[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 170 (Tuesday, September 1, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 54424-54432]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-19268]
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
[Docket No. OSHA-2020-0001]
STP Nuclear Operating Company; Application for Permanent Variance
and Interim Order; Grant of Interim Order; Request for Comments
AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: In this notice, OSHA announces the application of STP Nuclear
Operating Company (STP Nuclear) for a permanent variance and interim
order from the provision of OSHA standards that regulate the ensuring
of isolation of permit-required confined spaces and presents the
agency's preliminary finding to grant the permanent variance. OSHA also
announces the grant of an interim order in this notice. OSHA invites
the public to submit comments on the variance application to assist the
agency in determining whether to grant the applicant a permanent
variance based on the conditions specified in this notice of the
application.
DATES: Submit comments, information, documents in response to this
notice, and requests for a hearing on or before October 1, 2020. The
interim order described in this notice became effective on September 1,
2020, and shall remain in effect until it is modified or revoked,
whichever occurs first.
ADDRESSES: Submit comments by any of the following methods:
Electronically: You may submit comments and attachments
electronically at: http://www.regulations.gov, which is the Federal
eRulemaking Portal. Follow the instructions online for submitting
comments.
Facsimile: If your comments, including attachments, are not longer
than 10 pages, you may fax them to the OSHA Docket Office at (202) 693-
1648.
Mail, hand delivery, express mail, messenger, or courier service:
When using this method, you must submit a copy of your comments and
attachments to the OSHA Docket Office, Docket No. OSHA-2020-0001,
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of
Labor, Room N-3653, 200 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20210.
Please note: While OSHA's Docket Office is continuing to accept and
process submissions by regular mail, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the
Docket Office
is closed to the public and not able to receive submissions to the
docket by hand, express mail, messenger and courier service.
Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and OSHA
docket number (OSHA-2020-0001). All comments, including any personal
information you provide, are placed in the public docket without
change, and may be made available online at http://www.regulations.gov. Therefore, the agency cautions commenters about
submitting statements they do not want made available to the public, or
submitting comments that contain personal information (either about
themselves or others) such as Social Security numbers, birth dates, and
medical data.
Docket: To read or download comments or other material in the
docket, go to http://www.regulations.gov or the OSHA Docket Office at
the above address. All documents in the docket (including this Federal
Register notice) are listed in the http://www.regulations.gov index;
however, some information (e.g., copyrighted material) is not publicly
available to read or download through the website. All submissions,
including copyrighted material, are available for inspection at the
OSHA Docket Office. Contact the OSHA Docket Office for assistance in
locating docket submissions.
Extension of comment period: Submit requests for an extension of
the comment period on or before September 16, 2020 to the Office of
Technical Programs and Coordination Activities, Directorate of
Technical Support and Emergency Management, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution
Avenue NW, Room N-3653, Washington, DC 20210, or by fax to (202) 693-
1644.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Information regarding this notice is
available from the following sources:
Press inquiries: Contact Mr. Frank Meilinger, Director, OSHA Office
of Communications, U.S. Department of Labor, telephone: (202) 693-1999;
email: meilinger.francis2@dol.gov.
General and technical information: Contact Mr. Kevin Robinson,
Director, Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities,
Directorate of Technical Support and Emergency Management, Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, phone:
(202) 693-2110 or email: robinson.kevin@dol.gov.
I. Notice of Application
On February 18, 2019, STP Nuclear Operating Company (``STP
Nuclear'' or ``the applicant'') 12090 FM 521, Wadsworth, Texas 77483,
submitted under Section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 (``OSH Act''; 29 U.S.C. 655) and 29 CFR 1905.11 (``Variances
and other relief under section 6(d)'') an application for a permanent
variance from the provision of the OSHA standard that regulates
ensuring isolation of permit-required confined spaces, as well as a
request for an interim order pending OSHA's decision on the application
for variance (OSHA-2020-0001-0001) at its Wadsworth, Texas facility.
Specifically, STP Nuclear seeks a variance from the provision of the
standard that requires ``isolation of permit space,'' meaning the
process by which a permit-required space is removed from service and
completely protected against the release of energy and material into
the space (29 CFR 1910.146(b)) and (29 CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii)). STP
Nuclear also requests an interim order pending OSHA's decision on the
application for a variance.
According to the application, STP Nuclear operates two Pressurized
Water Reactor nuclear power plants at its Wadsworth, Texas location.
STP Nuclear's description of its operation indicates that these nuclear
power plants use steam to drive turbine generators, which is cooled by
circulating water through a condenser to convert the steam back into
water. STP Nuclear uses a Circulating Water System (CWS) that cools the
steam by pumping water from the Main Cooling Reservoir (MCR), through
the condenser and back to the reservoir. The MCR is 7,000 acres and
includes an intake structure where pumps that provide cooling to the
units are located. These pumps include the circulating water (CW)
pumps, of which there are a total of eight (four per unit). The flow
from each CW pump discharges through a motor operated valve into a 96
foot diameter pipe which passes over the reservoir embankment at 59
feet elevation. The four pump discharge pipes combine into two 138 inch
underground pipes that feed a manifold in the Turbine Generator
Building (TGB). The circulating water flows through condenser tubes
inside what STP Nuclear refers to as the ``water box.'' The manifold
supplies water to each of the six main condenser water boxes with an 84
inch motor-operated valve at the inlet and outlet of each water box.
