[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 68 (Friday, April 8, 2016)][Notices][Pages 20680-20688]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-08004]
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
[Docket No. OSHA-2014-0022]
Nucor Steel Connecticut Incorporated; Grant of a Permanent
Variance
AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: In this notice, OSHA grants a permanent variance to Nucor
Steel Connecticut Incorporated from the provisions of OSHA standards
that regulate the control of hazardous energy (lockout/tagout).
DATES: The permanent variance specified by this notice, becomes
effective on April 8, 2016 and shall remain in effect until it is
modified or revoked.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Information regarding this notice is
available from the following sources:
Press inquiries: Contact Mr. Frank Meilinger, Director, OSHA Office
of Communications, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue
NW., Room N-3647, Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-1999;
email: meilinger.francis2@dol.gov.
General and technical information: Contact Mr. Kevin Robinson,
Director, Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities,
Directorate of Technical Support and Emergency Management, Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, 200
Constitution Avenue NW., Room N-3655, Washington, DC 20210; phone:
(202) 693-2110 or email: robinson.kevin@dol.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Copies of this Federal Register notice.
Electronic copies of this Federal Register notice are available at
http://www.regulations.gov. This Federal Register notice, as well as
news releases and other relevant information, also are available at
OSHA's Web page at http://www.osha.gov.
I. Notice of Application
On September 22, 2014, Nucor Steel Connecticut Incorporated
(hereafter, "NSCI" or "the applicant") 35 Toelles Road,
Wallingford, CT 06492, submitted under Section 6(d) of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSH Act"; 29 U.S.C. 655) and 29 CFR
1905.11 ("Variances and other relief under section 6(d)") an
application for a permanent variance from several provisions of the
OSHA standard that regulates the control of hazardous energy
("lockout/tagout" or "LOTO"), as well as a request for an interim
order pending OSHA's decision on the application for variance (Ex.
OSHA-2014-0022-0003) at its Wallingford, CT facility. Specifically,
NSCI was seeking a variance from the provisions of the standard that
require: (1) Lockout or tagout devices be affixed to each energy
isolating device by authorized employees (29 CFR 1910.147(d)(4)(i));
and (2) lockout devices, where used, be affixed in a manner that holds
the energy isolating devices in a "safe" or "off" position (29 CFR
1910.147(d)(4)(ii)). Also, NSCI requested an interim order pending
OSHA's decision on the application for variance.
According to its application, NSCI manufactures steel wire rod and
coiled rebar from billets of steel by using rolling and forming
processes. Further, NSCI's description of its operation indicated that
the hot steel billets are shaped and formed into steel wire rod and
coiled rebar by running them through a series of rolls. The rolls shape
and form the steel as it moves from one stand to the next. Each roll
has several passes (or grooves), only one of which is used at a time.
The pass is designed to shape the bar to a certain size as it goes
through the mill by compressing, squeezing, and stretching the bar.
Rolls are designed with passes to bring a bar down through roughing,
intermediate and finish mills to a finished size.
As with any shaping tool, the passes wear during use and from time
to time need to be changed. As the pass wears, the shape of the bar and
the appearance of the bar are affected. When new rolls are brought into
production, every pass is prepared with a spray that provides friction
which allows the rolls to bite the bar between the rolls. Once rolls
are in operation, roll grinding is regularly required, because during
the operation of the mill stands water is used to cool the rolls to
prevent fracturing and damage to the rolls. The water protects the pass
while in use, but it also creates rust in the other passes. The rust
can affect the final quality of the bar being processed, so steps are
taken to remove the rust prior to restarting the operations. Rust is
removed from the passes using a common 4-inch hand grinder. Since
January 2012, the rolls have been ground with the rolls stopped and
locked out.
NSCI asserted that grinding the rolls requires access to the Motor
Control Room (MCR), in order to operate the energy isolation
disconnects for the roll mills. Employees who perform the particular
task of grinding the passes are exposed to potentially serious arc
flash hazards if they accessed the MCR in order to perform energy
isolation functions. To control exposure to the arc flash hazards, NSCI
instituted safe work rules that: (1) Designate the MCR as a restricted
entry work area; (2) restrict MCR access to qualified electricians
only; and (3) prohibit employees who perform pass grinding from
entering the MCR because they are not qualified electrical employees
trained in recognition and mitigation of electrical hazards. Further,
NSCI asserted that as a consequence of following these safe work rules
the employees performing pass grinding cannot lockout the energy
isolation disconnects located in the MCR or personally verify that a
lockout has been performed.
OSHA initiated a technical review of NSCI's variance application
and developed a set of follow-up questions regarding the assertions of
equivalent worker protection included in the application. On November
26, 2014, OSHA sent NSCI a letter containing a set of follow-up
questions (Ex. OSHA-2014-0022-0006). On December 19, 2014, NSCI
provided its responses to the follow-up questions (Ex. OSHA-2014-0022-
0007). Based on these responses to the follow-up questions and the
alternate safety measures proposed in NSCI's application, on May 22,
2015, the Agency sent NSCI a letter (Ex. OSHA-2014-0022-0009)
describing its findings on the technical merits of the application.
OSHA's letter also included a set of proposed conditions for the grant
of an interim order and permanent variance and a request for NSCI's
comments on these proposed conditions. On July 10, 2015, NSCI provided
its response (Ex. OSHA-2014-0022-0010) indicating acceptance of the
proposed conditions and including a few recommended changes. OSHA
carefully reviewed NSCI's recommended changes and incorporated the
majority of the changes into the conditions of the variance.
