Salini-Impregilo/Healy Joint Venture: Grant of Permanent Variance | Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Publication Date:

05/11/2020
Publication Type:

Notice
Fed Register #:
85:27767-27775
Standard Number:

1905.11

1905.13

1904

1904.4

1904.7

1904.8

1904.9

1904.10

1904.11

1904.12

1926

1926.20(b)(2)

1926.803

1926.803(f)(1)

1926.803(g)(1)(iii)

1926.803(g)(1)(xvii)

1926.803(f)(2)

1926.803(e)(5)

1926.803(g)(2)(vii)

1926.32(f)

1926.32(m)

1910.146(b)
Title:
Salini-Impregilo/Healy Joint Venture: Grant of Permanent Variance

[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 91 (Monday, May 11, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 27767-27775]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-09967]

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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

[Docket No. OSHA-2018-0013]

Salini-Impregilo/Healy Joint Venture: Grant of Permanent Variance

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.

ACTION: Notice of permanent variance.

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SUMMARY: In this notice, OSHA grants a permanent variance to Salini-
Impregilo/Healy Joint Venture from the provisions of OSHA standards
that regulate work in compressed-air environments.

DATES: The permanent variance specified by this notice becomes
effective on May 11, 2020 and shall remain in effect until the
completion of the Northeast Boundary Tunnel project.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Information regarding this notice is
available from the following sources:
Press inquiries: Contact Mr. Frank Meilinger, Director, OSHA Office
of Communications, phone: (202) 693-1999; email:
meilinger.francis2@dol.gov.
General and Technical Information: Contact Kevin Robinson,
Director, Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities,
Directorate of Technical Support and Emergency Management, Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor; phone:
(202) 693-2110 or email: robinson.kevin@dol.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Copies of this Federal Register notice: Electronic copies of this
Federal Register notice are available at http://www.regulations.gov.
This Federal Register notice and other relevant

information are also available at OSHA's web page at http://www.osha.gov.

I. Overview

On October 19, 2017, OSHA received a variance application from
Salini-Impregilo/Healy Joint Venture (``Salini'' or ``the applicant'')
regarding the Northeast Boundary Tunnel project, which consists of
boring a 12-foot diameter tunnel under a roadway near the Potomac River
in Washington, DC. Salini, requested a permanent variance from several
provisions of 29 CFR 1926.803, the OSHA standard that regulates
construction work in compressed air environments. Specifically, Salini
sought a variance from the provisions of the standard that: (1) Require
the use of the decompression values specified in decompression tables
in Appendix A of the compressed-air standard for construction (29 CFR
1926.803(f)(1)); and (2) require the use of automated operational
controls and a special decompression chamber (29 CFR
1926.803(g)(1)(iii) and .803(g)(1)(xvii), respectively).
Salini also requested an interim order pending OSHA's decision on
the application for a variance (Document ID No. OSHA-2018-0013-0001).
OSHA reviewed Salini's application for the variance and interim
order and determined that they were appropriately submitted in
compliance with the applicable variance procedures in Section 6(d) of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (``OSH Act''; 29 U.S.C.
655) and OSHA's regulations at 29 CFR 1905.11 (``Variances and other
relief under section 6(d)''), including the requirement that the
applicant inform workers and their representatives of their rights to
petition the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and
Health for a hearing on the variance application.
OSHA reviewed the alternative procedures in Salini's application
and preliminarily determined that the applicant's proposed alternatives
on the whole, subject to the conditions in the request and imposed by
the Interim Order, provide measures that are as safe and healthful as
those required by the cited OSHA standards. On August 27, 2019, OSHA
published a Federal Register notice announcing Salini's application for
permanent variance, stating the preliminary determination along with
the basis of that determination, and granting the Interim Order (84 FR
44932). OSHA requested comments on each.
OSHA did not receive any comments or other information disputing
the preliminary determination that the alternatives were at least as
safe as OSHA's standard, nor any objections to OSHA granting a
permanent variance. Accordingly, through this notice OSHA grants a
permanent variance subject to the conditions set out in this document.

II. Salini and Its Proposed Excavation Techniques and Safeguards

The information that follows about Salini, its methods, and its
project comes from Salini's variance application.
Salini, which is the general contractor for the Northeast Boundary
Tunnel Project (hereafter, ``the project''), is a contractor that works
on complex tunnel projects using innovations in tunnel-excavation
methods. Salini's workers engage in the construction of tunnels using
advanced shielded mechanical excavation techniques in conjunction with
an earth pressure balanced tunnel boring machine (EPBMTBM). Using
shielded mechanical excavation techniques, in conjunction with precast
concrete tunnel liners and backfill grout, EPBMTBMs provide methods to
achieve the face pressures required to the forward section (the working
chamber) of the EPBMTBM.
The project consists of a 12-foot diameter tunnel under a roadway
near the Potomac River in Washington, DC. Salini will bore the tunnel
below the water table through soft soils consisting of clay, silt, and
sand. Salini employs specially trained personnel for the construction
of the tunnel, and states that this construction will use shielded
mechanical-excavation techniques. Salini's workers perform hyperbaric
interventions at pressures greater than 50 p.s.i.g. in the excavation
chamber of the EPBMTBM; these interventions consist of conducting
inspections and maintenance work on the cutter-head structure and
cutting tools of the EPBMTBM.
Salini asserted in the variance application that innovations in
tunnel excavation, specifically with EPBMTBMs, have, in most cases,
eliminated the need to pressurize the entire tunnel. This technology
negates the requirement that all members of a tunnel-excavation crew
work in compressed air while excavating the tunnel. These advances in
technology modified substantially the methods used by the construction
industry to excavate subaqueous tunnels compared to the work regulated
by the current OSHA compressed-air standard for construction at 29 CFR
1926.803. Such advances reduce the number of workers exposed, and the
total duration of exposure, to hyperbaric pressure during tunnel
construction.
Using shielded mechanical-excavation techniques, in conjunction
with pre-cast concrete tunnel liners and backfill grout, EPBMTBMs
provide methods to achieve the pressures required to maintain a
stabilized tunnel face through various geologies, while isolating that
pressure to the forward section (working or excavation chamber) of the
EPBMTBM. EPBMTBMs are staffed by trained man-lock attendants and
hyperbaric or compressed-air workers.
Interventions involving the working chamber (the pressurized
chamber at the head of the EPBMTBM) take place only after the applicant
halts tunnel excavation and prepares the machine and crew for an
intervention. Interventions occur to inspect or maintain the
mechanical-excavation components located in the forward portion of the
working chamber. Maintenance conducted in the forward portion of the
working chamber includes changing replaceable cutting tools and
disposable wear bars, and, in rare cases, making repairs to the cutter
head due to structural damage.
In addition to innovations in tunnel-excavation methods, research
conducted after OSHA published its compressed-air standard for
construction in 1971 resulted in advances in hyperbaric medicine. In
this regard, the applicant asserts that the use of decompression
protocols incorporating oxygen is more efficient, effective, and safer
for tunnel workers than compliance with the existing OSHA standard (29
CFR 1926, subpart S, Appendix A decompression tables). According to the
applicant, workers must periodically enter the excavation working
chamber of EPBMTBMs to hyperbaric pressures up to 50 p.s.i.g., which
does not exceed the maximum pressure specified by the existing OSHA
standard (29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5)). The applicant asserts that these
hyperbaric exposures are possible because of advances in hyperbaric
technology, a better understanding of hyperbaric medicine, and the
development of a project-specific Hyberbaric Operations Manual (HOM)
that requires specialized medical support and hyperbaric supervision to
provide assistance to a team of specially trained man-lock attendants
and hyperbaric workers.
Salini contended that the alternative safety measures included in
the application provide Salini's workers with a place of employment
that is at least as safe and healthful as they would obtain under the
existing provisions of

