be able to handle the weight of an employee climbing it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the employer finds the pole to be unsafe to climb or to work
from, the employer must secure the pole so that it does not fail
while an employee is on it. The employer can secure the pole by a
line truck boom, by ropes or guys, or by lashing a new pole
alongside it. If a new one is lashed alongside the defective pole,
employees should work from the new one.
II. Inspecting Wood Poles
A qualified employee should inspect wood poles for the following
conditions:\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The presence of any of these conditions is an indication
that the pole may not be safe to climb or to work from. The employee
performing the inspection must be qualified to make a determination
as to whether it is safe to perform the work without taking
additional precautions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. General condition. Buckling at the ground line or an unusual
angle with respect to the ground may indicate that the pole has
rotted or is broken.
B. Cracks. Horizontal cracks perpendicular to the grain of the
wood may weaken the pole. Vertical cracks, although not normally
considered to be a sign of a defective pole, can pose a hazard to
the climber, and the employee should keep his or her gaffs away from
them while climbing.
C. Holes. Hollow spots and woodpecker holes can reduce the
strength of a wood pole.
D. Shell rot and decay. Rotting and decay are cutout hazards and
possible indications of the age and internal condition of the pole.
E. Knots. One large knot or several smaller ones at the same
height on the pole may be evidence of a weak point on the pole.
F. Depth of setting. Evidence of the existence of a former
ground line substantially above the existing ground level may be an
indication that the pole is no longer buried to a sufficient depth.
G. Soil conditions. Soft, wet, or loose soil around the base of
the pole may indicate that the pole will not support any change in
stress.
H. Burn marks. Burning from transformer failures or conductor
faults could damage the pole so that it cannot withstand changes in
mechanical stress.
III. Testing Wood Poles
The following tests, which are from Sec. 1910.268(n)(3) of this
chapter, are acceptable methods of testing wood poles:
A. Hammer test. Rap the pole sharply with a hammer weighing
about 1.4 kg (3 pounds), starting near the ground line and
continuing upwards circumferentially around the pole to a height of
approximately 1.8 meters (6 feet). The hammer will produce a clear
sound and rebound sharply when striking sound wood. Decay pockets
will be indicated by a dull sound or a less pronounced hammer
rebound. Also, prod the pole as near the ground line as possible
using a pole prod or a screwdriver with a blade at least 127
millimeters (5 inches) long. If substantial decay is present, the
pole is unsafe.
B. Rocking test. Apply a horizontal force to the pole and
attempt to rock it back and forth in a direction perpendicular to
the line. Exercise caution to avoid causing power lines to swing
together. Apply the force to the pole either by pushing it with a
pike pole or pulling the pole with a rope. If the pole cracks during
the test, it is unsafe.
Appendix E to Subpart V of Part 1926--Protection From Flames and
Electric Arcs
I. Introduction
Paragraph (g) of Sec. 1926.960 addresses protecting employees
from flames and electric arcs. This paragraph requires employers to:
(1) Assess the workplace for flame and electric-arc hazards
(paragraph (g)(1)); (2) estimate the available heat energy from
electric arcs to which employees would be exposed (paragraph
(g)(2)); (3) ensure that employees wear clothing that will not melt,
or ignite and continue to burn, when exposed to flames or the
estimated heat energy (paragraph (g)(3)); and (4) ensure that
employees wear flame-resistant clothing \1\ and protective clothing
and other protective equipment that has an arc rating greater than
or equal to the available heat energy under certain conditions
(paragraphs (g)(4) and (g)(5)). This appendix contains information
to help employers estimate available heat energy as required by
Sec. 1926.960(g)(2), select protective clothing and other
protective equipment with an arc rating suitable for the available
heat energy as required by Sec. 1926.960(g)(5), and ensure that
employees do not wear flammable clothing that could lead to burn
injury as addressed by Sec. Sec. 1926.960(g)(3) and (g)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Flame-resistant clothing includes clothing that is
inherently flame resistant and clothing chemically treated with a
flame retardant. (See ASTM F1506-10a, Standard Performance
Specification for Flame Resistant Textile Materials for Wearing
Apparel for Use by Electrical Workers Exposed to Momentary Electric
Arc and Related Thermal Hazards, and ASTM F1891-12 Standard
Specification for Arc and Flame Resistant Rainwear.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Assessing the Workplace for Flame and Electric-Arc Hazards
Paragraph (g)(1) of Sec. 1926.960 requires the employer to
assess the workplace to identify employees exposed to hazards from
flames or from electric arcs. This provision ensures that the
employer evaluates employee exposure to flames and electric arcs so
that employees who face such exposures receive the required
protection. The employer must conduct an assessment for each
employee who performs work on or near exposed, energized parts of
electric circuits.
A. Assessment Guidelines
Sources electric arcs. Consider possible sources of electric
arcs, including:
Energized circuit parts not guarded or insulated,
Switching devices that produce electric arcs in normal
operation,
Sliding parts that could fault during operation (for
example, rack-mounted circuit breakers), and
Energized electric equipment that could fail (for
example, electric equipment with damaged insulation or with evidence
of arcing or overheating).
Exposure to flames. Identify employees exposed to hazards from
flames. Factors to consider include:
The proximity of employees to open flames, and
For flammable material in the work area, whether there
is a reasonable likelihood that an electric arc or an open flame can
ignite the material.