Following this review, OSHA determined that the applicant proposed
an alternative that provides a workplace as safe and healthful as that
provided by the standard. On December 2, 2015, OSHA published a
preliminary Federal Register announcing NSCI's application for a
permanent variance and interim order, grant of an interim order,
and request for comments (80 FR 75472).
The comment period closed on January 4, 2016, and OSHA received one
comment (Ex. OSHA-2014-0022-0012) from the Association for Packaging
and Processing Technologies in support of granting NSCI the variance.
II. The Variance Application
A. Background
NSCI's variance application and the responses to OSHA's follow-up
questions included the following: Detailed descriptions of the
manufacturing process; the equipment used; the proposed alternative to
lockout/tagout (LOTO) devices and procedures implemented during
servicing and maintenance of specific equipment (e.g., grinding of roll
mill passes located in the roll mill stands); and technical evidence
supporting NSCI's assertions of equivalency of worker protection.
According to the information included in its application,
performing lockout on the roll mill stands requires access to the MCR,
an area restricted to qualified electricians. Because NSCI employees
who perform the particular task of grinding the passes are not
qualified electrical employees trained in recognition and mitigation of
electrical hazards, they may not access the MCR. Therefore, they cannot
use the EID in that location to isolate the hazardous electrical energy
or personally verify that energy isolation has been achieved if the EID
is operated by a qualified employee.
To address these issues, NSCI developed an alternative method of
preventing the unexpected startup or energization of the roll mill
passes located in the roll mill stands. NSCI proposes to use a
comprehensive engineered system and appropriate administrative
procedures to meet the energy isolation requirements. The engineered
system uses a "trapped key" concept and monitored safety-rated power
relays in combination with administrative procedures. The trapped key
system is designed to: Replace a locked out energy isolating device;
and function similarly (to a lockout device), in that only the employee
in possession of the key can restart the machine undergoing
maintenance. The single key is controlled through administrative group
lockout procedures that NSCI believes match the requirements of 29 CFR
1910.147.
Further, NSCI asserted that its proposed trapped key energy control
system has been evaluated \1\ for three scenarios that could result in
unexpected energization of the rolls including: (1) Intentional de-
energization; (2) intentional re-energization; and (3) potential
faults. The system prevents unexpected startup or energization in all
three scenarios.
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\1\ NSCI provided documentation that TUV Rheinland, an
independent third-party testing laboratory reviewed and certified
that the trapped key interlock system is a suitable component for
use in safety category 2, 3, and 4 safety systems as specified in
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) machinery standards. Further,
NSCI asserted that several independent experts (including Dr. James
Barrett, Mr. Ed Grund, Mr. Bruce Main, and Mr. Alan Metelsky)
skilled in the evaluation of electrical circuitry, guarding, and the
control of hazardous energy evaluated the circuitry of the trapped
key system and found that it was appropriately designed and
installed for this application.
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The applicant contended that the alternative safety measures
included in its application provide its workers with a place of
employment that is at least as safe and healthful as they would obtain
under the existing provisions of OSHA's control of hazardous energy
(lockout/tagout) standard. The applicant certified that it provided
employee representatives with a copy of the variance application. The
applicant also certified that it notified its workers of the variance
application by posting, at prominent locations where it normally posts
workplace notices, a summary of the application and information
specifying where the workers can examine a copy of the application. In
addition, the applicant informed its workers of their rights to
petition the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and
Health for a hearing on the variance application.
B. Variance From Paragraph (d)(4)(i) and (d)(4)(ii) of 29 CFR 1910.147
As an alternative means of compliance to the requirements of
1910.147(d)(4(i) and (ii), NSCI proposed to use a comprehensive
engineered system and appropriate administrative procedures to meet
these requirements. The engineered system uses a "trapped key"
concept and monitored safety-rated power relays in combination with
administrative procedures. The trapped key system is designed to:
Replace a locked out energy isolating device; and function similarly
(to a lockout device), in that only the employee in possession of the
key can restart the machine undergoing maintenance. The single key is
controlled through administrative group lockout procedures identical to
those required by 29 CFR 1910.147. Although the trapped key prevents
normal intended startup of the equipment being serviced, it is not
being used on an EID, as required by OSHA's standards. To meet this
requirement, NSCI proposed to use a monitored safety-relay system that
uses approved components, redundant systems, and control-reliable
circuitry. Use of the trapped key system in combination with detailed
administrative energy control policies and procedures, as well as
providing effective training allows NSCI's authorized and affected
employees to complete the required grinding of its stationary rolls in
a manner that provides equivalency in energy isolation to compliance
with the applicable provisions of the LOTO standard. The trapped key
system is based on use of an Allen Bradley GuardMaster safety-rated
relay, which is specifically designed for safety applications. However,
the use of the Allen Bradley GuardMaster safety-rated relay does not
meet the LOTO standard's definition of EID because this relay is a form
of control circuitry.
The applicant maintains that use of the trapped key system provides
equivalent safety with what can be achieved by strict compliance with
the 1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (ii) requirements. According to NSCI's
variance application, equivalent safety is achieved by prohibiting roll
movement during de-energization while grinding is being performed, as
well as prohibiting mistaken intentional re-energization and re-
energization due to fault conditions, without exposing employees to
hazards within the MCR. To protect against system faults causing re-
energization, the trapped key system meets the requirements for control
reliability as stated in ANSI B11.19 (2010) Performance of
Safeguarding, in that no single fault results in the loss of the safety
function. In addition, the system includes system fault monitoring,
tamper resistance, and exclusive employee control over lockout devices.