The water exiting the water boxes enters a discharge manifold which
then splits into two underground 138 inch pipes returning the water to
the MCR passing over the reservoir embankment at 58 feet elevation. The
applicant asserts that the design of the CWS is such that it cannot be
completely removed from service for water box cleaning or tube repair,
and that maintenance activities occur when one of the two Power Plants
are removed from service for refueling, which happens once every
eighteen months.
The condenser water box is a permit-required confined space that
under STP Nuclear's procedures requires a confined-space permit and
security alerts prior to entry. Employees can enter the water boxes to
clean condenser tubes and to repair or plug leaking tubes only after
being cleared by the STP Nuclear Entry Supervisor in accordance with
STP Nuclear's confined space procedure. STP Nuclear performs
maintenance on condenser water boxes prior to the summer months to
ensure maximum efficiency, and therefore, maximum generation during the
peak electric generating period in Texas. This maintenance activity
(tube cleaning) minimizes fouling and blocking of the condenser tubes.
Employees entering the water box to perform maintenance and repair
activities could be exposed to the hazard of engulfment by water that
could flow into the water box if condenser isolation valves were to
rotate or otherwise fail during the maintenance or repair activity.
STP Nuclear asserts that without frequent maintenance, the
condenser tubes could leak and introduce contaminants, such as sodium,
into plant systems that can erode barriers that prevent release of
radioactive materials. Further, STP Nuclear asserts that if the water
box cannot be timely isolated to repair tubes, it may have to shut down
the nuclear power plant, which will cause interruption to the power
supply. STP Nuclear previously believed that procedures already in
place--lockout/tagout of the isolation valve, continuous monitoring for
leakage past the valve and standby attendant--were adequate to protect
employees.
On March 22, 2018, OSHA received a complaint alleging that STP
Nuclear failed to ensure isolation of the condenser water box as
required by OSHA's permit-required confined space standard. In response
to this complaint, STP Nuclear submitted a letter, dated March 28,
2018, to OSHA's Corpus Christi, Texas Area Office (OSHA-2020-0001-
0002), asserting its belief that they are in full compliance with 29
CFR 1910.146 and describing their current practices to comply with the
standard. On April 20, 2018, the Corpus Christi, Texas OSHA Area Office
provided a response to STP Nuclear's explanation stating that it was
feasible to install two 5,000 pound blank flanges to isolate the system
and directed STP Nuclear to take corrective action (OSHA-2020-0001-
0003).
In STP Nuclear's February 18, 2019, variance application, the
applicant asserts that isolating the water box using blank flanges
creates a greater hazard and significant risk for injury. Further, the
applicant believes that installing blank flanges has the potential to
compromise the structural integrity of the system. To ensure isolation
of the condenser water box prior to maintenance activities, STP Nuclear
proposes in its variance application an alternative safety measure--
drilling four holes into the 99.75 inch diameter upper valve flange,
and fabrication of 20 three-fourth inch diameter mechanical stops (stop
pins), which will be installed to block movement of the butterfly valve
disc to ensure isolation of the water boxes during maintenance work.
OSHA initiated a preliminary technical review of STP Nuclear's
variance application and developed a set of follow-up questions on June
9, 2019 (OSHA-2020-0001-0003), regarding the assertions of equivalent
worker protection included in the application. On June 27, 2019, STP
Nuclear provided written answers to the follow-up questions, (OSHA-
2020-0001-0004) as well as supplemental materials to support the
variance application including: A Hazard and Operability Study report
and recommendations (hazard analysis using a ``HAZOP'' methodology); a
copy of all detailed procedures used when employees are entering or
inside the water box; and a copy of emergency procedures and equipment
used while employees are working inside the water box.
In reviewing the application, OSHA evaluated the use of two blank
flanges, a 99.5 inch diameter, 2.5 inch thick steel blank weighing
5,563 pounds each to isolate the condenser water boxes during
maintenance activities. The applicant asserted in the variance
application that installing a blank flange to isolate a condenser water
box creates a greater hazard and significant risk for injury to both
personnel and the physical building. STP Nuclear asserts that
installing a blank flange requires removal of the water box inlet and
outlet expansion joints and installation of two steel blanks.
Installing the blank flanges as described above entails a high degree
of risk, as it would require moving these heavy objects from the
building entrance to the water box, using rigged chain falls to trapeze
the blanks to the water box, as well as construction of a support
structure for the water box, in order to support the additional weight
of the 5,563 pound blanks and ensure the water box and/or inlet pipe
does not misalign from removal of the expansion joint. Further, OSHA
carefully reviewed the administrative and engineering controls outlined
in the variance application and supplemental materials as part of its
proposed alternative work practices identified in the variance
application.
Following this review and discussions with STP Nuclear, OSHA
determined that STP Nuclear proposed an alternative that will provide a
workplace as safe and healthful as that required by the permit-required
confined space standard. OSHA is granting STP Nuclear an interim order
that permits it to continue operations while OSHA continues to consider
the application for a permanent variance.
II. The Variance Application
Pursuant to the requirements of OSHA's variance regulations, the
applicant certifies that it provided employee representatives of
affected workers with a copy of the variance application. The applicant
also certifies that it notified the workers of the variance application
by posting, at prominent locations where it normally posts workplace
notices, a summary of the application and information specifying where
the workers can examine a copy of the application. In addition, the
applicant informed the workers and their representatives of their
rights to petition the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational
Safety and Health for a hearing on the variance application.