Probability that an electric arc will occur. Identify employees
exposed to electric-arc hazards. The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration will consider an employee exposed to electric-arc
hazards if there is a reasonable likelihood that an electric arc
will occur in the employee's work area, in other words, if the
probability of such an event is higher than it is for the normal
operation of enclosed equipment. Factors to consider include:
For energized circuit parts not guarded or insulated,
whether conductive objects can
come too close to or fall onto the energized parts,
For exposed, energized circuit parts, whether the
employee is closer to the part than the minimum approach distance
established by the employer (as permitted by Sec.
1926.960(c)(1)(iii)).
Whether the operation of electric equipment with
sliding parts that could fault during operation is part of the
normal operation of the equipment or occurs during servicing or
maintenance, and
For energized electric equipment, whether there is
evidence of impending failure, such as evidence of arcing or
overheating.
B. Examples
Table 1 provides task-based examples of exposure assessments.
Table 1--Example Assessments for Various Tasks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Task Is employee exposed to flame or
electric-arc hazard?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Normal operation of enclosed equipment, The employer properly installs No.
such as closing or opening a switch. and maintains enclosed
equipment, and there is no
evidence of impending failure.
There is evidence of arcing or Yes.
overheating.
Parts of the equipment are Yes.
loose or sticking, or the
equipment otherwise exhibits
signs of lack of maintenance.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Servicing electric equipment, such as racking in a circuit breaker or Yes.
replacing a switch.
-----------------------------------------
Inspection of electric equipment with The employee is not holding No.
exposed energized parts. conductive objects and remains
outside the minimum approach
distance established by the
employer.
The employee is holding a Yes.
conductive object, such as a
flashlight, that could fall or
otherwise contact energized
parts (irrespective of whether
the employee maintains the
minimum approach distance).
The employee is closer than the Yes.
minimum approach distance
established by the employer
(for example, when wearing
rubber insulating gloves or
rubber insulating gloves and
sleeves).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using open flames, for example, in wiping cable splice sleeves........... Yes.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Protection Against Burn Injury
A. Estimating Available Heat Energy
Calculation methods. Paragraph (g)(2) of Sec. 1926.960 provides
that, for each employee exposed to an electric-arc hazard, the
employer must make a reasonable estimate of the heat energy to which
the employee would be exposed if an arc occurs. Table 2 lists
various methods of calculating values of available heat energy from
an electric circuit. The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration does not endorse any of these specific methods. Each
method requires the input of various parameters, such as fault
current, the expected length of the electric arc, the distance from
the arc to the employee, and the clearing time for the fault (that
is, the time the circuit protective devices take to open the circuit
and clear the fault). The employer can precisely determine some of
these parameters, such as the fault current and the clearing time,
for a given system. The employer will need to estimate other
parameters, such as the length of the arc and the distance between
the arc and the employee, because such parameters vary widely.
Table 2--Methods of Calculating Incident Heat Energy From an Electric
Arc
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Standard for Electrical Safety Requirements for Employee Workplaces,
NFPA 70E-2012, Annex D, "Sample Calculation of Flash Protection
Boundary."
2. Doughty, T.E., Neal, T.E., and Floyd II, H.L., "Predicting Incident
Energy to Better Manage the Electric Arc Hazard on 600 V Power
Distribution Systems," Record of Conference Papers IEEE IAS 45th
Annual Petroleum and Chemical Industry Conference, September 28--30,
1998.
3. Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations, IEEE Std 1584-
2002, 1584a--2004 (Amendment 1 to IEEE Std 1584-2002), and 1584b-2011
(Amendment 2: Changes to Clause 4 of IEEE Std 1584-2002).*
4. ARCPRO, a commercially available software program developed by
Kinectrics, Toronto, ON, CA.
*This appendix refers to IEEE Std 1584-2002 with both amendments as IEEE
Std 1584b-2011.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The amount of heat energy calculated by any of the methods is
approximatelyinversely proportional to the square of the distance
between the employee and the arc. In other words, if the employee is
very close to the arc, the heat energy is very high; but if the
employee is just a few more centimeters away, the heat energy drops
substantially. Thus, estimating the distance from the arc to the
employee is key to protecting employees.
The employer must select a method of estimating incident heat
energy that provides a reasonable estimate of incident heat energy
for the exposure involved. Table 3 shows which methods provide
reasonable estimates for various exposures.
Table 3--Selecting a Reasonable Incident-Energy Calculation Method \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
600 V and Less \2\ 601 V to 15 kV \2\ More than 15 kV
Incident-energy calculation method -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1[Phi] 3[Phi]a 3[Phi]b 1[Phi] 3[Phi]a 3[Phi]b 1[Phi] 3[Phi]a 3[Phi]b
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NFPA 70E-2012 Annex D (Lee equation).......................... Y-C Y N Y-C Y-C N N \3\ N \3\ N \3\
Doughty, Neal, and Floyd...................................... Y-C Y Y N N N N N N
IEEE Std 1584b-2011........................................... Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N
ARCPRO........................................................ Y N N Y N N Y Y \4\ Y \4\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key:
1[Phi]: Single-phase arc in open air
3[Phi]a: Three-phase arc in open air
3[Phi]b: Three-phase arc in an enclosure (box)
Y: Acceptable; produces a reasonable estimate of incident heat energy from this type of electric arc
N: Not acceptable; does not produce a reasonable estimate of incident heat energy from this type of electric arc
Y-C: Acceptable; produces a reasonable, but conservative, estimate of incident heat energy from this type of electric arc.
