[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 80 (Wednesday, April 28, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 22458-22466]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-08812]
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
[Docket No. OSHA-2020-0001]
STP Nuclear Operating Company; Grant of Permanent Variance
AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: In this notice, OSHA grants a permanent variance to South
Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STP Nuclear) from the OSHA
standard that requires the isolation of permit-required confined
spaces.
DATES: The permanent variance specified by this notice becomes
effective on May 28, 2021 and shall remain in effect until it is
modified or revoked, whichever occurs first.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Information regarding this notice is
available from the following sources:
Press inquiries: Contact Mr. Frank Meilinger, Director, OSHA Office
of Communications, U.S. Department of Labor, telephone: (202) 693-1999;
email: meilinger.francis2@dol.gov.
General and technical information: Contact Mr. Kevin Robinson,
Director, Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities,
Directorate of Technical Support and Emergency Management, Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, phone:
(202) 693-2110 or email: robinson.kevin@dol.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Copies of this Federal Register notice: Electronic copies of this
Federal Register notice are available at http://www.regulations.gov.
This Federal Register notice and other relevant information are also
available at OSHA's web page at http://www.osha.gov.
I. Notice of Application
On February 18, 2019, South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company
(STP Nuclear or the applicant), 12090 FM 521, Wadsworth, Texas 77483,
submitted under Section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 (OSH Act; 29 U.S.C. 655) and 29 CFR 1905.11 (``Variances and
other relief under section 6(d)'') an application for a permanent
variance from the provision of the OSHA standard that regulates
ensuring isolation of permit-required confined spaces, as well as a
request for an interim order pending OSHA's decision on the application
for variance (OSHA-2020-0001-0001) at its Wadsworth, Texas facility.
Specifically, STP Nuclear seeks a variance from the provision of 29 CFR
1910.146 that requires ``isolation of permit space,'' meaning the
process by which a permit-required space is removed from service and
completely protected against the release of energy and material into
the space (29 CFR 1910.146(b) and 29 CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii)). STP
Nuclear's application also requested an interim order pending OSHA's
decision on the application for a variance.
According to the application, STP Nuclear operates two pressurized
water reactor nuclear power plants at its Wadsworth, Texas location.
STP Nuclear's description of its operation indicates that these nuclear
power plants use steam to drive turbine generators, which is cooled by
circulating water through a condenser to convert the steam back into
water. STP Nuclear uses a circulating water system (CWS) that cools the
steam by pumping water from the main cooling reservoir (MCR), through
the condenser and back to the reservoir. The MCR is 7,000 acres and
includes an intake structure where pumps that provide cooling to the
units are located. These pumps include the circulating water (CW)
pumps, of which there are a total of eight (four per unit). The flow
from each CW pump discharges through a motor operated valve into a 96
foot diameter pipe which passes over the reservoir embankment at 59
feet elevation. The four pump discharge pipes combine into two 138 inch
underground pipes that feed a manifold in the Turbine Generator
Building (TGB). The circulating water flows through condenser tubes
inside what STP Nuclear refers to as the ``water box.'' The manifold
supplies water to each of the six main condenser water boxes with an 84
inch motor-operated valve at the inlet and outlet of each water box.
The water exiting the water boxes enters a discharge manifold which
then splits into two underground 138 inch pipes returning the water to
the MCR passing over the reservoir embankment at 58 feet elevation. The
applicant asserts that the design of the CWS is such that it cannot be
completely removed from service for water box cleaning or tube repair,
and that maintenance activities occur when one of the two Power Plants
are removed from service for refueling, which happens once every
eighteen months.
The condenser water box is a permit-required confined space that
under STP Nuclear's procedures and OSHA's standard at 29 CFR 1910.146
require a confined-space permit and security alerts prior to entry.
Employees can enter the water boxes to clean condenser tubes and to
repair or plug leaking tubes only after being cleared by the STP
Nuclear Entry Supervisor in accordance with STP Nuclear's confined
space procedure. STP Nuclear performs maintenance on condenser water
boxes prior to the summer months to ensure maximum efficiency, and
therefore, maximum generation during the peak electric generating
period in Texas. This maintenance activity (tube cleaning) minimizes
fouling and blocking of the condenser tubes. Employees entering the
water box to perform maintenance and repair activities could be exposed
to the hazard of engulfment by water that could flow into the water box
if condenser isolation valves were to rotate or otherwise fail during
the maintenance or repair activity.
STP Nuclear asserts that without frequent maintenance, the
condenser tubes could leak and introduce contaminants, such as sodium,
into plant systems that can erode barriers that prevent release of
radioactive materials. Further, STP Nuclear asserts that if the water
box cannot be timely isolated to repair tubes, it may have to shut down
the nuclear power plant, which will cause interruption to the power
supply. STP Nuclear previously believed that procedures already in
place--lockout/tagout of the isolation valve, continuous monitoring for
leakage past the valve and standby attendant--were adequate to protect
employees.
