[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 161 (Thursday, August 20, 2015)] [Notices]
[Pages 50652-50662]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-20571]
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
[Docket No. OSHA-2014-0011]
Impregilo Healy Parsons Joint Venture; Grant of a Permanent
Variance
AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: In this notice, OSHA grants a permanent variance to Impregilo
Healy Parsons Joint Venture from the provisions of OSHA standards that
regulate work in compressed-air environments at 29 CFR 1926.803.
DATES: The permanent variance specified by this notice becomes
effective on August 20, 2015, and shall remain in effect until the
completion of the Anacostia River Tunnel Project, but no later than
December 31, 2016.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Information regarding this notice is
available from the following sources:
Press inquiries: Contact Mr. Frank Meilinger, Director, OSHA Office
of Communications, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue
NW., Room N-3647, Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-1999;
email: Meilinger.francis2@dol.gov.
General and technical information: Contact Mr. Kevin Robinson,
Director, Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities,
Directorate of Technical Support and Emergency Management, Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, 200
Constitution Avenue NW., Room N-3655, Washington, DC 20210; phone:
(202) 693-2110 or email: robinson.kevin@dol.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Copies of this Federal Register notice.
Electronic copies of this Federal Register notice are available at
http://www.regulations.gov. This Federal Register notice and other
relevant information are also available at OSHA's Web page at http://www.osha.gov.
I. Notice of Application
On April 3, 2014, Impregilo Healy Parsons Joint Venture, ("IHP
JV" or "the applicant"), 2600 Independence Avenue SE., Washington,
DC 20003, submitted an application for a permanent variance and interim
order under Section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 ("OSH Act"; 29 U.S.C. 655) and 29 CFR 1905.11 ("Variances and
other relief under section 6(d)") from several provisions of the OSHA
standard that regulates work in compressed air at 29 CFR 1926.803. IHP
JV also requested an interim order pending OSHA's decision on the
application for a variance (Exhibit OSHA-2014-0011-0001, Request for
Variance). Specifically, the applicant seeks a variance from the
provisions of the standard that: (1) Prohibit compressed-air worker
exposure to pressures exceeding 50 pounds per square inch (p.s.i.)
except in an emergency (29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5)); \1\ (2) require the use
of the decompression values specified in decompression tables in
Appendix A of the compressed-air standard for construction (29 CFR
1926.803(f)(1)); and (3) require the use of automated operational
controls and a special decompression chamber (29 CFR
1926.803(g)(1)(iii) and .803(g)(1)(xvii), respectively).
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\1\ The decompression tables in Appendix A of subpart S express
the maximum working pressures as pounds per square inch gauge
(p.s.i.g.), with a maximum working pressure of 50 p.s.i.g.
Therefore, throughout this notice, OSHA expresses the 50 p.s.i.
value specified by Sec. 1926.803(e)(5) as 50 p.s.i.g., consistent
with the terminology in Appendix A, Table 1 of subpart S.
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According to its application, IHP JV is currently the general
contractor for the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority's
("DC Water") project to construct the Anacostia River Tunnel. The
Anacostia River Tunnel project design requires the ability to safely
perform hyperbaric interventions in compressed air at pressures higher
than allowed in the existing OSHA standard 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5) which
states: "No employee shall be subjected to pressure exceeding 50
p.s.i.g. except in emergency" (see footnote 1).
The applicant is a contractor that works on complex tunnel projects
using recently developed equipment and procedures for soft-ground
tunneling. The applicant's workers engage in the construction of
subaqueous tunnels below the water table through soft soils consisting
of clay, silt, and sand using advanced shielded mechanical excavation
techniques in conjunction with an Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring
Machine (EPBTBM).
IHP JV employs specially trained personnel for the construction of
the tunnel, and states that this construction project uses shielded
mechanical-excavation techniques. IHP JV asserts that its workers
perform hyperbaric interventions at pressures greater than 50 p.s.i.g.
in the excavation chamber of the EPBTBM. The hyperbaric interventions
consist of conducting inspections and maintenance work on the cutter-
head structure and cutting tools of the EPBTBM.
OSHA considered IHP JV's application for a permanent variance and
interim order. On February 11, 2015, OSHA published a preliminary
Federal Register notice announcing IHP JV's application for a permanent
variance and interim order, grant of an interim order, and request for
comments (80 FR 7636) for the Anacostia River Tunnel project.
II. The Variance Application
A. Background
IHP JV asserts that innovations in tunnel excavation, specifically
with EPBTBMs, have, in most cases, eliminated the need to pressurize
the entire tunnel. These advances in technology modified substantially
the methods used by the construction industry to excavate subaqueous
tunnels compared to the caisson work regulated by the current OSHA
compressed-air standard for construction at 29 CFR 1926.803. Such
advances reduce the number of workers exposed, and the total duration
of exposure, to hyperbaric pressure during tunnel construction.
Using shielded mechanical-excavation techniques, in conjunction
with precast concrete tunnel liners and backfill grout, EPBTBMs provide
methods to achieve the face pressures required to maintain a stabilized
tunnel face through various geologies, and isolate that pressure to the
forward section (the working chamber) of the EPBTBM. Interventions in
the working chamber take place only after halting tunnel excavation and
preparing the machine and crew for an intervention. Interventions occur
to inspect or maintain the mechanical-excavation components located in
the working chamber. Maintenance conducted in the working chamber
includes changing replaceable cutting tools and disposable wear bars,
and, in rare cases, repairing structural damage to the cutter head.
In addition to innovations in tunnel-excavation methods, research
conducted after OSHA published its compressed-air standard for
construction in 1971, resulted in advances in hyperbaric medicine. In
this regard, the applicant asserts that the use of decompression
protocols incorporating oxygen is more efficient, effective, and safer
for tunnel workers than compliance with the existing OSHA standard (29
CFR 1926, subpart S, Appendix A decompression tables). According to the
applicant, contractors routinely and safely expose employees performing
interventions in the working chamber of EPBTBMs to hyperbaric pressures
up to 75 p.s.i.g., which is 50% higher than maximum pressure specified
by the existing OSHA standard (see 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5)). The
applicant asserts that these hyperbaric exposures are possible because
of advances in hyperbaric technology, a better understanding of
hyperbaric medicine, and the development of a project-specific HOM
(Hyperbaric Operations Manual) that requires specialized medical
support and hyperbaric supervision to provide assistance to a team of
specially trained man-lock attendants and hyperbaric workers.
The applicant contends that the alternative safety measures
included in its application provide its workers with a place of
employment that is at least as safe and healthful as they would obtain
under the existing provisions of OSHA's compressed-air standard for
construction. The applicant certifies that it provided employee
representatives of affected workers with a copy of the variance
application.\2\ The applicant also certifies that it notified its
workers of the variance application by posting, at prominent locations
where it normally posts workplace notices, a summary of the application
and information specifying where the workers can examine a copy of the
application. In addition, the applicant informed its workers and their
representatives of their rights to petition the Assistant Secretary of
Labor for Occupational Safety and Health for a hearing on the variance
application.
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\2\ See the definition of "Affected employee or worker" in
section VI. D.
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B. Variance From Paragraph (e)(5) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Prohibition of
Exposure to Pressure Greater Than 50 p.s.i.g. (See Footnote 1)
The applicant states that it may perform hyperbaric interventions
at pressures greater than 50 p.s.i.g. in the working chamber of the
EPBTBM; this pressure exceeds the pressure limit of 50 p.s.i.g.
specified for nonemergency purposes by 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5). The
EPBTBM has twin man locks, with each man lock having two compartments.