Further, the applicant asserted that the trapped key system uses
well tried components, which is a key factor in the reliability of a
control system. The system is based on an Allen Bradley GuardMaster
safety-rated relay which is specifically designed for safety
applications. The trapped key is a specially manufactured unique key
that is only available from the manufacturer at a significant cost, and
cannot be otherwise duplicated.
C. Technical Review
OSHA conducted a review of NSCI's application and the supporting
technical documentation. After completing the review of the application
and supporting documentation, OSHA concluded that NSCI:
1. Modified the electrical controls at the pulpit (central control
station located on the roll mill floor for the 15 roll mill stands), to
prevent employee exposure to hazards associated with movement of the
roll mill while performing the task of grinding roll mill passes
located in the roll mill stands;
2. Installed a trapped key control system and implemented
administrative energy control procedures that prevent employee exposure
to hazards associated with energy while grinding on the roll mill
passes;
3. Utilizing qualified engineering safety experts, performed a job
hazard analysis for roll grinding associated tasks, conducted and
documented an electrical isolation analysis, system and functional
safety reviews, and control reliability analysis to verify that the use
of the trapped key system and administrative energy control procedures
prevent the movement of roll mill passes; prevent mistaken or
intentional re-energization; and maintain immobility in the event of
fault conditions;
4. Developed a two-tiered system of securing the trapped key as
follows:
a. Stopping the operation and energization of the roll mill passes
by removing the trapped key from the system, and securing the key
within a lock box inside the pulpit area (central control station
located on the roll mill floor for the 15 roll mill stands); and
b. Locking the key to the lock box in the pulpit area inside a
secondary group lock box installed on the roll mill floor, with each
employee performing roll mill grinding applying their personal lock to
the lock box;
5. Developed detailed administrative energy control procedures for
use of the trapped key system;
6. Implemented detailed administrative energy control procedures
designed to ensure that each authorized employee applies a personal
lock to the secondary group lock box;
7. Procured and provided appropriate equipment and supplies;
8. Made the administrative energy control policies and procedures
available in English and Spanish;
9. Trained authorized and affected employees on the application of
the trapped key system and associated administrative energy control
policies and procedures;
10. Ensured that grinding on the passes is conducted only while
using the administrative energy control procedures based on the trapped
key system;
11. Installed guarding on the entry/infeed and exit/outfeed sides
of each roll mill stand to prevent employees from standing between
turning mills and being exposed to the crushing hazards of in-running
nip points;
12. Developed additional administrative controls and procedures to
minimize the potential for authorized and affected employees to enter
between the mill stands when harm could occur; and
13. Designated and posted the areas as "No Entry" unless the
procedures (1-12 above) are followed.
III. Description of the Conditions Specified for the Permanent Variance
As previously indicated in this notice, OSHA conducted a review of
NSCI's application and the supporting technical documentation. After
completing the review of the application and supporting documentation,
OSHA determined that NSCI developed, and proposed to implement,
effective alternative means of protection that protect its employees as
effectively as paragraphs 1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (ii) of OSHA's LOTO
standard during the servicing and maintenance task of grinding roll
mill passes located in the roll mill stands. Therefore, on December 2,
2015, OSHA published a preliminary Federal Register announcing NSCI's
application for a permanent variance and interim order, grant of an
interim order, and request for comments (80 FR 75472). The comment
period closed on January 4, 2016, and OSHA received one comment (Ex.
OSHA-2014-0022-0012) from the Association for Packaging and Processing
Technologies in support of granting NSCI the variance.
During the period starting with the December 2, 2015, publication
of the preliminary Federal Register notice announcing grant of the
interim order (80 FR 75472), until the Agency modifies or revokes the
interim order or makes a decision on its application for a permanent
variance, the applicant was required to comply fully with the
conditions of the interim order as an alternative to complying with the
requirements of 29 CFR 1910.147(d)(4)(i) and 1910.147(d)(4)(ii). With
the publication of this notice, OSHA is revoking the interim order
granted to the employer on December 2, 2015 (80 FR 75472).
This section describes the conditions that comprise the alternative
means of compliance with 29 CFR 1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (d)(4)(ii). Also,
these conditions provide additional detail regarding the conditions
that form the basis of the permanent variance OSHA is granting to NSCI.
Condition A: Scope
The scope of the permanent variance limits coverage of the
conditions of the permanent variance to the work situations specified
under this condition. Clearly defining the scope of the permanent
variance provides NSCI, NSCI's employees, other stakeholders, the
public, and OSHA with necessary information regarding the work
situations in which the permanent variance applies and does not apply.
For example, condition A limits coverage of the permanent variance only
to the task of grinding roll mill passes located in the roll mill
stands. The condition clarifies that no other maintenance work,
including electrical maintenance, can be performed on the roll mill
passes, the roll mill motors, other residual or stored energy sources,
or electric circuits connected to the trapped key system or roll mill
stands using the trapped key system to control hazardous energy.
According to 29 CFR 1905.11, an employer or class or group of
employers \2\ may request a permanent variance for a specific workplace
or workplaces. If granted, the variance applies only to the specific
employer(s) that submitted the application. In this instance, the
permanent variance applies to NSCI at its Wallingford, CT plant only.
As a result, it is important to understand that permanent variance does
not apply to any other employers or NSCI plant locations.
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\2\ A class or group of employers (such as members of a trade
alliance or association) may apply jointly for a variance provided
an authorized representative for each employer signs the application
and the application identifies each employer's affected facilities.
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Condition B: Definitions
Condition B defines a series of terms, mostly technical terms, used
in the permanent variance to standardize and clarify their meaning.
Defining these terms serves to enhance the applicant's and its
employees' understanding of the conditions specified by the permanent
variance.