On March 22, 2018, OSHA received a complaint alleging that STP
Nuclear failed to ensure isolation of the condenser water box as
required by OSHA's permit-required confined space standard. In response
to this complaint, STP Nuclear submitted a letter, dated March 28,
2018, to OSHA's Corpus Christi, Texas Area Office (OSHA-2020-0001-
0002), asserting its belief that they are in full compliance with 29
CFR 1910.146 and describing their current practices to comply with the
standard. On April 20, 2018, the Corpus Christi, Texas OSHA Area Office
provided a response to STP Nuclear's explanation stating that it was
feasible to install two 5,000 pound blank flanges to isolate the system
and directed STP Nuclear to take corrective action (OSHA-2020-0001-
0003).
In STP Nuclear's February 18, 2019, variance application, the
applicant asserts that isolating the water box using blank flanges
creates a greater hazard and significant risk for injury. Further, the
applicant believes that installing blank flanges has the potential to
compromise the structural integrity of the system. To ensure isolation
of the condenser water box prior to maintenance activities, STP Nuclear
proposes in its variance application an alternative safety measure--
drilling four holes into the 99.75 inch diameter upper valve flange,
and fabrication of 20 three-fourth inch diameter mechanical stops (stop
pins), which will be installed to block movement of the butterfly valve
disc to ensure isolation of the water boxes during maintenance work.
OSHA initiated a technical review of STP Nuclear's variance
application and developed a set of follow-up questions on June 9, 2019
(OSHA-2020-0001-0003), regarding the assertions of equivalent worker
protection included
in the application. On June 27, 2019, STP Nuclear provided written
answers to the follow-up questions, (OSHA-2020-0001-0004) as well as
supplemental materials to support the variance application including: A
Hazard and Operability Study report and recommendations (hazard
analysis using a ``HAZOP'' methodology); a copy of all detailed
procedures used when employees are entering or inside the water box;
and a copy of emergency procedures and equipment used while employees
are working inside the water box.
In reviewing the application, OSHA evaluated the use of two blank
flanges, a 99.5 inch diameter, 2.5 inch thick steel blank weighing
5,563 pounds each to isolate the condenser water boxes during
maintenance activities. The applicant asserted in the variance
application that installing a blank flange to isolate a condenser water
box creates a greater hazard and significant risk for injury to both
personnel and the physical building. STP Nuclear asserts that
installing a blank flange requires removal of the water box inlet and
outlet expansion joints and installation of two steel blanks.
Installing the blank flanges as described above entails a high degree
of risk, as it would require moving these heavy objects from the
building entrance to the water box, using rigged chain falls to trapeze
the blanks to the water box, as well as construction of a support
structure for the water box, in order to support the additional weight
of the 5,563 pound blanks and ensure the water box and/or inlet pipe
does not misalign from removal of the expansion joint. Further, OSHA
carefully reviewed the administrative and engineering controls outlined
in the variance application and supplemental materials as part of the
proposed alternative work practices identified in the variance
application.
OSHA reviewed STP Nuclear's application for the variance and
interim order and determined that they were appropriately submitted in
compliance with the applicable variance procedures in Section 6(d) of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act, 29 U.S.C.
655(d)) and OSHA's regulations at 29 CFR 1905.11 (``Variances and other
relief under section 6(d)''), including the requirement that the
applicant inform workers and their representatives of their rights to
petition the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and
Health for a hearing on the variance application.
Following this review and discussions with STP Nuclear, OSHA
determined that STP Nuclear's proposed alternative, subject to the
conditions in the request and imposed by the Interim Order, provides a
workplace as safe and healthful as that required by the permit-required
confined space standard. On September 1, 2020, OSHA published a Federal
Register notice announcing STP Nuclear's application for a permanent
variance, stating the preliminary determination along with the basis of
that determination, and granting the Interim Order (86 FR 54424). OSHA
requested comments on each.
OSHA did not receive any comments or other information disputing
the preliminary determination that the alternative was at least as safe
as OSHA's standard, nor any objections to OSHA granting a permanent
variance. Accordingly, through this notice OSHA grants a permanent
variance subject to the conditions set out in this document.
II. The Variance Application
A. Background
STP Nuclear's variance application and the responses to OSHA's
follow-up questions provided the following: Detailed descriptions of
the condenser water box maintenance process; the proposed work
alternative to isolate the condenser water box using stop pins while
performing maintenance activities; and procedures developed to manage
the permit-required confined space. Additionally, STP Nuclear provided
a HAZOP study as technical evidence supporting STP Nuclear's assertion
of equivalency of worker protection.
As an alternative to installation of blank flanges, STP Nuclear
proposes a comprehensive engineered system and appropriate
administrative controls to satisfy the isolation requirement. The
engineered system uses mechanical stops (stop pins) to block the
movement of the butterfly valve disk in combination with administrative
procedures to isolate the condenser water box in order to perform
maintenance activities. The stop pins function as the isolation device,
in that utilizing the stop pins prevents the engagement of the
condenser water box, thus interrupting the flow of water to the
condenser water boxes to allow maintenance activities. STP Nuclear
asserts that using stop pins to isolate butterfly valve disks in
condenser water boxes match the requirements of 29 CFR
1910.146(d)(3)(iii).
Further, STP Nuclear asserts that its mechanical stop system has
been evaluated via a HAZOP study, which is a process that seeks to
identify potential operating hazards and risks in systems/processes.