This configuration allows workers to access the man locks for
compression and decompression, and medical personnel to access the man
locks if required in an emergency.
EPBTBMs are capable of maintaining pressure at the tunnel face, and
stabilizing existing geological conditions, through the controlled use
of propel cylinders, a mechanically driven cutter head, bulkheads
within the shield, ground-treatment foam, and a screw conveyor that
moves excavated material from the working chamber. As noted earlier,
the forward-most portion of the EPBTBM is the working chamber, and this
chamber is the only pressurized segment of the EPBTBM. Within the
shield, the working chamber consists of two sections: The staging
chamber and the forward working chamber. The staging chamber is the
section of the working chamber between the man-lock door and the entry
door to the forward working chamber. The forward working chamber is
immediately behind the cutter head and tunnel face.
The applicant will pressurize the working chamber to the level
required to maintain a stable tunnel face. Pressure in the staging
chamber ranges from atmospheric (no increased pressure), to a maximum
pressure equal to the pressure in the working chamber. The applicant
asserts that most of the hyperbaric interventions will be at or near
atmospheric pressure. However, the applicant maintains that they may
have to perform interventions at pressures up to 52 p.s.i.g.
During interventions, workers enter the working chamber through one
of the twin man locks that open into the staging chamber. To reach the
forward part of the working chamber, workers pass through a door in a
bulkhead that separates the staging chamber from the forward working
chamber. The maximum crew size allowed in the forward working chamber
is three. At certain hyperbaric pressures (i.e., when decompression
times are greater than work times), the twin man locks allow for crew
rotation. During crew rotation, one crew can be compressing or
decompressing while the second crew is working. Therefore, the working
crew always has an unoccupied man lock at its disposal.
The applicant developed a project-specific HOM for the Anacostia
River Tunnel project (Exhibit OSHA-2014-0011-0003, IHP JV Project-
Specific HOM) that describes in detail the hyperbaric procedures and
required medical examinations used during the tunnel-construction
project. The HOM is project-specific, and discusses standard operating
procedures and emergency and contingency procedures. The procedures
include using experienced and knowledgeable man-lock attendants who
have the training and experience necessary to recognize and treat
decompression illnesses and injuries. The attendants are under the
direct supervision of the hyperbaric supervisor and attending
physician. In addition, procedures include medical screening and review
of prospective compressed-air workers (CAWs). The purpose of this
screening procedure is to vet prospective CAWs with medical conditions
(e.g., deep vein thrombosis, poor vascular circulation, and muscle
cramping) that could be aggravated by sitting in a cramped space (e.g.,
a man lock) for extended periods or by exposure to elevated pressures
and compressed gas mixtures. A transportable recompression chamber
(shuttle) is available to extract workers from the hyperbaric working
chamber for emergency evacuation and medical treatment; the shuttle
attaches to the topside medical lock, which is a large recompression
chamber. The applicant believes that the procedures included in the HOM
provide safe work conditions when interventions are necessary,
including interventions above 50 p.s.i.g.
C. Variance From Paragraph (f)(1) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement To
Use OSHA Decompression Tables
OSHA's compressed-air standard for construction requires
decompression in accordance with the decompression tables in Appendix A
of 29 CFR part 1926, subpart S (see 29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1)). As an
alternative to the OSHA decompression tables, the applicant proposes to
use newer decompression schedules that supplement breathing air used
during decompression with pure oxygen. The applicant asserts that these
decompression protocols are safer for tunnel workers than the
decompression protocols specified in Appendix A of 29 CFR part 1926,
subpart S. Accordingly, the applicant proposes to use the 1992 French
Decompression Tables to decompress CAWs after they exit the hyperbaric
conditions in the working chamber.
Depending on the maximum working pressure and exposure times, the
1992 French Decompression Tables provide for air decompression with or
without oxygen. IHP JV asserts that oxygen decompression has many
benefits, including (1) keeping the partial pressure of nitrogen in the
lungs as low as possible; (2) keeping external pressure as low as
possible to reduce the formation of bubbles in the blood; (3) removing
nitrogen from the lungs and arterial blood and increasing the rate of
elimination of nitrogen; (4) improving the quality of breathing during
decompression stops so that workers are less tired and to prevent bone
necrosis; (5) reducing decompression time by about 33 percent as
compared to air decompression; and (6) reducing inflammation.
In addition, the HOM requires a physician certified in hyperbaric
medicine to manage the medical condition of CAWs during hyperbaric
exposures and decompression. A trained and experienced man-lock
attendant also will be present during hyperbaric exposures and
decompression. This man-lock attendant will operate the hyperbaric
system to ensure compliance with the specified decompression table. A
hyperbaric supervisor (competent person), trained in hyperbaric
operations, procedures, and safety, will directly oversee all
hyperbaric interventions, and ensure that staff follow the procedures
delineated in the HOM or by the attending physician.
The applicant asserts that at higher hyperbaric pressures,
decompression times exceed 75 minutes. The HOM establishes protocols
and procedures that provide the basis for alternate means of protection
for CAWs under these conditions. Accordingly, based on these protocols
and procedures, the applicant requests to use the 1992 French
Decompression Tables for hyperbaric interventions up to 52 p.s.i.g. for
the Anacostia River Tunnel project. The applicant is committed to
follow the decompression procedures described in the project-specific
HOM during these interventions.
D. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(iii) of 29 CFR 1926.803,
Automatically Regulated Continuous Decompression
According to the applicant, breathing air under hyperbaric
conditions increases the amount of nitrogen gas dissolved in a CAW's
tissues. The greater the hyperbaric pressure under these conditions,
and the more time spent under the increased pressure, the greater the
amount of nitrogen gas dissolved in the tissues. When the pressure
decreases during decompression, tissues release the dissolved nitrogen
gas into the blood system, which then carries the nitrogen gas to the
lungs for elimination through exhalation. Releasing hyperbaric pressure
too rapidly during decompression can increase the size of the bubbles
formed by nitrogen gas in the blood system, resulting in DCI, commonly
referred to as "the bends." This description of the etiology of DCI
is consistent with current scientific theory and research on the issue
(see footnote 12 in this notice discussing a 1985 NIOSH report on DCI).
The 1992 French Decompression Tables proposed for use by the
applicant provide for stops during worker decompression (i.e., staged
decompression) to control the release of nitrogen gas from tissues into
the blood system. Studies show that staged decompression, in
combination with other features of the 1992 French Decompression Tables
such as the use of oxygen, result in a lower incidence of DCI than the
OSHA decompression requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803, which specify the
use of automatically regulated continuous decompression (see footnotes
10 through 14 in this notice for references to these studies).\3\ In
addition, the applicant asserts that staged decompression is at least
as effective as an automatic controller in regulating the decompression
process because:
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\3\ In the study cited in footnote 10 of this notice, starting
at page 338, Dr. Eric Kindwall notes that the use of automatically
regulated continuous decompression in the Washington State safety
standards for compressed-air work (from which OSHA derived its
decompression tables) was at the insistence of contractors and the
union, and against the advice of the expert who calculated the
decompression table and recommended using staged decompression. Dr.