Notes:\1\ Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration will consider these methods reasonable for enforcement
purposes when employers use the methods in accordance with this table, employers should be aware that the listed methods
do not necessarily result in estimates that will provide full protection from internal faults in transformers and similar
equipment or from arcs in underground manholes or vaults.
\2\ At these voltages, the presumption is that the arc is three-phase unless the employer can demonstrate that only one
phase is present or that the spacing of the phases is sufficient to prevent a multiphase arc from occurring.
\3\ Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration will consider this method acceptable for purposes of
assessing whether incident energy exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\, the results at voltages of more than 15 kilovolts are
extremely conservative and unrealistic.
\4\The Occupational Safety and Health Administration will deem the results of this method reasonable when the employer
adjusts them using the conversion factors for three-phase arcs in open air or in an enclosure, as indicated in the
program's instructions.
Selecting a reasonable distance from the employee to the arc. In
estimating available heat energy, the employer must make some
reasonable assumptions about how far the employee will be from the
electric arc. Table 4 lists reasonable distances from the employee
to the electric arc. The distances in Table 4 are consistent with
national consensus standards, such as the Institute of Electrical
and Electronic Engineers' National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI/IEEE
C2-2012, and IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard
Calculations, IEEE Std 1584b-2011. The employer is free to use other
reasonable distances, but must consider equipment enclosure size and
the working distance to the employee in selecting a distance from
the employee to the arc. The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration will consider a distance reasonable when the employer
bases it on equipment size and working distance.
Table 4--Selecting a Reasonable Distance from the Employee to the
Electric Arc
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Single-phase arc Three-phase arc mm
Class of equipment mm (inches) (inches)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cable........................... NA*............... 455 (18)
Low voltage MCCs and panelboards NA................ 455 (18)
Low-voltage switchgear.......... NA................ 610 (24)
5-kV switchgear................. NA................ 910 (36)
15-kV switchgear................ NA................ 910 (36)
Single conductors in air (up to 380 (15).......... NA
46 kilovolts), work with rubber
insulating gloves.
Single conductors in air, work MAD-(2xkVx2.54)... NA
with live-line tools and live- (MAD-(2xkV/10))
line barehand work. [dagger].
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* NA = not applicable.
[dagger] The terms in this equation are:
MAD = The applicable minimum approach distance, and
kV = The system voltage in kilovolts.
Selecting a reasonable arc gap. For a single-phase arc in air,
the electric arc will almost always occur when an energized
conductor approaches too close to ground. Thus, an employer can
determine the arc gap, or arc length, for these exposures by the
dielectric strength of air and the voltage on the line. The
dielectric strength of air is approximately 10 kilovolts for every
25.4 millimeters (1 inch). For example, at 50 kilovolts, the arc gap
would be 50 / 10 x 25.4 (or 50 x 2.54), which equals 127 millimeters
(5 inches).
For three-phase arcs in open air and in enclosures, the arc gap
will generally be dependent on the spacing between parts energized
at different electrical potentials. Documents such as IEEE Std
1584b-2011 provide information on these distances. Employers may
select a reasonable arc gap from Table 5, or they may select any
other reasonable arc gap based on sparkover distance or on the
spacing between (1) live parts at different potentials or (2) live
parts and grounded parts (for example, bus or conductor spacings in
equipment). In any event, the employer must use an estimate that
reasonably resembles the actual exposures faced by the employee.
Table 5--Selecting a Reasonable Arc Gap
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Class of equipment Single-phase arc mm (inches) Three-phase arc mm \1\ (inches)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cable.............................. NA \2\............................. 13 (0.5)
Low voltage MCCs and panelboards... NA................................. 25 (1.0)
Low-voltage switchgear............. NA................................. 32 (1.25)
5-kV switchgear.................... NA................................. 104 (4.0)
15-kV switchgear................... NA................................. 152 (6.0)
Single conductors in air, 15 kV and 51 (2.0)........................... Phase conductor spacings.
less.
Single conductor in air, more than Voltage in kV x 2.54...............
15 kV.
(Voltage in kV x 0.1), but no less Phase conductor spacings.
than 51 mm (2 inches)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Source: IEEE Std 1584b-2011.
\2\ NA = not applicable.
Making estimates over multiple system areas. The employer need
not estimate the heat-energy exposure for every job task performed
by each employee. Paragraph (g)(2) of Sec. 1926.960 permits the
employer to make broad estimates that cover multiple system areas
provided that: (1) The employer uses reasonable assumptions about
the energy-exposure distribution throughout the system, and (2) the
estimates represent the maximum exposure for those areas. For
example, the employer can use the maximum fault current and clearing
time to cover several system areas at once.
Incident heat energy for single-phase-to-ground exposures. Table
6 and Table 7 provide incident heat energy levels for open-air,
phase-to-ground electric-arc exposures typical for overhead
systems.\2\ Table 6 presents estimates of available energy for
employees using rubber insulating gloves to perform work on overhead
systems operating at 4 to 46 kilovolts. The table assumes that the
employee will be 380 millimeters (15 inches) from the electric arc,
which is a reasonable estimate for rubber insulating glove work.