The HAZOP study included a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
that was developed and documented. The FMEA is an assessment of the 84
inch butterfly valves in the closed position, with stop pins installed,
to physically isolate the condenser water box while the remainder of
the CWS remains in operation. The HAZOP study seeks to identify the
potential hazardous scenarios, as they relate to personnel entry into
the isolated water box, to determine potential areas of concern,
especially regarding a possible engulfment hazard. Issued June 20, 2019
(OSHA-2020-0001-0004), the HAZOP study included eight recommendations
for additional engineering and administrative controls, all of which
have been adopted by STP Nuclear. These recommendations are described
in Proposed Condition D of this notice.
STP Nuclear contends that the administrative and engineering
controls comprising the alternative safety measures included in the
variance application provide the workers with a place of employment
that is at least as safe and healthful as they would obtain under the
provisions of OSHA's permit-required confined space standard.
B. Variance From 29 CFR 1910.146(b) and 29 CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii)
As an alternative means of compliance with the isolation
requirements of Sec. Sec. 1910.146(b) and 1910.146(d)(3)(iii), STP
Nuclear is proposing to use a comprehensive system of engineering and
administrative control procedures. The engineering controls include (1)
a modification of the condenser isolation valves to drill four holes
into the 99.75 inch diameter upper valve flange, to allow the
installation of mechanical stops (``stop pins'') which block rotation
of the isolation valve disks, (2) utilizing a physical lock on the 6
inch cross-tie valves, and (3) utilization of automated drains that
provide a secondary means of evacuating water leakage from the isolated
water box connected piping. STP Nuclear has also established
administrative controls to support the use of the stop pin system,
including: (1) Continuous monitoring for leakage past the isolation
valve, (2) utilizing a dedicated water box drain pump operator while
personnel are inside the isolated water box, (3) utilizing a standby
attendant to aid in the evacuation of an employee working in the
condenser water box in the event of an emergency, and (4) a dedicated
emergency evacuation procedure.
Further, the applicant asserts that: (1) Full isolation of the
water boxes would create a greater hazard to its employees,
and (2) the continuous water system makes shutdown of the water supply
impossible. Shutting down the circulating water system could
potentially cause the nuclear power plant to leak radiation, which is a
significant public health hazard.
C. Technical Review
OSHA conducted a review of STP Nuclear's application and the
supporting technical documentation. After completing the review of the
application and supporting documentation, OSHA concludes that STP
Nuclear:
1. Has a permit-required confined space entry program;
2. Performed a hazard analysis using the Hazard and Operability
Study (``HAZOP'') methodology to assess the risks of entering condenser
water boxes to perform maintenance on condenser tubes;
3. Implemented controls recommended in the HAZOP study (outlined in
Proposed Condition D of this notice);
4. Established procedures for condenser water box online isolation
and restoration;
5. Has developed the Condenser Water Box Online Isolation and
Restoration procedure to remove condenser water boxes from service for
maintenance;
6. Has modified or will modify the isolation valve seats in
condenser water boxes by installing specified mechanical stops (``stop
pins''). These stop pins are inserted downstream of the inlet disc and
upstream of the outlet disc following condenser water box isolation and
drain down;
7. Implemented detailed administrative procedures designed to
provide additional safety measures for all employees working on or near
condenser water boxes, which include having a watch stander present at
all times, as well as emergency evacuation procedures in the event that
water begins flowing into isolated condenser water boxes;
8. Procured and provided appropriate equipment and supplies;
9. Made the alternative isolation control policies and procedures
available to employees;
10. Trained authorized and affected employees on the application of
the alternative work practice and associated isolation control policies
and procedures;
11. Developed additional administrative controls and procedures to
minimize the potential for authorized and affected employees to work
around isolated condenser water boxes;
12. Conducted a comparison of the blank flange versus use of stop
pins, which mechanically limits disc travel providing additional
personnel safety against engulfment;
13. Has effective emergency rescue procedures to quickly and
effectively evacuate workers within the condenser water box, including
a rescue team present on site during maintenance activities; and
14. Conducted a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, which was an
assessment of the 84 inch butterfly valves in the closed position.
III. Description of the Conditions Specified by the Permanent Variance
As previously indicated in this notice, OSHA conducted a review of
STP Nuclear's application and supporting documentation. OSHA determined
that STP Nuclear developed and proposed to implement effective
alternative means of protection that provides protection to their
employees ``as safe and healthful'' as protections required within
paragraph 29 CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii) of OSHA's permit-required confined
space isolation standard during the process of performing maintenance
on condenser water boxes. Therefore, on September 1, 2020, OSHA
published a Federal Register notice announcing STP Nuclear's
application for a permanent variance and interim order, grant of an
interim order, and request for comments (86 FR 54424). The agency
requested comments by October 1, 2020, and OSHA received no comments in
response to this notice.
During the period starting with the September 1, 2020, publication
of the preliminary Federal Register notice announcing grant of the
Interim Order until the agency modifies or revokes the Interim Order or
makes a decision on the application for a permanent variance, the
applicant was required to comply fully with the conditions of the
Interim Order as an alternative to complying with the requirements of
paragraph 29 CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii). As of the effective date of this
notice, OSHA is revoking the Interim Order granted to the employer on
September 1, 2020.
This section describes the conditions that comprise the alternative
means of compliance with 29 CFR 1910.146(b) and 29 CFR
1910.146(d)(3)(iii). These conditions form the basis of the permanent
variance that OSHA is granting to STP Nuclear.