A. Background
STP Nuclear's variance application and the responses to OSHA's
follow-up questions provided the following: Detailed descriptions of
the condenser water box maintenance process; the proposed work
alternative to isolate the condenser water box using stop pins while
performing maintenance activities; and procedures developed to manage
the permit-required confined space. Additionally, STP Nuclear provided
a HAZOP'' study as technical evidence supporting STP Nuclear's
assertion of equivalency of worker protection.
As an alternative to installation of blank flanges, STP Nuclear
proposes a comprehensive engineered system and appropriate
administrative controls to satisfy the isolation requirement. The
engineered system uses mechanical stops (stop pins) to block the
movement of the butterfly valve disk in combination with administrative
procedures to isolate the condenser water box in order to perform
maintenance activities. The stop pins function as the isolation device,
in that utilizing the stop pins prevents the engagement of the
condenser water box, thus interrupting the flow of water to the
condenser water boxes to allow maintenance activities. STP Nuclear
asserts that using stop pins to isolate butterfly valve disks in
condenser water boxes match the requirements of 29 CFR
1910.146(d)(3)(iii).
Further, STP Nuclear asserts that its mechanical stop system has
been evaluated via a HAZOP study, which is a process that seeks to
identify potential operating hazards and risks in systems/processes.
The HAZOP study included a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
that was developed and documented. The FMEA is an assessment of the 84
inch butterfly valves in the closed position, with stop pins installed,
to physically isolate the condenser water box while the remainder of
the CWS remains in operation. The HAZOP study seeks to identify the
potential hazardous scenarios, as they relate to personnel entry into
the isolated water box, to determine potential areas of concern,
especially regarding a possible engulfment hazard. Issued June 20, 2019
(OSHA-2020-0001-0004), the HAZOP study included eight recommendations
for additional engineering and administrative controls, all of which
have been adopted by STP Nuclear. These recommendations are described
in Proposed Condition D of this notice.
STP Nuclear contends that the administrative and engineering
controls comprising the alternative safety measures included in the
variance application provide the workers with a place of employment
that is at least as safe and healthful as they would obtain under the
provisions of OSHA's permit-required confined space standard.
B. Variance From 29 CFR 1910.146(b) and 29 CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii)
As an alternative means of compliance with the isolation
requirements of 1910.146(b) and 1910.146(d)(3)(iii), STP Nuclear is
proposing to use a comprehensive system of engineering and
administrative control procedures. The engineering controls include (1)
a modification of the condenser isolation valves to drill four holes
into the 99.75 inch diameter upper valve flange, to
allow the installation of mechanical stops (``stop pins'') which block
rotation of the isolation valve disks, (2) utilizing a physical lock on
the 6 inch cross-tie valves, and (3) utilization of automated drains
that provide a secondary means of evacuating water leakage from the
isolated water box connected piping. STP Nuclear has also established
administrative controls to support the use of the stop pin system,
including: (1) Continuous monitoring for leakage past the isolation
valve, (2) utilizing a dedicated water box drain pump operator while
personnel are inside the isolated water box, (3) utilizing a standby
attendant to aid in the evacuation of an employee working in the
condenser water box in the event of an emergency, and (4) a dedicated
emergency evacuation procedure.
Further, the applicant asserts that: (1) Full isolation of the
water boxes would create a greater hazard to its employees, and (2) the
continuous water system makes shutdown of the water supply impossible.
Shutting down the circulating water system could potentially cause the
nuclear power plant to leak radiation, which is a significant public
health hazard.
C. Technical Review
OSHA conducted a review of STP Nuclear's application and the
supporting technical documentation. After completing the review of the
application and supporting documentation, OSHA concludes that STP
Nuclear:
1. Has a permit-required confined space entry program;
2. Performed a hazard analysis using the Hazard and Operability
Study (``HAZOP'') methodology to assess the risks of entering condenser
water boxes to perform maintenance on condenser tubes;
3. Implemented controls recommended in HAZOP study (outlined in
Proposed Condition D of this notice);
4. Established procedures for condenser water box online isolation
and restoration;
5. Has developed the Condenser Water Box Online Isolation and
Restoration procedure to remove condenser water boxes from service for
maintenance;
6. Has modified or will modify the isolation valve seats in
condenser water boxes by installing specified mechanical stops (``stop
pins''). These stop pins are inserted downstream of the inlet disc and
upstream of the outlet disc following condenser water box isolation and
drain down;
7. Implemented detailed administrative procedures designed to
ensure that all employees working on or near condenser water boxes,
which include having a watch stander present at all times, as well as
emergency evacuation procedures in the event that water begins flowing
into isolated condenser water boxes;
8. Procured and provided appropriate equipment and supplies;
9. Made the alternative isolation control policies and procedures
available to employees;
10. Trained authorized and affected employees on the application of
the proposed alternative work practice and associated isolation control
policies and procedures;
11. Developed additional administrative controls and procedures to
minimize the potential for authorized and affected employees to work
around isolated condenser water boxes;
12. Conducted a comparison of the blank flange versus use of stop
pins, which mechanically limits disc travel providing additional
personnel safety against engulfment.
13. Has effective emergency rescue procedures to quickly and
effectively evacuate workers within the condenser water box, including
a rescue team present on site during maintenance activities; and
14. Conducted a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, which was an
assessment of the 84 inch butterfly valves in the closed position.