Table 6 also assumes that the arc length equals the sparkover
distance for the maximum transient overvoltage of each voltage
range.\3\ To use the table, an employer would use the voltage,
maximum fault current, and maximum clearing time for a system area
and, using the appropriate voltage range and fault-current and
clearing-time values corresponding to the next higher values listed
in the table, select the appropriate heat energy (4, 5, 8, or 12
cal/cm\2\) from the table. For example, an employer might have a
12,470-volt power line supplying a system area. The power line can
supply a maximum fault current of 8 kiloamperes with a maximum
clearing time of 10 cycles. For rubber glove work, this system falls
in the 4.0-to-15.0-kilovolt range; the next-higher fault current is
10 kA (the second row in that voltage range); and the clearing time
is under 18 cycles (the first column to the right of the fault
current column). Thus, the available heat energy for this part of
the system will be 4 cal/cm\2\ or less (from the column heading),
and the employer could select protection with a 5-cal/cm\2\ rating
to meet Sec. 1926.960(g)(5). Alternatively, an employer could
select a base incident-energy value and ensure that the clearing
times for each voltage range and fault current listed in the table
do not exceed the corresponding clearing time specified in the
table. For example, an employer that provides employees with arc-
flash protective equipment rated at 8 cal/cm\2\ can use the table to
determine if any system area exceeds 8 cal/cm\2\ by checking the
clearing time for the highest fault current for each voltage range
and ensuring that the clearing times do not exceed the values
specified in the 8-cal/cm\2\ column in the table.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The Occupational Safety and Health Administration used
metric values to calculate the clearing times in Table 6 and Table
7. An employer may use English units to calculate clearing times
instead even though the results will differ slightly.
\3\ The Occupational Safety and Health Administration based this
assumption, which is more conservative than the arc length specified
in Table 5, on Table 410-2 of the 2012 NESC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 7 presents similar estimates for employees using live-line
tools to perform work on overhead systems operating at voltages of 4
to 800 kilovolts. The table assumes that the arc length will be
equal to the sparkover distance \4\ and that the employee will be a
distance from the arc equal to the minimum approach distance minus
twice the sparkover distance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The dielectric strength of air is about 10 kilovolts for
every 25.4 millimeters (1 inch). Thus, the employer can estimate the
arc length in millimeters to be the phase-to-ground voltage in
kilovolts multiplied by 2.54 (or voltage (in kilovolts) x 2.54).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The employer will need to use other methods for estimating
available heat energy in situations not addressed by Table 6 or
Table 7. The calculation methods listed in Table 2 and the guidance
provided in Table 3 will help employers do this. For example,
employers can use IEEE Std 1584b-2011 to estimate the available heat
energy (and to select appropriate protective equipment) for many
specific conditions, including lower-voltage, phase-to-phase arc,
and enclosed arc exposures.
Table 6--Incident Heat Energy for Various Fault Currents, Clearing Times, and Voltages of 4.0 to 46.0 kV: Rubber
Insulating Glove Exposures Involving Phase-to-Ground Arcs in Open Air Only * [dagger] [Dagger]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum clearing time (cycles)
Voltage range (kV) ** Fault current ---------------------------------------------------------------
(kA) 4 cal/cm\2\ 5 cal/cm\2\ 8 cal/cm\2\ 12 cal/cm\2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.0 to 15.0..................... 5 46 58 92 138
10 18 22 36 54
15 10 12 20 30
20 6 8 13 19
15.1 to 25.0.................... 5 28 34 55 83
10 11 14 23 34
15 7 8 13 20
20 4 5 9 13
25.1 to 36.0.................... 5 21 26 42 62
10 9 11 18 26
15 5 6 10 16
20 4 4 7 11
36.1 to 46.0.................... 5 16 20 32 48
10 7 9 14 21
15 4 5 8 13
20 3 4 6 9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
* This table is for open-air, phase-to-ground electric-arc exposures. It is not for phase-to-phase arcs or
enclosed arcs (arc in a box).
[dagger] The table assumes that the employee will be 380 mm (15 in.) from the electric arc. The table also
assumes the arc length to be the sparkover distance for the maximum transient overvoltage of each voltage
range (see Appendix B to this subpart), as follows:
4.0 to 15.0 kV 51 mm (2 in.)
15.1 to 25.0 kV 102 mm (4 in.)
25.1 to 36.0 kV 152 mm (6 in.)
36.1 to 46.0 kV 229 mm (9 in.)
[Dagger] The Occupational Safety and Health Administration calculated the values in this table using the ARCPRO
method listed in Table 2.