OSHA's compressed-air standard for construction.
OSHA included all of the above information in the Federal Register
notice regarding Salini's variance application and did not receive any
comments disputing any of that information, including the safety
assertions made by Salini in the Variance application.

III. OSHA History of Approval of Nearly Identical Variance Requests

OSHA has previously approved several nearly identical variances
involving the same types of tunneling equipment used for similar
projects. OSHA notes that it granted three subaqueous tunnel
construction Permanent Variances from the same provisions of OSHA's
compressed-air standard (29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and
(g)(1)(xvii)) that are the subject of the present application: (1)
Impregilo, Healy, Parsons, Joint Venture (IHP JV) for the completion of
the Annacostia River Tunnel in Washington, DC (80 FR 50652 (August 20,
2015)); (2) Traylor JV for the completion of the Blue Plains Tunnel in
Washington, DC (80 FR 16440 (March 27, 2015)); and (3) Tully/OHL USA
Joint Venture for the completion of the New York Economic Development
Corporation's New York Siphon Tunnel project (79 FR 29809) (May 23,
2014)). The proposed alternate conditions in this notice are nearly
identical to the alternate conditions of the previous Permanent
Variances.\1\ OSHA is not aware of any injuries or other safety issues
that arose from work performed under these conditions in accordance
with the previous variances.
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\1\ The other variances allowed further deviation from OSHA
standards by permitting employee exposures above 50 p.s.i.g. based
on the composition of the soil and the amount of water that will be
above the tunnel for various sections of this project. The current
proposed variance includes substantively the same safeguards as the
variances that OSHA granted previously even though employees will
not be exposed to the higher pressures.
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IV. Applicable OSHA Standard and the Relevant Variances

A. Variance From Paragraph (f)(1) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement To
Use OSHA Decompression Tables

OSHA's compressed-air standard for construction requires
decompression in accordance with the decompression tables in Appendix A
of 29 CFR 1926, subpart S (29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1)). As an alternative to
the OSHA decompression tables, the applicant proposes to use newer
decompression schedules (the 1992 French Decompression Tables) that
rely on staged decompression and supplement breathing air used during
decompression with air or oxygen (as appropriate). The applicant
asserts decompression protocols using the 1992 French Decompression
Tables for air or oxygen as specified by the Northeast Boundary Tunnel-
specific Hyperbaric Operations Manual (HOM) are safer for tunnel
workers than the decompression protocols specified in Appendix A of 29
CFR 1926, subpart S. Accordingly, the applicant commits to following
the decompression procedures described in that HOM, which would require
it to follow the 1992 French Decompression Tables to decompress
compressed-air workers (CAWs) after they exit the hyperbaric conditions
in the working chamber.
Depending on the maximum working pressure and exposure times, the
1992 French Decompression Tables provide for air decompression with or
without oxygen. Salini asserts that oxygen decompression has many
benefits, including (1) keeping the partial pressure of nitrogen in the
lungs as low as possible; (2) keeping external pressure as low as
possible to reduce the formation of bubbles in the blood; (3) removing
nitrogen from the lungs and arterial blood and increasing the rate of
nitrogen elimination; (4) improving the quality of breathing during
decompression stops so that workers are less tired and to prevent bone
necrosis; (5) reducing decompression time by about 33 percent as
compared to air decompression; and (6) reducing inflammation.
In addition, the project-specific HOM requires a physician
certified in hyperbaric medicine to manage the medical condition of
CAWs during hyperbaric exposures and decompression. A trained and
experienced man-lock attendant also will be present during hyperbaric
exposures and decompression. This man-lock attendant will operate the
hyperbaric system to ensure compliance with the specified decompression
table. A hyperbaric supervisor (competent person), trained in
hyperbaric operations, procedures, and safety, directly oversees all
hyperbaric interventions, and ensures that staff follow the procedures
delineated in the HOM or by the attending physician.

B. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(iii) of 29 CFR 1926.803,
Automatically Regulated Continuous Decompression

According to the applicant, breathing air under hyperbaric
conditions increases the amount of nitrogen gas dissolved in a CAW's
tissues. The greater the hyperbaric pressure under these conditions,
and the more time spent under the increased pressure, the greater the
amount of nitrogen gas dissolved in the tissues. When the pressure
decreases during decompression, tissues release the dissolved nitrogen
gas into the blood system, which then carries the nitrogen gas to the
lungs for elimination through exhalation. Releasing hyperbaric pressure
too rapidly during decompression can increase the size of the bubbles
formed by nitrogen gas in the blood system, resulting in DCI, commonly
referred to as ``the bends.'' This description of the etiology of DCI
is consistent with current scientific theory and research on the issue.
The 1992 French Decompression Tables proposed for use by the
applicant provide for stops during worker decompression (i.e., staged
decompression) to control the release of nitrogen gas from tissues into
the blood system. Studies show that staged decompression, in
combination with other features of the 1992 French Decompression Tables
such as the use of oxygen, result in a lower incidence of DCI than the
use of automatically regulated continuous decompression. OSHA
decompression requirements of 29 CFR 1926.803, which specify the use of
automatically regulated continuous decompression (see footnotes 5
through 10 below for references to these studies).\2\ In addition, the
applicant asserts that staged decompression administered in accordance
with the project-specific HOM is at least as effective as an automatic
controller in regulating the decompression process the HOM includes for
at least two reasons:
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\2\ In the study cited in footnote 6, starting at page 338, Dr.
Eric Kindwall notes that the use of automatically regulated
continuous decompression in the Washington State safety standards
for compressed-air work (from which OSHA derived its decompression
tables) was at the insistence of contractors and the union, and
against the advice of the expert who calculated the decompression
table, who recommended using staged decompression. Dr. Kindwall then
states, ``Continuous decompression is inefficient and wasteful. For
example, if the last stage from 4 psig . . . to the surface took 1
h, at least half the time is spent at pressures less than 2 psig . .
., which provides less and less meaningful bubble suppression . . .
.'' In addition, the report referenced in footnote 5 under the
section titled ``Background on the Need for Interim Decompression
Tables'' addresses the continuous-decompression protocol in the OSHA
compressed-air standard for construction, noting that ``[a]side from
the tables for saturation diving to deep depths, no other widely
used or officially approved diving decompression tables use straight
line, continuous decompressions at varying rates. Stage
decompression is usually the rule, since it is simpler to control.''
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(1) A hyperbaric supervisor (a competent person experienced and

trained in hyperbaric operations, procedures, and safety) directly
supervises all hyperbaric interventions and ensures that the man-lock
attendant, who is a competent person in the manual control of
hyperbaric systems, follows the schedule specified in the decompression
tables, including stops; and
(2) The use of the 1992 French Decompression Tables for staged
decompression offers an equal or better level of management and control
over the decompression process than an automatic controller and results
in lower occurrences of DCI.

C. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(xvii) of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement
of Special Decompression Chamber

The OSHA compressed-air standard for construction requires
employers to use a special decompression chamber when total
decompression time exceeds 75 minutes (29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(xvii)).
Another provision of OSHA's compressed-air standard calls for locating
the special decompression chamber adjacent to the man lock on the
atmospheric pressure side of the tunnel bulkhead (29 CFR
1926.803(g)(2)(vii)). However, since only the working chamber of the
EPBMTBM is under pressure, and only a few workers out of the entire
crew are exposed to hyperbaric pressure, the man locks (which, as noted
earlier, connect directly to the working chamber) are of sufficient
size to accommodate the exposed workers. In addition, available space
in the EPBMTBM does not allow for an additional special decompression
lock. Again, the applicant uses the man locks, each of which adequately
accommodates a three-member crew, for this purpose when decompression
lasts up to 75 minutes. When decompression exceeds 75 minutes, crews
can open the door connecting the two compartments in each man lock
during decompression stops or exit the man lock and move into the
staging chamber where additional space is available. This alternative
enables CAWs to move about and flex their joints to prevent
neuromuscular problems during decompression.