Condition A: Scope
The scope of the permanent variance limits coverage to the working
conditions specified under this condition. Clearly defining the scope
of the permanent variance provides STP Nuclear, their employees,
potential future applicants, other stakeholders, the public, and OSHA
with necessary information regarding the work situations which the
permanent variance will cover. To the extent that STP Nuclear conducts
work outside the scope of this variance, it will be required to comply
with OSHA standards, including the isolation of permit-required
confined spaces.
Pursuant to 29 CFR 1905.11, an employer (or class or group of
employers) may request a permanent variance for a specific workplace or
workplaces. When OSHA approves a permanent variance, it applies only to
the specific employer(s) that submitted the application and only to the
specific workplace or workplaces designated as part of the project. In
this instance, OSHA's grant of a permanent variance applies only to the
applicant, STP Nuclear, and only at the Wadsworth, Texas nuclear plant.
The permanent variance does not apply to any other employers or STP
Nuclear locations outside of the Wadsworth, Texas facility.
Condition B: List of Abbreviations
The following abbreviations apply to this permanent variance:
1. CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
2. CWS--Circulating Water System
3. ECO--Equipment Clearance Order
4. FMEA--Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
5. HAZOP--Hazard and Operability Study
6. MCR--Main Cooling Reservoir
7. OSHA--Occupational Safety and Health Administration
8. OTPCA--Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities
9. RRP--Rope Rescue Program
10. TGB--Turbine Generator Building
Condition C: List of Definitions
The permanent variance includes definitions for a series of terms.
Defining these terms serves to enhance the applicant's and the
employees' understanding of the conditions specified by the permanent
variance.
1. Affected employee or worker--an employee or worker who is
affected by the conditions of this permanent variance, or any one of
his or her authorized representatives. The term ``employee'' has the
meaning defined and used under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.).
2. Competent person--an individual who is capable of identifying
existing and predictable hazards in the
surroundings or working conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or
dangerous to employees, and who has authorization to take prompt
corrective measures to eliminate them.
3. Engulfment--the surrounding and effective capture of a person by
a liquid or finely divided (flowable) solid substance that can be
aspirated to cause death by filling or plugging the respiratory system
or that can exert enough force on the body to cause death by
strangulation, constriction, or crushing.
4. Hazard and Operability Study--an evaluation of tasks or
operations to identify potential hazards and to determine the necessary
controls.
5. Isolation--the process by which a permit space is removed from
service and completely protected against the release of energy and
material into the space by such means as: Blanking or blinding;
misaligning or removing sections of lines, pipes, or ducts; a double
block and bleed system; lockout or tagout of all sources of energy; or
blocking or disconnecting all mechanical linkages.
6. Permit-required confined space--a confined space that has one or
more of the following characteristics: (1) Contains or has a potential
to contain a hazardous atmosphere; (2) Contains a material that has the
potential for engulfing an entrant; (3) Has an internal configuration
such that an entrant could be trapped or asphyxiated by inwardly
converging walls or by a floor which slopes downward and tapers to a
smaller cross-section; or (4) Contains any other recognized serious
safety or health hazard.
7. Qualified person--an individual who, by possession of a
recognized degree, certificate, or professional standing, or who, by
extensive knowledge, training, and experience, successfully
demonstrates an ability to solve or resolve problems relating to
maintenance of condenser water boxes.
Condition D: Safety Practices and Procedures
This condition requires that STP Nuclear (1) adhere to the
Condenser Water Box Online Isolation and Restoration Procedure provided
to OSHA with the Variance application and (2) implement the hazard
prevention and control requirements provided with the Variance
application to ensure the continued effective functioning of the
alternate work practice (use of stop pins) to isolate condenser water
boxes before performing maintenance activities. Further, STP Nuclear
must implement the following additional administrative controls
identified in the HAZOP study:
1. Close the cycle inlet and butterfly valves with a local
handswitch.
2. Remove power from the inlet and isolation valve and hang Danger
Tags on the local handswitch and the breaker.
3. Drain the condenser water box to another condenser water box
using the permanent installed condenser drain down pumps.
4. Check for leakages past the isolation valve seat. In the event
that a leak is found, STP Nuclear will use a handwheel to manually
achieve proper disk seating and ensure that a Danger Tag is hung on the
handwheel.
5. Establish and implement a procedure to ensure that no other
maintenance will be performed on the condenser water box, unless
permit-required confined space measures are used.
6. Modify each of the 12 condenser water box isolation valves to
drill four holes into the 99.75 inch diameter upper valve range, which
will be plugged when the condenser water box is in service and
fabricate 20 three-fourth inch diameter stop pins, which will be
installed to block movement of the butterfly valve disk and hang Danger
Tags on the pins.
7. Confirm that lineup changes (i.e., pump switching, valve
position changes) within the CWS are prohibited while personnel are
within the water box.
8. Limit the number of personnel occupying the isolated water box
to no more than 3 in the inlet or outlet and no more than 4 persons in
total during condenser water box maintenance activities.
9. Utilize technology-based level measurement instruments with
local audible alarms to alert the personnel working in the isolated
water box of a rising water level in the CWS piping beneath the water
box. This instrument serves as a secondary means of monitoring the
water level, in addition to the manual level monitoring via Tygon
tubing.