III. Description of the Conditions Specified by the Interim Order and
the Application for a Permanent Variance
This section describes the alternative means of compliance with 29
CFR 1910.146(b) and 29 CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii). These conditions form
the basis of the interim order and STP Nuclear's application for a
permanent variance.
Proposed Condition A: Scope
The scope of the interim order/proposed permanent variance would
limit coverage to the work conditions specified under this proposed
condition. Defining the scope of the proposed permanent variance
provides STP Nuclear, STP Nuclear's employees, potential future
applicants, other stakeholders, the public, and OSHA with necessary
information regarding the work situations in which the proposed
permanent variance would cover. To the extent that STP Nuclear does not
comply with the conditions in this variance, it would, alternatively,
be required to comply with OSHA standards.
Pursuant to 29 CFR 1905.11, an employer (or class or group of
employers) may request a permanent variance for a specific workplace or
workplaces. If OSHA approves a permanent variance, it would apply only
to the specific employer(s) that submitted the application and only to
the specific workplace or workplaces designated as part of the project.
In this instance, if OSHA were to grant a permanent variance, it only
would apply to the applicant, STP Nuclear at the Wadsworth, Texas
nuclear plant. The Interim Order and Proposed Variance would not apply
to any other employers or STP Nuclear locations outside of its
Wadsworth, Texas facility.
Proposed Condition B: List of Abbreviations
This proposed condition defines the terms used in the interim order
and proposed variance to clarify and standardize their meaning.
Abbreviations used throughout this proposed permanent variance include
the following:
1. CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
2. CWS--Circulating Water System
3. ECO--Equipment Clearance Order
4. FMEA--Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
5. HAZOP--Hazard and Operability Study
6. MCR--Main Cooling Reservoir
7. OSHA--Occupational Safety and Health Administration
8. OTPCA--Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities
9. RRP--Rope Rescue Program
10. TGB--Turbine Generator Building
Proposed Condition C: List of Definitions
The proposed condition defines a series of terms, mostly technical
terms, used in the proposed permanent variance to standardize and
clarify their meaning. Defining these terms serves to enhance the
applicant's and the employees' understanding of the conditions
specified by the proposed permanent variance.\1\
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\1\ In these conditions, the present tense form of the verb
(e.g., ``must'') pertains to the interim order, while the future
conditional form of the verb (e.g., ``would'') pertains to the
application for a permanent variance (designated as ``permanent
variance'').
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Proposed Condition D: Safety Practices and Procedures
This proposed condition requires that STP Nuclear (1) adhere to the
Condenser Water Box Online Isolation and Restoration Procedure provided
to OSHA with the Variance application and (2) implement the hazard
prevention and control requirements provided with the Variance
application
to ensure the continued effective functioning of the alternate work
practice (use of stop pins) to isolate condenser water boxes before
performing maintenance activities. Further, STP Nuclear must implement
the following additional administrative controls identified in the
HAZOP study:
1. Close the cycle inlet and butterfly valves with a local
handswitch.
2. Remove power from the inlet and isolation valve and hang Danger
Tags on the local handswitch and the breaker.
3. Drain the condenser water box to another condenser water box
using the permanent installed condenser drain down pumps.
4. Check for leakages past the isolation valve seat. In the event
that a leak is found, STP Nuclear will use a handwheel to manually
achieve proper disk seating and ensure that a Danger Tag is hung on the
handwheel.
5. Establish and implement a procedure to ensure that no other
maintenance will be performed on the condenser water box, unless
permit-required confined space measures are used.
6. Modify each of the 12 condenser water box isolation valves to
drill four holes into the 99.75 inch diameter upper valve range, which
will be plugged when the condenser water box is in service and
fabricate 20 three-fourth inch diameter stop pins, which will be
installed to block movement of the butterfly valve disk and hang Danger
Tags on the pins.
7. Confirm that lineup changes (i.e. pump switching, valve position
changes) within the CWS are prohibited while personnel are within the
water box.
8. Limit the number of personnel occupying the isolated water box
to no more than 3 in the inlet or outlet and no more than 4 persons in
total during condenser water box maintenance activities.
9. Utilize technology-based level measurement instruments with
local audible alarms to alert the personnel working in the isolated
water box of a rising water level in the CWS piping beneath the water
box. This instrument would serve as a secondary means of monitoring the
water level in addition to the manual level monitoring via Tygon
tubing.
10. Utilize hydraulic calculations to analyze the potential leak
paths into an isolated water box and quantify the inflow rates and
durations to fill the water box. This will identify how much time
personnel have to evacuate the water box in the event of a water leak
into the isolated water box.
11. Utilize a physical lock on the 6 inch cross-tie valve (or
replace the valve with a design that allows physical locking) to
prevent any unauthorized operation of the valve during the condenser
water box maintenance activity.
12. Monitor the water levels in the supply side water box (and
return water box) regardless of when personnel are present. Continuous
monitoring for water leakage on the supply and return water boxes of an
isolated segment of the system as water leakage from either side could
present a hazard to personnel even if they are not in the water box
where the leakage is occurring.
13. Require the presence of a dedicated water box drain pump
operator while personnel are occupying the isolated water box.
14. Utilize the water box low-point drains (6 inches for Unit 1 and
8 inches for Unit 2) to provide secondary means of evacuating water
leakage from the isolated water box connected CWS piping.