Kindwall then states, "Continuous decompression is inefficient and
wasteful. For example, if the last stage from 4 p.s.i.g.... to
the surface took 1 h, at least half the time is spent at pressures
less than 2 p.s.i.g...., which provides less and less meaningful
bubble suppression...." In addition, the report referenced in
footnote 5 under the section titled, "Background on the Need for
Interim Decompression Tables" addresses the continuous-
decompression protocol in the OSHA compressed-air standard for
construction, noting that "[a]side from the tables for saturation
diving to deep depths, no other widely used or officially approved
diving decompression tables use straight line, continuous
decompressions at varying rates. Stage decompression is usually the
rule, since it is simpler to control."
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1. A hyperbaric supervisor (a competent person experienced and
trained in hyperbaric operations, procedures, and safety) directly
supervises all hyperbaric interventions and ensures that the man-lock
attendant, who is a competent person in the manual control of
hyperbaric systems, follows the schedule specified in the decompression
tables, including stops; and
2. The use of the 1992 French Decompression Tables for staged
decompression offers an equal or better level of management and control
over the decompression process than an automatic controller and results
in lower occurrences of DCI.
Accordingly, the applicant is applying for a permanent variance
from the OSHA standard at 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii), which requires
automatic controls to regulate decompression. As noted above, the
applicant is committed to conduct the staged decompression according to
the 1992 French Decompression Tables under the direct control of the
trained man-lock attendant and under the oversight of the hyperbaric
supervisor.
E. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(xvii) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement
of Special Decompression Chamber
The OSHA compressed-air standard for construction requires
employers to use a special decompression chamber when total
decompression time exceeds 75 minutes (see 29 CFR
1926.803(g)(1)(xvii)). Use of the special decompression chamber enables
CAWs to move about and flex their joints to prevent neuromuscular
problems during decompression.
As an alternative to using a special decompression chamber, the
applicant notes that since only the working chamber of the EPBTBM is
under pressure, and only a few workers out of the entire crew are
exposed to hyperbaric pressure, the man locks (which, as noted earlier,
connect directly to the working chamber) and the staging chamber are of
sufficient size to accommodate the exposed workers. In addition,
available space in the EPBTBM does not allow for an additional special
decompression lock. Again, the applicant uses the man locks, each of
which adequately accommodates a three-member crew, for this purpose
when decompression lasts up to 75 minutes. When decompression exceeds
75 minutes, crews can open the door connecting the two compartments in
each man lock during decompression stops or exit the man lock and move
into the staging chamber where additional space is available. This
alternative enables CAWs to move about and flex their joints to prevent
neuromuscular problems during decompression.
F. Previous Tunnel Construction Variances
OSHA notes that on May 23, 2014, it granted a sub-aqueous tunnel
construction permanent variance to Tully/OHL USA Joint Venture (79 FR
29809) from the same provisions of the standard that regulate work in
compressed air (at 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and
(g)(1)(xvii)) that are the subject of the present application. On March
27, 2015, OSHA also granted another sub-aqueous tunnel construction
permanent variance to Traylor/Skanska/Jay Dee Joint Venture (80 FR
16440) from the same provisions of the standard that are the subject of
the present application. Generally, the alternate conditions in this
notice are based on and very similar to the alternate conditions of the
previous permanent variances.
G. Multi-State Variance
As stated earlier in this notice, IHP JV applied for a permanent
variance and interim order for its Anacostia River Tunnel project only.
The Anacostia River Tunnel project is located entirely in the District
of Columbia and thus under Federal OSHA's exclusive jurisdiction.
Therefore, any variance OSHA grants IHP JV will have effect only in the
District of Columbia.
Twenty-eight state safety and health plans have been approved by
OSHA under section 18 of the (OSH) Act.\4\ As part of the permanent
variance process, the Directorate of Cooperative and State Programs
will notify the State Plans of IHP JV's variance application and grant
of the Anacostia River Tunnel project permanent variance.
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\4\ Six State Plans (Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, New
York, Maine and the Virgin Islands) limit their occupational safety
and health authority to state and local government employers only.
State Plans that exercise their occupational safety and health
authority over both public- and private-sector employers are:
Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.
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Additionally, in considering IHP JV's application for a permanent
variance and interim order, OSHA noted that four State Plans have
previously granted sub-aqueous tunnel construction variances and
imposed different or additional requirements and conditions
(California, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington). California also
promulgated new standards \5\ for similar sub-aqueous tunnel
construction work.
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\5\ See California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Subchapter 7,
Group 26, Article 154, available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/sb7g26a154.html.
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III. Description of the Conditions Specified for the Permanent Variance
This section describes the alternative means of compliance with 29
CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii) and provides
additional detail regarding the conditions that form the basis of IHP
JV's permanent variance.
Condition A: Scope
The scope of the permanent variance limits coverage to the work
situations specified under this condition. Clearly defining the scope
of the permanent variance provides IHP JV, IHP JV's employees, other
stakeholders, the public, and OSHA with necessary information regarding
the work situations in which the permanent variance applies.
According to 29 CFR 1905.11, an employer (or class or group of
employers \6\) may request a permanent variance for a specific
workplace or workplaces (multiple sites). If granted, the variance
applies to the specific employer(s) that submitted the application. In
this instance, the permanent variance applies to the applicant, IHP JV,
for its Anacostia River Tunnel project, and does not apply to any other
employers.
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\6\ A class or group of employers (such as members of a trade
alliance or association) may apply jointly for a variance provided
an authorized representative for each employer signs the application
and the application identifies each employer's affected facilities.
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Condition B: Application
This condition specifies the circumstances under which the
permanent variance is in effect, notably only for hyperbaric work
performed during interventions. The condition places clear limits on
the circumstances under which the applicant can expose its employees to
hyperbaric pressure.
Condition C: List of Abbreviations
This condition defines a number of abbreviations used in the
permanent variance. OSHA believes that defining these abbreviations
serves to clarify and standardize their usage, thereby enhancing the
applicant's and its employees' understanding of the conditions
specified by the permanent variance.
Condition D: Definitions
The condition defines a series of terms, mostly technical terms,
used in the permanent variance to standardize and clarify their
meaning. Defining these terms serves to enhance the applicant's and its
employees' understanding of the conditions specified by the permanent
variance.
Condition E: Safety and Health Practices
This condition requires the applicant to develop and submit to OSHA
an HOM specific to the Anacostia River Tunnel project at least six
months before using the EPBTBM for tunneling operations. Additionally,
the condition includes a series of related hazard prevention and
control requirements and methods (e.g., decompression tables, job
hazard analysis (JHA), operations and inspections checklists, incident
investigation, recording and notification to OSHA of recordable
hyperbaric injuries and illnesses, etc.) designed to ensure the
continued effective functioning of the hyperbaric equipment and
operating system.
Review of the HOM enables OSHA to: (1) Determine that the safety
and health instructions and measures it specifies are appropriate and
do adequately protect the safety and health of the CAWs and that it
conforms to the conditions of the variance; and (2) request the
applicant to revise or modify the HOM if it finds that the hyperbaric
safety and health procedures are not suitable for the specific project
and do not adequately protect the safety and health of the CAWs. Once
approved, the project-specific HOM becomes part of the variance, thus
enabling OSHA to enforce its safety and health procedures and
measures.\7\
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\7\ Publication of the preliminary Federal Register notice (80
FR 7636) announcing IHP JV's application for a permanent variance
and grant of a project-specific interim order constituted
acknowledgement by OSHA of the acceptability of the HOM provided by
IHP JV for the Anacostia River Tunnel project. Further, publication
of this Federal Register notice announcing grant of a project-
specific permanent variance constitutes acknowledgement by OSHA of
the acceptability of IHP JV's revised HOM (Rev 1) (Ex. OSHA-2014-
0011-0009).