10. Utilize hydraulic calculations to analyze the potential leak
paths into an isolated water box and quantify the inflow rates and
durations to fill the water box. This will identify how much time
personnel have to evacuate the water box in the event of a water leak
into the isolated water box.
11. Utilize a physical lock on the 6 inch cross-tie valve (or
replace the valve with a design that allows physical locking) to
prevent any unauthorized operation of the valve during the condenser
water box maintenance activity.
12. Monitor the water levels in the supply side water box (and
return water box) regardless of when personnel are present. Continuous
monitoring for water leakage on the supply and return water boxes of an
isolated segment of the system as water leakage from either side could
present a hazard to personnel even if they are not in the water box
where the leakage is occurring.
13. Require the presence of a dedicated water box drain pump
operator while personnel are occupying the isolated water box.
14. Utilize the water box low-point drains (6 inches for Unit 1 and
8 inches for Unit 2) to provide secondary means of evacuating water
leakage from the isolated water box connected CWS piping.
15. Install a level indicator that will alarm to alert the employee
in the water box to evacuate because of rising water levels and auto
start the two drain pumps. This level indicator alarm is in addition to
the portable system being used in monitoring the levels.
16. In addition to the watch stander attendant required under 29
CFR 1910.146, the rescue team members must be present at the water box
throughout duration of the maintenance activities.
Condition E: Communication
This condition requires the applicant to implement an effective
system of information sharing and communication to provide workers
performing maintenance activities within condenser water boxes of any
hazards that may affect their safety. Effective information sharing and
communication are intended to ensure that affected workers receive
updated information regarding any safety-related hazards and incidents,
and corrective actions taken, prior to the start of each shift. This
condition also requires the applicant to ensure reliable means of
emergency communications are available and maintained for affected
workers and support personnel during maintenance activities within the
condenser water box. Availability of such reliable means of
communications enables affected workers and support personnel to
respond quickly and effectively to hazardous conditions or emergencies
that may develop during water box maintenance operations.
Condition F: Worker Qualification and Training
This condition requires STP Nuclear to implement an effective
permit-required isolation qualification and training program for
authorized employees who perform maintenance
activities within condenser water boxes. Additionally, Condition F
requires the applicant to train each affected employee on the purpose
and use of the permit-required confined space procedures.
The condition specifies the factors that an affected worker must
know how to perform safely during maintenance operations within the
condenser water box, including how to enter, work in, and exit from a
condenser water box under both normal and emergency conditions. Having
well-trained and qualified workers performing condenser water box
maintenance activities is intended to ensure that they can recognize
and respond appropriately to electrical safety and health hazards.
These qualification and training requirements enable affected workers
to handle emergencies effectively, thereby preventing worker injury,
illness, and fatalities. Additionally, Condition F requires the
applicant to train each affected employee in the purpose and use of the
alternative permit-required confined space isolation procedures
identified in the permanent variance application.
Condition G: Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention
This condition requires the applicant to implement and operate an
effective program for completing inspections, tests, program
evaluations, and accident prevention for performing maintenance and
cleaning activities within the condenser water box and associated work
areas. This condition will help to ensure the safe operation and
physical integrity of the condenser water boxes and the work areas
necessary to safely conduct maintenance operations.
This condition also requires the applicant to conduct tests,
inspections, corrective actions, and repairs involving the use of the
alternative isolation process used to perform maintenance activities on
condenser water boxes identified in the variance application. Further,
this requirement provides the applicant with information needed to
schedule tests and inspections to ensure the continued safe operation
of the equipment and systems and to determine that the actions taken to
correct defects are appropriate. These tests, inspections, corrective
actions, and repairs shall be conducted in concert with the Condenser
Water Box Online Isolate and Restoration Procedure submitted to OSHA by
STP Nuclear with the Variance application.
Condition H: Additional Recordkeeping Requirement
Under OSHA's recordkeeping requirements in 29 CFR part 1904
Recording and Reporting Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, STP
Nuclear must maintain a record of any recordable injury, illness, or
fatality (as defined by 29 CFR part 1904) resulting from the task of
cleaning and performing maintenance activities within the condenser
water box by completing OSHA Form 301, Injury and Illness Incident
Report and OSHA Form 300, Log of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses.
In addition, STP Nuclear must maintain records of all maintenance
activities performed at condenser water boxes at the STP Nuclear site,
as well as associated hazardous condition corrective actions and
repairs.
Condition I: Notifications
Under this condition, the applicant is required, within specified
periods of time, to: (1) Notify OSHA of any recordable injury, illness,
in-patient hospitalization, amputation, loss of an eye, or fatality
that occurs as a result of cleaning or maintenance activities around
the condenser water box; (2) provide OSHA a copy of the incident
investigation report (using OSHA Form 301, Injury and Illness Incident
Report) of these events within 24 hours of the incident; (3) include on
OSHA Form 301, Injury and Illness Incident Report, information on the
conditions associated with the recordable injury or illness, the root-
cause determination, and preventive and corrective actions identified
and implemented; (4) provide the certification that affected workers
were informed of the incident and the results of the incident
investigation; (5) notify OSHA's Office of Technical Programs and
Coordination Activities (OTPCA) and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area
Office at least 15 working days in advance, should the applicant need
to revise the permit-required confined space isolation procedures
related to condenser water box cleaning or maintenance affecting STP
Nuclear's ability to comply with the conditions of this permanent
variance; and (6) provide OTPCA and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area
Office, by January 31 of each calendar year, with a report covering the
previous calendar year, evaluating the effectiveness of the alternate
permit-required confined space isolation procedures set forth in the
conditions of the permanent variance.