Condition C: Safety and Health Practices
Condition C requires the applicant to: (1) Modify certain controls
at the pulpit by installing and operating a trapped key system designed
to replace an energy isolating device; (2) develop and implement
certain trapped key system-related alternate energy control policies
and procedures; and (3) develop and implement a series of trapped key
system-related hazard prevention and control requirements and methods
designed to ensure the continued effective functioning of the alternate
energy control equipment, policies, and procedures. Examples of such
hazard control measures include, but are not limited to: (1) Conducting
grinding on the passes only after using the steps required to properly
de-energize the system; (2) under the direction of a qualified
person,\3\ ensuring that the trapped key system is installed,
inspected, serviced, maintained, used, and when appropriate modified in
accordance with good engineering practices, and/or in strict accordance
with the manufacturers' specifications and instructions, where
available; and (3) no other maintenance can be performed on the roll
mill stands while grinding is taking place.
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\3\ See footnote 9.
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Condition D: Steps Required To De-Energize the System
Condition D requires the applicant to develop and implement a
detailed procedure for de-energizing the roll mill passes located in
the roll mill stands in order to perform the grinding task. The
procedure for de-energizing the roll mill passes includes a series of
steps to ensure that all authorized and effected employees are notified
that: The roll mill passes are effectively de-energized; the task of
grinding the roll mill passes is ready to begin; and no other servicing
or maintenance is to be performed on the roll mill stands while
grinding is taking place.
Condition E: Steps Required To Start Motion Intentionally
Condition E requires the applicant to develop and implement a
detailed procedure for re-energizing and intentionally starting motion
in the roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands in order to
resume normal operations at the conclusion of the grinding task. The
procedure for re-energizing the roll mill passes includes a series of
steps to ensure that all authorized and effected employees are notified
that the task of grinding the roll mill passes is complete and that the
roll mill passes are ready for use.
Condition F: Training and Methods of Operation
Condition F requires the applicant to develop and implement an
effective hazardous energy control qualification and training program
for authorized employees involved in using the trapped key system while
grinding roll mill passes. The condition specifies the factors that an
employee must know following completion of the training program.
Elements to be included in the training program encompass, among
others: The program to be presented in language that the employees can
understand; the instruction be reviewed periodically to accommodate
changes in the energy control program; the contents and conditions
included in the variance; the preparation of a job hazard analysis
(JHA) describing the application of the trapped key system, the
identification of associated hazards and safe use of the associated
energy control procedures; and instruction regarding the safe use of
the associated energy control procedures. Additionally, condition F
also requires the applicant to train each affected employee in the
purpose and use of the alternative energy control procedures using the
trapped key system.
Condition G: Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention
Condition G requires the applicant to develop, implement and
operate an effective program for completing inspections, tests, program
evaluations, and accident prevention measures for the use of the
trapped key system and safe application of the hazardous energy control
procedures in the roll mill stands and associated work areas. This
condition serves to ensure the safe operation and physical integrity of
the equipment and work area. Use of the trapped key system while
conducting roll mill grinding operations enhances worker safety by
reducing the risk of unexpected energization of the equipment.
This condition also requires the applicant to document tests,
inspections, corrective actions and repairs involving the use of the
trapped key system, and maintain these documents. Further, this
requirement provides the applicant with information needed to schedule
tests and inspections to ensure the continued safe operation of the
equipment and systems, and to determine that the actions taken to
correct defects are appropriate.
Condition H: Recordkeeping
Condition H requires the applicant to maintain records of specific
factors associated with use of the trapped key system implemented to
prevent the unexpected energization of the equipment while grinding
roll mill passes. The information gathered and recorded under this
provision, in concert with the information provided under condition I
(Notifications, for using the OSHA 301 Incident Report form to
investigate and record energy isolation failure-related injuries as
defined by 29 CFR 1904.4, 1904.7, 1904.8 through 1904.12), enables the
applicant and OSHA to determine the effectiveness of the permanent
variance in preventing recordable injuries.\4\
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\4\ See 29 CFR 1904 Recording and Reporting Occupational
Injuries and Illnesses (http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9631); recordkeeping
forms and instructions (http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/RKform300pkg-fillable-enabled.pdf); and Updates to OSHA's
Recordkeeping Rule (http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping2014/index.html).
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Condition I: Notifications
Condition I requires the applicant, within specified periods to:
(1) Notify OSHA (i.e., Office of Technical Programs and Coordination
Activities (OTPCA), and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office) of any
recordable injuries, illnesses, fatalities, work-related in-patient
hospitalizations, amputations and all losses of an eye (as defined by
29 CFR 1904.4, and 1904.7 through 1904.12) that occur as a result of
complying with the alternative energy control conditions of the
variance (e.g., as a result of performing roll mill pass grinding
operations) within 8 hours of the incident (or becoming aware of the
incident); (2) provide OSHA (i.e., OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area
Office) with a copy of the preliminary incident investigation report
(using OSHA 301 form) within 24 hours of the incident (or becoming
aware of the incident); (3) provide OSHA (i.e., OTPCA and the
Bridgeport, CT, Area Office) with a copy of the full incident
investigation within 7 calendar days of the incident (or becoming aware
of the incident); (4) include on the 301 form information on the energy
isolation procedures and conditions associated with the recordable
injury or illness, the root-cause determination, and preventive and
corrective actions identified and implemented; (5) provide its
certification that it informed affected workers of the incident and the
results of the incident investigation; (6) notify OTPCA and the
Bridgeport, CT, Area Office within 15 working days should the applicant
need to revise its energy isolation procedures to accommodate changes
in the application of its trapped key system that affect its ability to
comply with the conditions of the permanent variance; and (7) provide
OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office, by January 31st at the
beginning of each calendar year, with a report covering the year just
ended, evaluating the effectiveness of the alternate energy isolation
program.