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Condition F: Communication
This condition requires the applicant to develop and implement an
effective system of information sharing and communication. Effective
information sharing and communication ensures that affected workers
receive updated information regarding any safety-related hazards and
incidents, and corrective actions taken, prior to the start of each
shift. The condition also requires the applicant to ensure that
reliable means of emergency communications are available and maintained
for affected workers and support personnel during hyperbaric operations.
Availability of such reliable means of communication enable affected
workers and support personnel to respond quickly and effectively to
hazardous conditions or emergencies that may develop during EPBTBM
operations.
Condition G: Worker Qualification and Training
This condition requires the applicant to develop and implement an
effective qualification and training program for affected workers. The
condition specifies the factors that an affected worker must know to
perform safely during hyperbaric operations, including how to enter,
work in, and exit from hyperbaric conditions under both normal and
emergency conditions. Having well-trained and qualified workers
performing hyperbaric intervention work ensures that they recognize,
and respond appropriately to, hyperbaric safety and health hazards.
These qualification and training requirements enable affected workers
to cope effectively with emergencies, as well as the discomfort and
physiological effects of hyperbaric exposure, thereby preventing
injury, illness, and fatalities among workers.
As part of the qualification and training program, paragraph
(G)(2)(e) of this condition also requires the applicant to provide
affected workers with information they can use to contact the
appropriate healthcare professionals if they believe that they are
developing hyperbaric-related health effects. This requirement provides
for early intervention and treatment of DCI and other health effects
resulting from hyperbaric exposure, thereby reducing the potential
severity of these effects.
Condition H: Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention
This condition requires the applicant to develop, implement, and
operate a program of frequent and regular inspections of the EPBTBM's
hyperbaric equipment and support systems, and associated work areas.
This condition helps to ensure the safe operation and physical
integrity of the equipment and work areas necessary to conduct
hyperbaric operations. The condition also enhances worker safety by
reducing the risk of hyperbaric-related emergencies.
Paragraph (H)(3) of this condition requires the applicant to
document tests, inspections, corrective actions, and repairs involving
the EPBTBM, and maintain these documents at the job site for the
duration of the job. This requirement provides the applicant with
information needed to schedule tests and inspections to ensure the
continued safe operation of the equipment and systems, and to determine
that the actions taken to correct defects in hyperbaric equipment and
systems were appropriate, prior to returning them to service.
Condition I: Compression and Decompression
This condition requires the applicant to consult with its
designated medical advisor regarding special compression or
decompression procedures appropriate for any unacclimated CAW. This
provision ensures that the applicant consults with the medical advisor,
and involves the medical advisor in the evaluation, development, and
implementation of compression or decompression protocols appropriate
for any CAW requiring acclimation to the hyperbaric conditions
encountered during EPBTBM operations. Accordingly, CAWs requiring
acclimation have an opportunity to acclimate prior to exposure to these
hyperbaric conditions. OSHA believes this condition will prevent or
reduce adverse reactions among CAWs to the effects of compression or
decompression associated with the intervention work they perform in the
EPBTBM.
Condition J: Recordkeeping
This condition requires the applicant to maintain records of
specific factors associated with each hyperbaric intervention. The
information gathered and recorded under this provision, in concert with
the information provided under Condition K (using OSHA 301 Incident
Report form to investigate and record hyperbaric recordable injuries as
defined by 29 CFR 1904.4, 1904.7, 1904.8 through 1904.12), enables the
applicant and OSHA to determine the effectiveness of the permanent
variance in preventing decompression illness (DCI) and other
hyperbaric-related effects.\8\
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\8\ See 29 CFR 1904 Recording and Reporting Occupational
Injuries and Illnesses
(http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9631);
recordkeeping forms and instructions
(http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/RKform300pkg-fillable-enabled.pdf);
OSHA Recordkeeping Handbook
(http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/handbook/index.html);
and updates to OSHA's recordkeeping rule Web page
((79 FR 56130); http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping2014/index.html)).
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Condition K: Notifications
Under this condition, the applicant must, within specified periods:
(1) Notify OSHA of any recordable injuries, illnesses, in-patient
hospitalizations, amputations, loss of an eye, or fatality that occur
as a result of hyperbaric exposures during EPBTBM operations; (2)
provide OSHA with a copy of the incident investigation report (using
OSHA 301 form) of these events; (3) include on the 301 form information
on the hyperbaric conditions associated with the recordable injury or
illness, the root-cause determination, and preventive and corrective
actions identified and implemented by the applicant; and (4) its
certification that it informed affected workers of the incident and the
results of the incident investigation.
This condition also requires the applicant to: Notify the Office of
Technical Programs and Coordination Activities (OTPCA) and the
Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office within 15 working days should the
applicant need to revise its HOM to accommodate changes in its
compressed-air operations that affect its ability to comply with the
conditions of the permanent variance; and provide OSHA's OTPCA and the
Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office, at the end of the project, with a
report evaluating the effectiveness of the decompression tables.
These notification requirements enable the applicant, its
employees, and OSHA to determine the effectiveness of the permanent
variance in providing the requisite level of safety to the applicant's
workers and, based on this determination, whether to revise or revoke
the conditions of the permanent variance. Timely notification permits
OSHA to take whatever action may be necessary and appropriate to
prevent further injuries and illnesses. Providing notification to
employees informs them of the precautions taken by the applicant to
prevent similar incidents in the future.
This condition also requires the applicant to notify OSHA if it
ceases to do business, has a new address or location for its main
office, or transfers the operations covered by the permanent variance
to a successor company. In addition, the condition specifies that OSHA
must approve the transfer of the permanent variance to a successor
company. These requirements allow OSHA to communicate effectively with
the applicant regarding the status of the permanent variance, and
expedite the Agency's administration and enforcement of the permanent
variance. Stipulating that an applicant must have OSHA's approval to
transfer a variance to a successor company provides assurance that the
successor company has knowledge of, and will comply with, the
conditions specified by the permanent variance, thereby ensuring the
safety of workers involved in performing the operations covered by the
permanent variance.
IV. Comments on the Proposed Variance Application
OSHA received one public comment on the proposed variance
application. Mr. Barry Cole (safety specialist) representing Cole-
Preferred Safety Consulting, Inc., supported granting the permanent
variance (Exhibit OSHA-2014-0011-0008). In his comment, Mr. Cole made
two suggestions. First, he proposed that OSHA should allow the
applicant substantially more room to work beyond the anticipated
hyperbaric pressure of 52 p.s.i.g., by changing the upper hyperbaric
pressure limit of the variance from 52 p.s.i.g. to "the level
necessary to maintain safety on the face, and/up to the design/rating
limits of the machinery described." Second, he recommended that OSHA
should issue a letter of interpretation (LOI) that allows all tunnel
construction companies working under hyperbaric conditions "to be
allowed to use the stepped method of depressurization, as per
engineering/medical data and schedules (such as but not limited to the
French scale), as it is the best/safest practice, and the original
standard should have included it, even if the preference was for some
reason to use auto/straight line [decompression]. Either may be
allowed, under my proposed letter of interpretation."
The remainder of this section describes OSHA's response to Mr.