** The voltage range is the phase-to-phase system voltage.
Table 7--Incident Heat Energy for Various Fault Currents, Clearing Times, and Voltages: Live-Line Tool Exposures
Involving Phase-to-Ground Arcs in Open Air Only * [dagger] [Dagger] #
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum clearing time (cycles)
Voltage range (kV) ** Fault current ---------------------------------------------------------------
(kA) 4 cal/cm\2\ 5 cal/cm\2\ 8 cal/cm\2\ 12 cal/cm\2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.0 to 15.0..................... 5 197 246 394 591
10 73 92 147 220
15 39 49 78 117
20 24 31 49 73
15.1 to 25.0.................... 5 197 246 394 591
10 75 94 150 225
15 41 51 82 122
20 26 33 52 78
25.1 to 36.0.................... 5 138 172 275 413
10 53 66 106 159
15 30 37 59 89
20 19 24 38 58
36.1 to 46.0.................... 5 129 161 257 386
10 51 64 102 154
15 29 36 58 87
20 19 24 38 57
46.1 to 72.5.................... 20 18 23 36 55
30 10 13 20 30
40 6 8 13 19
50 4 6 9 13
72.6 to 121.0................... 20 10 12 20 30
30 6 7 11 17
40 4 5 7 11
50 3 3 5 8
121.1 to 145.0.................. 20 12 15 24 35
30 7 9 15 22
40 5 6 10 15
50 4 5 8 11
145.1 to 169.0.................. 20 12 15 24 36
30 7 9 15 22
40 5 7 10 16
50 4 5 8 12
169.1 to 242.0.................. 20 13 17 27 40
30 8 10 17 25
40 6 7 12 17
50 4 5 9 13
242.1 to 362.0.................. 20 25 32 51 76
30 16 19 31 47
40 11 14 22 33
50 8 10 16 25
362.1 to 420.0.................. 20 12 15 25 37
30 8 10 15 23
40 5 7 11 16
50 4 5 8 12
420.1 to 550.0.................. 20 23 29 47 70
30 14 18 29 43
40 10 13 20 30
50 8 9 15 23
550.1 to 800.0.................. 20 25 31 50 75
30 15 19 31 46
40 11 13 21 32
50 8 10 16 24
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
* This table is for open-air, phase-to-ground electric-arc exposures. It is not for phase-to-phase arcs or
enclosed arcs (arc in a box).
[dagger] The table assumes the arc length to be the sparkover distance for the maximum phase-to-ground voltage
of each voltage range (see Appendix B to this subpart). The table also assumes that the employee will be the
minimum approach distance minus twice the arc length from the electric arc.
[Dagger] The Occupational Safety and Health Administration calculated the values in this table using the ARCPRO
method listed in Table 2.
# For voltages of more than 72.6 kV, employers may use this table only when the minimum approach distance
established under Sec. 1926.960(c)(1) is greater than or equal to the following values:
72.6 to 121.0 kV 1.02 m
121.1 to 145.0 kV 1.16 m
145.1 to 169.0 kV 1.30 m
169.1 to 242.0 kV 1.72 m
242.1 to 362.0 kV 2.76 m
362.1 to 420.0 kV 2.50 m
420.1 to 550.0 kV 3.62 m
550.1 to 800.0 kV 4.83 m
** The voltage range is the phase-to-phase system voltage.
B. Selecting Protective Clothing and Other Protective Equipment
Paragraph (g)(5) of Sec. 1926.960 requires employers, in
certain situations, to select protective clothing and other
protective equipment with an arc rating that is greater than or
equal to the incident heat energy estimated under Sec.
1926.960(g)(2). Based on laboratory testing required by ASTM F1506-
10a, the expectation is that protective clothing with an arc rating
equal to the estimated incident heat energy will be capable of
preventing second-degree burn injury to an employee exposed to that
incident heat energy from an electric arc. Note that actual
electric-arc exposures may be more or less severe than the estimated
value because of factors such as arc movement, arc length, arcing
from reclosing of the system, secondary fires or explosions, and
weather conditions. Additionally, for arc rating based on the
fabric's arc thermal performance value \5\ (ATPV), a worker exposed
to incident energy at the arc rating has a 50-percent chance of just
barely receiving a second-degree burn. Therefore, it is possible
(although not likely) that an employee will sustain a second-degree
(or worse) burn wearing clothing conforming to Sec. 1926.960(g)(5)
under certain circumstances. However, reasonable employer estimates
and maintaining appropriate minimum approach distances for employees
should limit burns to relatively small burns that just barely extend
beyond the epidermis (that is, just barely a second-degree burn).
Consequently, protective clothing and other protective equipment
meeting Sec. 1926.960(g)(5) will provide an appropriate degree of
protection for an employee exposed to electric-arc hazards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ASTM F1506-10a defines "arc thermal performance value" as
"the incident energy on a material or a multilayer system of
materials that results in a 50% probability that sufficient heat
transfer through the tested specimen is predicted to cause the onset
of a second-degree skin burn injury based on the Stoll [footnote]
curve, cal/cm\2\." The footnote to this definition reads: "Derived
from: Stoll, A.M., and Chianta, M.A., `Method and Rating System for
Evaluations of Thermal Protection,' Aerospace Medicine, Vol 40,
1969, pp. 1232-1238 and Stoll A.M., and Chianta, M.A., `Heat
Transfer through Fabrics as Related to Thermal Injury,'
Transactions--New York Academy of Sciences, Vol 33(7), Nov. 1971,
pp. 649-670."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph (g)(5) of Sec. 1926.960 does not require arc-rated
protection for exposures of 2 cal/cm\2\ or less. Untreated cotton
clothing will reduce a 2-cal/cm\2\ exposure below the 1.2- to 1.5-
cal/cm\2\ level necessary to cause burn injury, and this material
should not ignite at such low heat energy levels. Although Sec.