This condition for completing and submitting the variance
conditions-related (recordable) preliminary incident investigation
report (OSHA 301 form) is more restrictive than the current
recordkeeping requirement of completing the OSHA 301 form within 7
calendar days of the incident (1904.29(b)(3)). Submittal of the
preliminary incident investigation report is to be followed by
submittal of the full incident investigation report within 7 calendar
days. This modified and more stringent incident investigation and
reporting requirement is restricted to variance conditions-related
(recordable) incidents only. Providing this notification is essential
because time is a critical element in OSHA's ability to determine the
continued effectiveness of the variance conditions in preventing
recordable incidents as well as the employer's identification of
appropriate hazard control measures and implementation of corrective
and preventive actions. Further, these notification requirements enable
the applicant, its employees, and OSHA to determine the effectiveness
of the permanent variance in providing the requisite level of safety to
the employer's workers and, based on this determination, whether to
revise or revoke the conditions of the permanent variance. Timely
notification permits OSHA to take whatever action is necessary and
appropriate to prevent further variance conditions-related recordable
injuries and illnesses. Providing notification to employees informs
them of the precautions taken by the employer to prevent similar
incidents in the future. Additionally, these notification requirements
allow OSHA to: Communicate effectively, expedite administration, and
enforce the conditions of the permanent variance.
Additionally, this condition requires the applicant to notify OSHA
if it ceases to do business, has a new address or location for its main
office, or transfers the operations covered by the permanent variance
to a successor company. In addition, the condition specifies that OSHA
must approve the transfer of the permanent variance to a successor
company. These requirements allow OSHA to communicate effectively with
the applicant regarding the status of the permanent variance, and
expedite the Agency's administration and enforcement. Stipulating that
an applicant is required to have OSHA's approval to transfer a variance
to a successor company provides assurance that the successor company
has knowledge of, and will comply with, the conditions specified by the
permanent variance. Also, seeking OSHA's approval to transfer a
variance to a successor company serves to further ensure the safety of
workers involved in performing the operations covered by the variance.
IV. Decision
As described earlier in this notice, after reviewing the proposed
alternatives OSHA determined that NSCI developed, and proposed to
implement, effective alternative means of protection that protect its
employees as effectively as paragraphs 1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (ii) of
OSHA's LOTO standard during the servicing and maintenance task of
grinding roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands. Further,
under section 6(d) of the Occupational safety and Health Act of 1970
(29 U.S.C. 655(d)), and based on the record discussed above, the Agency
finds that when the employer complies with the conditions of the
variance, the working conditions of the employers' workers are at least
as safe and healthful as if the employers complied with the working
conditions specified by paragraph 1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (ii) of OSHA's
LOTO standard. Therefore, under the terms of this variance NSCI must:
(1) Comply with the conditions listed below under section V of this
notice ("Order") for the period between the date of this notice and
until the Agency modifies or revokes this final order in accordance
with 29 CFR 1905.13; (2) comply fully with all other applicable
provisions of 29 CFR part 1910; and (3) provide a copy of this Federal
Register notice to all employees affected by the conditions using the
same means it used to inform these employees of its application for a
permanent variance.
V. Order
As of the effective date of this final order, OSHA is revoking the
interim order granted to the employer on December 2, 2015 (80 FR
75472).
OSHA issues this final order authorizing Nucor Steel Connecticut
Incorporated ("NSCI" or "the applicant") to comply with the
following conditions instead of complying with the requirements of
paragraphs 29 CFR 1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (ii) of OSHA's LOTO standard
during the servicing and maintenance task of grinding roll mill passes
located in the roll mill stands. This final order applies to all NSCI
employees located at the 35 Toelles Road, Wallingford, CT 06492
establishment during the servicing and maintenance task of grinding
roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands. These conditions are:
\5\
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\5\ See footnote 2.
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A. Scope
1. This permanent variance applies only to the task of grinding
roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands of NSCI's Wallingford,
CT establishment. This work is to be performed by authorized employees
under alternative energy control procedures using a trapped key system
and lock boxes.
2. No other maintenance work, including electrical maintenance
(such as troubleshooting or maintenance covered under 29 CFR 1910.333),
may be performed on the roll mill passes, the roll mill motors, or
electric circuits connected to the trapped key system or roll mill
stands using the trapped key system to control hazardous energy.
3. If any other maintenance or servicing work is performed, even if
that work is performed at the same time as grinding roll mill passes,
all of the maintenance work at that time must be performed under full
lockout as required by 29 CFR 1910.147.
4. Except for the requirements specified by 29 CFR
1910.147(d)(4)(i) and (ii), NSCI must comply fully with all other
applicable provisions of 29 CFR 1910.147 during servicing and
maintenance of roll mills during the task of grinding roll mill passes.
5. The interim order granted to the employer on December 2, 2015
(80 FR 75472) is hereby revoked.
B. Definitions
The following definitions apply to this permanent variance:
1. Affected employee--an employee whose job requires him/her to
work in an area in which grinding of roll mill passes located in the
roll mill stands is being performed.
2. Authorized employee--an employee who uses the trapped key system
in order to perform grinding of roll mill passes located in the roll
mill stands. An affected employee becomes an authorized employee when
that employee's duties include performing grinding of roll mill passes
located in the roll mill stands covered under this section.
3. Competent person--an employee who is capable of identifying
existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings associated with
grinding of roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands or working
conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees,
and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to eliminate them.\6\
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\6\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(f).