Cole's comments.
First, OSHA finds that the recommendation to increase the upper
hyperbaric pressure limit of the variance from 52 p.s.i.g. to the level
necessary to maintain safety at the face of the EPBTBM (up to 75
p.s.i.g.), is well beyond the scope of the requested variance.
Therefore, OSHA will not modify the permanent variance.
Initially, IHP JV sought a permanent variance for work in
hyperbaric environments up to 50 p.s.i.g., as indicated in its
Anacostia River Tunnel project-specific HOM. The HOM stated that in the
unlikely event that working pressures exceeding the anticipated maximum
of 50 p.s.i.g. are required during interventions, an amendment will be
prepared and added to the HOM. Following discussions with the
applicant, and in response to the applicant's request, OSHA is granting
an increase in the upper hyperbaric pressure limit of the variance from
50 p.s.i.g. to 52 p.s.i.g. This increase will: (1) Provide greater
flexibility and timeliness for responding to unanticipated conditions
such as the need for increased face pressure (exceeding 50 p.s.i.g.) in
the excavation chamber of the EPBTBM during interventions; and (2)
maintain consistency with the upper hyperbaric pressure limit of 52
p.s.i.g. included in the variance OSHA granted to Traylor Skanska Jay
Dee Joint Venture (80 FR 16440) for completing the Blue Plains Tunnel,
another phase of the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority's
("DC Water") Clean Rivers project. Subsequently, IHP JV submitted a
revised Anacostia River Tunnel project-specific HOM (Rev. 1; see Ex.
OSHA-2014-0011-0009) for work in hyperbaric environments up to 52
p.s.i.g.
Second, OSHA finds that the recommendation to publish a LOI on
stepped decompression using the French or other tables is well beyond
the scope of this variance. Therefore, OSHA will not undertake issuing
an LOI that allows tunnel construction companies working under
hyperbaric conditions to operate under the conditions of previously
granted variances. Moreover, the grant of this variance is conditioned
on OSHA's approval of the applicant's HOM, and such a procedure would
not be possible under a LOI.
Further, broader, industry-wide issues such as the setting of
hyperbaric exposure and decompression limits for all tunneling work
would be more appropriately resolved through the rulemaking process. In
recognition of this, on December 6, 2012, OSHA published a Federal
Register notice (77 FR 72781) announcing a request for information
(RFI) for its continuing regulatory reviews named standards improvement
projects (SIPs). The Agency is currently working on SIP-Phase IV (SIP-
IV). As part of SIP-IV, OSHA is considering updating the decompression
tables in Appendix A (1926.803 (f)(1)). This proposed action would
permit employers to use decompression procedures and updated
decompression tables that take advantage of new hyperbaric technologies
used widely in extreme hyperbaric exposures. If the planned SIP-IV
revises Appendix A, IHP JV (and similar tunneling contractors
previously granted a variance) will no longer need to obtain a variance
from the use of decompression values specified in decompression tables
in Appendix A of the compressed-air standard for construction (29 CFR
1926.803(f)(1)). However, they would still require hyperbaric tunneling
variances to address portions of the standard not proposed to be
covered by SIP-IV (i.e., 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5); .803(g)(1)(iii) and
.803(g)(1)(xvii)).
If SIP-IV is completed (including the planned update of the
decompression tables in Appendix A (1926.803 (f)(1)), OSHA will modify
IHP JV's and similar variances granted to other employers to include
the applicable SIP-IV provisions as appropriate.
V. Decision
As noted earlier, on February 11, 2015, OSHA published a
preliminary Federal Register notice announcing IHP JV's application for
a permanent variance and interim order, grant of an interim order, and
request for comments (80 FR 7636).
During the period starting with the February 11, 2015, publication
of the preliminary Federal Register notice announcing grant of the
interim order, until completion of the Anacostia River Tunnel or the
Agency modifies or revokes the interim order or makes a decision on its
application for a permanent variance, the applicant was required to
comply fully with the conditions of the interim order as an alternative
to complying with the requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803 (hereafter, "the
standard") that:
A. Prohibit employers using compressed air under hyperbaric
conditions from subjecting workers to pressure exceeding 50 p.s.i.g.,
except in emergency (29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5));
B. Require the use of decompression values specified by the
decompression tables in Appendix A of the compressed-air standard (29
CFR 1926.803(f)(1)); and
C. Require the use of automated operational controls and a special
decompression chamber (29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii) and .803(g)(1)(xvii),
respectively).
After reviewing the proposed alternative measures, OSHA determined
that:
A. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, effective
alternative measures to the prohibition of using compressed air under
hyperbaric conditions exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. The alternative measures
include use of engineering and administrative controls of the hazards
associated with work performed in compressed-air conditions exceeding
50 p.s.i.g. while engaged in the construction of a subaqueous tunnel
using advanced shielded mechanical-excavation techniques in conjunction
with an EPBTBM. Prior to conducting interventions in the EPBTBM's
pressurized working chamber, the applicant halts tunnel excavation and
prepares the machine and crew to conduct the interventions.
Interventions involve inspection, maintenance, or repair of the
mechanical-excavation components located in the working chamber.
B. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, safe hyperbaric
work procedures, emergency and contingency procedures, and medical
examinations for the project's CAWs. The applicant compiled these
standard operating procedures into a project-specific HOM. The HOM
discusses the procedures and personnel qualifications for performing
work safely during the compression and decompression phases of
interventions. The HOM also specifies the decompression tables the
applicant proposes to use. Depending on the maximum working pressure
and exposure times during the interventions, the tables provide for
decompression using air, pure oxygen, or a combination of air and
oxygen. The decompression tables also include delays or stops for
various time intervals at different pressure levels during the
transition to atmospheric pressure (i.e., staged decompression). In all
cases, a physician certified in hyperbaric medicine will manage the
medical condition of CAWs during decompression. In addition, a trained
and experienced man-lock attendant, experienced in recognizing
decompression sickness or illnesses and injuries, will be present. Of
key importance, a hyperbaric supervisor (competent person), trained in
hyperbaric operations, procedures, and safety, will directly supervise
all hyperbaric operations to ensure compliance with the procedures
delineated in the project-specific HOM or by the attending physician.
C. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, a training program
to instruct affected workers in the hazards associated with conducting
hyperbaric operations.
D. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, an effective
alternative to the use of automatic controllers that continuously
decrease pressure to achieve decompression in accordance with the
tables specified by the standard. The alternative includes using the
1992 French Decompression Tables for guiding staged decompression to
achieve lower occurrences of DCI, using a trained and competent
attendant for implementing appropriate hyperbaric entry and exit
procedures, and providing a competent hyperbaric supervisor, and
attending physician certified in hyperbaric medicine, to oversee all
hyperbaric operations.
E. IHP JV developed, and proposed to implement, an effective
alternative to the use of the special decompression chamber required by
the standard. EPBTBM technology permits the tunnel's work areas to be
at atmospheric pressure, with only the face of the EPBTBM (i.e., the
working chamber) at elevated pressure. The applicant limits
interventions conducted in the working chamber to performing required
inspection, maintenance, and repair of the cutting tools on the face of
the EPBTBM. The EPBTBM's man lock and working chamber provide
sufficient space for the maximum crew of three CAWs to stand up and
move around, and safely accommodate decompression times up to 360
minutes. Therefore, OSHA preliminarily determined that the EPBTBM's man
lock and working chamber function as effectively as the special
decompression chamber required by the standard.