V. Decision

After reviewing the proposed alternatives OSHA determined that:
(1) Salini developed, and proposed to implement, effective
alternative measures to the prohibition of using compressed air under
hyperbaric conditions exceeding 50 p.s.i.g. The alternative measures
include use of engineering and administrative controls of the hazards
associated with work performed in compressed-air conditions up to 50
p.s.i.g. while engaged in the construction of a subaqueous tunnel using
advanced shielded mechanical-excavation techniques in conjunction with
an EPBMTBM. Prior to conducting interventions in the EPBMTBM's
pressurized working chamber, the applicant halts tunnel excavation and
prepares the machine and crew to conduct the interventions.
Interventions involve inspection, maintenance, or repair of the
mechanical-excavation components located in the working chamber.
(2) Salini developed, and proposed to implement, safe hyperbaric
work procedures, emergency and contingency procedures, and medical
examinations for the project's CAWs. The applicant compiled these
standard operating procedures into a project-specific HOM. The HOM
discusses the procedures and personnel qualifications for performing
work safely during the compression and decompression phases of
interventions. The HOM also specifies the decompression tables the
applicant proposes to use. Depending on the maximum working pressure
and exposure times during the interventions, the tables provide for
decompression using air, pure oxygen, or a combination of air and
oxygen. The decompression tables also include delays or stops for
various time intervals at different pressure levels during the
transition to atmospheric pressure (i.e., staged decompression). In all
cases, a physician certified in hyperbaric medicine will manage the
medical condition of CAWs during decompression. In addition, a trained
and experienced man-lock attendant, experienced in recognizing
decompression sickness or illnesses and injuries, will be present. Of
key importance, a hyperbaric supervisor (competent person), trained in
hyperbaric operations, procedures, and safety, will directly supervise
all hyperbaric operations to ensure compliance with the procedures
delineated in the project-specific HOM or by the attending physician.
(3) Salini developed, and proposed to implement, a training program
to instruct affected workers in the hazards associated with conducting
hyperbaric operations.
(4) Salini developed, and proposed to implement, an effective
alternative to the use of automatic controllers that continuously
decrease pressure to achieve decompression in accordance with the
tables specified by the standard. The alternative includes using the
1992 French Decompression Tables for guiding staged decompression to
achieve lower occurrences of DCI, using a trained and competent
attendant for implementing appropriate hyperbaric entry and exit
procedures, and providing a competent hyperbaric supervisor and
attending physician certified in hyperbaric medicine, to oversee all
hyperbaric operations.
(5) Salini developed, and proposed to implement, an effective
alternative to the use of the special decompression chamber required by
the standard. EPBMTBM technology permits the tunnel's work areas to be
at atmospheric pressure, with only the face of the EPBMTBM (i.e., the
working chamber) at elevated pressure. The applicant limits
interventions conducted in the working chamber to performing required
inspection, maintenance, and repair of the cutting tools on the face of
the EPBMTBM. The EPBMTBM's man lock and working chamber provide
sufficient space for the maximum crew of three CAWs to stand up and
move around, and safely accommodate decompression times up to 360
minutes. Therefore, OSHA determined that the EPBMTBM's man lock and
working chamber function as effectively as the special decompression
chamber required by the standard.
OSHA conducted a review of the scientific literature regarding
decompression to determine whether the alternative decompression method
(i.e., the 1992 French Decompression Tables) proposed by the applicant
provide a workplace as safe and healthful as that provided by the
standard. Based on this review, OSHA determined that tunneling
operations performed with these tables \3\ result in a lower occurrence
of DCI than the decompression tables specified by the
standard.^{4 5 6}
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\3\ In 1992, the French Ministry of Labour replaced the 1974
French Decompression Tables with the 1992 French Decompression
Tables, which differ from OSHA's decompression tables in Appendix A
by using: (1) Staged decompression as opposed to continuous (linear)
decompression; (2) decompression tables based on air or both air and
pure oxygen; and (3) emergency tables when unexpected exposure times
occur (up to 30 minutes above the maximum allowed working time).
\4\ Kindwall, E.P. (1997). Compressed air tunneling and caisson
work decompression procedures: development, problems, and solutions.
Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine, 24(4), pp. 337-345. This article
reported 60 treated cases of DCI among 4,168 exposures between 19
and 31 p.s.i.g. over a 51-week contract period, for a DCI incidence
of 1.44% for the decompression tables specified by the OSHA
standard.
\5\ Sealey, J.L. (1969). Safe exit from the hyperbaric
environment: medical experience with pressurized tunnel operations.
Journal of Occupational Medicine, 11(5), pp. 273-275. This article
reported 210 treated cases of DCI among 38,600 hyperbaric exposures
between 13 and 34 p.s.i.g. over a 32-month period, for an incidence
of 0.54% for the decompression tables specified by the Washington
State safety standards for compressed-air work, which are similar to
the tables in the OSHA standard. Moreover, the article reported 51
treated cases of DCI for 3,000 exposures between 30 and 34 p.s.i.g.,
for an incidence of 1.7% for the Washington State tables.
\6\ In 1985, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) published a report entitled ``Criteria for Interim
Decompression Tables for Caisson and Tunnel Workers''; this report
reviewed studies of DCI and other hyperbaric-related injuries
resulting from use of OSHA's tables. This report is available on
NIOSH's website: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/decompression/default.html.

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The review conducted by OSHA found several research studies
supporting the determination that the 1992 French Decompression Tables
result in a lower rate of DCI than the decompression tables specified
by the standard. For example, H.L. Anderson studied the occurrence of
DCI at maximum hyperbaric pressures ranging from 4 p.s.i.g. to 43
p.s.i.g. during construction of the Great Belt Tunnel in Denmark (1992-
1996); \7\ this project used the 1992 French Decompression Tables to
decompress the workers during part of the construction. Anderson
observed 6 DCS cases out of 7,220 decompression events, and reported
that switching to the 1992 French Decompression tables reduced the DCI
incidence to 0.08%. The DCI incidence in the study by H.L. Andersen is
substantially less than the DCI incidence reported for the
decompression tables specified in Appendix A. OSHA found no studies in
which the DCI incidence reported for the 1992 French Decompression
Tables were higher than the DCI incidence reported for the OSHA
decompression tables, nor did OSHA find any studies indicating that the
1992 French Decompression Tables were more hazardous to employees than
the OSHA decompression tables.\8\
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\7\ Anderson H.L. (2002). Decompression sickness during
construction of the Great Belt tunnel, Denmark. Undersea and
Hyperbaric Medicine, 29(3), pp. 172-188.
\8\ Le P[eacute]chon J.C., Barre P., Baud J.P., Ollivier F.
(September 1996). Compressed air work--French tables 1992--
operational results. JCLP Hyperbarie Paris, Centre Medical
Subaquatique Interentreprise, Marseille: Communication a l'EUBS, pp.
1-5 (see Ex. OSHA-2012-0036-0005).
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Based on a review of available evidence, the experience of State
Plans that either granted variances (Nevada, Oregon, and Washington)
\9\ or promulgated a new standard (California) \10\ for hyperbaric
exposures occurring during similar subaqueous tunnel-construction work,
and the information provided in the applicant's variance application,
OSHA is granting the permanent variance.
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\9\ These state variances are available in the docket: Exs.
OSHA-2012-0035-0006 (Nevada), OSHA-2012-0035-0007 (Oregon), and
OSHA-2012-0035-0008 (Washington).
\10\ See California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Subchapter 7,
Group 26, Article 154, available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/sb7g26a154.html.
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Under Section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (29 U.S.C. 655), and based on the record discussed above, the
agency finds that when the employer complies with the conditions of the
following order, the working conditions of the employer's workers are
at least as safe and healthful as if the employer complied with the
working conditions specified by paragraphs (e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii),
and (g)(1)(xvii) of 29 CFR 1926.803. Therefore, Salini must: (1) Comply
with the conditions listed below under ``Conditions Specified for the
Permanent Variance'' for the period between the date of this notice and
completion of the Northeast Boundary Tunnel Project; (2) comply fully
with all other applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1926; and (3)
provide a copy of this Federal Register notice to all employees
affected by the conditions, including the affected employees of other
employers, using the same means it used to inform these employees of
the application for a permanent variance. Additionally, this order will
remain in effect until one of the following conditions occurs: (1)
Completion of the Northeast Boundary Tunnel Project; or (2) OSHA
modifies or revokes this final order in accordance with 29 CFR 1905.13.

VI. Description of the Conditions Specified for the Permanent Variance

The conditions for the variance are set out in the Order at the end
of this document. This section provides additional detail regarding the
conditions in the Order.