1926.960(g)(5) does not require clothing to have an arc rating when
exposures are 2 cal/cm\2\ or less, Sec. 1926.960(g)(4) requires the
outer layer of clothing to be flame resistant under certain
conditions, even when the estimated incident heat energy is less
than 2 cal/cm\2\, as discussed later in this appendix. Additionally,
it is especially important to ensure that employees do not wear
undergarments made from fabrics listed in the note to Sec.
1926.960(g)(3) even when the outer layer is flame resistant or arc
rated. These fabrics can melt or ignite easily when an electric arc
occurs. Logos and name tags made from non-flame-resistant material
can adversely affect the arc rating or the flame-resistant
characteristics of arc-rated or flame-resistant clothing. Such logos
and name tags may violate Sec. 1926.960(g)(3), (g)(4), or (g)(5).
Paragraph (g)(5) of Sec. 1926.960 requires that arc-rated
protection cover the employee's entire body, with limited exceptions
for the employee's hands, feet, face, and head. Paragraph (g)(5)(i)
of Sec. 1926.960 provides that arc-rated protection is not
necessary for the employee's hands under the following conditions:
For any estimated incident When the employee is wearing rubber
heat energy. insulating gloves with protectors
If the estimated incident heat When the employee is wearing heavy-duty
energy does not exceed 14 cal/ leather work gloves with a weight of at
cm\2\. least 407 gm/m\2\ (12 oz/yd\2\)
Paragraph (g)(5)(ii) of Sec. 1926.960 provides that arc-rated
protection is not necessary for the employee's feet when the
employee is wearing heavy-duty work shoes or boots. Finally, Sec.
1926.960(g)(5)(iii), (g)(5)(iv), and (g)(5)(v) require arc-rated
head and face protection as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minimum head and face protection
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arc-rated faceshield
Exposure with a minimum Arc-rated hood or faceshield with
None * rating of 8 cal/ balaclava
cm\2\ *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Single-phase, open air........... 2-8 cal/cm\2\....... 9-12 cal/cm\2\...... 13 cal/\2\ or higher.[dagger]
Three-phase...................... 2-4 cal/cm\2\....... 5-8 cal/cm\2\....... 9 cal/cm\2\ or higher.[Dagger]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* These ranges assume that employees are wearing hardhats meeting the specifications in Sec. 1910.135 or Sec.
1926.100(b)(2), as applicable.
[dagger] The arc rating must be a minimum of 4 cal/cm\2\ less than the estimated incident energy. Note that Sec.
1926.960(g)(5)(v) permits this type of head and face protection, with a minimum arc rating of 4 cal/cm\2\
less than the estimated incident energy, at any incident energy level.
[Dagger] Note that Sec. 1926.960(g)(5) permits this type of head and face protection at any incident energy
level.
IV. Protection Against Ignition
Paragraph (g)(3) of Sec. 1926.960 prohibits clothing that could
melt onto an employee's skin or that could ignite and continue to
burn when exposed to flames or to the available heat energy
estimated by the employer under Sec. 1926.960(g)(2). Meltable
fabrics, such as acetate, nylon, polyester, and polypropylene, even
in blends, must be avoided. When these fibers melt, they can adhere
to the skin, thereby transferring heat rapidly, exacerbating burns,
and complicating treatment. These outcomes can result even if the
meltable fabric is not directly next to the skin. The remainder of
this section focuses on the prevention of ignition.
Paragraph (g)(5) of Sec. 1926.960 generally requires protective
clothing and other protective equipment with an arc rating greater
than or equal to the employer's estimate of available heat energy.
As explained earlier in this appendix, untreated cotton is usually
acceptable for exposures of 2 cal/cm\2\ or less.\6\ If the exposure
is greater than that, the employee generally must wear
flame-resistant clothing with a suitable arc rating in accordance
with Sec. 1926.960(g)(4) and (g)(5). However, even if an employee
is wearing a layer of flame-resistant clothing, there are
circumstances under which flammable layers of clothing would be
uncovered, and an electric arc could ignite them. For example,
clothing ignition is possible if the employee is wearing flammable
clothing under the flame-resistant clothing and the underlayer is
uncovered because of an opening in the flame-resistant clothing.
Thus, for purposes of Sec. 1926.960(g)(3), it is important for the
employer to consider the possibility of clothing ignition even when
an employee is wearing flame-resistant clothing with a suitable arc
rating.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See Sec. 1926.960(g)(4)(i), (g)(4)(ii), and (g)(4)(iii) for
conditions under which employees must wear flame-resistant clothing
as the outer layer of clothing even when the incident heat energy
does not exceed 2 cal/cm\2\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under Sec. 1926.960(g)(3), employees may not wear flammable
clothing in conjunction with flame-resistant clothing if the
flammable clothing poses an ignition hazard.\7\ Although outer
flame-resistant layers may not have openings that expose flammable
inner layers, when an outer flame-resistant layer would be unable to
resist breakopen,\8\ the next (inner) layer must be flame-resistant
if it could ignite.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Paragraph (g)(3) of Sec. 1926.960 prohibits clothing that
could ignite and continue to burn when exposed to the heat energy
estimated under paragraph (g)(2) of that section.