OSHA conducted a review of the scientific literature regarding
decompression to determine whether the alternative decompression method
(i.e., the 1992 French Decompression Tables) proposed by the applicant
provide a workplace as safe and healthful as that provided by the
standard. Based on this review, OSHA preliminarily determined that
decompressions conducted in tunneling operations performed with tables
\9\ result in a lower occurrence of DCI than the decompression tables
specified by the standard.10 11 12
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\9\ In 1992, the French Ministry of Labour replaced the 1974
French Decompression Tables with the 1992 French Decompression
Tables, which differ from OSHA's decompression tables in Appendix A
by using: (1) Staged decompression as opposed to continuous (linear)
decompression; (2) decompression tables based on air or both air and
pure oxygen; and (3) emergency tables when unexpected exposure times
occur (up to 30 minutes above the maximum allowed working time).
\10\ Kindwall, EP (1997). Compressed-air tunneling and caisson
work decompression procedures: Development, problems, and solutions.
Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine, 24(4), pp. 337-345. This article
reported 60 treated cases of DCI among 4,168 exposures between 19
and 31 p.s.i.g. over a 51-week contract period, for a DCI incidence
of 1.44% for the decompression tables specified by the OSHA
standard.
\11\ Sealey, JL (1969). Safe exit from the hyperbaric
environment: Medical experience with pressurized tunnel operations.
Journal of Occupational Medicine, 11(5), pp. 273-275. This article
reported 210 treated cases of DCI among 38,600 hyperbaric exposures
between 13 and 34 p.s.i.g. over a 32-month period, for an incidence
of 0.54% for the decompression tables specified by the Washington
State safety standards for compressed-air work, which are similar to
the tables in the OSHA standard. Moreover, the article reported 51
treated cases of DCI for 3,000 exposures between 30 and 34 p.s.i.g.,
for an incidence of 1.7% for the Washington State tables.
\12\ In 1985, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) published a report entitled "Criteria for Interim
Decompression Tables for Caisson and Tunnel Workers;" this report
reviewed studies of DCI and other hyperbaric-related injuries
resulting from use of OSHA's tables. This report is available on
NIOSH's Web site: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/decompression/default.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The review conducted by OSHA found several research studies
supporting the determination that the 1992 French Decompression Tables
result in a lower rate of DCI than the decompression tables specified
by the standard. For example, H. L. Anderson studied the occurrence of
DCI at maximum hyperbaric pressures ranging from 4 p.s.i.g. to 43
p.s.i.g. during construction of the Great Belt Tunnel in Denmark (1992-
1996); \13\ this project used the 1992 French Decompression Tables to
decompress the workers during part of the construction. Anderson
observed 6 DCI cases out of 7,220 decompression events, and reported
that switching to the 1992 French Decompression tables reduced the DCI
incidence to 0.08%. The DCI incidence in the study by H.L. Andersen is
substantially less than the DCI incidence reported for the
decompression tables specified in Appendix A. OSHA found no studies in
which the DCI incidence reported for the 1992 French Decompression
Tables were higher than the DCI incidence reported for the OSHA
decompression tables, nor did OSHA find any studies indicating that the
1992 French Decompression Tables were more hazardous to employees than
the OSHA decompression tables.\14\ Therefore, OSHA concludes that use
of the 1992 French Decompression Tables protect workers at least as
effectively as the OSHA decompression tables.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Anderson HL (2002). Decompression sickness during
construction of the Great Belt tunnel, Denmark. Undersea and
Hyperbaric Medicine, 29(3), pp. 172-188.
\14\ Le P[eacute]chon JC, Barre P, Baud JP, Ollivier F
(September 1996). Compressed-air work--French tables 1992--
operational results. JCLP Hyperbarie Paris, Centre Medical
Subaquatique Interentreprise, Marseille: Communication a l'EUBS, pp.
1-5 (see Ex. OSHA-2014-0011-0004).
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Based on a review of available evidence, the experience of State
Plans that either granted variances (Nevada, Oregon, and Washington)
\15\ or promulgated a new standard (California)\16\ for hyperbaric
exposures occurring during similar subaqueous tunnel-construction work,
and the information provided in the applicant's variance application,
OSHA is granting the permanent variance.
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\15\ These state variances are available in the docket: Exs.
OSHA-2014-0011-0005 (Nevada), OSHA-2014-0011-0006 (Oregon), and
OSHA-2014-0011-0007 (Washington).
\16\ See California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Subchapter 7,
Group 26, Article 154, available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/sb7g26a154.html.
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Under Section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (29 U.S.C. 655(d)), and based on the record discussed above, the
Agency finds that when the employer complies with the conditions of the
following order, the working conditions of the employer's workers are at
least as safe and healthful as if the employer complied with the working
conditions specified by paragraphs (e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii)
of 29 CFR 1926.803. Under the terms of this variance, IHP JV must:
(1) Comply with the conditions listed below under
"Specific Conditions of the Permanent Variance" for the period between the
date of this notice and completion of the Anacostia River Tunnel project,
but no later than December 31, 2016; (2) comply fully with all other
applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1926; and (3) provide a copy of this
Federal Register notice to all employees affected by the conditions,
including the affected employees of other employers, using the same means it
used to inform these employees of its application for a permanent variance.
This order will remain in effect until one of the following conditions occurs:
(1) Completion of the IHP JV Anacostia River Tunnel project but no later
than December 31, 2016; or (2) OSHA modifies or revokes this final
order in accordance with 29 CFR 1905.13.
VI. Order
As of the effective date of this final order, OSHA is revoking the
interim order granted to the employer on February 11, 2015 (80 FR
7636).
OSHA issues this final order authorizing Impregilo Healy Parsons
Joint Venture, ("IHP JV" or "the applicant"), to comply with the
following conditions instead of complying with the requirements of
paragraphs 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and
(g)(1)(xvii). This final order applies to Impregilo Healy Parsons Joint
Venture at the Anacostia River Tunnel project in Washington, DC. These
conditions are:
A. Scope
The permanent variance applies only to work:
1. That occurs in conjunction with construction of the Anacostia
River Tunnel project, a subaqueous tunnel constructed using advanced
shielded mechanical-excavation techniques and involving operation of an
EPBTBM;
2. Performed under compressed-air and hyperbaric conditions up to
52 p.s.i.g. at the Anacostia River Tunnel project;
3. In the EPBTBM's forward section (the working chamber) and
associated hyperbaric chambers used to pressurize and decompress
employees entering and exiting the working chamber;
4. Except for the requirements specified by 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5),
(f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii), IHP JV must comply fully with
all other applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1926; and
5. This order will remain in effect until one of the following
conditions occurs: (1) Completion of the Anacostia River Tunnel
project, but no later than December 31, 2016; or (2) OSHA modifies or
revokes this final order in accordance with 29 CFR 1905.13.
B. Application
The permanent variance applies only when IHP JV stops the tunnel-
boring work, pressurizes the working chamber, and the CAWs either enter
the working chamber to perform interventions (i.e., inspect, maintain,
or repair the mechanical-excavation components), or exit the working
chamber after performing interventions.
C. List of Abbreviations
Abbreviations used throughout this permanent variance include the
following:
1. CAW--Compressed-air worker
2. CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
3. DCI--Decompression Illness
4. EPBTBM--Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring Machine
5. HOM--Hyperbaric Operations and Safety Manual
6. JHA--Job hazard analysis
7. OSHA--Occupational Safety and Health Administration
8. OTPCA--Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities
D. Definitions
The following definitions apply to this permanent variance. These
definitions supplement the definitions in IHP JV's project-specific
HOM.