Condition A: Scope

The scope of the permanent variance limits coverage to the work
situations specified under this condition. Clearly defining the scope
of the permanent variance provides Salini, their employees, potential
future applicants, other stakeholders, the public and OSHA with
necessary information regarding the work situations in which the
permanent variance applies. To the extent that Salini exceeds the
defined scope of this variance, it will be required to comply with
OSHA's standards.

Condition B: List of Abbreviations

Condition C defines a number of abbreviations used in the permanent
variance. OSHA believes that defining these abbreviations serves to
clarify and standardize their usage, thereby enhancing the applicant's
and their employees' understanding of the conditions specified by the
permanent variance.

Condition C: Definitions

The condition defines a series of terms, mostly technical terms,
used in the permanent variance to standardize and clarify their
meaning. Defining these terms serves to enhance the applicant's and
their employees' understanding of the conditions specified by the
permanent variance.

Condition D: Safety and Health Practices

This condition requires the applicant to develop and submit to OSHA
an HOM specific to the Northeast Boundary Tunnel at least six months
before using the EPBMTBM, proof that the EPMBTBM's hyberbaric chambers
have been designed, fabricated, inspected, tested marked, and stamped
in accordance with the requirements for ASME PVHO-1.2019 (or the most
recent edition of Safety Standards for Pressure Vessels for Human
Occupancy). These requirements ensure that the applicant develops
hyperbaric safety and health procedures suitable for the project.
The submission of the HOM to OSHA, which Salini has already
completed, enables OSHA to determine that the specific safety and
health instructions and measures it specifies are appropriate to the
field conditions of the tunnel (including expected geological
conditions), conform to the conditions of the variance, and adequately
protect the safety and health of the CAWs. It also facilitates OSHA's
ability to ensure that the applicant is complying with these
instructions and measures. The requirement for proof of compliance with
ASME PVHO-1.2019 is intended to ensure that the equipment is
structurally sound and capable of performing to protect the safety of
the employees exposed to hyperbaric pressure.
Additionally, the condition includes a series of related hazard
prevention and control requirements and methods (e.g., decompression
tables, job hazard analysis (JHA), operations and inspections
checklists, incident investigation, and recording and notification to
OSHA of recordable hyperbaric injuries and illnesses) designed to
ensure the continued effective functioning of the hyperbaric equipment
and operating system.

Condition E: Communication

Condition E requires the applicant to develop and implement an
effective system of information sharing and communication. Effective
information

sharing and communication ensures that affected workers receive updated
information regarding any safety-related hazards and incidents, and
corrective actions taken, prior to the start of each shift. The
condition also requires Salini to ensure that reliable means of
emergency communications are available and maintained for affected
workers and support personnel during hyperbaric operations.
Availability of such reliable means of communications enables affected
workers and support personnel to respond quickly and effectively to
hazardous conditions or emergencies that may develop during EPBMTBM
operations.

Condition F: Worker Qualification and Training

This condition requires the applicant to develop and implement an
effective qualification and training program for affected workers. The
condition specifies the factors that an affected worker must know to
perform safely during hyperbaric operations, including how to enter,
work in, and exit from hyperbaric conditions under both normal and
emergency conditions. Having well-trained and qualified workers
performing hyperbaric intervention work ensures that they recognize,
and respond appropriately to, hyperbaric safety and health hazards.
These qualification and training requirements enable affected workers
to cope effectively with emergencies, as well as the discomfort and
physiological effects of hyperbaric exposure, thereby preventing worker
injury, illness, and fatalities.
Paragraph (2)(e) of this condition also requires the applicant to
provide affected workers with information they can use to contact the
appropriate healthcare professionals if they believe they are
developing hyperbaric-related health effects. This requirement provides
for early intervention and treatment of DCI and other health effects
resulting from hyperbaric exposure, thereby reducing the potential
severity of these effects.

Condition G: Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention

Condition G requires the applicant to develop, implement, and
operate a program of frequent and regular inspections of the EPBMTBM's
hyperbaric equipment and support systems, and associated work areas.
This condition helps to ensure the safe operation and physical
integrity of the equipment and work areas necessary to conduct
hyperbaric operations. The condition also enhances worker safety by
reducing the risk of hyperbaric-related emergencies.
Paragraph (3) of this condition requires the applicant to document
tests, inspections, corrective actions, and repairs involving the
EPBMTBM, and maintain these documents at the job site for the duration
of the job. This requirement provides the applicant with information
needed to schedule tests and inspections to ensure the continued safe
operation of the equipment and systems, and to determine that the
actions taken to correct defects in hyperbaric equipment and systems
were appropriate, prior to returning them to service.

Condition H: Compression and Decompression

This condition requires the applicant to consult with a designated
medical advisor regarding special compression or decompression
procedures appropriate for any unacclimated CAW and then implement the
procedures recommended by the medical consultant. This provision
ensures that the applicant consults with the medical advisor, and
involves the medical advisor in the evaluation, development, and
implementation of compression or decompression protocols appropriate
for any CAW requiring acclimation to the hyperbaric conditions
encountered during EPBMTBM operations. Accordingly, CAWs requiring
acclimation have an opportunity to acclimate prior to exposure to these
hyperbaric conditions. OSHA believes this condition will prevent or
reduce adverse reactions among CAWs to the effects of compression or
decompression associated with the intervention work they perform in the
EPBMTBM.

Condition I: Recordkeeping

Condition I requires the applicant to maintain records of specific
factors associated with each hyperbaric intervention. Under OSHA's
existing recordkeeping requirements in 29 CFR 1904 regarding Recording
and Reporting Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, Salini must maintain
a record of any recordable injury, illness or fatality (as defined by
29 CFR 1904) resulting from exposure of an employee to hyperbaric
conditions by completing the OSHA's Form 301 Injury and Illness
Incident Report and OSHA's Form 300 Log of Work-Related Injuries and
Illnesses. Salini did not seek a variance from this rule and therefore
must comply fully with those requirements.
Condition I adds additional reporting responsibilities, beyond
those already required by the OSHA rule. Salini is required to maintain
records of specific factors associated with each hyperbaric
intervention. The information gathered and recorded under this
provision, in concert with the information provided under Condition J
(using OSHA's Form 301 Injury and Illness Incident Report to
investigate and record hyperbaric recordable injuries as defined by 29
CFR 1904.4, 1904.7, 1904.8-1904.12), enables the Salini and OSHA to
assess the effectiveness of the Permanent Variance in preventing DCI
and other hyperbaric-related effects.