Additionally, this condition requires the applicant to notify OSHA
if it ceases to do business, has a new address or location for the main
office, or transfers the operations covered by the permanent variance
to a successor company. In addition, the condition specifies that the
transfer of the permanent variance to a successor company must be
approved by OSHA. These requirements allow OSHA to communicate
effectively with the applicant regarding the status of the permanent
variance, and expedite the agency's administration and enforcement of
the permanent variance. Stipulating that an applicant is required to
have OSHA's approval to transfer a variance to a successor company
provides assurance that the successor company has knowledge of, and
will comply with, the conditions specified by this permanent variance,
thereby ensuring the safety of workers involved in performing the
operations covered by the permanent variance.
IV. Decision
As described earlier in this notice, after reviewing the proposed
alternative, OSHA determined that STP Nuclear developed, and proposed
to implement, effective alternative means of protection that protect
its employees as effectively as paragraph 29 CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii) of
OSHA's standard governing isolation of permit-controlled confined space
during the task of maintenance of condenser water boxes. Further, under
section 6(d) of the OSH Act (29 U.S.C. 655(d)), and based on the record
discussed above, the agency finds that when the employer complies with
the conditions of the variance, the working conditions of the
employer's workers are at least as safe and healthful as if the
employer complied with the working conditions specified by paragraph 29
CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii) of OSHA's standard for isolation of permit-
controlled confined space. Therefore, under the terms of this variance,
STP Nuclear must: (1) Comply with the conditions listed below under
section V of this notice (``Order'') for the period between the
effective date of this notice and until the agency modifies or revokes
this final order in accordance with 29 CFR 1905.13; (2) comply fully
with all other applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1910; and (3)
provide a copy of this Federal Register notice to all employees
affected by the conditions using the same means it used to inform these
employees of the application for a permanent variance.
V. Order
As of the effective date of this final order, OSHA is revoking the
Interim Order granted to the employer on September 1, 2020 (86 FR
54424).
OSHA issues this final order authorizing South Texas Project
Nuclear Operating Company (STP Nuclear or the applicant) to comply with
the following conditions instead of complying with the requirements of
paragraphs 29 CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii) of OSHA's isolation requirements
of permit-controlled confined space. This final order applies to all
STP Nuclear employees located at 12090 FM 521, Wadsworth, Texas 77483.
The standard defines ``isolation of permit space'' in 29 CFR
1910.146(b) as: The process by which a permit-space is removed from
service and isolated, and completely protected against the release of
energy and material into the space by such means as: . . . Blocking or
disconnecting all mechanical linkages. Further, 29 CFR
1910.146(d)(3)(iii) requires isolation of the permit-required confined
space.
A. Scope
1. This permanent variance applies only to the task of performing
maintenance activities within condenser water boxes at STP Nuclear's
Wadsworth, Texas facility. This work is to be performed by authorized
employees under the alternative isolation procedures submitted to OSHA
as part of this application for a permanent variance.
2. No other servicing and/or maintenance work, including electrical
maintenance, may be performed at the STP Nuclear facility using the
conditions of this order. These activities are to be performed in full
compliance with all applicable provisions of 29 CFR 1910.146.
3. No construction work (i.e., work for construction, alteration,
and/or repair, including painting and decorating) may be performed
within the condenser water boxes under the conditions of this order.
4. Except for the requirements specified by 29 CFR 1910.146(b) and
29 CFR 1910.146(d)(3)(iii), STP Nuclear must comply fully with all
other applicable provisions of 29 CFR 1910.146 during maintenance
activities of condenser water boxes.
5. The interim order granted to STP Nuclear on September 1, 2020
(86 FR 54424), is hereby revoked as of the effective date of this final
order.
B. List of Abbreviations
The following abbreviations apply to this permanent variance:
1. CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
2. CWS--Circulating Water System
3. ECO--Equipment Clearance Box
4. FMEA--Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
5. HAZOP--Hazard and Operability Study
6. MCR--Main Cooling Reservoir
7. OSHA--Occupational Safety and Health Administration
8. OTPCA--Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities
9. RRP--Rope Rescue Program
10. TGB--Turbine Generator Building
C. Definitions
The following definitions apply to this permanent variance:
1. Affected employee or worker--an employee or worker who is
affected by the conditions of this permanent variance, or any one of
his or her authorized representatives. The term ``employee'' has the
meaning defined and used under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.).
2. Competent person--an individual who is capable of identifying
existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working
conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees,
and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to
eliminate them.
3. Engulfment--the surrounding and effective capture of a person by
a liquid or finely divided (flowable) solid substance that can be
aspirated to cause death by filling or plugging the respiratory system
or that can exert enough force on the body to cause death by
strangulation, constriction, or crushing.
4. Hazard and Operability Study--an evaluation of tasks or
operations to identify potential hazards and to determine the necessary
controls.