\8\ Breakopen occurs when a hole, tear, or crack develops in the
exposed fabric such that the fabric no longer effectively blocks
incident heat energy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-flame-resistant clothing can ignite even when the heat
energy from an electric arc is insufficient to ignite the clothing.
For example, nearby flames can ignite an employee's clothing; and,
even in the absence of flames, electric arcs pose ignition hazards
beyond the hazard of ignition from incident energy under certain
conditions. In addition to requiring flame-resistant clothing when
the estimated incident energy exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\, Sec.
1926.960(g)(4) requires flame-resistant clothing when: The employee
is exposed to contact with energized circuit parts operating at more
than 600 volts (Sec. 1926.960(g)(4)(i)), an electric arc could
ignite flammable material in the work area that, in turn, could
ignite the employee's clothing (Sec. 1926.960(g)(4)(ii)), and
molten metal or electric arcs from faulted conductors in the work
area could ignite the employee's clothing (Sec.
1926.960(g)(4)(iii)). For example, grounding conductors can become a
source of heat energy if they cannot carry fault current without
failure. The employer must consider these possible sources of
electric arcs \9\ in determining whether the employee's clothing
could ignite under Sec. 1926.960(g)(4)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Static wires and pole grounds are examples of grounding
conductors that might not be capable of carrying fault current
without failure. Grounds that can carry the maximum available fault
current are not a concern, and employers need not consider such
grounds a possible electric arc source.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix F to Subpart V of Part 1926--Work-Positioning Equipment
Inspection Guidelines
I. Body Belts
Inspect body belts to ensure that:
A. The hardware has no cracks, nicks, distortion, or corrosion;
B. No loose or worn rivets are present;
C. The waist strap has no loose grommets;
D. The fastening straps are not 100-percent leather; and
E. No worn materials that could affect the safety of the user
are present.
II. Positioning Straps
Inspect positioning straps to ensure that:
A. The warning center of the strap material is not exposed;
B. No cuts, burns, extra holes, or fraying of strap material is
present;
C. Rivets are properly secured;
D. Straps are not 100-percent leather; and
E. Snaphooks do not have cracks, burns, or corrosion.
III. Climbers
Inspect pole and tree climbers to ensure that:
A. Gaffs are at least as long as the manufacturer's recommended
minimums (generally 32 and 51 millimeters (1.25 and 2.0 inches) for
pole and tree climbers, respectively, measured on the underside of
the gaff);
Note: Gauges are available to assist in determining whether
gaffs are long enough and shaped to easily penetrate poles or trees.
B. Gaffs and leg irons are not fractured or cracked;
C. Stirrups and leg irons are free of excessive wear;
D. Gaffs are not loose;
E. Gaffs are free of deformation that could adversely affect
use;
F. Gaffs are properly sharpened; and
G. There are no broken straps or buckles.
Appendix G to Subpart V of Part 1926--Reference Documents
The references contained in this appendix provide information
that can be helpful in understanding and complying with the
requirements contained in Subpart V of this part. The national
consensus standards referenced in this appendix contain detailed
specifications that employers may follow in complying with the more
performance-based requirements of Subpart V of this part. Except as
specifically noted in Subpart V of this part, however, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration will not necessarily
deem compliance with the national consensus standards to be
compliance with the provisions of Subpart V of this part.
ANSI/SIA A92.2-2009, American National Standard for Vehicle-Mounted
Elevating and Rotating Aerial Devices.
ANSI Z133-2012, American National Standard Safety Requirements for
Arboricultural Operations--Pruning, Trimming, Repairing,
Maintaining, and Removing Trees, and Cutting Brush.
ANSI/IEEE Std 935-1989, IEEE Guide on Terminology for Tools and
Equipment to Be Used in Live Line Working.
ASME B20.1-2012, Safety Standard for Conveyors and Related
Equipment.
ASTM D120-09, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves.
ASTM D149-09 (2013), Standard Test Method for Dielectric Breakdown
Voltage and Dielectric Strength of Solid Electrical Insulating
Materials at Commercial Power Frequencies.
ASTM D178-01 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Matting.
ASTM D1048-12, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Blankets.
ASTM D1049-98 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Covers.
ASTM D1050-05 (2011), Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating
Line Hose.
ASTM D1051-08, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Sleeves.
ASTM F478-09, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of
Insulating Line Hose and Covers.
ASTM F479-06 (2011), Standard Specification for In-Service Care of
Insulating Blankets.
ASTM F496-08, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of
Insulating Gloves and Sleeves.
ASTM F711-02 (2007), Standard Specification for Fiberglass-
Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod and Tube Used in Live Line Tools.
ASTM F712-06 (2011), Standard Test Methods and Specifications for
Electrically Insulating Plastic Guard Equipment for Protection of
Workers.
ASTM F819-10, Standard Terminology Relating to Electrical Protective
Equipment for Workers.
ASTM F855-09, Standard Specifications for Temporary Protective
Grounds to Be Used on De-energized Electric Power Lines and
Equipment.
ASTM F887-12\e1\, Standard Specifications for Personal Climbing
Equipment.
ASTM F914/F914M-10, Standard Test Method for Acoustic Emission for
Aerial Personnel Devices Without Supplemental Load Handling
Attachments.
ASTM F1116-03 (2008), Standard Test Method for Determining
Dielectric Strength of Dielectric Footwear.
ASTM F1117-03 (2008), Standard Specification for Dielectric
Footwear.