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4. Equipment lock box--a part of the trapped key system consisting
of any group lock box designated for and mounted on or near equipment
used for securing the equipment lock box key by use of a personal
lockout device.
5. Equipment lock box lock and key--a part of the trapped key
system consisting of a uniquely identified equipment specific lock
(red) and key used to secure the pulpit designated lock box containing
and securing the trapped key.
6. Group lock box--a purchased lock box labeled as "TRAPPED KEY
SYSTEM" that is used to enable more than one lock to be applied to the
box. There are two types of lock boxes used in association with the
trapped key system (see definitions for pulpit designated lock box and
secondary group lock box).
7. Job Hazard Analysis/Job Safety Analysis--an evaluation of tasks
or operations to identify potential hazards and to determine the
necessary controls.
8. Personal lock and key--a durable, standardized substantial and
uniquely identified device (a lock) that is maintained and controlled
by a single authorized employee whose name is attached to the device.
The key is unique to this device and is equally maintained and
controlled by the authorized employee \7\ whose name is attached to the
device. The personal lock and key is used to secure the equipment lock
box key in the secondary group lock box.
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\7\ See 29 CFR part 1910 [Docket No. S-012A], RIN 1218-AA53.
Control of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout/Tagout), regarding
"one person, one lock, one key."
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9. Pulpit designated lock box--a group lock box mounted inside the
pulpit designated for use with the "TRAPPED KEY SYSTEM" and including
the: (a) Trapped key; (b) equipment lock box lock and key; and (c)
pulpit operator personal lock and key placed on the pulpit designated
lock box to secure the trapped key.
10. Pulpit operator--an authorized employee who: (a) Is designated
to work on a roll mill crew; (b) is authorized to use the trapped key
system during the grinding of roll mill passes; and (c) is trained to
operate the pulpit panel. The pulpit panel has the ability to control
the following equipment systems: Reheat furnace, discharge roll line,
turntable, roll mill stands A & B; roll mill stands 1-15; water system;
finishing mill; laying head; and stelmore conveyor.
11. Pulpit operator trapped key system personal lock and key--a
part of the trapped key system consisting of a uniquely identified lock
(green) and key used by the pulpit operator to secure the pulpit
designated lock box containing and securing the trapped key.
12. Qualified person--an employee who, by possession of a
recognized degree, certificate, or professional standing, or who, by
extensive knowledge, training, and experience, successfully
demonstrates an ability to solve or resolve problems relating to the
subject matter, the work, or the project.\8\
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\8\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(m).
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13. Roll mill operator and/or lead--an authorized employee who is
designated and trained to operate specific and multiple equipment
systems or perform a specific job task that is part of the rolling
process, including application of the trapped key system for the
grinding of roll mill passes.
14. Secondary group lock box--a group lock box located on the mill
floor just below the pulpit where authorized employees apply personal
locks and follow trapped key system alternative energy isolation
procedures to secure the equipment lock box key.
15. Safety-rated relay--a device specifically designed for safety
applications that meets the requirements for control reliability as
stated in ANSI B11.19 (2010) Performance of Safeguarding. The term
"control reliable" means that no single fault results in the loss of
the safety function. In addition, the relay must include monitoring and
tamper resistance.
16. Team member--an employee who is trained and authorized to use
the trapped key system in order to perform grinding of roll mill passes
located in the roll mill stands.
17. Trapped key--a specially manufactured unique key only available
from its manufacturer that is inserted into the trapped key system's
rotary switch. The rotary switch trapped key is mechanically attached
by a chain to the pulpit designated lock box.
18. Trapped key system--the alternative method of preventing the
unexpected startup or energization during grinding of roll mill passes
located in the roll mill stands. NSCI presented the trapped key system
to OSHA in its variance application of September 22, 2014, as
supplemented by its responses to OSHA's questions during the Agency's
application review. The system is based on an Allen Bradley GuardMaster
safety-rated relay which is specifically designed for safety
applications and use of a trapped key that is a specially manufactured
unique key only available from its manufacturer, and the administrative
controls described in this variance.
C. Safety and Health Practices
1. NSCI shall modify the electrical controls at the pulpit (central
control station located on the roll mill floor for the 15 roll mill
stands), to prevent employee exposure to hazards associated with
movement of the roll mill during the task of grinding roll mill passes;
2. NSCI shall install a trapped key system;
3. NSCI shall install a pulpit designated lock box for the trapped
key in the pulpit area;
4. NSCI shall install a secondary group lock box in the roll mills
floor area for securing the pulpit designated lock box key;
5. NSCI shall develop administrative energy control procedures for
use of the trapped key system as described below;
6. NSCI shall implement detailed energy control procedures designed
to ensure that each authorized employee applies a personal lock to the
secondary group lock box, and has the ability to personally verify de-
energization of the system, as described below;
7. NSCI shall make the energy control policies and procedures
available to authorized and affected employees in English and Spanish;
8. NSCI shall ensure that grinding on the passes is conducted only
while using the administrative energy control procedures based on the
trapped key system, or using full lockout procedures that comply with
29 CFR 1910.147 when the roll stands must be de-energized so that other
maintenance operations can be performed simultaneously with roll
grinding;
9. NSCI shall install guarding on the entry/infeed and exit/outfeed
sides of each roll mill stand to prevent employees from standing
between turning mills and being exposed to the crushing hazards of in-
running nip points;
10. NSCI shall develop additional administrative controls and
procedures to minimize the potential for authorized and affected
employees to enter between the mill stands when harm could occur; and
11. NSCI shall designate and post the areas as "No Entry" unless
the procedures (1-10) are followed.