Condition J: Notifications

Under this condition, Salini must, within specified periods, notify
OSHA and local authorities of any recordable injuries, illnesses, or
fatalities that occur as a result of hyperbaric exposures during
EPBMTBM operations.
These notification requirements enable the applicant, their
employees, and OSHA to determine the effectiveness of the permanent
variance in providing the requisite level of safety to the applicant's
workers and, based on this determination, whether to revise or revoke
the conditions of the permanent variance. Timely notification permits
OSHA to take whatever action may be necessary and appropriate to
prevent further injuries and illnesses. Providing notification to
employees informs them of the precautions taken by the applicant to
prevent similar incidents in the future.
Additionally, this condition also requires the applicant to notify
OSHA if it ceases to do business, has a new address or location for
their main office, or transfers the operations covered by the permanent
variance to a successor company. In addition, the condition specifies
that the transfer of the permanent variance to a successor company must
be approved by OSHA. These requirements allow OSHA to communicate
effectively with the applicant regarding the status of the permanent
variance, and expedite the agency's administration and enforcement of
the permanent variance. Stipulating that an applicant must have OSHA's
approval to transfer a variance to a successor company provides
assurance that the successor company has knowledge of, and will comply
with, the conditions specified by permanent variance, thereby ensuring
the safety of workers involved in performing the operations covered by
the permanent variance.

VII. Order

As of the effective date of this final order, OSHA is revoking the
interim order granted to the employer on August 27, 2019, and replacing
it with a

permanent variance order. Note that there are not any substantive
changes in the conditions between interim order and the final order.
OSHA issues this final order authorizing Salini to comply with the
following conditions instead of complying with the requirements of
paragraphs 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and
(g)(1)(xvii). These conditions are:

A. Scope

1. The permanent variance applies only to work:
(a) That occurs in conjunction with construction of the Northeast
Boundary Tunnel Project in Washington, DC, a subaqueous tunnel
constructed using advanced shielded mechanical-excavation techniques
and involving operation of an EPBMTBM;
(b) In the EPBMTBM's forward section (the working chamber) and
associated hyperbaric chambers used to pressurize and decompress
employees entering and exiting the working chamber.
2. The permanent variance applies only when Salini stops the
tunnel-boring work, pressurizes the working chamber, and the CAWs
either enter the working chamber to perform interventions (i.e.,
inspect, maintain, or repair the mechanical-excavation components), or
exit the working chamber after performing interventions.
3. Except for the requirements specified by 29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1),
(g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii), Salini must comply fully with all other
applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 1926.
4. This order will remain in effect until one of the following
conditions occurs:
(1) Completion of the Northeast Boundary Tunnel Project; or (2)
OSHA modifies or revokes this final order in accordance with 29 CFR
1905.13.

B. List of Abbreviations

Abbreviations used throughout this permanent variance include the
following:

1. BWAO--Baltimore/Washington OSHA Area Office
2. CAW--Compressed-air worker
3. CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
4. DCI--Decompression Illness
5. EPBMTBM--Earth Pressure Balanced Moving Tunnel Boring Machine
6. HOM--Hyperbaric Operations and Safety Manual
7. JHA--Job hazard analysis
8. OSHA--Occupational Safety and Health Administration
9. OTPCA--Office of Technical Programs and Coordination Activities

C. Definitions

The following definitions apply to this permanent variance. These
definitions supplement the definitions in Salini's project-specific
HOM.
1. Affected employee or worker--an employee or worker who is
affected by the conditions of this permanent variance, or any one of
his or her authorized representatives. The term ``employee'' has the
meaning defined and used under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.)
2. Atmospheric pressure--the pressure of air at sea level,
generally 14.7 p.s.i.a., 1 atmosphere absolute, or 0 p.s.i.g.
3. Compressed-air worker--an individual who is specially trained
and medically qualified to perform work in a pressurized environment
while breathing air at pressures up to 50 p.s.i.g.
4. Competent person--an individual who is capable of identifying
existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working
conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees,
and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to
eliminate them.\11\
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\11\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Decompression illness (also called decompression sickness or the
bends)--an illness caused by gas bubbles appearing in body compartments
due to a reduction in ambient pressure. Examples of symptoms of
decompression illness include (but are not limited to): Joint pain
(also known as the ``bends'' for agonizing pain or the ``niggles'' for
sight pain); areas of bone destruction (termed ``dysbaric
osteonecrosis''); skin disorders (such as cutis marmorata, which causes
a pink marbling of the skin); spinal cord and brain disorders (such as
stroke, paralysis, paresthesia, and bladder dysfunction);
cardiopulmonary disorders, such as shortness of breath; and arterial
gas embolism (gas bubbles in the arteries that block blood flow).\12\
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\12\ See Appendix 10 of ``A Guide to the Work in Compressed Air
Regulations 1996,'' published by the United Kingdom Health and
Safety Executive and available from NIOSH at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docket/archive/pdfs/NIOSH-254/compReg1996.pdf.

Note: Health effects associated with hyperbaric intervention,
but not considered symptoms of DCI, can include: Barotrauma (direct
damage to air-containing cavities in the body such as ears, sinuses,
and lungs); nitrogen narcosis (reversible alteration in
consciousness that may occur in hyperbaric environments and caused
by the anesthetic effect of certain gases at high pressure); and
oxygen toxicity (a central nervous system condition resulting from
the harmful effects of breathing molecular oxygen (O2) at
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
elevated partial pressures).