ASTM F1236-96 (2012), Standard Guide for Visual Inspection of
Electrical Protective Rubber Products.
ASTM F1430/F1430M-10, Standard Test Method for Acoustic Emission
Testing of Insulated and Non-Insulated Aerial Personnel Devices with
Supplemental Load Handling Attachments.
ASTM F1505-10, Standard Specification for Insulated and Insulating
Hand Tools.
ASTM F1506-10a, Standard Performance Specification for Flame
Resistant and Arc Rated Textile Materials for Wearing Apparel for
Use by Electrical Workers Exposed to Momentary Electric Arc and
Related Thermal Hazards.
ASTM F1564-13, Standard Specification for Structure-Mounted
Insulating Work Platforms for Electrical Workers.
ASTM F1701-12, Standard Specification for Unused Polypropylene Rope
with Special Electrical Properties.
ASTM F1742-03 (2011), Standard Specification for PVC Insulating
Sheeting.
ASTM F1796-09, Standard Specification for High Voltage Detectors--
Part 1 Capacitive Type to be Used for Voltages Exceeding 600 Volts
AC.
ASTM F1797-09 [egr] \1\, Standard Test Method for Acoustic Emission
Testing of Insulated and Non-Insulated Digger Derricks.
ASTM F1825-03 (2007), Standard Specification for Clampstick Type
Live Line Tools.
ASTM F1826-00 (2011), Standard Specification for Live Line and
Measuring Telescoping Tools.
ASTM F1891-12, Standard Specification for Arc and Flame Resistant
Rainwear.
ASTM F1958/F1958M-12, Standard Test Method for Determining the
Ignitability of Non-flame-Resistant Materials for Clothing by
Electric Arc Exposure Method Using Mannequins.
ASTM F1959/F1959M-12, Standard Test Method for Determining the Arc
Rating of Materials for Clothing.
IEEE Stds 4-1995, 4a-2001 (Amendment to IEEE Standard Techniques for
High-Voltage Testing), IEEE Standard Techniques for High-Voltage
Testing.
IEEE Std 62-1995, IEEE Guide for Diagnostic Field Testing of
Electric Power Apparatus--Part 1: Oil Filled Power Transformers,
Regulators, and Reactors.
IEEE Std 80-2000, Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding.
IEEE Std 100-2000, The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards
Terms Seventh Edition.
IEEE Std 516-2009, IEEE Guide for Maintenance Methods on Energized
Power Lines.
IEEE Std 524-2003, IEEE Guide to the Installation of Overhead
Transmission Line Conductors.
IEEE Std 957-2005, IEEE Guide for Cleaning Insulators.
IEEE Std 1048-2003, IEEE Guide for Protective Grounding of Power
Lines.
IEEE Std 1067-2005, IEEE Guide for In-Service Use, Care,
Maintenance, and Testing of Conductive Clothing for Use on Voltages
up to 765 kV AC and 750 kV DC.
IEEE Std 1307-2004, IEEE Standard for Fall Protection for Utility
Work.
IEEE Stds 1584-2002, 1584a-2004 (Amendment 1 to IEEE Std 1584-2002),
and 1584b-2011 (Amendment 2: Changes to Clause 4 of IEEE Std 1584-
2002), IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations.
IEEE C2-2012, National Electrical Safety Code.
NFPA 70E-2012, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace.
Subpart X--Stairways and Ladders
0
18. Revise the authority citation for Subpart X of part 1926 to read as
follows:
Authority: 40 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657;
Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-90 (55 FR 9033), 5-2007 (72 FR
31159), or 1-2012 (77 FR 3912), as applicable; and 29 CFR Part 1911.
0
19. Revise Sec. 1926.1053(b)(12) to read as follows:
Sec. 1926.1053 Ladders.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(12) Ladders shall have nonconductive siderails if they are used
where the employee or the ladder could contact exposed energized
electrical equipment, except as provided in Sec. 1926.955(b) and (c)
of this part.
Subpart CC--Cranes and Derricks in Construction
0
20. Revise the authority citation for Subpart CC of Part 1926 to read
as follows:
Authority: 40 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657;
Secretary of Labor's Order No. 5-2007 (72 FR 31159) or 1-2012 (77 FR
3912), as applicable; and 29 CFR Part 1911.
0
21. Revise paragraph (g) of Sec. 1926.1400 to read as follows:
Sec. 1926.1400 Scope.
* * * * *
(g) For work covered by Subpart V of this part, compliance with
Sec. 1926.959 is deemed compliance with Sec. Sec. 1926.1407 through
1926.1411.
* * * * *
0
22. In Sec. 1926.1410, remove and reserve paragraph (d)(4)(iii) and
revise paragraphs (c)(2) and (d)(4)(ii) to read as follows:
Sec. 1926.1410 Power line safety (all voltages)--equipment operations
closer than the Table A zone.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(2) Paragraph (c)(1) of this section does not apply to work covered
by Subpart V of this part; instead, for such work, the minimum approach
distances established by the employer under Sec. 1926.960(c)(1)(i)
apply.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(4) * * *
(ii) Paragraph (d)(4)(i) of this section does not apply to work
covered by Subpart V of this part.
(iii) [Removed and Reserved]
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 2013-29579 Filed 4-1-14; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P