5. Isolation--the process by which a permit space is removed from
service and completely protected against the release of energy and
material into the space by such means as: Blanking or blinding;
misaligning or removing sections of lines, pipes, or ducts; a double
block and bleed system; lockout or tagout of all sources of energy; or
blocking or disconnecting all mechanical linkages.
6. Permit-required confined space--a confined space that has one or
more of the following characteristics:
(1) Contains or has a potential to contain a hazardous atmosphere;
(2) Contains a material that has the potential for engulfing an
entrant;
(3) Has an internal configuration such that an entrant could be
trapped or asphyxiated by inwardly converging walls or by a floor which
slopes downward and tapers to a smaller cross-section; or
(4) Contains any other recognized serious safety or health hazard.
7. Qualified person--an individual who, by possession of a
recognized degree, certificate, or professional standing, or who, by
extensive knowledge, training, and experience, successfully
demonstrates an ability to solve or resolve problems relating to
maintenance of condenser water boxes.
D. Safety Practices and Procedures
1. STP Nuclear shall adhere to the Condenser Water Box Online
Isolation and Restoration Procedure provided to OSHA with the Variance
application while performing cleaning or maintenance activities within
condenser water boxes, in accordance with STP Nuclear's permit-required
confined space program.
2. STP Nuclear shall implement the hazard prevention and control
requirements identified in the Variance application (use of stop pins)
to isolate condenser water boxes before performing maintenance
activities within condenser water boxes.
3. STP Nuclear shall close the cycle inlet and butterfly valves
with a local handswitch.
4. STP Nuclear shall remove power from the inlet and isolation
valve and hang Danger Tags on the local handswitch and the breaker.
5. STP Nuclear shall drain the condenser water box to another
condenser water box using the permanently installed condenser drain
down pumps.
6. STP Nuclear shall check for leakages past the isolation valve
seat. In the event that a leak is found, STP Nuclear will use a
handwheel to manually achieve proper disk seating and ensure that a
Danger Tag is hung on the handwheel.
7. STP Nuclear shall establish and implement a procedure to ensure
that no other maintenance will be performed on the condenser water box,
unless permit-required confined space measures are used.
8. STP Nuclear shall modify each of the 12 condenser water box
isolation valves to drill four holes into the 99.75 inch diameter upper
valve range, which will be plugged when the condenser water box is in
service and fabricate 20 three-fourth inch diameter stop pins, which
will be installed to block movement of the butterfly valve disk and
hang Danger Tags on the pins.
9. STP Nuclear shall confirm that lineup changes (i.e., pump
switching, valve position changes) within the CWS are prohibited while
personnel are within the water box.
10. STP Nuclear shall limit the number of personnel occupying the
isolated water box to no more than 3
people in the inlet or outlet and no more than 4 people in total during
condenser water box maintenance activities.
11. STP shall utilize technology-based level measurement
instruments with local audible alarms to alert the personnel working in
the isolated water box of a rising water level in the CWS piping
beneath the water box. The instrument serves as a secondary means of
monitoring the water level, in addition to the manual level monitoring
via Tygon tubing.
12. STP Nuclear shall utilize hydraulic calculations to analyze the
potential leak paths into an isolated water box and quantify the inflow
rates and durations to fill the water box. This will identify how much
time personnel have to evacuate the water box in the event of a water
leak into the isolated water box.
13. STP Nuclear will utilize a physical lock on the 6 inch cross-
tie valve (or replace the valve with a design that allows physical
locking) to prevent any unauthorized operation of the valve during the
condenser water box maintenance activity.
14. STP Nuclear shall monitor the water levels in the supply side
water box (and return water box) regardless of when personnel are
present. Continuous monitoring for water leakage on the supply and
return water box of an isolated segment of the system is required as
water leakage from either side could present a hazard to personnel even
if they are no in the water box where the leakage is occurring.
15. STP Nuclear shall require the presence of a dedicated water box
drain pump operator while personnel are occupying the isolated water
box.
16. STP Nuclear shall utilize the water box low-point drains (6
inch for Unit 1 and 8 inch for Unit 2) to provide secondary means of
evacuating water leakage from the isolated water box connected CWS
piping.
17. STP Nuclear shall install a level indicator that will alarm to
alert the employee in the water box to evacuate because of rising water
levels and auto start the two drain pumps. This level indicator alarm
is in addition to the portable system being used in monitoring the
levels.
18. STP Nuclear shall ensure that rescue team members be present at
the condenser water box throughout the duration of the maintenance
activities.
E. Communication
STP Nuclear must:
1. Implement a system that informs workers performing maintenance
activities within condenser water boxes of any hazardous occurrences or
conditions that might affect their safety.
2. Provide a means of communication among affected workers and
support personnel in energy isolation where unassisted voice
communication is inadequate.
(a) Use an independent power supply for powered communication
systems, and these systems must operate such that use or disruption of
any one phone or signal location will not disrupt the operation of the
system from any other location.
(b) Test communication systems at the start of each shift and as
necessary thereafter to ensure proper operation.