15. Install a level indicator that will alarm to alert the employee
in the water box to evacuate because of rising water levels and auto
start the two drain pumps. This should be in addition to the portable
system being used in monitoring the levels.
16. In addition to the watch stander attendant required under 29
CFR 1910.146, the rescue team members must be present at the water box
throughout duration of the maintenance activities.
Proposed Condition E: Communication
This proposed condition requires the applicant to implement an
effective system of information sharing and communication to provide
workers performing maintenance activities within condenser water boxes
of any hazards that may affect their safety. Effective information
sharing and communication are intended to ensure that affected workers
receive updated information regarding any safety-related hazards and
incidents, and corrective actions taken, prior to the start of each
shift. The proposed condition also requires the applicant to ensure
reliable means of emergency communications are available and maintained
for affected workers and support personnel during maintenance
activities within the condenser water box. Availability of such
reliable means of communications would enable affected workers and
support personnel to respond quickly and effectively to hazardous
conditions or emergencies that may develop during water box maintenance
operations.
Proposed Condition F: Worker Qualification and Training
This proposed condition requires the applicant to implement an
effective permit-required isolation qualification and training program
for authorized employees who perform maintenance activities within
condenser water boxes. Additionally, proposed Condition F also requires
the applicant to train each affected employee on the purpose and use of
the permit-required confined space procedures. Further, OSHA is
imposing conditions beyond those submitted by STP Nuclear in the
Variance application.
The proposed condition specifies the factors that an affected
worker must know to perform safely during maintenance operations within
the condenser water box, including how to enter, work in, and exit from
a condenser water box under both normal and emergency conditions.
Having well-trained and qualified workers performing condenser water
box maintenance activities is intended to ensure that they can
recognize and respond appropriately to electrical safety and health
hazards. These qualification and training requirements enable affected
workers to handle emergencies effectively, thereby preventing worker
injury, illness, and fatalities. Additionally, proposed Condition F
requires the applicant to train each affected employee in the purpose
and use of the alternative permit-required confined space isolation
procedures identified in the permanent variance application.
Proposed Condition G: Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention
This proposed condition requires the applicant to implement an
effective program for completing inspections, tests, program
evaluations and accident prevention for performing maintenance and
cleaning activities within the condenser water box and associated work
areas. This condition would help to ensure the safe operation and
physical integrity of the condenser water boxes and the work areas
necessary to safely conduct maintenance operations.
This condition also requires the applicant to conduct tests,
inspections, corrective actions and repairs involving the use of the
alternative isolation process used to perform maintenance activities on
condenser water boxes identified in the variance application. Further,
this requirement provides the applicant with information needed to
schedule tests and inspections to ensure the continued safe operation
of the
equipment and systems and to determine that the actions taken to
correct defects are appropriate. These tests, inspections, corrective
actions, and repairs should be conducted in concert with the Condenser
Water Box Online Isolate and Restoration Procedure submitted to OSHA by
STP Nuclear with the Variance application.
Proposed Condition H: Additional Recordkeeping Requirement
Under OSHA's recordkeeping requirements in 29 CFR part 1904
Recording and Reporting Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, STP
Nuclear must maintain a record of any recordable injury, illness, or
fatality (as defined by 29 CFR part 1904) resulting from the task of
cleaning and performing maintenance activities within the condenser
water box by completing OSHA Form 301, Injury and Illness Incident
Report and OSHA Form 300, Log of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses.
In addition, STP Nuclear must maintain records of all maintenance
activities performed at condenser water boxes at the STP Nuclear site,
as well as associated hazardous condition corrective actions and
repairs.
Proposed Condition I: Notifications
Under the proposed condition, the applicant is required, within
specified periods of time, to: (1) Notify OSHA of any recordable
injury, illness, in-patient hospitalization, amputation, loss of an
eye, or fatality that occurs as a result of cleaning or maintenance
activities around the condenser water box; (2) provide OSHA a copy of
the incident investigation report (using OSHA Form 301, Injury and
Illness Incident Report) of these events within 24 hours of the
incident; (3) include on OSHA Form 301, Injury and Illness Incident
Report information on the conditions associated with the recordable
injury or illness, the root-cause determination, and preventive and
corrective actions identified and implemented; (4) provide the
certification that affected workers were informed of the incident and
the results of the incident investigation; (5) notify OSHA's Office of
Technical Programs and Coordination Activities (OTPCA) and the Corpus
Christi, Texas Area Office at least 15 working days in advance, should
the applicant need to revise the permit-required confined space
isolation procedures related to condenser water box cleaning or
maintenance affecting STP Nuclear's ability to comply with the
conditions of the proposed permanent variance; and (6) provide OTPCA
and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area Office, by January 31 of each
calendar year, with a report covering the previous calendar year,
evaluating the effectiveness of the alternate permit-required confined
space isolation procedures set forth in the conditions of the permanent
variance.
Additionally, this proposed condition requires the applicant to
notify OSHA if it ceases to do business, has a new address or location
for the main office, or transfers the operations covered by the
proposed permanent variance to a successor company. In addition, the
condition specifies that the transfer of the permanent variance to a
successor company must be approved by OSHA. These requirements allow
OSHA to communicate effectively with the applicant regarding the status
of the proposed permanent variance, and expedite the agency's
administration and enforcement of the permanent variance. Stipulating
that an applicant is required to have OSHA's approval to transfer a
variance to a successor company provides assurance that the successor
company has knowledge of, and will comply with, the conditions
specified by proposed permanent variance, thereby ensuring the safety
of workers involved in performing the operations covered by the
proposed permanent variance.