12. NSCI shall ensure that the trapped key system and its
components are properly installed, inspected, maintained, and used so
that it works as designed. NSCI shall strictly follow, where
applicable, manufacturers' recommendations for the installation,
inspection, maintenance, and use of the system and its components.
13. NSCI shall ensure that the trapped key system is only altered
or modified for uses specified and approved by a qualified person by
following good engineering practices. Where available, such alterations
and modifications shall strictly follow the manufacturers'
specifications, instructions, and written authorization. No changes or
modifications may be made to the trapped key system or its components
that diminish the protection provided to affected employees.
14. NSCI shall ensure that alteration or modification of the
trapped key system is fully justified and documented when the
manufacturers' specifications, instructions, and written authorization
are lacking.
15. NCSI shall implement a procedure to ensure that no other
maintenance will be performed on the roll mill stands while grinding is
taking place, unless full lockout is used for all maintenance tasks
being performed at that time.
D. Steps Required To De-Energize the System
NSCI shall develop and implement a detailed procedure for de-
energizing the roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands in
order to perform the grinding task. The procedure for de-energizing the
roll mill passes shall include the following steps:
1. The authorized employee de-energizing the roll mill passes shall
notify all affected employees that the equipment will be shut down and
locked out to perform grinding of the passes;
2. The pulpit operator shall turn off the control leveler on the
control panel;
3. The pulpit operator shall activate the E-stop;
4. The pulpit operator verifies that the red "system functional"
indicator is illuminated, then turns the trapped lockout key 90[ordm]
to OFF position, and removes the trapped key from the panel. The
operator verifies that the green "safe to work indicator"
illuminates, and that the red "system functional" indicator goes out;
5. The pulpit operator:
a. Places the trapped key in the pulpit designated lock box and
applies his or her personal lock to the pulpit designated lock box; and
b. Applies the equipment lock box lock designated for this energy
control procedure;
6. The pulpit operator hands the equipment lock box lock key to the
roll mill operator and/or lead;
7. The roll mill operator and/or lead takes the equipment lock box
lock key to the secondary group lock box;
8. The roll mill operator and/or lead places the equipment lock box
lock key in the secondary group lock box and attaches his or her
personal lock;
9. Authorized employees (team members) place their personal locks
on the secondary group lock box;
10. The roll mill operator and/or lead verifies that the equipment
is de-energized and locked out by trying to operate the equipment
(using the start button);
11. The roll mill operator and/or lead ensures that there are no
additional sources of energy that could lead to the unexpected
energization of the roll mill passes;
12. Authorized employees who placed their personal trapped key
system locks on the secondary group lockout box shall also confirm that
the equipment is fully de-energized;
13. Authorized employees who placed their personal locks on the
secondary group lock box shall maintain their personal key in their
possession while performing grinding of the roll mill passes; and
14. Authorized employees shall perform the task of grinding the
passes only while these procedures are used.
E. Steps Required To Start Motion Intentionally
NSCI shall develop and implement a detailed procedure for re-
energizing and intentionally starting motion in the roll mill passes
located in the roll mill stands in order to resume normal operations at
the conclusion of the grinding task. The procedure for re-energizing
the roll mill passes shall include the following steps:
1. The roll mill operator and/or lead shall check the equipment and
the immediate area around the equipment to ensure that necessary items
have been removed and that the equipment components are operationally
intact;
2. The roll mill operator and/or lead shall check the work area to
ensure that all affected employees have been safely positioned or
removed from the area;
3. The roll mill operator and/or lead shall check that all controls
are in the neutral or off position;
4. Authorized employees shall remove their personal trapped key
system locks from the secondary group lock box;
5. The roll mill operator and/or lead shall remove the equipment
lock box lock key from the secondary group lock box and take it to the
pulpit;
6. The roll mill operator and/or lead shall hand the equipment lock
box lock key to the pulpit operator;
7. The pulpit operator shall verify that all personnel are clear of
the equipment before starting to re-energize the roll mill passes;
8. The pulpit operator shall remove his or her trapped key system
personal lock from the pulpit designated lock box;
9. Using the equipment lock box lock key, the pulpit operator shall
remove the equipment lock box lock;
10. The pulpit operator shall remove the trapped key from the
pulpit designated lock box and shall insert the key into the rotary
switch and turn it 90[deg] to the ON position;
11. The pulpit operator shall press the reset button to re-energize
the roll mill passes;
12. The pulpit operator shall confirm that the green light clears
and the red light activates indicating that the system is powered and
that the trapped key system no longer prevents roll mill motion; and
13. The pulpit operator shall notify affected employees that the
task of grinding the roll mill passes is complete and that the roll
mill passes are ready for use.
F. Training and Methods of Operation
NSCI shall develop and implement a detailed worker qualifications
and training program. NSCI must:
1. Develop an energy control training program and train each
authorized employee, pulpit operator, roll mill designated person, and
their supervisors on the trapped key system, and the procedures each
must perform under it. The training program shall be provided in a
language that the employees can understand;
2. Develop a training program and train each affected employee in
the purpose and use of the alternative energy control procedures using
the trapped key system before commencing operations under this
variance, and document this instruction. The training program shall be
provided in a language that the employees can understand;
3. Repeat the instruction specified in paragraph (1) of this
condition periodically and as necessary (e.g., after making changes, in
accordance with condition I-5, to the use of the trapped key system
that affect its component configuration or operation and associated
energy control procedures);
4. Ensure that each authorized and affected employee, designated
pulpit operator, roll mill designated person, and each of their
supervisors have effective and documented training in the contents and
conditions covered by this proposed variance;
5. Ensure that only trained and authorized employees, designated
pulpit operators, and roll mill designated persons, perform energy
control procedures for the task of grinding roll mill passes;
6. Prepare a JHA for the safe application of energy control
procedures; and
7. Review periodically and as necessary (e.g., after making
changes, in accordance with conditions C-13 and I-5, to the component
configuration or operation of the trapped key system and energy control
procedures that affect the grinding of roll mill passes located in the
roll mill stands), the contents of the JHA with affected personnel.