6. Earth Pressure Balanced Moving Tunnel Boring Machine--the
machinery used to excavate the tunnel.
7. Hot work--any activity performed in a hazardous location that
may introduce an ignition source into a potentially flammable
atmosphere.\13\
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\13\ Also see 29 CFR 1910.146(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

8. Hyperbaric--at a higher pressure than atmospheric pressure.
9. Hyperbaric intervention--a term that describes the process of
stopping the EPBMTBM and preparing and executing work under hyperbaric
pressure in the working chamber for the purpose of inspecting,
replacing, or repairing cutting tools and/or the cutterhead structure.
10. Hyperbaric Operations Manual--a detailed, project-specific
health and safety plan developed and implemented by the employer for
working in compressed air during the Northeast Boundary Tunnel.
11. Job hazard analysis--an evaluation of tasks or operations to
identify potential hazards and to determine the necessary controls.
12. Man lock--an enclosed space capable of pressurization, and used
for compressing or decompressing any employee or material when either
is passing into or out of a working chamber.
13. Pressure--a force acting on a unit area; usually expressed as
pounds per square inch (p.s.i.).
14. p.s.i.--pounds per square inch, a common unit of measurement of
pressure; a pressure given in p.s.i. corresponds to absolute pressure.
15. p.s.i.a--pounds per square inch absolute, or absolute pressure,
is the sum of the atmospheric pressure and gauge pressure. At sea
level, atmospheric pressure is approximately 14.7 p.s.i. Adding 14.7 to
a pressure expressed in units of p.s.i.g. will yield the absolute
pressure, expressed as p.s.i.a.
16. p.s.i.g.--pounds per square inch gauge, a common unit of
pressure; pressure expressed as p.s.i.g. corresponds to pressure
relative to atmospheric pressure. At sea level, atmospheric pressure is
approximately 14.7 p.s.i. Subtracting 14.7 from a pressure expressed in
units of p.s.i.a. yields the gauge pressure, expressed as p.s.i.g.
17. Qualified person--an individual who, by possession of a
recognized degree, certificate, or professional standing, or who, by
extensive knowledge, training, and experience,

successfully demonstrates an ability to solve or resolve problems
relating to the subject matter, the work, or the project.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\14\ Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(m).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

18. Working chamber--an enclosed space in the EPBMTBM in which CAWs
perform interventions, and which is accessible only through a man lock.

D. Safety and Health Practices

1. Salini must implement the most recent project-specific HOM
previously submitted to OSHA on February 1, 2018. The HOM shall provide
the governing safety and health requirements regarding hyperbaric
exposures during the tunnel-construction project.
2. Salini must implement the safety and health instructions
included in the manufacturer's operations manuals for the EPBMTBM, and
the safety and health instructions provided by the manufacturer for the
operation of decompression equipment.
3. Salini must use air as the only breathing gas in the working
chamber.
4. Salini must use the 1992 French Decompression Tables for air,
air-oxygen, and oxygen decompression specified in the HOM, specifically
the tables titled ``French Regulation Air Standard Tables.''
5. Salini must equip man-locks used by their employees with an
oxygen-delivery system as specified by the HOM. Salini must not store
oxygen or other compressed gases used in conjunction with hyperbaric
work in the tunnel.
6. Workers performing hot work under hyperbaric conditions must use
flame-retardant personal protective equipment and clothing.
7. In hyperbaric work areas, Salini must maintain an adequate fire-
suppression system approved for hyperbaric work areas.
8. Salini must develop and implement one or more JHAs for work in
the hyperbaric work areas, and review, periodically and as necessary
(e.g., after making changes to a planned intervention that affects
their operation), the contents of the JHAs with affected employees. The
JHAs must include all the job functions that the risk assessment \15\
indicates are essential to prevent injury or illness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\15\ See ANSI/AIHA Z10-2012, American National Standard for
Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems, for reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

9. Salini must develop a set of checklists to guide compressed-air
work and ensure that employees follow the procedures required by this
permanent variance (including all procedures required by the HOM, which
this permanent variance incorporates by reference). The checklists must
include all steps and equipment functions that the risk assessment
indicates are essential to prevent injury or illness during compressed-
air work.
10. Salini must ensure that the safety and health provisions of the
HOM adequately protect the workers of all contractors and
subcontractors involved in hyperbaric operations.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\16\ See ANSI/ASSE A10.33-2011, American National Standard for
Construction and Demolition Operations--Safety and Health Program
Requirements for Multi-Employer Projects, for reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Communication

1. Prior to beginning a shift, Salini must implement a system that
informs workers exposed to hyperbaric conditions of any hazardous
occurrences or conditions that might affect their safety, including
hyperbaric incidents, gas releases, equipment failures, earth or rock
slides, cave-ins, flooding, fires, or explosions.
2. Salini must provide a power-assisted means of communication
among affected workers and support personnel in hyperbaric conditions
where unassisted voice communication is inadequate.
a. Salini must use an independent power supply for powered
communication systems, and these systems must operate such that use or
disruption of any one phone or signal location will not disrupt the
operation of the system from any other location.
b. Salini must test communication systems at the start of each
shift and as necessary thereafter to ensure proper operation.

F. Worker Qualification and Training

Salini must:
1. Ensure that each affected worker receives effective training on
how to safely enter, work in, exit from, and undertake emergency
evacuation or rescue from, hyperbaric conditions, and document this
training.
2. Provide effective instruction, before beginning hyperbaric
operations, to each worker who performs work, or controls the exposure
of others, in hyperbaric conditions, and document this instruction. The
instruction must include topics such as:
a. The physics and physiology of hyperbaric work;
b. Recognition of pressure-related injuries;
c. Information on the causes and recognition of the signs and
symptoms associated with decompression illness, and other hyperbaric
intervention-related health effects (e.g., barotrauma, nitrogen
narcosis, and oxygen toxicity).
d. How to avoid discomfort during compression and decompression;
and
e. Information the workers can use to contact the appropriate
healthcare professionals should the workers have concerns that they may
be experiencing adverse health effects from hyperbaric exposure.
3. Repeat the instruction specified in paragraph (2) of this
condition periodically and as necessary (e.g., after making changes to
their hyperbaric operations).
4. When conducting training for their hyperbaric workers, make this
training available to OSHA personnel and notify OTPCA the BWAO before
the training takes place.