IV. Grant of Interim Order, Proposal for Permanent Variance, and
Request for Comment
OSHA hereby announces the preliminary decision to grant an interim
order allowing STP Nuclear to perform maintenance operations in
condenser water boxes, subject to the conditions that follow in this
document. This interim order will remain in effect until the agency
modifies or revokes the interim order or makes a decision on STP
Nuclear's application for a permanent variance. Beginning with the
publication of this notice until the agency modifies or revokes the
interim order or makes a decision on the application for a permanent
variance, the applicant is required to comply fully with the conditions
of the interim order as an alternative to complying with the isolation
requirements of permit space contained in 29 CFR 1910.146 (the
standard). The standard defines ``isolation of permit space'' in 29 CFR
1910.146(b) as: The process by which a permit-space is removed from
service and isolated, and completely protected against the release of
energy and material into the space by such means as: . . . blocking or
disconnecting all mechanical linkages. Further, 29 CFR
1910.146(d)(3)(iii) requires isolation of the permit-required confined
space.
In order to avail itself of the interim order, STP Nuclear must:
(1) Comply with the conditions listed in the interim order for the
period starting with the grant of the interim order until the agency
modifies or revokes the interim order or makes a decision on the
application for a permanent variance; (2) comply fully with all other
applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1910.146; and (3) provide a copy
of this Federal Register notice to all employees affected by the
proposed conditions, using the same means it used to inform these
employees of the application for a permanent variance.
OSHA is also proposing that the same requirements would apply to a
permanent variance if OSHA ultimately issues one for this employer.
OSHA requests comment on those conditions as well as OSHA's preliminary
determination that the specified alternatives and conditions would
provide a workplace as safe and healthful as those required by the
standard from which a variance is sought. After reviewing comments,
OSHA will publish in the Federal Register the agency's final decision
approving or rejecting the request for a permanent variance.
V. Specific Conditions of the Interim Order and the Application for a
Permanent Variance
The following conditions apply to the interim order OSHA is
granting to STP Nuclear. These conditions specify the alternative means
of compliance with the definition of ``isolation of permit space'' in
29 CFR 1910.146(b) and 29 CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii) that STP Nuclear is
proposing for its permanent variance. To simplify the presentation of
the conditions, OSHA generally refers only to the conditions of the
proposed permanent variance, but the same conditions apply to the
interim order except where otherwise noted.\2\
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\2\ In these conditions, OSHA is using the future conditional
form of the verb (e.g., ``would''), which pertains to the
application for a Permanent variance (designated as ``Permanent
variance'') but the conditions are mandatory for purposes of the
Interim Order.
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The conditions would apply to all STP Nuclear employees located at
the Wadsworth, Texas location during the maintenance and cleaning of
condenser water boxes. These conditions are outlined in this Section.
A. Scope
The interim order applies, and the permanent variance would apply,
only to the task of performing maintenance activities within condenser
water boxes at STP Nuclear. The interim order and
proposed variance would not apply to construction work (i.e. work for
construction, alteration and/or repair, including painting and
decorating) performed within condenser boxes at STP Nuclear. The
interim order and proposed variance apply only to work:
1. That occurs at STP Nuclear, 12090 FM 521, Wadsworth, Texas
77483; and
2. Performed in compliance with all applicable provisions of 29 CFR
1910.146. Additionally,
3. No other maintenance work, including electrical maintenance may
be performed using the conditions of this interim order.
4. Except for the requirements specified by 29 CFR 1910.146(b) and
29 CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii), STP Nuclear must comply fully with all
other applicable provisions of 29 CFR 1910.146 during maintenance
activities of condenser water boxes.
5. The interim order will remain in effect until OSHA modifies or
revokes it; or OSHA publishes a Federal Register notice granting the
permanent variance in accordance with 29 CFR 1905.13, whichever occurs
first.
B. List of Abbreviations
Abbreviations used throughout this proposed Permanent variance
would include the following:
1. CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
2. CWS--Circulating Water System
3. ECO--Equipment Clearance Box
4. FMEA--Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
5. HAZOP--Hazard and Operability Study
6. MCR--Main Cooling Reservoir
7. OSHA--Occupational Safety and Health Administration
8. OTPCA--Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities
9. RRP--Rope Rescue Program
10. TGB--Turbine Generator Building
C. Definitions
The following definitions would apply to this proposed permanent
variance. These definitions would supplement the definitions in STP
Nuclear's application for permanent variance.
1. Affected employee or worker--an employee or worker who is
affected by the conditions of this proposed permanent variance, or any
one of his or her authorized representatives. The term ``employee'' has
the meaning defined and used under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.).
2. Competent person--an individual who is capable of identifying
existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working
conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees,
and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to
eliminate them.
3. Engulfment--the surrounding and effective capture of a person by
a liquid or finely divided (flowable) solid substance that can be
aspirated to cause death by filling or plugging the respiratory system
or that can exert enough force on the body to cause death by
strangulation, constriction, or crushing.
4. Hazard and Operability Study--an evaluation of tasks or
operations to identify potential hazards and to determine the necessary
controls.