1. Affected employee or worker--an employee or worker who is
affected by the conditions of this permanent variance, or any one of
his or her authorized representatives. The term "employee" has the
meaning defined and used under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.)
2. Atmospheric pressure--the pressure of air at sea-level,
generally, 14.7 p.s.i.a., 1 atmosphere absolute, or 0 p.s.i.g.
3. Compressed-air worker--an individual who is specially trained
and medically qualified to perform work in a pressurized environment
while breathing air at pressures up to 52 p.s.i.g.
4. Competent person--an individual who is capable of identifying
existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working
conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees,
and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to
eliminate them.\17\
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\17\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Decompression illness--an illness (also called decompression
sickness (DCS) or the bends) caused by gas bubbles appearing in body
compartments due to a reduction in ambient pressure. Examples of
symptoms of decompression illness include (but are not limited to):
joint pain (also known as the 'bends' for agonizing pain or the
'niggles' for slight pain); areas of bone destruction (termed dysbaric
osteonecrosis); skin disorders (such as cutis marmorata, which causes a
pink marbling of the skin); spinal cord and brain disorders (such as
stroke, paralysis, paresthesia, and bladder dysfunction);
cardiopulmonary disorders, such as shortness of breath; and arterial
gas embolism (gas bubbles in the arteries that block blood flow).\18\
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\18\ See Appendix 10 of "A Guide to the Work in Compressed-Air
Regulations 1996," published by the United Kingdom Health and
Safety Executive available from NIOSH at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docket/archive/pdfs/NIOSH-254/compReg1996.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Health effects associated with hyperbaric intervention but
not considered symptoms of DCI can include: barotrauma (direct damage
to air-containing cavities in the body such as ears, sinuses and
lungs); nitrogen narcosis (reversible alteration in consciousness that
may occur in hyperbaric environments and is caused by the anesthetic
effect of certain gases at high pressure); and oxygen toxicity (a
central nervous system condition resulting from the harmful effects of
breathing molecular oxygen (O2) at elevated partial
pressures).
6. Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel Boring Machine--the machinery
used to excavate the tunnel.
7. Hot work--any activity performed in a hazardous location that
may introduce an ignition source into a potentially flammable
atmosphere.\19\
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\19\ Also see 29 CFR 1910.146(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. Hyperbaric--at a higher pressure than atmospheric pressure.
9. Hyperbaric intervention--a term that describes the process of
stopping the EPBTBM and preparing and executing work under hyperbaric
pressure in the working chamber for the purpose of inspecting,
replacing, or repairing cutting tools and/or the cutterhead structure.
10. Hyperbaric Operations Manual--a detailed, project-specific
health and safety plan developed and implemented by IHP JV for working
in compressed air during the construction of the Anacostia River Tunnel.
11. Job hazard analysis--an evaluation of tasks or operations to
identify potential hazards and to determine the necessary controls.
12. Man lock--an enclosed space capable of pressurization, and used
for compressing or decompressing any employee or material when either
is passing into or out of a working chamber.
13. Pressure--a force acting on a unit area. Usually expressed as
pounds per square inch (p.s.i.).
14. p.s.i.--pounds per square inch, a common unit of measurement of
pressure; a pressure given in p.s.i. corresponds to absolute pressure.
15. p.s.i.a--pounds per square inch absolute, or absolute pressure,
is the sum of the atmospheric pressure and gauge pressure. At sea-
level, atmospheric pressure is approximately 14.7 p.s.i. Adding 14.7 to
a pressure expressed in units of p.s.i.g. will yield the absolute
pressure, expressed as p.s.i.a.
16. p.s.i.g.--pounds per square inch gauge, a common unit of
pressure; pressure expressed as p.s.i.g. corresponds to pressure
relative to atmospheric pressure. At sea-level, atmospheric pressure is
approximately 14.7 p.s.i. Subtracting 14.7 from a pressure expressed in
units of p.s.i.a. yields the gauge pressure, expressed as p.s.i.g.
17. Qualified person--an individual who, by possession of a
recognized degree, certificate, or professional standing, or who, by
extensive knowledge, training, and experience, successfully
demonstrates an ability to solve or resolve problems relating to the
subject matter, the work, or the project.\20\
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\20\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(m).
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18. Working chamber--an enclosed space in the EPBTBM in which CAWs
perform interventions, and which is accessible only through a man lock.
E. Safety and Health Practices
1. IHP JV must develop and implement a project-specific HOM, and
submit the HOM to OSHA for approval at least six months before using
the EPBTBM. IHP JV must receive a written acknowledgement from OSHA
regarding the acceptability of the HOM.\21\ The HOM shall provide the
governing safety and health requirements regarding hyperbaric exposures
during the tunnel-construction project.
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\21\ See footnote 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. IHP JV must implement the safety and health instructions
included in the manufacturer's operations manuals for the EPBTBM, and
the safety and health instructions provided by the manufacturer for the
operation of decompression equipment.
3. IHP JV must use air as the only breathing gas in the working
chamber.
4. IHP JV must use the 1992 French Decompression Tables for air,
air-oxygen, and oxygen decompression specified in the HOM,
specifically, the tables titled, "French Regulation Air Standard
Tables."
5. IHP JV must equip man locks used by its employees with an
oxygen-delivery system as specified by the HOM. IHP JV must not store
oxygen or other compressed gases used in conjunction with hyperbaric
work in the tunnel.
6. Workers performing hot work under hyperbaric conditions must use
flame-retardant personal protective equipment and clothing.
7. In hyperbaric work areas, IHP JV must maintain an adequate fire-
suppression system approved for hyperbaric work areas.
8. IHP JV must develop and implement one or more JHAs for work in
the hyperbaric work areas, and review, periodically, and as necessary
(e.g., after making changes to a planned intervention that affects its
operation), the contents of the JHAs with affected employees. The JHAs
must include all the job functions that the risk assessment \22\
indicates are essential to prevent injury or illness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ See ANSI/AIHA Z10-2012, American National Standard for
Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems, for reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. IHP JV must develop a set of checklists to guide compressed-air
work and ensure that employees follow the procedures required by this
permanent variance (including all procedures required by the HOM, which
this permanent variance incorporates by reference). The checklists must
include all steps and equipment functions that the risk assessment
indicates are essential to prevent injury or illness during compressed-
air work.
10. IHP JV must ensure that the safety and health provisions of the
HOM adequately protect the workers of all contractors and
subcontractors involved in hyperbaric operations.\23\
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\23\ See ANSI/ASSE A10.33-2011, American National Standard for
Construction and Demolition Operations--Safety and Health Program
Requirements for Multi-Employer Projects, for reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. Communication
1. Prior to beginning a shift, IHP JV must implement a system that
informs workers exposed to hyperbaric conditions of any hazardous
occurrences or conditions that might affect their safety, including
hyperbaric incidents, gas releases, equipment failures, earth or rock
slides, cave-ins, flooding, fires, or explosions.
2. IHP JV must provide a power-assisted means of communication
among affected workers and support personnel in hyperbaric conditions
where unassisted voice communication is inadequate.
(a) IHP JV must use an independent power supply for powered
communication systems, and these systems must operate such that use or
disruption of any one phone or signal location will not disrupt the
operation of the system from any other location.