G. Inspections, Tests, and Accident Prevention

1. Salini must initiate and maintain a program of frequent and
regular inspections of the EPBMTBM's hyperbaric equipment and support
systems (such as temperature control, illumination, ventilation, and
fire-prevention and fire-suppression systems), and hyperbaric work
areas, as required under 29 CFR 1926.20(b)(2) by:
a. Developing a set of checklists to be used by a competent person
in conducting weekly inspections of hyperbaric equipment and work
areas; and
b. Ensuring that a competent person conducts daily visual checks,
as well as weekly inspections of the EPBMTBM.
2. If the competent person determines that the equipment
constitutes a safety hazard, Salini must remove the equipment from
service until it corrects the hazardous condition and has the
correction approved by a qualified person.
3. Salini must maintain records of all tests and inspections of the
EPBMTBM, as well as associated corrective actions and repairs, at the
job site for the duration of the job.

H. Compression and Decompression

Salini must consult with their attending physician concerning the
need for special compression or decompression exposures appropriate for
CAWs not acclimated to hyperbaric exposure.

I. Recordkeeping

Salini must maintain a record of any recordable injury, illness, or
fatality (as defined by 29 CFR part 1904 Recording and Reporting
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses) resulting from exposure of an
employee to hyperbaric conditions by completing the OSHA's Form 301

Injury and Illness Incident Report form and OSHA's Form 300 Log of
Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses.
Examples of important information to include on the OSHA's Form 301
Injury and Illness Incident Report (along with the corresponding
question on the form) are:
Q14
the task performed;
the composition of the gas mixture (e.g., air or oxygen);
an estimate of the CAW's workload;
the maximum working pressure;

temperature in the work and decompression environments;
unusual occurrences, if any, during the task or
decompression
Q15
time of symptom onset;
duration between decompression and onset of symptoms
Q16
type and duration of symptoms;
a medical summary of the illness or injury
Q17
duration of the hyperbaric intervention;
possible contributing factors;
the number of prior interventions completed by the injured
or ill CAW; and the pressure to which the CAW was exposed during those
interventions.\17\
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\17\ See 29 CFR 1904 Recording and Reporting Occupational
Injuries and Illnesses (http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9631); recordkeeping
forms and instructions (http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/RKform300pkg-fillable-enabled.pdf); and OSHA Recordkeeping Handbook
(http://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/handbook/index.html).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition to completing the OSHA's Form 301 Injury and Illness
Incident Report form and OSHA's Form 300 Log of Work-Related Injuries
and Illnesses, the employer must maintain records of:
1. The date, times (e.g., began compression, time spent
compressing, time performing intervention, time spent decompressing),
and pressure for each hyperbaric intervention.
2. The name of each individual worker exposed to hyperbaric
pressure and the decompression protocols and results for each worker.
3. The total number of interventions and the total hyperbaric
exposure duration at each pressure.
4. The results of the post-intervention physical assessment of each
CAW for signs and symptoms of decompression illness, barotrauma,
nitrogen narcosis, oxygen toxicity or other health effects associated
with work in compressed air or mixed gases for each hyperbaric
intervention.

J. Notifications

1. To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified herein,
the employer must:
a. Notify the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington OSHA Area Office
of any recordable injury, illness, or fatality (by submitting the
completed OSHA's Form 301 Injury and Illness Incident Report form \18\)
resulting from exposure of an employee to hyperbaric conditions,
including those exposures that do not require recompression treatment
(e.g., nitrogen narcosis, oxygen toxicity, barotrauma), but still meet
the recordable injury or illness criteria of 29 CFR 1904. The employer
shall provide the notification within 8 hours of the incident or 8
hours after becoming aware of a recordable injury, illness, or
fatality, and submit a copy of the incident investigation (OSHA's Form
301 Injury and Illness Injury Reporting Form) within 24 hours of the
incident or 24 hours after becoming aware of a recordable injury,
illness, or fatality. In addition to the information required by the
OSHA's Form 301 Injury and Illness Injury Reporting Form, the incident-
investigation report must include a root-cause determination, and the
preventive and corrective actions identified and implemented.
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\18\ See footnote 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Provide certification within 15 days of the incident that the
employer informed affected workers of the incident and the results of
the incident investigation (including the root-cause determination and
preventive and corrective actions identified and implemented).
c. Notify the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington OSHA Area Office
within 15 working days in writing of any change in the compressed-air
operations that affects the employer's ability to comply with the
conditions specified herein.
d. Upon completion of the Northeast Boundary Tunnel, evaluate the
effectiveness of the decompression tables used throughout the project,
and provide a written report of this evaluation to the OTPCA and the
Baltimore/Washington OSHA Area Office.

Note: The evaluation report is to contain summaries of: (1) The
number, dates, durations, and pressures of the hyperbaric
interventions completed; (2) decompression protocols implemented
(including composition of gas mixtures (air and/or oxygen), and the
results achieved; (3) the total number of interventions and the
number of hyperbaric incidents (decompression illnesses and/or
health effects associated with hyperbaric interventions as recorded
on OSHA's Form 301 Injury and Illness Incident Report and OSHA's
Form 300 Log of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses, and relevant
medical diagnoses and treating physicians' opinions); and (4) root
causes of any hyperbaric incidents, and preventive and corrective
actions identified and implemented.

e. To assist OSHA in administering the conditions specified herein,
inform the OTPCA and the Baltimore/Washington OSHA Area Office as soon
as possible after it has knowledge that it will:
i. Cease to do business;
ii. Change the location and address of the main office for managing
the tunneling operations specified herein; or
iii. Transfer the operations specified herein to a successor
company.
f. Notify all affected employees of this permanent variance by the
same means required to inform them of the application for a variance.
g. This permanent variance cannot be transferred to a successor
company without OSHA approval.

VIII. Authority and Signature

Loren Sweatt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, authorized the preparation of this
notice. Accordingly, the agency is issuing this notice pursuant to
Section 29 U.S.C. 655(6)(d), Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-2012 (77
FR 3912, Jan. 25, 2012), and 29 CFR 1905.11.

Signed at Washington, DC, on May 5, 2020.
Loren Sweatt,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety
and Health.
[FR Doc. 2020-09967 Filed 5-8-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P