5. Isolation--the process by which a permit space is removed from
service and completely protected against the release of energy and
material into the space by such means as: Blanking or blinding;
misaligning or removing sections of lines, pipes, or ducts; a double
block and bleed system; lockout or tagout of all sources of energy; or
blocking or disconnecting all mechanical linkages.
6. Permit-required confined space--a confined space that has one or
more of the following characteristics: (1) Contains or has a potential
to contain a hazardous atmosphere; (2) Contains a material that has the
potential for engulfing an entrant; (3) Has an internal configuration
such that an entrant could be trapped or asphyxiated by inwardly
converging walls or by a floor which slopes downward and tapers to a
smaller cross-section; or (4) Contains any other recognized serious
safety or health hazard.
7. Qualified person--an individual who, by possession of a
recognized degree, certificate, or professional standing, or who, by
extensive knowledge, training, and experience, successfully
demonstrates an ability to solve or resolve problems relating to
maintenance of condenser water boxes.
D. Safety Practices and Procedures
1. STP Nuclear shall adhere to the Condenser Water Box Online
Isolation and Restoration Procedure provided to OSHA with the Variance
application while performing cleaning or maintenance activities within
condenser water boxes, in accordance with STP Nuclear's permit-required
confined space program.
2. STP Nuclear shall implement the hazard prevention and control
requirements identified in the Variance application (use of stop pins)
to isolate condenser water boxes before performing maintenance
activities within condenser water boxes.
3. STP Nuclear shall close the cycle inlet and butterfly valves
with a local handswitch.
4. STP Nuclear shall remove power from the inlet and isolation
valve and hang Danger Tags on the local handswitch and the breaker.
5. STP Nuclear shall drain the condenser water box to another
condenser water box using the permanently installed condenser drain
down pumps.
6. STP Nuclear shall check for leakages past the isolation valve
seat. In the event that a leak is found, STP Nuclear will use a
handwheel to manually achieve proper disk seating and ensure that a
Danger Tag is hung on the handwheel.
7. STP Nuclear shall establish and implement a procedure to ensure
that no other maintenance will be performed on the condenser water box,
unless permit-required confined space measures are used.
8. STP Nuclear shall modify each of the 12 condenser water box
isolation valves to drill four holes into the 99.75 inch diameter upper
valve range, which will be plugged when the condenser water box is in
service and fabricate 20 three-fourth inch diameter stop pins, which
will be installed to block movement of the butterfly valve disk and
hang Danger Tags on the pins.
9. STP Nuclear shall confirm that lineup changes (i.e. pump
switching, valve position changes) within the CWS are prohibited while
personnel are within the water box.
10. STP Nuclear shall limit the number of personnel occupying the
isolated water box to no more than 3 people in the inlet or outlet and
no more than 4 people in total during condenser water box maintenance
activities.
11. STP shall utilize technology-based level measurement
instruments with local audible alarms to alert the personnel working in
the isolated water box of a rising water level in the CWS piping
beneath the water box. The instrument would serve as a secondary means
of monitoring the water level in addition to the manual level
monitoring via Tygon tubing.
12. STP Nuclear shall utilize hydraulic calculations to analyze the
potential leak paths into an isolated water box and quantify the inflow
rates and durations to fill the water box. This will identify how much
time personnel have to evacuate the water box in the event of a water
leak into the isolated water box.
13. STP Nuclear will utilize a physical lock on the 6 inch cross-
tie valve (or replace the valve with a design that allows physical
locking) to prevent any unauthorized operation of the valve during the
condenser water box maintenance activity.
14. STP Nuclear shall monitor the water levels in the supply side
water box (and return water box) regardless of when personnel are
present. Continuous monitoring for water leakage on the supply and
return water box of an isolated segment of the system as water leakage
from either side could present a hazard to personnel even if they are
no in the water box where the leakage is occurring.
15. STP Nuclear shall require the presence of a dedicated water box
drain pump operator while personnel are occupying the isolated water
box.
16. STP Nuclear shall utilize the water box low-point drains (6
inch for Unit 1 and 8 inch for Unit 2) to provide secondary means of
evacuating water leakage from the isolated water box connected CWS
piping.
17. STP Nuclear shall install a level indicator that will alert the
employee in the water box to evacuate because of rising water levels
and auto start the two drain pumps. This should be in addition to the
portable system being used in monitoring the levels.
18. STP Nuclear shall ensure that rescue team members be present at
the condenser water box throughout the duration of the maintenance
activities.
E. Communication
STP Nuclear must:
1. Implement a system that informs workers performing maintenance
activities within condenser water boxes of any hazardous occurrences or
conditions that might affect their safety.
2. Provide a means of communication among affected workers and
support personnel in energy isolation where unassisted voice
communication is inadequate.
(a) Use an independent power supply for powered communication
systems, and these systems would have to operate such that use or
disruption of any one phone or signal location will not disrupt the
operation of the system from any other location.
(b) Test communication systems at the start of each shift and as
necessary thereafter to ensure proper operation.