F. Worker Qualifications and Training
STP Nuclear will implement an effective permit-required confined
space isolation qualification and training program for authorized
employees involved in performing maintenance activities within
condenser water boxes. All training must be provided in a language that
the employees can understand. STP Nuclear must:
1. Utilize the permit-required confined space isolation training
program submitted to OSHA as part of this Variance application, and
train each authorized employee on the isolation process for condenser
water boxes, and the procedures required under it;
2. Develop a training program and train each affected employee in
the purpose and use of the alternative permit-required confined space
isolation procedures used for maintenance of condenser water boxes
under this interim order and document this instruction;
3. Ensure that workers performing maintenance activities within
condenser water boxes know how to enter, work in, and exit from a
condenser water box under both normal and emergency conditions;
4. Ensure that each authorized and affected employee has effective
and documented training in the contents and conditions covered by this
permanent variance and interim order; and
5. Ensure that only trained and authorized employees perform
permit-required confined space isolation procedures for the task of
performing maintenance of condenser water boxes at the STP Nuclear
site.
G. Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention
STP Nuclear must implement the detailed program for completing
inspections, tests, program evaluations, and incident prevention for
the isolation of condenser water boxes for maintenance purposes in
accordance with its permit-required confined space procedure submitted
to OSHA as part of STP Nuclear's Variance application. STP Nuclear
must:
1. Ensure that a competent person (authorized employee) conducts
daily visual checks and monthly inspections and functionality tests of
condenser water boxes and permit-required confined space isolation
procedures that ensure the procedure and conditions of this permanent
variance and interim order are being followed.
2. Ensure that a competent person conducts daily inspections of the
work areas associated with the maintenance of the condenser water
boxes.
3. Develop a set of checklists to be used by a competent person in
conducting daily inspections of the condenser water boxes and permit-
required confined space procedures used while performing maintenance
activities at condenser water boxes at the STP Nuclear facility.
4. STP Nuclear will remove from service any equipment that
constitutes a safety hazard until STP Nuclear corrects the hazardous
condition and has a qualified person approve the correction.
5. STP will maintain records of all maintenance activities of the
condenser water box, as well as associated corrective actions and
repairs, at the job site for the duration of the variance. Where
available, the maintenance, servicing, and installation of replacement
parts must strictly follow the manufacturer's specifications,
instructions, and limitations.
H. Additional Recordkeeping Requirement
STP Nuclear must maintain a record of any recordable injury,
illness, or fatality (as defined by 29 CFR 1904) resulting from the
task of cleaning and performing maintenance activities within the
condenser water box by completing OSHA Form 301, Injury and Illness
Incident Report, and OSHA Form 300, Log of Work-Related Injuries and
Illnesses. In addition, STP Nuclear must maintain records of all
maintenance activities performed at condenser water boxes at the STP
Nuclear site, as well as associated hazardous condition corrective
actions and repairs.
I. Notifications
To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified herein,
STP Nuclear must:
1. Notify OSHA's Office of Technical Programs and Coordination
Activities (OTPCA) and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area Office of any
recordable injury, illness, in-patient hospitalization,
amputation, loss of an eye, or fatality (by submitting the completed
OSHA Form 301, Injury and Illness Incident Report) resulting from
implementing the alternative isolation procedures of this permanent
variance conditions while completing the tasks of cleaning and/or
maintenance of the condenser water box, in accordance with 29 CFR 1904.
STP Nuclear shall provide the notification within 8 hours of the
incident or 8 hours after becoming aware of a recordable injury,
illness, or fatality; and a copy of the incident investigation (OSHA
Form 301, Injury and Illness Incident Report) must be submitted to OSHA
within 24 hours of the incident or 24 hours after becoming aware of a
recordable injury, illness, or fatality.
2. Provide OTPCA and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area Office a copy
of the incident investigation report (using OSHA Form 301, Injury and
Illness Incident Report) of these events within 24 hours of the
incident;
3. Include on the OSHA Form 301, Injury and Illness Incident
Report, information on the conditions associated with the recordable
injury or illness, the root-cause determination, and the preventive and
corrective actions identified and implemented.
4. Provide certification to OTPCA and the Corpus Christi, Texas
Area Office within 15 working days of any engulfment incident that STP
Nuclear has informed affected workers of the incident and the results
of the incident investigation (including the root-cause determination
and preventive and corrective actions identified and implemented).
5. Notify OTPCA and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area Office at least
15 working days in advance, should STP Nuclear need to revise the
permit-required confined space isolation procedures related to
condenser water box cleaning or maintenance affecting its ability to
comply with the conditions of this permanent variance.
6. Provide OTPCA and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area Office, by
January 31 of each calendar year, with a report covering the previous
calendar year, identifying the maintenance activities performed on the
condenser water boxes and evaluating the effectiveness of the alternate
permit-required confined space isolation procedures set forth in the
conditions of the permanent variance.
7. Inform OTPCA and the Corpus Christi, Texas Area Office as soon
as possible, but no later than 7 days, after it has knowledge that it
will:
(i) Cease doing business; or
(ii) Transfer the operations specified herein to a successor
company.
6. Notify all affected employees of this permanent variance by the
same means required to inform them of the application for a variance.
Authority and Signature
James S. Frederick, Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, Washington, DC 20210, authorized the
preparation of this notice. Accordingly, the agency is issuing this
notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 657(g)(2)), Secretary of Labor's Order No.
8-2020 (85 FR 58393, Sept. 18, 2020), and 29 CFR 1910.7.
Signed at Washington, DC, on April 22, 2021.
James S. Frederick,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 2021-08812 Filed 4-27-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P