(b) IHP JV must test communication systems at the start of each
shift and as necessary thereafter to ensure proper operation.
G. Worker Qualifications and Training
IHP JV must:
1. Ensure that each affected worker receives effective training on
how to safely enter, work in, exit from, and undertake emergency
evacuation or rescue from, hyperbaric conditions, and document this
training.
2. Provide effective instruction, before beginning hyperbaric
operations, to each worker who performs work, or controls the exposure
of others, in hyperbaric conditions, and document this instruction. The
instruction must include topics such as:
(a) The physics and physiology of hyperbaric work;
(b) Recognition of pressure-related injuries;
(c) Information on the causes and recognition of the signs and
symptoms associated with decompression illness, and other hyperbaric
intervention-related health effects (e.g., barotrauma, nitrogen
narcosis, and oxygen toxicity);
(d) How to avoid discomfort during compression and decompression;
and
(e) Information the workers can use to contact the appropriate
healthcare professionals should the workers have concerns that they may
be experiencing adverse health effects from hyperbaric exposure.
3. Repeat the instruction specified in paragraph (2) of this
condition periodically, and as necessary (e.g., after making changes to
its hyperbaric operations).
4. When conducting training for its hyperbaric workers, make this
training available to OSHA personnel and notify the OTPCA at OSHA's
national office and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office before the
training takes place.
H. Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention
1. IHP JV must initiate and maintain a program of frequent and
regular inspections of the EPBTBM's hyperbaric equipment and support
systems (such as temperature control, illumination, ventilation, and
fire-prevention and fire-suppression systems), and hyperbaric work
areas, as required under 29 CFR 1926.20(b)(2) by:
(a) Developing a set of checklists to be used by a competent person
in conducting weekly inspections of hyperbaric equipment and work
areas; and
(b) Ensuring that a competent person conducts daily visual checks
and weekly inspections of the EPBTBM.
2. If the competent person determines that the equipment
constitutes a safety hazard, IHP JV must remove the equipment from
service until it corrects the hazardous condition and has the
correction approved by a qualified person.
3. IHP JV must maintain records of all tests and inspections of the
EPBTBM, as well as associated corrective actions and repairs, at the
job site for the duration of the job.
I. Compression and Decompression
IHP JV must consult with its attending physician concerning the
need for special compression or decompression exposures appropriate for
CAWs not acclimated to hyperbaric exposure.
J. Recordkeeping
IHP JV must maintain a record of any recordable injuries,
illnesses, in-patient hospitalizations, amputations, loss of an eye, or
fatality (as defined by 29 CFR part 1904 Recording and Reporting
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses), resulting from exposure of an
employee to hyperbaric conditions by completing the OSHA 301 Incident
Report form and OSHA 300 Log of Work Related Injuries and Illnesses.
Note: Examples of important information to include on the OSHA 301
Incident Report form (along with the corresponding question on the
form) must address the following: the task performed (Question (Q) 14);
an estimate of the CAW's workload (Q 14); the composition of the gas
mixture (e.g., air or oxygen); the pressure worked at (Q 14);
temperature in the work and decompression environments (Q 14); did
something unusual occur during the task or decompression (Q 14); time
of symptom onset (Q 15); duration of time between decompression and
onset of symptoms (Q 15); nature and duration of symptoms (Q 16); a
medical summary of the illness or injury (Q 16); duration of the
hyperbaric intervention (Q 17); any possible contributing factors (Q
17); the number of prior interventions completed by injured or ill CAW
(Q 17); the number of prior interventions completed by injured or ill
CAW at that pressure (Q 17); the contact information for the treating
healthcare provider (Q 17); and the date and time of last hyperbaric
exposure for this CAW.
In addition to completing the OSHA 301 Incident Report form and
OSHA 300 Log of Work Related Injuries and Illnesses, IHP JV must
maintain records of:
1. The date, times (e.g., began compression, time spent
compressing, time performing intervention, time spent decompressing),
and pressure for each hyperbaric intervention.
2. The name of each individual worker exposed to hyperbaric
pressure and the decompression protocols and results for each worker.
3. The total number of interventions and the amount of hyperbaric
work time at each pressure.
4. The post-intervention physical assessment of each individual CAW
for signs and symptoms of decompression illness, barotrauma, nitrogen
narcosis, oxygen toxicity or other health effects associated with work
in compressed air or mixed gasses for each hyperbaric intervention.
K. Notifications
1. To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified herein,
IHP JV must:
(a) Notify the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office of
any recordable injuries, illnesses, in-patient hospitalizations,
amputations, loss of an eye, or fatality (by submitting the completed
OSHA 301 Incident Report form \24\) resulting from exposure of an
employee to hyperbaric conditions including those that do not require
recompression treatment (e.g., nitrogen narcosis, oxygen toxicity,
barotrauma), but still meet the recordable injury or illness criteria
(of 29 CFR 1904). The employer shall provide the notification within 8
hours of the incident, or 8 hours after becoming aware of a recordable
injury, illness, in-patient hospitalization, amputation, loss of an
eye, or fatality, and submit a copy of the incident investigation (OSHA
form 301) within 24 hours of the incident, or 24 hours after becoming
aware of a recordable injury, illness, in-patient hospitalization,
amputation, loss of an eye, or fatality. In addition to the information
required by the OSHA form 301, the incident-investigation report must
include a root-cause determination, and the preventive and corrective
actions identified and implemented.
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\24\ See footnote 8.
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(b) Provide certification within 15 days of the incident that the
employer informed affected workers of the incident and the results of
the incident investigation (including the root-cause determination and
preventive and corrective actions identified and implemented).
(c) Notify the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office
within 15 working days in writing of any change in the compressed-air
operations that affects IHP JV's ability to comply with the conditions
specified herein.
(d) Upon completion of the Anacostia River Tunnel project, evaluate
the effectiveness of the decompression tables used throughout the
project, and provide a written report of this evaluation to the OTPCA
and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office.
Note: The evaluation report is to contain summaries of: (1) The
number, dates, durations, and pressures of the hyperbaric
interventions completed; (2) decompression protocols implemented
(including composition of gas mixtures (air and/or oxygen), and the
results achieved; (3) the total number of interventions and the
number of hyperbaric incidents (decompression illnesses and/or
health effects associated with hyperbaric interventions as recorded
on OSHA 301 and 300 forms, and relevant medical diagnoses and
treating physicians' opinions); and (4) root-causes, and preventive
and corrective actions identified and implemented.
(e) To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified
herein, inform the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington DC Area Office as
soon as possible after it has knowledge that it will:
(i) Cease to do business;
(ii) Change the location and address of the main office for
managing the tunneling operations specified by the project-specific
HOM; or
(iii) Transfer the operations specified herein to a successor
company.
(f) Notify all affected employees of this permanent variance by the
same means required to inform them of its application for a variance.
2. OSHA must approve the transfer of this permanent variance to a
successor company.
Authority and Signature
David Michaels, Ph.D., MPH, Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, 200 Constitution Avenue NW.,
Washington, DC 20210, authorized the preparation of this notice.
Accordingly, the Agency is issuing this notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 655(d),
Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-2012 (77 FR 3912, Jan. 25, 2012), and
29 CFR 1905.11.
Signed at Washington, DC, August 14, 2015.
David Michaels,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 2015-20571 Filed 8-19-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P