F. Worker Qualifications and Training
STP Nuclear will implement an effective permit-required confined
space isolation qualification and training program for authorized
employees involved in performing maintenance activities within
condenser water boxes. STP Nuclear must:
1. Utilize the permit-required confined space isolation training
program submitted to OSHA as part of this Variance application, and
train each authorized employee on the isolation process for condenser
water boxes, and the procedures required under it;
2. Develop a training program and train each affected employee in
the purpose and use of the alternative permit-required confined space
isolation procedures used for maintenance of condenser water boxes
under this interim order and document this instruction;
3. Ensure that workers performing maintenance activities within
condenser water boxes know how to enter, work in, and exit from a
condenser water box under both normal and emergency conditions;
4. Ensure that each authorized and affected employee have effective
and documented training in the contents and conditions covered by this
proposed variance and interim order; and
5. Ensure that only trained and authorized employees perform
permit-required confined space isolation procedures for the task of
performing maintenance of condenser water boxes at the STP Nuclear
site.
G. Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention
STP Nuclear will have to implement the detailed program for
completing inspections, tests, program evaluations, and incident
prevention for the isolation of condenser water boxes for maintenance
purposes in accordance with its permit-required confined space
procedure submitted to OSHA as part of their Variance application. STP
Nuclear must:
1. Ensure that a competent person (authorized employee) conducts
daily visual checks and monthly inspections and functionality tests of
condenser water boxes and permit-required confined space isolation
procedures that ensure the procedure and conditions of this proposed
variance and interim order are being followed.
2. Ensure that a competent person conducts daily inspections of the
work areas associated with the maintenance of the condenser water
boxes.
3. Develop a set of checklists to be used by a competent person in
conducting daily inspections of the condenser water boxes and permit-
required confined space procedures used while performing maintenance
activities at condenser water boxes at the STP Nuclear facility.
4. STP Nuclear will remove from service any equipment that
constitutes a safety hazard until STP Nuclear corrects the hazardous
condition and has a qualified person approve the correction.
5. STP will maintain records of all maintenance activities of the
condenser water box, as well as associated corrective actions and
repairs, at the job site for the duration of the variance. Where
available, the maintenance, servicing, and installation of replacement
parts must strictly follow the manufacturer's specifications,
instructions, and limitations.
H. Additional Recordkeeping Requirement
STP Nuclear must maintain a record of any recordable injury,
illness, or fatality (as defined by 29 CFR 1904) resulting from the
task of cleaning and performing maintenance activities within the
condenser water box by completing OSHA Form 301, Injury and Illness
Incident Report and OSHA Form 300, Log of Work-Related Injuries and
Illnesses. In addition, STP Nuclear must maintain records of all
maintenance activities performed at condenser water boxes at the STP
Nuclear site, as well as associated hazardous condition corrective
actions and repairs.
I. Notifications
To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified herein,
STP Nuclear must:
1. Notify OSHA's Office of Technical Programs and Coordination
Activities (OTPCA) and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area Office of any
recordable injury, illness, in-patient hospitalization, amputation,
loss of an eye or fatality (by submitting the completed OSHA Form 301,
Injury and Illness Incident Report) resulting from implementing the
alternative isolation procedures of the proposed variance conditions
while completing the tasks of cleaning and/or maintenance of the
condenser water box, but still meet the recordable injury or illness
criteria of 29 CFR 1904. The notification would have to be made within
8 hours of the incident or 8 hours after becoming aware of a recordable
injury, illness, or fatality; a copy of the incident investigation
(OSHA Form 301, Injury and Illness Incident Report) must be submitted
to OSHA within 24 hours of the incident or 24 hours after becoming
aware of a recordable injury, illness, or fatality.
2. Provide OTPCA and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area Office a copy
of the incident investigation report (using OSHA Form 301, Injury and
Illness Incident Report) of these events within 24 hours of the
incident;
3. Include on the OSHA Form 301, Injury and Illness Incident Report
information on the conditions associated with the recordable injury or
illness, the root-cause determination, and the preventive and
corrective actions identified and implemented.
4. Provide certification to OTPCA and the Corpus Christi, Texas
Area Office within 15 working days of any incident of which STP Nuclear
informed affected workers of the incident and the results of the
incident investigation (including the root-cause determination and
preventive and corrective actions identified and implemented).
5. Notify OSHA's Office of Technical Programs and Coordination
Activities (OTPCA) and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area Office at least
15 working days in advance, should the applicant need to revise the
permit-required confined space isolation procedures related to
condenser water box cleaning or maintenance affecting its ability to
comply with the conditions of the proposed permanent variance.
6. Provide OTPCA and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area Office, by
January 31 of each calendar year, with a report covering the previous
calendar year, identifying the maintenance activities performed on the
condenser water boxes and evaluating the effectiveness of the alternate
permit-required confined space isolation procedures set forth in the
conditions of the permanent variance.
7. Inform OTPCA and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area Office as soon
as possible, but no later than 7 days, after it has knowledge that it
will:
(i) Cease doing business; or
(ii) Transfer the operations specified herein to a successor
company.
6. Notify all affected employees of this proposed permanent
variance by the same means required to inform them of the application
for a variance.
OSHA will publish a copy of this notice in the Federal Register.
Authority and Signature
Loren Sweatt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, Washington, DC 20210, authorized the
preparation of this notice. Accordingly, the agency is issuing this
notice pursuant to Section 29 U.S.C. 655(6)(d), Secretary of Labor's
Order No. 1-2012 (77 FR 3912, Jan. 25, 2012), and 29 CFR 1905.11.
Signed at Washington, DC, on August 27, 2020.
Loren Sweatt,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety
and Health.
[FR Doc. 2020-19268 Filed 8-31-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P