G. Inspections, Tests and Incident Prevention
NSCI shall develop and implement a detailed program for completing
inspections, tests, program evaluations and incident prevention. NSCI
must:
1. Initiate and maintain a program of frequent and regular
inspections of the trapped key system and associated work areas by:
a. Ensuring that a competent person (authorized employee) conducts
daily visual checks and quarterly inspections and functionality tests
of the trapped key system components and configuration or operation and
energy control procedures that affect the grinding of roll mill passes
located in the roll mill stands to ensure that the procedure and the
conditions of this variance are being followed;
b. Ensuring that a competent person conducts weekly inspections of
the work areas associated with the grinding of roll mill passes located
in the roll mill stands; and
c. Developing a set of checklists to be used by a competent person
in conducting the weekly inspections of the work areas associated with
the grinding of roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands and
the quarterly inspections and functionality tests of the trapped key
system components and configuration or operation and energy control
procedures that affect the grinding of roll mill passes.
2. Remove the equipment from service if the competent person
determines that the equipment constitutes a safety hazard. NSCI must
not return the equipment to service until the hazardous condition is
corrected and the correction has been approved by a qualified person.
3. All maintenance, servicing, and installation of replacement
parts must be performed in strict accordance with good engineering
practices. Where available, the maintenance, servicing and installation
of replacement parts must strictly follow the manufacturers'
specifications, instructions, and limitations.
H. Recordkeeping
1. NSCI must maintain a record of any recordable injury, illness,
in-patient hospitalizations, amputations, loss of an eye or fatality
(using the OSHA 301 Incident Report form to investigate and record
energy control-related recordable injuries as defined by 29 CFR 1904.4,
1904.7, 1904.8 through 1904.12 \9\), resulting from the task of
grinding roll mill passes located in the roll mill stands by completing
the OSHA 301 Incident Report form and OSHA 300 Log of Work-Related
Injuries and Illnesses.
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\9\ See footnote 5.
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2. NSCI must maintain records of all tests and inspections of the
component configuration or operation, and energy control procedures, as
well as associated hazardous condition corrective actions and repairs.
I. Notifications
To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified herein,
NSCI shall:
1. Notify the OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office of any
recordable injuries, illnesses, in-patient hospitalizations,
amputations, loss of an eye or fatality (by submitting the completed
OSHA 301 Incident Report form) resulting from implementing the
alternative energy control procedures of the proposed variance
conditions while completing the task of grinding roll mill passes
located in the roll mill stands. The notification must be made within 8
hours of the incident or 8 hours after becoming aware of a recordable
injury, illness, in-patient hospitalizations, amputations, loss of an
eye, or fatality.
2. Submit a copy of the preliminary incident investigation (OSHA
form 301) to the OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office within 24
hours of the incident or 24 hours after becoming aware of a recordable
case and submit a copy of the full incident investigation within 7
calendar days of the incident or 7 calendar days after becoming aware
of the case. In addition to the information required by the OSHA form
301, the incident-investigation report must include a root-cause
determination, and the preventive and corrective actions identified and
implemented.
3. Provide certification within 15 working days of the incident
that NSCI informed affected workers of the incident and the results of
the incident investigation (including the root-cause determination and
preventive and corrective actions identified and implemented).
4. Notify the OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office in writing
and 15 working days prior to any proposed change in the energy control
operations (including changes addressed by condition C-13) that affects
NSCI's ability to comply with the conditions specified herein.
5. Obtain OSHA's approval prior to implementing the proposed change
in the energy control operations that affects NSCI's ability to comply
with the conditions specified herein.
6. Provide a written evaluation report, by January 31st at the
beginning of each calendar year, with a report covering the year just
ended, to the OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office summarizing the
quarterly inspections and functionality tests of the trapped key system
components and configuration or operation and energy control procedures
that affect the grinding of roll mill passes located in the roll mill
stands, to ensure that the energy control procedure and the conditions
of this variance are being followed.
Note: The evaluation report is to contain summaries of: (1) The
number of variance-related incidents (as recorded on OSHA 301
forms); and (2) root causes of any incidents, and preventive and
corrective actions identified and implemented.
7. Inform the OTPCA and the Bridgeport, CT, Area Office as soon as
possible after it has knowledge that it will:
a. Cease to do business;
b. change the location and address of the main office for managing
the
alternative energy control procedures specified herein; or
c. transfer the operations specified herein to a successor company.
8. Notify all affected employees of this permanent variance by the
same means required to inform them of its application for a variance.
9. Request approval from OSHA for the transfer of the permanent
variance to a successor company.
Authority and Signature
David Michaels, Ph.D., MPH, Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, 200 Constitution Avenue NW.,
Washington, DC 20210, authorized the preparation of this notice.
Accordingly, the Agency is issuing this notice pursuant to Section 29
U.S.C. 655(6)(d), Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-2012 (77 FR 3912,
Jan. 25, 2012), and 29 CFR 1905.11.
Signed at Washington, DC, on March 4, 2016.
David Michaels,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 2016-08004 Filed 4-7-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P
